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SWJED
12-13-2008, 05:58 AM
U.S. Special Operations
Personal Opinions
by Colonel John M. Collins, Small Wars Journal

U.S. Special Operations: Personal Opinions (Full PDF Article) (http://smallwarsjournal.com/mag/docs-temp/148-collins.pdf)


Many true believers throughout USSOCOM have memorized SOF Truths, here are the first four of five bullets that I conceived and Congressman Earl Hutto signed in the Foreword to U.S. and Soviet Special Operations on 28 April 1987:


- Humans are more important than hardware
- Their quality is more important than quantities
- Special Operations Forces cannot be mass-produced
- Competent SOF cannot be created after emergencies occur

When General Stiner sent me on a Cook’s tour of his subordinate commands in 1993 the first stop was Fort Bragg, where USASOC commander Lieutenant General Wayne Downing proudly concluded his formal presentation with a slide that displayed SOF Truths. He did a double take when I told him “they’re wonderful,” then said, “I wrote ‘em.”

If asked to start over from scratch, I would add one word to the fourth bullet so it would read “Competent SOF cannot be created RAPIDLY after emergencies occur.” Otherwise, I believe they are still solid as bricks, but wish that whoever enshrined the first four had retained Number 5, which says “Most Special Operations require non-SOF assistance.” That oversight was a serious mistake in my opinion, because its omission encourages unrealistic expectations by poorly tutored employers and perpetuates a counterproductive “us versus everybody else” attitude by excessively gung ho members of the SOF community.

Bob's World
12-13-2008, 12:07 PM
I don't believe that I have ever had the pleasure of meeting John, but next time you are down at USSOCOM I will gladly buy you beer for as long as you'd care to entertain my endless questions.

This piece is spot on, and entertaining to read as well. Thanks.

To lend my own reinforcing fires to this, the top issue that will be coming out of Tampa as we roll into QDR is the need for the development of SOF enablers.

Thanks John.

COL Robert C. Jones

Ken White
12-13-2008, 04:40 PM
...the top issue that will be coming out of Tampa as we roll into QDR is the need for the development of SOF enablers.hopefully by that you mean this most important point from Colonel Collins (he's older'n I am so he gets a title... ;) ):

"Number 5, which says “Most Special Operations require non-SOF assistance.”

Bob's World
12-14-2008, 11:37 AM
Exactly. In fact, i'll see what I can do about getting number 5 added back on.

SWCAdmin
12-14-2008, 11:47 AM
Exactly. In fact, i]ll see what I can do about getting number 5 added back on.
Your timing is impeccable, Bob. You seem to be the first poster after our ~17 hours of downtime. Glad to see the Council is resilient. Now for the Journal side of things....

Bob W.
12-14-2008, 01:26 PM
Special Forces Groups now have support battalions as part of their organization. This is a substantial improvement in logistic capability for SF. There are drawbacks, though, especially with the manning and organization of these units. For instance, there are no Special Forces Officers/NCOs on that Battalion's staff, which is a mistake, done more to make the CSS community happy for the additional personnel slots than anything else. As a result, I have seen a lack of knowledge and experience on the staff's part in sustaining Special Operations Forces/missions. This may be remedied over time, as junior CSS Officer/NCOs serve in multiple roles at different ranks in the support battalion, and the unit matures.

This next comment is anecdotal, but sure to be controversial: Are the 03/04 CSS personnel that HRC identifies to go to SF Support Battalions the log branches' "best and brightest"? Recent experiences with these guys suggest this may not be the case, especially when compared to their counterparts throughout the Army. It will be interesting to hear see what other people write in here on this subject. Cheers.

Bob W.
Acreofindependence.com

max161
12-14-2008, 03:26 PM
Special Forces Groups now have support battalions as part of their organization. This is a substantial improvement in logistic capability for SF. There are drawbacks, though, especially with the manning and organization of these units. For instance, there are no Special Forces Officers/NCOs on that Battalion's staff, which is a mistake, done more to make the CSS community happy for the additional personnel slots than anything else. As a result, I have seen a lack of knowledge and experience on the staff's part in sustaining Special Operations Forces/missions. This may be remedied over time, as junior CSS Officer/NCOs serve in multiple roles at different ranks in the support battalion, and the unit matures.

This next comment is anecdotal, but sure to be controversial: Are the 03/04 CSS personnel that HRC identifies to go to SF Support Battalions the log branches' "best and brightest"? Recent experiences with these guys suggest this may not be the case, especially when compared to their counterparts throughout the Army. It will be interesting to hear see what other people write in here on this subject. Cheers.

Bob W.
Acreofindependence.com

Bob,

Good comments but I would like to put a different spin on things. First, the problem with filling CSS positions is that the Army is short all of these enabling MOS. As an example in an SF Bn there are 150 soldiers in 51 different non-SF MOSs. In many of these MOSs the Army is only 75-80% strength throughout the entire Army and they are faced with the ARFORGEN system preparing the BCTs for rotations to Iraq and Afghanistan (and of course SF in theater is getting enabling support from many of these BCTs on a area support basis).

Second, I would offer that wanting the "best and the brightest" to go to SF/SOF is counterproductive and turns people against us as people think we believe we are entitled to the "best and brightest." I would submit that we are not "entitled" to the best and the brightest but what we really want are the RIGHT soldiers to fill these SOF enabler positions. We need a capable competent soldier who can work in a non-standard even unconventional environment who can support Special Operations. We do not necessarily need officers who are destined for flag rank in their branch and to think we should be getting them (e.g., the best and the brightest) puts us at odds with the Army to fill all their requirements. As you well know no one element is going to win these wars in Afghanistan. It takes a whole of government and whole of military effort (the right forces and organizations) to help our Afghan and Iraqi partners win their counterinsurgencies and to secure their nations (because we cannot do it for them in the end - we can only be the external support to their efforts in the fight for legitimacy among their people).

Okay off my soap box for now.

Ken White
12-14-2008, 03:59 PM
I had a dream...

That we (pick one):

a. Improved Army SOF and Army (-) interface, knowledge and cooperation by eliminating the Branch and rotating people from various branches through the system as it was not all that long ago...

b. Destroyed Army SOF and damaged Army (-) interface, knowledge and cooperation by eliminating the Branch and rotating people from various branches through the system as it was not all that long ago...

Note that said options really apply only to Officers, not to Warrants or NCOs.

Bob's World
12-14-2008, 05:55 PM
Just to open the aperture on this discussion a little, when we talk about "SOF enablers," logistics is just one small, but important aspect. We also are not talking about adding more forces to SOF, so much as creating more effective mechanisms and structures to allow the conventional force support SOF led operations.

What is really being put on the table is a true paradigm shift, that depending on the situation could put any of a wide range of combinations of CBT, CS, and/or CSS capabilities under the C2 of the SOF commander allowing a much smaller SOF force to cover a much larger mission. This could mean an ODA with a combined arms company of infantry, engineers, CA, MPs, Log, and artillery attached perhaps; or a BCT supporting a JSOTF; allowing one to retain SOF focus while expanding the size of the JOA considerably and not needing to commit an additional BN or Group of SF; or (hold your breath), maybe even thinking about picking an SF general to have overall control for the planned expansion of operations in Afghanistan. After all, as COL Gentile often notes, just working harder with more guys isn't the answer, but working smarter as well.

Afterall, every SF officer was once an infantryman, artilleryman, etc from across the conventional force. Given the nature of the operations we are currently in, I personally find it hard to rationalize only considering generals who earned their stars commanding conventional forces in overall command. One step at a time though.

Bill Moore
12-14-2008, 06:24 PM
Number 5, which says “Most Special Operations require non-SOF assistance.” That oversight was a serious mistake in my opinion, because its omission encourages unrealistic expectations by poorly tutored employers and perpetuates a counterproductive “us versus everybody else” attitude by excessively gung ho members of the SOF community.

The "us versus everybody else" comment really hit home. This is our primary national security challenge in my opinion, because it limits our ability to effectively apply our elements of national power. It is a problem throughout the government, not just within Defense. It will require a substantial culture change to fix it, and the change have forced upon legacy organizations by the right leaders.


Given their guidance and endless hours probing masterpieces by Special Ops groundbreakers like Mao Zedung, David Galula, and Sir Robert Thompson, I produced four surveys that publicized Special Operations Forces (SOF) favorably on Capitol Hill and beyond, when virtually every command, control, planning, and force posture problem reflected misunderstandings.

The quote above gets at many of the debates we have within our SOF community. What exactly are special operations? I could post the DoD definition here, but it wouldn't be overly helpful. However, I think most would agree that our first SOF organization (organized, equipped, trained, and employed to conduct these missions) was the OSS, then followed by the CIA and in DoD the formation of Special Forces.

When Mr Collins focuses on Mao, Galula and Thompson as special operations ground breakers, it seems he is implying that special operations was originally special warfare, or psychological warfare (different from psychological operations, but psychological operations play a key role)., and this was the special operations capability that JFK envisioned we needed to expand to counter Soviet infiltration and subversion globally.

The shift from psywar to DA/CT started in the 70s, especially after Israel's successful raid on Entebee. It was a capability that we didn't have, at least to the level it needed to be based on the changing threat environment. Developing a CT/DA capability was essential, what we did wrong is neglect our FID/UW capability while pursuing the CT/DA capability.


Direct action in fact has prospered since 1986, because every USSOCOM commander thus far has climbed the DA ladder, mostly within the Joint Special Operations Command.

DA prospered for a number of reasons, some of them were very good reasons. The fact that DA prospered is not a negative, we have the best DA force in the world, a capability we didn't have when we attempted to rescue the hostages in 1980. It is a capability we needed then, a capability we need today, and a capability we will need tomorrow.

The negative comes from the aspect that organizations chase money, and if DA is what draws the money, then all organizations tend to migrate that way. Other critical capabilities like FID/COIN/UW are neglected and not developed. Those who are supposed to maintain expertise in them, drift to missions like DA and SR to stay relevant to their payroll masters. SOCOM did great work, what they accomplished in 20 years was nothing short of a miracle, but it was a myoptic and single focused effort.


I wonder why any commander would waste area oriented, foreign language qualified, high cost, low density UW and FID specialists on direct action missions except in emergencies.

I think this statement is a bit over simplified, as there are numerous variables that influence how a force is employed. Sometimes those who are most at fault are actually in the force that is being improperly applied. I think much of the problems we see today was due to poor planning during the initial days of this conflict, and that resulted in less than ideal use of some SOF elements. Over time these methods of employment became the new norm, and we all know how hard is it to break out of a norm. Now we have SF NCOs and officers who have seen nothing else, so our next generation of SF leaders may continue to pull SF into DA/SR/CT fold. Like everything else SF does, they'll do it well, but who is going to do COIN/UW well? When we wonder how we got to stupid, we don't have to look too far back in our history to see where we turned left when we should of turned right. There is no single person to blame, there may not even be a group of people to blame, the decisions made at the time were based on numerous variables that existed at that time. The challenge now is to break the current mold and get back on the right path. Mr. Collin's statement below sums it up nicely.


When superiors don’t know what to do it’s hard for subordinates to know how to do it, but they must do the best they can with the hands they’re dealt.

Bottom up strategy sounds good, but rarely works. We need a top down strategy, that is executed bottom up. Tell the guys what you want, and they'll get it done.

John T. Fishel
12-14-2008, 06:56 PM
paradigm shift so much as a reinventing of the wheel. Back in the late 60s SF organized one or two Spaecial Action Forces (SAF) built around an SF Group, with engineers, MPs, CA, PSYOP and others. 8 SAF in Latin America was a prototype. Anyway, it was a good idea then - it migrated to being called a FID Augmentation Force (FIDAF) in the 1990 FM 100-20 LIC manual - and it is still a good idea.

Agree with your other points even more.

Cheers

JohnT

Ken White
12-14-2008, 08:34 PM
The "us versus everybody else" comment really hit home. This is our primary national security challenge in my opinion, because it limits our ability to effectively apply our elements of national power. It is a problem throughout the government, not just within Defense. It will require a substantial culture change to fix it, and the change have forced upon legacy organizations by the right leaders.True and well said. I also agree with the rest and would suggest that this
"... Now we have SF NCOs and officers who have seen nothing else (than a lot of DA), so our next generation of SF leaders may continue to pull SF into DA/SR/CT fold. Like everything else SF does, they'll do it well, but who is going to do COIN/UW well?Good question -- REALLY good question...

Having had a great deal of fun (well, more often than not...) doing both missions in various environments with varied opposition, I am firmly convinced that the two missions are not compatible. There is no question that some people can switch between the two and do both equally well (not me, too impatient for a good FID worker) nor is there any question the Groups have done that over the years -- and pretty successfully so. That does not change the fact that each mission IDEALLY would have operators that were psychologically and emotionally attuned to that particular mission.

Far more importantly, each type of mission requires extensive training. Attempts to make Teams adept at both will unavoidably and adversely affect capability in both mission sets. Not to mention adverse impacts on operational employment...

And those kinds of impacts can have inadvertent and bad strategic effects...

120mm
12-14-2008, 11:57 PM
I was witness to some brilliant SF guys during OIF I, who basically collected up a bunch of underused NG assets and used them as "force multipliers". They had to train them a bit, but I think they got good use from them.

On CSS; in my experience, as a Combat Arms guy who spent a year in the desert with them, they don't HAVE a "brightest and best". The CSS officer development in the US Army is so broken that even the "best" were bloody awful.

I think a tour with SF would help fix that "broken-ness".

Bill Moore
12-15-2008, 12:55 AM
I am firmly convinced that the two missions are not compatible. There is no question that some people can switch between the two and do both equally well (not me, too impatient for a good FID worker) nor is there any question the Groups have done that over the years -- and pretty successfully so. That does not change the fact that each mission IDEALLY would have operators that were psychologically and emotionally attuned to that particular mission.

This has been a debate in our community for as long as I have been a part of it (only since 1979), and of course there is the argument that if you can do UW you can do everything, which an argument that quickly falls apart when seriously examined.

There are several challenges in trying to produce an ideal FID force, and we seem to simply gloss over them, or come up with recommendations that probably will be less than helpful on the tip of the spear.

1. Credibility: maintaining credibility with your foreign students or counterparts can be a challenge, if you don't have real experience in the subject you're teaching. A SF Soldier who was an infantry platoon Sgt or a Team Leader who commanded an infantry Co prior to coming in SF carries some credibility when we're trying to train and advise an infantry unit. Not everyone in SF has that experience, so we seem to fall back on what we know, which is door kicking skills, which is now a skill set common to all in SF, but not always the most useful skill set in a COIN environment.

2. Language/culture: definitely value added, but only if you have the right language. I have seen to approaches in SF, one is where the entire ODA is focused on the same language, which means the team has a capability in the countries that speak that language. The other is assign different languages to each individual on the team, in hopes that whereever they deploy someone will at least have some language capability. While better than none, what does this really give the force? Let's say we're in Thailand, my medic speaks Thai, everyone speaks a Chinese, Russian, Arabic, Korean, etc. Do I really have a Thai language capability? My medic needs to teach his own classes, take care of medical issues, etc., I can't use him as a full time translator. There is still a benefit, but the traning management challenge is based on a guess (on where we might deploy). Assuming we guessed correctly, and we deploy to assist country X by conducting FID, and my whole team speaks X'ish. That is extremely powerful, at least until it is time to rotate out. How many teams speak X'ish? How do we sustain operations with the appropriate language capabilities? If it is a major operation like OIF or OEF-A then everybody needs to play to sustain the effort, not just those regionally oriented to the area, so the second order effect is the guys from out of the region are losing their regional expertise.

The point is how much effort should we invest in language? How much do we really get in return on our investment with the way we're currently employed? Change the way we're employed, then it is a different matter.

3. The other issues have to do with authorities, leadership, task organization, etc.


Far more importantly, each type of mission requires extensive training. Attempts to make Teams adept at both will unavoidably and adversely affect capability in both mission sets. Not to mention adverse impacts on operational employment...

Go back to challenge 1, how do you train to be an advisor in a skill set if you haven't done it? It can be done, we do it all the time, but what trainer is better? The one who is an expert in his field, or the one who's knowledge on the topic is text book deep, but he has the right mind set to be a good teacher? To be honest, it can be argued either way, and is highly situation dependent.

Getting back to the larger issue of DA, SR, CT, FID, UW, etc., I think it is much bigger than the individual, a lot of the capability is resident due to the unit's task organization. Obviously the Rangers are much better organized and equipped to conduct large scale DA than SF. SF is task organized to do UW from the ODA to the Group. Rangers are task organized to do DA from the squad to the Bn. And there is more to the unit than its organization that enables a capability, it is the unit's culture, its collective training, it's C4I structure, etc. We need to get over the rice bowl fights and focus on winning the fight. Assigning the right forces to the right mission makes sense to everyone, but in reality it is so hard to do.

max161
12-15-2008, 01:03 AM
"Unconventional Warfare (UW) … remains uniquely Special Forces'. It is the soul of Special Forces: the willingness to accept its isolation and hardships defines the Special Forces soldier. Its training is both the keystone and standard of Special Forces Training: it has long been an article of faith, confirmed in over forty years of worldwide operations, that "If you can do the UW missions, you can do all others." The objective of UW and Special Forces' dedication to it is expressed in Special Forces' motto: De Oppresso Liber (to free the oppressed)."

Robert M. Gates, Remarks at the dedication of the OSS Memorial, Langley, VA, 12 June 1992, quoted in The Special Forces History Society's The Special Forces Regimental History Calendar, 1994, (Fort Bragg, NC: Office of the Command Historian, U.S. Army Special Operations Command).

Ken White
12-15-2008, 01:45 AM
"... it has long been an article of faith, confirmed in over forty years of worldwide operations, that "If you can do the UW missions, you can do all others." The objective of UW and Special Forces' dedication to it is expressed in Special Forces' motto: De Oppresso Liber (to free the oppressed)."and having watched the effort since then with some care as well as having friends and relatives to this day involved in doing both missions, I respectfully disagree to an extent with what the SecDef said in 1992. I wonder if he still feels the same way today...

I'll say again what I said earlier:

""...nor is there any question the Groups have done (both the DA and FID missions) over the years -- and pretty successfully so. That does not change the fact that each mission IDEALLY would have operators that were psychologically and emotionally attuned to that particular mission.

Far more importantly, each type of mission requires extensive training. Attempts to make Teams adept at both will unavoidably and adversely affect capability in both mission sets. Not to mention adverse impacts on operational employment...""

That's the kind of thing SecDefs, even those who were former Intel Analysts and who are cheerleaders sometimes miss. As Bill Moore said, that's been an argument for longer than he's been in the field, I can assure you it went on hot and heavy in 1960-61 in the Team Rooms and all over the Hill but then as now -- can do and should do are different things.

I know it is not an ideal world and mission demands do their thing. I also know the SecDef is right -- it is an article of faith.

The question remains however; should that be so?

Bill Moore
12-15-2008, 02:25 AM
Being capable of doing UW means you "should" be capable of executing, coordinating, training, and advising a resistance movement on a wide range of activities ranging from guerrilla tactics (harassment, raids, ambushes, which are not DA) and a host of other activities. At the leadership level, it means the leaders understand what psychological and political warfare is, and how to manage its complexities. That same education and mindset should also enable them to develop well thought out and functional FID/COIN campaign plans, if they could only be put in charge. UW is by far the most complex SOF mission, which means it requires the most training, which in turn means minimizing the distractions (like chasing other missions). It does not mean that SF is ideally organized, trained, or equipped to conduct SR, CT, or CWMD. They can have done all the above, but SF in its normal organizational mode was not the right force to attempt a hostage rescue in Iran in 1980, to do so SF would have had to conduct significant reorganization and training so they could conduct that operation at the skill level required. In effect they would morph into something else that might look like the Rangers. Any unit, even conventional units, can be tasked to do anything, that doesn't mean they should be.


I’ve been invited to view a hostage rescue operation after supper tonight. Army Special Forces troops are well trained and equipped in such regards, but I wonder why any commander would waste area oriented, foreign language qualified, high cost, low density UW and FID specialists on direct action missions except in emergencies.

SF used to do Gabreil demonstrations, which demonstrated a wide range of capabilities to various audiences. Admittedly hostage rescue demonstrations are exciting, especially to those to don't understand special warfare, so had it to the new Gab demonstration.

Maybe when the argument is over with the reality will be that SF does need to focus on DA/CT based on way we conduct war, and the way DoD prioritizes funding, so in the end, maybe the focus on DA isn't wrong? However, our SECDEF is trying to change that mindset in DoD with the focus on IW, which doesn't mean DA/SR/CT etc. are not important, they are more important, but the other skills, legacy SF skills are the grease which will enable them to work in our new security environment. The debate will continue, and the meantime our Soldiers will do the best they can downrange based on the guidance given to them. If there are any problems, they are not on the tip of the spear.

reed11b
12-15-2008, 03:28 AM
This could mean an ODA with a combined arms company of infantry, engineers, CA, MPs, Log, and artillery attached perhaps; or a BCT supporting a JSOTF; allowing one to retain SOF focus while expanding the size of the JOA considerably and not needing to commit an additional BN or Group of SF; or (hold your breath), maybe even thinking about picking an SF general to have overall control for the planned expansion of operations in Afghanistan. After all, as COL Gentile often notes, just working harder with more guys isn't the answer, but working smarter as well.

Afterall, every SF officer was once an infantryman, artilleryman, etc from across the conventional force. Given the nature of the operations we are currently in, I personally find it hard to rationalize only considering generals who earned their stars commanding conventional forces in overall command. One step at a time though.
I would volunteer for that mission in a heart beat!! Jobs I am good at ,in a unit structure I would like, more deployments for shorter durations, nirvana. Salivating just thinking about it. If you make that happen, I will be back active in a heartbeat! I wonder if other soldiers feel as strongly as I do?
Reed

Ron Humphrey
12-15-2008, 03:50 AM
True and well said. I also agree with the rest and would suggest that thisGood question -- REALLY good question...

Having had a great deal of fun (well, more often than not...) doing both missions in various environments with varied opposition, I am firmly convinced that the two missions are not compatible. There is no question that some people can switch between the two and do both equally well (not me, too impatient for a good FID worker) nor is there any question the Groups have done that over the years -- and pretty successfully so. That does not change the fact that each mission IDEALLY would have operators that were psychologically and emotionally attuned to that particular mission.

Far more importantly, each type of mission requires extensive training. Attempts to make Teams adept at both will unavoidably and adversely affect capability in both mission sets. Not to mention adverse impacts on operational employment...

And those kinds of impacts can have inadvertent and bad strategic effects...

So are you saying we do need GPF that are reasonably good at all types of warfare in tandem with SF that are very very good at one or the other type and who can help to lead said GPF through whichever one they end up with?

Ken White
12-15-2008, 04:36 AM
So are you saying we do need GPF that are reasonably good at all types of warfare in tandem with SF that are very very good at one or the other type and who can help to lead said GPF through whichever one they end up with?However, a couple of minor tweaks on that... ;)

These are just my opinions and they're sorta like armpits, everyone has a couple but these weren't arrived at in a vacuum or in a flash of light. Took 45 years for this to gel. :wry:

We need GPF trained primarily for MCO (Heavy Bdes) and for FID, etc (LtInf). I'm agnostic on the Strykers. The training tasks are too different for one unit to be total spectrum trained. Bdes should be specialized and train for their specialty for the near future. That specialization needs to be reassessed at every QDR (and left alone between them to avoid jerking units around).

We need SF that do the UW and SFA missions AND we need DA SOF elms, not SF for the DA stuff (we also need separate strat recon but that's another ball of wax...). Again, the training tasks are too different for BEST proficiency in either if a unit tries to do both. I've seen too many beanie wearers killed because they were doing something they weren't totally proficient at. They will give it their all, no question but it is not smart.

The issue of who works for who (GPF for SOF or SOF for GPF) should be totally mission based and the parochial BS should go. We must fix the unity of command problem in the US armed forces...

I'd personally go for an Inf Bn working for an A Team or a B Team working for a Rifle Co but that's probably a step too far for most. :D

I'll also tack on to something that appeared up-thread. Not only are there some SOF Generals out there -- real SOF, not Ranger Regt graduates -- but they are some sharp cookies and their integrity quotient seems to be ahead of the conventional Generals nowadays. That's not a plea to put them in command of Division (I don't even agree with Artillery types getting Div cmd or Mech guys getting Lt Inf and vice versa) but it does suggest they can certainly command TFs that mix SF, DA elms and GPF.

Ranger94
12-15-2008, 08:07 AM
I would volunteer for that mission in a heart beat!! Jobs I am good at ,in a unit structure I would like, more deployments for shorter durations, nirvana. Salivating just thinking about it. If you make that happen, I will be back active in a heartbeat! I wonder if other soldiers feel as strongly as I do?
Reed

I certainly agree that all of the above. I am former SF support (got my short tab while with 1st SFGA), combat deployment with LRS and current ETT. The closest that I have found are IA deployments for NG soldiers attatched to JSOC.

ODB
12-16-2008, 06:19 AM
First I want to address CSS within SF. We have had many discussions over this in recent weeks with a few key points continually coming up:

1. Currently there are many growing pains with now having a GSB. For years battalions have supported themselves while complaining they needed a GSB, now they have them they are complaining about the support they receive. It is a matter of the GSB folks playing catching up and figuring out the nuances of SF.

2. The single worst thing that can happen is to send a brand new support soldier to a SF Group. There should be no lower enlisted slots in Group. Nothing worse than hearing a brand new private being inprocessed by specialist calling E-8s by there first name. I got it, different environment but have to draw the line at some point. Then 3 years down the road that private now has to go back to big Army, they are in for a huge culture shock.

3. There should be some sort of initial intergration/assessment (don't wanna say selection) process. Unfortunately we have a hard enough time even getting CSS personnel who are airborne qualified or want to go to school. This brings up another issue in itself for another conversation.

Overall I believe having a GSB will pay off in the end, just like anything though there is going to be growing pains. As far as officer manning does anyone honestly believe big Army would give up their best and brightest to SOF?

I agree with many of the comments regarding SF and DA missions. Many who have come SF since 01' think all SF is is door kicking. Now that DA is winding down they say SF isn't what it used to be, when in actuality it is starting to get back to it's roots. IMHO funding is a huge part of this. There is entirely too much politics involved. The whole look at us we can do this and we can do that, what do you need them for. Everyone is trying to do everyone elses job and forgeting there own missions in the process. When one looks at SOF as a whole all the pieces are there, just get back to using them in their role. Many of us can see SF evolving one of two ways:

1. Being more of a DA/CT force but then this leaves a huge void to be filled, but then why MARSOF? SEALS tried FID wanting a piece of the action and then realized they want absolutely nothing to do with it. So the question is who fills the void if SF evolved this way?

2. The way many of us see SF evolving is taking a larger role in HUMNIT and possibly becoming much more focused on this aspect than anything else. In doing so FID/UW would not go on the back burner as FID would be the proverbial foot in the door.

Another huge issue about to rear it's ugly head is when SF gets back into it's normal role of FID and all these guys are used to operating with a ton of logistical support and conventional forces all over country. What happens when you are the only 12 Americans in the country minus the Embassy personnel? Too many have gone the past 7 years without having to deal with this. There is definately some bumps in the road ahead but nothing that cannot be overcome.


Ken WhiteThe issue of who works for who (GPF for SOF or SOF for GPF) should be totally mission based and the parochial BS should go. We must fix the unity of command problem in the US armed forces...

Personally I'd love an Inf company OPCON to me, the things I could do and Battalion would be a dream come true, unfortunately I doubt I'll ever see the day, we are just not there yet. Then again it would depend on the personalities, I definately think Inf companies are doable. Then again why would I need them if I was doing my job developing my FID force?

My final comment is on credibility.....getting harder everyday. All I'll say on that, many will know what I'm talking about. Will save other ramblings for later.

Schmedlap
12-16-2008, 10:04 AM
Personally I'd love an Inf company OPCON to me, the things I could do and Battalion would be a dream come true, unfortunately I doubt I'll ever see the day, we are just not there yet. Then again it would depend on the personalities, I definately think Inf companies are doable. Then again why would I need them if I was doing my job developing my FID force?

I like it. Could you give me your two cents on THIS (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=60326&postcount=49)?

reed11b
12-16-2008, 04:54 PM
Then again why would I need them if I was doing my job developing my FID force?


Perhaps to have a QRF that the Host Nation could actually emulate, instead of our traditional over reliance on arty and airpower, which take longer to train then good infantry and many HN's can not afford. That's my thought anyway. Plus you know it would be NCO heavy and could augment training personnel.
Reed
(Of course, I am probably unduly influenced by the fact that I would want that job)

Ken White
12-16-2008, 04:59 PM
...Nothing worse than hearing a brand new private being inprocessed by specialist calling E-8s by there first name. I got it, different environment but have to draw the line at some point. Then 3 years down the road that private now has to go back to big Army, they are in for a huge culture shock.I know that's true but I've long thought Big army has the wrong approach... :(
...As far as officer manning does anyone honestly believe big Army would give up their best and brightest to SOF?Probably not but then, SOF shouldn't get the best and brightest in the support arena, they should get what the pipeline spews forth. If the pipeline spews inadequate people, then the pipeline needs to fixed. Most people are average, period...
...IMHO funding is a huge part of this. There is entirely too much politics involved. . .When one looks at SOF as a whole all the pieces are there, just get back to using them in their role. Many of us can see SF evolving one of two ways:

1. Being more of a DA/CT force but then this leaves a huge void to be filled, but then why MARSOF? SEALS tried FID wanting a piece of the action and then realized they want absolutely nothing to do with it. So the question is who fills the void if SF evolved this way?Heh. Precisely. It is not a job for everyone and while many can do both jobs 'acceptably' (in the eyes of some -- casualty count disregarded) there is no question that about ten percent or so of the guys can excel at both jobs and that 70 plus percent of the folks in all the US SOF can do both at a decreasingly acceptable level but that means about 10 percent or so cannot do both -- and it also means that probably about 50-60% can one job much better than they can do the other. Why are we doing this if it's dumb? You answered it just above: "There is entirely too much politics involved." :rolleyes:
2. The way many of us see SF evolving is taking a larger role in HUMNIT and possibly becoming much more focused on this aspect than anything else. In doing so FID/UW would not go on the back burner as FID would be the proverbial foot in the door.I hear you and generally agree but be careful, the HUMINT business is necessary but it too takes special qualities. It is not a job everyone is suited for and it can start driving the FID train instead of just aiding it if you aren't careful.
...Too many have gone the past 7 years without having to deal with this. There is definately some bumps in the road ahead but nothing that cannot be overcome.True dat.
Personally I'd love an Inf company OPCON to me, the things I could do and Battalion would be a dream come true, unfortunately I doubt I'll ever see the day, we are just not there yet. Then again it would depend on the personalities, I definately think Inf companies are doable. Then again why would I need them if I was doing my job developing my FID force?We'll get there. We'll have to, I suspect.

sapperfitz82
12-16-2008, 06:00 PM
If I understand your general direction, Ken.

They are right up the street, attract/cultivate some great leadership, have a small unit culture and big unit assetts, are pretty much have given up on FLS forced entry as a mission. At least if one counts the amount of training they can devote to that.

My thought was to have a BDE per group and focus them regionally. Get the NCO's to language training and send the O's to some SWC course on FID. The benefit is a very large reinforcement of SF very rapidly, a quick bridging of the cultural divide at the lower level, and CONUS geography (pretty close to SWC already, as well as to the CA/PSYOP guys.)

Down side is the cultural divide at higher levels, as well as some turf issues on who works for whom. But they follow orders, right?

This is pretty much what is going on in theatre in Afghanistan anyway (minus some of the lower level coordination) with SF taking point and GPF providing support. In my experience, the lack of formal relations made for redundent and often conflicting missions. (SF makes contact with a tribe, GPF comes through a week later and does an on-your-face cordon and search.)

Cavguy
12-16-2008, 06:23 PM
This is pretty much what is going on in theatre in Afghanistan anyway (minus some of the lower level coordination) with SF taking point and GPF providing support. In my experience, the lack of formal relations made for redundent and often conflicting missions. (SF makes contact with a tribe, GPF comes through a week later and does an on-your-face cordon and search.)

As far as who screws up the other's coin efforts - plenty of examples on both sides - I was the recipent of several Black SOF raids gone bad in my sector, where I had to do the consequence management afterwards.

We consistantly violated unity of effort with SF in Iraq until I left in Feb 07. GPF has little SA on SF ODA ops and vice versa. The "Black SOF" is the worst offender, conducting independent raids into sectors and more often than not leaving a mess for the GPF commander to clean up. Plenty of discussion on the consequence management aspect of SOF raids gone wrong over at company command (http://companycommand.army.mil).

I never understood why the ODA in a BCT sector was not OPCON or TACON to the BCT or even vice versa. Both sides stepped on each others' toes constantly in SOIs and missions because of the parallel chains of command. Relations were highly dependent on the SF team leader and BCT/BN commander personalities to work well. I have seen examples of both sides failing to work with the other due to personality issues.

Bob W.
12-16-2008, 06:29 PM
Good discussion all around.

People talked a great deal about the ability of plugging into enablers throughout this thread; additionally, it is important to note the amount of organic enablers that are now part of SF Groups, or coming on line: dogs, UAVs, Signal, not to mention the CSS discussed earlier.

ODB
12-16-2008, 09:42 PM
As far as who screws up the other's coin efforts - plenty of examples on both sides - I was the recipent of several Black SOF raids gone bad in my sector, where I had to do the consequence management afterwards.

We consistantly violated unity of effort with SF in Iraq until I left in Feb 07. GPF has little SA on SF ODA ops and vice versa. The "Black SOF" is the worst offender, conducting independent raids into sectors and more often than not leaving a mess for the GPF commander to clean up. Plenty of discussion on the consequence management aspect of SOF raids gone wrong over at company command (http://companycommand.army.mil).

I never understood why the ODA in a BCT sector was not OPCON or TACON to the BCT or even vice versa. Both sides stepped on each others' toes constantly in SOIs and missions because of the parallel chains of command. Relations were highly dependent on the SF team leader and BCT/BN commander personalities to work well. I have seen examples of both sides failing to work with the other due to personality issues.

I'm so tired of the who has the biggest d*ck on the block mentality on all sides. When an ODA and BCT get along great things come from it, when they do not we all might as well sit that rotation out. SF feels the same pain of those middle of the night unannounced raids. You'd think with the information highway what it is there would be better communication on all levels.


My thought was to have a BDE per group and focus them regionally. Get the NCO's to language training and send the O's to some SWC course on FID. The benefit is a very large reinforcement of SF very rapidly, a quick bridging of the cultural divide at the lower level, and CONUS geography (pretty close to SWC already, as well as to the CA/PSYOP guys.)

Much easier done by integrating both sides early on. Up until GWOT there was very little if any training/operations done between SOF and conventional forces. We sometimes have to sleep in that bed we have made. Coming SF with 14 years infantry experience I had little to no exposure to SF before hand. This can be remedied in multiple ways. CTC rotations, school house, local training, ones imagination is the limit. I do not believe we need set BCTs dedicated to supporting SF Groups, takes too many out of the fight. Big problems arise when you start dedicating troops to one specfic mission, then they always get held back for that just in case we need them excuse. The good thing coming out of the GWOT is the SOF/conventional integration and the experiences being learned. My fear of being OPCON/TACON to a BCT is much like any other attachment; under utilization and misuse. Many conventional and unconventional commanders forget or do not know how to utilize assests properly. My fear goes the same way for conventional forces being OPCON/TACON to ODAs or Group.

One of my good idea fairies thinks one of the best solutions would be cross pollination so to say. With many younger less experienced soldiers in SF today at some point in their career you kick them back to big Army to be SL/PSG, then they get the feel for conventional ways and nothing wrong with bringing a few SSG/SFC Infantry guys to be an extra bravo on the team. Send SF Majors to conventional staffs and conventional majors to SF staffs. Just a thought and a HRC nightmare but might just get us the most bang for our buck in the long run.

reed11b
12-16-2008, 09:48 PM
SOF MP's (http://www.wood.army.mil/MPBULLETIN/pdfs/Fall%2008/Watson-SFMP.pdf) I think this article is relevant. I am kind of surprised something similar has not been suggested seeing the difficulty we have had in both A-stan and Iraq training competent police forces.
Reed

jkm_101_fso
12-16-2008, 10:12 PM
I'm so tired of the who has the biggest d*ck on the block mentality on all sides. When an ODA and BCT get along great things come from it, when they do not we all might as well sit that rotation out. SF feels the same pain of those middle of the night unannounced raids. You'd think with the information highway what it is there would be better communication on all levels.

I'll note some of the same habitual problems as Cavguy; my BN owned an AO in Iraq, but an SF team worked indepedently inside a city in our AO. It wasn't that we had a poor relationship with them, but that we weren't privy to all of the operations and "deals" they made with Iraqi leaders inside the city. When they left the AO, all we heard from the local leaders was "Captain Jimmy (SF TL) said this, Captain Jimmy said that". It was a very frustrating obstacle to try and work through. Additionally, the SF team "hired" their own militia that continued independent ops after the SF team left. They even occupied the SF team safehouse as their HQ. Deconflicting their ops (because they weren't IA) was hard, because they had been empowered by the SF team to do so. I will say that the SF team did a fairly good "battle handover" with us when they left, but it was hasty and we didn't get all the details we should have. Our fault for not asking all the right questions and getting all the info we should have.


One of my good idea fairies thinks one of the best solutions would be cross pollination so to say. With many younger less experienced soldiers in SF today at some point in their career you kick them back to big Army to be SL/PSG, then they get the feel for conventional ways and nothing wrong with bringing a few SSG/SFC Infantry guys to be an extra bravo on the team. Send SF Majors to conventional staffs and conventional majors to SF staffs. Just a thought and a HRC nightmare but might just get us the most bang for our buck in the long run.

Agree with much of this. What would be the willingness of the SF officers and NCOs to "go back on the line"? I'm assuming that they wouldn't prefer that. I guess it could be DA mandated. I think there would be much to gain from putting 18 series guys back into 11 series formations.

In the the field artillery world, we send non-SF majors/post-command CPTs to SF groups to be FSOs. Granted, they are on staff and not with the teams, but still learn from their experiences. I think it's a great program and one that the Army will continue. Of the former SF FSOs that I've seen come out of Group, they are great assets to the FA BNs they go back to, because of what they learned with Group.

I believe (but don't know for sure) that 13F/13A from the Ranger BNs also support Delta missions, but aren't Operators. I assume they bring great knowledge and experience base back to Rgr BN and other FA BNs they eventually go to.

Cavguy
12-16-2008, 10:13 PM
I'm so tired of the who has the biggest d*ck on the block mentality on all sides. When an ODA and BCT get along great things come from it, when they do not we all might as well sit that rotation out. SF feels the same pain of those middle of the night unannounced raids. You'd think with the information highway what it is there would be better communication on all levels.


ODB,

We're in violent agreement.

ODB
12-30-2008, 05:56 AM
I like it. Could you give me your two cents on THIS (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=60326&postcount=49)?

Not a bad thought at all. The right side of my brain keeps going to that if I was doing my job properly I wouldn't need a conventional force because I would have trained and equiped my indig force properly. Definately could see this early on while preparing that indig force or if in an AO that didn't have one. I look at the intel thing kinda like local law enforcement vs FBI.

sandbag
12-30-2008, 09:45 PM
I cannot agree more on this. In a SOF organization, the RIGHT fit is always the way to go. Technical or tactical competence only gets your foot in the door to the organization. If you're technically brilliant, but can't get along with others, you're going to pose a danger downrange. This applies not only to CSS but to combat arms officers integrating into SOF. Working and playing well with others counts for a lot when you have a small organization.

On support personnel: If the problem's at the supply end of the personnel pipeline, let's fix it. Staffing a GSB with a bunch of 82d alumni isn't always the answer. It's already been done, and it was done based on a faulty premise. We're living with it today.

PS: I've tended to look at the whole "grunt-me-combat-me-best, you-CSS-you-suck" to be a pretty emotionally retarded outlook. I know my fair share of tabbers that couldn't act like a grownup if their lives depended on it. If you're in charge of support guys, treat them and train them like your combat arms guys. If you're driving that wedge for sophmoric branch parochialism, you're part of the problem.


Bob,

Second, I would offer that wanting the "best and the brightest" to go to SF/SOF is counterproductive and turns people against us as people think we believe we are entitled to the "best and brightest." I would submit that we are not "entitled" to the best and the brightest but what we really want are the RIGHT soldiers to fill these SOF enabler positions. We need a capable competent soldier who can work in a non-standard even unconventional environment who can support Special Operations.

Okay off my soap box for now.

ODB
12-30-2008, 11:47 PM
Good discussion all around.

People talked a great deal about the ability of plugging into enablers throughout this thread; additionally, it is important to note the amount of organic enablers that are now part of SF Groups, or coming on line: dogs, UAVs, Signal, not to mention the CSS discussed earlier.

As of late this new buzzword "SOF enablers" has been a hot topic around the team room beer fridge. Sorry the beer fridge has taken the place of the proverbial water fountain. Personally my verdict is still out there, I'm voting present right now. I see good and bad but don't know if the good out weighs the bad. Instead of streamlining our processes and adding the things we need, we keep getting handed more technology we don't need. I already have too many UAVs watching my every move so arm chair quarterbacks can question the decisions. Additional to this is many know we work the gray areas to get things done, where is my gray area?

When I think of enablers I think in terms of policies and requirements that are streamlined to enable me to do what it is I'm trained to do. Not add additional requirements and more hands to the pot for me to deal with. Enable me to do what needs to be done!

I have not yet had the dogs in country, have trained with them and again admittingly there are growing pains. UAVs I see no gain, sorry but the picture from 10,000 feet looks a lot different than the picture on the ground.

Perhaps others can shed some light that I and others are missing on this.

Voodoun
01-18-2009, 05:52 PM
So I'm brand new to this board, and relatively new to the military in general. I recently went through AIT at the exceedingly broken A/3/1 SWTG for PSYOP, and having just read the article this thread is addressing, I think its just applicable, perhaps even more so, to the little sisters who train across the hall from our Green Beret wearing big brothers at the schoolhouse.

Soft Power one thing that distinguishes the special operations community from the big Army, and in a time when UW and soft power capabilities are more critical than they ever have been, it seems that we've been just crippling our capacity in that arena through sub par training, shortened timelines, and organizational screw ups.

Now, maybe I'm wrong, maybe I don't know what I'm talking about, its a possibility, but as an academic consumer of security policy from my undergraduate years through grad school, I have some inkling into whats required of policy actors. And now as a policy actor myself, I think I've gained a wee bit more insight.

Now, to revisit my point, what happened in this thread is exactly what seems to be happening at SWTG, USASOC, and now USAR - two primary components of SOF, CA and PSYOP, go from being heavily discussed in the article, to virtually ignored in the discussion. Why is that? Is CA not sexy enough? Is PSYOP too much of an unknown commodity?

Or is it that SF is really the only thing people care about?

max161
01-18-2009, 06:00 PM
So I'm brand new to this board, and relatively new to the military in general. I recently went through AIT at the exceedingly broken A/3/1 SWTG for PSYOP, and having just read the article this thread is addressing, I think its just applicable, perhaps even more so, to the little sisters who train across the hall from our Green Beret wearing big brothers at the schoolhouse.

Soft Power one thing that distinguishes the special operations community from the big Army, and in a time when UW and soft power capabilities are more critical than they ever have been, it seems that we've been just crippling our capacity in that arena through sub par training, shortened timelines, and organizational screw ups.

Now, maybe I'm wrong, maybe I don't know what I'm talking about, its a possibility, but as an academic consumer of security policy from my undergraduate years through grad school, I have some inkling into whats required of policy actors. And now as a policy actor myself, I think I've gained a wee bit more insight.

Now, to revisit my point, what happened in this thread is exactly what seems to be happening at SWTG, USASOC, and now USAR - two primary components of SOF, CA and PSYOP, go from being heavily discussed in the article, to virtually ignored in the discussion. Why is that? Is CA not sexy enough? Is PSYOP too much of an unknown commodity?

Or is it that SF is really the only thing people care about?

Thanks for your comments. Believe me, we do care very much about CA and PSYOP (and everyone should remember that SF grew out of the US Army Psychological Warfare Department and most importantly all war is Psychological!)

I think your criticisms have merit but I would also like to remind you that institutional training is not designed to make the graduate an expert. Upon graduation you are an apprentice or journeyman at best and it is not until you get to your unit with opportunity formentoring from your leaders with the experience and the opportunity to deploy and employ what you have learned do you begin to develop the knowledge to become an expert. This is as true of CA and PSYOP as it is for SF. We cannot teach everything during the qualification courses.
Dave

Voodoun
01-18-2009, 06:17 PM
I'm not sure that I was suggesting that training should lead to immediate expertise, and if that's what came across I most certainly mis-expressed myself.

When I said training was broken at A co. 3rd bn I didnt mean that because we didn't all leave as experts it was broken, I meant that my class had a something close to a 40% washout rate, 15 suicide watches, 9 of which were serious, we had instructors making serious advances on trainees (one of them apparently married a trainee within weeks of her transfer to Airborne school, before she was MOS Q'd), trainees were being recycled for drinking, and drug tests were not given despite the cadre being made aware of drug use, and the academic "testing" consisted of being able to remember the answers to multiple choice questions already provided to you, not having any actual comprehension of the material. Don't get me wrong, there was plenty "right" there, and the quality of training was leaps and bounds better than BCT, which also had plenty of positive aspects, but since a riot nearly broke out when we had our final sensing session with an SF officer from SWC command (I'm not kidding, trainees actually stood up in the middle of it and walked out in disgust), I'm pretty confident that something was seriously broken.

But again, I might be wrong, I always allow for that possibility. I've only got two years of ROTC in college back in the 90's and 1.5 years enlisted under my belt, maybe my perspective will change in 5 years.

davidbfpo
01-18-2009, 08:07 PM
Welcome to SWC and the debates here, please take time to introduce yourself here: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=1441&page=43

It helps others to understand your perspective and within security an explanation what brought you here.

davidbfpo

reed11b
01-19-2009, 12:47 AM
I know that CA is expanding and has an aggressive recruiting drive on the active side of the house, but i am skeptical on how many CA skills can be taught in a 13 week AIT. They are also remaining on one base and one unit, which will create an atmosphere of "group think" for active CA. CA would be one area were an exposure to a wide range of ideas and perspectives is important. Just my 2 cents.
Reed

Culpeper
01-19-2009, 02:53 AM
That was part of Kerry's platform when he ran for president. Much more SOF and SF. First thought that came to my mind was lowering the bar.

Bill Moore
01-19-2009, 02:56 AM
Voodoun, much of what you cite is simply a by product of mass production. As you have discovered, we do mass produce SOF in response to a crisis, and you pointed out mass production equates to numerous production errors. That said, we’ll still get the same good folks we would have assessed anyway, but unfortunately there will be a quite a few marginal performers in that crowd also.

The mass production issue is an unfortunate reality based on the world situation, so we're just going to have to live with it to some extent. Moving past that pint, just what is it we want more of? Defense states that it “needs” more Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Soldiers so we can effectively employ soft/smart power to help shape the "new complex" environment we’re fighting in. Then on the other hand many have argued that SOF and General Purpose Forces (GPF) supposedly do not think highly of these CA and PSYOP Soldiers and their skills, so they are not employed correctly, and then on top of that these CA and PSYOP Soldiers are poorly trained, so who are we fooling? Why do we want more?

First, I agree we're operating in a complex environment where the "correct" application of CMO and PYSOP is essential, but this isn't new. All the noise your hearing is simply a loud Baptist like revival movement within DoD where everyone is shouting hallelujahs anytime the preacher says anything about irregular warfare, yet when we step outside the church it is business as usual.

Second, "good" leaders in SOF and GPF care very much about their CA and PSYOP Soldiers and what they bring to the fight. I worked for one Bde Cdr who made his CA Soldiers his center of gravity, and everyone else in the BDE was task organized to support them, which was appropriate in this situation. Just like the inconvenient truth of mass production, another inconvenient truth is not all leaders are "good" leaders. Get used to it; that is the world you're really going to work in. Just remember that you have a responsibility to make it work when you’re down range, you have to tactfully educate your chain of command on how you should be employed, and that means you need to understand their mission and where you can help. Don’t expect the Cdr or S3 to automatically know how to employ you.

Third, "if" CA and PSYOP Soldiers are poorly trained, who reached that conclusion and why? What is it that we want CMO and PYSOP to accomplish downrange? Can the Soldiers do it? If not, why not? Inadequate training in some skill areas? Unrealistic expectations? Bottom line is that we to identify the “specific” problems (if there are any), then figure out how to fix them.

I don't mind young Soldiers complaining, but I hear the same type of complaints from senior CA and PSYOP officers, so if there is an issue or issues take the emotion out of it, tell the force what it is, and tell us what we need to do to fix it at the training and the operational level.

Right now all I hear is we need more CA and PSYOP, and then right after that I hear that CA and PYSOP are broken. Both arguments may be true, but I would think we would want to fix what is broken before we produce more of the same.

Thoughts?

Surferbeetle
01-19-2009, 04:34 AM
...you need not fear the result of a hundred battles.

Welcome to the Army :wry:

Know your basic soldiering skills, know your mos, know your assigned language, know your part of the world, if you go reserves find a civilian job which allows you to expand your knowledge in your specialty, and work your ass off to be the best you can be. The rest will fall into place.

Voodoun
01-19-2009, 05:53 AM
In response to Bill Moore:

Let me first note that I was primarily commenting on how while the article in question discussed its implications on CA and PSYOP, the discussion was heavily focused on SF. This is reflective of the attitude I perceive throughout the community, although I've already been happily made aware that some of my perceptions are wrong.

I essentially agree with everything in Bill Moore's post. Mass production results in production errors. It is something I'm going to have to live with, and all I really have control over is my team, and how we perform on deployment.

I'm glad to know that senior CA and PSYOP officers are making the same sort of comments I did, because that means I've accurately assessed the situation, to some degree at least. Absolutely I agree that the emotion should be taken out of the discussion. I'm not sure if I seemed particularly emotionally invested in the matter (nor am I sure that it was implied that I was), but if I did, let me assure you that I simply don't have the emotional resources to be diverted in that direction.

As far as tactfully educating my command on how to employ us, I'm all over that one - My team chief wants me to have our team's CAPEs brief ready to go a month before we deploy.

Anyway, I think the questions you raised are absolutely critical to the future of this country's military hegemony.

I think we need to rephrase the sentiment though - 'we need more properly trained and effective PSYOP and CA' is a more comprehensive way of expressing the conventional wisdom. Can I get a hallelujah?

As far as answering this bit:


<Third, "if" CA and PSYOP Soldiers are poorly trained, who reached that conclusion and why? What is it that we want CMO and PYSOP to accomplish downrange? Can the Soldiers do it? If not, why not? Inadequate training in some skill areas? Unrealistic expectations? Bottom line is that we to identify the “specific” problems (if there are any), then figure out how to fix them. >

I could not agree more, and if I thought I could do it, and anyone would care, I'd scrap my current thesis (an examination of how the rejection of Aristotelian reason in response to al Mamum's mihna, and the decline of Mutazalite influence in Sunni Islam in the 9th c. CE has directly contributed to the intransigence of the Arab-Israeli conflict) and all the research I've done, in order to try to answer those exact questions so that people smarter than me could develop solutions.

I've got my ideas concerning those answers, but as a social scientist I don't like to draw conclusions based solely on my own observations, no matter how common sense they may appear to be.

I could postulate all night over what ifs, and engage in thought experiments and grandiose proposals for selection boards, Personality Inventories, 6 month long AITs, continuing MOS specific training, ad nauseum (nauseating for you, at least!) but I do think there are some no brainers worth addressing.

PSYOP is a confusing job. It's ill defined, and rather than try to better define it, we need to give soldiers a better chance to wrap their heads around it. Some of the concepts are collegiate level issues that need that sort of attention. Creating cognitive dissonance is one example. Collegiate Cognitive Psych classes spend a week on just *understanding* what cognitive dissonance it, much less creating it.

The 18x program hasn't seen any lack of interest, has it? That's because SF is perceived to be bad-ass. People are attracted to bad-asserey. Create the perception (and work to make it an undeniable reality) that CA and PSYOP are elite units, and I suspect interest will skyrocket. Get a MIST involved on the next season of 24, sex up a TPT and CAT-A by including them in the GI Joe movie sequel, and watch what happens. :-)

Reservists changing their MOS get the shaft. They may need more time than AIT students to 'get it' because we're asking them to make a fundamental change in the way they approach missions. How can we expect an MP or an Infantryman to just reject the mindset that they've developed over years of training and practice, with a 3 week test-memorizing course?

Cadre should be drawn from the best and brightest, and held to an almost impossibly high ethical standard.

Aside from that, I would love to see more integration between the Reserve and AD. We're talking about a TINY community on the tactical side, less than 1500 soldiers, from what I understand? Send AD soldiers with great evals back from deployment to spend a weekend every month with Reserve units gearing up to deploy. Send Reserve soldiers to 4th POG to boost capacity for short missions. The animosity between the reserve side and the AD side goes beyond friendly rivalry (from what I've seen) and we're too small of a community to tolerate that sort of thing.

Like I said, I could go on forever just brainstorming solutions, but I've got zero insight into the feasibility of those suggestions, nor do I understand the political dynamics or tensions operating WAY above my paygrade, although I'm fairly confident in my comprehension ability.

Good night! I've got boring homework to get back to :-)

82redleg
01-19-2009, 12:45 PM
Should CA and PYSOP remain SOF? Except for the active BDEs, I don't believe they are part of USASOC any more, but USACAPOC.

We've determined that every BCT needs them in theater (something we haven't done with ODAs, Rangers, 160th, etc)?

CA & PSYOP have a dichotomy, in that thier AC units exist to support SOF, while their RC units exist to support the rest of the Army. Despite all the expansion, my BCT will only ever see 1 PSYOP NCO, 1 CA NCO and CA officer from the AC- a COA which automatically creates tension between us and our CA/PSYOP support. I'm not saying its right, I'm saying thats the way it is.

Heck, since we've made everything else organic to the BCTs, maybe a combined CA/PSYOP company in the BSTB?

Voodoun
01-19-2009, 01:47 PM
CA and PSYOP have been part of USACAPOC for years now, which was once known as the US Army Reserve Special Operations Command. In 1990 USACAPOC was created and aligned under USASOC according to functional lines (instead of component).

A couple years ago USACAPOC moved from USASOC to USAR, but "USASOC was to retain proponency for Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations -- including doctrine, combat development and institutional training."

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/army/ca-psyop.htm

I don't think you're playing Devil's Advocate, actually, I think there's a significant degree of pressure to continue to divest CA and PSYOP from its SOF roots. From my limited understanding, the AD components are supposed to be supporting only the SOF units, but the reality is the manpower simply isnt there yet.

I just personally don't see how this divorce with weekend custody can continue. If there's tension between your BCT and its CA and PSYOP element, and there's tension between the AD and RC of CA and PSYOP, and tension between CA and PSYOP itself, not to mention tensions between the reservists who went through reclass school and those who went through AIT at the unit level, there's just WAY too much tension and not enough love.

If you're with the 82nd, I suspect 'tension' is a kind way of putting it. I think there's a mutual disdain that hampers mission readiness. I hope I'm wrong, that's just the impression I've gotten in my limited experience.

Should CA and PSYOP be completely separated from SOF? I think if you polled CA and PSYOP, you'd get a resounding 'hells to the no'. If you asked big Army and USAR, the answers might range from 'absolutely' to 'who cares' to 'why do we even need those guys'?

As far as combining CA and PSYOP into a single company, I'm not sure thats a good move - there's a distinction between the two objectives that needs to be maintained. CA has a very specific function, whereas PSYOP has to be as flexible as a Ukrainian gymnast in order to maximize its potential contribution.

The Army needs to hire a bunch of relationship counselors so we can all explore and resolve our feelings. Group hug anyone?

This board is rapidly becoming my new procrastination excuse! Bad mojo.

Voodoun
01-19-2009, 09:27 PM
So unreliable inside sources tell me the decision has already been made for USASOC to re-absorb CAPOC, and that it could happen as early as within the next 6 months. I never realized how much the Army was like high school, full of cliques and rumors. oh. my. god! can you believe, like, totally.

Ken White
01-19-2009, 10:47 PM
Believe me. Can be even more fun than High School, though... :D

Schmedlap
01-19-2009, 11:11 PM
Now, to revisit my point, what happened in this thread is exactly what seems to be happening at SWTG, USASOC, and now USAR - two primary components of SOF, CA and PSYOP, go from being heavily discussed in the article, to virtually ignored in the discussion. Why is that? Is CA not sexy enough? Is PSYOP too much of an unknown commodity?

Or is it that SF is really the only thing people care about?

For what it's worth, I know of at least two JSOTF commanders and two Group Commanders who considered "IO" - largely to include PSYOP, CA, and a few related capabilities - to be their main effort in Iraq and Afghanistan. And their deeds backed up their words.

The remarkable thing about this is that those "IO" assets were poorly integrated until just prior to - or in some cases after - deployment. Yet they were still seen as tremendous assets and leveraged very well. The greatest shortcoming was not integrating them during training. The perception seemed to be that a commander could just say, "hey PSYOP guy, this looks like a job for something non-lethal. Throw some PSYOP at this."

Elsewhere in this thread, you mentioned something about developing a CAPEs brief. If that brief is to be of any value, it needs to be given to the commander while they are planning their collective training, way prior to deployment. Otherwise, it's too much information, too late. There is a growing consensus out there in the SOF community that the (IO/non-lethal/insert term) assets are valuable. The speed with which they've learned to leverage those assets has been, in my opinion, very slow.

Surferbeetle
01-20-2009, 12:52 AM
Elsewhere in this thread, you mentioned something about developing a CAPEs brief. If that brief is to be of any value, it needs to be given to the commander while they are planning their collective training, way prior to deployment. Otherwise, it's too much information, too late. There is a growing consensus out there in the SOF community that the (IO/non-lethal/insert term) assets are valuable. The speed with which they've learned to leverage those assets has been, in my opinion, very slow.

Supported units are getting better at understanding how CAPOC works:

Typically it goes something like this on the reserve side of the house...late night call: "Hey teamleader we need you to time off from work and go to location X. We have rustled up the following troops for you who also have taken time off from work, make it happen".

The correct response is "No problem".

You can only say this when you & your team-members have the benefit of:

Good training on soldiering skills and your AOR; a number of years spent in the same unit with the same people; a civilian job which both exercises your skill set and supports your service to the nation; active duty folk who understand that their CA & PSYOP requests will be answered just before go time with minimally materially resourced (computers, etc.) folks; a solid team capabilities briefing for all key supported unit players on what you can do and what you need in order to be successful as soon as you hit the ground.

Amazingly CAPOC has a bunch of dedicated folks who are willing to play by these rules. The 'divorce' has complicated things since GPF does not understand this well as SF does (and they don't really care for it much of the time). GWOT has been good in that everybody GPF and SOF has had to play together and get used to things as they are. Hopefully things will continue to improve...

max161
01-20-2009, 01:01 AM
The remarkable thing about this is that those "IO" assets were poorly integrated until just prior to - or in some cases after - deployment. Yet they were still seen as tremendous assets and leveraged very well. The greatest shortcoming was not integrating them during training. The perception seemed to be that a commander could just say, "hey PSYOP guy, this looks like a job for something non-lethal. Throw some PSYOP at this."


Good points all. The good news is we are now getting the deployment cycles synched so that the CA and PSYOP units can conduct PMT with the JSOTFs. The problem has always been high demand low density for CA and PSYOP. During the "Surge" active duty CA and PSYOP had to support the GPF as well as SOF because the reserve components could not surge enough forces and many reserve component units were used initially during OIF and had dwell issues. Active duty CA and PSYOP units will not have fully recovered from the Iraqi "surge: until this summer but we are now able to get the deployment cycles in line so they can train together before they deploy. Remember though that the JSOTFs are deploying every 6 months which means 7 months in the box and 5 months home.

reed11b
01-20-2009, 01:54 AM
So unreliable inside sources tell me the decision has already been made for USASOC to re-absorb CAPOC, and that it could happen as early as within the next 6 months. I never realized how much the Army was like high school, full of cliques and rumors. oh. my. god! can you believe, like, totally.
Umm, for us dumb knuckle dragger eleven bang bangs could you explain what that means? pictures help too.
Reed
P.S. I think that even spreading out the CA teams to co-exist w/ the SF groups would help to expand there utility and knowledge base. Same for Psyops, though I know even less about them.

Voodoun
01-20-2009, 06:53 AM
Umm, for us dumb knuckle dragger eleven bang bangs could you explain what that means? pictures help too.
Reed
P.S. I think that even spreading out the CA teams to co-exist w/ the SF groups would help to expand there utility and knowledge base. Same for Psyops, though I know even less about them.

Reed, you think I know what that means? I really have no idea, when it comes down to the nitty gritty. I HOPE it means world peace will break out and the sun will rise over a Pax Americana that lasts until the martians arrive, but I think I might be setting my expectations a little high on that one.

maybe.

Schmedlap
01-20-2009, 11:05 AM
I HOPE it means world peace will break out and the sun will rise over a Pax Americana that lasts until the martians arrive...

Based on the news reports that I've been seeing over the past week, that should be occurring today at around noon. At least the world peace thing.

82redleg
01-20-2009, 01:05 PM
1- CAT-As need to be beefed up to the point that they are self-mobile (meaning 4 vehicle crews). Otherwise, they take combat power out of the fight to execute their missions, or their missions will always be second fiddle to combat operations.

2- We acknowledge that we need CA and PSYOP, but only have enough active for the SOF community. WRONG ANSWER. If we need the capability, we need the capability. There is enough issues integrating "non-lethal" because it is NOT (generally) what the Army does. Having your "non-lethal" guy being an overweight, out-of-shape reservist with an attitude ("I'm special so I don't have to comply with your standards") who shows up at the last minute, without resources or collective training, makes integration almost impossible. Yes, I've thrown out every stereotype there is, but believe me, I've seen most of them.

3- If everyone needs CA and PSYOP all the time (or even most of the time), they aren't SOF, and can't remain only in the SOF community. That means that the BCT CA officers, and CA & PSYOP NCOs can't be the cast offs (those that aren't "good enough" to hang with the SOF guys), and that the active BCTs need their own assets, all the time. The best solution I see for this a CO in the BSTB. Yes, CA & PSYOP are different, but they are often focused in the same areas, and alot of their indiividual training requirements (language, culture, etc) are the same. Plus, neither element is large enough to justify a company of its own- a CA CO (even augmented as in 1- above) and a TPD combined would still be among the smaller COs in the BCT.

4- If what surferbeetle is describing is the norm, than there is something completely disfunctional somewhere. If we can have a LAD before we even redeploy, we should be able to align a team at LEAST to meet our ITC, MRE and deployment. And rotating them based on a different deployment schedule is ridiculous. Same as the JTACs, an enabler like that should task organize, deploy with, and redeploy with the BCT- I don't care what service or component.

Voodoun
01-20-2009, 01:22 PM
Based on the news reports that I've been seeing over the past week, that should be occurring today at around noon. At least the world peace thing.

Goodness gracious! You're absolutely right! in fact, I think I'm going to book my vacation to the Sudan right now - I hear they've got wonderful beaches there.

Voodoun
01-20-2009, 01:25 PM
1- CAT-As need to be beefed up to the point that they are self-mobile (meaning 4 vehicle crews). Otherwise, they take combat power out of the fight to execute their missions, or their missions will always be second fiddle to combat operations.

2- We acknowledge that we need CA and PSYOP, but only have enough active for the SOF community. WRONG ANSWER. If we need the capability, we need the capability. There is enough issues integrating "non-lethal" because it is NOT (generally) what the Army does. Having your "non-lethal" guy being an overweight, out-of-shape reservist with an attitude ("I'm special so I don't have to comply with your standards") who shows up at the last minute, without resources or collective training, makes integration almost impossible. Yes, I've thrown out every stereotype there is, but believe me, I've seen most of them.

3- If everyone needs CA and PSYOP all the time (or even most of the time), they aren't SOF, and can't remain only in the SOF community. That means that the BCT CA officers, and CA & PSYOP NCOs can't be the cast offs (those that aren't "good enough" to hang with the SOF guys), and that the active BCTs need their own assets, all the time. The best solution I see for this a CO in the BSTB. Yes, CA & PSYOP are different, but they are often focused in the same areas, and alot of their indiividual training requirements (language, culture, etc) are the same. Plus, neither element is large enough to justify a company of its own- a CA CO (even augmented as in 1- above) and a TPD combined would still be among the smaller COs in the BCT.

4- If what surferbeetle is describing is the norm, than there is something completely disfunctional somewhere. If we can have a LAD before we even redeploy, we should be able to align a team at LEAST to meet our ITC, MRE and deployment. And rotating them based on a different deployment schedule is ridiculous. Same as the JTACs, an enabler like that should task organize, deploy with, and redeploy with the BCT- I don't care what service or component.

Jeez. I understood about a 2/3 of that.

But yeah, fat out of shape reservists? Big problem (no pun intended). Fat out of shape soldiers in general? Big problem (pun intended this time).

Seriously, there should simply not be uniforms made to fit certain body types.

120mm
01-20-2009, 03:39 PM
I admit to being "out of the loop" with current CA issues, but I've lived some in the past.

First, circa the '90s, they didn't want anyone else to play their special reindeer games. The only way to hold down a CA slot was to be school-trained, but the only way to get the school was to be in a CA slot. And now they're screaming for more people. Guess what, CA-guy; you guys created your own problems.

Second, CA guys tend to come in two flavors: Broken SF dude who is too "special" to play nice, and "dud". So units end up leaning on some combat-arms reservist who holds a CA-relevant job in the US, during deployment.

Third, currently they are trying to stand up a CA Brigade in Europe. While they are willing to export a 38-series enlisted school to Europe, they are forcing officers to come back to the US for school. The "so-what" of this, is that most Army Reservists serving in Europe would make terrific CA officers, but by attending the stateside school, these people will lose their tax-exempt status, so basically it will cost around $20,000 to attend the school.

And CA refuses to budge on their school requirement. Frankly, I doubt their school is "all that and a bag of chips."

I have my doubts as to whether CA should continue to be allowed to exist as a branch.

Surferbeetle
01-20-2009, 04:28 PM
1- CAT-As need to be beefed up to the point that they are self-mobile (meaning 4 vehicle crews). Otherwise, they take combat power out of the fight to execute their missions, or their missions will always be second fiddle to combat operations.

2- We acknowledge that we need CA and PSYOP, but only have enough active for the SOF community. WRONG ANSWER. If we need the capability, we need the capability. There is enough issues integrating "non-lethal" because it is NOT (generally) what the Army does. Having your "non-lethal" guy being an overweight, out-of-shape reservist with an attitude ("I'm special so I don't have to comply with your standards") who shows up at the last minute, without resources or collective training, makes integration almost impossible. Yes, I've thrown out every stereotype there is, but believe me, I've seen most of them.

3- If everyone needs CA and PSYOP all the time (or even most of the time), they aren't SOF, and can't remain only in the SOF community. That means that the BCT CA officers, and CA & PSYOP NCOs can't be the cast offs (those that aren't "good enough" to hang with the SOF guys), and that the active BCTs need their own assets, all the time. The best solution I see for this a CO in the BSTB. Yes, CA & PSYOP are different, but they are often focused in the same areas, and alot of their indiividual training requirements (language, culture, etc) are the same. Plus, neither element is large enough to justify a company of its own- a CA CO (even augmented as in 1- above) and a TPD combined would still be among the smaller COs in the BCT.

4- If what surferbeetle is describing is the norm, than there is something completely disfunctional somewhere. If we can have a LAD before we even redeploy, we should be able to align a team at LEAST to meet our ITC, MRE and deployment. And rotating them based on a different deployment schedule is ridiculous. Same as the JTACs, an enabler like that should task organize, deploy with, and redeploy with the BCT- I don't care what service or component.

82nd Redleg has some good points. Keep in mind that I have spent time in all of our Army's arena's: Active, Guard, Reserve, and Civil Service. My observation is that most of the Army has not been resourced and trained like the tier one units such as the 82nd, 101st, and SF; however GWOT has changed many things.

Many of the issues mentioned, imho, can be boiled down to prioritizing and resourcing. Head count for both active and reserve CA and PSYOP types is low, our allocated budgets track with our headcounts, and the majority of active training (from AIT to OBC and onwards) has not addressed the use of CA and PSYOP. Before GWOT the majority of units that I have supported did not know that CA existed. This of course impacted the integration and budgeting process then and it still does to an extent (1610's were not funded, requests for CA support were an afterthought, etc.)

IMHO a civilian Assistant DA, City Planner, City Manager, Civil Engineer, Doctor, a Nurse, a Policeman, and a Teacher is a practicing specialist who brings needed skills to COIN work that are not found on active duty. Most of these folks do not fit the 18-25 year-old demographic (it takes time to acquire mastery in these employment fields). Despite this we need to integrate these types of folks into the COIN fight, others may disagree.

As an aside how many active duty folk also hold a 'part-time-job' in addition to 'active-duty-job' and sometimes risk their 'active-duty-job' in order to serve their nation in their 'part-time-job'? Few do.

Increasing the number of Active Duty CA and PSYOP, training the force on CA and PSYOP, and resourcing CA and PYSOP are certainly answers to some of these issues, in particular if a generalist in this arena can get things done. My observation is that sometimes you need a specialist and it is for this reason that CA and PSYOP reserve types are still around. Your mileage may vary.

As for 120mm's observations, some are valid and some not so. We in the CA community are looking for good, smart soldiers...send me a PM and I will get you linked up with someone who can help you sign up and then you can straighten things out. ;)

Ken White
01-20-2009, 05:51 PM
82nd Redleg has some good points. Keep in mind that I have spent time in all of our Army's arena's: Active, Guard, Reserve, and Civil Service. My observation is that most of the Army has not been resourced and trained like the tier one units such as the 82nd, 101st, and SF; however GWOT has changed many things.True on the training and resourcing -- and there's also an intangible difference. Can't speak for the 101 today but knowing folks in the other two organizations there is an attitudinal difference --and an arrogance -- that can be problematic and annoying to some.

That attitudinal difference makes it hard for the Airborne and SF communities to accept the sometimes seemingly casual attitude of other communities. Having spent a great many years in both communities, my take is that the arrogance is okay but it should not blind one to the value of other organizations and it must not take the form of bigoted disdain -- nobody will work well if they sense that attitude coming from the people with whom they're supposed to cooperate...

The SOF / conventional force divide is stupid and counterproductive; the AC / RC divide is even more so. Both need to disappear.
IMHO a civilian Assistant DA, City Planner, City Manager, Civil Engineer, Doctor, a Nurse, a Policeman, and a Teacher is a practicing specialist who brings needed skills to COIN work that are not found on active duty. Most of these folks do not fit the 18-25 year-old demographic (it takes time to acquire mastery in these employment fields). Despite this we need to integrate these types of folks into the COIN fight, others may disagree.This is a critical point -- those civilian skills ARE necessary and the likelihood of any AC CA type ever acquiring and enhancing them to the point a civilian practitioner who is a Reservist is microscopic. Those skills are hard to obtain, are critical and the fact that the City Manager is overweight and doesn't look like a recruiting poster is immaterial.
As an aside how many active duty folk also hold a 'part-time-job' in addition to 'active-duty-job' and sometimes risk their 'active-duty-job' in order to serve their nation in their 'part-time-job'? Few do.True and some things all the active folks need to contemplate are:

- Navy and DoD studies show conclusively that reservists excel at the non-operational skills and will invariably outperform their active counterparts. In the operational arena, that is reversed. The point is that for many things, the reservist or guardsman brings a lot to the table.

- Many dislike the money spent on the reserve, contending it would be better spent on the active forces and they justify this by saying that when reserve units are called up, they still need additional training. That ignores the fact that a Guard Brigade taking 90 days to train up to deploy is far less time than it would take to recruit, fill and train a Brigade from scratch.

- The guardsman and reservist put in a lot of kitchen table time for no pay in doing their military jobs. Also, due to the dispersed nature of reserve units, the reserve leader is more independent and resourceful than his Active counterpart. Due to the nature of many reserve units, he or she will generally be a better troop leader than most active compatriots (Before you flame, realize that leading and commanding are different things. Also consider the reserve company commander may be 150 miles from his Bn CO, a situation many an active company commander has often wished for :D ).
Increasing the number of Active Duty CA and PSYOP, training the force on CA and PSYOP, and resourcing CA and PYSOP are certainly answers to some of these issues, in particular if a generalist in this arena can get things done. My observation is that sometimes you need a specialist and it is for this reason that CA and PSYOP reserve types are still around. Your mileage may vary.There is no doubt that more CA and PSYOP folks are needed, both active and reserve -- though the best CA assets will always be reservists due to the daily skill practice -- and there's no doubt that some AC assets need to be in position to accompany the General Purpose forces, not all should be SOF.

reed11b
01-20-2009, 06:16 PM
Ken,
Also having been both sides of the house, one thing that Active side could do to gain some of the advantages of the reserve side is reduce the amount of movement from unit to unit. Keep people in a unit longer. The big advantage of the NG over active is that the soldiers know each other and how to work w/ each other and when they do have a deployment, that experience and knowledge stay w/ the unit for a long time. In the 41st BCT ORNG that I used to belong to, you could no longer tell the difference from prior service soldiers and those that had only served in the guard once we returned from OIF. Us prior service guys shouldered a lot of the weight early on, but this diminished fast. By the time we returned from Iraq, I would say that the M-day soldiers were every bit as skilled as the active side of the house.
Reed

Ken White
01-20-2009, 06:27 PM
All your points are correct. Too much AC movement and the continuity in RC units gives them an edge in many things. I know some FA units that have six Chiefs of section in a Battery that have all been in that job over 15 years -- they are good!

BTW, by both sides, I meant Abn and SF; my RC time is more than limited and was over a half century ago -- but I did learn much about them from working with them for years in uniform and as a DAC.

We're all one Army...

jkm_101_fso
01-20-2009, 07:40 PM
Also having been both sides of the house, one thing that Active side could do to gain some of the advantages of the reserve side is reduce the amount of movement from unit to unit. Keep people in a unit longer.

Having been on both sides of the house myself, I disagree with you. I think active duty has the right idea. It prevents buck SGTs from calling the 1SG by his first name after being in the same unit for 10 years (just what I experienced in the NG). In AC, just about the time that folks get TOO comfortable with each other, they move on.

On active duty, it is also possible for folks (NCOs in particular) to homestead on posts forever. My last 1SG had been at Campbell for 12 years, most of it in the same BCT and BN. There were several NCOs in my BN at Campbell that had been there for 5+ years.


The big advantage of the NG over active is that the soldiers know each other and how to work w/ each other and when they do have a deployment, that experience and knowledge stay w/ the unit for a long time.

Also consider that active duty work together every single day, as opposed to just drills. In my own experience, I developed much closer relationships with peers, superiors and subordinates much more quickly than I did in the Guard unit I was in for 4 year. Relationships forge quickly in the military, from what I've seen. Maybe they don't work and live in the same town like NG, but professionally, relationships on active duty flourish pretty quickly, IMO...it makes sense, you work with them everyday.


In the 41st BCT ORNG that I used to belong to, you could no longer tell the difference from prior service soldiers and those that had only served in the guard once we returned from OIF. Us prior service guys shouldered a lot of the weight early on, but this diminished fast. By the time we returned from Iraq, I would say that the M-day soldiers were every bit as skilled as the active side of the house.

I'm glad it went well for your unit. In theory, it should work that way. Not sure it ends up being that way across the board. Not sure if the NG/RC SOF dynamic works differently. With that being said, I never met a CA guy or PSYOPer that wasn't RC...

reed11b
01-20-2009, 08:09 PM
Having been on both sides of the house myself, I disagree with you. I think active duty has the right idea. It prevents buck SGTs from calling the 1SG by his first name after being in the same unit for 10 years (just what I experienced in the NG). In AC, just about the time that folks get TOO comfortable with each other, they move on.

On active duty, it is also possible for folks (NCOs in particular) to homestead on posts forever. My last 1SG had been at Campbell for 12 years, most of it in the same BCT and BN. There were several NCOs in my BN at Campbell that had been there for 5+ years.

To be honest that sounds more like culture shock then anything else to me (and believe me, I had it as well), how does a buck sergeant calling the Top "Bob" prevent him from effectively completing his mission exactly? Also keep in mind that it is more likely to be due A) poor discipline in a unit that only meets one weekend a month-two weeks a year or B) lowly SGT works w/ "Bob" the 1stSGT in the real world then because they have been in the same unit too long. As for your second point, that may be true, but you can't guarantee it, and how quality were those particular NCO's? If you have to sacrifice your commitment to the job in order to remain in a location (my experience w/ homesteading NCO's) then those soldiers are not very good examples of the benefits or liabilities of allowing for a more stable roster.




Also consider that active duty work together every single day, as opposed to just drills. In my own experience, I developed much closer relationships with peers, superiors and subordinates much more quickly than I did in the Guard unit I was in for 4 year. Relationships forge quickly in the military, from what I've seen. Maybe they don't work and live in the same town like NG, but professionally, relationships on active duty flourish pretty quickly, IMO...it makes sense, you work with them everyday.
True, but personal relationships have little to do with effectively working together and placing the best person for the job in the job. I disliked several soldiers in my squad and even on my team, but I knew there strengths and weaknesses and could lead them effectively. My RTO had been an RTO for 3-4 years, on active duty they usually had been an RTO for less then 6 months.



I'm glad it went well for your unit. In theory, it should work that way. Not sure it ends up being that way across the board. Not sure if the NG/RC SOF dynamic works differently. With that being said, I never met a CA guy or PSYOPer that wasn't RC...

Again CA is making a big recruiting push, so perhaps we will see that change. I would also guess that the culture shock between SF and RC is much less due to the SOF communities less formal operating mode to begin with. Of course I have never been or worked with the SF community, my knowledge is all second-hand through peers in the community.
Reed

Ken White
01-20-2009, 08:17 PM
...It prevents buck SGTs from calling the 1SG by his first name after being in the same unit for 10 years (just what I experienced in the NG). In AC, just about the time that folks get TOO comfortable with each other, they move on.but if a 1SG is really competent he won't really care what SGT Heebly calls him, he will care how Heebly performs and if that's good, then Heebly can call him "SOB" and get away with it...:wry:

More to the point, that 'move on' bit also prevents a lot of accountability processes. For example; if one is a BC and has a mediocre 1SG (there are a lot of them about) but one knows the 1SG's leaving in six months, there is little incentive to fix the problem. If one is himself leaving in a few months, there's no incentive to get rid of bad apples that will not be moving with one.
...My last 1SG had been at Campbell for 12 years, most of it in the same BCT and BN. There were several NCOs in my BN at Campbell that had been there for 5+ years.That propensity for staying tends to make one police the ranks a little better, poor performers get noticed and zapped...

That's one factor that gives both the 82d and 101st a little bit better overall performance capability than many units (having said that, all units go through cycles -- I've seen both Divisions in sad shape).

Both sides of the AC / RC mix have good and bad points and traits, in the end, it's all about the quality of the people -- and, mostly, there is little difference between them and they're pretty good. For which we should all be thankful.

120mm
01-21-2009, 12:05 AM
As for 120mm's observations, some are valid and some not so. We in the CA community are looking for good, smart soldiers...send me a PM and I will get you linked up with someone who can help you sign up and then you can straighten things out. ;)

Are you saying the numbnuts who run CA have decided to grant an exception to Reserve Officers living overseas for the transition course? This is the kind of brain dead idiotic decisions that I'm familiar with vis-a-vis CA.

My complaint about that dates back to earlier this year. I doubt it has changed since then. If CA cannot or will not recognize the unique asset that ex-pat Reserve Officers could potentially be, I have nothing for them. And if they think that it is reasonable for an ex-pat Reservist to give up their tax exempt status to rebranch CA, they are smoking weed.

And not thanks, I believe that CA is beyond straightening out. Making CA a branch was a mistake.

Voodoun
01-21-2009, 08:42 AM
So we've clearly identified a problem with Reserve CA and PSYOP troops then. Given that brand new units are being stood up and soldiers are being brought in from other MOS, with seasoned MPs becoming amateur PSYOP and CA RC's, it seems that some of the blame lies with a faulty reserve model. It may work fine for a logistics unit, or even an MI unit, but if we were to rebuild CA and PSYOP, or even reintroduce RC SF, what would we do different? I've heard great things about the NG SF units, what are they doing different, and how can RC CA and PSYOP benefit from whatever it is that they are doing differently?

Ken White
01-21-2009, 05:30 PM
So we've clearly identified a problem with Reserve CA and PSYOP troops then.Seems to me we've heard that they don't hit the weight standard and that they have arcane personnel management rules (as does the entire Army -- both items...). I'm not sure that equates to a problem. Reserve CA an PsyOps folks generally work full time in allied fields as civilians and thus develop a day-to-day expertise that few active duty people will achieve through training or education.
...it seems that some of the blame lies with a faulty reserve model. It may work fine for a logistics unit, or even an MI unit, but if we were to rebuild CA and PSYOP, or even reintroduce RC SF, what would we do different? I've heard great things about the NG SF units, what are they doing different, and how can RC CA and PSYOP benefit from whatever it is that they are doing differently?The two USAR SF Groups left the structure as a result of a political deal between the ARNG and the USAR. That deal saw all combat arms units in the ARNG and the USAR convert to CS/CSS. Dumb idea IMO but it's done. I'm not at all sure that the reserve CA/PsyOp element are in as much disarray as you seem to think...

But I'm old and retarded so I'll yield to someone who's there now... ;)

Surferbeetle
01-21-2009, 05:48 PM
Chores permitting I'll see if I can set aside some time this weekend to research and add a post on military government/civil affairs history. I will also try and address in a short space why it's still around and why it's a fun/rewarding specialty for those of us who practice it...

Somebody else will have to take the the SF and PSYOP batons.

Voodoun
01-21-2009, 08:43 PM
I dont think I would ever say its disarray, but its been pretty well established that we have a mixed reputation. Its incumbent on us to turn that around and leave every supported unit from here on out thinking 'damn, those guys were great, how did I ever do my job without them?', so I'm just engaging in a creative thought experiment.

Ken White
01-21-2009, 08:57 PM
Admitting that I'm not current, I did play with those kinds of folks off and on for a long time. Then the problem was not that they were incompetent -- they were quite competent. The problems were, in order of importance:

- Too many combat arms commanders didn't know how they were best employed and a good many of those were too ego driven to listen to good advice.

- They were scruffy Reservists, many needed haircuts, etc. etc.

While I'll acknowledge that there are some poor performing types in the CA / PsyOps world (no field of endeavor is filled with perfect people), I think, based on my observations that the issue is not so much your guy's reputations as it some people prejudices and lack of knowledge (attributable to poor training).

Bet the Combat Arms Officer Basic Courses offer little instruction on the use of either one of those force multipliers. Yet, almost every graduate thereof will work with them before he sees another school...

And we have known that for over 63 years.

Uboat509
01-21-2009, 11:04 PM
I've heard great things about the NG SF units, what are they doing different, and how can RC CA and PSYOP benefit from whatever it is that they are doing differently?

Can you qualify this statement? What great things have you heard about NG SF? You want to see if anything they do differently would transfer to the reserve CA forces but I am not sure that there is really anything to transfer.

SFC W

Uboat509
01-21-2009, 11:25 PM
Admitting that I'm not current, I did play with those kinds of folks off and on for a long time. Then the problem was not that they were incompetent -- they were quite competent. The problems were, in order of importance:

- Too many combat arms commanders didn't know how they were best employed and a good many of those were too ego driven to listen to good advice.

- They were scruffy Reservists, many needed haircuts, etc. etc.

While I'll acknowledge that there are some poor performing types in the CA / PsyOps world (no field of endeavor is filled with perfect people), I think, based on my observations that the issue is not so much your guy's reputations as it some people prejudices and lack of knowledge (attributable to poor training).

Bet the Combat Arms Officer Basic Courses offer little instruction on the use of either one of those force multipliers. Yet, almost every graduate thereof will work with them before he sees another school...

And we have known that for over 63 years.

This is something that I have seen more than once in the last few years. As ken notes, it is an old problem. Prior to OIF, Big Army really didn't want to have anything with the type of missions they routinely do now. They didn't want to do FID, they didn't want to do COIN and they damn sure din't want to have spend time worrying about the indig except as obstacles on the battlefield. That was all stuff to be left to the "snake eaters" and good riddance. CA clearly fell into that group. SF was off doing FID and UW and building rapport with the indig while Big Army was concerned with defending against 20 Guards Tank divions rolling out of the Fulda Gap. Both groups sort of looked down their noses at one another but they were more or less happy with way things were divided, and that included CA assests. Then along came OIF and everything changed. After the invasion, Big Army found itself doing alot of those tasks that they has outright disdained for years and SF found itself sharing those tasks with the Big Army. That has created a lot of the friction that has occured between these two groups in recent years. Now Big Army wants more CA. Fine. I whole heartedly agree that have more CA available to Big Army is a good thing. I do get annoyed, however when I hear people complaining about how SF gets more of the AD CA guys when, for years, SF was the main user of CA assets. I also can't help but wonder if, after OIF ends and OEF draws down if you won't see a return to the old division of labor between SF and Big Army.

SFC W

Ken White
01-21-2009, 11:42 PM
...I do get annoyed, however when I hear people complaining about how SF gets more of the AD CA guys when, for years, SF was the main user of CA assets. I also can't help but wonder if, after OIF ends and OEF draws down if you won't see a return to the old division of labor between SF and Big Army.somebody needs to work on both those problems There's no need for either. The structural imbalance is an easy fix.

While a certain degree of professional jealousy will always exist and is even healthy in small doses, when it gets in the way of getting the job done, it should be fixed. It seems that there's a fair degree of cooperation and understanding at the working level, be nice if it could be raised to the echelons above reality...

Voodoun
01-22-2009, 01:03 AM
I've just heard great things about them. People who have worked with them that I know have said they were top notch. I don't know why - I can only assume that they train very effectively and are good at their jobs.

As far as RC CA/PSYOP being scruffy and needing haircuts, I think there is a need for these groups to culturally distinguish themselves from the high and tight 82nd types. In the Arab world, for instance, facial hair and beards are immediate symbols of virility, power, and trustworthiness. I cannot stand facial hair on myself, and I look absolutely retarded with a mustache, but bet your britches I'm growing one out when I get deployed (hopefully I can stand it). From what I've seen there's an intentional cultivation of that scruffier look specifically in order to present a less militant and hostile image to the population.

Does this come across as lazy or rebellious to Commanders?

Ken White
01-22-2009, 01:28 AM
I've just heard great things about them. People who have worked with them that I know have said they were top notch. I don't know why - I can only assume that they train very effectively and are good at their jobs.good periods and bad periods; all of 'em have subordinate elements that vary from good to bad. The 19th and 20th did and do train hard, they did and do get a lot of active SF guys who get out and want to go to the Groups; so they are pretty good -- but nobody's always great. Nobody. Nor any unit...
As far as RC CA/PSYOP being scruffy and needing haircuts, I think there is a need for these groups to culturally distinguish themselves from the high and tight 82nd types.Partly true, I think but I suspect the average Co Cdr in the deuce won't agree. :D
In the Arab world, for instance, facial hair and beards are immediate symbols of virility, power, and trustworthiness.Uh, yeah -- for them selves. Since they mostly watch a video or TV once in a while, they know that westerners generally don't do that, you simply become someone who's trying way too hard to fit in -- and, in most case unless you're really fluent in the language and really like the culture and adapt to it thoroughly (which, unfortunately, can sometimes cause chain of command problems...), they won't five uyou much credit for facial hair. The Marine unit that went in to Fallujah with OIF 3 all grew mustaches, I heard they pretty well shaved 'em off after a few weeks. A lot of SF guys do the beard thing -- for them it's an advantage in delaying their identification as US for a few minutes; they may think it's a cultural in but folks in Afghanistan tend to call them 'the Jews' on the rastionale that only Muslims and Jews were beards... :wry:
I cannot stand facial hair on myself, and I look absolutely retarded with a mustache, but bet your britches I'm growing one out when I get deployed (hopefully I can stand it). From what I've seen there's an intentional cultivation of that scruffier look specifically in order to present a less militant and hostile image to the population.Wait 'til you get there to decide. As to presenting a less miltant look, the flip side of that is that Arabs do weakness, OTOH, if you look like you know what you're doing, they tend to leave you alone if possible. ;)
Does this come across as lazy or rebellious to Commanders?It will to some, those with enough self confidence won't worry about it, may even encourage it IF they know it does in their AO what you think it might.

RTK
01-22-2009, 01:42 AM
I've done long hair, mustache, beard, high and tight, and shaved head thing in my tours. Some out of necessity and water conservation, some out of pure experimentation and attempts to do what you're talking about.


I've found that competency and sincerity count more to the Arabs than follicular exuberance.

jkm_101_fso
01-22-2009, 05:33 AM
In the Arab world, for instance, facial hair and beards are immediate symbols of virility, power, and trustworthiness. I cannot stand facial hair on myself, and I look absolutely retarded with a mustache, but bet your britches I'm growing one out when I get deployed (hopefully I can stand it). From what I've seen there's an intentional cultivation of that scruffier look specifically in order to present a less militant and hostile image to the population.

Ditto what RTK said. It's all a bunch of crap.

Guys will try and go "scruffy" on deployment because there's some misnomer that looking like that is cool. I don't really get it.

You're an American Soldier. Arabs all know it and could care less if you grow a mustache. They will be more impressed with your sincerity, effort and patience.

I will admit that for 6 weeks during deployment #2, I grew a mustache and went sans haircut. I did not do so to impress any Arab I worked with, but too infuriate and annoy my commander (who hated both long hair and mustaches), which I enjoyed doing very much.:D

Bill Moore
01-22-2009, 08:13 AM
For the most part I agree with the criticisms about the long hair and facial hair. It has simply been over done. When you see some of these kids on the FOB everyday with their Jihad beards or ungroomed (and not so bushy) mustaches with long side burns, yet you never see them on patrol you have to stratch your head and wonder what the real purpose is. Everyone wants their cool guy photos I guess. Did GEN Petraeus grow a beard or mustache? Was he disrespected because he didn't?

RTK pegged it quite well,
I've found that competency and sincerity count more to the Arabs than follicular exuberance.

You know it went too far when you're in Afghanistan and the U.S. dudes are bearded, but their ANA counterparts are relatively clean shaven because they're enjoying their freedom from Taliban rule. We claim it is so we can fit in better, but that argument is frequently superficial for the most part, because that is as far as many are willing to go to fit in better.

On the other hand, there are definitely times when it is required (or sometimes it is just helpful), and adult leadership can figure that out. If you need it, then by all means go for it. F@#* a bunch of worthless of regulations that aren't applicable and the morons who mindlessly enforce them, but on the other hand if you don't need it for operational purposes, stop making the force look stupid. Just do the right thing for the right reason.

Schmedlap
01-22-2009, 09:47 AM
And let's not even get started on the dreaded rolling of sleeves. Folding back the cuff of one's sleeve about two inches? That has scarred many mens' souls...

82redleg
01-22-2009, 10:37 AM
...As far as RC CA/PSYOP being scruffy and needing haircuts, I think there is a need for these groups to culturally distinguish themselves from the high and tight 82nd types. In the Arab world, for instance, facial hair and beards are immediate symbols of virility, power, and trustworthiness. I cannot stand facial hair on myself, and I look absolutely retarded with a mustache, but bet your britches I'm growing one out when I get deployed (hopefully I can stand it). From what I've seen there's an intentional cultivation of that scruffier look specifically in order to present a less militant and hostile image to the population.

Does this come across as lazy or rebellious to Commanders?

You can grow a mustache and not have a high and tight, and still be within Army regulations. As pointed out below, it probably doesn't make that much difference.

The PSYOP team sergeant that we inherited on our A-stan deployment (he rotated about 3 months after we arrived) had a great Grizzly Adams red beard, modified DCUs with velcro all over, and absolutely no badges, patches, nametags, anything. He also wore a pro-tech helmet and a plate carrier whenever he could (we ended up threatening to leave him on the FOB if he didn't conform to PPE directives). His excuse was "I have to blend in, there is a price on my head because I am a SOF guy"- I've got news for you- you stick out like a sore thumb, because you are getting out of an Up Armor HMMWV. If you want to blend in, try looking like the other 30 Americans you are traveling with. Guys like this give PSYOPpers a bad name.


And let's not even get started on the dreaded rolling of sleeves. Folding back the cuff of one's sleeve about two inches? That has scarred many mens' souls...

That is just lack of standards. Wear the uniform, wear it right, its not that hard. Out humping the mountains, I got it- you do what needs to be done. If you don't have the discipline to get your uniform right when you come back on the FOB, why should I believe you have the discipline to clear your weapon right, take care of your vehicles right, or do anything else right. And if you live on the FOB, and your only exposure to the heat is the walk from work to the DFAC (or from your NTV to the DFAC), you have no excuse whatsoever.

Schmedlap
01-22-2009, 11:00 AM
Out humping the mountains, I got it- you do what needs to be done.
That is what I was referring to. I've never lived on a FOB and I've never made any attempt to understand the madness that occurs there. There are people who go diving for their heart pills when they see a photo of a guy with his cuff folded while on a raid.

Voodoun
01-22-2009, 11:23 AM
I suppose my perception of this is skewed by the fact that the only Active Duty time I really have is months spent either in the schoolhouse at Bragg surrounded by instructors and non-AIT students with longish hair and scruffy facial hair, or in a sea of 82nd guys with razor sharp high and tights. Very interesting perspectives.

As far as rolling the sleeves, we were shown to tuck them up and in, not out. Running around Camp Mackall in Cat 5 in full battle rattle was bad enough with cuffed sleeves and unboused boots, I cannot imagine what 140 degree heat is going to be like.

How effective are techniques like soaking a keffyiah in water? Moderately, I assume?

Bill Moore mentioned the superficiality of fitting it, and I totally agree, so my question is, what are some of the deeper 'fitting in' methods you would suggest? I mean, I'm as culturally aware it gets, having grown up with Arab culture in my intimate surroundings, but what specific things can soldiers who work with the people do to fit in better?

Voodoun
01-22-2009, 11:39 AM
Well, from what I understand about the name tapes, that was a centralized directive from USASOC (again, I dont know, that's just what I've heard from multiple sources). From what I've been told by more than one authority in both DoD and DoJ, there was good reason for concern in protecting family names.

I've got a rather unique last name, and I'm actually pretty certain I'm the ONLY one with it in the US Army (according to the last AKO search I did).

Although I never got to find out the details of the investigation, I do know for a fact that someone used my name and SSN# and enlisted in the Marine Corps. All I know is that he was in the DEP and that the authorities were aggressively looking for him.

That sort of thing scares the bejeezus out me, particularly because I spent some time on the editorial staff of a significantly distributed paper, and resourceful student radicals were able to track down personal information and deliver threats I was advised to take seriously.

I wonder if I can get a fake nametape made up - like "Nasser" or something.

What I don't understand is why anyone would want to grow a full on beard in Iraq, good lord. And if you're on the FOB, why wouldnt you want to be showered, clean, shaved, and neat? Seems like that would be a luxury.

RTK
01-22-2009, 11:59 AM
As far as rolling the sleeves, we were shown to tuck them up and in, not out. Running around Camp Mackall in Cat 5 in full battle rattle was bad enough with cuffed sleeves and unboused boots, I cannot imagine what 140 degree heat is going to be like.


I don't let my guys do that. Neither does army regulation. Here's why:

When you see a guy burn the Sierra out of his arm from a hot .50 cal cartridge or a second degree sunburn, both of which take him out of the fight for days, cuffing defeats the purpose of the function of the uniform.

This is a microcosm example of how we've excused our way into bad practices and shortcuts over the past few years. We used to monitor hydration. Now we allow our guys to sidestep uniform functionality for comfort.

I've worked under the command of an AOB in combat as a TACON conventional troop commander. I've worked with NG and AC SF teams. All do their jobs well. We had no problems between the two "worlds." We knew our role and how we fit into their scheme of maneuver. We were able to express that to our Soldiers, and we were very clear to our guys that we would stick to the standards and regulations that we had trained and followed up until that point, regardless of what those around us would do. There were things that we bent on, due to form and function (like grooming standards during mission due to water conservations), but uniforms function was not one of them.

As for fake nametapes, don't bother. You'll only confuse the identity process for your family. If you don't want someone to know your name, take the velcro nametape off.

Voodoun
01-22-2009, 01:11 PM
RTK, what a great way to assume we're all gonna die! :-)

No, seriously, very valid point.

Also, the cuffing of sleeves I mentioned only meant one fold, up and in, so the sleeve stopped at the wrist, rather than somewhere on the hand, greatly improving airflow. I could feel my body temp drop significantly when doing this. Sunscreen was mandatory, of course, though, as was hydration, but when we were out at Land Nav the SF selection star course going on in our shared AO lost two soldiers to heat related issues (I think there were other more direct causes, one of which was multiple moccassin bites). I've spent most of my life in hot humid climates, where temperatures regularly got to 110+, and I simply cannot fathom the 140 degree heat you all have had to cope with. Its a huge concern of mine, and I intend to spend this summer making myself miserable in the Texas heat to acclimatize the best I can.

Thinking about that guy who used my info to enlist, I wonder if its worth trying to dig up the results of that. It happened about 15 months ago, and I understand that I have no right to know what happened, but boy, I sure am curious.

RTK
01-22-2009, 02:03 PM
Also, the cuffing of sleeves I mentioned only meant one fold, up and in, so the sleeve stopped at the wrist, rather than somewhere on the hand, greatly improving airflow.


One cuff still defeats the function. You need gloves anyways, at least when dealing with crew served weapons on HMMWVs or 72 ton monsters that attract heat like white on rice. If I'm not mistaken, that's an Armywide policy when leaving the wire anyways (gloves and eye protection is part of the uniform). The cuffing allows a little pocket that's just the right size for brass. Even when dismounted, a thrown 5.56 round into the sleeve could result in the striken Soldier to unvoluntarily clench his muscles. If he's behind you in the stack and his weapon is flagging someone, it could have catastrophic results.

From a motorized or mechanized perspective, we hung a Kestrel guage in our tank in May 2003. The gunner's station was 155 F. You'd scald yourself on the metal of the coopla. In 2005 the inside of my HMMWV, with a climate control system, in the middle of the Al Jezera desert in western Iraq was still over 100 F. Imagine if the driver cuffed and a stray .50 round went in his blouse. I can. We damn near rolled a vehicle.

In the end, risk reduction control measures are emplaced for reasons. I'd bounce my ideas off my senior NCOs before I completed my risk assessment with special emphasis in reduction control measures. My last 1SG had 40% of his body burned in Iraq. Needless to say his pet peeve was uniforms, nomex, gloves, eye protection, and NO CUFFING.

Your NCOs will direct you on the right path. Don't try to out-think them. Some of these guys have been doing this a while.

We're from the government and we're here to help. :D

Voodoun
01-22-2009, 03:00 PM
My unit consists of maybe 30% who have deployed, and the only ones who have deployed as PSYOP will not be deploying with us when we go. My current TPT has me as the second most senior person on it - my e5 promotion should be within the next couple months. I will be the only one who has completed PSYOP AIT, as oppose to the 3 week reclass. I'm not trying to out think anyone, I'm trying to get as much information vicariously as possible, so that my team doesnt make retarded mistakes, like getting burnt by hot brass because of cuffed sleeves.

sandbag
01-22-2009, 07:42 PM
My second trip out, two new PSYOPers attached to us reported directly to the J-4 and asked: "Can we have some knives and watches?" A couple of days later, they put each other in for CABs when a bird they were in got one or two rounds fired at it. Classic.

Anecdotal and not fully reflecting upon the community, I know, but one of the biggest challenges I saw the CA/PSYOP guys face was the "kit makes the man" mentality. Work with SF? Awesome. Lots of people do, but beards, sterile ACUs and a bunch of kit you can't use right aren't required for the job. Sometimes, the more you try to fit in, the more you stand out. The locals have figured out that Joe isn't always allowed to sport the Grizzly Adams. Grow a porn/CW3 'stache and work from there. Just be mellow, and things will work out.






Bill Moore mentioned the superficiality of fitting it, and I totally agree, so my question is, what are some of the deeper 'fitting in' methods you would suggest? I mean, I'm as culturally aware it gets, having grown up with Arab culture in my intimate surroundings, but what specific things can soldiers who work with the people do to fit in better?

Voodoun
01-22-2009, 08:44 PM
Knives and watches? I'm not sure I understand that, is that code or something? Shouldn't everyone have a watch, and isn't some sort of knife/leatherman a good idea?

As far as other kit, I've never understood why people would want to carry all sorts of extra gear. If anything I'm going to buy the farm because I leave something behind because I dont want to carry it. The sterile ACUs thing I defintely get though for many reasons, the aforementioned protective measure, as well as the elimination of rank as a concern when working with centers of gravity.

I'm pretty set on the mellow part, and I'm quite comfortable with Arab customs, although I'm sure Iraqi customs are a bit different than Levantine ones. How do you guys handle being offered food and drink over there? do you just swig pepto all day and hope for the best?

reed11b
01-22-2009, 08:55 PM
I'm pretty set on the mellow part, and I'm quite comfortable with Arab customs, although I'm sure Iraqi customs are a bit different than Levantine ones. How do you guys handle being offered food and drink over there? do you just swig pepto all day and hope for the best?

Yep :D Actually I never did get sick from the local lunches, only from the vendor food. The food was actually pretty good, eat as little meat as you can and still be polite, you should do just fine. Of course why whould Psyops guys be eating w/ the locals? I thought "hearts and minds" belonged to CA and local unit commanders. What exactly do PSYOPS guys do?
Reed

Voodoun
01-22-2009, 09:18 PM
hearts and minds is, from what I understand, a phrase invented by PSYOP for PSYOP.

I have no idea why we'd be eating over there, I just know I've heard people telling stories talking about it. A couple guys I know were living in safehouses way outside the wire, with an ODA, rolling around in old battered pick up trucks and donkeys and what not.


But if you're working with a center of gravity, or key influencer, say, a mayor or an influential businessman, and you're in their house or office, I would be surprised if you werent being offered all kinds of "treats".

The closest thing I have to operational experience is the CULEX out at FOB Freedom at Mackall, and as a TPT chief I was regularly being manuevered into highly uncomfortable situations into houses and offices and having gatorade thrust at me that these sweaty guys with bad hygiene were swigging from, not to mention cheap cigars.

You know whats funny is, all this anticipation on my part, and I'm going to wind up in the green zone training the IO cell of some IA unit in an AC bldg the whole time.

Ken White
01-22-2009, 09:19 PM
Knives and watches? I'm not sure I understand that, is that code or something? Shouldn't everyone have a watch, and isn't some sort of knife/leatherman a good idea?an old SF myth. Today, some units issue both, thus the plea for an issue...

Get a good watch, preferably not battery operated; supply can get dicey and a Leatherman tool or a Gerber is more gooder than a knife for most things.
...The sterile ACUs thing I defintely get though for many reasons, the aforementioned protective measure, as well as the elimination of rank as a concern when working with centers of gravity.It's not a protective measure; not one that does much good for any practical purpose, anyway -- though it is considered by some to be high speed (mostly by people who have no real need). I wouldn't put too much credence on the elimination of rank; being honest, accurate and sensible counts for more than rank with most in the AO (and the Army) -- and if you try the "Mr." bit on any experienced officer or NCO, they're just going to ask you for your real ID card which you have to carry. I've ruined the day of several young Specialists and NCOs with nominally obscure rank status on that score; couple of LTs as well... :wry:

Establish your credibility with competence -- that always works.

Be careful with 'centers of gravity' that's an Operational level term that doesn't translate well to the tactical realm where you'll likely be working.;)
...How do you guys handle being offered food and drink over there? do you just swig pepto all day and hope for the best?Can't speak for others but I had no problems and I ate on the economy far more often that not. I can truthfully say that I never had a bad meal in the Middle East -- had plenty of bad ones in Asia, Latin America and here...:o

sandbag
01-22-2009, 10:53 PM
It's not a code: they just assumed that they were entitled to some kind of kitwhore version of a fruit basket for getting off the aircraft. Cool kid gear is overrated, but I don't think they got told that before they left CONUS. :)

On food outside the wire: if you have med/vet people checking out local sources, that helps. If not, shoot for stuff that is thoroughly cooked. Bread is an awesome filler (and let me tell you the region has some excellent breads), and is usually a very safe bet.

The whole no-rank, first-name thing has been done for years by jackass SP4s in the CID community. You'll not likely be in a situation in which you need to do that (then again, most CID guys aren't, either, but they do it all the same). Just follow the lead of older folks who are in charge. BLUF: if you are looking over your shoulder a lot when you're doing it, it's probably not a good practice.


Knives and watches? I'm not sure I understand that, is that code or something? Shouldn't everyone have a watch, and isn't some sort of knife/leatherman a good idea?

As far as other kit, I've never understood why people would want to carry all sorts of extra gear. If anything I'm going to buy the farm because I leave something behind because I dont want to carry it. The sterile ACUs thing I defintely get though for many reasons, the aforementioned protective measure, as well as the elimination of rank as a concern when working with centers of gravity.

I'm pretty set on the mellow part, and I'm quite comfortable with Arab customs, although I'm sure Iraqi customs are a bit different than Levantine ones. How do you guys handle being offered food and drink over there? do you just swig pepto all day and hope for the best?

ODB
01-22-2009, 10:53 PM
Think all of those terms neatly explain what everyone is talking about and yet they are the way we judge soldiers today. If I'm disciplined and force those around me to be disciplined then none of the other terms apply to how I act or how I present myself. ACUs I hate them personally, but will I be caught in something else? No, I am still a soldier and do as soldiers should. In todays kinder, gentler Army we have issues such as these. Yes we want intelligent, free thinkers, but they also must understand the institution that is the Army. Sorry to admit this but it is not the officers job to enforce uniform adherence. Unfortunately it has started to come to this, many NCOs today are nothing more than glorified privates. As assholish as it sounds I make a point to make a uniform correction everyday. We kinda make it into a challenge to get other NCOs involved, before you know it, it catches fire. Be, know, do! Do they still teach that?

Nothing like hot brass. I absolutely love it when hot brass goes down the back of my uniform. Think I want that on my wrist? I got it, it is flippin' hot out but not as hot as hot brass. I'd have to venture out and say if your dying while conducting movement then you may want to reevalute your physical conditioning. When was the last time you did body armour runs? Funny the more you use it the easier it gets, just a thought. For a truly unique experience throw the promask into the mix. Goes back to training and pushing yourself and those around you beyond your normal limits. There is plenty of talk on here about training won't beat that dead horse anymore. Basics, basics, basics.

Funny the other day as I was logging into AKO there was this great picture of a soldier in a shop in Iraq wearing a ball cap. Perception it must be a SF guy, reality it was some conventional officer. What is the picture we are trying to paint? Sorry not a fan of the doesn't matter how you did as long as you looked good doing thought process. Know your job, know the regulations and present yourself in a professional manner and the rest will take care of itself.


As far as other kit, I've never understood why people would want to carry all sorts of extra gear. If anything I'm going to buy the farm because I leave something behind because I dont want to carry it. The sterile ACUs thing I defintely get though for many reasons, the aforementioned protective measure, as well as the elimination of rank as a concern when working with centers of gravity.

Kit. Want some I got 7 tough boxes, 2 duffle bags, and 3 kit bags of Army kit. Everytime I get ready to go back I have to go through RFI and add to it. There is stuff that has been in plastic for 5 years, more kit than you'll ever think about using. Hell I just about could outfit my own indig force, wait already have my wife and kid. Sterile does little to nothing except that on occasion we make CF staffs think we out rank the team sergeant and team leader, can be quite comical at times, especially when they find out it's actually the opposite. When dealing with locals it does absolutely nothing since your PPE covers it all anyways.

sandbag
01-22-2009, 11:00 PM
Listen to this guy. He knows quite a few things.

What you'll find is that there's a really bad perception in the rest of the Army that SOF is where you go if you want to do your own thing/be a cool kid/get tons of toys/whatever. It's wrong. SOF units are small because it's hard to find that many disciplined grownups who can check their ego at the door and work together for long periods in terrible conditions (hence the term "Quiet Professionals"!).


Think all of those terms neatly explain what everyone is talking about and yet they are the way we judge soldiers today. If I'm disciplined and force those around me to be disciplined then none of the other terms apply to how I act or how I present myself.

Voodoun
01-23-2009, 01:44 AM
Like I said, the last time I ran around in full battle rattle was a few months ago in cat 5 heat at Camp Mackall. It sucked. SF candidates were dying. Hydration only goes so far when in its hot as hell and you're on maybe 45 min-1.5 hours of interrupted sleep per day. That's why I was pointing out how awed I am by how you guys cope with 140 degree heat all summer long. You realize that the US military consists of the first people in the WORLD to manage that feat, right? Iraqi natives never ran around in the mid day summer sun loaded down with gear and wearing non-convection cooling clothes.

I'm just really impressed.

As far as the no name/no rank thing, just understand that its taught as a tactical procedural tool by the instructors at SWCS. I'm not saying its right or wrong, but given what I know about the targeting of SOF soldiers' families by cells here in the states, and the uniqueness of my last name, I get the name tape thing, while the rank thing has been explained by everyone from E5's back from deployment to Lt. Cols warning us that PFC's and E4's are going to be required to be able to walk into a room with tribal officials, wearing no rank, and present themselves with enough professionalism and competence that they come across as seasoned officers. I don't know one iota of how things work in the real world, don't get me wrong, I just think its important that you understand that on certain fronts you may be coming down too hard on the soldiers for making individual 'cool kid' choices when they're just following their unit SOP. During our CULEX the opposition used our pictures and names to distribute their own propaganda, and to counter our products.

But its good to understand all of your varying perceptions!

82redleg
01-23-2009, 10:47 AM
As far as the no name/no rank thing, just understand that its taught as a tactical procedural tool by the instructors at SWCS. I'm not saying its right or wrong, but given what I know about the targeting of SOF soldiers' families by cells here in the states, and the uniqueness of my last name, I get the name tape thing, while the rank thing has been explained by everyone from E5's back from deployment to Lt. Cols warning us that PFC's and E4's are going to be required to be able to walk into a room with tribal officials, wearing no rank, and present themselves with enough professionalism and competence that they come across as seasoned officers. I don't know one iota of how things work in the real world, don't get me wrong, I just think its important that you understand that on certain fronts you may be coming down too hard on the soldiers for making individual 'cool kid' choices when they're just following their unit SOP. During our CULEX the opposition used our pictures and names to distribute their own propaganda, and to counter our products.

But its good to understand all of your varying perceptions!

Your AIT may have taught you that, but generally speaking, a PFC or SPC won't be doing that- the PL or CO CDR will. The PFC or SPC will be there to support.

I'm not talking about a going without a nametape, or wearing a different name outside the wire- in my experience, its over the top, but whatever. Our HCT guys do it, too. What I'm talking about is NO, absolutely zero, patches, US ARMY, anything, except maybe some BS pirate patch, "becuase I have to blend in" (newsflash, you just got out of a HMMWV, you don't blend it), which, combined with a Grizzly Adams beard on the FOB (since you only went out for a leaflet drop, and the BN CDR's KLE), and absolute disregard for directed uniform standards, discredits your entire operation

Voodoun
01-23-2009, 10:59 AM
pirate patches? you're kidding. thats kinda funny.

Schmedlap
01-23-2009, 11:26 AM
Sorry to admit this but it is not the officers job to enforce uniform adherence.

That is really what I was getting at when I inadvertently diverted this thread down the uniform rabbit hole. On my last deployment, a JSOTF commander was personally screening photos taken by embedded COMCAM personnel before the photos were sent higher. His primary concern: cuffed sleeves, sideburns, and other random uniform infractions. The reason for his concern: someone higher up would get upset about said infractions. It is, imo, a ridiculous situation when an SF LTC feels that he needs to pay such attention to such minutia. This was a very laid back, very effective commander. He would not have focused so much attention on this foolishness unless there was significant emphasis on it from higher up because he admittedly did not care about the issue otherwise.

I cannot prove it, but I have a nagging suspicion that the folks up higher were not concerned about practical issues associated with cuffed sleeves, such as hot brass. They were concerned about appearances, even though the photos were taken on raids or during training that occurred within an IA compound, away from prying eyes. And we can all argue about dangers of cuffed sleeves, but it seems reasonable to me to let a E-8 team sergeant dictate such minutia. The Colonels and Generals aren't doing their jobs if they're wetting their pants over this stuff.

Voodoun
01-23-2009, 12:03 PM
understand that not everyone is going to have access to E8 team sgt's with multiple deployments on their first tour out. I'm glad I have a venue in which to absorb all these opinions prior to my deployment. The highest ranking NCO in my company is an E6. No one with PSYOP deployment experience is going to be deploying with us, as far as we know right now. My entire Detachment has zero combat deployments.

jkm_101_fso
01-23-2009, 03:36 PM
understand that not everyone is going to have access to E8 team sgt's with multiple deployments on their first tour out. I'm glad I have a venue in which to absorb all these opinions prior to my deployment. The highest ranking NCO in my company is an E6. No one with PSYOP deployment experience is going to be deploying with us, as far as we know right now. My entire Detachment has zero combat deployments.

Is your unit new? Wow, that is pretty unbelievable after seven years of war; considering the high number of deployments for CA/PSYOP.

Voodoun
01-23-2009, 04:07 PM
My unit is brand spanking new, and so are A LOT of the units rotating into the field over the next 12 months.

At this point our only NCO PSYOPers with combat deployments as PSYOP are ETSing before our deployment.

Our 1st Sgt is an E6 (we have an E7 Training NCO, but he's admin support, so I didnt count him).

We have the one WO test case for PSYOP, and a couple Det Cmdrs with deployment experience, but I'm not going to see my DC but what, once or twice in a deployment?

So like I said, I'm eager to absorb the musings you guys have about all this stuff, because while I may have a pretty impressive civilian history, that has little bearing on soldiering.

See, I've already learned - whatever adjustments I feel I need to make when working in the field I'll make, but I won't come strolling back onto the FOB that way. I could have spent my entire deployment affecting my relationship with my supported unit and never known, because I wasnt given the heads up by an E8 team sgt with experience!

Ken White
01-23-2009, 06:14 PM
...He would not have focused so much attention on this foolishness unless there was significant emphasis on it from higher up because he admittedly did not care about the issue otherwise.
. . .
The Colonels and Generals aren't doing their jobs if they're wetting their pants over this stuff.concerned with appearance than with combat capability -- much less combat competence...

Penalty of being raised in an overly rank heavy 'peacetime Army' that places image ahead of performance and compliance ahead of innovation and that goes out of its way to stifle initiative by significant overcentralization. It is an institutional problem and not totally the fault of the worrywarts.

Ken White
01-23-2009, 06:18 PM
...Our 1st Sgt is an E6 (we have an E7 Training NCO, but he's admin support, so I didnt count him).I've seen a bunch of less than E8 1SGs -- including an Artillery Battery E-5 (and a NCOC graduate at that) in combat. Many do a better job than a lazy 8 would...
... but I'm not going to see my DC but what, once or twice in a deployment? That's okay, too.