McMaster on war (merged thread) [Archive]

Merv Benson

04-22-2006, 03:15 PM

While it is a good book, it is wrong to compare the situation in the book to the situation with respect to Iraq. In Vietnam, specific troop request were denied or cut in half. In Iraq, no one in the chain of command ever had a troop request denied. Ever. While people can make legitimate arguments over Gen. Abizaid's "small foot print" strategy, it is his strategy and there is no evidence that it was forced on him. In fact there is considerable evidence to the contrary. Both the President and the Secretary of defense have indicated on numerous occassions that if the commanders in the field say they need more troops they will get them. When testifying before congress Gen. Abizaid and Gen Casey have also made it clear that they have made no request for additional troops.

Let's have an honest debate over the small foot print strategy instead of trying to scape goat civilian leadership over a commanders strategy that some may disagree with. If you read Tommy Franks book American Soldier, it is clear that he and his component commanders got the troops they requested and that it was their plan that was approved for execution in Iraq. There is little doubt that through Phase III of the plan it was one of the most brilliant plans for combat operations ever. It is the Phase IV aspect of the plan that has come into question. The problem with most of the complaints about the Phase IV aspect of the plan is that the enemy was forced to change his plan and adapt to the reality of losing the war and come up with a new plan to continue fighting. He is continuing to adapt as we adapt to his plans.

It is not only an unfair criticism of civilian leadership to blame them for not knowing plans that the enemy did not even have at the time, it is a disservice to the military commanders in the field who are dealing with an adapting enemy.

One more point about McMaster should be made. His innovative plan for the liberation of Tal Afar is an example of our military adapting and dealing with the enemy in a very successful operation. There is no indication that civilian leadership inhibited his planning and execution of his assignment in Tal Afar, particularly the way civilian leadership did in operations in Vietnam. The Tal Afar operation is in many ways a vindication of Gen. Abizaid's small footprint strategy which includes reliance on Iraqi troops to get the force to space ratio needed to cutoff and kill the insurgency. The real problem with the strategy was its requiring US forces to buy the same real estate more than once during the period before there were sufficient Iraqi troops to hold territory taken from the enemy.

SWJED

06-29-2006, 01:40 PM

29 June Colorado Springs Gazette - 3rd ACR Loses Its Famous Chief (http://www.gazette.com/display.php?id=1318819).

3rd ACR Loses Its Famous Chief

McMaster, who used cultural and war strategy in Iraq, heads to think tank

By Tom Roeder, The Gazette

The most famous commander of the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment since World War II hero George S. Patton will hand over the reins of the unit in a ceremony today at Fort Carson.

Col. H.R. McMaster, described in some circles as the Bush administration’s poster boy for the Iraq war, has led the regiment since 2004, earning presidential praise for tactics that drove insurgents from the city of Tal Afar.

His troops first surrounded the city and then ordered a mass evacuation, assuming that only the enemy would defy the order. Then the troops launched a house-tohouse sweep to root out insurgents.

The tactics in Tal Afar countered a problem that plagued American commanders in Iraq — insurgents who would evade capture by fleeing when the Army showed up. McMaster’s approach has been adopted by the Army and Marines in sectors of Baghdad and Ramadi.

President Bush praised McMaster’s success in Tal Afar...

McMaster’s next assignment is a think-tank job at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, where he’s charged with devising better tactics to battle terrorism...

Many of the 5,200 soldiers who served under McMaster in the 3rd ACR worship him as a leader whose sheer intelligence saved lives in Iraq.

Capt. Russ Nowels said McMaster was so well-studied in Arabic language, history and culture that he gained instant respect from the Iraqis he encountered...

McMaster, a 1984 graduate of West Point who holds a doctorate in military history, ordered his officers to complete an extensive reading list on the Middle East before their Iraq deployment and emphasized cultural training for his troops.

Nowels said the training ordered by McMaster better prepared soldiers for Iraq, where they are part-time warriors and part-time peacekeepers...

Between the two Iraq wars, McMaster stayed in the spotlight as a critic of American leadership during the Vietnam War.

His 1997 book, “Dereliction of Duty,” which outlined the failures of leadership that led to defeat in Vietnam, became a Pentagon must-read. Its criticism of military leaders who refused to speak out against disastrous policies set by the Johnson administration has emboldened military critics of the Iraq war, who have cited McMaster’s work as a reason generals should stand up to Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld.

McMaster has also penned scholarly papers on the military’s modernization plans. He has labeled as nonsensical the military’s assumption of the possibility of total knowledge on future battlefields through technology...

McMaster is especially critical of the Air Force and its high-technology satellite and aircraft purchases.

“The Air Force has become a force that is marketing flawed ideas that harm our defense,” he said.

jonSlack

07-02-2006, 08:49 PM

One day I was home watching a History Channel program on Desert Storm while I was eating lunch. There I saw a CPT McMaster interviewed because of his command of Eagle Troop/3rd ACR, which wiped out an entire Republican Guard BDE. I saw his name and thought "Gee, I wonder if he is still in the Army." I AKO White Paged him and was surprised that he was the current Regimental Commander of the ACR.

Finding that was neat.

Jon Slack

Cavguy

02-15-2008, 04:00 AM

I brought this over from the Blog -

On War: Lessons to be Learned by Colonel H.R. McMaster (http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/content?content=10.1080/00396330801899439)

Money Quotes:

"During the decade prior to the terrorist attacks against the United States in September 2001, thinking about defence was driven by a fantastical theory about the character of future war rather than by clear visions of emerging threats to national security in the context of history and contemporary conflict. Proponents of what became known as military transformation argued for a ‘capabilities based’ method of thinking about future war. In practice, however, capabilities-based analysis focused narrowly on how the United States would like to fight and then assumed that the preference was relevant."

And

"So-called capabilities-based approaches to force development and constructive simulations that validate those approaches ought to be abandoned in favour of clear-headed thinking about contemporary and future conflict. Afghanistan, Iraq and Lebanon reveal the need for balanced joint capabilities and additional capacity in other agencies to assist in postconflict stability and counter-insurgency operations. At the operational level, forces must be capable of conducting counter-insurgency, stability or state-building operations. At the tactical level, forces must be able to fight under conditions of uncertainty and be employed in sufficient force and in the right combination to establish security and overwhelm the enemy in their area of operations."

A stinging and on target commentary. Doubt it will help him on the third look to BG. :(

Ken White

02-15-2008, 05:34 AM

It should guarantee his pickup -- but you may be right. Unfortunately.

William F. Owen

02-15-2008, 06:24 AM

"So-called capabilities-based approaches to force development and constructive simulations that validate those approaches ought to be abandoned in favour of clear-headed thinking about contemporary and future conflict. Afghanistan, Iraq and Lebanon reveal the need for balanced joint capabilities and additional capacity in other agencies to assist in postconflict stability and counter-insurgency operations. At the operational level, forces must be capable of conducting counter-insurgency, stability or state-building operations. At the tactical level, forces must be able to fight under conditions of uncertainty and be employed in sufficient force and in the right combination to establish security and overwhelm the enemy in their area of operations."

While I agree on one level, I think McMasters might be looking down the wrong end of the telescope. If you continually ask the wrong question, at no time do you get the right answer.

Forces should be capability based. What is always missing is a clear doctrinal understanding of why the capabilities should be limited. The US problem has always been to assume that military power comes from maximising capabilities. Obviously it does not! Sorry to state the obvious, but it needs to be stated.

Ken White

02-15-2008, 07:25 AM

...
Forces should be capability based. What is always missing is a clear doctrinal understanding of why the capabilities should be limited. The US problem has always been to assume that military power comes from maximising capabilities. Obviously it does not! Sorry to state the obvious, but it needs to be stated.

that military power does not come from maximizing capabilities. Seems to me he's saying that they should be doctrinally based on needed capabilities, not the same thing as our current technique, thus his use of the words "so-called."

He's also aware of our (and most everyone's) problem of political dithering and meddling in the force design process.

02-15-2008, 03:24 PM

I find these concluding lines of the piece to be the most compelling.
no matter how clearly one thinks, it is impossible to predict precisely the character of future conflict. The key is to come close enough to be able to adjust as new challenges to security emerge. (Mcmaster, H. R. (2008) 'On War: Lessons to be Learned', Survival, 50:1, 28)
The point made here is the need to be flexible. And flexibility applies as much to one's thinking as to one's force structure. Until reform of the "personnel manglement" systems inculcates a selection bias towards flexibility and innovation as character traits, I suspect we will continue to see material solutions and organizational structures that are as agile as 200 car freight train negotiating the Tehachapi Loop.

RTK

02-16-2008, 01:15 AM

I think the elephant in the room on this is the FCS system of systems. Every time you see the word transformation in this paper think "FCS."

William F. Owen

02-16-2008, 02:38 AM

I think the elephant in the room on this is the FCS system of systems. Every time you see the word transformation in this paper think "FCS."

OK, BUT do you mean or elephant like capability? Do we want to maximise our elephants or merely replicate their effect, but using grey mice with big noses? :eek:

Cliff

02-16-2008, 06:05 AM

It seems to me that this is comparing apples and oranges. I think somewhere between McMasters and Dunlap is the right place...

that military power does not come from maximizing capabilities. Seems to me he's saying that they should be doctrinally based on needed capabilities, not the same thing as our current technique, thus his use of the words "so-called."

He's also aware of our (and most everyone's) problem of political dithering and meddling in the force design process.

You need to have a spectrum of capabilities. The effects or capabilities based doctrine is supposed to mean that you don't use a jackhammer when a chisel is required or vice-versa - IE, you look at the strategic objectives (ends), determine the effects required to achieve them (ways), then determine what forces can best achieve those effects (means). I am sure most people here agree with that. You can't predict what future war will be like, so you must organize/train/equip a spectrum of capabilities as a hedge against your vision of future war being wrong.

I don't see OIF as a renunciation of the effects based doctrine. I see it as an example of the wrong effects being used... due to not understanding the actual effects required to achieve our objectives. As far as defeating Saddam's fielded forces and removing him from power, we did pretty well... quick victory and fairly low casualties - hardly a failure. The following ops were just the opposite - we didn't understand the effects required.

It should not be a zero sum game... IE, having the ability to dominate at the high end with "transformational forces" should not exclude having the capability to do a manpower-intensive lower end COIN war... we need to maintain a spectrum of capabilities. If the nation can't afford both, then maybe we should avoid COIN ops/nation building-if you're not willing to do it right/spend the money to do it right, then you shouldn't do it at all. Clearly we must be able to protect our survival and vital interests, which typically won't involve COIN but more high intensity conflict. So if we are funds limited, you have to make choices, and maybe the low end, nice to have capabilities fall out. I personally think that we can afford to maintain a reasonable high end force (380 F-22s, new bombers, B-2 replacement for the AF, 300 ships for the Navy, FCS for Army) and still afford the low end (COIN aircraft, increase size of SOF forces, maintain robust light infantry forces). It seems that rejecting the RMA is just as invalid as thinking that the RMA's transformational charachteristics will apply to all wars. If we failed in Iraq by thinking that it would follow the OEF model, won't we potentially fail in the next war by thinking that it will follow the 2005-2008 OIF model?

I agree wholeheartedly for the need to reform the interagency process. I'll be very curious to see if the next president does this... a new Goldwater Nichols for the interagency?

Not having been there I can't be certain, but folks who were involved in Anaconda at both the strategic/operational level (in the CAOC) as well as the tactical level (some of the first A-10s on scene) all have said that the Army and AF were NOT well coordinated prior to Anaconda. While Col McMasters' statements about UAV surveillance may be true, I don't think the AF was ready at all for Anaconda. It seems that both services are at fault- the Army for not making sure the AF was ready to support/wanting the support, and the AF for not making sure they knew what the Army had planned and lining up the proper support. Not our joint forces finest hour...

Anyway definitely a well thought article!

V/R,

Cliff

Ken White

02-16-2008, 07:36 AM

It seems to me that this is comparing apples and oranges. I think somewhere between McMasters and Dunlap is the right place...though McMaster,an Army guy, is,as RTK says, inveighing against the purchase of the FCS while Dunlap is fighting for more birds... :D
You need to have a spectrum of capabilities...Of course you do.
...The effects or capabilities based doctrine is supposed to mean that you don't use a jackhammer when a chisel is required or vice-versa - IE, you look at the strategic objectives (ends), determine the effects required to achieve them (ways), then determine what forces can best achieve those effects (means). I am sure most people here agree with that...I suspect you're correct, most not only agree with it but they know it. However, That's not the issue McMaster is surfacing.
...You can't predict what future war will be like, so you must organize/train/equip a spectrum of capabilities as a hedge against your vision of future war being wrong.That's in essence what McMaster is saying, he's just pointing out two big truths; first, he said:

"Proponents of what became known as military transformation
argued for a ‘capabilities based’ method of thinking about future war. In
practice, however, capabilities-based analysis focused narrowly on how the
United States would like to fight and then assumed that the preference was relevant...(emphasis in original / kw)
Self-delusion about the character of future conflict weakened US efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq as war plans and decisions based on flawed visions of war confronted reality. This self-delusion has not been limited to the United States..."(emphasis added / kw)He's merely stating the obvious but he's correct in saying we were planning for the war we wanted to fight -- not those we might have to. I suggest Dunlap is still in that mode, looking for the war he wants to fight. He's a smart guy, probably a good lawyer. He ought to stick to that....

Secondly he makes the same point you make here:
...I don't see OIF as a renunciation of the effects based doctrine. I see it as an example of the wrong effects being used due to not understanding the actual effects required to achieve our objectives...Precisely and that was due to two factors; poor national level intel but, even more so, trying to fight the war we wanted to instead of the war we went to. None of the services were ready to do that because all had concentrated for almost 30 years on fighting the "big war." Even after Viet Nam when it was quite obvious that such smaller wars would be foisted upon us in the future. In 1986, the Army acknowledged that fact -- but still kept its head in the sand and prepared to fight across the north German plain; the Navy insisted it was 'blue water' and the USAF was prepared to take on Migs once again.

By 1990 it was glaringly obvious that the USSR was not going to be threat for a long time if ever again -- and all the Services did nothing to adapt (or, very little to do so...). Preparations to fight the most likely kinds of war were ignored pretty much by all the services.

We got caught up short and had better admit that -- or we're likely to repeat the failure to adapt.
...The following ops were just the opposite - we didn't understand the effects required.Worse than that -- we didn't know how to apply the effect once we figured out we'd been suckered by Saddam.
It should not be a zero sum game... IE, having the ability to dominate at the high end with "transformational forces" should not exclude having the capability to do a manpower-intensive lower end COIN war... we need to maintain a spectrum of capabilities.We can agree on that, we need a full spectrum capbility in all services -- which means the USAF needs to boost up AFSOC. ;)
...If the nation can't afford both, then maybe we should avoid COIN ops/nation building-if you're not willing to do it right/spend the money to do it right, then you shouldn't do it at all...I think we can afford it but Congress does like the big ticket items; jobs for the boys in multiple districts (also a part of the pre 9/22 stupidity and still a problem). The real question is will the voters put up with the sustained effort required for COIN efforts -- because they're long dirty slogs and that isn't going to change.
...Clearly we must be able to protect our survival and vital interests, which typically won't involve COIN but more high intensity conflict.As has been said here by many and often; we can afford to lose a COIN effort, we cannot afford to lose a major war. No question about that in my mind. The question that needs to be asked though is how many COIN efforts can we afford to lose?
...So if we are funds limited, you have to make choices, and maybe the low end, nice to have capabilities fall out.That low end isn't nice to have it's a part of being full spectrum -- and that "nice to have" is repeating the same flawed logic that got us stuck in Iraq.
I personally think that we can afford to maintain a reasonable high end force (380 F-22s, new bombers, B-2 replacement for the AF, 300 ships for the Navy, FCS for Army) and still afford the low end (COIN aircraft, increase size of SOF forces, maintain robust light infantry forces).So do I but I'm not voting for a whole lot of money for the FCS -- and you left out the F35 which I think is every bit as valuable as the F22. Not to mention that we have half dozen International Agreements about the little bird.
...It seems that rejecting the RMA is just as invalid as thinking that the RMA's transformational charachteristics will apply to all wars.I don't know anyone who's rejecting it. I do know a lot of us with scars are skeptical that anyone has all the answers...
If we failed in Iraq by thinking that it would follow the OEF model, won't we potentially fail in the next war by thinking that it will follow the 2005-2008 OIF model?Nor is anyone suggesting that -- full spectrum; that's what you said and with that, most agree. Full spectrum means that if you hit an OIF like situation you at least know what to do -- ALL the Armed forces of the United States hit OIF and took 18 months to figure out what to do and another 18 months to turn the massive bureaucracy around and start doing things right -- we may not have that that luxury next time.
I agree wholeheartedly for the need to reform the interagency process. I'll be very curious to see if the next president does this... a new Goldwater Nichols for the interagency?I hope not; G-N needs to die IMO. Nor will it be totally up to the Prez; Congress, the senior civilians and the AFGE will have a big say in that Interagency bit.
Not having been there I can't be certain, but folks who were involved in Anaconda at both the strategic/operational level (in the CAOC) as well as the tactical level (some of the first A-10s on scene) all have said that the Army and AF were NOT well coordinated prior to Anaconda. While Col McMasters' statements about UAV surveillance may be true, I don't think the AF was ready at all for Anaconda. It seems that both services are at fault- the Army for not making sure the AF was ready to support/wanting the support, and the AF for not making sure they knew what the Army had planned and lining up the proper support. Not our joint forces finest hour...Anaconda was an equal opportunity screwup; most everyone participating in that fiasco erred. In fairness to all of them, almost everybody was doing stuff they'd never done for real before.

More importantly, they were doing stuff they hadn't even trained for -- or thought about. A repetition of that is what McMaster is trying to preclude.

William F. Owen

02-16-2008, 12:06 PM

You need to have a spectrum of capabilities. The effects or capabilities based doctrine is supposed to mean that you don't use a jackhammer when a chisel is required or vice-versa - IE, you look at the strategic objectives (ends), determine the effects required to achieve them (ways), then determine what forces can best achieve those effects (means). I am sure most people here agree with that. You can't predict what future war will be like, so you must organize/train/equip a spectrum of capabilities as a hedge against your vision of future war being wrong.

I do not think you need a spectrum of capabilities. A defined capability provides the spectrum. An M1A2 is a discrete and definable capability. It can operate across a spectrum. FCS seeks to undermine that logic, with creating "M1A2" effects or capabilities from something that is not an M1A2. Suppose it might be Stryker MGS (i know it is not) - and that is very limited and cannot operate across the spectrum M1A2 can.

Military power is military power. If you have it, you have it. It's simple coherent and logical.

Cliff

02-18-2008, 02:42 AM

..you do have to procure discrete capablities...

I do not think you need a spectrum of capabilities. A defined capability provides the spectrum. An M1A2 is a discrete and definable capability. It can operate across a spectrum. FCS seeks to undermine that logic, with creating "M1A2" effects or capabilities from something that is not an M1A2. Suppose it might be Stryker MGS (i know it is not) - and that is very limited and cannot operate across the spectrum M1A2 can.

Military power is military power. If you have it, you have it. It's simple coherent and logical.

I agree with you when you say a system can have a range of effects.

I think that you do need to procure a range of capabilities to cover the range of potential conflicts/threats you might face. The FCS can have some of the M1's effects vs. armored forces... but you have to consider the M1's psychological effect in other situations...

I think the execution phase is when effects based thinking is most appropriate... you can then consider the desired outcome, what effects will achieve this, and then pick the systems that generate the desired effects instead of having a system and then trying to tailor its effects to the desired level. Of course this assumes you have multiple systems to choose from (Heavy forces, Stryker, Light inf, SOF....) etc...

V/R,

Cliff

Granite_State

02-18-2008, 03:18 AM

I think the elephant in the room on this is the FCS system of systems. Every time you see the word transformation in this paper think "FCS."

Was thinking the same thing. But I think that ship has already sailed.

Steve Blair

02-18-2008, 03:21 PM

can we at least get his name right? It's McMaster, not McMasters. That last 's' doesn't belong.

Pet peeve of mine.

As for Anaconda...there was certainly enough blame/confusion/whatever to go around, but it also played into what the AF does not really want to do: CAS. They don't like it. Never have, no matter how much lip service it gets. We've had instructors here dismiss it as a waste of assets (and yes...I'm serious. And we're talking about O-5s instructing future AF officers). The Army messed up to be sure in a number of areas (some of which can be traced back to Franks, who is not high on my favorite 'leader' list), as Ken points out.

tulanealum

02-19-2008, 12:59 AM

It should not be a zero sum game... IE, having the ability to dominate at the high end with "transformational forces" should not exclude having the capability to do a manpower-intensive lower end COIN war... we need to maintain a spectrum of capabilities. If the nation can't afford both, then maybe we should avoid COIN ops/nation building-if you're not willing to do it right/spend the money to do it right, then you shouldn't do it at all. Clearly we must be able to protect our survival and vital interests, which typically won't involve COIN but more high intensity conflict.

Cliff,

I thought your post was good and thought provoking. But, I take issue with the elimination of COIN and thinking our vital interests won't necessarily involve COIN. Most did not think Iraq would see an insurgency...often times we may go somewhere and find ourselves in a COIN role. Eliminating training for that or ignoring it will see us in our current situation (or 2004 in Iraq) or leaving because we don't want to do it. You have to have both...how expensive is COIN? I'm willing to bet a lot cheaper to train than to buy a lot of the weapons we currently have and probably don't need.

RTK

02-19-2008, 01:49 AM

OK, BUT do you mean or elephant like capability? Do we want to maximise our elephants or merely replicate their effect, but using grey mice with big noses? :eek:

No, I mean the FCS is based on a flawed premise. Not only that, it replicates nothing. It takes the Soldier out of the armored game and turns him into a technician. Hell, I can't even roll the damned vehicle with my head out of the hatch.

In short, it's a piece of sh!t.

Ken White

02-19-2008, 01:58 AM

"Hell, I can't even roll the damned vehicle with my head out of the hatch."in less than three days. :D

Not to worry. The budget cuts will thankfully kill it and we can spin off the good stuff. Works for me. :cool:

Cavguy

07-15-2008, 06:47 PM

Most had heard before, but I got the official memo today. This is a publically available announcement.

I know two of them personally - COL MacFarland and COL Shields. COL McMaster is also on the list.

Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates announced that the President nominated the Army Competitive Category colonels listed below for promotion to the rank of brigadier general.

Name (Branch)
Current Assignment

Colonel Heidi V. Brown (AD)
Effects Coordinator
I Corps and Fort Lewis
Fort Lewis, Washington 98433

Colonel John A. Davis (30)
En route to: Deputy Commander
Joint Task Force-Global Network Operations Defense Information Systems Agency

Colonel Edward P. Donnelly, Jr. (50)
Special Assistant to the Chief of Staff, Army United States Army

Colonel Karen E. Dyson (FI)
Deputy Director for Army Budget
Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Financial Management &
Comptroller)

Colonel Robert S. Ferrell (SC)
En route to: Director
Future Combat System Strategic Communications Army Capabilities Integration Center-Forward

Colonel Stephen G. Fogarty (MI)
Director of Intelligence, J-2
United States Central Command

Colonel Michael X. Garrett (IN)
Enroute to: Senior Military Fellow
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)

Colonel Thomas A. Harvey (TC)
Assistant Chief of Staff, C-4/J-4
United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command/ United States Forces Korea/ Deputy Commander (Support), Eighth United States Army/ Deputy Commander, United States Forces Korea (Advanced Element)

Colonel Thomas A. Horlander (45)
En route to: Director, Resource Management Installation Management Command

Colonel Paul J. Lacamera (IN)
United States Joint Special Operations Command Fort Bragg, North Carolina 28307

Colonel Sean B. MacFarland (AR)
Commander
Joint Task Force North
United States Northern Command

Colonel Kevin W. Mangum (AV)
Senior Commander, Fort Drum
10th Mountain Division (Light) and Fort Drum

Colonel Robert M. McCaleb (49)
Deputy Director
Program Analysis and Evaluation
Officer of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-8

Colonel Colleen L. McGuire (MP)
Director, Senior Leader Development
Office of the Chief of Staff, Army

Colonel Herbert R. McMaster, Jr. (AR)
En route to: Director
Concepts Development and Experimentation Army Capabilities Integration Center Unites States Army Training and Doctrine Command Fort Monroe, Virginia

Colonel Austin S. Miller (IN)
Deputy Director for Special Operations
J-37, The Joint Staff

Colonel John M. Murray (IN)
Deputy Commander

Colonel Richard P. Mustion (AG)
Commander

Colonel Camille M. Nichols (AC)
Commander
United States Army Expeditionary Contracting Command

Colonel John R. O Connor (TC)
Deputy Commander/Director of Operations Military Surface Deployment and Distribution

Colonel Lawarren V. Patterson (SC)
Chief
Joint/Current Operations Division
Office of the Army Chief Information Officer/G-6 Taylor Building

Colonel Gustave F. Perna (OD)
Commander
Defense Supply Center Philadelphia

Colonel Warren E. Phipps, Jr. (AV)
Deputy Commander/Assistant Commandant
United States Army Aviation Center

Colonel Gregg C. Potter (MI)
United States Army Intelligence and Security Command Fort Belvoir, Virginia 22060

Colonel Nancy L. Price (AC)
Deputy Program Manager
Future Combat System Brigade Combat Team Program Integration (Network/Complementary Programs) Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland

Colonel Edward M. Reeder, Jr. (SF)
Executive Officer to the Commander
United States Special Operations Command
MacDill Air Force Base, Florida

Colonel Ross E. Ridge (FA)
Chief of Staff, Strategic Effects
Multi-National Forces- Iraq
OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM, Iraq

Colonel Jess A. Scarbrough (AC)
Assistant Deputy for Acquistion and Systems Management Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics and Technology)

Colonel Michael H. Shields (IN)
Assistant Deputy Director
Politico-Military (Europe and Africa Affairs), J-5 The Joint Staff

Colonel Jefforey A. Smith (IN)
Assistant Division Commander (Support)
10th Mountain Division (Light)/
Multi-National Division - Center

Colonel Leslie C. Smith (CM)
Commandant
United States Army Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear School/ Deputy Commander, Material and Technology United States Army Maneuver Support Center

Colonel Jeffrey J. Snow (IN)
Commander
20th Support Command (Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and High Yield Explosive)

Colonel Kurt S. Story (40)
Deputy Commander (Operations)
United States Army Space and Missile Defense Command/ United States Army Forces Strategic Command

Colonel Kenneth E. Tovo (SF)
Deputy Commander
Special Operations Command Europe
United States European Command

Colonel Stephen J. Townsend (IN)
Executive Officer to the Commander
United States Central Command

Colonel John Uberti (FA)
Commander
Installation Management Command
Korea Region

Colonel Thomas S. Vandal (FA)
Deputy Commander (Maneuver)
3d Infantry Division (Mechanized)
Fort Stewart, Georgia

Colonel Bryan G. Watson (EN)
Chief of Staff
1st Armored Division

Colonel John F. Wharton (QM)
Deputy Commander
United States Army Field Support Command with duty as Commander, Army Materiel Command Forward-Southwest Asia/G-4, United States Army Central

Colonel Mark W. Yenter (EN)
Executive Officer to the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7 United States Army

*********************************************

Cavguy

07-15-2008, 06:49 PM

The board composition and stats:

The Selection Board consisted of the following general officers (all grades and assignments shown are as of the convening date of the board):

General David H. Petraeus, Commander, Multi-National Force-Iraq, OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM, Iraq

General Charles C. Campbell, Commanding General, United States Army Forces Command, Fort McPherson, Georgia

Lieutenant General Peter W. Chiarelli, Senior Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington, DC

Lieutenant General Ann E. Dunwoody, Deputy Chief of Staff, G-4, United States Army, Washington, DC

Lieutenant General Benjamin C. Freakley, Commanding General, United States Army Accessions Command/Deputy Commanding General for Initial Military Training United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, Fort Monroe, Virginia

Lieutenant General John F. Kimmons, Deputy Chief of Staff, G-2, United States Army, Washington, DC

Lieutenant General Stanley A. McChrystal, Commander, Joint Special Operations Command/ Commander, Joint Special Operations Command Forward, United States Special Operations Command, Fort Bragg, North Carolina

Lieutenant General Stephen M. Speakes, Deputy Chief of Staff, G-8, United States Army, Washington, DC

Lieutenant General David P. Valcourt, Commanding General, Eighth United States Army/Chief of Staff, United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command/United States Forces Korea

Lieutenant General Robert L. Van Antwerp, Jr., Chief of Engineers/Commanding General, United States Army Corps of Engineers, Washington, DC

Major General Sean J. Byrne, Commanding General, United States Army Human Resources Command, Alexandria, Virginia

Major General Randal R. Castro, Deputy Director, Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Fort Belvoir, Virginia

Major General Bernard S. Champoux, Deputy Commander, Security International Security Assistance Force, OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM, Afghanistan

Major General Anthony A. Cucolo III, Chief of Public Affairs, Office of the Secretary of the Army, Washington, DC

Major General Robert P. Lennox, Commanding General, United States Army Air Defense Artillery Center and Fort Bliss, Fort Bliss, Texas

Major General John F. Mulholland, Jr., Commander, Special Operations Command Central, United States Central Command, MacDill Air Force Base, Florida

Major General Roger A. Nadeau, Commanding General, United States Army Test and Evaluation Command, Alexandria, Virginia

Major General Virgil L. Packett II, Commanding General, United States Army Aviation Warfighting Center and Fort Rucker, Fort Rucker, Alabama

Major General Edgar E. Stanton III, Director for Army Budget, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Financial Management & Comptroller), Washington, DC

Major General Peter M. Vangjel, Commanding General ,United States Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill, Fort Sill, Oklahoma

Major General Dennis L. Via, Commanding General, United States Army Communications-Electronics Life Cycle Management Command and Fort Monmouth, Fort Monmouth, New Jersey

The following statistical data applies to the nominees as of the day of
selection:

AGE AT SELECTION
YOUNGEST: 44 YEARS, 2 MONTHS
AVERAGE: 48 YEARS, 1 MONTH
OLDEST: 54 YEARS, 3 MONTHS

TIME IN GRADE
LEAST: 1 YEAR, 11 MONTHS
AVERAGE: 4 YEARS, 0 MONTHS
MOST: 6 YEARS, 2 MONTHS

YEARS OF COMMISSIONED SERVICE
LEAST: 21 YEARS, 9 MONTHS
AVERAGE: 25 YEARS, 5 MONTHS
MOST: 29 YEARS, 4 MONTH

YEAR GROUP
MOST RECENT: 1986
PREDOMINANT: 1982
EARLIEST: 1978

jkm_101_fso

07-15-2008, 08:42 PM

Glad to see COLs McMaster and McFarland on the list; certainly well deserved.

Does anyone know the answer to my title question?

SWJED

07-15-2008, 10:12 PM

Heroes of Ramadi, Tal Afar to Get First Star (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2008/07/heroes-of-ramadi-tal-afar-to-g/) by Jeff Schogol, Stars and Stripes (http://www.stripes.com/article.asp?section=104&article=56184).

Army Cols. Sean B. MacFarland and H.R. McMaster Jr. have been selected for brigadier general pending Senate confirmation, officials said.

MacFarland was commander of the 1st Brigade Combat Team, 1st Armored Division in May 2006 when the unit was sent to Ramadi, then one of the worst places in Iraq for US troops.

During his tenure in Ramadi, MacFarland’s troops worked with local tribes and established combat outposts to take the initiative away from the insurgents...

McMaster, then commander of the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment, ordered his troops to treat detainees humanely, reached out to local Sunni Arabs to separate them from the insurgents, and he established patrol bases throughout the city, The Washington Post reported in 2006.

In late 2005, he launched Operation Restore Rights to take back the city from insurgents.

By the time the unit left in early 2006, the mayor of Tal Afar wrote a letter to the commander of US troops in Iraq praising the regiment...

Ron Humphrey

07-16-2008, 02:42 AM

Team Infidel

07-16-2008, 12:50 PM

Great to see COL (P) Davis on there. IO Warrior..

Wildcat

07-22-2008, 03:26 PM

Sweet. I remember first reading about McMaster in Tom Clancy's account of the Battle of 73 Easting, when he was a troop commander. Fast forward several years later when I'm reading George Packer's "The Lesson of Tal Afar" during my COIN research, and I see the same name pop up along with nothing but accolades for his leadership and initiative. I can't say I've read "Dereliction of Duty" yet, though. Still, it's encouraging to see officers of his calibre staying in the Army for the long haul.

Tom Odom

07-22-2008, 03:41 PM

McMaster in Tom Clancy's account of the Battle of 73 Easting,

See also Certain Victory (http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/content.asp#cert)

By late afternoon on February 26, Captain H. R. McMaster had been at war for 72 hours. His tank, Eagle 66, led a nine-tank formation as it moved across the featureless Iraqi plain like a squadron of miniature warships gliding through a glass-calm sea. Inside the steel body of Eagle 66, three other soldiers peered intently into a swirling sandstorm searching for the lead tanks of the Iraqi Tawakalna Division.

Isolated in the driver's compartment in front, Specialist Christopher "Skog" Hedenskog lay supine on his "lazy boy" couch. Skog's greatest fear was that his tank, the one that carried the troop commander, might stumble over a mine and miss the war. As he peered intently ahead, he nudged his T-bar left and right to steer smoothly around every piece of suspicious metal or slight imperfection in the ground ahead.

Staff Sergeant Craig Koch, the gunner, sat in the right of the turret, wedged between the gently moving gyro-stabilized gun and a densely packed jumble of white boxes and black telescopes illuminated periodically by blinking red, white, yellow, and green computer lights. The sandstorm, which limited visibility to 900 meters, made Koch very tense. He knew that in a tank battle, victory goes to the gunner who sees the other guy first.

Koch pressed his head tightly against the vinyl rest of his thermal-imaging sight, his right hand gently turning the " Cadillac" handgrips left and right to maintain a constant, rhythmic slewing motion of the turret. His left hand nervously flipped the toggle that changed his sight picture from 3 to 10 power and back and forth between a "black hot" and "white hot" thermal image. He strained to discern from the desert horizon any telltale point of light that would be his first indication of Iraqi armor.

...The shooting war began for Eagle 66 at 1618 hours and lasted exactly seven seconds. As he crested a slight rise, Koch spotted not one, but eight thermal hot spots. He could only make out a series of thin lines through his sight because an earthen berm masked the image of each Iraqi tank. Eagle 66 was loaded with a high-explosive antitank round, or HEAT, not the optimum choice for taking on the Soviet-made T-72 tanks. Should Koch's first shot hit the berm, the HEAT round would explode harmlessly. Koch screamed, "Tanks, direct front." McMaster spotted the tanks. "Fire, fire sabot," he yelled as he kicked up the metal seat and dropped inside to look through his own thermal imager. McMaster's clipped command was a code that automatically launched his three crew mates into a well-rehearsed sequence of individual actions. To Jeff Taylor,"Fire, fire sabot" meant that once the loaded HEAT round was gone, he must reload sabot, known to tankers in the desert as the "silver bullet."

Kreker

07-22-2008, 05:15 PM

Still, it's encouraging to see officers of his calibre staying in the Army for the long haul.

...as he is enroute to be the Director, Concept Development & Experimentation, ARCIC, and his perchant for 'net-centric warfare'.

See his CSL paper:
http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usacsl/Publications/S03-03.pdf

Kreker

h2harris

10-20-2008, 05:22 PM

LEARNING FROM CONTEMPORARY CONFLICTS

TO PREPARE FOR FUTURE WAR

by H. R. McMaster

War is the final auditor of military institutions.
Contemporary conflicts such as those in Afghanistan and Iraq
create an urgent need for feedback based on actual
experience. Analysis of the present combined with an
understanding of history should help us improve dramatically
the quality of our thinking about war. Understanding the
continuities as well as changes in the character of armed
conflict will help us make wise decisions about force
structure, develop relevant joint force capabilities, and
refine officer education and the organization, training, and
the equipping of our forces.

Rest of the essay - www.west-point.org/publications/McMasterFutureWar.txt

Rob Thornton

10-20-2008, 06:54 PM

Some of the ideas (among quite a few) worth bringing out to the SWC and discussing are:

In Dunlap's construct, war could once again be made simple, fast, inexpensive, and efficient by divorcing military operations from policy or limiting the application of military force to targets capable of "projecting power."

Divorced from its political context, the problem of future war could be solved by America's "asymmetric advantages."[2] The argument has appeal, in part, because it defines war as we might prefer it to be.

Promising simplicity overtly, or tacitly by omission in order to serve parochial interests castrates the Civ/Mil discussion when it matters most - that is when the object of policy seems most irresistible and the uniformed leaders must articulate risk in the face of appetite. If there is the false promise of simplicity and efficiency and low risk, then there is little good argument as to why the use of military force to achieve the objective might produce undesirable or unintended risk and consequence.

As such, those who might try and argue caution or upset the status quo for more resources, or a change in approach will have a hard time communicating their reason. Basically the discussion was shaped by our actions and promises, and any voice in the institution which challenges those assumptions by laying out unattractive options (scope of commitment) will have an uphill battle if the institution has compromised its integrity at the expense of its responsibilities. To paint a picture of the nature of war as other then it is may be the worst of betrayals.

Moreover, efficiency in war means barely winning, and in war, barely winning is an ugly proposition.

The complexity and uncertainty of war require decentralization and a certain degree of redundancy, concepts that cut against business's emphasis on control and efficiency.

Forces ought to be designed explicitly to fight under conditions of uncertainty and to achieve effectiveness rather than efficiency. This will entail tolerating a higher degree of redundancy.

Kind of brings out the iron calculus doesn't it? Means + Will = Resistance. There was also a point made that where possible resources should not drive strategy, but the reverse. I think there are at least three sides to this observation - first, do you have the resources available (or can they be made available) to make your preferred strategy feasible; second is the policy of such import that rather then piecemeal resources, you make them available up front thereby making your strategy both more effective, and creating the conditions to where the objective is realized sooner, and as such becomes more efficient in the long run; third - have you created an intellectual and political climate where the the first two points can be brought to light -i.e. if you create and breed a climate of apathy, that is likely what you will get.

Best, Rob

Entropy

10-21-2008, 01:46 AM

Interesting read and I agree with a lot, but I also have a few problems:

First, "balanced joint forces" used three times in the piece:

Post-9/11 experience highlights the enduring uncertainty of combat and the need for balanced air, ground, and maritime forces that can both project power from a distance and conduct operations on the ground to defeat the enemy and
secure critical terrain.

and

In doing this, we must avoid viewing force design as a zero-sum game among the services. Precision strike, information, and surveillance technologies cannot substitute for balanced
joint forces, but they are nonetheless vitally important.

and

The above factors militate for the development of balanced joint forces capable of operating against determined enemies that will attempt to evade and attack our technological advantages.

What does "balanced" mean in real terms? He doesn't really explain. And similarly, in his conclusion:

Forces ought to be designed explicitly to fight under conditions of uncertainty and to achieve effectiveness rather than efficiency.

Fighting under conditions of uncertainty seems more like a mindset problem than a force structure problem to me, provided one has a full-spectrum force. His comments on uncertainty seems to argue for a full-spectrum force (something I support) - is that what he's calling for? I couldn't really tell.

I also think his comments on RMA and transformation are a bit too critical and it seems he might want to throw the baby out with the bathwater in that regard:

Our experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as the 2006 Lebanon war, provide strong warnings that we should abandon the orthodoxy
of defense transformation and make appropriate adjustments to force structure and development.

Although I agree the concepts of RMA and transformation were oversold as a grand-unified-theory of warfare, they should not be simply abandoned because they still have utility in certain kinds of conflict. RMA and transformation concepts should be kept in those areas where they work and discarded in those areas where they don't.

That is why the U.S. Joint
Force must expand its ability to deter, coerce, or defeat nations that either threaten U.S. vital interests or attack those vital interests through proxies.

Personally, I see this more as a political problem than a force structure problem. Differences in force structure are not going to matter much in terms of deterring or coercing states that utilize proxies - it's ultimately political will to hold a state accountable for what proxies do that matters. History seems to show that such political will rarely exists which is why proxies are so effective.

However, recent conventional combat experience also suggests that we should reject the notion that lightness, ease of deployment, and reduced logistical infrastructure are virtues in and of themselves. What a force is expected to achieve once it is deployed is far more important than how quickly it can be moved and how easily it can be sustained. As we endeavor to improve ground force capability, we must
therefore increase airlift and sealift capabilities.

I do think rapid deployability is a virtue which is why I agree with his call for more airlift and sealift capabilities. Regarding the second sentence, if a force can't be moved quickly enough to intervene in a timely manner then it won't be able to achieve anything at all - nor will it be able to achieve much without sustainment. And this contradicts what was earlier said regarding Tora Bora:

At Tora Bora, for example, surveillance of the difficult terrain could not compensate for a lack of ground forces to cover exfiltration routes.

He's right about surveillance, but the reason there was a lack of ground forces was the inability to rapidly deploy and sustain a more adequate force quickly. These limitations were what drove planners toward using locals as a proxy ground force. The recent combat experience of Afghanistan would therefore seem to argue for the opposite of what he suggests. Additionally, logistics continues to be a limiting factor for Afghan operations, so ISTM forces with reduced logistical infrastructure requirements are a virtue in that theater.

Finally, I strongly agree with Ron's comments regarding the relationship between strategy and resources.

Ken White

10-21-2008, 03:08 AM

...Fighting under conditions of uncertainty seems more like a mindset problem than a force structure problem to me, provided one has a full-spectrum force. His comments on uncertainty seems to argue for a full-spectrum force (something I support) - is that what he's calling for? I couldn't really tell.Can't answer for him but that's the way I took it.
I also think his comments on RMA and transformation are a bit too critical and it seems he might want to throw the baby out with the bathwater in that regard...

Although I agree the concepts of RMA and transformation were oversold as a grand-unified-theory of warfare, they should not be simply abandoned because they still have utility in certain kinds of conflict. RMA and transformation concepts should be kept in those areas where they work and discarded in those areas where they don't.I'm inclined to throw out the whole caboodle. I'm also curious. Where do you think they might work?
Personally, I see this more as a political problem than a force structure problem. Differences in force structure are not going to matter much in terms of deterring or coercing states that utilize proxies - it's ultimately political will to hold a state accountable for what proxies do that matters. History seems to show that such political will rarely exists which is why proxies are so effective.True but force structure has a significant effect on what your forces can be successfully committed to do.
He's right about surveillance, but the reason there was a lack of ground forces was the inability to rapidly deploy and sustain a more adequate force quickly. These limitations were what drove planners toward using locals as a proxy ground force.I think there's much more to it. Planning failures and command disconnects (regrettably to include some parochialism...) were also involved.
Finally, I strongly agree with Ron's comments regarding the relationship between strategy and resources.True -- and that's why force structure has significant impact and that's why we must have full spectrum forces.

Entropy

10-21-2008, 01:47 PM

I'm also curious. Where do you think they might work?

They seemed to work pretty well in phases I-III of OIF and even Col. McMaster concedes the point to some extent several times in his essay. One example:

The major offensive operation that quickly toppled the Hussein regime in Iraq clearly demonstrated the possibilities associated with new technology, as well as the effects that improved speed, knowledge, and precision can have in the context of a large-scale offensive operation.
However, the initial phases of the operation also revealed important continuities in warfare that lie beyond the reach of technology. Unconventional forces will continue to evade detection from even the most advanced surveillance capabilities. Moreover, what commanders most needed to know about enemy forces, such as their degree of competence and motivation, lay completely outside the reach of technology.

I don't disagree at all with the above. However, in the end, Saddam's attempts at an unconventional strategy and use of unconventional forces to defend Iraq and his regime failed spectacularly. Col. McMaster is completely correct about the limits of surveillance and technology against unconventional forces, but they proved very useful against his conventional forces.

True but force structure has a significant effect on what your forces can be successfully committed to do.

Sure, but the case he points out was Iran - what force structure will help us coerce, deter them? One more focused on LIC/COIN or one more focused on HIC? Ironically, it was after what appeared to be the complete success of OIF in mid-2003 that Iran put forward a tentative offer for a grand rapprochement with the US.

I think there's much more to it. Planning failures and command disconnects (regrettably to include some parochialism...) were also involved.

Oh I agree - there is always more to the story and I agree with your points, but the fundamental problem of putting forces into and sustaining them in a landlocked country with no infrastructure remained. And of course there was the political pressure to act sooner which, IMO, also helped push the plan toward using locals.

10-21-2008, 01:59 PM

Forces ought to be designed explicitly to fight under conditions of uncertainty and to achieve effectiveness rather than efficiency. This will entail tolerating a higher degree of redundancy.

I suspect that the above provides the meat of McMaster's article.
I see his "conditions of uncertainty" as another way of describing risk. The level of risk is a factor of the degree of damage caused times the probability of occurence. Risk can be mitigated but it cannot be eliminated. Force design is (or ought to be) a function of trying to mitigate risk in the attainment of assigned missions. One way to mitigate risk is to overdesign for contingencies. This is what McMaster seems to espouse with his desire "to achieve effectiveness rather than efficiency." However, force developers must also recognize that not every mission has an equal probability of being assigned. So, the force structure must be such as to be able to handle the missions whose risk (consequences of failure times probability of occurence) is highest, within availalble resource constraints.

The real issue is whether those who drive the budget process are willing to appropriate the funds needed to allow the military to mitigate a larger portion of the perceived risk. Dollars drive the procurement actions (to include military personnel and their training) that produce a balanced (or out of balance) joint force.

In order to change the attitudes of those who approve budgets, the military needs to do a better job of identifying the spectrum of risk that various funding levels engender. As McMaster points out, the business notion of waste (as found in LEAN thinking) does not apply as directly to the military. A larger, balanced force structure inventory than immediately necessary (one that is able to handle more than just the short term, quick and dirty deployment, but not so large as to win WWIII within a week, a month, or perhaps even a year) is really a cost avoidance strategy, not waste. This is what needs to be made apparent to those who apportion Federal funding.

Ken White

10-21-2008, 03:12 PM

...I don't disagree at all with the above. However, in the end, Saddam's attempts at an unconventional strategy and use of unconventional forces to defend Iraq and his regime failed spectacularly.Did they? We're still there and I'm quite sure that was not the original US plan...
Col. McMaster is completely correct about the limits of surveillance and technology against unconventional forces, but they proved very useful against his conventional forces.Well, I see no RMA invovled in any of that or Afghanistan -- or in Iran, come to that. Absolutely none. As for 'transformation' I see none, really; what I do see is technological progress at an accelerated rate (compared to historical change) being adapted -- and that not as well or as rapidly as I would wish. So I guess we have a definition discrepancy more than a disagreement.

Sure, but the case he points out was Iran - what force structure will help us coerce, deter them? One more focused on LIC/COIN or one more focused on HIC?Any fight with Iran will absolutely require both and thus both capabilities would seem required to effectively deter.
Ironically, it was after what appeared to be the complete success of OIF in mid-2003 that Iran put forward a tentative offer for a grand rapprochement with the US.One of many over the years. Having served in Iran long ago, i've watched it pretty closely over the years. They're as good as North Korea at playing the US and they constantly approach and scuttle away. They're good at it; haggling is national sport...
...And of course there was the political pressure to act sooner which, IMO, also helped push the plan toward using locals.Too true, that. :mad:

Entropy

10-21-2008, 04:36 PM

So I guess we have a definition discrepancy more than a disagreement.

Yes, I think you're right here. That's the trouble with so much Pentagon and think-tank speak.

h2harris

10-23-2008, 06:54 PM

FCS, “Transformation” Wrong Path: Top Army Brain
By Greg Grant Wednesday, October 22nd, 2008 4:21 am
Posted in Land, Policy

Two distinct groups are emerging in the Army with quite different views on the nature of future wars the U.S. is likely to fight and the decisions the service should make about future force structure and weapons. The first group is the Title 10 side that urges the Army to embrace the troubled Future Combat Systems program and new operational concepts built around dominant battlefield intelligence. The other side is represented by officers returning from Iraq and Afghanistan who think future wars will resemble the messy reality of the current ones.

In a new paper, Army Col. H.R. McMaster, definitely a member of the messy war group, calls for abandoning so-called transformation, which is intellectually rooted in the idea of a Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). McMaster, of 73 Easting and Tal Afar fame, is a highly influential soldier-scholar who is currently putting together a brain trust for Gen. David Petraeus to review U.S. policy towards Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Continuation at: http://www.dodbuzz.com/2008/10/22/fcs-transformation-wrong-path-top-army-brain/

Ron Humphrey

10-25-2008, 01:09 PM

I think Mr Collins had it right back in 85, As you get better in one type of fight the threshold for a different type of fight is lowered. Would seem to reason as wel for HIC/LIC, CONV/COIN, whatever as it did for Conv/Nuclear

In that that doesn't mean either type won't happen just seems that it's all the more important to figure out just what "Balanced" looks like and get to working on it.

Entropy

10-28-2008, 06:24 PM

Was doing a bit of reading over at DID (http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/Military-Transformation-and-the-Limits-of-Ucertainty-2-Views-05132/) where they linked McMaster's article along with this one from 2006 (http://www.comw.org/pda/0603rm12.html) that I hadn't read before and found quite interesting. It examines RMA and "transformation" developments during the inter-war years in Germany and France which I think are important to consider today. Some excerpts:

With the benefit of hindsight, France's preparations for war with Germany are an easy target of critique. It is another matter, however, to derive guidelines that might reliably help us avoid errors in our present efforts to envision future war and prepare for it. In fact, French planners conformed in a general way to dictums that are today supposed to help planners avoid obvious mistakes. They sought to "learn the lessons of the last war" and not prepare to re-fight it. But for the dominant clique in French leadership this meant resisting the "cult of the offensive" that had sent millions to their deaths against barbed wire and artillery during the Great War.

This disposition did not imply the abandonment of offensive capabilities and operations altogether. But it did place emphasis on defensive preparations and defensive operations in the opening stages of war as a way of buying time and setting the stage for a subsequent counter-offensive. This approach also accorded with the French leadership's assessment of what types of support it might expect from its allies, how much, when, and under what circumstances. In other words, France's strategic disposition reflected its view of its strategic circumstances.

Drawing useful lessons from the experience of interwar force developments and their subsequent application requires that we relinquish the privilege of hindsight. The question is: What might the historic players have done differently given what they knew at the time? And, moreover: Can their mistaken choices be structurally associated with predispositions that others might avoid? In other words, can we identify a "character flaw" in their planning or execution?

As noted above, the case of the French air force warns against the politicalization of RMA efforts, while also suggesting that service interests can distort RMA development. The troubled experience of French ground force development illustrates how tying an RMA vision closely to a particular strategic disposition (as though one entails the other), can cloud the appreciation of operational opportunities.

The German case points to how a nation's strategic disposition can disable the perception of operational limits. The contours of the new synthesis in land warfare were not fully drawn until Kursk. Before this, what the Germans saw was how a particular instantiation of the new synthesis might resolve, at least temporarily, a particular operational impasse. What the Russians saw subsequently was how the synthesis might be applied to spoil the German solution. What the French saw was neither.

None of the provisos outlined above promise a way to reliably surmount the problem of RMA uncertainty, of course. At best, they flag some predispositions that can distort the development and application of new capabilities. As always, the real challenge is applying the precepts to entirely novel circumstances.

The entire thing is well worth a read.

Ken White

10-28-2008, 06:46 PM

This, in particular is worthy of being burned in the memories of many people:
First, we can somewhat mitigate RMA uncertainty by means of extensive, independent, and competitive experimentation, field trials, and exercises - both single service and joint. We also can seek to sharpen the debate among competing RMA schools, service visions, and branch perspectives - while insulating these from partisan politics and commercial interests.

Second, despite our best efforts, a substantial degree of uncertainty will persist; the only decisive test of vision is war. This humbling fact argues for avoiding over-commitment during periods of great strategic uncertainty, retaining flexibility, and developing our facilities for rapid adaptation. Adaptation is best served by substantial equipment and unit prototyping, which would offer multiple potential paths of development. Also useful is modularization of capabilities, units, and training regimes - an approach that allows rapid change through "add-ons" and supplemental training. (emphasis added, both / kw)

Third, pervasive uncertainty tends to strengthen the position of the status quo, especially during periods of significant strategic change. For institutional reasons, the default position may be to extend the status quo into the future. However, this is not a neutral position. When the world is changing rapidly the preservation (or recapitalization) of the status quo involves a "future vision" as risky and open to question as any - if not more so.

Finally, "uncertainty" by itself does not constitute a strong rationale for either sitting still or moving decisively down a new path. It lends positive support only to efforts to reduce uncertainty or improve our capacity to react, recover, and respond to surprise (that is, to adapt).All simple basic common sense -- and all far too often ignored totally due to egos and agendas.

That I underlined is harsh reality, that I placed in bold type is the only way to preclude not being prepared for that reality; one or the other will not work -- we have to be able to do either/or. Or even 'whatever'...

Bill Moore

11-09-2008, 06:51 PM

Policy and Strategy Must Determine Force Development
U.S. force development should be driven by how our forces might be employed to protect vital national interests. Prior to 9/11, “capabilities-based” defense analysis reinforced shallow thinking about war and disconnected war from policy and strategy. The belief that surveillance and information technology could lift the fog of war elevated a desired military capability to the level of strategy. After 9/11, military operations were not clearly subordinated to comprehensive plans that aimed to achieve policy goals and objectives.

I think this excerpt from BG McMaster's article captured the essence of the problem. This article combined with Robert Jone's article in SWJ, "Populace Centric Engagement" help paint a picture that points to one Sun Tzu's cautions, "tactics without strategy is the noise before defeat.

http://smallwarsjournal.com/mag/2008/10/populacecentric-engagement.php

We are not struggling in this conflict due to the technological gains resulting of RMA, but rather because we tended to perceive war in a new way, or more simply we tried to model conflict to fit our preconceived technological solutions to it. Quite simply we created a lie. The technological gains have allowed us to be wildly successful at the tactical level, but tactical successes do not always equate to strategic success. BG McMaster's assessment that the capabilities approach to RMA reinforced shallow thinking about war and disconnected it from policy is spot on. RMA methodology has reinforced myths about war, but the question remains is a capabilities approach the wrong approach to drive technological evolution of our military forces? I don't think we know what the future will look like, and developing capabilities to address a wide range of potential threats is prudent, but a capability is not a strategy, it is simply a tool in the tool box. Perhaps the only revolution we need is in our military professional develop curriculum?

Ken White

11-09-2008, 07:05 PM

... I don't think we know what the future will look like, and developing capabilities to address a wide range of potential threats is prudent, but a capability is not a strategy, it is simply a tool in the tool box. Perhaps the only revolution we need is in our military professional develop curriculum?Strongly endorse, in fact...

Bill Moore

11-10-2008, 02:24 AM

I wanted to read over my post before I hit submit, but house hold six gave me an order to get off the computer so we could make our appointment, what's a guy going to do? :wry:

Perhaps the only revolution we need is in our military professional develop curriculum? Anyway, what I meant to write was, "perhaps the only revolution we need is in our military professional development curriculum.

On further thought, that professional development revolution needs to be pushed throughout the Whole of Government WOG. Many folks agree that the current system is far from ideal, but they're content to wait for the bureaucracy to change, but based on my experience that is a receipe for the same ole crap. Dynamic leaders push out beyond the culturally defined rules/limitations, then let bureaucracy catch up with reality. The key is to success is to develop these leaders, and then reward them with the right incentives to stay in, not place them in a dead end job because they're making waves. When people see innovative behavior rewarded, we'll once again see our greatest resource (our people) raise to the occassion of today's and tomorrow's challenges.

Ken White

11-10-2008, 02:45 AM

...On further thought, that professional development revolution needs to be pushed throughout the Whole of Government WOG...Dynamic leaders push out beyond the culturally defined rules/limitations, then let bureaucracy catch up with reality. The key is to success is to develop these leaders, and then reward them with the right incentives to stay in, not place them in a dead end job because they're making waves. When people see innovative behavior rewarded, we'll once again see our greatest resource (our people) raise to the occassion of today's and tomorrow's challenges.However, that is going to require Congress to change their ways to an extent and I'm not sure that can be done.

What the Army -- all of DoD -- can do is take your thought and apply it internally at all levels. I'd submit that in addition to a revolution in professional development, we need and can have a revolution in initial entry training, officer and enlisted.

We also need and can have a significant loosening of the systemically imposed stifling and initiative killing cultural norms to achieve real loosening of the de facto, over-cautious restraints on leaders so they not only permitted but actually encouraged to be dynamic leaders and push out beyond the culturally defined rules/limitations, and let the bureaucracy catch up with reality.

That is 'do-able,' Congress really can't stop it and those serving and most Americans will applaud it. Do wonders for the retention of Captains... ;)

reed11b

11-10-2008, 03:11 AM

However, that is going to require Congress to change their ways to an extent and I'm not sure that can be done.

What the Army -- all of DoD -- can do is take your thought and apply it internally at all levels. I'd submit that in addition to a revolution in professional development, we need and can have a revolution in initial entry training, officer and enlisted.

We also need and can have a significant loosening of the systemically imposed stifling and initiative killing cultural norms to achieve real loosening of the de facto, over-cautious restraints on leaders so they not only permitted but actually encouraged to be dynamic leaders and push out beyond the culturally defined rules/limitations, and let the bureaucracy catch up with reality.

That is 'do-able,' Congress really can't stop it and those serving and most Americans will applaud it. Do wonders for the retention of Captains... ;)

I would second that having "unit" personel policies, instead of individual ones, would also be extremly important for any signifigant change in the DOD.

Sabre

11-14-2008, 07:54 PM

"Conventional "legacy" Army organizations, designed to fight
under uncertain conditions, proved critical in Operation
Anaconda in Afghanistan in March 2002 and in the attack into
Baghdad a year later. But some of those organizations have
since been eliminated or redesigned, based in part on the
assumption that future tactical and operational environments
would be marked by a high degree of certainty. Although the
divisional cavalry squadron of the Third Infantry Division,
a unit designed to fight for information, protect against
surprise, and ease the forward movement of follow-on forces,
was invaluable during the attack toward Baghdad, that
formation and all others like it have since been eliminated
in favor of small, lightly armed reconnaissance squadrons
designed to use mainly aerial and ground sensors to develop
situational awareness out of contact."

It was with sadness that I read the whole article, since I happen to agree with it, and I don't see it, or anything else, changing the mindset of those in position to effect change - they will instead continue to happily eat PowerPoint slide decks. But as in the above quote from McMaster's paper the DivCav squadrons could serve as the "poster child" example of how the latest grand reorganization went wrong (amoung some things that it admittedly got right), and more generally, how any belief in the chimera of RMA has led to some very bad conclusions...

Whatever war is or becomes, it will always end up as a gun fight, and you'd better'd make sure units have enough weapons in the hands of people who realize that it is their job to employ them and know how to do so.
Throwing more personnel and money into, say, military intelligence, certainly doesn't guarantee better intelligence (far from it, from what I have seen). But a grunt, scout, or a sapper with a rifle? I can think of all sorts of things that he can usefully do, even if I end up in a situation totally different from the original mission.

(Heh, and "Deployablity", how far down THAT road have we gone, for no return on investment?)

Bullmoose Bailey

12-11-2008, 08:00 PM

Very enlightening post from one of our most treasured General Officers.

True that the RMA mentality repesents a deficit in critical thinking coupled with myopic obsession on a style of warfighting that is the exception not the norm, even if we attept to normalise it.

SWJED

08-19-2009, 01:26 PM

Brigadier General H.R. McMaster on Setting Conditions and The Army Capstone Concept

Certainty vs. Uncertainty / Theory vs. Recent and Ongoing Conflicts (Then and Now)

Knowledge centric vs. fighting and politics centric.

Planning process vs. design and education.

Synchronization vs. initiative.

Centralization vs. decentralization.

Risk avoidance vs. risk mitigation.

Efficiency vs. effectiveness.

Fires vs. combined arms fire and maneuver.

See / quality of firsts vs. find and understand.

Rapid, Decisive Operations vs. sustained campaigns.

ISR vs. recon and security.

Command from the FOB vs. command from the front.

Systems approach (EBO) vs. complexity (design).

Dominance vs. strategy and continuous interaction.

MCO focus vs. spectrum of conflict.

Capabilities Based Assessment vs. Threat Based Assessment.

Vagueness vs. transparency.

Linear progression (leap ahead) vs. interaction with adversaries - continuous innovation.

Implications for the Army Capstone Concept

Conducting operations under the condition of transparency.

Conducting operations with partners and amongst diverse populations.

Overcoming anti-access in the context of a joint operation.

Conducting and sustaining operations from and across extended distances.

Fighting for information (physical reconnaissance and human intelligence).

Employing the manpower, mobility, firepower, and protection to close with the enemy.

Conducting area security operations over large areas (including population security; precision fires to limit collateral damage).

Developing partner capabilities (e.g. Security Force Assistance).

Protecting the network and routinely fighting in degraded mode.

Overcoming hybrid threats / complex terrain and overcoming enemy count-mobility efforts.

Reshaping logistics and the demand side of sustainment to ensure operations without pause and freedom of movement in non-contiguous area of operations.

SWJED

08-19-2009, 01:41 PM

Conference comment - What we lost in the 90's was the understanding that land warfare is fundamentally different from aerospace and maritime warfare because of the presence of a population and the complexity of geography. We have to capture that again...

SWJED

08-19-2009, 01:44 PM

Conference comment - In consideration of the Capstone Concept and the implications and solutions it suggests we have to be careful that we do not overcorrect...

SWJED

08-19-2009, 01:50 PM

Conference comment - The 2009 Army Capstone Concept fits nicely with US Joint Forces Command's Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (http://www.jfcom.mil/about/fact_ccjo.html).

Mark O'Neill

08-19-2009, 01:55 PM

lack context in the 'vs' , Can you elaborate?

Thanks

Mark

SWJED

08-19-2009, 01:59 PM

Mark - context was in previous theory (90's) vs. the reality we eventually encountered.

Westhawk

08-19-2009, 02:20 PM

Mark O'Neill

08-19-2009, 02:22 PM

Mark - context was in previous theory (90's) vs. the reality we eventually encountered.

thanks for the clarification for a remote Aussie.

marct

08-19-2009, 02:24 PM

SWJED

08-19-2009, 02:31 PM

There is an interesting dynamic at work in this presentation - it is a paradigm shift in the classic, Kuhnian sense. My immediate perception of most of the concern and debate is that it not involve a total paradigm shift, aka a Revolution but, rather, a modification and adaptation of the basic epistemology to bring it more in line with lived reality.

I will also point to the conference comment above concerning overcorrecting - that is probably the tough part here concernng adapting for the future - what's too little and what's too much. Hopefully there will be some drilling down on this...

Next brief and discussion is just starting - it's on the Army Campaign Plan...

William F. Owen

08-19-2009, 03:04 PM

Mark - context was in previous theory (90's) vs. the reality we eventually encountered.

Well that does beg the question as to how the "theory" of the 90's became accepted in the face of no evidence and a body of historically informed "best practice" which has remained largely the same since 1918.

The only reason I point this out, is that an organisation that is prone to making poor decisions, usually avoids finding out why the bad decisions get made.

EG: On what planet was "Command from the FOB vs. command from the front" ever a good idea, and how is video feeds from UAVs helping solve this problem?

Fuchs

08-19-2009, 03:08 PM

"Brigadier General H.R. McMaster on Setting Conditions and The Army Capstone Concept"

Where's the primary source?

marct

08-19-2009, 03:12 PM

"Brigadier General H.R. McMaster on Setting Conditions and The Army Capstone Concept"

Where's the primary source?

Currently, from what I understand, it is in draft format for internal discussion.

Anlaochfhile

08-19-2009, 03:17 PM

BG McMaster delivered a broad attack on the DoD’s transformation plans from the 1990s. He asserted that the technological focus of that time neglected the human, social, cultural, and political factors necessary to prevail on the modern battlefield. According to McMaster, events of this decade have shown how adversaries have adapted to previous U.S. methods thus negating them.

McMaster’s capstone concept seeks to reverse many of the precepts and assumptions of the 1990s defense transformation program. Under McMaster’s vision, in order to prevail in ground combat U.S. forces will need to “go local,” by getting very close to the enemy and sustaining long-term operations deep into a variety of indigenous population.

During yesterday’s staff ride of the Gettysburg battlefield, we discussed how any army is the product and reflection of the society from which it comes. The nature of U.S. Southern culture favored the Confederacy early on, but the more industrial and commercial nature of the North later asserted its dominance.

The question for today is whether U.S. society can produce the kind of soldiers and the Army necessary to implement the capstone concept McMaster described. And whether U.S. society can support the operational concept McMaster believes is required to prevail.

-Robert Haddick

Excellent point. We live in a society that is overall much more enamored with technology and hard sciences than with the humanities. How can a nation that routinely lags behind much of the world in social studies, geography, language arts, and other liberal arts studies hope to field armies that are culturally adept enough for the small wars that are likely to be a significant part of our future? The services are certainly making an effort, but without a solid grounding in our own culture, these efforts seem unlikely to ‘stick’.

I highly recommend Dr. Adrian Lewis’ book The American Culture of War: the History of U.S. Military Force from World War II to Operation Iraqi Freedom, which focuses on the role that American culture plays in how our forces organize, equip, and fight. It has some keen insights in this regard.

Brasidas

08-19-2009, 03:45 PM

A quick point. The Capstone Concept for Joint Operations is a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff document of his vision on how joint forces would operate 2016-28 in the face of assorted challenges. CCJO incorporates USJFCOM's work in the document: Joint Operating Environment, threats and trends that could face the future force. The JOE is a companion document to CCJO.

SWJED

08-19-2009, 06:22 PM

Thanks Brasidas, you are very correct that the CCJO is a CJCS document.

On the draft Army Capstone Concept - this document is the product of a writing team of 20 personnel...

SWJED

08-19-2009, 10:04 PM

I highly recommend Dr. Adrian Lewis’ book The American Culture of War: the History of U.S. Military Force from World War II to Operation Iraqi Freedom, which focuses on the role that American culture plays in how our forces organize, equip, and fight. It has some keen insights in this regard.

Thanks Anlaochfhile...

The American Culture of War: The History of U.S. Military Force from World War II to Operation Iraqi Freedom (http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0415979757?ie=UTF8&tag=smallwarsjour-20&linkCode=xm2&camp=1789&creativeASIN=0415979757)

The American Culture of War is a comprehensive and authoritative survey of American conduct in war from World War II to the present, including both Iraq wars. It traces the evolution of American strategic, operational, and tactical doctrine, including the national command structure, civil-military relations, the role of the media, military technology, the military personnel system, airpower doctrine, the role of Congress, and numerous related aspects of national defence. The American Culture of War will be an indispensable text for upper-division undergradudate courses on the history of war as well as history courses on the Vietnam War and the 1960s.

SWJED

08-27-2009, 12:56 PM

Capstone Concept will change Army doctrine
By Robert Haddick

At last week’s TRADOC Senior Leaders Conference, I heard BG H.R. McMaster deliver a presentation on the U.S. Army’s forthcoming Capstone Concept. Here is a news article (http://www.army.mil/-news/2009/08/24/26508-army-capstone-concept-balances-winning-todays-wars-with-preparing-for-future-conflict/?ref=home-headline-title2) from TRADOC and the U.S. Army that describes what the Army’s Capstone Concept is and what it will mean to the Army in the years ahead. A few excerpts from the article:

The new Capstone Concept, McMaster said, examines how the Army operates under conditions of complexity and uncertainty in an era of persistent conflict. The concept's purpose is to put into operational terms Army Chief of Staff Gen. George Casey's vision of balancing the Army to win today's wars while describing how the future Army will fight the wars of tomorrow...

The primary purpose of the capstone concept is to lead force development and employment by establishing a common framework to think about future Army operations; place modernization decisions in a broader context of future armed conflict; establish a conceptual foundation for subordinate concepts; guide experimentation in Army operations and capabilities; and guide capability development.

"We looked at how the Army intends to operate and face the challenges in the future operating environment against what we're calling hybrid threats," said McMaster. "By looking at the current operating environment and the hybrid threats we face and could face in the future, this helps the Army make a grounded projection into the near future and understand what challenges our Army will face as part of a Joint, interdepartmental and multinational force, and then develop the capability our Army will need to fight the future battle."

BG McMaster is leading a team that will complete work on the Capstone Concept by the end of this year. The new Capstone Concept is then supposed to guide the development of subordinate Army doctrine. The Capstone Concept effort thus represents important guidance for Army training, leader development, and combat unit organization.

During his presentation last week, BG McMaster emphasized the differences between the doctrine his team is completing and the doctrine the Army operated under a decade ago. Small Wars Journal hopes to provide further discussion of the Army Capstone Concept as it nears completion. For now, I recommend reading the article linked to above.

marct

08-27-2009, 03:03 PM

I'll admit that this jumped out at me:

In the new edition of the Army Capstone Concept, understanding the situation will be better defined and what the Army learns about the ethnic and cultural aspects of a situation will be factored into whatever threat the Army will face in the future.
{emphasis added}

I've been concerned for some time now about how "culture", broadly speaking, is understood and operationalized in US Army doctrine. There are serious implications for both policy, strategy and operations regardless of how the concept is constructed, but they vary by the construction. I'll be interested to see what final form they take.

davidbfpo

08-27-2009, 10:44 PM

'HR' spoke yesterday at IISS, London to a nearly full conference room on the project, with a small number of slides; in a nice touch he had to operate the PPT control himself and sometimes forgot. Very clever delivery and some wicked humour: UK Ministry of Defence (Strategy) questioner poses question and 'HR' responds did I hear you right Tragedy?

A lot to absorb and many points that could be applied to law enforcement.

IISS I think will add a video to their website soon: http://www.iiss.org/ .

Later 'HR' added his praise for the contribution of SWJ / SWC.

More another day.

davidbfpo

Ron Humphrey

08-27-2009, 11:33 PM

William F. Owen

08-28-2009, 05:54 AM

Fuchs

08-28-2009, 10:35 AM

a.) Someone has to understand that the US (and the UK) were not good at fighting regular forces. Since about 1988 we just happen to have been faced with very very incompetent regular forces. Korea and Vietnam clearly showed the great limits of the US's ability to fight any type of enemy.

I would indeed point at the summer of '45 as the line between 1st class and lesser opponents. The enemies in Korea and Vietnam had a very narrow set of competence; their combined arms capability was in its infancy.

Many U.S. FMs are still full of the same B.S. that the French used to defeat themselves in 1940. Especially the emphasis on planning & firepower as well as the lack of emphasis on agile decisionmaking and agile formations are terrible.
Several U.S. divisions were probably ahead of current U.S. doctrine in 1944.

The quest for "situational awareness" is in part explained by a desire to gather information for planning because of a doctrinal inability to handle the fog of war.

Reformers should listen to the readily available "3GW" crowd, for their lessons don't seem to have been understood yet.

marct

08-28-2009, 01:33 PM

"The biggest change is that we're recognizing some of the limitations in technologies that were designed to improve situational understanding and situational awareness," said McMaster. "We understand now how enemy countermeasures can place what we need to know about the enemy and what we need to know about the situation outside the reach of technology."
Seriously? After 20 years of folks telling telling them this they now just get it? I find this statement profoundly depressing.

You know, I took that quote as a face saving way of reversing the worst of the cyborgophile tendencies in FCS. Ever since RoboCop and Terminator, the US public has been enamoured of the idea of cyborg warriors; something the earlier (pre-9/11) FCS played into. As to why they played into it, my gut guess would be twofold. First, the public belief that human casualties would be reduced, and second, the growing split between civilian public "consciousness" and the military.

There is a bureaucratic imperative operating in almost all large organizations that translates to "Must get more resources.... Hmmmm, resources!" {spoken in a Homer Simpson voice for added effect}. The cyborgian vision of FCS certainly played out along these lines. But, as with all bureaucracies, there was a tendency to force individual members of the organization to accept the organizational rhetoric as reality. I think this was pretty clearly shown in the reaction to Van Ripper's actions in Millennium Challenge.

But how do you change the rhetoric (aka organizational construct of "reality") without damaging the organization? The simplest way to do it is very, VERY, slowly (think about the phrase "Holy Mother Church in Her Wisdom has always said that..."). In particular, note the phrase "We understand now how enemy countermeasures" (emphasis added). This implicitly says that "it's not our fault!" without having to admit that the entire idea was stupid in the first place.

Let me pull that last comment out a bit....

I think that the rhetorical vision of FCS was "stupid" for one, simple reason: it excludes human nature. The more control span you give to a commander, the greater the temptation to use it. Furthermore, such an enhanced control span disregards one of the most brilliant pieces of technology in the arsenal of warfare - the human mind. Having such a control span makes a force much less able to react on the fly while, at the same time, increasing the likelihood of producing "commanders" who are only capable of following the Book.

Honestly, I'm rather heartened by the current discussions. I think that they are very well aware of the potential problems and how to solve at least some of them.

William F. Owen

08-28-2009, 03:53 PM

Don't get me wrong. I am very happy that they are spotting the mistakes, but that does require someone to acknowledge it was a mistake and to have the honesty to point out why it was a mistake.

There was boat loads of evidence the FCS crows chose to ignore. The problem is not the stupidity of FCS. It is the ignoring of the evidence.

"War is now more complex" is based on choosing to ignore the actual evidence, and to reason their way through what the problem actually may be.

davidbfpo

09-02-2009, 08:47 PM

HR McMaster's IISS talk is now available, in two parts, his speech (33 mins) and the Q&A (29 mins): http://www.iiss.org/ scroll down slightly and click on 'watch the speech'. The 'strategy' or 'tragedy' quip is in the first minute of the Q&A, superb.

davidbfpo

J Wolfsberger

09-03-2009, 07:36 PM

There was boat loads of evidence the FCS crows chose to ignore. The problem is not the stupidity of FCS. It is the ignoring of the evidence.

If I may quibble, ignoring the evidence is only an implementation of stupidity.

"War is now more complex" is based on choosing to ignore the actual evidence, and to reason their way through what the problem actually may be.

It is more complex because the span of control issue that MarkT cites has already arisen. The issue of tactical responsiveness can be addressed through implementing auftragstaktik, and "two up, two down" communication, etc. (Which, by the way, I believe the Aussies have gone after in a big way.) That, however, requires leadership, trust in subordinates ...

But, then, recognizing that would require people to "... reason their way through what the problem actually may be."

marct

09-03-2009, 07:51 PM

Hi JW,

If I may quibble, ignoring the evidence is only an implementation of stupidity.

True, but it's also a case where a lot of the policy directives originated outside of the military. As a system, FCS had that cool, post-Star Wars, post-Cold War feel to it that attracted a large segment of the civilian and political population. Ignoring the evidence may actually have been partially required by the political realities that the US military lives under. That, however, isn't to ignore or excuse what showed up in Millennium Challenge; the entire system needed to be re-thought and re-worked after that little fiasco, and that was the responsibility of the military.

Ken White

09-03-2009, 08:17 PM

The issue of tactical responsiveness can be addressed through implementing auftragstaktik, and "two up, two down" communication, etc. (Which, by the way, I believe the Aussies have gone after in a big way.) That, however, requires leadership, trust in subordinatesFor two reasons:

We have not done it that way in the time of service of the current crop of Flag officers -- the fact that we have in the past done it and been quite successful and that we have generally been less successful since we stopped doesn't seem to penetrate...

We cannot trust subordinates because we KNOW they're only half trained...:rolleyes:

:mad: :mad:

William F. Owen

09-05-2009, 05:24 PM

Recently saw H.R. McMasters speak at the Land Warfare conference in Israel. Very impressive, and his comments actually addressed exactly my concerns, as did my conversation with him afterwards.

Essentially, if we accept the substantial limitation of human beings in relation to information technology, then we may see useful progress.

Bob's World

09-06-2009, 12:42 PM

The US army is pretty good at adjusting to new situations in the pursuit of defeating military threats.

Where we fall short is when such a defeat is not the path to victory. Will be sitting down with McMasters and his team soon, but having listened to Army senior leadership talk about how they view IW recently, I am not optimistic that this new Capstone Concept will do much more than rearrange the proverbial deck chairs...

Will see what they have to say though, and see if we can't widen the aperture a bit.

davidbfpo

06-25-2012, 07:23 AM

There are numerous hits on 'McMaster' and he appears to have four threads and they will be merged, with a new title.
When the US army, at the request of Colonel H R McMaster, set up small military bases within the Iraqi town of Tal Afar during 2006, he pioneered a new strategy of bottom-up leadership. In his talk at TEDxWarwick 2011, Tim Harford, Economist and senior columnist for the Financial Times, suggests that the success that followed was not just due to the bottom-up approach, but was also based in Colonel McMaster's ability to recognise and react to local problems and challenges.

Which ends with:
Other businesses are also decentralising their management as they acquire new technology, with a realisation that there is no substitution for political knowledge of time and place. This, Harford states, is the management lesson of the war in Iraq and one that we all can learn from.

Link:http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/knowledge/themes/04/timharford/

Bill Moore

04-21-2013, 03:36 AM

http://csis.org/event/ground-force-maneuver-why-it-still-matters

MG McMasters is interviewed by Dr. Maren Leed at a CSIS event regarding the role of ground forces in the future security environment.

During the discussion MG McMaster identifies what he calls two scary lessons that some people have apparently learnt from the past decade of conflict:

1. We think we can wars by raiding

2. We think we can outsource our wars and have others fight them

Both of these comments seem to be making a swipe on some of the verbiage coming out USSOCOM, but I don't think anyone senior in USSOCOM thinks we can wars with a raiding approach. Most realize it is a tool in the toolbox that does have numerous applications, but rarely is it decisive.

Regarding lesson number 2, I think this argument is weak because it is based on a series of assumptions that are not credible when you scratch the surface, yet on the other hand assisting others with addressing their security needs when it is appropriate is still a valid strategy. Of course this isn't new, we have been doing this for decades.

At the end of the day the U.S. military is responsible for defending our Constitution and nation, not our partners. Most of the time we have done that with partners, but if someone is proposing a national defense strategy that hinges on outsourcing this responsibility to partners that seems to be irresponsible and dangerous.

Moderator's Note

There is an earlier thread 'McMaster on War': http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=647

Fuchs

04-21-2013, 09:48 AM

Irresponsible and dangerous?

List the countries which can defend themselves successfully without allies, please.

If you cannot create a long list here with more than a hundred countries around, maybe you should consider whether you became used to a very high level of ambition and then mistook it for a kind of minimum requirement.

davidbfpo

04-21-2013, 12:12 PM

I will listen to 'Hal' McMaster later today. Meantime a quick response to Bill M. post (in part):
2. We think we can outsource our wars and have others fight them.....

Regarding lesson number 2, I think this argument is weak because it is based on a series of assumptions that are not credible when you scratch the surface, yet on the other hand assisting others with addressing their security needs when it is appropriate is still a valid strategy. Of course this isn't new, we have been doing this for decades.

It appears to me that sometimes the USA in the GWOT has assisted others with addressing primarily US security needs, not their own security needs. Mali comes to mind and the externally funded, almost mercenary like AU intervention in Somalia, where few Somalis appear to fight for their own government.

Bill Moore

04-21-2013, 06:00 PM

Fuchs

Irresponsible and dangerous?

List the countries which can defend themselves successfully without allies, please.

This comment is irrelevant to the argument I'm making, and the argument I think MG McMasters is making. Neither dismissed the value of allies, but ultimately we're responsible for defending our nation and our national interests, which IMO implies basing our national defense resourcing decisions on the assumptions that our allies and partners will take care of it for us seems very dangerous. There is a big difference between "outsourcing" and coalitions.

Let's face facts, most of our allies and partners, perhaps especially true in Europe have enjoyed a relatively free ride when it comes to security, since the U.S. provided it. Putting the politics aside, assuming it was in Europe's interest to remove Saddam, neutralize Afghanistan as a safehaven, or even defend South Korea (something I think South Korea is probably capable of doing on its own), they don't have the means.

davidbfpo

It appears to me that sometimes the USA in the GWOT has assisted others with addressing primarily US security needs, not their own security needs. Mali comes to mind and the externally funded, almost mercenary like AU intervention in Somalia, where few Somalis appear to fight for their own government.

True, but more accurately put we help others when we have "common" security interests. I agree our approach backfires when we attempt to cherry pick a particular threat group (Cartel, terrorist group, or a specific insurgent group) in a particular country, because we fail to address the larger systemic issues that ultimately more important to the assisted nation's security. You can take that issue up with our State Department and Congress.

All nations ultimately act to pursue their own interests.

jcustis

04-22-2013, 02:45 AM

If people are criticizing the opening phase of OEF in 2001 and the SOF-centric approach, because somehow that is akin to thinking we could win a war with SOF and raiding, I'd counter that phase was not 'war'.

Can you accomplish limited objectives through raiding? Absolutely, and we've done so throughout history. Even our SOF raiding practices in Iraq went after certain objectives.
If the general was referring to policy-makers and some narrow views they may hold, roger, but I don't think too many folks in the force hold on to the illusion that raiding wins wars in the larger sense of the word.

ETA: I finished the clip and understand the angle of his points better. I completely concur that we shouldn't put all of our eggs in a "raiding" approach to war. In an unspoken manner, McMaster seemed to allude to the standard "we need to be able to take and hold ground," mantra.

jmm99

04-22-2013, 03:58 PM

I count MG McMaster among the "smart guys". One of my reasons for that is his book, Dereliction of Duty (http://www.amazon.com/Dereliction-Duty-Johnson-McNamara-Vietnam/dp/0060187956) - with which, I am and was very much in agreement (before the book was written; and even before McMaster was born in 1962).

Although the CSIS talk covered many points, Bill has pointed to the two "scary lessons":

1. We think we can wars by raiding

2. We think we can outsource our wars and have others fight them

As to the first point, then Maj. McMaster (in a PBS interview, Lessons of Vietnam (http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/military/etc/lessons.html)) had this to say (inter alia):

Q. What are we to take from Vietnam about the concept of graduated pressure and the use of force, particularly air power, as a form of diplomatic communication? Why not bombs for peace?

A. There is a grave danger associated with calling the bombing of another country anything but war. During the period in which Vietnam became an American war, Lyndon Johnson and Robert McNamara created the illusion that attacks on North Vietnam were alternatives to war rather than war itself. Bombing, particularly from the perspective of the receiving end, is not "communication." Bombs result in death and destruction. After engaging in acts of war against another nation, there exists a degree of uncertainty in terms of the enemy's reactions. War inspires an unpredictable psychology and evokes strong emotions that defy systems analysis quantification.

Once the United States crossed the threshold of war against North Vietnam, the future course of events depended not only on decisions made in Washington, but also on enemy responses and initiatives. Sadly, Pentagon war games predicted the enemy reaction, a massive offensive on the ground, but McNamara ignored that advice. Indeed, many people within the administration made compelling arguments against the assumption that bombing would affect Hanoi's will sufficiently to convince North Vietnam to desist from its support of the insurgency in the South. Until the massive deployment of ground troops in 1965 forced him to confront the consequences of his earlier decisions, McNamara continued to view the war as another business management problem. The notion that air power alone could solve the complex military and political problem of Vietnam was based in ignorance and advocacy by air power zealots. It was obvious to many at the time that bombing fixed installations and economic targets was not appropriate for Vietnamese communist mobile forces. Curiously, the definition of the enemy's strength derived from the strategy rather from a critical examination of the full political, cultural, and military reality in South Vietnam. Perhaps a lesson is that one should take pause before using military force for communication, punishment, or catharsis. The application of military force without a clear idea of how that force is contributing to the attainment of policy goals is not only unwise, but dangerous.

His CSIS comment on "raiding" was explicitly referenced to Douhet - and implicitly to over-hyped expectations for "shock and awe". So, McMaster has been consistent on point 1 since the 1990s.

Point 2 is obviously more complex - in fact, the bulk of the CSIS talk is devoted to multiple factors bearing on the respective roles of the US and "partners" (a broader term than "allies").

MG McMaster didn't explicitly cite the following as an example of the "scary" mindset for outsourcing wars and having others fight them. However, I shall:

We are not about to send American boys nine or ten thousand miles away from home to do what Asian boys ought to be doing for themselves.
--Lyndon Johnson, Oct. 1964 (http://www.vietnamwar.net/quotations/quotations.htm)

At that time, I thought LBJ was lying; and, in the event (the next 12 months), he was.

Now I'm going to have to watch the whole video again. IIRC, he never did answer the question (included in a multi-part question) about where and how the Marines fit into all of this. ;)

Regards

Mike

Bill Moore

04-23-2013, 04:00 AM

I count MG McMaster among the "smart guys". One of my reasons for that is his book, Dereliction of Duty - with which, I am and was very much in agreement (before the book was written; and even before McMaster was born in 1962).

Mike,

I concur, and I don't disagree with any of his assertions, but as others have said I think they have to be taken in context. Raiding in some cases may achieve our objectives short of war, and in other cases raiding is a tactic to pursue war aims. Outsourcing is a terrible term due to its connotation, but if we can empower others to address security issues where we have "common" interests that is an appropriate course of action. I do agree we can't outsource our wars, and it does seem to me that this has been implied in more than a few articles.

The bottom line is the Army is struggling with its vision for the future, and IMO clinging too much to OEF-A and OIF as examples of what the future portends. I don't have answers or even good suggestions at this point, but suspect the Army will need to develop new capabilities to address future security challenges related to intelligence, strike, human domain, and developing doctrine that facilitates the implementation of mission command as described by the Chairman's white paper.

jmm99

04-24-2013, 04:56 AM

Bill,

McMaster and everyone else working on the future role(s) of the Army (Navy, Marines, Air Force) are faced with a plethora of variables in political and policy constraints (the example following is the way I look at the larger picture):

A. Sea Control - Global or Regional ?

1. Commercial Projection

2. DIME Projection

B. Land Control - Global or Regional ?

1. Commercial Projection

2. DIME Projection

C. Air-Space Control - Global or Regional ?

1. Commercial Projection

2. DIME Projection

D. Cyber Control - Global or Regional ?

1. Commercial Projection

2. DIME Projection

E. Information Control - Global or Regional ?

1. Commercial Projection

2. DIME Projection

Each one of these major "control" areas has a private aspect ("commerce"), which itself will have multiple major variables (its own "DIME") and will influence politics and policies that will or might affect it. The multiple aspects of the governmental DIME cannot be expected to march in lockstep with each other, much less with non-governmental interests. One could also add NGOs, international organizations, etc., to this mix.

The "Global or Regional" issue will be decided in each of these major "control" areas by what actually happens. In trying to predict what will happen, the futurist planner (absent a working crystal ball) is faced with many methodology issues.

Methodology Issues

Several methodology issues are:

1. What is Material vs What is Relevant ? Millions of facts, people, places, etc., may affect the future to some extent - and, hence, are "relevant". Those that weigh heavily on the future are "material". What weighs heavily (substantially, etc.) tends to be subjective. We also must confront the "butterfly flapping its wings" argument - which raises Cain with judging materiality. A variant of the "butterfly flapping" is the "1% possible nuclear attack" - the risk is small, the consequences are huge.

2. Consideration of the Past, Present and Future. As you point out, excessive emphasis on past wars will probably give a false prediction of the future. The past does allow us to avoid re-inventing the wheel; but will that wheel work in the future as it did in the past ?

3. Immediate Consequences vs Deferred Consequences. The theory is that the usual bad guy is concerned about what will happen to him today if he acts badly; the consequences far down the road will usually not be an effective deterrent.

Setting the Focus (Worldviews)

The basic idea is to consider the Geopolitical Maximum vs. the Geopolitical Minimum for each one of the major "control" areas.

I'd say that US Commercial Projection will be Global in all five areas; it will not "control" all of those areas; and there will be some "white spaces" on its maps. I'd say that US DIME Projection will also be Global in three areas: Air-Space Control; Cyber Control; and Information Control. Again, DIME Projection will not "control" all of those areas; and there will be some "white spaces" on its maps.

That leaves Sea Control and Land Control - where to me the DIE Projections are Global, but the M Projections are more limited. My theory is illustrated in my "Never Again Region" map:

1714

I've been influenced during my lifetime by four "Never Again Situations" - Korea, Vietnam, Afghanistan, Iraq. None were disasters (e.g., as the French and German marches on Moscow were); but they fell short of expectations and were failures at least in part. So, my normative lines of land and sea armed force projection are the far Atlantic and far Pacific littorals, absent exigent circumstances.

I do not accord with the normative "Heartland" theory, illustrated by its original 1904 presentation:

1715

and summed by Mackinder's "rule":

"Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland;
who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island;
who rules the World-Island controls the world."
(Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and Reality, p. 106)

Actually, I've shifted the "Heartland" to the Americas. Doing that by its very nature imposes limitations on African-Eurasian ground wars and Indian Ocean naval wars. The problem is overstretch - i.e., re-enactment of Syracuse and Aegospotami.

"Heartland" Refs (all short):

Wiki, The Geographical Pivot of History (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Geographical_Pivot_of_History)

Mackinder, The Geographical Pivot of History (http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/eBooks/Articles/1904%20HEARTLAND%20THEORY%20HALFORD%20MACKINDER.pd f) (1904)

Fettweis, Sir Halford Mackinder, Geopolitics, and Policymaking in the 21st Century (http://www.carlisle.army.mil/USAWC/parameters/Articles/00summer/fettweis.htm) (2000 Parameters)

Gaming the Plan - An Example

War Plan Green: see Brian M. Linn, The Echo of Battle (http://www.amazon.com/Echo-Battle-Armys-Way-War/dp/0674034791) (2007). This is a little cited case study, with two paragraphs at p.92 and notes for original sources at p.264 (the plans and studies are not online that I could find).

In 1922, the Mexican army was assesed to be so weak that War Plan Green was changed to Special Plan Green, an occupation plan: the army would establish a government, reform the education and legal systems, employ honest police and civil servants, with the clear and expressed US intention to create "peace and good order." I'd call that nation building.

In 1924, Special Plan Green was war gamed. The resulting report concluded that the most probable COA for the Mexicans was not to resist the main invasion columns; but to wait a while and then engage in guerrilla warfare, etc. The majority staff conclusion was that the occupation would morph into a long, slow and frustrating unconventional war.

So, in 1927, Special Plan Green was amended to provide for a rapidly moving direct attack with the purpose of deposing the Mexican government, and then immediately withdrawing. The plan required that it be made clear to the Mexican people that the US did not intend a military occupation; that the operation was not against the Mexican nation; but was an operation solely against the Mexican government. In short, it was a gigantic raid.

The dissenting voices were legion. One declared: "We ought to realize that punitive expeditions, or expeditions to dispossess the government in power, are worse than useless and are not to be undertaken." (Linn, p.91)

What is important here is that the plan was gamed with voices heard - not who was right or wrong in the 1920s. Ironically, the first stage in OIF proved that a very large raid can successfully remove a government (SPG 1927). The rest of the Iraq scenario then proceeded to follow SPG 1922 ("nation building"), with the Iraq results soon being quite similar to the 1924 war game.

Regards

Mike

slapout9

04-25-2013, 05:27 AM

From JMM:
I've been influenced during my lifetime by four "Never Again Situations" - Korea, Vietnam, Afghanistan, Iraq. None were disasters (e.g., as the French and German marches on Moscow were); but they fell short of expectations and were failures at least in part. So, my normative lines of land and sea armed force projection are the far Atlantic and far Pacific littorals, absent exigent circumstances.

The entire post was excellent but this phrase was really exceptional and hopefully can be remembered by those making policy.

davidbfpo

05-10-2013, 09:25 PM

A "lurker" asked if SWC had spotted this speech by BG McMaster, at CSIS, on March 20th 2013. It appears to be mentioned on SWJ and was in the Daily News round-up.

The title was 'Raiders, Advisors And The Wrong Lessons From Iraq' and one news report was:http://breakingdefense.com/2013/03/20/gen-mcmaster-raiders-advisors-and-the-wrong-lessons-from-iraq/

Link to CSIS video:http://csis.org/event/ground-force-maneuver-why-it-still-matters

davidbfpo

07-21-2013, 06:44 PM

The latest McMaster article in the NYT; which ends with:
What we can afford least is to define the problem of future war as we would like it to be, and by doing so introduce into our defense vulnerabilities based on self-delusion.

Link:http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/21/opinion/sunday/the-pipe-dream-of-easy-war.html?_r=0&pagewanted=all

Makes an interesting comparison with the restrictions placed on serving British soldiers to write a book chapter, a very different public exposure when compared to the NYT.

Bill Moore

07-21-2013, 07:55 PM

The latest McMaster article in the NYT; which ends with:

Link:http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/21/opinion/sunday/the-pipe-dream-of-easy-war.html?_r=0&pagewanted=all

Makes an interesting comparison with the restrictions placed on serving British soldiers to write a book chapter, a very different public exposure when compared to the NYT.

Excellent article by one of our few clear thinkers on war on active duty. He doesn't reject the value of technology, but the Rumfield like hubris associated with it. Shock and awe sort of worked against the Iraqi military, but there were a lot of social and political factors at play that influenced the collapse the military that we chose to ignore (silient evidence). Shock and awe had no discernible impact on the subsequent rebellion against our occupation, AQ in Iraq, or the civil war. Sure it gave a tactical edge that I don't recommend sacrificing, but as MG McMasters pointed out, we initially forgot the old truths that war is political, human, and uncertain.

It seems we started down this path under McNamara with his obsession of measuring progress in war, there by creating a pseudo-science of sorts that eventually resulted in a dysfunctional strategic approach in Vietnam. That eventually evolved into the toxic effects based operation (EBO) doctrine and Warden's Systems approach that attempted to replace uncertainty with certainty. It viewed the world as red and blue, and if blue did a particular action then red would respond a certain way. It neglected to recognize the multiple factors that influence political and social behavior and both concepts failed, yet Congress still seems to want to embrace the concept of what MG McMaster's calls the "Simple War."

defense was driven by ideas that regarded successful military operations as ends in themselves, rather than just one instrument of power that must be coordinated with others to achieve, and sustain, political goals

I will take a step further, although on the books we allegedly have a system for synchronizing all elements of our national power with the National Security Council and Staff, I don't think any of us would invest in these entities if they were companies because they have repeatedly failed to produce a profitable service.

Thucydides identified nearly 2,500 years ago: fear, honor and interest. But in the years preceding our last two wars, thinking about defense undervalued the human as well as the political aspects of war.

He correctly points out we under appreciated this initially in both Afghanistan and Iraq, but then adapted.

THIRD, war is uncertain, precisely because it is political and human. The dominant assumption of the “Revolution in Military Affairs” was that information would be the key to victory.

But in Afghanistan and Iraq, planning did not account for adaptations and initiatives by the enemy

My favorite quote in the article is,
clear thinking about war costs nothing, but that unfortunately is part of the problem. What lobbyist on Capital Hill is going to push for this? :wry:

davidbfpo

02-26-2014, 01:48 PM

McMaster at a Brookings seminar is reported as having made the Army’s case in his characteristically blunt language.

“What concerns me the most is really that we’ll engage in wishful thinking that’s motivated mainly by budget constraints,” he said. “You get the army that the people are wiling to pay for in a democracy, and it’s our job to do our best with it.”

The “wishful thinking” that McMaster fears is what he calls “four fallacies” about future conflicts that promise “easy solutions”:

“The return of the revolution in military affairs,” a theory thought discredited in Iraq — “it’s like a vampire,” he said — with its promise that long-range sensors and precision strikes will let air and sea forces win wars cleanly and bloodlessly (for us) on their own.

“The Zero Dark Thirty fallacy” that we can solve our problems almost bloodlessly with Special Operations raids, “something akin to a global swat team to go after enemy leaders.”

What might be called the Mali Fallacy (my words, not his) that we can rely on allies and local surrogates to do the fighting on the ground while the US provides advisors and high-tech support.

All three fallacies, he said, begin with a core of truth: Air Force, Navy, Special Operations, advisors, and allies are all impressive and essential capabilities, but we can’t count on them to prevail alone.

The fourth fallacy, by contrast, McMaster considers just plain “narcissistic.” The idea that the US can “opt out” of certain kinds of conflict — say, counterinsurgency, or ground warfare in general — without giving our adversaries credit for what they may be able to force us to do. Invading Afghanistan seemed ludicrous on September 10, 2001, after all, and inescapable on September 12th.

Link:http://breakingdefense.com/2014/02/the-army-force-cuts-3-truths-4-fallacies/

carl

02-26-2014, 04:40 PM

I think McMaster's primary point is a very basic one. We don't understand the nature of war because we don't want to understand the nature of war. Our thinking regarding the subject is poor, willfully poor and it is immature. We act like teenagers who really really want it to be like we want it to be and that is how we will view it the facts and history be damned.

This is a flaw of fundamental nature. The guys on the spot can overcome it to certain extent if they have enough time, as they did in Iraq and Afghanistan. But we won't have the time always, especially if something big happens. Our challenge is to rejigger our thinking before that happens. I don't know if we can do it. The Prussians couldn't before 1806 even though the people who transformed the Prussian army afterward were the same people they had before that year. They needed a disastrous defeat to effect change. They could afford it because the English and the Russians were around. If we have to go the same route, we won't have it so good because there is no analog to England and Russia now.

Grant Martin made a comment on the Journal about how 'system' seems to be invincible. Nothing seems to alter it. Nothing. I think 'the system' cannot win a war, any war. We will be defeated at anything we try as long as 'the system' exists. The puerile thinking McMaster decries underlays 'the system' and if we can't change things we are looking at hard times to come.

davidbfpo

03-01-2014, 09:10 PM

Nick Prime, a PhD student, on the relaunched Kings of War responds to HR's latest comments, it is very critical:http://kingsofwar.org.uk/2014/02/remastering-the-us-armys-narrative/?

carl

03-01-2014, 11:06 PM

Not impressed with that article. I think McMaster's primary objection to "RMA" is intellectual in that it presumes to remove uncertainty from war. The author turns that into criticism of a single procurement decision. The author also stated that recent experience demonstrates that protection should trump maneuverability and firepower. That is an extreme oversimplification.

davidbfpo

03-30-2014, 10:37 PM

On SWJ, with a few comments to date, 'Reflections on the Continuities in War and Warfare', an interview of LTG McMaster by by Octavian Manea:http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/reflections-on-the-continuities-in-war-and-warfare

SWJ Blog

07-13-2014, 12:46 PM

Q&A with Departing Benning Commander Maj. Gen. H.R. McMaster (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/qa-with-departing-benning-commander-maj-gen-hr-mcmaster)

Entry Excerpt:

--------
Read the full post (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/qa-with-departing-benning-commander-maj-gen-hr-mcmaster) and make any comments at the SWJ Blog (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog).
This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.

SWJ Blog

07-13-2014, 12:46 PM

Q&A with Departing Benning Commander Maj. Gen. H.R. McMaster (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/qa-with-departing-benning-commander-maj-gen-hr-mcmaster)

Copied to here as I think what he says is important to SWC. Yes this long interview, by a local paper, has whole passages of little interest. His comments on his own combat help to explain what came after 1991.

SWJ Blog

09-12-2014, 04:25 PM

McMaster Busts Myths of Future Warfare (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/mcmaster-busts-myths-of-future-warfare)

Entry Excerpt:

--------
Read the full post (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/mcmaster-busts-myths-of-future-warfare) and make any comments at the SWJ Blog (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog).
This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.

SWJ Blog

09-12-2014, 04:25 PM

McMaster Busts Myths of Future Warfare (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/mcmaster-busts-myths-of-future-warfare)

Read the full post (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/mcmaster-busts-myths-of-future-warfare) and make any comments at the SWJ Blog (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog).

davidbfpo

11-18-2014, 09:44 PM

The full title is 'The Warrior Ethos at Risk: H.R. McMaster’s Remarkable Veterans Day Speech' and was given Georgetown University. In case you've not seen it:http://blogs.cfr.org/davidson/2014/11/18/the-warrior-ethos-at-risk-h-r-mcmasters-remarkable-veterans-day-speech/

davidbfpo

02-19-2015, 07:10 PM

Thanks to David Ucko's tip General McMaster gave a talk 'Continuity and Change: The Nature of Future Armed Conflict' to IISS-US today. The video is one hour long, Elliott COhen is in the chair and includes some Q&A:https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kZ5cDdposJc&feature=youtu.be

SWJ Blog

02-25-2015, 06:13 PM

More from Lt. Gen. McMaster (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/more-from-lt-gen-mcmaster)

SWJ Blog

02-25-2015, 06:13 PM

More from Lt. Gen. McMaster (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/more-from-lt-gen-mcmaster): http://warontherocks.com/2015/02/reading-galula-in-afghanistan/

Copied for reference

--------
Read the full post (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/more-from-lt-gen-mcmaster) and make any comments at the SWJ Blog (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog).
This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.

SWJ Blog

09-11-2015, 08:21 AM

McMaster: Combat Vehicle Modernization Strategy To Be Revealed at AUSA (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/mcmaster-combat-vehicle-modernization-strategy-to-be-revealed-at-ausa)

Granite_State

11-12-2015, 01:14 AM

http://www.politico.eu/article/inside-the-pentagons-fight-over-russia-us-eastern-europe/

On one side is Macgregor, an outspoken and controversial advocate for reform of the Army — whose weapons he describes as “obsolescent,” its senior leaders as “self-interested,” and its spending as “wasteful.” Viewed by many of his colleagues as one of the most innovative Army officers of his generation, Macgregor, a West Point graduate with a Ph.D. in international relations (“he can be pretty gruff,” a fellow West Point graduate says, “but he’s brilliant”), led the 2nd Cav’s “Cougar Squadron” in the best-known battle of Operation Desert Storm in February 1991. In 23 minutes, Macgregor’s force destroyed an entire Iraqi Armored Brigade (including nearly 70 Iraqi armored vehicles), while suffering a single American casualty. Speaking at a military “lessons learned” conference one year later, Air Force General Jack Welsh described the Battle of 73 Easting (named for a map coordinate) as “a stunning, overwhelming victory.”
......
Macgregor’s views line him up against Lt. General H.R. McMaster, an officer widely thought of as one of the Army’s best thinkers. McMaster fought under Macgregor at “73 Easting,” where he commanded Eagle Troop in Macgregor’s Cougar Squadron. McMaster, however, had more success in the Army than Macgregor, is a celebrated author (ofDereliction of Duty, a classic in military history), and is credited with seeding the Anbar Awakening during the Iraq War. Even so, McMaster was twice passed over for higher command until David Petraeus, who headed his promotion board, insisted his success be recognized. McMaster is now a lieutenant general and commands the high-profile Army Capabilities Integration Center (called “ARCINC”), whose mandate is to “design the Army of the future.” David Barno, a retired Lt. General who headed up the US command in Afghanistan, describes McMaster as an officer “who has repeatedly bucked the system and survived to join its senior ranks.”