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MikeF
12-19-2008, 11:58 PM
Originally posted in the SWJ Blog by Frank Hoffman.
All in all - the beginnings of a good debate. Yes, we need a definition better than what we have. Yes, concur with the point about populations (very COIN centric). But out of a dozen or so definitions that exist in the foreign literature, and the six or so developed by OSD, Army, Booze Allen etc, this is not an improvement. Sorry about that – so it’s back to the white board. I will put up a bottle of scotch to the best definition.

KISS- Keep it simple stupid. I'll drink to that!!!

1. UW-us helping dudes take down a bad government. Broken down into components.

- 1a. Contact me on SIPR.
- 1b. Contact me on SIPR.

2. IW- us helping a friendly government stop dudes from taking them down. Broken down into components.

- 2a. SFA- We give them big guns, ships, and planes to help smack the dudes, and we teach them how to use the toys.

- 2b. FID- We send a small SF team or MTT team to combat advise.

- 2c. Partnership (co-located)-Army unit (the current majority of US forces in Iraq/Afghanistan)- we live with them and help them stop the bad dudes.

- 2d. Partnership (not co-located)- Army units (Iraq 2003-2006) live in their land and stop by once a week to tell them how bad they suck at stopping the bad dudes.

- 2e. Training exercises- Army units embark on temporary duty to jump outta airplanes or drive tanks with our brothers, high five, and encourage them to stop the bad dudes. Army unit leaves with foreign jump wings or gives up stetsons.

Who's next?

v/r

Mike

Rank amateur
12-20-2008, 12:30 AM
Irregular warfare: any form of war that makes the Air Force feel like it's assets are not being properly utilized.

Entropy
12-20-2008, 01:06 AM
Irregular warfare: any form of war that makes the Air Force feel like it's assets are not being properly utilized.

Thanks for the valuable contribution to the discussion. :(

PhilR
12-20-2008, 01:24 AM
While I know that there is some practicality to achieving a definition (such as the world of DoD programs and concepts), I for one hope that Frank never has to pay off.
I would much rather have the continuing debate and the knowledge that it impels and creates, than a definition that eventually becomes something to memorize with little thought.
If I remember the DoD joint concept Venn diagrams, the Irregular concept is interlinked with the Stability and Reconstruction Concept and the Major Combat Operations Concept (or "Regular" concept). As Dan Kelly pointed out in an earlier Journal entry, providing the definition, especially as a method to bin subordinate concepts, drives a "this or that" mentality that really doesn't fit reality.
The desire for definitional specificity is great when tasking someone to "secure" or "sieze." I'm not sure we will task anyone to conduct irregular operations (at least I hope not). KISS is great, but for the multiple shades of what irregular warfare could be, if its simple, I suspect that its wrong.
So, I am looking forward to the discussion Frank is continuing and am happily not anticipating a winner.

MikeF
12-20-2008, 01:31 AM
Thanks for the valuable contribution to the discussion. :(

Rank amatuer's comment expressing how the Air Force "feels" is highly relevant to this discussion and delves into the partisan, parochial politics of the Joint Staff that infects the DoD and hampers the efforts of the soldiers stuck in remote patrol bases in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Throughout the 1990's, the USAF, Air Commandos (JTACs, PJ's, and AFSOF) aside,portrayed themselves as the "main effort" of military operations. This mirage is exasperated by MG Dunlop's continued efforts to try to manipulate doctrine into AF dominance.

Don't get me wrong- I would not be typing this post today if it were not for a brave A-10 pilot running on empty to give me CAS in Nassiriyah back in 2003 or for the heroic F-15 and B-52 pilots supporting me through the trenches of Turki Village during the surge...But, in the end, they were SUPPORTING efforts, not the main efforts perceived in the Balkan Wars.

I love the AF in the same way the I love Britney Spears and Jessica Simpson. It's too bad that Simpson's chicken of the sea comment is akin to the AF's flying nuclear weapons over the continental US....

Opps, I did it again. I suppose that I'm on a roll tonight. Standing by those that differ.

I'm simply a grunt. Back to my hole.

v/r

Mike

ginspace
12-20-2008, 02:42 AM
In light of PhilR's comment that IW defies boundaries, is there anything wrong with declaring that IW is not a conventional fight between nation states or otherwise established fielded force on force? In that case, we have

Regular warfare, which everyone who stared across the fields of Waterloo, trenches of the Seine, and Fulda Gap is comfortable with, and

Irregular warfare, which is just about everything else from insurgency to cyberattacks (though these may at some point become "regular" in the future)


As far as partisan politics goes, MikeF, the Air Force is clearly trying to find its role in the "new" world of IW, particularly in an urban environment, but to think that ground forces will always be the SUPPORTED effort is to misunderstand the meaning of the term. Ground forces in the Balkans were initially constrained by political realities, so the Air forces had to be the main effort. True, you can't seize and hold territory from the air, but you can certainly force capitulation to a diplomatic resolution, which is in fact what happened.
To RankA, from what I observed, there are plenty of grunts who feel their "assets" are not being properly utilized as well. The fact is, IW requires all elements of national power, especially diplomatic, informational, and economic efforts, which unfortunately have not received the preeminence they deserve lately. "Nation building" is not what the Army was designed for, despite the skill of CA and CE troops, nor should they be expected to carry out these missions.

The ideal IW warrior is a multi-lingual cultural anthropologist with a good business sense and close air support.

slapout9
12-20-2008, 02:48 AM
I'll take a shot.
IW= War waged by Sub-national Organizations.

Entropy
12-20-2008, 02:52 AM
...has broken into the bottle of scotch a bit early. No, this tangent doesn't have anything to do with defining IW (Britney Spears? PJ's portraying themselves as the "main effort?" Do you actually know any PJ's?). Furthermore, one wonders if you are aware of any irony at all in your rail against AF parochialism.

ginspace,

How you classify irregular forces and tactics in support of a nation state? For example, the Fedeyeen and the car and truck bombs used during the drive to Baghdad during OIF.

Ken White
12-20-2008, 03:12 AM
Thanks for the valuable contribution to the discussion. :(Not that bad... ;)

Mike F has a point also -- on the parochial bit -- not just dinging the Air Force; all the services, USSOCOM, branches within the Army, communities within the other services all get silly about stuff. It's wasteful and counterproductive. Really needs to stop...:(

However, and very seriously, as to Irregular Warfare.

My first point is that DoD paper is good to go for a first cut and doesn't need to be quarreled with before the ink is dry; that's pointless. Having said that:

Here's the problem as described by Hoffman:
"In over a year of effort, and two separate meetings of OSD's most senior officers; we failed to come up with a good solid definition for Irregular Warfare (IW). It’s like porn, we know IW when we see it." (emphasis added / kw)I'm surprised with all that ego you got as far as you did. When everyone is always right and everyone differs on comma placement, it's hard to agree. You don't ask those kinds of guys for a definition, especially not in a group. You convince them that your definition is correct and their idea. I am NOT being facetious -- nor, really, am I being disrespectful. FlagOs should be doing FlagO stuff and definitions are not FlagO stuff. If you ask them to get involved, they will (and you'll wish you had not), if you tell them their help is not required, most -- the good ones -- will accede.

Oh, and I don't drink scotch; thanks anyway. :wry:

MikeF
12-20-2008, 03:14 AM
...has broken into the bottle of scotch a bit early. No, this tangent doesn't have anything to do with defining IW (Britney Spears? PJ's portraying themselves as the "main effort?" Do you actually know any PJ's?

Many moons ago, we attended the same dive school. Now, in grad school, we're working through the same difficult issues. I consider Air Commandos (JTACs, PJ's, and AFSOC) in the same light as any other paratroopers, soldiers, marines, or operators.

My "tangent" on AF had nothing to do with AFSOF (that's why I specifically stated them "aside").

You simply misunderstood me.

Besides that, my "tangent" was specifically directed to discuss the wars we're actually fighting justapoxed with the financial battles and continuing dilemmas in Washington.

In light of this lightened debate, I was simply try to stoke the fires so that we could all learn something...I'm not merely as thick-headed as I perceive to be on this blog.

As ODB and CavGuy put it on another thread discussing SF v/s Conventional army, I'm simply sick of the infighting.

I simply want to win the game.

And yes, me like scotch.

v/r

Mike

ODB
12-20-2008, 03:14 AM
1. UW-us helping dudes take down a bad government. Broken down into components.

UW
Really like the simplicity but does it have to be a bad government and taking it down? Can UW not be from within ones own government? A power seizure by some within the government if not the government itself? Here's my reach: No direct engagement, expose any and all vulnerabilities and exert pressure onto those vulnerabilities in an attempt to show lack of control and creditability to the populace. One must think in asymmetrical terms. In truly simple terms: Brains not brawn.

IW
What we call it when we fight those conducting UW. Fighting dudes and dudettes who wear no uniform, are bound by no laws, and definately do not play fair.

MikeF
12-20-2008, 03:21 AM
That would simply be dubbed "Change," but I like where you're headed.

v/r

Mike

Entropy
12-20-2008, 03:29 AM
Maybe the first thing we should ponder is whether we need to define IW in the first place. As the paper notes, the definition battle has been around for decades - that should tell us something. Maybe our efforts would be better spent on narrower, more easily defined terminology.

slapout9
12-20-2008, 03:33 AM
Maybe the first thing we should ponder is whether we need to define IW in the first place. As the paper notes, the definition battle has been around for decades - that should tell us something. Maybe our efforts would be better spent on narrower, more easily defined terminology.

Now your talking. That is/was one of the chief benefits of Systems Thinking they apply to any system or situation...lethal or non-lethal.

MikeF
12-20-2008, 03:36 AM
Maybe the first thing we should ponder is whether we need to define IW in the first place. As the paper notes, the definition battle has been around for decades - that should tell us something. Maybe our efforts would be better spent on narrower, more easily defined terminology.

Enthropy,

I totally agree with you on this one. In the SWJ blog, I used a football analogy. I've fought throught regular and irregular conflicts (no unconventional as of yet), and I really think it's as simply as tackle/ block and pass/run.

I was trying to make this thread a comical version of KISS in terms that we understand while explaining very difficult topics.

Somewhere in the Bible, it says there is a time for war and a time for peace...

I suppose that will be the case until the end of days.

To me, warfare is the same- it sucks, people die, and sh@t happens.

Regardless, it's gonna happen.

v/r

Mike

ginspace
12-20-2008, 03:39 AM
Fedayeen would be Regular warfare (since they're "uniformed troops") using asymmetric tactics, I guess.
It's really like trying to distinguish between strategic attack and interdiction...if the troops haven't started moving, it's the former, if they're moving to the front line it's the latter.
So if the Fedayeen are not acting as part of a national force on force, it's Irregular?
Hell, I don't know.

ODB
12-20-2008, 04:09 AM
How can one not look at what is happening today within our own government and not see it as a hostile take over or UW if you please, only thing missing is the action arm, oh that's right 20,000 troops dedicated to NORTHCOM!!!! Sorry not to get political on here, just thinking it can be looked at as a form of UW. Which then really blurs the lines. Outta box kinda guy here, sorrry.

Bill Moore
12-20-2008, 05:57 AM
The definition is good enough to generate discussion on where we have gaps, but it is far from ideal, just as our definitions of unconventional warfare are far from ideal. Does it need to have a perfect definition, or is an idea or generalized concept enough?

Part of the definition addresses the actors who are non-state, and another part of the definition addresses the focus of the strategy which is a specific population.

Conventional/regular warfare is generally thought of as conventional military forces fighting other conventional military forces, so the actor is the nation state and their conventional military forces and the objective is the enemy's capability to wage conventional war.

I think we all know that war is much more complex than that, and that IW and regular warfare elements will almost always be blended.

This is a tough one, but I do like Scotch, so I may give it a try later.

Stevely
12-20-2008, 04:05 PM
IW is one of those things like pornography - can't tell you what it is, but you know it when you see it.

Tom Odom
12-20-2008, 04:15 PM
Anyone who has been on an operational stint in the 3rd world knows full well what it means to be irregular :eek:

Scotch--when you can get it--is often a great cure (or at least reduces related anxieties. Single malt 25 years or more is best. :wry:

Tom

William F. Owen
12-20-2008, 07:11 PM
Clausewitz warned that it was extremely important to understand the "nature of the war" in that it was the "setting forth of policy." Therefore I submit that the nature of IW is defined by the nature of the Policy. It's the WHY, not the HOW or the WHO.

Personally I've totally rejected the idea of IW/RW and Small v Big War. It's not a useful distinction and responsible for much of the current confusion and avant garde BS that surrounds it.

So, in pursuit of a bottle of whiskey...

"IW is a grossly simplified way of explaining that some forms of conflict fall out side regular armies comfort zone, because of a lack of education and training."

Bill Moore
12-20-2008, 07:53 PM
"IW is a grossly simplified way of explaining that some forms of conflict fall out side regular armies comfort zone, because of a lack of education and training."

I recall in the past being in disagreement with your assertions many times, and felt your belief that war was war was too simple, but you are slowly winning me over. I think the issue in OIF and OEF-A was due to a lack of education and training. I also think IW is a forcing mechanism to correct that gap in education and training, but there is a danger if we try to separate from the concept of war as something different we'll end up training and teaching the wrong things to our future force.

However, that said I want to vote no on your proposed definition, because I really want that bottle of scotch. ;)

Ken White
12-20-2008, 08:34 PM
keep you away from demon alcohol and a descent into debauchery, I gotta vote for Wilf's definition:
"IW is a grossly simplified way of explaining that some forms of conflict fall out side regular armies comfort zone, because of a lack of education and training."With a note that I still think the DoD version is acceptable; simply that if there must be a change, Wilf has come up with the most accurate suggestion to date. Now, if you can top that, I can change my vote... ;)

(Not that anyone pays any attention to my votes... :D )

Entropy
12-20-2008, 08:36 PM
I like Wilf's definition too. Hopefully he'll forget our frequent disagreements on air power and let me have a sip of that scotch!

slapout9
12-20-2008, 08:45 PM
IW= A Conflict in which the Enemy intentionally violates the Laws of Armed Conflict in order to achieve his Objective.

William F. Owen
12-20-2008, 09:22 PM
I also think IW is a forcing mechanism to correct that gap in education and training, but there is a danger if we try to separate from the concept of war as something different we'll end up training and teaching the wrong things to our future force.


Concur. That is further food for thought.


I like Wilf's definition too. Hopefully he'll forget our frequent disagreements on air power and let me have a sip of that scotch!

You can have whole bottle, a. Cos I don't drink, and b. Cos you disagree with me and that makes me think.


IW= A Conflict in which the Enemy intentionally violates the Laws of Armed Conflict in order to achieve his Objective.

Wouldn't this cover the British, German and French Armies in WW1?

reed11b
12-20-2008, 10:15 PM
Personally I've totally rejected the idea of IW/RW and Small v Big War. It's not a useful distinction and responsible for much of the current confusion and avant garde BS that surrounds it.



I agree on one level, and that statement makes sense to theorists like us that feel that infantry is the core of any army, but I am afraid that it could also empower folks like Sparks that say that armored vehicles are the key to winning any war or ,nearly as bad, Air Power advocates. What say you to this, good sir...
Reed

slapout9
12-20-2008, 10:29 PM
Wouldn't this cover the British, German and French Armies in WW1?

Wilf,it certainly could. Wars can start out RW and switch to IW or they could go the other direction too. I guess??? I don't like the term myself. Isn't UW also IW? why have so many?

Rex Brynen
12-21-2008, 01:31 AM
Fighting against (or sometimes with) people who don't fight they way doctrine says they're supposed to?

William F. Owen
12-21-2008, 08:18 AM
I agree on one level, and that statement makes sense to theorists like us that feel that infantry is the core of any army, but I am afraid that it could also empower folks like Sparks that say that armored vehicles are the key to winning any war or ,nearly as bad, Air Power advocates. What say you to this, good sir...
Reed

Well there's a difference between good theorists and poor theorists. I just subscribe to a collection of "ways and means."

The great problem with modern military theories is that a lot of them are not military. Mike and others always manage to confuse technology (and not a stellar understanding at that) with warfare, as though the two inextricably linked. They are not.

The Native Americans fought a nation state war to avoid annihilation, against an a "hybrid nation state" enemy, while using inferior technology. ...as did the Incas!

Bill Moore
12-21-2008, 08:36 AM
The ongoing debate over the definition of IW and what it means to the military and the whole of government is creating much confusion, but that confusion is valuable and the debate is long overdue. Unfortunately IW will not lend itself to a simple definition due to its complexity and many shades of gray. Keep in mind that ultimately we're attempting to fix real problems based on our performance in numerous IW environments.

Many in my Special Forces community think we already have the doctrine required in our wealth of unconventional warfare and foreign internal defense doctrine. Yet we have proven time and time again that the existing doctrine is insufficient in many regards. First, it is only intended for Special Forces, and not the Army or Joint community. Since any type of UW or FID operation will fall under the command and control of Geographic Combatant Commander GCC, it is clear that joint doctrine is needed (note, Joint doctrine for FID exists) for SF to be successful. Without it, we'll continue to hear we could have done better if higher knew what they were doing. Second, the current UW doctrine is largely focused at the tactical and operational level in support of a main conventional force effort. A recent article posted to the SWJ titled "Irregular Warfare: Everything yet Nothing" argued that our old UW doctrine said UW activities were focused against the enemy's military, not a civilian populace as stated in the IW definition. What they failed to address was the context that the doctrine was developed in. It was written post WWII to address the Soviet threat. The U.S. vision of UW then was uising it to collect intelligence and to disrupt Soviet military activities in the Soviet occupied areas in case of WWIII. It was UW in support of a conventional war, thus the tactical/operational focus. On the other hand, Mao and many others used UW as a strategic instrument, and the primary focus was on influencing various population groups as stated in our current IW definition. Of course they still had to defeat the hostile military force, but maintaining the support of the populace is what enabled them to defeat the hostile military forces. Therefore, the first and foremost objective was maintaining that support base.

The argument is further blurred when it is argued that conventional or regular warfare is easy (or easier than IW) because the focus is on defeating the enemy's capacity to wage war, which we generally assume to be their conventional military forces. I can't think of one conventional war where our politicians, thus our military strategists, didn't have to focus on maintaining or winning the support of different population groups, so that requirement is hardly unique to IW.

To further muddy the waters about unconventional, irregular, and conventional warfare, the DoD dictionary defines unconventional weapons as chemical, biological and nuclear weapons. If we decided to drop a nuclear weapon on one of our enemies' cities to convince their population to cease supporting their government, is that conventional, unconventional or irregular warfare? Gaining influence over a specific populace can definitely be achieved with coercion; the terrorists prove this again and again.

Who is the "irregular"? General purpose forces cut off from their units can conduct guerrilla warfare, are they irregulars? If Special Forces are supporting an insurgency in another country are those SF soldiers considered irregulars? The character of the war (to some extent) would be same whether the insurgent is a non-state warrior or a Soldier. That implies we still would have use COIN/FID to counter the threat.

There are numerous shades of gray not discussed here, and while debating them over beer may be fun, we just may have to accept the fact that there is no perfect definition. In the long run what is important is that we address our shortfalls in addressing these non-conventional threats. Our history has shown time and again that we have struggled against the irregular threat, and now that this IW threat may be more dangerous to us than at any time in the past we can't afford to neglect it any longer.

Assuming that it is true that war is war, that argument hasn't been helpful in a practical sense. We developed UW, FID/COIN, and counterterrorism doctrine to respond to new types of threats because the existing doctrine was inadequate. We have once again come to that point where our current doctrine is insufficient to address the threats we face today.

I'm not prepared to propose a new definition yet even though I find the current definition troubling, yet in many ways I think it is adequate if we fail to develop a better one.

Surferbeetle
12-21-2008, 03:25 PM
The ongoing debate over the definition of IW and what it means to the military and the whole of government is creating much confusion, but that confusion is valuable and the debate is long overdue. Unfortunately IW will not lend itself to a simple definition due to its complexity and many shades of gray. Keep in mind that ultimately we're attempting to fix real problems based on our performance in numerous IW environments.


On the other hand, Mao and many others used UW as a strategic instrument, and the primary focus was on influencing various population groups as stated in our current IW definition. Of course they still had to defeat the hostile military force, but maintaining the support of the populace is what enabled them to defeat the hostile military forces. Therefore, the first and foremost objective was maintaining that support base.



Bill,

For the most part, I like where your head is at on this one.

We forget our roots, however, when we think that a working IW definition is within our reach but outside of our grasp. Once upon a time our military forces had to be able to productively fit into the civilian populace most days and then, as needed, be able to step onto the battlefield to effectively fight an Army that was better trained and resourced than they were.

DIME and PMESII are acronyms which bear deep consideration both over beer and in formal settings. I see them as an attempt to formalize what we knew innately way back when...'when your back is against the wall and somebody is in your land anything goes'. There was outrage when we hid behind trees to take our shots when 'Real Armies' used line and column formations out in the open.

I am not yet at a point where I can provide a pithy one-line powerpoint definition of IW. My personal definition is longer than that and uses systems analysis. Our opponent lives in the AO, speaks the language, has time to think, and has a burning desire to kill us or throw us out or both. Perhaps we would all profit by seriously studying our opponent and looking at his definition of IW as well as ours.

Michael Scheuer's book Imperial Hubris (ISBN 1-57488-862-5) was an interesting start down this road for me.

Regards,

Steve

slapout9
12-21-2008, 03:26 PM
Bill Just switch to SBW. SBW= People who act as soldiers but don;t look like soldiers. Using things as weapons that don't look like weapons. That use places as battlefields that don't look like battlefields.;) put that on your secret Bill Moore Green Beret website.

MikeF
12-21-2008, 07:00 PM
Originally from Wilf: Personally I've totally rejected the idea of IW/RW and Small v Big War. It's not a useful distinction and responsible for much of the current confusion and avant garde BS that surrounds it.

I tend to agree that's why I try to simplify the discussion into a football metaphor. I don't see COL Gentile as anti-COIN and John Nagl as pro-COIN. I simply see them engaged in a healthy debate focused on what mixture of run/pass we should have within our military structure.


Originally posted by Bill Moore: The ongoing debate over the definition of IW and what it means to the military and the whole of government is creating much confusion, but that confusion is valuable and the debate is long overdue.

Bill's point is important. If WE disagree over our own definitions, how can our civilian policy-makers and bosses hope to understand what we do. This debate is healthy and much needed if only to educate so they can make informed decisions on how to employ us effectively.

v/r

Mike

davidoff
12-22-2008, 10:12 AM
What is the point of defining IW? Is it so that we can classify and therefore work on strategies to counter it?

If this is the case then IW is, or is similar to, unconventional warfare and operations other than war. It is hard to prescribe a strategy without having boots on the ground because each situation can be different than it seems, and this reality will not be likely to present itself during the "fog of war".

Therefore, simplification may be helpful in that we work on strategies for specific situations without consideration of the type of warfare encountered.
In some ways IW can be defined as not fighting for territory or resources. Rather it is a a continuation of the cold war fight for ideology and does not confine itself to states or other boundaries. We need creative solutions on how to overcome ideas.

I know this definition is wide, but it is meant to encompass a lot of different types of adversaries and methods.

William F. Owen
12-22-2008, 01:26 PM
In some ways IW can be defined as not fighting for territory or resources. Rather it is a a continuation of the cold war fight for ideology and does not confine itself to states or other boundaries. We need creative solutions on how to overcome ideas.

I know this definition is wide, but it is meant to encompass a lot of different types of adversaries and methods.

How does a fight for territory and and fight for ideology differ? Last I checked, only human beings have "ideas" and all humans live on land, or territory. I can't see how you can ever have a "war of ideas."

selil
12-22-2008, 02:43 PM
How does a fight for territory and and fight for ideology differ? Last I checked, only human beings have "ideas" and all humans live on land, or territory. I can't see how you can ever have a "war of ideas."

Not all battles are for physical territory or using kinetic weapons. Sometimes trade, rights to transit across territory, inclusion in decision making, and other forms of soft power can be just as effective as bullets.

The use of kinetic power has only one utility. The cessation of the adversaries autonomic functions. Some times you want to keep an adversary alive as a wedge against another adversary. As such ideas are all you have and limited deterrence (another idea by the way).

Stan
12-22-2008, 02:49 PM
Hey Slap, did you so happen to do some tours in Sub-Sahara :cool:

This SBW is some real spooky Sierra :D


Bill Just switch to SBW. SBW= People who act as soldiers but don;t look like soldiers. Using things as weapons that don't look like weapons. That use places as battlefields that don't look like battlefields.;) put that on your secret Bill Moore Green Beret website.

jkm_101_fso
12-22-2008, 02:52 PM
I tend to agree that's why I try to simplify the discussion into a football metaphor. I don't see COL Gentile as anti-COIN and John Nagl as pro-COIN. I simply see them engaged in a healthy debate focused on what mixture of run/pass we should have within our military structure.


Would it be correct to say that COL Gentile wants to run the wishbone and only throw on third and long?
...and Nagl believes in the multi-formation "west coast" offense and wants to throw every other down (even on first sometimes)?

William F. Owen
12-22-2008, 03:09 PM
Not all battles are for physical territory or using kinetic weapons. Sometimes trade, rights to transit across territory, inclusion in decision making, and other forms of soft power can be just as effective as bullets.

All true, but that's not war. It's something else. Diplomacy? Soft power cannot kill and cannot break will, therefore it is not part of warfare.


The use of kinetic power has only one utility. The cessation of the adversaries autonomic functions. Some times you want to keep an adversary alive as a wedge against another adversary. As such ideas are all you have and limited deterrence (another idea by the way).

The use of kinetic power is central to war and warfare. If no one dies then no war took place. War as an instrument of Policy/politics is concerned with people living on land. Even sea and air have their purpose on land.

Surferbeetle
12-22-2008, 03:21 PM
From wikipedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blockade)


A blockade is any effort to prevent supplies, troops, information or aid from reaching an opposing force. Blockades are the cornerstone to nearly all military campaigns and the tool of choice for economic warfare on an opposing nation. The International Criminal Court plans to include blockades against coasts and ports in its list of acts of war in 2009.

Blockades can take any number of forms from a simple garrison of troops along a main roadway to utilizing dozens or hundreds of surface combatant ships in securing a harbor, denying its use to the enemy, and even in cutting off or jamming broadcast signals from radio or television. As a military operation, blockades have been known to be the deciding factor in winning or losing a war.

slapout9
12-23-2008, 12:46 AM
Hey Slap, did you so happen to do some tours in Sub-Sahara :cool:

This SBW is some real spooky Sierra :D


Hi Stan, while the name SBW is said in jest the rest is serious that is their MO!! Alot of advatanges to looking at this IW stuff from an LE perspective...in the end IW people act just like criminals;) don't have to worry about what Wing Wang Zu or Karl Von Bergermeister said 500 years ago. Just study the facts....understand the system....and counter it.

slapout9
12-23-2008, 01:20 AM
The Last President to understand IW explains it for everyone. He should get the bottle of Scotch!


http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=C4cqSXtj9ak&feature=related

ginspace
12-23-2008, 05:55 AM
Sorry WillF, but I totally disagree...war is about breaking the will of your enemy and forcing him to accept your ideas, not about killing. It may involve kinetic effects, but certainly doesn't have to, and it definitely doesn't always have to be about the control of land.

While the redistribution of territory is often an outcome of treaties, wars have always been fought over religion, ethnicity, and economics to mention just a few root causes. Wars have certainly been fought over the control of sea lanes, and the only reason wars haven't been fought in space is because we don't live there yet. You can be assured that there will be wars fought in cyberspace in the future, and although these attacks may result in death due to economic and infrastructure collapse, the initial effects will not be kinetic.

if you think your will can't be broken with soft power, you haven't learned the lessons of the Vietnam war, the Algerian revolution, or any other irregular war won by an insurgency. Information and psychological warfare is often the only tool of IW, and it is very effective against a liberal democracy. Killing may play a role, but it is by no means the defining characteristic of war.

Speaking of irregular warfare, the last QDR defined it as "conflicts in which enemy combatants are not regular military forces of nation states." This includes civilians and is a type of warfare that occurs at every level in what the Chinese call Unlimited Warfare.

We are currently engaged in an "unlimited war of ideas" with radical Islamists (and have been for over a millenium) that transcends mere kinetic effects and petty squabbles over who gets the water, oil, and olive trees. It is a clash of civilizations as Huntington theorized, but there's no reason for it to end in the destruction of one or other.

I am a believer that warfare is not a zero-sum game, and that there is a moderate solution to every problem where both parties can emerge better off than they were. Irregular warfare requires an irregular approach to victory.

William F. Owen
12-23-2008, 06:58 AM
Sorry WillF, but I totally disagree...war is about breaking the will of your enemy and forcing him to accept your ideas, not about killing. It may involve kinetic effects, but certainly doesn't have to, and it definitely doesn't always have to be about the control of land.
OK, so which wars in history have resulted in NO casualties? War is killing. Read Clausewitz. Changing someone's ideas without killing is marketing or diplomacy, and nothing to do with the military. Killing is what makes war a distinct and discrete human activity. It's what defines war.

We are currently engaged in an "unlimited war of ideas" with radical Islamists (and have been for over a millenium) that transcends mere kinetic effects and petty squabbles over who gets the water, oil, and olive trees. It is a clash of civilizations as Huntington theorized, but there's no reason for it to end in the destruction of one or other.
The "Radical Islamist" have terrain based objectives. A Pan Islamist Caliphate or a US withdrawal from Iraq/Afghanistan and the "land of two mosques." It may even be "world domination." How is this not about land?

Speaking of irregular warfare, the last QDR defined it as "conflicts in which enemy combatants are not regular military forces of nation states." This includes civilians and is a type of warfare that occurs at every level in what the Chinese call Unlimited Warfare.
So which combatants who are not regular military forces of nation states have causes not attached to land or their people who hark from a specific geographic area?

I have read Unlimited Warfare. I don't bother reading it anymore.

I am a believer that warfare is not a zero-sum game, and that there is a moderate solution to every problem where both parties can emerge better off than they were. Irregular warfare requires an irregular approach to victory.
I believe Warfare is about getting what my people want and that is not a moderate solution, because the other side is Not moderate. If they were I wouldn't need to kill them. Irregular Warfare just means being careful about who you kill, and why you kill them. That's the only difference.

William F. Owen
12-23-2008, 09:00 AM
if you think your will can't be broken with soft power, you haven't learned the lessons of the Vietnam war, the Algerian revolution, or any other irregular war won by an insurgency. Information and psychological warfare is often the only tool of IW, and it is very effective against a liberal democracy. Killing may play a role, but it is by no means the defining characteristic of war.


The Vietnam was was not won by an insurgency. The NLF had been soundly defeated by 1970-71. Vietnam 1964-75 was a war between nation States (North Vietnam, China and Russia, versus an Allied Coalition) with a 60K US dead. Not much soft power involved. Dead US Soldiers broke the will of the US Govt to commit to a military solution as they had done in Korea. The Republic of South Vietnam was militarily defeated, by conventional military forces.

The Viet Minh, Militarily defeated the French, using conventional military strength (Infantry and artillery). Again, not much "soft power" involved.

Both Algerian "civil wars" saw vast amounts of killing. The French withdrew because they could not hold onto power in an effective or legitimate way.

Information and Psychological means are adjuncts to violence. The are violence enhancers. If they are employed without violence, then they are marketing or diplomacy, and nothing to do with war.

Bill Moore
12-23-2008, 04:29 PM
Information and Psychological means are adjuncts to violence. The are violence enhancers. If they are employed without violence, then they are marketing or diplomacy, and nothing to do with war.

Since when is violence considered separately from psychological operations? The U.S. wants to fight a politically correct form of war, but those who are experts are at irregular warfare fully understand the power of armed propaganda.

The debate is over what audience the propaganda is aimed at. If the relevant audience is not the opposing military, but rather another relevant population then according to the definition it is IW. This definition is less than useful.

Good comments on the Vietnam conflict. I like Nagl's book on "Eating Soup with a Knife", but found his comparision of Vietnam to Malaysia greatly flawed. Still his obseveration that we failed to learn and adapt quick enough was generally correct.

William F. Owen
12-23-2008, 04:51 PM
Good comments on the Vietnam conflict. I like Nagl's book on "Eating Soup with a Knife", but found his comparision of Vietnam to Malaysia greatly flawed. Still his obseveration that we failed to learn and adapt quick enough was generally correct.

I don't think the US did fail to adapt. It's a myth. If you assume US involvement being from 1965-71, when the NLF was pretty much irrelevant, that was about 7 years.

The Malayan Emergency started in 1948, and 7 years later in 1954, was still very much an issue. It wasn't declared over till 1960!

We certainly didn't get ahead of the game in Northern Ireland in the first 7 years.

Also, there is just no sensible comparison to be made between the two conflicts. I might also suggest that by 1972, the US was probably the equal of any nation on earth, when it came to COIN.

IMO, Why it all got forgotten was what Nagl should have written about.

Bill Moore
12-23-2008, 05:10 PM
It pains me to this day to continue to see the misinterpretations of the Vietnam War. You are absolutely correct that we did adapt relatively quickly, and we defeated both the regular and irregular threats. When I hear senior military officers spread the myth that we didn't understand the nature of the war, I have to wonder about how much the extreme left has influenced our thinking.

On the other hand, while we won, the S. Vietnamese lost. As you stated it was due to a large scale conventional invasion from the North, not a people's uprising. The reason we didn't intervene with air power is due to our lack of political will, a sitting President who was not elected, etc. Our political will seemed to be drained by the narratives presented by our media. We didn't "learn" how to counter that. To make matters worse we didn't sufficiently exploit the atrocities that the N. Vietnamese commited after they invaded. Thousands of people of murdered (not killed in combat). Not sure our left leaning academia and press understood this, or simply blocked it out because it was too unpleasant and they didn't want to admit they were wrong.

However, there was one area where we failed to adapt quickly enough, and that was our attempt to fight the insurgents using the same tactics we used to fight the conventional NV forces. The push to deliver body counts statistics instead of controlling the populace set us back tactically and strategically. Westmoreland took CIDG members who were trained and equipped to defend their villages against communist inflltration and used them as front line troops to fight conventional forces. There was one war, but it required two strategies, and while we did adapt quicker than the Brits did in Malaysia, we didn't adapt quick enough to keep the media and left leaning academia at bay.

ginspace
12-24-2008, 02:29 PM
I'll grant that the Vietnam conflict was not won by the insurgency, but it certainly started as one when the VietCong communists staged uprisings against the oppressive Diem government. It then became a civil war between North and South, and the North had the political will to continue a fight that the South may have won had they been able to establish a viable government. Unfortunately, we were caught in the middle because of our policy to support anyone who was anti-communist, no matter how corrupt.

That said, I never suggested wars were won without casualties. Like you alluded, Clausewitz cautions repeatedly against strategists who believe war can be won without bloodshed. He also states the only difference between war and other great conflicts of nations is that war is settled with bloodshed. However, there are plenty of examples of "wars" between princes in the era of Machiavelli that ended when their private mercenary armies either came to a resolution on the battlefield without actual fighting, or one side capitulated after maneuvering to a severe disadvantage.

I will also grant that a moderate solution cannot be reached until one side is convinced they cannot prevail on their terms, which often involves killing a lot of people. But the Algerians didn't just kill Frenchmen and pied noirs, they killed a lot of their own Muslim population just to spread a sense of terror, which is why the French were unable to establish a legitimate government. This is a very difficult problem to solve...when your enemy is suicidal, killing them is just giving them what they want and massive reprisals against a population you aren't familiar with just creates more radicals.

Insurgencies and irregular warfare take a lot of time and energy and require intimate knowledge of the entire political, economic, cultural and military situation in order to defeat the enemy. In that way, IW is not just about killing, though I agree, you have to root out and eliminate the radical, sometimes there are people you can convince to be on your side without killing them.

I still say that the only reason war is about land is because people need to live and practice their ideas somewhere. If we could live in a bubble in the sky, people would fight over the bubbles too.

DJL
12-24-2008, 02:44 PM
I've been content to just read SWJ for a while, but the single malt gauntlet has brought me out of the woodwork.

It seems that many definitions of conventional and irregular warfare focus too much on tactics, types of forces involved, and legal definitions rather than focusing on the distinctions between the ways the modes of warfare are intended to work. Agreed, both are intended to either force your opponent to accept your will by either 1. killing him, eliminating his vote, 2. forcing him to accept the reality that resistance is futile, or 3. actually converting him to your cause by making him a stakeholder in the new status quo. Agreed, that violence or the threat of violence is implicit in either conventional or IW approaches, but is not mutually exclusive nor necessarily the most important aspect compared to "soft" approaches in every case.

The current Joint Operating Concepts discern between the modes of warfare based on the populations we focus on, with conventional focusing on the enemy's military forces and IW focusing on the population. In a comprehensive theory of war, both types focus on the population, but the conventional definition acknowledges that one subset of the enemy population, the military, presents a significant "speedbump" in the road to convincing the rest of the population to agree with or at least acquiesce to your point of view. Could we look at the difference in the modes of warfare in terms of strategies based on the relative military strengths of the opponents, and how the combatants choose to deal with them within a given amount of time?

Conventional warfare: Direct confrontation against the opponent's military strength, primarily using attrition to force a political decision in the short term.

Irregular warfare: Using multiple, short duration acts of violence against enemy weak spots to bypass an opponent's military strength, primarily using exhaustion to force a political decision in the long term.

OK, feel free to start shooting holes in these, but I think the key points are that 1. one mode confronts the enemy's military strength directly while the other avoids it, and 2. time has got to be part of the distinction between the modes of warfare.

Ready for your spears...

DJL

Bob's World
12-24-2008, 02:59 PM
Just spent the last four days loading and then driving a 26' Penske truck and Uhaul trailer from California to Florida by myself. Talk about irregular warfare....

Anyway, while I belive the term IW must be tossed as soon as possible for one more suited for the purpose that this concept is supposed to address ( Sorry Mr. Vickers, but while I realize you are very tied to this term, it absolutely turns off the rest of the US Government whose support you are attempting to garner with this concept).

My shot at the definition is built upon the existing one, but with some major modifications:

"IW consists of actions conducted by the whole of government, typically in times of peace, to shape the struggle between state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence with relevant populations. IW favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may require the full range of military and other capabilities, in order to create conditions favorable to U.S. national interests and the well-being and good governance of the focus populace."

(If this passes muster, I drink Dalmore. Though I'd prefer a nice bottle of Irish, Tullamore Dew on that count)

Bill Moore
12-24-2008, 05:19 PM
"IW consists of actions conducted by the whole of government, typically in times of peace, to shape the struggle between state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence with relevant populations. IW favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may require the full range of military and other capabilities, in order to create conditions favorable to U.S. national interests and the well-being and good governance of the focus populace."

If we agree that IW is something that we do (like UW), versus an environment, then I think your first sentence sums it up nicely. The remaining sentences are too presuming and to be frank too politically correct or lawyer like :D. Seriously, the remaining sentences "assume" that there is a prescribed approach without considering all the variables and our national objectives for each situation. Sometimes direct versus indirect actions may be desired, such as punitive expeditions, versus the lofty goal of government reform. Swinging a big stick, just as spanking a kid (I know from getting my butt whacked a few times), can modify our foe's behavior also (in some situations). Is it really in our national interests to spend millions of dollars in a vain attempt to reform the world? In some cases yes, but I argue in most that isn't the case.

The point is don't restrict the definition to "favors indirect and asymmetrical approaches".

Just leave your definition as "shape the struggle between state and non-state actors for legitmacy and / or (added) influence with relevant populations". That definition will still serve as a forcing mechanism to drive any needed doctrinal changes, and it does add much clarity in my opinion.

Bob's World
12-24-2008, 10:44 PM
Bill,

Good points, less is usually more. I do think that IW is intended to be an umbrella of a wide range of operations that we conduct, and not to describe an environment. Fact is, as you well know, understanding the environment you are operating in, and what it is that you actually have to accomplish to achieve your desired ends are the two most important things to get right. What you call it is really moot.

This is a concept, that for all of its flaws (horrible name, no acceptable definition), that will not go away, nor should it. The U.S. military is pretty good at waging war, but not so much at waging peace. That is probably why we try to turn every situation into war, we know we are good at it.

IW is really about waging peace, and that can be a very tricky, dangerous business, but it is what we need to get our arms around as it is the majority of projected operations. We also need to get our brains around the fact that though DoD may bring the bulk of the resources, it is most often a situation that requires a civilian lead, both for the HN, and for the U.S. involvement. IW was intended to garner not only that lead, but greater non-DoD support. Problem is that we had to go and call it war. "Irregular Peace" is more apt, and also more likely to garner the support we seek.

Everybody have a safe and merry Christmas. And when you pause to remember our brave young men and women down range, say an extra prayer for those fine infantrymen like my boy. Regardless of how clever our strategies are, or what we call the latest concept, it always boils down to a frontal assault for the lead squad....

William F. Owen
12-25-2008, 06:22 AM
I still say that the only reason war is about land is because people need to live and practice their ideas somewhere. If we could live in a bubble in the sky, people would fight over the bubbles too.

Concur, which is why land is at the centre of all Strategic thought.


That definition will still serve as a forcing mechanism to drive any needed doctrinal changes, and it does add much clarity in my opinion.

OK, I can dig that, but why not have a doctrine to drive doctrinal change. Why not teach war better so that folks have better understanding?

Bob's World
12-25-2008, 01:58 PM
William,

Your right in that as it applies to "War," IW does not make sense. That is the point that I was attempting to highlight in my earlier posts. IW is not war. IW is that family of engagement that the military does primarily in peace. To try to make it war is as frustrating as trying to get the proverbial square peg into the round hole.

Granted, many of the operations that fall under this umbrella term are also conducted ancillary to true war (the OSS with the French Resistance in WWII for example, or the Russian resistance movement that tormented the Germans).

My take as a fairly close observer and even participant in this latest ideological struggle within the military heirarchy is that everyone is talking past each other, blinded by their own preconceived notions of what war is, what their branch or service should do in war, and even what the role of DoD and the other agencies are in our overall scheme of national security. The very real changes in the environment are driving the need for very real changes in both our response mechanisms and how we think about applying those responses.

Regardless of changes in the environment, the nature of war, just as the nature of insurgency, does not change, it just occurs within that new environment. At the end of the day, our military must be able to wage war, and it must be able to conduct UW in places where we want an insurgency to prevail, and FID where we want the existing troubled government to sort things out with its populace. But as we wage the peace, we need to get smarter about how to do it in this new environment, how we operate as a military, and how other agencies operate, and how we operate with each other...thus the need to sort this out. Sadly that sorting out has been packaged as IW.

DJL
12-25-2008, 03:43 PM
Gents,

A few thoughts:

Isn't it still useful to reserve the term "warfare" for the aspects of a comprehensive approach that involve force or the threat of force, whether that force be lethal or non-lethal? Agree that IW cannot be conducted without the "unity of effort" you describe, but to include all of the political and economic lines of effort under IW may be extending the definition into aspects which would more correctly fall under politics or economic competition rather than warfare. Gets tough to draw the lines since we're increasingly realizing the interdependence of the efforts - guess that's a good thing. The bad thing is that it's still the military that has to do all of these at the same time in most cases.

Do we really want to try and tie IW to non state actors? Seems to artificially narrow the definition to match current conditions, but doesn't acknowledge the historical or current practices of state actors useing IW whether overtly or covertly.

Final Devil's advocate question: Isn't the mind of the opponent really the center of all strategic thought? (Guess I'll show my cards as a Boyd fan with that one). That said, thank God for infantrymen like Bob's World's son, and bless 'em all.

Happy Holidays!

DJL

Bob's World
12-25-2008, 04:38 PM
Just as war is a continuation of Politics, IW is part of that continuation as well, typically well short of what we would consider "war."

My newly edited definition:

"IW consists of actions conducted by the whole of government, typically in times of peace, to shape the struggle for legitimacy and influence with relevant populations. Military activities favor indirect and asymmetric approaches in a supporting role, though at times may require the full range of options."

max161
12-25-2008, 05:52 PM
Below is from a thesis I wrote on Unconventional Operations in 1994-95 when I was trying to describe the Post Cold War World. Obviously not a definition but a description:


Conflict is defined as "an armed struggle or clash between organized political parties within a nation or between nations in order to achieve limited political or military objectives." This definition, though somewhat more ambiguous than war, is still rather straightforward and simple to understand. However, non-conventional conflict is something even more ambiguous and difficult to understand. It extends the continuum of conflict. Conflict in the conventional sense begins when the armed struggle begins; however, non-conventional conflict encompasses all of the types of conflict listed above, starting with the threat or possibility of conflict and extending past conflict termination, because the conditions that gave rise to hostilities in the first place may still remain, though not visible or easily recognized. It also includes armed clashes by unorganized groups that are not seeking to achieve any political or military objectives.

Non-conventional conflict encompasses the lawlessness of a society in which the governmental system has collapsed, but no organized group has risen to take its place. Violence and terrorist-like activity can occur out of frustration with no identifiable purpose. This type of conflict is non-conventional, because it is difficult to determine the objectives and methods of the actors, perhaps difficult to even determine the actors, and thus it is difficult to apply conventional elements of power. This is the sensitive and complex environment in which operations may increasingly take place. Although the situation may not be a traditional insurgency, there will likely be many of its characteristics present. In these types of non-conventional environments it is the issue of perceived legitimacy by the people and the political powers involved that places new stresses on military forces whose legitimacy is no longer a matter of fact.

Surferbeetle
12-25-2008, 08:26 PM
Gentlemen,

Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept, Version 1.0, 11 September 2007 has a section that I found worth ripping off and incorporating into my personal definition… IW is the use of any means available to attrite, influence, and or exhaust an opponent in order to have him succumb to your will.

Ok, where is that scotch?

William F. Owen
12-25-2008, 08:53 PM
Gentlemen,

Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept, Version 1.0, 11 September 2007 has a section that I found worth ripping off and incorporating into my personal definition… IW is the use of any means available to attrite, influence, and or exhaust an opponent in order to have him succumb to your will.

Ok, where is that scotch?

Regular Warfare is the use of any means available to attrite, influence, and or exhaust an opponent in order to have him succumb to your will.

Will that do for the Regular Warfare definition?

Bill Moore
12-25-2008, 09:57 PM
Regular Warfare is the use of any means available to attrite, influence, and or exhaust an opponent in order to have him succumb to your will.

Will that do for the Regular Warfare definition?

Excellent response, since war and warfare are about the threat of, or the use of, coercion to make your opponent bend to your will, this proposed definition doesn't add much to the debate.


Conflict is defined as "an armed struggle or clash between organized political parties within a nation or between nations in order to achieve limited political or military objectives."

I thought about using conflict also, but how can we define Al Qaeda's and numerous other irregular groups has having limited objectives? AQ is waging total war in an attempt to re-establish the Caliphate. If that is a limited objective, then what objective isn't limited?


"IW consists of actions conducted by the whole of government, typically in times of peace, to shape the struggle for legitimacy and influence with relevant populations. Military activities favor indirect and asymmetric approaches in a supporting role, though at times may require the full range of options."

First, we do not conduct warfare during peace, we participate in warfare to bring about a desirable peace. Peacetime engagement conducted for numerous reasons falls short of warfare. IW is not restricted to other than war environments, in fact I can't think of any conflict where there was no element of IW being conducted in parallel or pre or post conventional conflict. When we say military activities favor indirecct and asymmetric approaches, we are presented with two problems. First the terms mean nothing and everything depending upon the audience. The indirect approach is over hyped and misleading. If you are in war, you still have to defeat the enemy, which probably means killing him. If we're helping someone else do it, then they still have to conduct direct approaches to defeat the enemy. The strategy for getting to the point where we direct power can be applied first depends upon controlling/influencing the relevant population, so they will identify the enemy (drain the swamp). However, that doesn't necessarily mean indirect.

The second problem is you are presenting a so called preferred solution, by stating "ususally favors". Every problem is unique, I think any definition should stay far away from proposed solutions. The goal is to understand the problem and then to develop an appropriate strategy to counter it.

IW consists of actions conducted by the whole of government to shape the struggle for legitimacy and influence with relevant populations.

Surferbeetle
12-25-2008, 10:22 PM
Regular Warfare is the use of any means available to attrite, influence, and or exhaust an opponent in order to have him succumb to your will.

Will that do for the Regular Warfare definition?

William,

It seems from your previous comments that you are MCO centric and that you discount the effects which diplomacy, information/intelligence, and economics have on the success/failure of warfare. As a result the inclusive definition that you offer above does not follow what you have previously, narrowly and incorrectly IMHO, ruled out:


OK, so which wars in history have resulted in NO casualties? War is killing. Read Clausewitz. Changing someone's ideas without killing is marketing or diplomacy, and nothing to do with the military. Killing is what makes war a distinct and discrete human activity. It's what defines war


Information and Psychological means are adjuncts to violence. The are violence enhancers. If they are employed without violence, then they are marketing or diplomacy, and nothing to do with war.


How does a fight for territory and and fight for ideology differ? Last I checked, only human beings have "ideas" and all humans live on land, or territory. I can't see how you can ever have a "war of ideas."


All true, but that's not war. It's something else. Diplomacy? Soft power cannot kill and cannot break will, therefore it is not part of warfare.

Sun Tzu says it more eloquently than I:


To fight and conquer in all your battles is not supreme excellence; supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy's resistance without fighting.



In the practical art of war, the best thing of all is to take the enemy's country whole and intact; to shatter and destroy it is not so good. So, too, it is better to recapture an army entire than to destroy it.

Regards,

Steve

Bob's World
12-25-2008, 10:54 PM
When I read the first "official" definition of IW, my thoughts were much the same as the point I believe William is making for some of our efforts here: A defiinition that is too general describes EVERY form of warfare. This is certainly true of the ones offered by Surfer Beetle and Bill Moore as well.

Also, as Bill has pointed out on my proposals, the tact that I am taking in carving out IW as a period of activity ranging from full peace to a niche of operations that also take place in full warfare, I propose the solution that those operations require in the defintion. A fair criticism.

So we find ourselves the same place that senior leaders find themselves: We know we need to consider new types of engagement and develop capabilities for conducting that engagement, we just don't know exactly what to call it or how to classify it.


As I think about this, I find insightful a recent statement by ADM Olson: "What we are calling GWOT or The Long War is actually the new normal, and it will endure." I tend to agree. I believe what we are calling war is actually peace. Messy and dangerous as it is.
For if something is "normal", then it is not also "irregular"; and similarly if it is "enduring" it cannot be warfare, but must in fact be peace, as I believe (in this Christmas season) that peace is the enduring human condition, and it is the periods of "irregular" violence that accent that peace that are in fact "war."

So I go back to focusing on what the purpose for the crazy concept is in the first place:
1. Get DoD to realize that not every dangerous thing we do requires fire and maneuver to defeat an enemy force; and
2. To get the rest of our Government to realize that they don't get to sit back and wait for DoD to make everything nice and safe before they get out and do the things in their respective lanes.

We've dumped a dozen similar concepts in recent years as all failing to fully scratch the itch that is nagging at us. Somewhere along the track the Department of Defense started drifting back to thinking of itself as the "War Department" again. We changed the name for a reason. National Security is far more than waging war, it is preventing war and creating an environment that supports not only our overall security, but "Life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness" as well.

One answer is to simply say that there is Peace and there is War, and that DoD participates in both. Peace is longer and not DoD led; War is shorter and is DoD led. The problem is getting the services to recognize their peace duties, and to organize, man, train, and equip for them as well as they do for their war duties. That is why I think we are chasing this elusive concept of IW.

Off soapbox, end of sermon.

Bill Moore
12-25-2008, 10:58 PM
you discount the effects which diplomacy, information/intelligence, and economics have on the success/failure of warfare.

Surferbeetle, I can't speak for William, but we have always used diplomacy, information and economic power in addition to our military power in any conflict. Our diplomats first strive to build a consensus, then a coalition, push items through the UN, that is supported with information/intelligence, and economic power has been used in numerous ways both for irregular and regular warfare.

Ginspace made an interesting argument earlier about war, or acts of war, that fall short of violence, and I think his example was the blockade. I think a blockade that is enforced by another person's warships definitely falls under the threat of force to those who decide to violate it, but it is not necessarily violence or the threat of violence against the country we're trying to get to bend to our will. If the UN considers that an act of war, then are we at war?

I also wondered what an attack on another nation's internet, banking system, other economic infrastructure, etc. would be considered? There are lots of means to influence another's nation's will using coercion without violence, so maybe Clausewitz's definition of war is not adequate for our Defense Department? What else should the military be prepared to defend against? We have to be careful with this one, as it can quickly get out of hand.

Surferbeetle
12-25-2008, 11:47 PM
Surferbeetle, I can't speak for William, but we have always used diplomacy, information and economic power in addition to our military power in any conflict. Our diplomats first strive to build a consensus, then a coalition, push items through the UN, that is supported with information/intelligence, and economic power has been used in numerous ways both for irregular and regular warfare.

Bill,

Appreciate your thoughtful responses; I will shoot a quick response from the hip and then give this a little more thought and see if I can add some references in order to reinforce my feelings on this in a subsequent post.

BLUF we do not resource or train for DIME operations sufficiently. I don't discount that we use diMe, but it is my opinion that we do not consistently use DIME.

As a CTC/BCTP-bum it is only in the last few years that I have observed DOD make the attempt to pull in other agencies at the tactical level. IMHO if we are not doing DIME at the tactical level then we are not fully committed to the fight.

(D) The DOS team's that I have interacted with are consistently bright, culturally oriented, and understaffed. IMHO they are also very wary of DOD intentions.

(I) As a kid I used to listen to the reassuring VOA broadcasts. IMHO what we presently say is not synchronized to what we do and thus it is consistently discounted and discredited on 'the street' and in other countries.

(E) The embargo on Iraq bears more examination as a recent example of this aspect of the effectiveness of our E part of warfare. Perhaps JMM99 can bring some of his excellent clarity to the underpinnings of the execution, however my dirty boots view was that it degraded my ability to rapidly stabilize the populace in my small part of the AO in Iraq and it appeared that from a day to day living standpoint the GOI elite were minimally impacted. I would add that USAID seems to overwhelmed and understaffed.

Best,

Steve

max161
12-26-2008, 03:38 AM
As we discuss what IW is I think we should pay attention to what has been written in the past.

Sam Sarkesian, a professor of political science at Loyola University, writing in 1993 put forth a set of characteristics that summarize the variety of future conflicts in which the US might become involved. He believes that it is in this environment that US SOF will be called upon to operate.

• Asymmetrical Conflicts. For the US these conflicts are limited and not considered a threat to its survival or a matter of vital national interests; however, for the indigenous adversaries they are a matter of survival.

• Protracted Conflicts. Require a long term commitment by the US, thus testing the national will, political resolve, and staying power of the US.

• Ambiguous and Ambivalent Conflicts. Difficult to identify the adversary, or assess the progress of the conflict; i.e., it is rarely obvious who is winning and losing.

• Conflicts with Political-Social Milieu Center of Gravity. The center of gravity will not be the armed forces of the adversaries as Clausewitz would argue, but more in the political and social realms as Sun Tzu espouses.

Sam C. Sarkesian, Unconventional Conflicts in a New Security Era: Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1993), 15.

As an aside this book was an excellent analysis of Vietnam and Malaya. But as we wrestle with the meaning of IW (and especially those among us who think they are coming up with something new) we should consider that everything we are talking and writing about has been discussed in past writings.

Bill Moore
12-26-2008, 04:06 AM
As an aside this book was an excellent analysis of Vietnam and Malaya. But as we wrestle with the meaning of IW (and especially those among us who think they are coming up with something new) we should consider that everything we are talking and writing about has been discussed in past writings.

Agreed, but what was written in the past is insufficient for what DoD is looking for today. Still there was much written that was very relevant to today's challenges, but for whatever reason it didn't seem to help us too much with our current challenges. Reminds me of what my old boss used to say, we have lessons, we don't have lessons learned.

However, before we fix anything, we first need to address IW as a policy, or policy enabler. What do we really want to be capable of doing? Why? Then it shouldn't be so hard to identify the gaps and where we need to go. I hope we don't envision Iraq and Afghanistan as models for future war, but that is exactly what it sounds like. Perhaps we simply need to learn how to develop more feasible strategies, employ our forces correctly, and then maybe we'll find the gap isn't as large as we may think.

Surferbeetle
12-26-2008, 04:30 AM
CSM Analysis (http://www.csmonitor.com/2008/1226/p01s01-wosc.html); Promoting Peace in Afghanistan


Born out of the mantra that the war in Afghanistan cannot be won by military means alone, the mission of these small units – 26 in total – is to coordinate with local leaders and do development work – thus winning Afghan hearts and minds.

It was not always like this. As the war here began in October 2001, there was much talk about the need for reconstruction. But a RAND Corp. study found that, even as President Bush was promising a "Marshall Plan" for Afghanistan, the country received less assistance per capita than postconflict Bosnia, Kosovo, or Haiti, and less than half of what later would be spent in Iraq.

Last year, though, the budget for reconstruction projects here tripled, USAID development experts were shipped out by the dozens, and the PRTs were given new status. The US has now spent more than $32 billion on assistance to Afghanistan – 32 percent of which was allocated to development and humanitarian assistance. That number, according to the US State Department, will continue to climb in 2009.


With the understanding that quantity does not necessarily equate to quality (a SOF truth if I recall correctly, and assuming that my research gathered accurate data - the UK numbers seem pretty low) I built a quick set of Diplomatic Ratios for comparison purposes among some of the coalition forces. The Diplomatic Personnel to Inhabitants ratios work out to be: US = 1:213,000 UK = 1:29,850 France = 1:3,687 and Germany = 1:12,692; and the Diplomatic Personnel to USD/Euro/Pounds ratios work out to be US = 1:818,571 UK = 1:42,500 France = 1:273,340 and Germany = 1:200,000

Diplomatic Snapshot of the United States

The DOS has 14,000 personnel, a budget of 11.46 billion dollars, and diplomatic and consular activities in 180 plus countries. The US has 298.2 million inhabitants. (1 (http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/100033.pdf)), (2 (http://www.bls.gov/oco/cg/cgs041.htm))

Diplomatic Snapshot of the UK

Over 2,000 personnel deliver counselor service, with a budget of 85 million pounds, and 261 embassies, high commissions and other diplomatic posts worldwide. The country has 59.7 million inhabitants. (3 (http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/about-the-fco/)), (4 (http://www.fco.gov.uk/resources/en/pdf/pdf13/fco_pdf_consularstrategy2007))

Diplomatic Snapshot of France

French Foreign and European Affairs Ministry has 16,463 personnel, a 4.5 billion euro budget, and 158 embassies. The country has 60.7 million people. (5 (http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/ministry_158/ministry-missions_2050/the-ministry-of-foreign-and-european-affairs-in-numbers_9209.html))

Diplomatic Snapshot of Germany

Foreign Service has 6,500 Staff, a 1.3 billion euro budget and 226 missions abroad. The country has 82.5 million inhabitants. (6 (http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/diplo/en/AAmt/AuswDienst/Mitarbeiter.html)), (7 (http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/diplo/en/AAmt/AuswDienst/AVen.html)), (8 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreign_Office_(Germany)))

William F. Owen
12-26-2008, 07:54 AM
William,
It seems from your previous comments that you are MCO centric and that you discount the effects which diplomacy, information/intelligence, and economics have on the success/failure of warfare.

MCO = Major Contingency Operation? Not at all. I am definitely not BIG War centric. I am Warfare centric. Diplomacy, Info/Int and economics all have a role in the strategy behind conflict, and can exist when separated from conflict.

Strategy and War are not the same thing. Strategy should make use of all the instruments of power including culture. Military force should focus on the use or the threat of lethal force.


Sun Tzu says it more eloquently than I:
Sun Tzu wrote the "Art of Bing" Bing = Strategy, so yes, if you can get what you want without fighting, then "way cool," but that is usually dependant on being militarily superior, thus economically superior, thus overall better.

As Clausewtiz said "it is best to be strong everywhere."

Bob's World
12-26-2008, 12:08 PM
Dave is spot on that this is ground that has been plowed hard, and often. And yet for all the working of soil, not much has grown of this concept. One reason, is that many hold positions similar to William, not saying it is right or wrong, but it is counter to what is being proposed with IW. IW is all about defining and shaping a military to do things other than war.

Another problem is that we have never landed on a name that sticks. Add to that the general perception in the military that this kind of work is something one does only when you can't find a good symetric enemy to train to fight in a nice conventional way. Hell, the only reason we have NORTHCOM is because in the early days following the Cold War, before that peace started getting messy, the military found itself under hard budgetary attack and without a mission to justify its existence at current levels, so they looked around, saw that the Guard had a mission still, and tried to steal that mission. Soon after, once OPTEMPO started to climb in places like Bosnia, I'm sure they regretted that boneheaded move, but it highlights how DoD thinks.

So the questions remain: What does DoD do in times of peace? What should those activities be called? How does DoD balance its primary warfighting mission with the need to man, train, organize, equip and execute supporting roles in these peacewaging missions?

Once we sort out the question, we have a better chance of coming to an answer. IW, sadly, is as unlikely to catch on as any of the other failed concepts that went before it. So, I think, to earn this bottle of Scotch, you need far more than a simple definition.

A good start would be to define the Task and the Purpose; Then perhaps a workable term and a definition for that term that links cleanly back to the task/purpose. Also important in this will be Command Relationships. Always touchy, and METT-T driven, in general terms though there should be a presumption of civilian lead for this.

A good answer will be simple, but it will require a rigor of analysis of a very complicated area of foreign policy to get to.

Bob's World
12-26-2008, 04:58 PM
Ok, I just read the article "Irregular Warfare is Warfare" in the latest Joint Forces Quarterly. It is a very accurate statement of what the current rationale and thinking is within DoD.

I believe it is based upon unsubstantiated positions and flawed analysis, and take an opposite viewpoint. I believe that Irregular Warfare is not irregular, or warfare.

I said above that we needed to look at the task and the purpose for this concept we are wrestling with, and start fresh with naming and defining it. In the course of doing that I looked at various related missions, from Security Assistance, to that of US AID, to the Department of State. None of those really captured it. The closest I found is how DoD supports Civil Authorities here at home for emergencies. So my proposal is to simply expand the mission of "Military Support to Civil Authorities" laid out in DODD 3025.15, and expand it to include support for foreign policy as well. So, in that vein:

Current Term: Irregular Warfare

Current Definition: “A violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations. IW favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capabilities, in order to erode an adversary’s power, influence, and will.”

Proposed:

Task: Coordinate US Government activities to implement foreign policy in peace

Purpose: To ensure efficient and effective implementation of all elements of national power under a lead appropriate to the mission at hand in order to support U.S. national interests abroad.

Term: Military Support to Civil Authorities (MSCA)

Definition: (Military Support to Civil Authorities (MSCA). Those activities and
measures taken by the DoD Components to foster mutual assistance and support between the Department of Defense and any civil government agency in planning or preparedness for, or in the application of resources for response to, the implementation of foreign policy, the consequences of civil emergencies or attacks, including national security emergencies.


Obviously what DoD did, and how it did it would be completely determined by the situation at hand and what the civil lead wanted to accomplish. One additional benefit of this approach is that there is already an extremely effective and well established protocal for when and how military support is incorporated, and more importantly, how it is concluded. Last in, first out. Civil lead, bottom up approach to crisis management.

Bill Moore
12-26-2008, 05:45 PM
Warfare and peace are not the same, and our objective clearly is not to wage peace (which is a condition), but conduct operations to counter or support irregular WARFARE to obtain whatever our national interests may be.

This is where the so called "indirect approach" leads to terribly flawed, U.S. centric view of the world misperceptions of reality. This implies if we're providing support (training, financial, equipment, intelligence, etc.) to a nation that is battling insurgents, we're at Peace; therefore, the world must be at peace. We call it a success when U.S. Soldiers are not involved in combat (and in many ways it is, but), yet the war like scenario on the ground has changed little for the irregular and nation still conducting a bloody conflict. We're doing high fives, and the locals are still bleeding. If you want to call that Peace go ahead, I'm not on board.

IW implies (or clearly states) there is a violent conflict. When engage in war or warfare, hopefully after careful consideration, we are supporting or waging war or warfare to achieve stated objectives. Iraq and Afghanistan are two examples, but as you know we're engaged in numerous other locations.

In other locations we may not be conducting IW, instead we may be focused on building partner capacity or security force assistance as a pre-emptive measure (boarding up the windows before the storm hits). We may be teaching IW, but in that case we're not participating in it. When we conduct a JCS exercise to exercise regular war with our allies, are we waging war or simply training?

I think we're beginning to confuse two issues, one is preventing an IW conflict and one is executing IW. Both are critically important and they dovetail with each other, but the game changes when we commit to the fight.

War is waged to obtain a better peace, peace is normally the objective of war, it shouldn't be confused with warfare.

selil
12-26-2008, 06:21 PM
I've always kind of thought of war and peace as being two transitions. The transition between peace and war being rapid whereas the transition between war and peace being a long tail. Whether in a real world aspect that occurs quickly (dropping nuclear bombs brings peace quickly even if back to to the stoneage) the cognitive efforts especially when whipping a population up has certain inertia.

Surferbeetle
12-26-2008, 07:41 PM
David Maxwell provided a link to a RAND study (OP_200, Doctrine of Eternal Recurrence) (http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/2008/RAND_OP200.pdf) on the influence of Military Structure on COIN Doctrine during 1960-1970 and 2003-2006 which provides an excellent critique of our blind spots with regards to IW/COIN.

I would recommend substituting 'personnel engaged in IW/COIN' for 'Officers' in order to account for the flattening of hierarchy that we see taking place as well as to account for some of the inter-agency efforts.


The essence of this argument is that a force that is structured to fight a high-intensity conflict against another nation-state’s military is ill-equipped to adapt to the challenge of COIN. It is not just physically ill equipped but, much more importantly, mentally ill equipped.

This is not an indictment of the intellectual capabilities of the military. Professional military officers are rarely stupid, particularly in the highly competitive ranks of the U.S. military. Rather, it is an argument that successful organizations such as the U.S. military develop structures, philosophy,and preferences together referred to as 'organizational culture' to help them carry out their tasks. By virtue of long years of training and education, officers are inculcated with patterns of thinking that reflect this culture. In the case of the U.S. military, these patterns are both incredibly useful in high-intensity conflict (the mission of most of the military) and incredibly inappropriate in COIN.


Today's Washington Post (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/12/25/AR2008122500663.html) has a timely example of this disconnect between our words and our actions in Mark Ward's Opinion Article, An Afghan Aid Disconnect


Having spent nearly the past five years as the senior career officer responsible for US economic assistance to Afghanistan, I agree with those in the military who have said that 80 percent of the struggle for Afghanistan is about reconstruction and sustainable economic development and only 20 percent about military operations. In the face of a heightened Taliban insurgency, the US military has changed its tactics. But if civilian US agencies do not change the ways they deliver economic assistance, they jeopardize their chances for success and risk alienating the Afghan people.

William F. Owen
12-27-2008, 08:02 AM
Term: Military Support to Civil Authorities (MSCA)

Definition: (Military Support to Civil Authorities (MSCA). Those activities and
measures taken by the DoD Components to foster mutual assistance and support between the Department of Defense and any civil government agency in planning or preparedness for, or in the application of resources for response to, the implementation of foreign policy, the consequences of civil emergencies or attacks, including national security emergencies.


Actually, "Aid to the Civil Power" used to be at the heart of UK COIN doctrine, before it became all new, wonderful, and re-learnt.

Bob's World
12-27-2008, 10:21 AM
Concur that their is much for the US to learn from the British experience, not just in the realm of COIN, but also to recognize that the US is entering the same period of instability and transition that England faced 1776-1945. We focus so much on our rise during this period, that we fail to study England's decline over the same period, the challenges they faced, things they did that worked, and things they did that did not.

Which brings me to my number one issue with IW. We are struggling to come up with a concept to manage the results of failed foreign policy, instead of digging into the real issue of how to retune our foreign policy for the world we live in today. Such is always the soldier's lot I suppose. We don't start the wars, and we don't end them, we just get to fight them.

As Tennyson reminded us so well, "Ours in not to reason why, ours is but to do and die.."