The Army We Need [Archive] - Small Wars Council

Bill Moore

12-28-2008, 09:25 AM

Soldiers are not diplomats. Soldiers do fight and kill their way to operational success and/or gain that success by being capable or threatening to do so.

In Special Forces we strive to full fill the role of Warrior, diplomat and teacher as required to accomplish the mission. Part of the reason we did so poorly in Iraq initially is because many in the conventional Army failed to grasp that were in a diplomatic role where they had to negotiate with local leaders to gain situational awareness and to co-opt support.

Soldiers on point in this type of irregular warfare environment cannot define their role as strictly being a warrior unless we want to lose this fight. There is no one else to perform that role outside the capital. That American Soldier may be the only American that a local sees in a remote village, and the dialouge between them is as important as the shooting war in IW.

Victory does not from building local institutions.

One of the criticisms directed at the U.S. military is that we confuse combat with strategy. Our entire Network Warfare concept is based on seeing first and acting first, which is great for combat, but it doesn't come close to looking like a strategy to win the war. We defeated both the Taliban/AQ and Saddam's conventional like forces in battle, but we're still far from a strategic victory. If a strategic victory is obtainable, it is going to be obtained through building viable host nation institutions, not institutions that parallel the American Government structure, but whatever works in the area we're fighting in.

William, I think you're doubling back on your previous argument where you stated we don't need irregular warfare doctrine, we just need to learn to fight wars better (loosely paraphrased). I agreed to some extent, but your argument in my opinion proves why we do an IW doctrine/concept whatever to provide some sort of organizing structure for winning these conflicts. Unlike many who swallow the indirect approach and peace corps with rifle b.s. to the extreme, I agree ultimately we have to kill/capture or co-opt the insurgents, but to that we have to engage the local population and win their support to some extent to find them.

William F. Owen

12-28-2008, 11:05 AM

William, I think you're doubling back on your previous argument where you stated we don't need irregular warfare doctrine, we just need to learn to fight wars better (loosely paraphrased).

My actual point is you need better doctrine that does not make the error of looking at "IW" as something distinct and difficult, when it is the common currency of military operations.

Unlike many who swallow the indirect approach and peace corps with rifle b.s. to the extreme, I agree ultimately we have to kill/capture or co-opt the insurgents, but to that we have to engage the local population and win their support to some extent to find them.

Concur, and engaging the local population and wining their support is a normal military skill. It is not necessarily unique to COIN and it is not diplomacy! It's bog standard G2 bread and better. Calling it diplomacy is inaccurate, misleading, and unhelpful.

John T. Fishel

12-28-2008, 01:23 PM

Wilf, as Churchill said. You and Bill and John (and me) are not all that far apart. Part of the problem is semantic - we mean different things when we use the same words. Some of that is driven by culture and historical experience - American, British, Israeli, etc. But there are structural differences as well. The US military is bigger and more instituionally diverse than any other military engaged in the wars we are fighting. The American military is not now as large as the Soviet military was when it was engged in Afghanistan but the US Army alone brings far more diverse elements to the Afghanistan fight than the Soviets ever did. It also brings far more diverse capabilities to that fight than any of its allies. This is not to say we are better - often they are - but we can do things that they can't. And, often, we must do them because no other institution in the American government can. The ongoing effort to increase STate Dept capacity that Secstate designate Clinton hope sto ramp up will help but it won't replace the capabilities of the US military in both its active and reserve components, eg Civil Affairs. Bottom line is that much of what John said was specifically targeted at an audience of junior American officers with all the baggage they carry. As some wag put it, "Context is everything."

Cheers

JohnT

Gian P Gentile

12-29-2008, 01:30 AM

Wilf’s post was spot-on. He sensed the essence of Nagl's speech which was--regardless of if he was talking to captains or generals--a call to transform the American army into a nation-building force. It can not be read in any other way.

Those of us who have commanded combat outfits in coin understand Wilf's statement that soldiers are not diplomats. Coin experts may retch when this is said but basically, fundamentally it is a statement of fact. Combat soldiers stand posts, they shoot, they pull security, they do raids, they patrol, they secure infrastructure projects, etc. The notion that they are diplomats is self-serving fiction. It briefs well but beyond that it is pure nonsense.

And what is one of those young infantry or armor captains to do with Nagl's call for them to be diplomats when they are infantry, cavalry, or tank company commanders and it comes to making choices about training time and resources? Does part of it go to diplomacy training?

If Nagl gets his way the increase of 30K soldiers into the Army will essentially be spent on a nation-building advisory corps for Iraq and Afghanistan. Those 30K could have instead gone toward building 5-6 more combat brigades. See potentially the tack that the American Army is on?

Is this really what we want?

gg

Ken White

12-29-2008, 02:40 AM

John T. Fishel makes well the point that the US and the UK differ mightily on their employment of 'diplomats' in wartime. The UK does that very well, we are not so fortunate -- that means the US Armed forces have to fill the gap. That works.

The question though is -- is that a good solution?

I suggest the answer is a resounding 'no.'

State and the rest of the US government need to be brought up to adequate capability and the Army, all of DoD, should fight hard to insure that occurs -- it will be to the detriment of the Defense establishment if it does not occur...

Gian comes in with a good post. I frequently agree with him but often chide him and suggest he lower the level of his expressed discontent just a bit. Not this time. He and Wilf are right -- so is Bill Moore -- SF can do the diplomat / teacher / soldier bit and can provide the necessary interface with local populations (if the powers that be will stop sending them to kick in doors...); The Multi Purpose Forces that are the bulk of the US Armed Services are not diplomats and should not train or spend too much thought time on that aspect of their total competency.

They can be adequately mentored and guided by SF elements and by a revamped and empowered Department of State. Shifting from combat to COIN is not that difficult, if it seems to hard, then the training is inadequate because numerous Armies do it, have done it, we have done it -- it just isn't that difficult. So let SF do their job and let the MPF do theirs -- to include assisting SF at a reasonable level of capability as supplementaries, not replacements.

Be careful how we train -- too much training time spent on building other peoples Armies or nations will lead to a US Army that is not competent at its own primary mission. None of the services train new entrants, officer or enlisted well enough today; to fragment their training on COIN / FID as opposed to basic MOSC and military competence will lessen their overall capability. We need to be able to do COIN adequately (as opposed to superbly); we do not need to let it drive the train...

reed11b

12-29-2008, 03:09 AM

I agree with Wilf and Ken. There is a military aspect to COIN, or else it would not have reached the stage of armed conflict. Yes, State and NGO’s play an important role in COIN, but that is there role, not the Army's. The military's role is to fight the insurgents armed force and there means of supply and communication. I feel that stating that insurgencies are always about the population is flawed. Some insurgencies derive there strength and supply through the population but some do not.
The big difference in COIN and HIC in my mind is that COIN has an aspect of Law Enforcement to it. I wonder if having some sort of US Gendarme would pay dividends?
On an almost unrelated note: I feel strongly that reducing the DOD trend of micromanagement would pay big dividends in creating thinking, better fighting soldiers in both COIN and HIC. Creating effective and productive infantry is a big part of this as well.

Reed
Sorry for the scattered thoughts, working way too many hours.

Gian P Gentile

12-29-2008, 03:36 AM

See Ken, I have paid attention to your patient "chiding."

I especially liked your last paragraph with the lead sentence cautioning as to "how we train."

v/r

gian

John T. Fishel

12-29-2008, 03:38 AM

is more than infantry, cavalry, artillery, and armor - the pointy end of the spear. At the point of the "pointy end" are the SF who often have to do it all, usually on a small scale. But out there on the shaft are the aviators, transporters, loggies, MPs, engineers, psyopers, CA, and intel folk. Embedded in the shaft of the spear are the folk who can, should, and must do some of the tasks that full spectrum warfare - including COIN - requires and that the combat arms are less well equipped to do. That said, the most common roles throughout the history of the US military have been those that require the skills of diplomats, teachers, advisors, trainers. This has been true since the days following the American Revolution. The very first task of the US military under the new Federal Constitution was to put down the Whiskey Rebellion in Western Pennsylvania - something that was done by President Washington's designated second in command, MG Alexander Hamilton (Sec of Treas) without firing hardly a shot. Big wars came approximately once a generation punctuating lots of small wars activities but, most Army officers only wanted to train for and fight the big ones. See, for example, Emory Upton's trip report on his mission to observe and report on the Brits in the NW Frontier of India, published as The Armies of Europe and Asia, and concentrating on the German General Staff! So, the lessons of small wars, while recorded, were rarely learned. And we keep having to reinvent the wheel as a result.

Ken is right when he says that State and other govt agencies need to do more but they have to be funded to do so by Congress. The Civilian Response Corps is a step in the right direction but it will take time to build and even more time to deploy. In its (and State's etc) absence, who will do what is required? Soldiers and Marines - as they always have. Again, that is why we have FAOs, SF, CA and other specialties. Finally, I would note that some of our Greatest Captains - Eisenhower, Marshall, and MacArthur, among others spring to mind - were more than just soldiers; they were diplomats as well.

Cheers

JohnT

Bill Moore

12-29-2008, 05:33 AM

Those of us who have commanded combat outfits in coin understand Wilf's statement that soldiers are not diplomats. Coin experts may retch when this is said but basically, fundamentally it is a statement of fact. Combat soldiers stand posts, they shoot, they pull security, they do raids, they patrol, they secure infrastructure projects, etc. The notion that they are diplomats is self-serving fiction. It briefs well but beyond that it is pure nonsense.

This attitude contributed greatly to our downward trend in OIF. Fortunately for our nation it was reversed by an officer who understood that engaging in diplomacy with the locals is not a self serving fantasy, it is absolutely essential. Soldiers are more than capable of engaging with the local populace to identify and help resolve their problems, thus helping develop trusting relationships with the locals that also enable Soldiers to garner intelligence based on that relationship.

If Soldiers are only capable of guarding infrastructure and saluting their red coat officers who have no faith in them (I realize this only applies to a small percentage of our officers, but unfortunately a damaging percentage), then we might as well empty our prisons and fill our ranks with category four soldiers, because we don't need well behaved smart kids capable of solving complex problems like we have now, we just need grunts who do not interact with their environment, but can shoot when so ordered.

Shifting from combat to COIN is not that difficult, if it seems too hard, then the training is inadequate because numerous Armies do it, have done it, we have done it -- it just isn't that difficult.

Words of wisdom, as are,

Be careful how we train -- too much training time spent on building other peoples Armies or nations will lead to a US Army that is not competent at its own primary mission.

We need to be able to do COIN adequately (as opposed to superbly); we do not need to let it drive the train...

It isn't that hard, even an officer can figure it out if he has a patient NCO that doesn't mind mentoring him. Nor do we have to be that good at it, but we sure as how have to understand the character of the fight we're in.

Ken White

12-29-2008, 05:55 AM

...who will do what is required? Soldiers and Marines - as they always have. Again, that is why we have FAOs, SF, CA and other specialties.Yep.
Finally, I would note that some of our Greatest Captains - Eisenhower, Marshall, and MacArthur, among others spring to mind - were more than just soldiers; they were diplomats as well.Totally true -- and with no special training back in the day but a lot of common sense, more talking than was probably comfortable for all three and sound military judgment applied when required ... ;)

Wilf correctly notes:
My actual point is you need better doctrine that does not make the error of looking at "IW" as something distinct and difficult, when it is the common currency of military operations.
. . .
Concur, and engaging the local population and wining their support is a normal military skill. It is not necessarily unique to COIN and it is not diplomacy! It's bog standard G2 bread and better. Calling it diplomacy is inaccurate, misleading, and unhelpful.My suspicion is that the three gentlemen John T. named would agree with that description. Then, as Bill Moore points out:
It isn't that hard, even an officer can figure it out if he has a patient NCO that doesn't mind mentoring him. Nor do we have to be that good at it, but we sure as how have to understand the character of the fight we're in.True and as Gian reinforced, all we gotta do is be careful about
"how we train."

William F. Owen

12-29-2008, 07:42 AM

Bob's World

12-29-2008, 11:32 AM

Before we can truly address the question of what kind of Army we need, we must first figure out what kind of foreign policy our government intends to implement.

For the past 60+ years it has been a policy based on a Cold War construct, and now that the Soviets are gone, and try as we might, we can't seem to force anyone else to pick up flag and fill that "enemy" role required to make the policy work, we find ourselves in a quandary. For the past 20 years or so much have simply been our efforts to maintain the status quo.

Problem is that things in nature do not remain static. Particularly populaces and doubly particularly populaces who have been suppressed under first colonial, and then Cold War induced policies implemented by foreign powers that have stifled their opportunities for self determination.

Now, with post-Cold War opportunity, and accelerated by the factors of globalization, the region of the world that has been suppressed and controlled the most is rift with local insurgent movements. Add to that mix the stirrings of reformation movements within Islam as those same factors of globalization crack the stranglehold of the Mullahs over their congregations (much as the printing press cracked the stranglehold of the Catholic leadership over European populaces not so long ago...).

So, the question is: What do you want to be when you grow up America?

We have plenty of role models in history to learn from. My position (and I realize it is a lonely one, but I am confident it will grow) is that we must be true to ourselves. And by that I do not mean to selfishly impose our will over others, but to instead be true to the principles upon what this very great, and very unique country were originally built. We are so convinced that "we are the good guys" that populaces will greet us like liberators when we invade their homelands for "noble" purposes. History really doesn't bear this out.

We have a new President, a new opportunity to finally take a strategic pause, catch our breath, and do a top to bottom reassessment of what type of world we want to live in and how we want to participate in that world (ends). Then look at our national strategies. We currently do not possess a grand strategy as a nation, but have an ad hoc collection of national level (and rather vague) strategies. Let’s craft a new strategy to achieve these newly defined ends (ways). Then, and only then, can we relook our national security structure and institutions of foreign engagement and retune them for the new mission at hand (means).

Right now we are struggling over how to do the wrong thing very well. I for one, take the position that it is better to do the right thing poorly; but that we need to strive to do it to the best of our abilities.

We can do this. We must do this.

Right now we are like a bunch of beer bellied losers arguing about the best ways to beat their wives. Many opinions out there to those ends. Others say no, you must control your wife, and only beat her when she really needs it. I say, hell, we're not even talking about our own wife, we are talking about how to help the neighbor (same neighbor who has never done much for us, by the way) control and beat his wife.

Maybe we need to step back and re-evaluate. I realize the analogy above is not perfect, and that it is intended to evoke an emotional response. Hopefully it also causes some to pause and reflect on the problems discussed in this forum in a new light as well.

William F. Owen

12-29-2008, 01:39 PM

Before we can truly address the question of what kind of Army we need, we must first figure out what kind of foreign policy our government intends to implement.

OK but isn't this inherent to the nature of the military instrument? It's not particularly puzzling as to what you want an army to be able to do is it?

Foreign Policy can change in less than a week. US Government Policy of September 10 2001 was made irrelevant 48 hours later. Armies take years to change.

I don't think the question is what type of army the US and even the UK need. The need is for a good army. What makes a good army is actually pretty well understood. The problem is the people and ideas that stop those things from taking effect.

Rob Thornton

12-29-2008, 01:51 PM

I'm glad Bill Moore used the word "soldier", it has the best of both functions and qualities, and covers the vast center we mostly operate in between the words "diplomat" and "warrior". Soldiers should not be automatons, but embody I think the territory in between disciplined and fair, courage and honor, professionalism and candor, etc. Maybe that is what John Nagl meant, however, I would prefer we qualify what we are - just my preference.

While I agree with John T that we have certainly been called often to perform those functions (teaching, advising, diplomat), I would say its worth considering the context under which they were performed, and who at what level should be capable of doing what and when. Does a company commander or battalion advisor characterize himself as a diplomat, or as a soldier who may employ some diplomatic skills to support his military purpose? What of LTCs, COLs and GOs? I realize this may seem like semantics, but it is a subtle nuance that may affect his mission. The truth I think is that it depends upon the conditions, and that is another reason why I prefer the term soldier with its inherent flexibility to adapt as opposed to warrior or diplomat.

How is (or should) a FAO or CA perceived first by those with whom they interact? As a diplomat or as a soldier? How do they see themselves? How should they? Does this affect the way in which other around them act? Is this beneficial or detrimental? Is it something that we should attempt to change, or something we should use? If you change the core nature of something without contemplating the full implications, you may wind up with something that only does either "not so well". That was one of the reason I ran the draft of the case study by Ken, I knew he would raise the flag on any extreme recommendation in the DOTML(&E)PF chapter that raised risk instead of mitigating it. We should consider the addition of new skills and traits from the perspective of enhancing our core values, not as being in opposition to them, of improving our chances of achieving the objectives set before us, not fulfilling one at the expense of another. The oath we take is rather unique in its implications, and should be considered as the litmus test for how we see our future selves.

I believe we are capable of doing what we are called on to do with some relatively painless changes once we recognize there is no real threat to our core values, however that requires we not create threats where there should be none.

A soldier's balancing act then is not a 50/50 proposition, but knowing when (and how) to shift the load accordingly, with the understanding and anticipation that said load may have to be shifted again and again, because conditions and policy objectives change over time, and so must we. This is the danger in opinion - it is that we (people) seem naturally predisposed to calcify and protect our positions, and seek out rational to do so. It seems it is just who we are, and guarding against that desire to make things final, or to preserve what we have is a natural tendency we have to fight.

Bob' s World: Sir, I sorry I missed your visit to Leavenworth - perhaps I'll meet you down in Tampa this month in support of the UQ seminar. There is something worth considering in your statement:

a new opportunity to finally take a strategic pause, catch our breath

Realizing I took the piece out of a larger paragraph, that opportunity comes with a price. As the President Elect takes office, there will be a great deal of pressure to employ the power of the United States in various ways ( from both inside the White House and beyond it). Certainly with tensions high between India and Pakistan, with the increased violence in Gaza, and with many others looking to take advantage of opportunities a true strategic pause would be hard to come by I think (if there ever was one). These in conjunction with dynamic situations in OEF and OIF. The GCCs certainly appear up to their eye teeth in hungry alligators. A pause of any type comes with a price tag - it may be worth paying, but its a price none the less. If it is visible, there are those who will advantage themselves of it.

Best, Rob

Gian P Gentile

12-29-2008, 01:59 PM

This attitude contributed greatly to our downward trend in OIF. Fortunately for our nation it was reversed by an officer who understood that engaging in diplomacy with the locals is not a self serving fantasy, it is absolutely essential. Soldiers are more than capable of engaging with the local populace to identify and help resolve their problems, thus helping develop trusting relationships with the locals that also enable Soldiers to garner intelligence based on that relationship...we sure as how have to understand the character of the fight we're in.

Bill:

Your response is typical of the reactive nature of Coin experts anytime somebody questions standard thinking and language concerning the oracle of coin.

Your suggestion that "this attitude" caused to use your words a "downward trend" in OIF is not supported by the operational record as shown by early histories of the Iraq War. I have used this quote before but the most recent current history "On Point II" argues that by and large, most army tactical units by the end of 2003 were conducting best practices in counterinsurgency operations. As a BCT XO in 4ID in Tikrit one of the first briefings we gave to our BCT commander was how to go about setting up local governance in our area, how to go about rebuilding infrastructure, and how to go about protecting the populace.

Later I commanded a cav squadron in west Baghdad in 2006. Conventional forces in coin operate differently than ODA teams. Infantrymen, tankers, scouts, etc for the most part do not take part in so-called diplomacy. Their patrol leaders, SSGs, SFCs, LTs, etc are the ones who engage and talk to the population. So the notion that every combat soldier that has done a tour in Iraq or Astan is out talking to the sheik or local leaders as a diplomat is chimera.

Does this mean as your post suggests, that combat soldiers in coin do nothing but kicking down doors and killing people? Of course not, nor does it mean that in pre-deployment training for a specific area that all soldiers should not learn the basics of the cultures they are going into to help them better understand their environment.

The point that Wilf and I and others are making is that the notion as is literally stated that soldiers are diplomats is just simply folly. They are not, they are combat soldiers and as wilf has pointed out they need to be able to do the basic functions and skills of combat soldiers. If they can do that, then they can step into different directions to do coin, stability ops, nation building etc.

The concern I have is that by using terms like Diplomats we are confusing ourselves as to what should be our priorities, and the reality of coin on the ground in places like astan and iraq.

gian

Bob's World

12-29-2008, 02:12 PM

Certainly many share the position that Armies just need to focus on being Armies. We already have a "good army" in America. In fact, we have a great army. From the ingenuity and initiative inherent in each American Soldier, to the very best training, equipment and leadership we can provide. Building a good army is not the issue.

The issue is what should we be asking that army to do, and is the army trained organized and equipped to do those things well. A good army at desert operations is not automatically a good army at jungle operations; or a good army at defense is not necessarily a good army at offense. We all know this. You must tailor your training, organization and training to the mission at hand. The US developed perhaps the most devastating army at fire and maneuver that the world has ever seen, and while that serves a tremendous deterrent effect, it does not help much in the operations that we are currently asked to conduct.

My point is that we really need to sort out what the mission is prior to changing the army to simply do what we are currently asking it to do more effectively. And while policy may be able to change quickly, the US national security apparatus, with a few minor mods over the years, is based upon the world as it existed emerging from WWII.

So, I stand by my position. England has always had a good army, but that and $1.75 will get you a cup of coffee at starbucks, but it won't bring the Empire back. The solution for this problem must begin at the top. Meanwhile we soldiers will keep doing what good soldiers do, and that is our very best; whenever and where ever we are directed to go.

RTK

12-29-2008, 03:33 PM

I was typing this when Bob's World replied. His second paragraph is another way of looking at my next two paragraphs:

I'd submit that the Army isn't just a hammer, nor is it the top-of-the-line Leatherman pocket tool that has everything from a can opener to magnifying glass.

In this, I'd say that the Army is one of those multi-tools we had when we were growing up that had about 8 functions but did about three of them really well. In the end, you never used about 5 of the functions because you ran the risk of breaking the damned thing. Army units, particularly those at the tactical level, are the same. Cavalrymen being diplomats detracts from their abilities as scouts. Not saying they can't, just saying they won't be as effective. SF Soldiers have some fantastic capablilities and talents - However, I wouldn't want their leadership to determine the best way for 1st Cavalry Division to employ 2 tank companies in the defense. Not saying they aren't capable of providing that leadership, just saying there are other functions their particular piece is better suited to provide.

There has to be a balance struck somewhere. Today's junior combat leader (squad leader, section leader, PL, PSG) should be able to conduct all of their basic battle drills, competently demonstrate proficiency in core METL tasks, actions on contact, and reporting, and basic troop leading procedures.

They also need a familiarity with TTPs in COIN, though these TTPs need to find a baseline in the core competencies mentioned above. It's been said and quoted multiple times in this thread; It depends on how you train. This is the #1 big issue on my mind at this point.

The new Army capstone training manual, FM 7-0, Training For Full Spectrum Operations, should not have been published. Training for METL is training for METL is training for METL. We need to, as an Army, get back to the 8 step training model, training schedules, and methods of training that our Soldiers will understand.

FM 7-0, published early this month, opens up with a giant glass of Kool Aid describing the environments, conditions, and preconditions that wars and battles are to be fought in the future, quite possibly under the flawed premise that they are right. There are plenty of smart people on this board who work at CAC, but can someone tell me where the hell you all hide the Crystal Ball at Leavenworth?

This manual offers no fresh ideas, but rather codifies an incorrect training methodology that pays lip service to the old method and mirrors what we've been forced to do as an Army in the last 7 years due to a mission cycle that finds the Army deploying, deployed, or recovering from operations abroad every 12-18 months. Just because we've been forced to train in this method due to poor planning doesn't mean it's the right way to train.

I'm reminded of an AAR at JRCT in 2002, as my sapper platoon just completed a route reconnaissance where one of our vehicles was destroyed by a mine. The platoon OC, a cantankerous Staff Sergeant who had a 10th Mountain Division combat patch from Somalia, making him one of the only OCs we had with combat experience. This guy was EF Hutton - when he talked, people listened. At the conclusion of this lane, he sat everyone down and told us that he was going to give us a quote to think about but wouldn't tell us who said it until the last day of the exercise. The quote was "Don't let the fact that everyone is doing it wrong prevent you from doing it right." It gave us all pause and resolved the platoon into determining better practices.

Our junior leaders have lost the art of how to train their Soldiers because those of us who have trained properly in the past have not trained them to conduct proper training management in the present. This is OUR failure as an Army and as Leaders. Platoons don't come up with training plans or schedules anymore. The vast majority of what a unit trains on before they leave for theater is directed by FORSCOM Training Guidance crammed down their throats that forces BDE and BN commanders to pick and choose which tasks they're going to blow off in the pre-deployment training cycle.

Training isn't forecasted in terms of long range, short range, and near term anymore. Though tucked into the back fo chapter 4 in the new 7-0 it talks about these three terms, what it should have said is that tactical units at the BDE and below are in reaction mode within the 8 week mark and are so used to jumping through their asses on a week to week basis before deployment that any work done to forecast training out beyond three weeks is futile since it's going to change.

Sure, there are large Easter Eggs that can be thrown on the largest of echelons' schedule (block leave after deployment, gunnery, CTC/MRE rotation, rail-load, block leave before deployment, and LAD), but the day to day operations, "Hey YOU" mission planning cycle, and micromanagement from echelons above BN due to the increased "strength" in BDE and DIV staffs have created environments of hate and discontent of the staff officers and NCOs appointed over the small units; Staffs whose mere existance, in the minds of the tactical units, stifles progress at the tactical level. This has become such an accepted part of Army life that FM 7-0 actually speaks to it in chapter 4:

[Paragraph] 4-12. Modular formations are more agile, expeditionary, and versatile than previous Army organizations. However, modular organizations require a higher degree of training and operational synchronization at the brigade level.

Operational synchronization, for those keeping track at home, is the new joint definition of micromanagement.

Training meetings at the company level used to be able to take what is happening 8 weeks out and walk back to T-1 and T week to lock in and conduct final coordinating instructions. This doesn't happen anymore. Training meetings at the company level are now wargaming sessions that determine the method of crisis management to be emplyed over the next week to ensure the mission gets accomplished despite the changes imposed from on high.

Indeed, it depends on how we train. The question is, does anyone remember how to train properly?

PS - The quote was from that 1976 porn classic, The Opening of Misty Beethoven. You'll have to rent it to find out the context (or PM Stan).

Ken White

12-29-2008, 04:14 PM

...In fact, we have a great army. From the ingenuity and initiative inherent in each American Soldier, to the very best training, equipment and leadership we can provide. Building a good army is not the issue.Define great... :D

I do not agree -- we do have the potential to be great but that potential is NOT met due to the fact that we don't provide even adequate initial entry training; that our equipment issue is overly influenced by the defense industry, Congress and the media and that our leadership is not the best we can provide -- it is the best that a semi-meritocratic system hobbled by an inefficient and ineffective personnel system which is required to provide an excessively 'fair' shot for all at higher rank and which can only reward competence by promotion in such rank.

As far as our great training goes, that's funny. It is adequate, no question but it overemphasizes cost reduction, metrics and ease of execution (particularly in the institutions) at the cost of true competence. RTK has well addressed many training issues above in his great post.
My point is that we really need to sort out what the mission is prior to changing the army to simply do what we are currently asking it to do more effectively.That I do agree with -- I also doubt it will ever happen for three reasons; The world is infinitely variable and rapid, unpredictable shifts can and do occur, Politicians object strenuously to being tied into positions and we have developed an elephantine bureaucracy that will bicker about changes until they're too late. Thus we are confronted with the fact that the US Army must be multi-spectrum capable -- and that it is not today due to training inadequacies, a deficient personnel system and an inflexible bureaucracy.
...And while policy may be able to change quickly, the US national security apparatus, with a few minor mods over the years, is based upon the world as it existed emerging from WWII.Also agree -- and it's past time that needs to be corrected. The Armed Forces cannot change many aspects of that problem but they have also taken too few steps to change much they could change.
...Meanwhile we soldiers will keep doing what good soldiers do, and that is our very best; whenever and where ever we are directed to go.That is true and some issues are beyond DoD control but it does not excuse the 'system' for not trying to better itself to the extent it is able...

Having said that, as Rob says:
"I believe we are capable of doing what we are called on to do with some relatively painless changes once we recognize there is no real threat to our core values, however that requires we not create threats where there should be none."

Rob Thornton

12-29-2008, 04:20 PM

The issue is what should we be asking that army to do, and is the army trained organized and equipped to do those things well.

I think that is a good question, however its unlikely to get a definable answer that most are comfortable with. It will change over time. However unlikely we might think certain possibilities are, this seems to be one of those counter intuitive outcomes where to consider them impossible makes them more likely.

Having a full suite of tools at your disposal to influence, coerce or compel if need be provides the other participants something to consider. As they work to free themselves from some, they may remain susceptible to others.

Iran is a great example, but there are others. Why do we believe that Iran will never cross the line which requires us to go to war with them? I use Iran as an example not because of the current rhetoric, evidence of their use of proxies in the ME, actions in the Persian Gulf itself, and not to justify a position. I ask the question in earnest, on what grounds do we justify a belief that Iran would not cross a line, or be perceived of having crossed a line that we would feel there was no other option but to go to war?

Next I'd ask what is the foundation of that belief? The same question could be asked many times over, however we'd be wise to consider that our belief should be grounded in the conditions which include our capabilities and theirs to deter or achieve an objective at what can be considered a tolerable cost to either participant. If a given belligerent believes they can now accomplish something in which they could not previously, because whatever the opposition’s capability was is no longer a capability or a capability with sufficient capacity then they have good reason to weigh the risk differently. Based on their desire or attraction to an objective, they may even defy your estimate (based on your beliefs and intelligence) of their odds or actions.

Transparency in capability communicated through statecraft is critical, but if your capability is hollow, of inadequate capacity, or is in fact not an appropriate capability, then transparency becomes an incentive to act, not a deterrence.

The word "well" in itself is one which is subject to conditions. What is the quality of "well"? This is the challenge of those who have the responsibility to provide "well" when the conditions change, and who must contemplate the consequences when "well" was not good enough. It is not an indictment, but it is the truth - policy when it matters most rarely apportions risk in a way that allows you to make infallible choices. Instead, it often corresponds to its nature of being the unlikely candidate because it comes from interactions which were difficult to discern based on how you saw things prior to those interactions.

So I would argue the other side as well, that while you consider this:

it does not help much in the operations that we are currently asked to conduct.

You may also consider that those capabilities have wielded and may yet wield influence beyond the obvious. How has deterrence based on that capability allowed us to protect our interests beyond OIF and OEF, and even to concentrate on our current operations? What lines were not crossed by others because they did not wish to contend with that capability? What opportunities were presented because others thought our capability relevant to their interests? What influence was gained in our diplomacy based on those capabilities?

Even in theater that capability has shaped operations - consider if we had not been able to retake Fallujah, or paid a terrible price for it? Consider the implications of not being able to open and retain a critical ground line of communication for conduct of our CSS? Consider more than just the political actions which facilitated the Al-Anbar – as Bing West has observed, there is indeed political power in being the strongest tribe on a a number of levels. When that strength is coupled with discipline, restraint, judgment and other attractive qualities it is all the more attractive.

I would argue that in fact we may understand our shortfalls with regard to current operations far better than we understand our strengths, and how they have made our current successes possible. We get immediate feedback when we fail, and we are our own worst (or most effective) critic – however, we don’t always get complete or immediate feedback on the things we do right, and we rarely give ourselves credit – its just our nature. This does not mean we don't have work to do in those gaps, but that if you dismiss something without understanding how it served as an enabler, the new capabilities we build will not be made operational in a way that matters as it pertains to providing the right “means” to operationalize the “ways” we’d prefer toward the “ends” we require.

My point is that we really need to sort out what the mission is prior to changing the army to simply do what we are currently asking it to do more effectively.

And while policy may be able to change quickly, the US national security apparatus, with a few minor mods over the years, is based upon the world as it existed emerging from WWII.

The first and second sentences can be viewed in more than one way. It could support John Nagl's argument or COL Gentile's depending on how we qualify "currently".

I'll agree that the values which we profess to guide our actions have been consistent on paper and spoken word, even occasionally in deed - however the implementation of these values is another matter. They create new possibilities and outcomes which sometimes must be (or have been) addressed in ways that are incongruent. This is as much due to domestic policy interaction as FP.

I think we are going to see a very ambitious FP in its reality. I think we must be prepared to both implement that FP in ways that stand the best chance of success, mitigate risk and preserve our options when those FP interactions create outcomes (or opportunities for others) which we did not anticipate, and which must be dealt with. Better than to have an Army that has its eyes wide open to the range of possibilities and can transition and adapt its capabilities with minimal hiccups, and one which is not rooted in one camp or another.

I cannot remember where on SWJ, but someone had remarked that preserving our "war fighting" capabilities in an armored corps, or something of that size would be enough to retain that capability and expand it. I don't think its that simple. While you might get away with it for a year or two, it would not be long before that capability could not be expanded fast enough to provide you options to respond to your policy crisis, or in a way that was seen as a meaningful way by those who were assessing your capabilities. I don't think it would be long before the DOTML(&E)PF reflected this change as well, and any incentive to preserve there would be overcome by the mainstream.

The solution for this problem must begin at the top.

Yes, our duly elected leadership has that responsibility. However, we must inform them of the risks and advantages. We must provide them alternative advice when appropriate. While our political leadership, and as such its priorities may change (more or less) based on their political philosophy and what they consider the appropriate use of military force, our institutions provide some balance. This is good (although some will say it is not so good), because the institution often has unique insights, and a sense of itself that should be considered.

Best Regards, Rob

Surferbeetle

12-29-2008, 06:24 PM

From the good Colonel’s post I could probably be forgiven if I gained the mistaken impression that US Army is not a training based institution.

Let us examine the phrase ‘Diplomatic Training’. Is it the Colonels implication that for the US Army to offer ‘Diplomatic Training’ requires that this weeks world-wide training schedule will include a John F. Kennedy School of Government Graduate School Course on Diplomacy for all of our soldiers, the majority of whom have high school educations? Does it mean that we will listen to or watch regularly played AFN Commercials which remind us not to be an ‘Ugly American’? Will we participate in a 40-hour Headstart Language Course, unit Language Training, a SOLT Language Course, or perhaps a DLI Language Course? Perhaps our soldiers will be afforded an opportunity to use Tuition Assistance or the GI Bill on a college course on History or Government or even Diplomacy? Perhaps an offer will be extended to some of our soldiers to study at West Point, which offers some of the same courses? Perhaps CA, PSYOP, or SF training is a possibility for our soldiers? Or perhaps, the US Army should not expend the time, effort, or any other resources on this type of training which would further Diplomacy, defined in my copy of Websters as (1) The conducting of relations between nations. (2) Tact.

The trenches of WWI are homage to the type of thinking that ‘Diplomatic Training’ is not warranted for soldiers.

Instead I offer up the following references, which examine the pros and cons of this debate in far deeper and more eloquent detail than can I, a mere solider who has in fact received Diplomatic Training from the US Army, who knows first hand that there is more than one path to success, and who unequivocally rejects limiting our Nations ability to fully respond in this war or any other.

Strategic Studies Institute ‘The 2006 Lebanon Campaign and the Future of Warfare: Implications for Army and Defense Policy by Stephen Biddle and Jeffrey A. Friedman (http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB882.pdf)

RAND Publication CF 251 Integrating Instruments of Power and Influence (Lessons Learned and Best Practices) (http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB882.pdf)

Ken White

12-29-2008, 07:41 PM

From the good Colonel’s post I could probably be forgiven if I gained the mistaken impression that US Army is not a training based institution.Unfortunately, I also a mere soldier, have no idea what you're trying to say here? Could I ask for a clarification?

I read this link; "Strategic Studies Institute ‘The 2006 Lebanon Campaign and the Future of Warfare: Implications for Army and Defense Policy by Stephen Biddle and Jeffrey A. Friedman" but this one
RAND Publication CF 251 Integrating Instruments of Power and Influence (http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB882.pdf) yields the same document

I guess the second one is meant to point to this LINK (http://www.rand.org/pubs/conf_proceedings/CF251/). *

I'm unsure what either really has to do with the statement which Wilf, I and others have made that diplomacy in the conduct of relations between nations sense is not the business of the soldier (while acknowledging that tact is most always required of soldiers) ...

* Which I had read earlier and disagreed with much that is therein said, strongly believing that the entire Balkans episode was a goat rope that was none of our business and that we did ourselves more diplomatic harm then good there...

Surferbeetle

12-29-2008, 09:15 PM

Ken,

Thanks for fixing the link, this document (http://www.rand.org/pubs/conf_proceedings/2008/RAND_CF251.pdf) is indeed the one I wanted to link to.

I'm unsure what either really has to do with the statement which Wilf, I and others have made that diplomacy in the conduct of relations between nations sense is not the business of the soldier (while acknowledging that tact is most always required of soldiers) ...

During my year in Iraq I was not engaged in combat operations 24 hours a day, seven days a week and I do not believe that the bulk of our forces during this entire war have been so engaged either. This includes during 2006 when the fruits of following a MCO-centric/Diplomacy-light attitude were particularly evident. This war is not about trench warfare with uniformed force locked with uniformed force. Nor is this war about our top diplomat negotiating with their top diplomat for the win. Things are not that black and white and all the wishing in the world will not make them so.

Instead, the reality is that our Commanders work in a world filled with shades of gray and have to be able effectively negotiate with the local civilian power structure in order to be able to reach some sort of an accommodation. Certainly, sometimes words fail and death has to do the talking. Much of the time, however, a Commander can influence the will of the population with other means. This war is focused upon 'the population'. Commanders (and by this I do not limit the word to Officers, but include NCO's and Agency folks) who fail to understand this, fail to understand the power of diplomacy, and in so doing fail to use all techniques available to them in order to win.

Diplomacy works at a tactical level and it's past time to train on, and consistently use all means available to win. Other duties as assigned is not just a catch phrase...

Regards,

Steve

Ken White

12-29-2008, 10:57 PM

During my year in Iraq I was not engaged in combat operations 24 hours a day, seven days a week and I do not believe that the bulk of our forces during this entire war have been so engaged either...Things are not that black and white and all the wishing in the world will not make them so.Those statements are true of all wars as nearly as I can ascertain. Certainly applies to all I've seen on three continents.
...This war is focused upon 'the population'. Commanders (and by this I do not limit the word to Officers, but include NCO's and Agency folks) who fail to understand this, fail to understand the power of diplomacy, and in so doing fail to use all techniques available to them in order to win.That is typical not only of COIN operations but, again to my knowledge, of all wars to a greater or lesser extent. I certainly agree with what you say is required with the exceptions of the fact that what you describe is not diplomacy and that you omit privates who also must be involved.
Diplomacy works at a tactical level and it's past time to train on, and consistently use all means available to win. Other duties as assigned is not just a catch phrase...Then I suggest you need to define diplomacy as you are using it a little better than you did before. Seems to me you are now talking somewhere between international discourse and tact. I don't disagree with the fact that frequently in any war and almost constantly in a COIN-like scenario, some effort along that line is needed by all ranks. No disagreement at all.

What I disagree with is twofold -- calling it diplomacy which it absolutely is not; and the implication that 'other duties as assigned' doesn't cover the problem. It does, it is indeed not a catch phrase -- it never has been that...

Other duties as assigned in this context mean that one has to apply experience and judgment in relations with opponents and civilians in a combat zone to achieve a balance of security and freedom of action. Should such capability be included in our training regimen? Certainly. It should have been from 1975 until 2005 but essentially was not for the bulk of the Armed Forces (in COIN or post conventional conflict / occupation / pacification operations). Hopefully that has been or is being rectified -- but that training is not diplomatic training and to use that word sends a bad message to many, not least Congress who might start thinking diplomacy was a military mission.

Such muddy thinking could lead to a map like this: LINK (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=63159&postcount=1) and a situation wherein the GeoCom CinCs actually were the lead agents in US foreign affairs in their AOs. Note that Schmedlap has said he sees that area allocation dichotomy as a good thing; may or may not be -- what is certain is that having Flag Officers serving as de facto Pro-Consuls around the world means that they are exercising diplomacy. While they need to be knowledgeable about all that, I submit it is not their job to actually do that and further believe that such muddying of waters is not good for the US. Diplomacy is the job of politicians and the foreign affairs crowd; military involvement in diplomacy has always had bad results -- ala your earlier comment about the trenches in WW I.

What you suggest as required training is IMO correct -- what it is not is diplomacy. Not in any way.

Gian P Gentile

12-30-2008, 12:34 AM

Lots of good discussion and thoughts on important matters in this thread.

Surferbeetle: Ken's subsequent posts after your questions of me clearly state what would be a detailed explanation by me of what this term "diplomacy" means in terms of an army and its soldiers.

I jumped on John Nagl's use of the term in his speech because in a sense he meant it literally; and in a sense he uses the word as a trope to call for signficant transformation of the American Army toward a force built around the principle of nation-building. It was in that sense that I used strident language and prose to attack the word. But in that attack in no way did I mean to suggest that American soldiers in combat--coin or whatever--should not act with tact, respect, and morality.

I really liked RTK's critique of the new FM 7-0. RTK, you should consider sending it to Military Review, perhaps shortened and tightened up a bit (maybe also without the porn reference; too funny!!) as an oped for one of their upcoming editions. I have yet to read 7-0 closely, but your critique of it will guide me through it when I do.

I also agree with much that Rob T said in his post. Balance is important. But what I have argued in many places and I really liked RTK's analogy to the multi-tool that it had many functions but if you used (or trained) on them all at once the thing would be ineffective. In this sense as RTK argues, the Army should build itself around its core functions of fighting; from there it can do other missions required of it. I just dont see it going the other way, that if we build primarily a nation-building army and then expect it to fight an enemy who stands and fights, well it will not be a pretty picture.

gian

Surferbeetle

12-30-2008, 01:29 AM

In this sense as RTK argues, the Army should build itself around its core functions of fighting; from there it can do other missions required of it. I just dont see it going the other way, that if we build primarily a nation-building army and then expect it to fight an enemy who stands and fights, well it will not be a pretty picture.

Sir,

I appreciate your comments and would greatly appreciate on references on diplomacy (or other topics) that you are willing to share.

With respect to your above statement, I too believe that we must have a steel core to our Army that excels at MCO, however, that steel core must also be able to consistently apply effective COIN skills as well. Why? It is my experience that we (the Army) bear the brunt of figuring things out and that there is much more to war than 'just' MCO.

As a CA-Bubba, I was privileged to be attached to the 101st ABN DIV during OIF 1, and their ability to mix solid MCO skills with innovative CMO TTP's as needed was most impressive to me. I traveled the country fairly extensively during my tour and did not see this same mix everywhere. I do not mean to say that we were perfect, I humbly note that we are still fighting in Iraq and that things are still not stable.

Today, and many times when I attend CTC's, it seems to me that the emphasis for this war is still on MCO/COIN as opposed to COIN/MCO. Agency and DOD interaction/teamwork is not where it should be IMO and current force structure has much to do with this (DOS, USAID, SOF, and USAF in particular). I do not claim to have the silver bullet to our problems but I truly feel that we must change our approach in order to arrive at better outcomes. As Ken says there is a difference between diplomacy and Diplomacy and I am still working that one out...

Regards,

Steve

Ken White

12-30-2008, 03:10 AM

As Ken says there is a difference between diplomacy and Diplomacy and I am still working that one out...which is difficult since I don't even own a pedant :D -- but to preclude further confusion I may have inadvertently sown; Ken doesn't say there is a difference between diplomacy and Diplomacy, large or small 'd' -- it is the intercourse between nations and / or the exercise of tact.

There is however, as Webster points out, a difference between diplomacy (or Diplomacy) and being diplomatic. The latter is a euphemism for being tactful... :wry:

Words, as they say, are important. ;)

Particularly when dealing with that crew of Lawyers that constitute our Congress...

jmm99

12-30-2008, 03:28 AM

seems a logical extension from "exercise of tact" by soldiers, or anyone else.

I recognize the shorthand use of "that crew of Lawyers that constitute our Congress", so long as you keep in mind that "Lawyers" in the congressional context means "persons who happen to have law degrees". There is a notable lack of what I consider "Good Lawyers" in those hallowed halls.

;)

Ken White

12-30-2008, 04:18 AM

...There is a notable lack of what I consider "Good Lawyers" in those hallowed halls.their parsing skills only, I presume the majority have no lawyerly skills or they wouldn't be in Congress. Hmmm, maybe skill is a bad word -- perhaps penchant for paralyzing parsing would be better... ;)

RTK

12-30-2008, 05:16 AM

ODB

12-30-2008, 05:31 AM

It seems to me that in many aspects over the past 7 years we have blurred many lines. Everyone wants a piece of the pie and not "their" piece of the pie. Those many levels above my "boots on the ground" are jumping on whatever they think will be the next big thing, punching their "ticket". Maybe I'm a bit of an old school crusty bastard but it's kind of like the old stay in your lane and trust those to your left and right. Having done tours on both sides of the fence conventional and SF, I see things from both sides. Right now IMO there is a lot of confusion in the Army today. Seems everyone wants to do everyone elses job. I know everyone has their own experiences good and bad, unfortunately when personality conflicts take priority over mission accomplishment we get where we are today. Maybe I'm naive or too simple minded when I look at things, but to me it is too easy. We have multiple organizations all with specific skill sets and purposes yet we continually forget how or when to use them or do we simply just think "Hey, I got a great idea let's create a new unit that does this, yeah that's what we need.". As I read many of the comments posted there are multiple thoughts and opinions, but I ask this: What gets us to where we need to go to be successful in MCO and COIN? Why is that the step we need to take, what quantifies that as the solution? Is it as simple as properly employing all the assets available to the US gov't. Stop the political infighting for bigger budgets. Stop showing what else it is you think you can do and actually do the job your organization was created to do. IMO we need to somehow figure out how to come together to fight and defeat the common enemy and wish I knew how to make that happen, it is the million dollar solution. Unfortunately we have too many who put their own personal agendas before everything else.

The last thing I want to touch on is Army Training Sir!!!! RTK hits some major points. Many years ago when I was a young SGT and looking starry eyed at my big, bad green beret neighbor he told me something interesting. He said "Do you know what makes us look so high speed when we do things?" He simply stated "We do the basics to perfection, it just looks like we are doing something high speed". Fast forward many years when I made the jump to SF, let's just say I was shell shocked. After years of losing focus and concentrating on DA, we lost track of how to do the basics. Fortunately we had a smart company SGM who saw this and forced us back to them. Nothing like seeing ODAs in the Aug heat conducting react to contact, squad attack, and break contact live fires. We had lost what made us so good. There are more schools out there to teach you new techniques and to enhance your individual skills but it still comes down to the basics shoot, move, and communicate. I remember as a Private when we started our training cycles it was always with individual weapons. On those ranges every soldier in the company would be there. If it was an M60 range every soldier was there conducting concurrent training on that weapon system. We were all taught how to disassemble, assemble, zero day/night, crew drills, range cards, field expeident emplacement. Every single soldier in the company could effectively employ all weapons systems. Only then would we move onto maneuver LFX (Live Fire Exercises). We started with buddy teams, then fire teams, squads, etc... We built up to Battalion sized LFXs. I want to know what happened to individual skills training. Who decided we no longer needed CTT(common tasks training)? If I remember correctly collective tasks are nothing more than individual tasks put together. If every soldier is taught and trained his individual tasks then collective tasks are a breeze. Like I said earlier maybe I'm too simple minded and just an old crusty bastard, but this is how I was taught and it has worked for me for years. Learn it right the first time you spend the rest of your life doing it right, learn it wrong the first time you spend the rest of your life trying to do it right. Lastly, the best thing that could happen to the Army would be to outlaw Outlook, get back to seeing what your men are doing, get out from behind the desk!

Gian P Gentile

12-30-2008, 01:37 PM

Sir,

I'll see what I can put together before I leave for points east.

When I looked through the new 7-0, I had the OCT 02 version next to it and basically went page by page. You can clearly see the same line of thinking from the people who brought us the BfSB (another source of my frustration).

RTK: I am showing my ignorance here, or perhaps just a bit too early but what is "BfSB?"

Also, where are heading to? If you dont mind, drop me a line to let me know?

thanks

gg

RTK

12-30-2008, 02:01 PM

RTK: I am showing my ignorance here, or perhaps just a bit too early but what is "BfSB?"

Also, where are heading to? If you dont mind, drop me a line to let me know?

thanks

gg

Sir,

E-mail enroute.

12-30-2008, 02:19 PM

There is however, as Webster points out, a difference between diplomacy (or Diplomacy) and being diplomatic. The latter is a euphemism for being tactful... :wry:

Words, as they say, are important. ;)

I think it is also important to note that not all words are created equal. Adjectives are pretty valuable for achieving clarity about the nouns we use to represent the things we discuss.

At the risk of being viewed as redundant (Is that as bad as being pedantic? ;) ), I provided the following thoughts that I also posted here (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=63219&postcount=16in) in the COIN Comes Home Thread.

Seems to me that one can see COIN operations in two different lights: preemptive COIN and reactive COIN.

Preemptive COIN stops an insurgency before it starts (sort of like preventive maintenance). What Bob's World described in his post wrt the Civil Rights Act would fall in this category I think.

Reactive COIN is what happens after the insurgency has broken out and one seeks to return things to a preinsurrection status quo aka peacefulness (restorative maintenance--what your mechanic does after your car breaks down on the highway, if you wish). What Wilf is seeking to describe with his questions above falls into the second category. What the coalition is doing in IZ and AF is reactive COIN as well.

A third consideration applies whether one is engaged in reactive or preemptive COIN. That is what we might call Limitation COIN. Limitation COIN strives to ensure that the actions taken to restore the status quo do not fan the fames and broaden the insurgency instead. It also must ensure that the efforts to forestall/preempt the insurrection do not produce new sources of dissatisfaction that foment more/different dissent in the populace. I suspect that this part of COIN is what Nagl had in mind when he called on us to produce soldier diplomats.

Bob's World

12-30-2008, 03:28 PM

"COIN" is an unfortuante term in that it suggests a reaction or response to insurgency. How then, to become more proactive and to either prevent problems altogether, or to minimize the impact if unable to prevent?

I looked to Mao's three phases as a great point of departure for analyzing this problem (and yes, the final, very conventional NVA attack that finally defeated South Vietnam was classic phase III Maoist insurgency). For me, it all makes more sense by adding a phase 0 on the front end of Mao's three phases, and then considering every populace and every governance to be generally within that "peaceful" phase of daily interaction. As governance and popualces drift apart, one moves gradually into Mao's phase I.

Viewed in this light there is clear Civil lead and responsibility for COIN day in and day out. I don't need fancy metrics to know if I am in a community that is in low phase 0, high phase 0, or any other phase. You know it when you see it.

This is why I believe there is some merit at applying our existing MSCA doctrine to the the COIN problem set. It fully recognizes the enduring role of the Civil leadership, and has clear mechanisms for bringing in military support as needed, and peeling it back off as soon as no longer required. I believe this type of mindset would be a major advance in how we execute COIN.

Problem is that we got into this damn GWOT, and now attempt to paint all of our engagement in a wide array of environments as COIN; and it is messy and doesn't square well. Iraq is unique, as we invaded that country, took over the governance, and then facilitated the creation of a new governance. Always tricky business. We went from conventional attack, to occupation, to true US COIN against a resistance insurgency facilitated by UW waged by AQ. Ouch. Then we shifted to FID in support of a fledgling Iraqi government, while still dealing with COIN against a resistance and CT against AQ. We then had mixed in the Iraqi governments own COIN against both revolutionary and separatist insurgent movements and our FID to suupport that. Confused yet?

In Afghanistan we went from UW in support of the Northern Alliance insurgency, to FID in support of the new Afghan government that emerged. We also got into a resistance COIN operation with the Taliban, and CT against AQ who was again waging UW to support the insurgents.

In the Philippines we came in conducting FID and continue to conduct FID, it slips left and right on us every now and then, but we have been able to keep it cleaner as we did not begin with either an invasion or a UW campaign against the existing government.

Bottom line is that this is complex, but by seeking language and definitions that help us better classify the nature of the particular and unique activities, threats, and environment that we are dealing with in any particular case; and by adopting a more holistic concept of the activities that make up insurgency and COIN to allow us be both more proactive and better in our support to Civil leadership, I think we move forward.

Covered a lot of ground in a couple paragraphs, so if I pole vaulted over any key points without making them clear, just let me know and I will address.

MikeF

12-30-2008, 03:57 PM

Bob's World

12-30-2008, 04:43 PM

Just as an interesting aside to the earlier discussion regarding soldier's role as diplomat; I was just reviewing the 1940 USMC Small Wars Manual, and in para 2-2 "The Mission" one finds:

“If there is an organized hostile force opposing the intervention, the primary objective in small wars, as in a major war, is its early destruction. In those cases where armed
opposition is encountered only from irregular forces under the leadership of malcontents or unrecognized officials, the mission is one of diplomacy rather than military.”

Just found it to be an interesting statement, and one timely to the current discussion. I haven't sorted out yet exactly what they meant by that, or how I think about it. Perhaps it serves as bridge between WILF's oft stated position and some of the others.

William F. Owen

12-30-2008, 05:13 PM

“If there is an organized hostile force opposing the intervention, the primary objective in small wars, as in a major war, is its early destruction. In those cases where armed
opposition is encountered only from irregular forces under the leadership of malcontents or unrecognized officials, the mission is one of diplomacy rather than military.”

Well what I read from this, is in the event of of you needing to employ some form of diplomacy, you dust off Col Odom or similar skilled individual and deploy him. One unrecognised official, requires one "solider with some diplomatic training."- while it is still a problem is not a military problem.

I would also add that I do not find the 1940 Small Wars manual that useful or insightful. It is good but I don't hold it to be gospel.

Gian P Gentile

12-30-2008, 05:35 PM

...I would also add that I do not find the 1940 Small Wars manual that useful or insightful. It is good but I don't hold it to be gospel.

Wilf: as with most things, I am in agreement with you.

Your observation of the Marine Corps SWM is spot-on. In a couple of published pieces I have given the same observation. Aside from a few pages in the beginning about the political nature of small wars, etc. most of the book is made up of how to move donkeys, guns, marines etc over and under the mountains and streams of central america. As a primary text of history it is useful, but as a secondary source that somehow holds the key and secrets to small wars success it is of very limited value.

I have always thought it silly for commanders to place it on so high a level on their reading lists in preparation for deployment. Actually, the SWM is probably one of the last books a LT should read before deploying; unless that is he or she is hopping into Rufus's time machine for the jungles of nic. in the early 1930s and the Sandino hunt.

gg

Bob's World

12-30-2008, 05:44 PM

Confess that this my first blush with this manual myself. Agree with Gian and Wilf, and in general find it to be way too (hold onto your hat) threat-centric in its approach. Today we can no longer storm ashore on any foreign coast we chose, and simply support the side that closest matches our US interests in the area by force of arms.

Now more than ever we must prioritize the position of the populace of any country where we insert ourselves into the mix. Would love to sit down with Smedley Butler to discuss....

Steve Blair

12-30-2008, 05:45 PM

Within its historical context (read Mars Learning for more on that), the SWM is an amazing piece of work. Sadly, too many on both sides of the debate ignore that context. The SWM was really the first major doctrine publication put out by the US military on that area of warfare. Is it all applicable now? Of course not, but neither is Active Defense. Is it gospel? Of course not, but there is precious little in doctrinal writing that is. It was more an attempt to codify lessons that would certainly have been lost otherwise in an area where the Corps expected to deploy again at some point in the future.

Of course, had the British Army come out with it in the 1920s or so, I'm sure it would be gospel....;):D (joke, for those who don't get emoticons)

Gian P Gentile

12-30-2008, 09:05 PM

Steve:

Agree with your post especially that too many folks take the SWM out of its context and turn it into a "how to" manual for today's conflicts.

Problem with it, Steve, as I see things is that nobody has the 1976 version of 100-5 (active defense) on reading lists and as "must reads" before deploying to Iraq or Astan. But that Marine SWM has become the latter. And unlike other great works from the past the have an element of timelessness and ongoing relevance to them (eg., Thuycidies, Clausewitz, Callwell, Lawrence, to name a few) the Marine SWM really is a situational, historical text and should be read that way.

gian

Ken White

12-30-2008, 09:21 PM

context -- in particular context of the times. Things change. I did things in Korea that were not supposed to be done in Viet Nam. I'm sure we did things in VN that no one can legally do today. I suppose we're better off for that but I do have to wonder occasionally... :wry:

The SWM is like every other piece of military gospel I've read -- and that's a bunch, I'm old and it's my only hobby :D -- it has its uses and its suggestions (that's all they are) must be applied with caution and an appreciation (METT-TC like) for the specifics of the situation. Same thing applies to Orde Wingate, Clausewitz, Belisaurius, Sun Tzu, Khalid ibn Walid and all the nominal experts and savants of today. Even applies to my personal pet, Subatai... :cool:

Even doctrine must be regarded skeptically. One has to know it well, apply it usually but always be prepared to interpolate and modify.

Apply anyone else's solutions of the times to your tactical, operational -- or strategic -- problems of the moment without a great deal of thought and you'll be in trouble.

Ken White

12-30-2008, 09:29 PM

...as I see things is that nobody has the 1976 version of 100-5 (active defense) on reading lists and as "must reads" before deploying to Iraq or Astan...unlike other great works from the past the have an element of timelessness and ongoing relevance to them (eg., Thuycidies, Clausewitz, Callwell, Lawrence, to name a few)...That was one of several items of 'doctrine' -- some much more current -- I had in mind just above. :D

I agree with all your named authors as having merit but would submit they too can lead one astray if not placed in context and modified IAW the actual situation of the moment. No one has yet come up with a golden bullet, many can provide a few silver bullets... ;)

Gian P Gentile

12-31-2008, 12:25 AM

That was one of several items of 'doctrine' -- some much more current -- I had in mind just above. :D

I agree with all your named authors as having merit but would submit they too can lead one astray if not placed in context and modified IAW the actual situation of the moment. No one has yet come up with a golden bullet, many can provide a few silver bullets... ;)

Ken:

You are right; it would be hard for somebody who has no background reading and knowledge in the middle east and its history to understand lawrence, or somebody who has no background in military theory to get Clausewitz. Heck I remember when I bought my first copy of st carl at the inf officer advanced course in 1990 and read it, or at least tried to, and looked around and asked myself if I was an idiot because I just spent an entire weekend reading through this and the only thing i got out of it was something about the relationship between war and politics.

But with study and reflection many of these texts can be understood, and the ones that I mentioned have in my mind a timelessness to them that other texts simply do not. And your point about history and context and the reader of it is exactly what Clausewitz was getting at in his dicsussion on historical criticism and a theory of war.

gian

John T. Fishel

12-31-2008, 12:46 AM

Gian. I wrote a piece back in 95 - published in Low Intensity Conflict & Law Enforcement (before I became its editor and it went out of business:rolleyes:) called "Little Wars, Small Wars, LIC, OOTW, the GAP, and Things That Go Bump in the Night." Near the beginning of the piece, I discussed Callwell and the SWM and argued that the authors of the SWM were very much acquainted with Callwell, Indeed, their discussion of what Small Wars are parallels his - with one major exception. The Marines who wroted the SWM rejected wars of imperial conquest in their manual - something Colonel Callwell applauded.

The SWM is mostly TTP. In that sense it resembles the new COIN manual FM 3-24, or rather 3-24 resembles the SWM. Some TTP has changed over the decades; some remains the same. If there is a need to use mounted troops and pack animals then the SWM is a good source (Afghanistan anyone?). Gospel it is not. But it is a fascinating look at a point in the evolution of Small Wars. Certainly, one can go back to classical times to look for examples of insurgencies and other small wars that look much like those of the present. It is interesting to read Josephus' account of the Jewish revolt in light of, say the FLN's revolution in Algeria and Kilcullen's enemy centric v. population centric strategies. Obviously, Callwell is another point on the timeline - closer to the Banana Wars that are the focus of the SWM than is Josephus - but the issues we are discussing here reflect those from past records, wars, and writers from antiquity to the present.

Cheers

JohnT

Gian P Gentile

12-31-2008, 01:08 AM

JohnT:

Right; I think we may have had this discussion once before on a previous thread.

Agree with what you say about SWM and Callwell. My point though was to highlight the elevated status that SWM has received especially since the start of the Iraq War and it has come to be seen in some circles as a historical "how to" conduct small wars manual with template-like relevance for the present. You are right in that it is a fascinating look into marine operations during that period. Although at least philosophically even though the marines did not consider themselves imperialist like the British, well others might see more similarities than dissimilarities. Smedley Butler certainly saw his and his marines' actions as part of american imperialism in central america.

You are right to point out the links between SWM and Callwell and of course the authors of the manual acknowledge the influence of Callwell on their writing of it. However, Callwell is of a different class in my mind. I would consider him, like Lawrence, as a minor military classic. In that sense I would elevate him above other more popular coin practioners so admired and used in today's army like Galula, Thompson, and Kitson. Reason for my saying this is simply in the breadth of knowledge of history and theory displayed in Callwell and its application in the writing of his book.

just some thoughts; liked your Sword3 Piece.

So you were editor of a journal and it went out of business? reminds me of sam adams and his attempt at beer making and tax collecting; failed at both endeavors. But what the heck, he was a superb revolutionary.

gian

Umar Al-Mokhtār

12-31-2008, 02:10 AM

But a death in the immediate family, and all the logistics that entails, and getting my youngest spawn off to Basra (who as a matter of fact just rung us up to let us know she was in Kuwait awaiting transport) has occupied a fair a mount of my time as of late. :cool:

On another thread here I pontificated:

“In many respects I agree with Gentile’s concerns and do not believe he is anti-COIN. The Army needs to have a robust capability to fight in both types of warfare. IMHO it is much easier for a Soldier who is highly trained in the complexities of employing the variety of weapons systems in conventional warfare to quickly adapt to a COIN/LIC/IW situation than it is for a Soldier who is trained predominantly in COIN to function at his optimum when thrust into the chaos of conventional war.

Soldiers, after all, are trained to obey orders, but to follow orders they need the skills. Conventional warfare requires solid skill sets, many of which that are also useful in COIN. COIN is more of an intellectual exercise requiring a common sense approach, an understanding of human behavior, and empathy with the local population, skills not necessarily taught or quantified in an FM.”

How we train is how we fight and at present training does seem to be slipping further towards being overly COIN centric, to the detriment of those hard skills Soldiers and Marines need. IMHO an “Advisor Corps” of the magnitude that Nagl recommends would strip away too many valuable troops from the main force. Better to develop an “Advisor Cadre,” place it within ARSOC or SOCOM, expand ARSOC to allow for sufficient personnel, make a fair amount of the strength Guard and Reserve, stop using SOF predominantly in DA, and tie them closer to State in some areas.

As to the SWM, it must be taken in the context and era for which it was written. The Marine Corps that fought in the “Banana Wars” of the 20s and 30s was not the Marine Corps that emerged from the Pacific Campaign. The genesis of that Marine Corps was Culebra and Quantico, not Haiti and Nicaragua. What I feel the “Banana Wars” contributed to the senior combat leaders in WW II was a taste of close quarters combat. At any level entering combat for the first time is a mind-boggling experience. There is great advantage to having combat vets in leadership positions when a unit enters combat for the first time, especially a green unit.

We do not need a COIN operated Army (or Marine Corps) we need a robust conventional Army and Marine Corps that is also capable of COIN and savvy in limited operations in conjunction with State in nation building/rebuilding.

To me that entails a greater fostering of professional inquisitiveness on the part of all ranks. I cracked open St Karl as a corporal, fortunately for me it was an abridged version but still, like Gian noted, it made little sense to me at the time and even made my head hurt a bit. :D But as I read more works by other theorists, delved into doctrine, and explored military history it made returning back to the old German dude easier and he started to make sense. To me John Boyd’s massive briefing “Patterns of Conflict” was less theoretical and more a revelation of how military history and theory all flowed together like a massive quilt writ large across the ages. That one should look at it all holistically and not try to cherry pick favorite strategies or theories. I am reminded of the introduction to the Encyclopedia Britannica’s series The Great Books. In it the editors posit that a “great conversation’ was occurring throughout the millennia between the Greek philosophers to those of the 20th Century. That each work of literature built on what came before. I see military theory and history entwined in a similar “conversation” across the ages. It’s tougher to see where you’re going if you don’t understand where you’ve been.

The Army we need is one well versed in conducting complex combat operations against a peer foe and can also decisively wage COIN.

John T. Fishel

12-31-2008, 02:17 AM

You're probably right about previous threads. I'm an old guy - like Ken - and I often foget what I've written after it's posted.:rolleyes:

I hadn't thought about Callwell in the way you suggest. Have to review him again with that in mind. I'm not entirely sure who I would put in the pantheon of Small Wars classics. Part of that depends on what aspect of Small Wars you are looking at. For Revolution, it's relatively easy - Mao clearly has a place. But for COIN - since Callwell and before my pal Max Manwaring - I'm not sure. Still, I particularly like Lansdale's memoir, In the Midst of Wars.

I guess I'm in good company with Sam Adams...;)

Cheers

JohnT

Gian P Gentile

12-31-2008, 03:09 AM

JohnT:

agree about Mao in terms of revolutionary warfare. Although friends of mine who are chinese history scholars have pointed out some serious flaws to Mao's work; namely that it was not a reflection of reality on the ground in china.

Ref Callwell, if you can suggest you read historian Doug Porch's intro to it in a recently released reprint to it by University of Nevada Press. Porch's intro is quite good because he gets at how Callwell is still relevant today in a world of counterinsurgency theory and thought that is dominated by post world war II revolutionary war theorists.

yeah, just like the great Sam A.

UAM: ref your statement about Marine Corps roots; I think it is truly relative for them in terms of the kind of force that they are shaping for the present and future. At times it has been Quantico, but at other times certainly the SWM and Cent America.

gian

John T. Fishel

12-31-2008, 03:15 AM

Gian--

Well, at least, I can drink it:D

JohnT

Bill Moore

12-31-2008, 04:10 AM

Posted by Gian,

The point that Wilf and I and others are making is that the notion as is literally stated that soldiers are diplomats is just simply folly. They are not, they are combat soldiers and as wilf has pointed out they need to be able to do the basic functions and skills of combat soldiers. If they can do that, then they can step into different directions to do coin, stability ops, nation building etc.

There are those among us who want to limit the definition of diplomat to one who practices diplomacy to facilitate relationships and agreements between nation-states. I know this will come as a surprise to many of you, but I think the definition is lacking (I know you heard this song from me before in regards to insurgency, etc., and I'm back on that soap box again, Ken couldn't bury it deep enough to keep me from finding it again :)).

This definition is fine for the State Department an organization, because as the name implies they conduct diplomacy between nation-"states". However, I think some of their young turks would agree with where I'm going with this argument. Diplomacy can't not be restricted to the protocols between nation-states (as though it ever could), because we're dealing not only with States but tribes, gangs, extended families, insurgent groups, militias and an assortment of other Stateless groups. Groups that I, and many of you, have dealt with over the years to develop relationships and work out agreements. That process is nothing less than diplomacy. I'm from one country, they're from another, and I'm working out our relationship and possibly agreements to better enable me to accomplish my mission.

Soldiers do this all over Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere in the world far from where most State Department diplomats tread. It is not folly that soldiers practice diplomacy, it is essential. However, I'll agree with you that not "all" Soldiers practice diplomacy, nor should they, but I believe Nagl was speaking to a group of graduating officers?

In support of this argument, I refer to Bob's World's post,

In those cases where armed opposition is encountered only from irregular forces under the leadership of malcontents or unrecognized officials, the mission is one of diplomacy rather than military.”

This was written before Gulala, so a tip of my beret to the Marines of our past who actually understood insurgent warfare quite well at one time.

In the conventional war, military action, seconded by diplomacy, propa-ganda, and economic pressure, is generally the principal way to achieve the goal. Politics as an instrument of war tends to take a back seat and emerges again—as an instrument—when the fighting ends . . . The picture is differ-ent in the revolutionary war. The objective being the population itself, the operations designed to win it over (for the insurgent) or to keep it at least submissive (for the counterinsurgent) are essentially of a political nature. In this case, consequently, political action remains foremost throughout the war. It is not enough for the government to set political goals, to determine how much military force is applicable, to enter into alliances, or to break them; politics becomes an active instrument of operation.And so intricate is the interplay between the political and the military actions that they cannot be tidily separated; on the contrary, every military move has to be weighed with regard to its political effects, and vice versa.—David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare

In the end we may disagree on the term diplomacy, but I don't know what else you would call it?

Ken White

12-31-2008, 04:45 AM

I didn't bury your soap box very well, left it partly visible so you could find it, I weakened three boards in the 'platform' with saw cuts and put a bear trap inside -- be careful how often and where you use that box... :D

There may be some here who restrict diplomacy to nation states but I'm not one of them -- the issue is not who our side talks to; tribes, clans, gangs, militias all need to be talked to. No question and I said that above.

The issue is who talks for our side. Or, more correctly who determines what will be said by our side

If you want the Armed Forces to engage in setting foreign policy and / or law enforcement policy; that's cool -- many will agree with you. I don't and I don't think the Constitution does.

The Politicians and the foreign Policy gurus need to determine, broadly WHAT is said. -- on a local level, certainly military folks will have to talk and they hopefully will do that diplomatically and IAW the policy laid down by our silly-villian masters -- but that ain't diplomacy. Diplomacy is not a military function. Conduct of relations diplomatically, yes -- conduct diplomacy? Not IMO.

It's being done now to an extent because the GeoCom CinCs are there but that needs to be changed and if everyone in the Army comes up with their own definition for diplomacy, then Congress will get more confused than it already is and the Army will be operating in a sphere that isn't their business...

You asked:
"In the end we may disagree on the term diplomacy, but I don't know what else you would call it?"Why do we have to disagree? I'm not at all sure we do. I'm merely saying that the civilian uberstructure sets the policy, the parameters of 'diplomacy' and the troops on the ground exercise that policy in the conduct of their relations and negotiations with locals of all kinds and they do that talking with tact and diplomatically. :cool:

William F. Owen

12-31-2008, 07:13 AM

There are those among us who want to limit the definition of diplomat to one who practices diplomacy to facilitate relationships and agreements between nation-states. I know this will come as a surprise to many of you, but I think the definition is lacking (I know you heard this song from me before in regards to insurgency, etc., and I'm back on that soap box again, Ken couldn't bury it deep enough to keep me from finding it again :)).

Well this one amongst you, does not think that you should limit the definition of diplomat to one who practices diplomacy to facilitate relationships and agreements between nation-states. No sir!

Soldiers should focus on soldiering. The skills needed to be a good/effective soldier will constantly change and evolve. I suggest that one of the abilities currently required is to restrict force in line with the campaign aims. That means greater discrimination, precision and proportionately.

It does not mean breaking bread and drinking tea with every owner of a mud hut who owns an AK, and asking how you can make his life better, because A, he might hold you to a promise you can't deliver, and B, it's not your job! - You may want to be break bread and drink tea to to gather intelligence, and convince him that you are the good guys. If he is starving, drop off a bag of rice and a tarp, to repair the roof of his hut which the tribe stole, but that's it.

The US Army need solid professional soldiers, not "warrior poets" in service of he post-modern COIN avant-garde.

MikeF

12-31-2008, 07:49 AM

In my earlier haste, I forgot to mention that this is a wonderful thread...Even though thoughts vary from John Nagl to Col Gentile, I find a bit of truth in each post...

As I sit gazing on the beauty of the Inter-Coastal waterway back in NC, sipping on a Pabst Blue Ribbon intermixed with a bit of sweet tea, and painting memories of seashells with my daughter, I'm gonna allow y'all's thoughts to simmer a bit more....

Happy New Years and please continue the debate for the sake of the disgruntled captains and majors that struggle day in and day out...

God bless us all...

Inshallah

Mike

Steve Blair

12-31-2008, 03:21 PM

I hadn't thought about Callwell in the way you suggest. Have to review him again with that in mind. I'm not entirely sure who I would put in the pantheon of Small Wars classics. Part of that depends on what aspect of Small Wars you are looking at. For Revolution, it's relatively easy - Mao clearly has a place. But for COIN - since Callwell and before my pal Max Manwaring - I'm not sure. Still, I particularly like Lansdale's memoir, In the Midst of Wars.

I guess I'm in good company with Sam Adams...;)

Cheers

JohnT

This is a difficult question because many of the great Army practitioners before WW 2 never wrote anything of value on their techniques. The SWM was to my mind intended to capture the tactical lessons of small wars (TTP as you suggest) and wasn't really a work of theory. Some was written during the 20s and 30s (Mars Learning goes into some of the writing in the Marine Corps Gazette and other journals that formed the background to the SWM), but prior to that it's very hard to find. Much of what successful commanders practiced during the Indian Wars, for example, was never really recorded (or became part of their own personal propaganda machines). My take on the SWM has always been that it was an attempt to prevent hard-learned lessons from fading away again. It was a tool, not a work of theory.

As for soldiers focusing on only being soldiers? Not always possible. Never has been, and most likely never will be. Why? Because each situation is fluid and ever-changing. One could even argue that the focus on just being soldiers led to the vacuum in planning that followed the fall of Baghdad. Soldiers don't plan for post-conflict, after all, because they aren't needed then.... And yes, I realize that's a bit of an exaggeration, but I'm doing it to make the point. Where we fall down is in the transition, and soldiers have to understand at least some of that to understand where their role either ends or is reduced. And by default, in some situations, soldiers do end up acting as diplomats (at least for a limited period of time). Ideal? No. Reality? Yes. Again, it doesn't mean that the Army can (or should) ever replace diplomats, but it does mean that they do need a basic grounding in some skills and ideas that might fall outside the "only soldiers" framework.

Bob's World

12-31-2008, 03:23 PM

________________________________________
In debating if soldiers are also diplomats or not, it may be helpful to rephrase the question and take a fresh perspective. Certainly in war the primary diplomacy waged by soldiers is that which is inherent in their very actions, and shaped by their values and conduct. In peace soldiers have a very different role, from Port Calls (proudly touted as security assistance by our Navy brothers) to FID, to even what is often called COIN. In these missions and environments the success of the engagement is very much shaped more by the diplomatic skills of the soldier in his interactions with the populace, security forces, and foreign officials, than by any martial acts conducted. For SF soldiers, this is bread and butter, and we are very good at it; always recognizing that we are guests, and that we can only be effective in passing on any unique skills we may possess when we can set our egos aside and embrace the people, the culture and the forces we engage with for what they are, and not what they are not.

Conventional forces are not particularly good at this. When I left 8 years of Regular Army service to attend law school, I joined the Oregon National Guard and was in on the ground floor of the "Enhanced Brigade" program. My former RA brethren descended on us in hordes, forcing us to literally expand the size of our TOCs to three times their normal size to be able to accommodate the unit's staff, an equal size team of "mentors", and another equal size team of "evaluators." My job was hard enough to go to law school full time and also serve as the operations officer for a light infantry battalion an hours drive away that only got the chance to train a couple days a month. To also have to tolerate a crush of arrogant a-holes who looked down their noses at you as being sadly inferior; while (depending on which team you were on) dishing out endless advice or judgment as to how what you were doing was not they way the did it in their last assignment with the 82nd. No kidding, guess what, my soldiers don't live on post. This was not the exception, this was the norm. I see this same syndrome overseas in similar engagement with foreign armies. I give our conventional forces a D- for diplomacy. They may be getting better with recent experience in Afghanistan and Iraq, but I doubt they have risen above a C.

So, yes, I share very real cautions about taking this "soldier-diplomat" thing too far, or expecting too much. Expect it of SF with little reservation, but as you get farther from that one unique slice of our force your concerns need to rise accordingly.

But the issue I wanted to raise is that where one draws the line between war and peace also determines how one is likely to see the appropriateness of this diplomacy mission. I believe that Wilf places that line in a very different place than I do, and sees soldiers primarily being used in war for purposes of war. Gian probably drops on to the scale near to Wilf, Ken White somewhere down from there, skip a ways to Bill Moore, and then to me. I'm not sure who is right, and listen to everyone's perspective in order to improve my own.

In peacetime engagement, and I believe the majority of our engagement is certainly in support of a US that is at peace, are rooted in diplomacy. As operations become more warlike this role becomes less the focus, but must never be completely forgotten. I just would not put to much expectation on our conventional forces to be great diplomats; it just isn't in the culture.

Steve Blair

12-31-2008, 04:00 PM

But the issue I wanted to raise is that where one draws the line between war and peace also determines how one is likely to see the appropriateness of this diplomacy mission. I believe that Wilf places that line in a very different place than I do, and sees soldiers primarily being used in war for purposes of war. Gian probably drops on to the scale near to Wilf, Ken White somewhere down from there, skip a ways to Bill Moore, and then to me. I'm not sure who is right, and listen to everyone's perspective in order to improve my own.

In peacetime engagement, and I believe the majority of our engagement is certainly in support of a US that is at peace, are rooted in diplomacy. As operations become more warlike this role becomes less the focus, but must never be completely forgotten. I just would not put to much expectation on our conventional forces to be great diplomats; it just isn't in the culture.

I don't think it's a question of who's right or wrong so much as it is understanding the practical role that the US military often finds itself in. Historically, officers have been called on to be de-facto diplomats with surprising regularity. Some were successful, some were not, and others muddled through until the real diplomats arrived. In most, if not all, cases these officers were not trained for those roles...it was just something they did because it went with the job. It also wasn't something that was necessarily planned by the political leadership. A great deal of it is situational.

It's fine to have a dream role for soldiers...where they sit in the corner quietly and only come out guns blazing when called for and then go back again as soon as the last bullet is fired. But reality isn't like that. I can understand the desire for it to be so, but do worry that when we get too focused on what we'd like to see we end up gutting ourselves for reality. Quite often the line between war and peace is only visible in hindsight, and even then not necessarily with stark clarity.

Should soldiers be diplomats? Not under ideal circumstances, but it's a good thing if they are at least aware that they might have to act in such a role in some situations. By the same token, we've seen what happens when diplomats try to play soldier.

Cavguy

12-31-2008, 04:12 PM

It's fine to have a dream role for soldiers...where they sit in the corner quietly and only come out guns blazing when called for and then go back again as soon as the last bullet is fired. But reality isn't like that. I can understand the desire for it to be so, but do worry that when we get too focused on what we'd like to see we end up gutting ourselves for reality. Quite often the line between war and peace is only visible in hindsight, and even then not necessarily with stark clarity.

Should soldiers be diplomats? Not under ideal circumstances, but it's a good thing if they are at least aware that they might have to act in such a role in some situations. By the same token, we've seen what happens when diplomats try to play soldier.

I almost responded to Wilf last night but was tired and cranky .... :D

Agree with you Steve. It may not be the ideal role, but sometimes it must be done, and often the only person with the availablity and resources to meet with 'every leader with an AK' is a soldier.

I, for one, think being a soldier is about winning. Sometimes winning means kicking people in the teeth. Sometimes it requires skilled application of synchronized combined arms maneuver. And other times it requires lots of tea drinking and civil tasks. But the bottom line task is to win.

We can tilt at windmills about what soldiers should or should not ideally be doing, but reality over the last 15-20 years for the US army is that we are employed as "armed diplomats". There is little to no political will to change that anywhere in the future, so soldiers will still be required to do "diplomat" like tasks.

For all the criticism, Nagl has a very salient point - we need to prepare our soldiers to win our CURRENT conflicts. To do this, they require better training on employment of lethal and non-lethal means, and especially skills on advising host nation forces. We can continue to stick our head in the sand and say we "don't do windows", or we can address the problem to give us a better chance of acheiving victory.

As a personal story, I took tons of grief from my soldiers in Tal Afar for the amount of local meals I ate and adopting the local habits - including the dreaded man kiss (cheek - I even worked my way up to the prestigious 4-kiss greet). However, those relations proved the basis of successful pacification of my sector, just as it later did for our BCT in Ramadi. It wasn't that we preferred, liked, or even should of been doing it - it was simply what was required if we wanted to have a chance at succeeding in our AO.

We should prepare our officers for these tasks until the policy-makers decide a better framework. The military's mission remains to succeed at whatever it is assigned to by the political leadership. Whatever skillsets are needed to accomplish those tasks are what should be trained.

I still contend we can, and must, do both.

Tom Odom

12-31-2008, 04:17 PM

We should prepare our officers for these tasks until the policy-makers decide a better framework. The military's mission remains to succeed at whatever it is assigned to by the political leadership. Whatever skillsets are needed to accomplish those tasks are what should be trained.

I still contend we can, and must, do both.

Great post, Niel!

Give us a kiss, :D

Tom

RTK

12-31-2008, 04:47 PM

It wasn't that we preferred, liked, or even should of been doing it - it was simply what was required if we wanted to have a chance at succeeding in our AO.

I'm no medic, fire support specialist, logistician, engineer (anymore), or mechanic, but I need some skill sets in those areas to be successful in my AO as well.

I'm not saying the Soldier shouldn't at least familiarize themselves with other skills sets that will make them better (we used to call this cross training), but they better be damned good with what they are supposed to do first.

ODB makes a great point, whether you're an SF ODA, a scout platoon, or a professional football team. Successful teams do the routine things routinely the correct way.

Basics and fundamentals are the core of what we do. Actions on contact don't change in a COIN environment from a tank-on-tank environment; they're the same four steps each time

1. Deploy and Report
2. Evaluate and develop the situation
3. Choose a COA
4. Execute the selected COA

I would submit the same basic methodology would work in a non-kinetic bilateral engagement at the shiek or local leader level.

Same goes for the IPB process when determining the areas IEDs will most likely be placed.

In terms of diplomacy, diplomatic status, or whatever the hell else we want to call it, I see it this way.

According to Webster's:

di·plo·ma·cy
Pronunciation: \də-ˈplō-mə-sē\
Function: noun
Date: 1796
1 : the art and practice of conducting negotiations between nations
2 : skill in handling affairs without arousing hostility : tact

I think what we're looking at is the second definition. The first, though I've seen it talked about above, doesn't really apply. Just because I make an agreement with the local shiek doesn't mean I've entered into the diplomatic stage of my career. Substituting "nation" with any other host of words doesn't foot the bill either and we need to be careful on what terms we sub in for "nation." Eventually we'll come all the way around and negotiating a good used car deal will include us in a host of diplomats.

I think what we're really talking about is the common sense approach to dealing with other people. The Golden Rule, as it were. What are the fundamental laws of human behavior and nature that we must follow keeping in mind the cultural differences between societies? What does the Law of Realistic Expectation say how the interaction, over a long period of time, will materialize. How do you deal logically with others (logical is a relative term as well, depending on the society) and what is the understanding of the culture and societal dos and don'ts? Given what I say to the local leader or what I do on patrol could and will influence the second and third order effects of how the locals deal with me in both the near and far term, I think this is what we really mean by "diplomacy."

Ken White

12-31-2008, 04:57 PM

Good job RTK. That one and your training critique mean you can have New Years Day off -- unless you've got the duty... ;)

William F. Owen

12-31-2008, 05:01 PM

As a personal story, I took tons of grief from my soldiers in Tal Afar for the amount of local meals I ate and adopting the local habits - including the dreaded man kiss (cheek - I even worked my way up to the prestigious 4-kiss greet). However, those relations proved the basis of successful pacification of my sector, just as it later did for our BCT in Ramadi. It wasn't that we preferred, liked, or even should of been doing it - it was simply what was required if we wanted to have a chance at succeeding in our AO.

...and none of that is in any way contrary to what I suggest. Yes, win by any means, but you are military and that means you job is to employ the military instrument. Armed Forces should use "armed force." To whit,

"those relations proved the basis of successful pacification of my sector,"

Pacification being the operative word. If you can achieve your MILITARY MISSION by drinking tea, then all to the good.

I am not against raising the bar for officer training and education. I am supportive of exactly the opposite, but that education has got to be relevant to the full spectrum of military tasks.

What I am implacably against the idea that best practice is to transform an Army into an "armed social work organisation," or "nation building organisation" that have to pick up the ball because the other instruments of Government power are broken, negligent, stupid or lazy.

Steve Blair

12-31-2008, 05:12 PM

What I am implacably against the idea that best practice is to transform an Army into an "armed social work organisation," or "nation building organisation" that have to pick up the ball because the other instruments of Government power are broken, negligent, stupid or lazy.

Not sure that the majority of us (and I know I don't) advocate such a change. But I'm also wary of the "it's not our problem...we just shoot" mentality. It would be nice if the world worked that way, but all too often it doesn't.

ODB

12-31-2008, 05:15 PM

I had to for my own sake dig out the trusty old Websters dictionary to see what it said a diplomat was.

Diplomat: one employed or skilled in diplomacy.

Could we be any broader? So then I went up one word to diplomacy.

Diplomacy: 1. the art and practice of conducting negotiations between nations 2. TACT

Finally I looked up tact.

Tact: a keen sense of what to do or say to keep good relations with others

I didn't post these to insult anyone. The point I'm getting to is that in the sense diplomacy is tact then yes soldiers are diplomats. When soldiers start getting into negotiations then we are wrong, minus those who have this skill set. I think some of the problem is in the broadness of the terms soldier and diplomat/diplomacy. When one gets down in the weeds then we can start to see the relevance of both.

IMO soldiers at all levels need to be tactful, therefore diplomats, but hard lines need to be drawn when it comes to soldiers conducting negotiations and therefore being diplomats in this sense.

Simplier way would be to say all soldiers need to be tactful. Then figure out at what levels or who as soldiers need to be negotiators?

RTK can type and research faster than I, looks like I need some work on the basics.

RTK

12-31-2008, 05:19 PM

;)
I had to for my own sake dig out the trusty old Websters dictionary to see what it said a diplomat was.

Diplomat: one employed or skilled in diplomacy.

Could we be any broader? So then I went up one word to diplomacy.

Diplomacy: 1. the art and practice of conducting negotiations between nations 2. TACT

Finally I looked up tact.

Tact: a keen sense of what to do or say to keep good relations with others

I didn't post these to insult anyone. The point I'm getting to is that in the sense diplomacy is tact then yes soldiers are diplomats. When soldiers start getting into negotiations then we are wrong, minus those who have this skill set. I think some of the problem is in the broadness of the terms soldier and diplomat/diplomacy. When one gets down in the weeds then we can start to see the relevance of both.

IMO soldiers at all levels need to be tactful, therefore diplomats, but hard lines need to be drawn when it comes to soldiers conducting negotiations and therefore being diplomats in this sense.

Simplier way would be to say all soldiers need to be tactful. Then figure out at what levels or who as soldiers need to be negotiators?

RTK can type and research faster than I, looks like I need some work on the basics.

ODB: I like you. You need to post more.:D

Ken: My only duty these last two weeks has been to grow out a beard and sit on my duff watching football. I may have to come in "on my own time" tomorrow.

Cavguy

12-31-2008, 05:26 PM

IMO soldiers at all levels need to be tactful, therefore diplomats, but hard lines need to be drawn when it comes to soldiers conducting negotiations and therefore being diplomats in this sense.

No disagreement in the ideal - but - what do you do as a military member when negotiations with local leaders are required and there are no civil reps available?

That is the crux of the problem. Hell, we couldn't get the PRT out of Mosul to come to Tal Afar or Ramadi. A good recent article cited USAID was hampered because it wasn't allowed to leave Kabul. Things have gotten better in Iraq but I doubt many COPs in A-Stan have access to a DoS rep when needing to negotiate with a local leader. And until DoS enters the chain of command it's kind of like the famous observation about the Pope - "How many divisions does he have?" Local leaders know who has the power, and deal with those who have real power.

The task for the forseeable future in the current conflicts falls to the military. Whether we should do it or are the ideal organization is irrelevant. Civil capacity (if ever developed/funded) is one or more decades away. So in the meantime, I argue we must prepare our soldiers to succeed in the environment they face. If this means "not my lane" tasks, then so be it.

I just fundamentally disagree with those who say the military shouldn't train this because it shouldn't be their mission. As long as political masters keep us engaged in such conflicts and refuse to transform the civilian establishment to meet those demands, the military would be negligent and irresponsible not to prepare its officers and NCO's in command positions for such challenges.

I will happily hand this over to DoS when we create more foreign service officers than the Army has Soldiers in its bands, or the political leadership takes the task away. The military serves the state and is expected to win. Therefore, we must do whatever it takes to win, even if it's a non-military task.

Steve Blair

12-31-2008, 05:34 PM

No disagreement in the ideal - but - what do you do as a military member when negotiations with local leaders are required and there are no civil reps available?

That is the crux of the problem. Hell, we couldn't get the PRT out of Mosul to come to Tal Afar or Ramadi. A good recent article cited USAID was hampered because it wasn't allowed to leave Kabul. Things have gotten better in Iraq but I doubt many COPs in A-Stan have access to a DoS rep when needing to negotiate with a local leader. And until DoS enters the chain of command it's kind of like the famous observation about the Pope - "How many divisions does he have?" Local leaders know who has the power, and deal with those who have real power.

The task for the forseeable future in the current conflicts falls to the military. Whether we should do it or are the ideal organization is irrelevant. Civil capacity (if ever developed/funded) is one or more decades away. So in the meantime, I argue we must prepare our soldiers to succeed in the environment they face. If this means "not my lane" tasks, then so be it.

I just fundamentally disagree with those who say the military shouldn't train this because it shouldn't be their mission. As long as political masters keep us engaged in such conflicts and refuse to transform the civilian establishment to meet those demands, the military would be negligent and irresponsible not to prepare its officers and NCO's in command positions for such challenges.

I will happily hand this over to DoS when we create more foreign service officers than the Army has Soldiers in its bands.

I'd only add that this isn't just restricted to our current conflicts...it's been around for the majority of the Army's existence. It's easily forgotten that Army officers were for a time the first government representatives to contact foreign national groups (the Native tribes). I will agree that for many years this was more a Navy thing, but it was still an historical reality.

Tact, diplomacy...call it what you will (and I'm also the first to admit that there is a difference between inter-government Diplomacy and the lower-level stuff that most officers and some NCOs will be faced with...but the local level will always be with us unless Sate gets MUCH bigger or we stop sending anyone outside of CONUS). The fact remains that in many places the military IS the face of the US government that many will see first (right or wrong) and we need to be prepared to deal with that.

Sometimes I think we spent so much time preparing for a war that never came that we lost sight of what we'd really been doing before and were being called on to do "on the cheap," as it were.

ODB

12-31-2008, 05:34 PM

No disagreement in the ideal - but - what do you do as a military member when negotiations with local leaders are required and there are no civil reps available?

That is the crux of the problem. Hell, we couldn't get the PRT out of Mosul to come to Tal Afar or Ramadi. A good recent article cited USAID was hampered because it wasn't allowed to leave Kabul. Things have gotten better in Iraq but I doubt many COPs in A-Stan have access to a DoS rep when needing to negotiate with a local leader. And until DoS enters the chain of command it's kind of like the famous observation about the Pope - "How many divisions does he have?" Local leaders know who has the power, and deal with those who have real power.

The task for the forseeable future in the current conflicts falls to the military. Whether we should do it or are the ideal organization is irrelevant. Civil capacity (if ever developed/funded) is one or more decades away. So in the meantime, I argue we must prepare our soldiers to succeed in the environment they face. If this means "not my lane" tasks, then so be it.

I just fundamentally disagree with those who say the military shouldn't train this because it shouldn't be their mission. As long as political masters keep us engaged in such conflicts and refuse to transform the civilian establishment to meet those demands, the military would be negligent and irresponsible not to prepare its officers and NCO's in command positions for such challenges.

I will happily hand this over to DoS when we create more foreign service officers than the Army has Soldiers in its bands, or the political leadership takes the task away. The military serves the state and is expected to win. Therefore, we must do whatever it takes to win, even if it's a non-military task.

That is why I submit to get at the heart of the problem we as an Army need to decide who as soldiers and at what level need to be able to conduct negotiations. That I don't know at this point, I have my thoughts and ideas but then again we all do and that is how we get in these messes.

I know the right answer is make the Washingtonites get off their collective asses and do what they are paid to do. If I work for any gov't agency/department and I'm in theatre well guess what moving around country facing the dangers are the risk inherent to my job. They need to get over it as do some of our own when it comes to this. Force them to do their job. We need to stop feeding the machine what we think it wants to hear and feed it what it needs to hear. Sorry for the rant there, but got refocus the other day. Talking with a buddy and told him I was going to stop bitching about many issues because it wasn't helping, he told me when they don't wanna listen talk louder!

Tom Odom

12-31-2008, 05:42 PM

We we train it here via street level engagements and more formal senior engagements.

Stan did it on the ground in Goma in 4-way formal negotiations between the the USJTF, the USAF (a foreign power :D), the Zairians, and the French

Steve has it. Nothing in my study of history or experiences in the ground suggests that nice, neat definitions reflect operational necessity.

Tom

Ken White

12-31-2008, 05:45 PM

No disagreement in the ideal - but - what do you do as a military member when negotiations with local leaders are required and there are no civil reps available?

That is the crux of the problem...Local leaders know who has the power, and deal with those who have real power.Seems to me that everyone commenting on the thread has acknowledged that to one degree or another.
The task for the forseeable future in the current conflicts falls to the military. Whether we should do it or are the ideal organization is irrelevant. Civil capacity (if ever developed/funded) is one or more decades away. So in the meantime, I argue we must prepare our soldiers to succeed in the environment they face. If this means "not my lane" tasks, then so be it.I think the disconnect is here -- I see no one disagreeing with any of that paragraph but several have implied that such disagreement exists. The issue is, I think two fold:

(1) Who should set the parameters for the positions taken by members of the Armed forces in dealing with local entities of what ever kind. Wilf, Gian and I say it should be the civilian politicians to whom the Armed Forces in democratic nations are responsible but all acknowledge that actions on the ground may lead to occasional military precedence in setting such policy. Occasional is totally understandable and acceptable; constant OTOH is not a good idea...

(2) Our training is not as good as it should be; Most of us seeming disagreeable types including ODB and RTK agree that some training in the areas of human relations, culture (du jour) and US policy is not only desirable but necessary. What we want is better training on ALL the basics principally on the combat functions core requirements but certainly including those things. I, for one have said that we should never have stopped doing that (we did it pretty well from the early 60s to 75).

Thus, I don't think anyone disagrees with you on this:
I just fundamentally disagree with those who say the military shouldn't train this because it shouldn't be their mission...Or this:
I will happily hand this over to DoS when we create more foreign service officers than the Army has Soldiers in its bands, or the political leadership takes the task away. The military serves the state and is expected to win. Therefore, we must do whatever it takes to win, even if it's a non-military task.

Steve Blair posted this while I was pecking:
"Tact, diplomacy...call it what you will (and I'm also the first to admit that there is a difference between inter-government Diplomacy and the lower-level stuff that most officers and some NCOs will be faced with...but the local level will always be with us unless Sate gets MUCH bigger or we stop sending anyone outside of CONUS). The fact remains that in many places the military IS the face of the US government that many will see first (right or wrong) and we need to be prepared to deal with that.I suggest that is a great encapsulation of what ALL of us on this thread have been saying. As the Bishop said to the Actress, "We aren't arguing over what you are; we're haggling about the price."

reed11b

12-31-2008, 05:49 PM

Embedded DoS workers when situation calls for it? I wonder if the apparatus for this could be hashed out and how much veto power would DOS liaison and the AO commander have over each other? Relates back to the DOS vs. DOD region differences thread. I would like to see the concept of DoS military liaisons go forward, 1) to help the DOD remember that it has to plan for the end of hostilities prior to the end of hostilities and 2) to increase the DoS level of real world experience in an effective and rapid manner.
Reed
P.S. The art of diplomacy is regional IMHO, and not a defined skill set, so generalist training in it for officers is only going to detract from core competencies for minimal benefit. Training for the region being deployed too as part of the train up makes a great deal of sense, but do we not already attempt to do this as much as possible?
P.S.S. Must learn to type faster, Not sure any of my comments are relevent after Kens last post.

William F. Owen

12-31-2008, 06:57 PM

I just fundamentally disagree with those who say the military shouldn't train this because it shouldn't be their mission. As long as political masters keep us engaged in such conflicts and refuse to transform the civilian establishment to meet those demands, the military would be negligent and irresponsible not to prepare its officers and NCO's in command positions for such challenges.

OK, I an accept that, but what I orginally took issue with was Nagl's statement,

Your nation needs you to be a diplomat as well as a warrior, because we can’t kill or capture our way to success in this fight; victory comes from building local institutions that can stand on their own. But your nation also needs you to tell us what you need to fight your fight better, to build an Army that is truly a learning institution able to defeat adaptive insurgent enemies.

Operational success is gained by protecting the civilian population, and that may well mean killing or capturing. It did in Malaya, Kenya, Aden and Cyprus.

The US Army should not be made to have a raison d'etre as being a force to build "local institutions."

...and bearing in mind what the US Army has achieved in 6 years compared to what the UK managed in Malaya in the same time span, the US Army is clearly a learning organisation. What ever the US Army is doing right now, seems to be working.

Now to clarify. I have no Axe to Grind with John Nagl in particular. The Ax I am grinding here is with the "transformation of War" crowd who are pedalling an ill-conceived agenda to restrict military force into irrelevance, and take will some day take it off the table as an instrument of policy. There are no new and better ways of war. There are simply the ones we know work. They are mostly bloody, cruel and violent, and history is an excellent guide, correctly read.

"Rounds Complete. Guns to rest. Mission ends. Will establish comms on the schedule."

Ron Humphrey

12-31-2008, 10:12 PM

The US Army should not be made to have a raison d'etre as being a force to build "local institutions."

...and bearing in mind what the US Army has achieved in 6 years compared to what the UK managed in Malaya in the same time span, the US Army is clearly a learning organisation. What ever the US Army is doing right now, seems to be working.

Although as I think I have stated before I think I agree with your premise that War is War and the only real differences are to be found in the approach to fighting one, I'm not sure I can buy the concern that choosing to fight less / diplo more(in the most general and tactful sense) necessarily leads one down the road to eradication of need for a fighting force. Consider that in order to create and maintain any kind of norm amongst populace whether it be foreign or domestic there must be sufficient capability to enforce said norms otherwise the requirements are actually a moot point.

IMHO the same goes for fighting, if there is not a set of requirements that one is fighting to attain then exactly what purpose does the conflict actually seek to fulfill. Call it what you will (*cause, laws, tradition, faith, fiction, folly) there is always a guiding premise to why war happens and as such it does seem important to focus at least minimally on those things which have less to do with what your fighting and more to do with why.

I might propose that the reason Israel is involved in Gaza right now has more to do with the fact that the other countries around it choose to leave the burden of dealing with those who represent at least as great a threat to themselves more because its easier politically for them to do so and not because they support groups such as Hamas and or Hezbollah. As such is it not important for a party such as the US to learn to explain to others in a somewhat tactful but forceful manner that they don't get to sit it out if they truly want to become a part of the greater global community in any form other than simply word.

Now to clarify. I have no Axe to Grind with John Nagl in particular. The Ax I am grinding here is with the "transformation of War" crowd who are pedalling an ill-conceived agenda to restrict military force into irrelevance, and take will some day take it off the table as an instrument of policy. There are no new and better ways of war. There are simply the ones we know work. They are mostly bloody, cruel and violent, and history is an excellent guide, correctly read.

"Rounds Complete. Guns to rest. Mission ends. Will establish comms on the schedule."

It would seem that in order to get the kind of conversations needed to take place at the political level a certain level of discourse which would of course be uncomfortable for those who focus on the how to's of battle itself. That would be do to the fact that a majority of those who actually make the decision of when and where you fight have not actually had to fight for much more than financing and political recognition. This is not said not to denigrate them but rather in helping to equate the understandings they have with your own. Nagl and others have gotten the goat of many within the defense community but it may be more important to see what kind of effect their messages have had on those within the political structure and accept that maybe just maybe in the end it might not have been such a bad thing.

I completely agree with you in that wars don't really ever change, people on the other hand just might, and that is something which I'm afraid we tend to forget way to often.

Ken White

12-31-2008, 10:27 PM

...Nagl and others have gotten the goat of many within the defense community but it may be more important to see what kind of effect their messages have had on those within the political structure and accept that maybe just maybe in the end it might not have been such a bad thing.Sigh. History says you have a good idealistic view that will sadly go unrewarded...
...people on the other hand just might, and that is something which I'm afraid we tend to forget way to often.Sigh again. See my previous comment. :wry:

Ron Humphrey

12-31-2008, 11:18 PM

Sigh. History says you have a good idealistic view that will sadly go unrewarded...Sigh again. See my previous comment. :wry:

As always greatly appreciate the reminder that more often than not life doesn't quite go the way we think it should. And as I have found growing up many of those same things my parents had to rain on my parade about I now tend to do the same to my own. That said I do enjoy the fact that at least for now I still get to believe that things can be better. At some point I'll have to be the curmudgeon; but not quite yet:wry:

Just a side note though, when I was young I remember a president who pointed out that the very fact we seek to make things "better" is where we draw our greatest strengths from. Seems to me that trying to make things better isn't quite the guaranteed failure we usually think it will be.

In the last two hundred years we have been through periods where multiple groups of people were treated as less than others. Tradition, cultures etc stood in the way of moving past that yet we did. As of next month we will have someone representative of just one of those groups become the president and all indications are thats taking place because a large enough group of people thought there can be something better and voted accordingly. The curmudgeon in me might say they most likely will be sorely mistaken in their expectations but in all honesty I hope not. Thus continual efforts made to ensure thats not the case.

Just never been able to accept not doing something simply due to the fact it probably won't work. Kinda like the saying -
You'll never win the lottery if you never buy a ticket.

Thank you though I don't know if you know how much the wisdom of your years is appreciated by those of us who seek to learn rather than just know:D

Bill Moore

12-31-2008, 11:31 PM

Cavguy,

Thanks for your post. Until you stated the obvious I thought I was blogging with aliens (or worse my old SWJ friends were replaced by aliens! Remember the old science fiction movie where the aliens placed a pod next to the victims bed at night, and the pod would replicate the person? It was classic, and I know it relates to IW somehow).

The bottom line is that State doesn't have the capacity, so forget about what should be, and lets deal with reality. Problems have to be solved, sometimes significant problems that are more political in nature than military, and we're frequently the only ones the local populace will turn to, and we often "want" to be the only ones the people will turn to (note that when I say we, that can mean U.S. forces or the HN forces we're supporting, whoever we want to win). If we don't fill this void, then someone else will, and it won't be DoS. In Afghanistan it may very well be the Taliban.

ODB, the military isn't wrong when it conducts negotiations. The requirement to be able to negotiate has long been recognized in the Special Operations community, and SWC (the Army SOF schoolhouse) has open source lesson plans and video courses on how to conduct negotiations. Negotiation may be a specified or implied task depending on the situation. In smaller scale operations like the OEF-Philippines and when I participated in JTF Liberia, DoS conducted the effective diplomacy, just the way we would like to see everywhere, but in more remote, or larger scale problems, or in extremely hostile situations the military may have to do it. Fortunately, in Special Forces we generally don't have guys who say, "not my job man", if it needs doing, we'll do it. After a slow start effective conventional force leaders came to the same realization.

I think we're agreeing more than disagreeing. Irregular Warfare (like the term or not) is largely political in nature at the local level, not just at the nation-state level. I agree with Bob's World post in one of the forums, where he said that the issues we're dealing with are the result of failed foreign policy (failed diplomacy). While I don't think the problems' origins are confined to failed foreign policy (let's face it, the HN owns 95% or more of the responsibility for failing, we don't need to own that guilt), the point is still valid in that what they and we were doing at the political level obviously failed. Once you have a broken society, political system (Iraq, Afghanistan) do you fix it from the top down or bottom up?

You'll be able to answer that one when you can tell me what the sound of one hand clapping is:D. Have a Happy New Years.

Bill

Ken White

01-01-2009, 12:21 AM

Ron: No intent to temper idealism, after all that turtle wouldn't get anywhere unless he stuck out his neck a bit. Just a caution to remember that politicians have short attention spans and memories and are prone to try to reinvent wheels and that doing it right is not generally one of their priorities... ;)

Bill:
"I think we're agreeing more than disagreeing."Oh man. Me, too.
"Once you have a broken society, political system (Iraq, Afghanistan) do you fix it from the top down or bottom up? "Neither. You just hold the window open while they either fix it or don't and you better be prepared for either result.

ODB

01-01-2009, 02:32 AM

RTK

01-01-2009, 02:55 AM

Seems to me that really what we are all saying in our own ways is that we are failing in our training.

With that said how do we fix it? Who do we train and when?

Where is it taught? Is it something added to all advance courses (NCO and Officer)? Or is it done earlier on?

Then when do we revisit that training, part of pre-deployment preparations along with everything else that we are required to suck down?

Do we turn it into it's own course that conducts MTTs?

Have to be honest the few hours I got at SWCS was not enough, felt it should have been more indepth. But then again the senarios training later on really paid off. Definately not something easily trained in death by powerpoint.

At Armor BOLC III training management is given a 1 hour block. It is essentially a "how-do-I-read-chapter-5-of-an-ARTEP" class. I go over training schedules, the platoon leader's role as a participant in sergeant's time training ("you mean my Soldiers can teach me stuff too?"), and what the PLs responsibilities to supporting the troop/company METL are in terms of collaboratively planning and providing guidance to his NCOs the focus on individual, crew, section, and platoon tasks.

Essentially, all the things I bitched about in the earlier post I address as talking points to get it into their minds and adjust our azimuth at the lower levels (my own private insurgency). :D

1 hour is not enough. The bag is full, however, and I don't know where else to cram it.

Training management was not taught at the Captains Career Course 2 years ago. I seriously doubt they're teaching it now. Jon Slack may have info regarding that one.

My NCOs that have recently come back from BNCOC/ANCOC who said there was very little regarding training management at the platoon level.

Gian P Gentile

01-01-2009, 03:04 AM

I wish some of you coindinistas (I use that term intentionally here to make my following point) would stop throwing these silly little catechisms in our faces. You know things like

"you dont get to pick the war you want to fight," or

"you are not going to kill your way out of this one," or

"in coin politics infuses actions to the lowest levels" or

"in coin man, you cant say 'not my lane," or

"when I was in coin i ate fish and man-kissed with sheiks because I realized what I was doing was inherently political,"

(and when we question calls for “diplomacy” we are not the new millennium’s Emory Uptons who are telling our political masters how and when they can use us!!)

My point is that in this thread to try to sum up and the fact that many of us have done coin at the business end with combat soldiers we get all of the political, nation building stuff; the thing of being respectful, of negotiations by certain levels of leaders with locals. Got It!! Did it!! So Ken White in the Nam ate rice with farmers and me and Big Rob Thornton in the Bdad ate kbobs with sheiks or Iraqi Army colonels!!!

What we are saying, I think, is that for this coin stuff to happen by combat forces first and foremost they must be just that: combat forces, trained, organized and deployed as such. To start throwing catchy words like diplomacy as a potential skill that combat soldiers must have, many of us took a step back and worried about what that actually means on the ground in terms of training, priorities and functions. Does a captain at a cop in the Korengal need to be able to talk, negotiate, bla, bla, bla with the locals? Well yes sure a big duh he does. But does that same concept before that young captain’s company ever gets to the Korengal from Fort Drum, Pendleton, Fort Benning, etc play itself out by meaning that instead of going to the shoot-house for a month it gets classes from the local community college on conflict resolution? See what I am getting at, and I think this is in line with RTK’s concern too.

gian

ODB

01-01-2009, 03:25 AM

Where do we fit it in? What do we get rid of? I know we already try to cram everything possible in the shortest time possible. I just don't know what the answer is. I put myself in both shoes as the trainer and the student. We all know when we are the student we sit there and think why are they teaching me this? I have better things to do with my time. As the instructor we think I don't have enough time to train them on this. Can we ever get there, I do not know, I like to think we can.

I personally think we spend entirely too much time on yearly, quarterly redundant training. My pet peeves are the quarterly POSH training, the yearly safety training, terrorism level 1 training....etc. I just think there are more important things our soldiers need to be spending there time doing. IMO many of things would go away if we held individuals responsible for their actions, hold their feet to the fire. Hey troop why did you smack her on the ass? Sir I didn't know it was wrong no one trained me on it in the last 3 months. I mean come on..... Sorry to have digressed a bit, just seems to me we are wasting a lot of time on things that do not need to take up such a large percentage of our time.

On the advance course stuff, I know some years ago there was talk of integrating officer and enlisted during points of the course, did this come about? Thought it a good idea on the surface but never heard anything other than that. As some may know from my other posts I'm a big advocate of cross training across the Army. We need more integration on the training levels. Additionally in my experiences with most courses I come away having learned more from my peers than the school house. If only we could get our schoolhouse to adapt like we are on the ground. How can we not streamline this system as well? In the world of technology we have become an Army that does less and less face to face interactions and everything needs to be in pretty little spreadsheets and powerpoint presentations to get anywhere. Sorry but I just simply do not understand why changes take so long in the school house. Years ago when I attended BNCOC they were still teaching how to zero previous generation equipment. At least I had a fairly smart SGL (Small Group Leader) that let us revamp the classes we were teaching. Had a buddy of mine from 1/75 that we rewrote every class we taught. We threw out the classes that were created and started over. I cannot speak for things on the officer side, but on the NCO side of the house I do not see why this cannot be the norm in professional development courses. Upon arrival you are given the subject of the classes you are going to teach and you create and teach them. Might keep us up to date. I understand the cadre need to oversee the products being created to ensure all key points are covered, but this accomplishes many things.

Again I apologize for digressing off subject, do not mean to hijack the thread, just think that most agree we need to address "Diplomat Training" in the Army, but when and where and to who?

RTK pm enroute

Ken White

01-01-2009, 03:35 AM

Bill Moore said:
Max161 posted a RAND article somewhere in SWJ that addressed the reasons that the Army failed to use the existing COIN doctrine during the Vietnam War. In short, it stated that the information was available, but it was rejected. Seems the problem is more related to professional culture and organization. As you have stated elsewhere leadership can be decisive. If it is important to the leaders, then it will generally happen. Then again the RAND study said that GEN Abrams couldn't get his subordinate commanders to toe the line in some cases. He told them to focus on the populace, and they still did everything possible to up their body counts.There are three problems with RANDs conclusions. The methodology wasn't rejected, it was ignored by the MACV staff which was more interested in metrics ans a tidy battlefield than in the COIN effort; it was rejected by some -- not all -- commanders who were into ticket punching and thought body counts were the way to go for more merit badges; it did not point out what I'm trying to point out with this post:

We pay lip service to train as you will fight and we don't do it. We pay lip service to first class training and we don't provide it. Our failures in training affect the way we operate.

Based on what I've seen over the last 60 years (sheesh... :( ) then and now, the way we minimally train those entering service is the culprit. In my observation, the average over all those years, 1948 to 2008 is that it takes about three peacetime years of IET / OBC and unit 'training' to produce a pretty competent Private / Specialist / Lance corporal or company grade officer. Introduction to a harsh combat situation will cut that time by 75%, to a less harsh situation (Afghanistan, Iraq or Viet Nam like) will cut it by about 40-60+% dependent on many factors. I think that's unacceptable.

If we train newly entering enlisted people and officers to full basic competency and demand excellent performance, they will perform better, casualties will be lower, retention will be higher and those inclined to be slothful and irresponsible will seek other employment.

We insist we can only afford to train people for their 'next assignment.' We have done that for years at a cost of high casualties until combat experience kicks in, mediocre retention rates and an abysmal failure to acknowledge that the Armed forces are not Acme Industries -- there. the cost of inferior training and education is busted widgets and a tax write off -- in the Armed forces, the cost is an unnecessarily high casualty rate. I submit we should train everyone for two levels ABOVE their next assignment.

That applies also to PME. It amazed me when I was an instructor at the Armor School that POIs for BNCOC and ANCOC differed very little. Going up a notch, the POIs for the OBC and the OAC differed not a great deal more. Give that some thought. As RTK says above that still seems to be pretty much the case. Some things don't change. Thirty years later and no change -- if that doesn't scare you folks, it should.

My contention -- and I base this on two major short notice deployments with units to combat in two different wars -- is that if the unit is good at the basics, a major trainup is not required so all this pre-deployment training can be task focussed and not back to basics. I was recently in Atlanta and I got a look at the latest FORSCOM pre-deployment training guidance. It is embarrassing. it is a litany of every conceivable training requirement for both theaters for everything from CSS to combat aviation and back again, I do not recall the page count but it was huge -- it was NOT training guidance; it was a CYA effort so they could say "Well, we told them to train on it." Bureaucratic idiocy.

Yeah, training is the problem -- and as RTK pointed out yesterday, the new overfull and unimaginative FM 7-0 is not going to fix it.

Extremely long winded way of agreeing with ODB; we are failing in our training, it needs to be fixed starting with IET / OBC and worked upward through PME. MTTs and pre-deplyment training are NOT the answer. Neither are the CTCs (Sorry, Tom and others ;( ). They are great training but no one seems to pick up on the lessons learned at them -- same problem as MTTs, it's a canned solution. Try free play and see how that works... ;)

Yeah, I know, I've heard it -- that may omit some required training evolutions and graded efforts; we can't afford the infrastructure to do that with a degree of control. Umm, free play and control are a contradiction in terms... :D

No intent to pick on anyone or the CTCs who do provide a valuable training environment -- I just get awfully frustrated by the lack of initiative, imagination, logic and willingness to accept 'risk' in our training. We breed bad habits inadvertently. Good units can turn that around with a lot of work -- they should not have to do that.

Ski

01-01-2009, 04:01 PM

Ken White

01-01-2009, 04:42 PM

The FORSCOM pre-deployment training "guidance" is near criminal. It's a CYA document that continues the shameful practice of stripping command authority, personal expertise and command responsibility so the higher command can have a physical document handy that acts as a get out of jail free card in case a unit gets mauled in theater.True dat.

The terrible thing is that approach to Command and Command Guidance effectively ropes in subordinate commanders to a host of rules that emascualte them (well, some of them...) and the compensatory factor is an allowance to do some few things with no guidance. We've got it backwards.

For example, much has been written about the problems with Divisional level hand overs in both theaters; such a transition always seems to result in a steep learning curve and many early errors. Thus, freedom to handle transition anyway you want is proffered but actual operations are constrained by a host of rules -- many arcane and unnneccessary (but protective of reputations and the institution...).
FM 7-0 is another waste of trees, similar to FM 3-0 and FM 3-24. A few good points, mostly filler.Equally true. All are way too wordy (so am I but then, i'm old ;) ) and 3-0 in particular didn't really have enough changes from the previous version to merit publication.
The entire issue with training comes down to two very simple problems and I don't have any great solutions at the ready:

1. Training management is a dying if not dead art...We're so focused on deployment related training and activities because of ARFORGEN that we often disguise or conviently gloss over certain training...Appears to be true to this observer and echoes some errors experienced by me in the past. The primary job of every officer and NCO is training of subordinates; they'll spend more time doing that than they will directing combat operations. That priority is not reflected in our training.

A secondary problem is the ARFORGEN process itself. I believe that needs a really critical look, followed by destruction, followed by a logical, simpler, less bureaucratic approach.
2. There is not enough time to train on both COIN and conventional tasks in this environment.[quote]That's why the ARFORGEN process is broken. an added problem is all the 'mandatory' training, much of which is simply time wasted so someone can check a block -- shades of the atrocious FORSCOM guidance.[quote]BRAC is also going to accentuate this problem by jamming more units into mega-bases with finite ranges, training areas and simulators.Many of which mega bases are located in areas where the environmental and anti-war types will challenge everything and slowly degrade capability. That happens when the Bean Counters instead of Operators and Trainers are allowed to determine which Base where gets to stay -- with an eye on which Congressional delegation has the most clout. :(

Congress's politicking adversely impacts more than just big ticket equipment buys and degraded training. The US Congress has over the years been responsible for more US combat deaths than they should be comfortable with... :mad:
...We'll continue to try and meet unrealistic training goals, and we'll half ass our way to being mediocre and hope that no major problems occur on our deployments.It is, unfortunately, apparently the American way...
Just like we're continuing to relearn lessons from Vietnam, we will have to relearn such basics of training management when the OPTEMPO decreases.But Ski, you don't understand! We're smarter now, far better educated -- we don't have to pay attention to what any of our predecessors did. We can and should easily reinvent all the wheels, particularly the square ones... :wry:

Bill Moore

01-01-2009, 07:26 PM

In my early years we had limited money, at least until President Reagan was able to get the money flowing again, and SOCOM came on line, but it "seemed" that we trained more, and in many ways trained more effectively. We had training distractions then, but not to the extent that we do now. The training was less structured then, so there was more "time" for mentoring, which is when the real learning takes place. That also meant that leaders were being more effectively developed. Everything today seems so rushed, and this condition is not just a post 9/11 condition, it started in the 90s. I hate the term training management, because training management today is now driven my red, amber green dots on power point slides. Simply conducting mandated training does not make it effective training, and while we're supposed to train to standard our current management system doesn't allow that flexibility. We have idiots who think that the training schedule is the Holy Bible, and if you need to need to change it based on discovering a weakness in your organization, then you're obviously a poor manager. We give lip service to good training, but it does seem to be a lost art. One of the few things we did right is stand up the national training centers, and while I haven't been through a NTC rotation since 9/11, back in the day they were excellent training, and I hope they still are. But that doesn't make up for the loss of our day to day training. We have a mind set in many units that if you have green dots across the board, then we must be ready for war. That analysis is power point deep, and while it may sound absurd to blame a software product, powerpoint has fundamentally changed the way we manage training and other things in DoD for the worse. I would love to see a study on how the Army functioned prior to power point and harvard graphics, and what happened to it since then. We now live for the brief. Commanders need to observe more training, and spend less time in briefs. Talk to the troops, they'll tell you if they're confident.

To some degree we need a check the block mentality, but it is way over done. If we did all the non-combat related training that the Army mandated (often coming down from Congress) ranging from annual sexual harassment, drug abuse, gangs and tatoos, family support group stuff, briefs and more briefs, human rights training, etc., we wouldn't get any training combat accomplished. Why we have to conduct these events annually is beyond me, but once it becomes a requirement on the books, then it never goes away. Gian's post makes sense, because we are challenged to find the time we need. The reality is we need to train on both clearing houses and conflict resolution. The reality is that we frequently don't have time.

Someone mentioned that they wanted to bring back the Army Common Task training to Special Forces. Having lived through that whole cycle of stupidity that is the last thing we need. If Team Sergeants can't figure out what Army common tasks are relevant and how to train to them in a "realistic" manner, then they need to be fired. We used to get this laundry list of 10 tasks from higher that everyone needed to know, and somehow that was one of our metrics for effective training? If it wasn't related to your mission it was a waste of time period. Furthermore, the Army has adapted much of SF's training methodology from instinctive shooting to advanced medical treatment because when the bullets started flying it soon became apparent that a 30 minute block of instruction on how to apply a pressure dressing was a waste of time. If you can't teach that in 5 minutes, then something is seriously wrong. Instead of focusing on what is key, we used to focus on the type of knot, ensuring no white was showing on the bandage etc., things that had absolutely no functional value whatsoever to stopping the bleeding, saving a life. That is training management in the Army, and fortunately we have been drifting away from that mindset. Unfortunately it took a war to wake everyone up. When the Vietnam Vets said it was a waste of time, no one wanted to listen.

Hey my first rant for 2009. A case of beer.

Ken White

01-01-2009, 08:12 PM

Only one minor caveat. You said:

To some degree we need a check the block mentality, but it is way over done. Agree totally but would suggest the only block that needs to be checked is the one that says the Unit is combat capable -- and that based on a realistic, graded test in peacetime and in wartime or periods of tension a graded predeployment exercise attuned precisely to the theater and AO to which the unit is headed.

Units -- not persons. Units fight wars; the Army of One does not. We grade people -- wrong answer; grade the units. SF Team through BCT. It isn't that hard to do.

Bill Moore

01-01-2009, 08:18 PM

Excellent point! Now how do you do that in a non-bias manner? If you get the right guys evaluating you, they will share value added observations that will help you realize your unit's strengths and weaknesses. If you get some egotistical idiot whose only comment is that isn't how we did it my unit, then the evaluation is a waste of time. I suspect that is why the Army came up with objective evaluation criteria, but life isn't objective, we need a way to inject more subjectivity into our training. We need more mentoring around the camp fire, and less focus on checklists (they have their place, but there is more to training than check the block).

Rob Thornton

01-01-2009, 09:18 PM

I've been in one of those lucky situations where resources were piled on. In 2002 the Army was going to do everything it could to insure that if the SBCT failed as a concept, it would not be because of training. As one of the two IOT&E companies A/1-24 (of 1/25th) was given resources and risk beyond.

I learned a good lesson early on: proficiency at any level begins with being proficient in the basics. As such we shot 10 X as much as we had a right to by STRAC standards. We were encouraged - just keep shooting we'll get you more. There were few on Lewis who had a higher priority, and when there was a conflict Range Control gave our BN some alternatives. When I (we) went too far and screwed something up - it happened - both the BN CDR and the BDE CDR backed me up, and gave us an opportunity to grow. It paid off, during the IOT&E up at Knox in the Summer of 2003 (OPFOR was mostly 10th Mountain folks) we did very well - the platform was simply that a platform from which to get more mileage out of the skills we'd built. Most of the IOT&E called for squad and section level actions across Knox - and as such time spent doing battle drills at various levels was time well spent. Sometime we'd get a FRAGO and have to reassemble for platoon and company missions on the fly - the technology helped some there, but it was always the soldiers and leaders who had built valid expectations of what they were capable of through tough, realistic training. It was the basic soldier and leader skills upon which higher individual and collective competencies were founded.

I bring this up because if the military is sent in to do something, generally there is a good reason associated with it that has to do with the conditions. These conditions likely mean that there is either a requirement for those associated skill sets based on the enemy, or based on the friendly requirements (which is also based on an enemy, just one that may not be operating directly against you yet.) While some exceptions may be found, I think this is a pretty good rule of thumb.

I don't know if Ken has said it on this thread yet, but it comes down to his claim that resourced correctly, with the acceptance of risk, we can do better, and we can be multi-purpose. The wild card is wartime OPTEMPO. It means that the available time to train has to be scrutinized better. There is certainly risk associated with it, but there may be some training models out there we could look at for MTO&E units which would reduce the amount of friction we have.

I think its going to take some real money and emphasis put toward training, and that has further reaching impacts than just the types of CQB/CQM and bigger MOUT facilities available to a post. I'm pretty sure it would require a major infusion of effort into our defense logistics - more CL V production, a bottomless STRAC (I shot our whole BDE's worth of its old .50 CAL allotment in one day for part of crew and leader qualification). Vehicles and other pieces of equipment need to be FMC all the time - rather than burning up time hot seating vehicles or waiting around at the ranges. More ranges need to be upgraded and the range control staff modified and upgraded so that the days that a unit wants to shoot, it can do so with minimal effort and pain - in fact, when something else drops off the plate, and the unit finds some free time, it should be able to go down and shoot, drive, or communicate with minimal problems. Our training aids (the old TAS-Cs) need to be reinvigorated with better stuff and better incorporated with our force on force, LFX and other training. With all our talk, we still spend precious time "waiting to train", we put the fault back on the soldier and the leader, and cry - "hip pocket", but I think this is just an excuse that makes substandard resourcing go down better. Now BG Bob Brown (currently in MND-N) understood how precious time is as the CDR of 1/25th, as did the various BN CDRs of 1-24th and the BDE's other leaders.

I believe that if we made those core technical skills at the individual and collective level easier to train, and more productive, we'd find there was more time available to send people to school, do distance learning and train on important non-combat skills such as culture (language, histories, etc.) or how to apply those skills in other ways such as advising foreign forces. I think we'd generally develop people in ways beyond what we thought possible while retaining those skills which keep them alive, and make the enemy consider his future actions after he has come into contact with well trained U.S. units.

Like I mentioned earlier we had 2/75th down the road from 1/25th (1/25th is now in Alaska). As such we often got guys from in the BN who were either tired of the OPTEMPO, looking for other opportunities, or had been released because they had failed to measure up. Even those in the last category were often very good soldiers, its just that the 75th gets to pick and choose, so why should it tolerate anything less than the standards it lays out - anything less would be unfair to its other soldiers who'd met the standards. I bring up the 75th because they have a superb training support system to accommodate their OPTEMPO. Admittedly they have some incredible talent, but without the training resources they have to accommodate their OPTEMPO would they reach their potential? Would they be as good?

Obviously the Multi-Purpose Force's roles and requirements are different from the 75th, just as they are from SF and other branches of the military, but what if we took the same resourcing strategy and applied it to the MPF? What if we resourced them to the things we know they are being required to do, and for more than just good enough? This means everything from bullets to barracks and to at some point relatively comparable bonuses - it means range time for units on demand (and where every squad leader can go out and run up to a fire team LFX). It means vehicles that run at FMC, quick turn around on weapons, quick replacement of CL IX. It means increased decentralization and acceptance of risk. It means not having to screw with buying uniforms, and researching, developing and getting better equipment faster. It means having a steady state support staff to free up folks for training, education and deployments (this should be largely GS folks of various ranks - not many contractors, and very few SES types - they need to work for the maneuver CDRs).

Make no mistake, what I'm saying is take the resource methodology we normally associate with specialized forces, and apply it to the MPF - just toward its roles and missions.

I had the fortune of seeing some of the most incredible NCOs and junior officers develop before my eyes. I saw PV2s step up and carry the weight of a fire team leader. If anything I think this has increased now. In some real ways they point the direction to the Army I believe we need, just on an institutional scale, and one that is backed at home as well as on deployment. I think given that we would get all the things we want and them some. I also think we'd get more in return than from the Wall Street Bailout $$ - I don't think we'd see golden parachutes buying swank penthouse apartments in NYC.

I used to think we had to sacrifice something somewhere else - I now think that is BS. The money is there, its a question of our national priorities (just as is our willingness to create an economy that is stable, or responsible energy at home, or a host of other things). Regardless of if incoming administration prefers it or not, I think our commitments will grow if anything. Like energy policy, or education, physical health (not health care - but national fitness) -which by the way are also all linked to military preparedness and potential, we are talking about things which atrophy much faster than they grow - so if we really want to have the right tools available, better to start now, and have a comprehensive effort at it.

Well, like Bill I've got my New Year's rant over with:D

Happy New Year SWJ,

Best, Rob

Added - its out there on electrons - by then COL Bob Brown wrote several pieces on smart adaptive training - in Mil Review I believe.

Ken White

01-01-2009, 09:33 PM

Excellent point! Now how do you do that in a non-bias manner?for a few promotions instead of selecting everyone who doesn't screw up for too many promotions. That means eliminating DOPMA which is a Congressionally imposed fairness to all effort. War is not fair. It's not unbiased, either. There will be many who say that cannot be done. I disagree. There will be others who do not want it to be done -- those are people who espouse mediocrity and easy duty. I don't.
If you get the right guys evaluating you, they will share value added observations that will help you realize your unit's strengths and weaknesses. If you get some egotistical idiot whose only comment is that isn't how we did it my unit, then the evaluation is a waste of time.Both points are correct, proving yet again that my contention that our egos are a big BIG part of our problems in the Armed Forces. Solution to that is to forcefully tune them. That's a hint to the senior leadership of the services... ;)
I suspect that is why the Army came up with objective evaluation criteria...Partly. Having been around at the birth of that foolishness, I know it was really an honest effort to do just that -- but it failed for three reasons. The frailty of humans; an effort to produce ever more 'empirical metrics' to satisfy the numbers hounds; and a quiet, behind the scenes effort to remove any stigma from what was graded -- actually, it was to remove any penalty for failing...

Before the sorry effort called an ARTEP came into being, units ran Army Training Tests, those ATTs were subjectively graded by peer units. Since the 3d Bn provided OPFOR, support and OCs for the 1st Bn, for example, they had pressure to be fair and unbiased because in the round robin scheme of things, what went around came around -- it kept the system reasonably honest. The downsides in the eyes of some were (a) that the grading was essentially subjective, the scientific types hated that; and (b) that those who failed were replaced by a hopefully better person. That applied generally fairly; i.e. sometimes a Cdr went, sometimes an S3 or the S4, a Platoon leader or sergeant here or there. Sometimes nobody went. Generally just a few; those who really fouled up badly.

However, folks saw their friends gone and so a bunch of very smart Majors and Captains at Benning in the early 70s created the ARTEP as a new idea (it was not, not even close; same stuff as the old Army Training Program [ATP] and ATT combined in a new package; most tasks didn't even change) and pushed the civilian educator espoused ideal of no grading stigma {{ADDED:that was at the start of the 'self esteem' craze. I won't even go into the fact that a civilian educator with no knowledge of the Army is dangerous for an Army to listen to on any topic}}. In essence they used smoke and mirrors plus a new name and no grading to insure that when they got to be LTC or COL, they wouldn't get relieved if they screwed the pooch on an ATT. Like I said, very smart...

My observation is that the Army has gone downhill in many respects since.

Thus we're confronted with the FACT that a Commander can take a unit into combat to get people killed but he cannot be risked to take a test and be relieved if he fails. What risk? The terrible risk of upsetting the Personnel system that will maybe have to find the dispossessed a job and will certainly have to find a replacement for said dispossessed...
...life isn't objective, we need a way to inject more subjectivity into our training. We need more mentoring around the camp fire, and less focus on checklists (they have their place, but there is more to training than check the block).Yep, I think so...

The failure to rely more on the absolute subjectivity that is a judgment on any tactical evolution outside of combat (there it is definitely Pass or Fail) is due to the pressure of DOPMA to say that all officers of like grade and specialty are equal. It is an absolute fact that is incorrect but in an effort to support what they were told to do, the Army had to try to produce an 'objective' grading criteria; that meant 'metrics' and 'no subjectivity' -- it also induced a lack of trust because EVERYONE knows that system is flawed and allows incompetents and incompetence at all levels. It's really sad IMO.

Happy new year, Bill ;)

ODB

01-01-2009, 10:12 PM

Should have explained it a bit better. Was referring back to my days as a Pvt in the infantry (15-16 years ago) and think to this day for me at that time in my career it paid off. Point I was trying to make is that for some years now we have changed focus from training individual core tasks to training collective tasks.

Bill Moore Funny you mention the medical training aspect of things now. This last PMT we had to go through 101st T-CCC to check the block. Found that one to be quite the tongue biter. 50% contradicted what our medics were now training.

Funny story. I deploy with 3-187 Mar 2002 to Afghanistan. We get back in Aug 2002. Two months later we were in JRTC getting blessed off by the Army that we were ready to go to war. The single worst, yet funniest CTC rotation of my career. Then 2-3 months later was sitting in Kuwait waiting to cross the boarder.

Rob Thornton Brings up a huge issue, ranges available to train on. I don't know about other places but here things get extremely crowded. One of my personal rants is this issue and how it was/is handled here, but will save that for a better time. As an Army we are extremely guilty of wasting money that could be well spent providing training resources. Do we really need a 10 foot all brick wall surrounding the entire front of the post? Do we need $30 million command centers? Do MPs need brand new Yukons to patrol post in? This doesn't even scratch the surface of gross fraud, waste, and abuse IMO. When will they realize that the number one "platform" they need to be investing in is the individual soldier, not some multi-billion dollar technology platform?

Happy New Year to all.....

Ken White

01-02-2009, 12:33 AM

and has it right, I think.

All things considered, the biggest training problems are two things; too much bureaucratic BS in the way and most of that due to the second issue -- the training systems are designed to make life easy for the systems owner or operator, not for the unit training...

ODB

01-02-2009, 05:33 AM

Aerospace Daily & Defense Report
December 17, 2008

Conventional Forces, SOF Could See Roles Reversed

The two most pressing technology needs of U.S. forces in combat remain precision close-air support and counter-IED capabilities, according to Navy Vice Adm. Robert Harward, the new deputy commander of U.S. Joint Forces Command.

Moreover, the sequence of combat involvement may be flipped on its head, with conventional forces learning how to support special operations forces (SOF), instead of the current practice of using SOF to support conventional warfare, Harward told defense reporters at a breakfast Dec. 16.

Describing the JOE report as a “hard turn away from the classic theater warfare focus to emphasizing irregular warfare” — including increasing dependence on unmanned sensors and aircraft, small fighting units, directed-energy weapons and cyberwarfare — “is very accurate,” Harward says. He describes the new realm of hybrid warfare as “a very dynamic, uncertain environment” that produces a lot of change and persistent conflict.

“Were focusing a lot on the training method…in the joint, interagency and multinational environment,” he said. “That’s probably where [JFCOM] has its strongest influence across the spectrum.”

To that effect, planners want to have a high-fidelity, fighter-pilot-like simulator for ground soldiers so that training and response to attacks, ambushes and other actions are well rehearsed before anyone is thrust into a combat situation. Moreover, the latest lessons learned from irregular warfare — such as recent fighting in Baghdad and the Second Lebanon War — will be fed back into the training.

Source considered but still scary IMO

http://gunnyg.wordpress.com/2008/12/17/conventional-forces-sof-could-see-roles-reversed/

Just found this tidbit and thought it releavant to our training issues, we can see where they want to take training in the future.

01-02-2009, 03:20 PM

In my early years we had limited money, . . . , but it "seemed" that we trained more, and in many ways trained more effectively. We had training distractions then, but not to the extent that we do now. The training was less structured then, so there was more "time" for mentoring, which is when the real learning takes place. That also meant that leaders were being more effectively developed. In my LT days, we had both limited time and limited personnel; we also had a huge number of training distractors. I was in a tenant unit in USAREUR's VIIth Corps area where we ran a real world intelligence mission 24/7 with an organization at about 60% strength (on a good day). We did our jobs and were still able to do all the training the Army, USAREUR, my MACOM, and VII Corps required of us as well as all the valuable (and silly) stuff my troops needed to learn to be able to pass their MOS tests (and later their SQTs). How did we do it? Bill has the answer partly right.

Commanders need to observe more training, and spend less time in briefs. Talk to the troops, they'll tell you if they're confident.
All "leaders" need to observe more training. Real leaders will observe day-to-day performance first, recognize what training their subordinates need, and then develop and conduct the appropriate training to fix those performance shortfalls.

The wild card is wartime OPTEMPO. It means that the available time to train has to be scrutinized better. There is certainly risk associated with it, but there may be some training models out there we could look at for MTO&E units which would reduce the amount of friction we have.
Wartime OPTEMPO is an excuse for not doing the right thing. Rob is correct about making sure to use the right kind of training to get the desired results though--that is what training management is really all about.
Caution war story follows:
I was a platoon leader and the Bn training officer (as an additional duty) when Skill Qualification Tests (SQT) were coming into existence. My Bn Cdr's pucker factor was getting huge because he knew his OER would be affected by the performance of the Bn's soldiers on their SQTs. He tasked me to develop a training program for the SQT. In my plan, I proposed what my NCOs and I were already doing in my platoon: a great amount of on-the-job training, executed by the NCOs and me during normal duty following "pre-testing"--an assessment by the NCO of soldiers' job proficiency. (As noted above, my unit was maybe 60% strength and we were doing real world Cold War intel Indications & Warning work, not some garrison training, annual live fire at a range on Graf, and maneuver wargames as part of a REFORGER--but we supported those and Autumn Forge exercises too.) When I briefed the plan, the Bn Cdr's concern was with the lack of classroom training and any ability to verify that the training had occurred. He wanted sign-in sheets and post tests after the classroom instruction--the check the box mentality mentioned by Bill Moore predates PowerPoint and Harvard Graphics (2 tools that I have grown to loath over the years, but they still are better than the old hand drawn charts we had to use in the "brown shoe Army" of the Carter years and earlier.) Being more concerned with doing the right thing than with presenting the right appearance, I used some well placed expletives about his proposed approach to training and convinced the commander to forego that kind of nonsense. The troops did great on the first round of SQT (and subsequent ones too, so I was told). At the same time, my platoon increased its Bn-leading mission productivity. Other platoons actually got better at their missions because of the additional scrutiny given to their soldiers them by their NCOs and LTs. And, overall Bn morale improved (as indicated by a drop in drinking related incidents and other MP blotter reports involving my Bn's troops).
End of war story

reed11b

01-02-2009, 10:27 PM

oops, got one long thread mixed up w/ another one..however this post from COIN comes Home truly belongs here...so here it is.
Reed

One of the big problems in the US Armed forces is that inclination to 'proactivity' -- do something even if it's wrong. That attitude insures that quite often, it will be wrong...

My point is still that my questions MUST be asked and honestly answered before any implementation of your model is begun.

That and the fact that in our last three reasonably large sized wars, the principle of FID, propping up a failing state and defeating an insurgency were not the issues that caused us to enter the nations involved. ;)

It also points to a need for a better structured process for (get ready now) STABO. (yes I know, the word is as despised as OOTW, but I am a product of the '90s) Violence and wars in particular leave a vacuum in there wake, and simply leaving that vacuum to fill itself up can lead to larger conflicts or repeats of conflicts (WWI and WWII or DS/DS and OIF are examples so is OIF I and OIF II-whatever OIF we are on now). So there is a need to train and plan for "waging the peace" (sorry again) but I wonder if the DOD is the best organization to orchestrate that planning. I still like the idea of DoS military liaisons and some sort of post conflict expeditionary (I am going to heck after this post) unit, heavy on CA, Medical and MP support. Trying to shoehorn those assets into the BCT's only dilutes the BCT's fighting ability and dilutes the effectiveness of the non-combat assets.
In response to Nagle's original article, saying that the need is there, does not mean that wedging that ability into the existing structure is the best bet. Some wider range thinking outside of the DoD is needed.
Reed

RTK

11-22-2009, 02:03 AM

I re-read some old posts tonight and I came to three burning questions:

Are current force modernization efforts based upon the fights in which we are currently engaged resultant of failed foreign policy strategies or are they based upon a coherent concept of future threats to the nation?

Is it possible that future wars will include both conventional and unconventional aspects where both COIN/CT focused units and heavier conventional units will be required?

Are we shooting spiders off our shoes with a 12 gauge?

Discuss....

slapout9

11-22-2009, 03:05 AM

Are current force modernization efforts based upon the fights in which we are currently engaged resultant of failed foreign policy strategies.

Yes to this and it is a big one. If we had some type of rational energy policy we wouldn't even be envolved in half the countries that are on the enemy/threat list.

Ski

11-22-2009, 02:38 PM

As someone who worked in the 50A field until 2006 (when I left that arena to join the 59A squad of looters), I can tell you that your first assessment is dead on.

Force development (how units are formed) and force modernization (how they are equipped) has been totally driven by our foreign policy since the 1990's. If you want to get into brushfire wars with multiple enemies fighting each other, and then you once you inject yourself into the system, then you don't need mechanized and armored forces. The USMC knew this in the 80's when they began development of the LAV force. They needed wheeled vehicle to traverse the usually terrible road networks when conducting NEO's, and just a little bit of armor to protect the joes. Throw a 25mm cannon and maybe a TOW system and you have enough firepower and protection for most third world scenarios.

The MRAP is the illogical conclusion of all of this nonsense. It is still not on any TOE or MTOE within the Army - perhaps a few specialized Engineer units are the exception.

You have to understand that there is no such thing as threat based modernization strategies any longer. That horse road out the barn in the 90's. Everything is capabilities driven - you can thank the Network Centric warfare guys for starting this road to perdition.

As to your second question, yes. All wars are a blend of both. It all depends on the senior commanders, their intelligence, mental flexibilty and willingness to innovate.

As to your final statement, of course.

I re-read some old posts tonight and I came to three burning questions:

Are current force modernization efforts based upon the fights in which we are currently engaged resultant of failed foreign policy strategies or are they based upon a coherent concept of future threats to the nation?

Is it possible that future wars will include both conventional and unconventional aspects where both COIN/CT focused units and heavier conventional units will be required?

Are we shooting spiders off our shoes with a 12 gauge?

Discuss....

bumperplate

08-12-2011, 12:19 AM

Been reading this thread with particular attention to our current training methodologies.

I can't at this moment sum it all up in one or two sentences but there are excellent points in this thread about training. As an Army and as a society we are fixated on metrics. Things must be quantitative. I understand this from a scientific and statistical perspective. But, when it is used to assess the performance of organizations that constantly must execute varied, random, and unpredictable tasks, it is counter-productive. Conducting operations in southern Baghdad is not like showing proficiency in writing out the proof of the first fundamental theorem of calculus. Thus, suitability of a unit for conducting such operations cannot be assessed in a likewise manner.

In the Army, we must crack the code on this and get away from these futile exercises in training, looking to follow a recipe, check X% of boxes for the GO, just head for the PowerPoint slide showing "T" or green or whatever.

While I've met many NCOs and officers I wouldn't trust or follow in combat, overall we have some good ones out there that know their craft and can train their subordinates. To date I have not found any manual that can train a group of 19K Privates about the M2 like a seasoned 19K30 can. Nor have I encountered any manual or test that tells me that a Private is ready to man that M2 in combat as well as tough training, mentoring, and assessment from that 19K30.

I think, in the end, our central problem is trust. Our senior leaders don't trust that we can let that 19K30 loose on a bunch of junior Soldiers and train them on that M2.