A War's Impossible Mission

[MikeF]

This article was the thing last that I ever expected to read this morning, and I am at a loss for words. Roger Hill is a classmate of mine. The Roger that I knew is a gentlemen- cordial, smart, funny, endearing. The Roger that I remember embodied the values and character of West Point.

So, I suppose that I'm going to pray for discernment and discretion and hope that he finds peace. If I'm asked to provide a character reference, I will happily volunteer.

Regardless, I'm struck trying to resolve what happened.

A War's Impossible Mission (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/12/12/AR2008121203291.html?hpid=opinionsbox1)
PJ Tobia, Washington Post


KHOST PROVINCE, Afghanistan Capt. Roger Hill stood behind a long wooden desk, reading from a piece of paper that trembled lightly in his hand. "Please know that seeing your brothers whittled down one by one by a cowardly and ghost-like enemy is difficult," he said, glancing up only briefly at the team of military prosecutors assembled around him.

Hill is a U.S. Army officer in Afghanistan accused of detainee abuse, including a mock execution, war crimes, dereliction of duty and other serious charges stemming from an incident last August at a U.S. military base outside the capital city of Kabul. Members of his unit allegedly slapped Afghan detainees, and Hill himself is said to have fired his pistol into the ground near blindfolded Afghans to frighten them.

But after exploring the personalities and circumstances involved in this case, it's hard for me to condemn Hill or his first sergeant, Tommy Scott, who has been charged with assaulting the detainees. Stuck in the deadly middle ground between all-out war and nation- building, these men lashed out to protect themselves. To me, their story encapsulates the impossible role we've asked U.S. soldiers to play in the reconstruction of this devastated country. They are part warrior, part general contractor, yet they are surrounded on all sides by a populace that wants nothing more than to kill or be rid of them.


v/r

Mike

[Cavguy]

I have often explained to people who have not deployed that what frightened me about war wasn't the combat or getting killed, but ensuring I didn't lose my humanity and values in the process. It's real easy to fall into the trap CPT Hill and his 1SG did, and I came close myself once after a series of casualties in my unit, but fortunately thought the better of it.

It's also why people are confused when I talk about how much I utterly condemn the Abu Gharib individuals and the soldiers who raped/murdered the girl south of Baghdad, but have sympathy for the Marines involved in the Haditha issue. The former were gratuitous evil, an the latter a byproduct of the sheer frustration of operating among a population who's trying to kill you while you're trying to help. I doesn't make it okay, but I understand the frustration. It takes a tremendous amount of character and moral strength not to lose yourself out there, especially in combat outposts.

I hate to say it, but those who haven't been there just can't truly understand. Hopefully his jury will be comprised of at least a few who have. I don't see why his inquiry is heading in a harsh direction though, since no-one was killed. The BN CO who did it a few years back in Iraq only had to resign. Hell, he didn't kill anyone, like Sassaman's unit did, who also got off, along with COL Steele for ordering his PVTs to kill everyone on that island. Perhaps someone has recognized a trend and decided an example needed to be made.

So Sad.:(

Update: Reread the WaPo Article and was struck by this:


I was present for every unclassified minute of the Article 32 hearing. Prior to the incident last August, Hill was known as a promising young officer who had received a Bronze Star for valor and three Army commendation medals. He led his men through a bloody spring and summer of ambushes and IEDs. His company -- D Company of the 1st Battalion, 506th Infantry Regiment -- numbered only about 100 men and suffered more than 30 casualties and at least two deaths. But their morale was high. "These guys wouldn't want to be anywhere else," Scott said of his men.

Scott also has an impressive résumé. Career military, he won a Bronze Star of his own for a combat jump into Panama in 1988 and fought for 15 hours straight during the 1991 Gulf War.

(emphasis mine)

I hope the Article 32 hearing takes what has been demanded of these men in the past into consideration. This is why those guys can't be left in combat outposts for such long periods (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=4973) - they stress out. Units must enforce "off the line" time to recalibrate or incidents like this happen.

[MikeF]

Cavguy says:


I hope the Article 32 hearing takes what has been demanded of these men in the past into consideration. This is why those guys can't be left in combat outposts for such long periods (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=4973) - they stress out. Units must enforce "off the line" time to recalibrate or incidents like this happen.

Unfortunately, sending the boys "off the line" back to the FOB for rest and relaxation is often more frustrating and stressful than it is worth. This is not Vietnam. They are not going back to a "rest" area where they can have a couple of beers and decompress. I'll try to summarize how my soldiers described their refits. Eventually, most requested not to go on refits b/c it wasn't worth the hassle.

1. Scrounge FOB for parts, equipment, and ammunition.
2. Get yelled at by a CSM for having a dirty uniform.
3. Guard platoon's equipment.
4. Get yelled at by a CSM for not having a PT reflective belt in chow line.
5. Wait in line for an hour to use phone.
6. Get yelled at by a CSM for not having a haircut.
7. Return to Patrol Base.

As funny as these observations are, they are sad as well.

Just another day in the life of a grunt I suppose.

Update: one interesting study that should be conducted is on burnout. Police Officers, psychologists specializing in trauma, ER doctors, etc... face a high degree of burnout that can lead to a shortened career lifespan. Is their a correlation for soldiers in COIN? Is there a quantifiable time limit/tour frequency that soldiers can maintain? Just a thought.

v/r

Mike

[reed11b]

Cavguy says:



Unfortunately, sending the boys "off the line" back to the FOB for rest and relaxation is often more frustrating and stressful than it is worth. This is not Vietnam. They are not going back to a "rest" area where they can have a couple of beers and decompress. I'll try to summarize how my soldiers described their refits. Eventually, most requested not to go on refits b/c it wasn't worth the hassle.

1. Scrounge FOB for parts, equipment, and ammunition.
2. Get yelled at by a CSM for having a dirty uniform.
3. Guard platoon's equipment.
4. Get yelled at by a CSM for not having a PT reflective belt in chow line.
5. Wait in line for an hour to use phone.
6. Get yelled at by a CSM for not having a haircut.
7. Return to Patrol Base.

As funny as these observations are, they are sad as well.

Just another day in the life of a grunt I suppose.

Update: one interesting study that should be conducted is on burnout. Police Officers, psychologists specializing in trauma, ER doctors, etc... face a high degree of burnout that can lead to a shortened career lifespan. Is their a correlation for soldiers in COIN? Is there a quantifiable time limit/tour frequency that soldiers can maintain? Just a thought.

v/r

Mike
One Year. As for tour frequency that is more difficult to calculate, but my observations (which are obviously the opposites of the DOD's) lead me to believe that tour length has greater impact then tour frequency. Too bad the Army does not see it that way, but I have always said that Army Mental Health knowledge and Army policy have a huge gap that needs to be closed.
Reed

[Cavguy]

Most the below are simply leadership issues. My BCT took a different approach: see below



1. Scrounge FOB for parts, equipment, and ammunition.

Your S4, HHC CO, BMO, and BN XO failed you here. Period. I can say that after being an S4 in OIF 1 when we had real theater wide parts shortages, and my BN never lacked for anything essential that was humanly attainable through legal means or available for purchase on the economy. There is a way with a motivated and competent staff, which begins with the XO crushing nuts if they don't do it. The staff may bitch, but the bottom line is the staff supports the commander and the line.


2. Get yelled at by a CSM for having a dirty uniform.

Fixable by BN CO andyour CSM. That's what green tabs are for. I also never hesitated to tell another unit's NCO to get lost if giving my guys grief, and underwrote my NCO's and LT's to do the same. (within reason) Also fixable by you if it's another unit's CSM. What are they going to do - send you to a COP?


3. Guard platoon's equipment.

??? I guess I am puzzled why this is an issue.


4. Get yelled at by a CSM for not having a PT reflective belt in chow line.

Leadership issue. But how hard is it to carry a PT belt in your pocket?


5. Wait in line for an hour to use phone.

On our FOB the guys in COPs were issued special passes through the 1SG giving "head of line" priviliges at all MWR facilities supported by the BCT CO.


6. Get yelled at by a CSM for not having a haircut.

Leadership issue again.



Update: one interesting study that should be conducted is on burnout. Police Officers, psychologists specializing in trauma, ER doctors, etc... face a high degree of burnout that can lead to a shortened career lifespan. Is their a correlation for soldiers in COIN? Is there a quantifiable time limit/tour frequency that soldiers can maintain? Just a thought.

v/r

Mike

Agreed. Grossman writes extensively on psychological issues related to combat. Hackworth talks a lot about burnout (his and others) in 'About Face'. That is why I ruthlessly enforced my guys getting 48h break every 2 weeks in the COP. They didn't have the option of not going back. Even with the FOB BS the separation from the stress of being killed was key. The few times I was told they were messed with it was dealt with forcefully by either myself, the BN CO, and sometimes the BCT CO. Fortunately, our CSM's were relatively common sense. And there was no question inside of the Dukes that the guys in the COPs had priority.

More importantly though is the leadership attitude you describe. Maybe I was lucky over two tours to have very sensible leadership who shared the hardships with the men and ruthlessly forced the staff and logistics personnel to support the line. The interesting thing was that none of the loggies resented that - they embraced it. It was a point of pride that the line was taken care of. That's why 2-37 AR never wanted for anything essential in two tours. If someone in the line needed it, they got it. But the mindset comes from the 6's. If they're not standing up for their guys - we have major problems. It's leadership, stupid.

Niel

[Ken White]

"Down time in the rear" was ever thus -- Korea and Viet Nam had the same syndromes. Korea was tolerable, Viet Nam was far worse and your description sounds like Viet Nam x 1.5...

One BIG difference is that the problems in those earlier wars were unlikely to be senior NCOs but more likely to be Officers of other than combat arms or even more often, MPs. Thus, it seems we have a major change of who the uncomprehending are -- and they are that, uncomprehending, not necessarily ill intentioned -- and that is very worrisome.

It really needs some education. What is the Sergeants Major Academy doing to those guys? What are they doing? Things must have changed, I served as a Bn and a Bde CSM in peacetime and in combat and I sure had other things to worry about. In both states of conflict.

I'm not going to address that stupid reflective belt which is and should be trashed worldwide but certainly restricted to CONUS at a minimum...:mad:

To your secondary point -- may be your primary but to me it's secondary. Not to denigrate it or lessen the evil or pain of it but simply in view of the inevitability of it. It cannot, I believe, be prevented; it goes with the job:
Update: one interesting study that should be conducted is on burnout. Police Officers, psychologists specializing in trauma, ER doctors, etc... face a high degree of burnout that can lead to a shortened career lifespan. Is their a correlation for soldiers in COIN? Is there a quantifiable time limit/tour frequency that soldiers can maintain? Just a thought.It's been studied and there are no conclusive results to my knowledge. My observation is that it is very much an individual thing; some people can take a lot of stress, others less. Everyone has a breaking point and there's no way to tell what action or event will trigger that point in an individual -- though leaders can and should see the signs of an impending problem if they know and watch their people. That means the Squad Leader has to let the Platoon leader know because no one can know 40 people well enough to spot that if one is doing one's other jobs; that, in turn, means the PSG or Plt Ldr have to train and require their subordinates -- which they're supposed to be doing in any event.

I'm not sure whether the tedium and long term pressure of COIN operations are worse than MCO. My sensing is that each affects different people in different ways; some can tolerate one and not the other, some tolerate neither and some can tolerate both fairly well. There are studies which posit 200 days of combat is the determinant but that's a median and I think it's still a very individual thing.

Having said all that, re: the original issue in the linked Article, seems to me the wrong folks are the recipients of the Article 32, from the WaPo article:
"Over the past year, Hill's company made at least 10 such requests, although none were approved, according to 1st Lt. Larry Kay, Hill's executive officer. Kay, who is also facing charges related to the incident, added that other U.S. companies' detainees are routinely accepted by battalion and blames the repeated denials on friction between Hill and his battalion command."The Captain erred, so did his 1SG but (1) I don't see a 'federal case' here and (2) who's investigating the Battalion for not accepting the detainees? More questions than answers at this point, perhaps more information will come out.

More importantly, when the Australians were in Viet Nam, they wisely threw up a 20' berm around their base camps and they did NOT use local contract labor. Seemed smart to me and I spent a couple of years in Viet Nam railing about the stupidity -- it is that -- of using local employees on combat bases to 'boost the local economy.' Stupid. Abysmally stupid.

[Cavguy]

It really needs some education. What is the Sergeants Major Academy doing to those guys? What are they doing? Things must have changed, I served as a Bn and a Bde CSM in peacetime and in combat and I sure had other things to worry about. In both states of conflict.

I'm not going to address that stupid reflective belt which is and should be trashed worldwide but certainly restricted to CONUS at a minimum...:mad:


Ken,

A slight majority of CSM's I have endured have "taking care of soldiers" back-assward in my view. They think their role is to enforce discipline. Rather than focus on the important things, they equate discipline to "enforcing the standard", usually evidenced by unusual concern with police call, uniform quality, haircuts, speed limits.

I have rarely seen them concerned with weapons maintenance, vehicle maintenance (other than making sure chalk blocks and drip pans were down), soldier food quality, supply availability, or things that really matter to combat survival.

I have had some MAJOR exceptions to this. But somewhere between E-7 and E-9 many lose perspective of their role in the unit, and go through motions rather than helping with what really matters.

I think the Parameters article from 15 years ago arguing for the abolition of the CSM (not SGM) rank above BN level had some merit. The higher level the CSM the more they focus on BS, typically.


I'm not sure whether the tedium and long term pressure of COIN operations are worse than MCO. My sensing is that each affects different people in different ways; some can tolerate one and not the other, some tolerate neither and some can tolerate both fairly well. There are studies which posit 200 days of combat is the determinant but that's a median and I think it's still a very individual thing.


Ken, I think it's the constant exposure to danger (in and out of the line), not the intensity, that creates the combat stress. Multiply x2 to x10 for those in leadership positions. One can only handle the weight so long, that is why I advocate regular rotation to rear areas, which is something learned in WWII and I read about as well in Korea. And yes, each individual is different. It is also directly related to unit morale and perception of winning/progress. It is worst when it appears you are taking casualties for no gain.

[Ken White]

One Year. As for tour frequency that is more difficult to calculate, but my observations (which are obviously the opposites of the DOD's) lead me to believe that tour length has greater impact then tour frequency. Too bad the Army does not see it that way, but I have always said that Army Mental Health knowledge and Army policy have a huge gap that needs to be closed.We can do one of two things; go pre-WW II British and US Army professional with old sweat PFCs having 15-20 years of service and who deploy until the job is done or keep roughly our current enlistment policies and go to six month tours. The year tour is bad * -- we proved that in Korea and we proved it again in Viet Nam. :mad:

Slow learners -- or no sense of history or continuity, that's us... :mad:

* Which makes the 15 month tour worse... :mad:

NOTE: While longer tours would make for greater continuity of effort, the lack of that -- and we do have that lack in spades right now -- is a leadership problem that is repairable . Quite high level leadership...

[MikeF]

Cavguy says:


It's leadership, stupid.

Ken says:

What is the Sergeants Major Academy doing to those guys?

Allow me place my last post in context. Throughout my three tours in Iraq, I witnessed excellent leadership from senior leaders (both O and NCO). During the Surge, Brigade and Battalion Commanders lived/visited patrol bases and shared the burden as best as possible with the troops. My squadron commander personally cleared trenches during a ten day extended operation to clear an Al Qaeda training camp. Furthermore, I observed BN and BDE CSMs inspecting patrol bases and demanding that quality of life issues are addressed.

However, on larger FOBs, I observed senior NCOs obsessed with maintaining "good order and discipline" outside the parameters of common sense (i.e. when a soldier conducts three four hour patrols a day, his uniform will appear dirty particularly when he washes his own clothes).

The shortage of parts, equipment, ammunition was simply the product of "Surging" a division (minus) worth of troops into a FOB recently held by a battalion (plus) not a lack of initiative/effort on any S4. The shortage reminded me of the initial occupation of Baghdad after the Thunder Runs. Remote areas like the Diyala River Valley were farther back in priority than Baqubah and Baghdad. Limited resources were focused on survivability of patrol bases (a good thing) as the area was still controlled by Al Qaeda.

The post was meant to demonstrate the graveyard humor of soldiers while trying to explain that there really is no true refit in combat ops not knock the chain-of-command.

That's why they still call it "The Suck."

v/r

Mike

[Cavguy]

The post was meant to demonstrate the graveyard humor of soldiers while trying to explain that there really is no true refit in combat ops not knock the chain-of-command.

That's why they still call it "The Suck."


Understand the context now. But even the BS of the fob is *different* BS than being exposed in sector. Psychologically it is very different, in my opinion, the soldier can let down his guard psychologically for awhile, which helps recenter.

Thing that worried me was guys refusing trips back b/c of it.

Just my .02

[Ken White]

...They think their role is to enforce discipline. Rather than focus on the important things, they equate discipline to "enforcing the standard", usually evidenced by unusual concern with police call, uniform quality, haircuts, speed limits.Know the type, they've been around for Centuries. Most can be retrained, those that cannot should not be retained. My poetry contribution for the day -- but a serious comment. :mad:
I have rarely seen them concerned with weapons maintenance, vehicle maintenance (other than making sure chalk blocks and drip pans were down), soldier food quality, supply availability, or things that really matter to combat survival.Back in my day, I believe the split was about 75:25 combat and training focus versus sham indicator focus. Based on what I hear from those now serving, it seems the ratio has reversed. That is not good. The CSM ought to be the supreme tactical guru and trainer for the Troops in the Bn/Sqn.
I think the Parameters article from 15 years ago arguing for the abolition of the CSM (not SGM) rank above BN level had some merit. The higher level the CSM the more they focus on BS, typically.Having been a Bde CSM, I agree. Anything above Battalion is not good because the guy doesn't really have a job or a job description, he does pretty much what he wants and most (not all) Bde Cdrs will allow him to do that. :wry:

Whatever is done, the current system is not, IMO very good -- either for the individuals or the units and thus the Army.
I think it's the constant exposure to danger (in and out of the line), not the intensity, that creates the combat stress. Multiply x2 to x10 for those in leadership positions. One can only handle the weight so long, that is why I advocate regular rotation to rear areas, which is something learned in WWII and I read about as well in Korea. And yes, each individual is different. It is also directly related to unit morale and perception of winning/progress. It is worst when it appears you are taking casualties for no gain.Totally correct IMO. I'll also echo your comment that prevention and treatment are leadership problems -- and they are problems -- but good leaders handle it and produce good units that avoid some of the situations discussed in this thread. Unfortunately, there are some great people who have awesome capabilities in many areas who just aren't good leaders but the system makes no allowances for that...

[carl]

When we arrived at COB Speicher in September 2007 we were told there was only one place to have keys made and they only made keys one day a week. It was an annoyance to us but only a slight one. I remember thinking of how maddening it must have been to soldiers who came onto the base and needed a key made on the other six days of the week. Life could have been made so much easier for them with just a little effort, as has been commented upon.

I have read the books describing these things happening in past wars and I am not naive enough to think the millennium has come but it was a great disappointment to see it firsthand.

[MikeF]

Carl said:


When we arrived at COB Speicher in September 2007 we were told there was only one place to have keys made and they only made keys one day a week. It was an annoyance to us but only a slight one. I remember thinking of how maddening it must have been to soldiers who came onto the base and needed a key made on the other six days of the week. Life could have been made so much easier for them with just a little effort, as has been commented upon.

As we digress, I'm still trying to understand this....


"Men have sought to make a world from their own conception and to draw from their own minds all the material which they employed, but if, instead of doing so, they had consulted experience and observation, they would have the facts and not opinions to reason about, and might have ultimately arrived at the knowledge of the laws which govern the material world." -Francis Bacon

Bacon also warned to "beware the fallacies into which undisciplined thinkers most easily fall--they are the real distorting prisms of human nature…assuming more order than exists in chaotic nature."

Juxtaposed, Goethe suggest that “no living thing is unitary in nature; every such thing is a plurality. Even the organism which appears to us as an individual exists as a collection of independent entities.”

Maybe I've been in Northern California too long...

As I consider the original article and reflective belts in the FOBs, I'm not sure if it relates, but it seems important...

Given the times and ramifications, I should probably quit studying and go back to soldiering :)

[jkm_101_fso]

Worried about the safety of their men, Hill and Scott resorted to drastic measures. Though it is unclear exactly who initially planned to detain the Afghans, Hill acknowledges that the ultimate responsibility is his. "I did wrongfully discharge my weapon and I did fail to maintain control of the situation," he said in his statement at the hearing.

According to testimony from a number of witnesses, it was Scott, the first sergeant, who began interrogating the bound detainees. He straddled their chests one at a time as they lay on the ground, pinning their shoulders with his knees and slapping their faces while shouting questions.

"My whole twenty-plus-year career in the military has been about taking care of soldiers," Scott said after the hearing concluded. "I couldn't let these men go just so that they could come back and kill some of my boys. It made no sense."

I'd like to sit here and tell you that I would have done the right thing; but I won't. I didn't walk in these fellas' shoes. They did what they thought they had to. No one died or was hurt. There have been far more egregious offenses in these wars that have gone unpunished.

At worst, slap Hill on the wrist.

We can't afford to lose anymore good officers.

[MikeF]

Word....It is what it is....

Initially, I questioned posting this thread in the wake of an ongoing investigation, but since command allowed free access to reporters, I garnered this story was up for free debate....

FSO states:


I'd like to sit here and tell you that I would have done the right thing; but I won't. I didn't walk in these fellas' shoes. They did what they thought they had to. No one died or was hurt. There have been far more egregious offenses in these wars that have gone unpunished.


In spite of articles professing junior officers to be exceptional leaders, all of us in actual contact have fought through similar predicaments as Roger Hill...

Hopefully, decision makers above the 03 and O4 level are monitoring our thoughts to resolve how to keep their company commanders and first sergeants out of this dilemma.

In my own words as I try to explain and unravel the thoughts in my head...

The Arab world is a wonderful, mystical land of multiple paradoxes competing and contrasting directly with traditional western rational thought, norms, and values. This land that provided the world with Hammurabi’s law, algebra, and three religions coexists in the same land that introduced honor killings, suicide bombers, and assassins. This cradle of civilization ebbs and flows in persistent conflict with modernity while defying western utopian dreams of perpetual peace. This land contradicts and conforms in a beauty unresolved leaving most unfamiliar unnerved striving to determine some rhyme and reason to it all.

This land is in competing thought with the ethical black and white values of West Point....

I'd ask that you'd give it some thought with Arab notions of balanced opposition prior to passing judgement.

As I reread, I'm still considering....

As I reconsider, I'd recommend any board must represent the minimum of valor...In Hill's case, I'd recommend everyone on his jury have a minimum of Bronze Star w/ valor...


I'd consider that due process...

v/r

mike

[Meinertzhagen]

Our fundamental failure to make any significant progress in over 7 years towards an even marginally functioning legal system in Afghanistan is the root cause of these men's actions. It is extraordinarily difficult to incarcerate captured individuals regardless of the evidence against them. The process is even more difficult than described in the article. Last time I saw the statistics, we hold over 23,000 prisoners in Iraq compared to only about 600 in Afghanistan despite a similar population and having been there for years longer. If not one of the very few placed in U.S. custody, 90% are released and the rest go to the humanitarian disaster that is the Afghan prison system. In prison, there is little opportunity for due process with Afghan courts incapable of processing the volume of cases required. Once imprisoned, many of the worst offenders, politically connected financiers and warlords, are often quickly released due to political pressure from various factions in the government. Worse, there are no efforts to reform, “retrain” or otherwise reduce recidivism or a return to the insurgency.

This has several effects. It taints the type of operation utilized to achieve desired effects on personalities. Since an individual of interest, once captured is likely only to spend a short stay in prison if at all, direct action operations are more likely to “kill” oriented. Inevitably, second and third order effects mount, civilian casualties result and intelligence is lost. In addition, a number of individuals with significant histories of insurgent activities and mountains of evidence are left to operate in plain sight. What’s left are prisons filled with low-level insurgents languishing with little hope of release, angry families, and the worst offenders free to fight another day. While no excuse for their action, I have little doubt that CPT Hill and his unit saw this first hand and decided that action was only possible at their level.

[MikeF]

Has been universally accepted by Afghanis in the last two thousand centuries?

You contend:


Our fundamental failure to make any significant progress in over 7 years towards an even marginally functioning legal system in Afghanistan is the root cause of these men's actions.

So please explain....Also please introduce yourself here (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=1441&page=40)...

I'm still confused on how Roger Hill's actions destroyed the national security agenda for the last seven years much less disrupted any notions of the modern democratic, capitalistic nation-state system...

Maybe I'm confused (it wouldn't be the first time) :)

Thanks,

Mike

[Meinertzhagen]

Mike,

I'm not at all suggesting that we impose a western-centric model of "justice" in Afghanistan. Whether the justice is tribal, the punishment local and the prisons national or any mix in between, there must be a better system in place that allows for some form of remediation for crimes between death by JDAM and release. In its absence, the current Afghan government imprisons without chance of justice/due process (in any sense; western or Islamic), bad men walk the mountains free and good men like CPT Hill feel forced to take matters into their own hands.

Also:

I'm still confused on how Roger Hill's actions destroyed the national security agenda for the last seven years much less disrupted any notions of the modern democratic, capitalistic nation-state system...

I'm not sure where I said that...

Note: I previously introduced myself under a different alias which was my real name in the old thread, but changed it later to preserve anonymity)

[MikeF]

Like I said previously, this will not be the first time I'm confused or wrong:)
I've gotta learn to think before I type....

Thanks for the reply. I now realize my misunderstanding.

Please continue to contribute...

Gotta love it!!!!

"Shut up I'm thinking...I had a clue now it's gone forever."
-Dave Matthew Band

v/r

Mike

[MikeF]

Imagine waking up to learn that a buddy of yours was accused of war crimes. I suppose it touched a nerve.

As I reread this thread, I suppose that I simply vented my frustration. I went back to a framework of fiction to resolve the question of what is a soldier? This is what I found...Not sure if it is important, but it struck me. With that, I'm off my soapbox of emotion. I apologize for any digression.

v/r

Mike




The rhythm of the mercenary's life is a narcotic, as the passion of the whoremonger or gambler, which careers the shield for hire, if he answers truly to that name, collaterally pursues. Its currents efface all that went before and all that will come after.

First, and beyond all, fatigue. The infantryman breathes exhaustion night and day. Even in a gale at sea the soldier, returned from retching over the rail, collapses to the planks and drops off with ease, beard buried in the bilges.

Second stands boredom and third hunger. The soldier is foot-weary. He treks, ever upon the march, advancing towards some object which draws near only to be superseded by another, equally bereft of meaning. The earth endures beneath his tread, and he himself stands ready to drop upon it, if not in death then in exhaustion. The soldier never sees the landscape, only the burdened back of the man trudging in line before him.

Fluids dominate the soldier's life. Water, which he must have or die. Sweat, which drips from his brow and drains in tunnels down his ribcage. Wine, which he requires at march's end and at battle's commencement. Vomit and piss. Semen. He never runs out of that. The penultimate, blood, and beyond that, tears.

The soldier lives on dreams and never tires of reciting them. He yearns for sweetheart and home, yet returns to the front with joy and never narrates his time apart.

Spear and sword, the manual tells us, are the weapons of the infantryman. This is erroneous. Pick and shovel are his province, hoe and mattock, lever and crowbar; these and the mortarman's hood, the forester's axe, and, beyond all, the quarryman's basket, that ubiquitous artefact the raw recruit learns to cobble on-site of reeds or faggots. Ant get her to set alright, my fellow, tumpline upon the brow, bowl across the shoulders with no knot to gouge the flesh, for when she is laden with rubble and stone to the measure of half your weight you must hump her. Up that ladder, see? To where the forms of timber await to receive the fill that will become the wall that will encircle the city, whose battlements we will scale and tear down and set up all over again.

The soldier is a farmer. He knows how to shape the earth. He is a carpenter; he erects ramparts and palisades. A miner, he digs trenches and tunnels; a mason, he chisels a road from a sheer face of stone. The soldier is a physician who performs surgery without anaesthetic, a priest who inters the dead without psalm. He is a philosopher who plumbs the mysteries of existence, a linguist who pronounces 'pussy' in a dozen tongues. He is an architect and a demolition man, a fire brigadier and an incendiary. He is a beast who dwells in the dirt, a worm, owning a mouth and an anus and nothing but appetite in between.

The soldier looks upon horrors and affects to stand indifferent to them. He steps, oblivious, over corpses in the road and flops to wolf his gruel upon stones painted black with blood. He imbibes tales that would bleach the mane of Hades and tops them with his own, laughing, then turns about and donates his last obol to a displaced woman or urchin he will never see again except cursing him from a wall or rooftop, hurling down tiles and stones to cleave his skull.


-excerpt (http://www.bebo.com/BlogView.jsp?MemberId=2491206752&BlogId=3818440650) from Tides Of War by Steven Pressfield.

[healerpoet]

A couple thoughts on the initial article on the Washington Post

1. This was not handled correctly from the get go. What I read wasn't Abu Ghraib, or COL Steele, or even LTC West. This was a case of underresourced soldiers in the middle of a complex ethical environment (See FM 3-24). Not every LOAC violation is a war crime. The lower level command amplified the threat that an incident like this posed by threatening GCM.

2. Striking detainees is against the rules. We play by the rules. On the other hand, it's unfair to throw soldiers under the bus when, at the highest levels of Government, officials and lawyers are saying that torture (and this is not even close to torture) is permissible. What do expect at the ground level when leadership is talking out of their ass.

3. We don't train for this, and we need to start familiarizing soldiers with the scenario where the interpreter turns out to be a bad guy. This should not be open to improvisation. Monday morning quarterback in me says if BN won't pick these guys up then keep holding them...ok, that a 96 hour violation but I don't think anyone is going to be talking anything worse than a counseling statement or a bad OER as a result.

4. I hear through the grapevine that the soldiers got dealt with a much lower level...Maybe someone at division or higher does understand military justice.

[Shek]

A couple thoughts on the initial article on the Washington Post

1. This was not handled correctly from the get go. What I read wasn't Abu Ghraib, or COL Steele, or even LTC West. This was a case of underresourced soldiers in the middle of a complex ethical environment (See FM 3-24). Not every LOAC violation is a war crime. The lower level command amplified the threat that an incident like this posed by threatening GCM.

2. Striking detainees is against the rules. We play by the rules. On the other hand, it's unfair to throw soldiers under the bus when, at the highest levels of Government, officials and lawyers are saying that torture (and this is not even close to torture) is permissible. What do expect at the ground level when leadership is talking out of their ass.

3. We don't train for this, and we need to start familiarizing soldiers with the scenario where the interpreter turns out to be a bad guy. This should not be open to improvisation. Monday morning quarterback in me says if BN won't pick these guys up then keep holding them...ok, that a 96 hour violation but I don't think anyone is going to be talking anything worse than a counseling statement or a bad OER as a result.

4. I hear through the grapevine that the soldiers got dealt with a much lower level...Maybe someone at division or higher does understand military justice.

1. Mock execution has been considered to be a war crime - our interrogation manual at the outset of OEF/OIF explicitly stated so (although that specific language was removed from the version just published). GCM is appropriate, and the extenuating circumstances should definitely come into play if and when soldiers are found guilty.

2. As a military, we control the application of UCMJ to those who serve under it. While I agree that there have been mixed signals, implied and/or explicit, from those who don't serve under UCMJ, that should not prevent us as a professional body from enforcing our own standards. Two wrongs don't make a right.

3. I'm very curious about the relationship between company and battalion in this situation. From the portrayal in the article, there seems to be a huge disconnect and it seems like this was a huge contributing factor. However, without more details, commenting specifically on this would simply be speculation. However, I think these are details that need to come out in some general form to mitigate the chance of an incident like this from occurring again.

4. While only a grapevine report, it sounds like the wheels of justice are being applied proportionately to the level of responsibility one holds. This is a good thing.

[screamingeagle506]

1. Mock execution has been considered to be a war crime

4. While only a grapevine report, it sounds like the wheels of justice are being applied proportionately to the level of responsibility one holds. This is a good thing.

The article incorrectly uses the term mock execution. It describes how Capt. Hill fired his pistol off in the distance and sombody ALLEGEDLY said 'you want to end up like your friend.' That is not a mock execution. A mock execution is holding a gun to somebody's head, pulling the trigger with no round in the chamber and then saying 'the next one will be real.' Or, standing the guy up on a stool and putting a noose around his neck. Yes, they broke some rules, which Hill freely admits, but I guess they just don't make war crimes like they used to.

Proportionately?--The batallion refused to support this undermanned company and arrest the terrorist detainees. The evidence against the detainees was "incontrovertible"--why wouldn't batallion take them? It's a pattern of neglect and incompetence. The leadership should be the ones investigated, not the brave soldiers.

But then again, we're talking about a company commander, his first sergeant and other lowly peons. If you don't have a bird or star on your shoulder who cares right?

[jkm_101_fso]

The article incorrectly uses the term mock execution. It describes how Capt. Hill fired his pistol off in the distance and sombody ALLEGEDLY said 'you want to end up like your friend.' That is not a mock execution. A mock execution is holding a gun to somebody's head, pulling the trigger with no round in the chamber and then saying 'the next one will be real.' Or, standing the guy up on a stool and putting a noose around his neck. Yes, they broke some rules, which Hill freely admits, but I guess they just don't make war crimes like they used to.

Proportionately?--The batallion refused to support this undermanned company and arrest the terrorist detainees. The evidence against the detainees was "incontrovertible"--why wouldn't batallion take them? It's a pattern of neglect and incompetence. The leadership should be the ones investigated, not the brave soldiers.

But then again, we're talking about a company commander, his first sergeant and other lowly peons. If you don't have a bird or star on your shoulder who cares right?

Curahee,
You are right, these are all allegations for now until the findings are complete. I think that it is unfortunate this situation was made public before everyone knew what really went down. Hopefully the initial report will be followed up with the results of any consequences/exonerations and what ACTUALLY happened.

I've already given my opinion on this situation, so I won't re-iterate it.

I've got some real good buddies in 506 with you right now. I pray that you guys make it home safe.

Air Assault, brother.

[h2harris]

(Opening Paragraphs)
"Hill is a U.S. Army officer in Afghanistan accused of detainee abuse, including a mock execution, war crimes, dereliction of duty and other serious charges stemming from an incident last August at a U.S. military base outside the capital city of Kabul. Members of his unit allegedly slapped Afghan detainees, and Hill himself is said to have fired his pistol into the ground near blindfolded Afghans to frighten them."

(Conclusion)
"But after exploring the personalities and circumstances involved in this case, it's hard for me to condemn Hill or his first sergeant, Tommy Scott, who has been charged with assaulting the detainees. Stuck in the deadly middle ground between all-out war and nation- building, these men lashed out to protect themselves. To me, their story encapsulates the impossible role we've asked U.S. soldiers to play in the reconstruction of this devastated country. They are part warrior, part general contractor, yet they are surrounded on all sides by a populace that wants nothing more than to kill or be rid of them."

"Watching the prosecution destroy the reputations of Scott and Hill was heartbreaking, tragic -- and deeply conflicting. As an American who fiercely believes in the rule of law and due process, I understand that the actions of D Company are inexcusable. A mock execution, under almost any circumstance, is antithetical to the ideals and standards our nation aspires to.'

"And perhaps Hill's superiors had good reason not to take these particular men into custody. Maybe they were on the radar of U.S. intelligence and taking them out of circulation might have meant losing valuable information.

But the soldiers of D Company felt that they were out of options.

I fear that this kind of story will repeat itself in other parts of Afghanistan again and again, if only because U.S. forces know that their enemy's mission is clearer than their own.

" 'They're Taliban,' one soldier said in response to a prosecutor's question at the hearing. That soldier is facing charges of repeatedly hitting a detainee who bit him as he tried to put a gag into the man's mouth. 'If it was us, they'd cut our heads off, videotape it and put it on al-Jazeera for our families to see.' "

(For the Rest of The Story)

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/12/12/AR2008121203291.html?nav=hcmodule

[ODB]

My thoughts revert back one of my other posts on here.
If only we had a few more of these and a lot less of what we have today.

http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=46545&postcount=37