'America's Broken Army' NPR Series. Cavguy makes COL Gentile proud ...

[Cavguy]

All,

I just learned an NPR interview the COIN Center gave in October was aired yesterday. In it, a MAJ "Neal" (can't anyone spell my name right?) Smith bemoans the lack of conventional competency in our force.

http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=99156039

Of course it's one quote out of an hour long interview we gave, but it does reflect the need for "balance" in the future between COIN and HIC tasks.


All Things Considered, January 12, 2009 · America has the most battle-hardened Army in the nation's history, but it's an Army that may also be broken. The seven years of war — in Iraq and Afghanistan — have taken a toll on the troops, tanks and trucks, as well as on the Army's leaders.

.....

A Debate Over Training

That switch has sparked a debate inside the Army over what missions it can perform and how it should train its soldiers. The training, lately, is all about counterinsurgency, and some in the Army are wondering if the pendulum has swung too far.

"Obviously we can't go back to the extreme we were in 2003 where the force knew nothing about counterinsurgency," says Maj. Neal Smith, the operations officer of the Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Center. He teaches people how to fight the kind of wars we're in now in Iraq and Afghanistan. "But we also can't go to a force where if a tank division is needed someday — no one knows how to move, defend, attack or move to contact anymore."

But even he worries about what today's soldiers are being taught: how to fight a classic ground war.

"The risk we run as a force is that we have a generation of officers [who] have spent five to six years [at war] that never have done their conventional competency," Neal Smith says. "And if we were expected on short notice to fulfill that conventional competency, we would struggle very hard to do it as well as we did in 2003 during the attack to Baghdad."

The problem is there simply isn't enough time to teach people how to fight both conventional and unconventional wars — the soldiers are simply at war too much and troops now have only about 12 months between deployments.

"The reality is we really only have enough time to prepare soldiers for the next mission they're going to face," says Lt. Gen. William Caldwell, who runs the Combined Arms Center for the Army. He oversees 18 different schools and training centers, including the National Training Center. "Then as time permits, we'll operate across the whole continuum of intensity of ops."

The Army says it won't even be able to really begin training for all kinds of warfare until 2010 at the earliest, so for now, the focus is on hearts and minds, not tanks and artillery.

[Tom Odom]

Way to go, Neel! :D

So what did you say for the rest of the hour? :wry:

Tom

[Hacksaw]

yada yada yada... as Niel exposed his secret crush for Elaine:D

[Stan]

Darn spell checker :D

Click, Click... Boom...Hooraah :)

[Entropy]

Oh, I get it. For the longest time I've been wondering what "knee haul" was!

So, Cavguy, do you feel the quoting was appropriate? Is there anything you wish they would have included that they didn't?

[jkm_101_fso]

"The risk we run as a force is that we have a generation of officers [who] have spent five to six years [at war] that never have done their conventional competency," Neal Smith says. "And if we were expected on short notice to fulfill that conventional competency, we would struggle very hard to do it as well as we did in 2003 during the attack to Baghdad."


Very accurate.

I have to somehow sweep the cobwebs out of my head and remember how to do manual gunnery in two months...yikes.

Along the same lines, did anyone else see that documentary on Nat Geo last night about NTC (http://channel.nationalgeographic.com/episode/full-battle-rattle-4263/)? It was pretty interesting.

[SWJED]

Good Job Niles!

[Ron Humphrey]

Sure to be extremely popular in
some circles:wry:

[CR6]

I sorta cringed when the reporter discussed the focus being "hearts and minds" but it was a decent awareness piece given it ran in less than eight minutes.

[Ski]

Kneel getting some voice time with the NPR dudes! Check out the big brain! :)

[reed11b]

Alright! Way to go Nell! Semi-serious question, how much is our training hampered by our unit structures and manning policy?
Reed

[Ken White]

worng... :D

[Umar Al-Mokhtār]

perhaps a name change to something easier to spell phonetically, like Sean...:D

[Gian P Gentile]

You just go ahead Nelly!!!

OK, you got me; I owe you one. First chance I get I will state publicly that the Army is loosing its Coin capabilities....NOT!!

But come on, dont ya' think that we knew just a little, little, tiny, winy bit about counterinsurgency in 2003 instead of as you say the extreme and "knew nothing" about coin?

Can ya help a fellow coin brother out here?

gian

[Schmedlap]

"The risk we run as a force is that we have a generation of officers [who] have spent five to six years [at war] that never have done their conventional competency," Neal Smith says. "And if we were expected on short notice to fulfill that conventional competency, we would struggle very hard to do it as well as we did in 2003 during the attack to Baghdad."

I disagree with that. I think the training that we did prior to OIF was pretty weak and the training prior to 9/11 was a complete joke. What I recall doing in training, especially prior to 9/11 but also prior to OIF, was a lot range safety briefs, rodding weapons, absurd weapons handling safety guidelines that have no place in combat or in training for combat, burdensome range safety restrictions (we weren't even allowed to transition from M4 to sidearm), and frankly I thought that NTC was as fake, canned, and safetied to death in 2000 as it was in 2004. Hopefully that has changed for the better.

When my unit prepared to return to Iraq for OIF III we did the same Table 8 / Table 12 stuff, using that as the foundation for the additional, mission-specific training (additional LFX's (CSS, convoy, etc), more reflexive fire, shoot house live fires, and so on). The Table 8/12 stuff was much better than what we did in preparation for OIF I because the chain of command recognized just how absurd prior safety restrictions were, so they did away with most of them. As a result, we did BETTER conventional training in preparation for OIF III than we did for OIF I. And while I deployed with a different unit for OIF V, I know that this process was repeated because I had to plan it all as the AS3 before I PCS'd.

Besides, forces are built from the bottom up (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2008/04/officer-questions-petraeuss-st-1/#comment-1444). The average platoon of infantrymen today is far and away more lethal, competent, and experienced that the average platoon from ten years ago. The improvement in combat readiness among our non-combat MOS's is even more pronounced. Suddenly, they have a reason to actually train for combat. Cross-training is also significantly greater, with Soldiers relying less on mechanics and medics because they don't have time to wait and the mechanics and medics becoming more proficient shooters. And I could go on forever about all of the intangibles.

[Eden]

I agree that we are probably better at some conventional warfighting skills than we were, say, ten years ago, at least at the platoon, battery, and company level. And I know that being in a real shooting war eventually translates to better tactical training back in garrison - more realism, more emphasis on the most valuable skills, less energy expended on needless 'safety' items and other eyewash.

But...I sense a complacency in your last post that I'm afraid many in the service share. There are a set of staff and command muscles that just don't get exercised anymore, at least so far as I can see. When is the last time anyone maneuvered a brigade in the US Army? Prepared a battalion defense? Conducted a brigade level passage of lines? Provided direct fire support for a division as it attacked? Deployed an AD battalion in direct support of a division? Conducted a brigade breach of an obstacle or an assault river crossing? Conducted SEAD in conjunction with an aviation deep strike? Set up a refueling point for a division as it road marched? Conducted a tactical road march consisting of three or four brigades? Coordinated all of the above as a division staff within the space of three or four days?

We used to do that all the time...well, two to three times a year, anyway, and still screwed the pooch almost every time. Now, I suspect, there are armor and infantry and aviation brigade commanders who have never done any of these things. Some of these will become our next set of division commanders. They will lead battalion and brigade commanders who may not even suspect they have missed something.

This is not a value judgment - I also believe that you have to train for the war you are fighting, and there is only so much time to train. But I am not as sanguine as some about how easily we will be able to resurrect our conventional skills when (not if) called upon to do so.

[William F. Owen]

I think there has to be a differentiation between doing some good training, because you are going to war in a place you know well, against folks you have fought before and the body of skills, drill and forms that you need to maintain an army to be ready for anything that it is likely to be asked to do.

I submit that the issue is doctrine. There is a pretty good body of best practice that can fairly easily accessed, by anyone prepared to take the risk of doing so.

Look at any military training problem and you'll usually find some idiotic body of opinion defending some ones empire or skill set.

Look out for people who believe that it is their job to "deliver training" instead of "teaching people how do things." and then testing them to make sure they can.

[Ken White]

Schmedlap and Eden? I place 'truth' in quotes because I fully acknowledge that 'truth' in training is very subjective, subject to interpretation and means different things to different people.

I think Scmedlap's version of unit training broadly tracks with my experience over almost 30 years of doing and another almost 20 of closely observing and 'overseeing.' I think Eden's comments also track with all that.

The important thing to me is to acknowledge that we are now training better at the unit level than we ever did -- but we still are not doing that as well as we can or should...

Eden says:
"When is the last time anyone maneuvered a brigade in the US Army?... (and much else) ... Coordinated all of the above as a division staff within the space of three or four days?

We used to do that all the time...well, two to three times a year, anyway, and still screwed the pooch almost every time..."I do not dispute that was done nor that it was training but I will point out that it was generally done poorly -- as Eden acknowledges -- and in my observation unrealistically only once or twice a year and with no penalties for failure or error.

That's a long way of getting to the major point -- how you train is a great deal more important than what you train.

It is far better for combat forces to do the basics well than to do the exotic or upper levels poorly...

Added: Wilf said:
"Look out for people who believe that it is their job to "deliver training" instead of "teaching people how do things." and then testing them to make sure they can."YES!!!

[reed11b]

There are a set of staff and command muscles that just don't get exercised anymore, at least so far as I can see. When is the last time anyone maneuvered a brigade in the US Army? Prepared a battalion defense? Conducted a brigade level passage of lines? Provided direct fire support for a division as it attacked? Deployed an AD battalion in direct support of a division? Conducted a brigade breach of an obstacle or an assault river crossing? Conducted SEAD in conjunction with an aviation deep strike? Set up a refueling point for a division as it road marched? Conducted a tactical road march consisting of three or four brigades? Coordinated all of the above as a division staff within the space of three or four days?



Ummm, what is this "Division" you refer too? Read somthing about them in WWII I believe :wry: and since when have staff and command weenies had "muscles"? :D
Reed

[RTK]

Hey Ken!

Didn't we have the "training management sucks" talk last week?

[Ken White]

I'm in a rut...:D

[Eden]

Ummm, what is this "Division" you refer too?

My point exactly!

As for staff and command muscles - here is the approved staff weenie workout:

Stretch the truth
Wrap your head around obvious nonsense
Run into brick walls (3 sets)
Jump through hoops
Perform mental gymnastics
Bob and weave at the podium for thirty seconds
Cool down with 12-oz curls (as many as you need)

[Schmedlap]

Could you explain that again in PowerPoint format? I couldn't quite understand it in plain English.

[Tom Odom]

My point exactly!

As for staff and command muscles - here is the approved staff weenie workout:

Stretch the truth
Wrap your head around obvious nonsense
Run into brick walls (3 sets)
Jump through hoops
Perform mental gymnastics
Bob and weave at the podium for thirty seconds
Cool down with 12-oz curls (as many as you need)

Successful completion earns you the Expert PPT Badge

Successful completion in an operational zone gets the Combat PPT Badge

In my day, the equivalent was the coveted Expert Grease Pencil and Combat Grease Pencil badges

Tom

[Entropy]

I've got a few of these, unfortunately (http://www.nbc-links.com/powerpoint.html):

http://www.nbc-links.com/graphics/pwrptpatch.gif

Don't forget the advice of Patton:

http://www.nbc-links.com/graphics/patton.jpg

[Ken White]

In my day, the equivalent was the coveted Expert Grease Pencil and Combat Grease Pencil badgesprecursor Expert Flint and Clay Tablet badge.

Gotta grandfather these things... :D

[wm]

My point exactly!

As for staff and command muscles - here is the approved staff weenie workout:

Stretch the truth
Wrap your head around obvious nonsense
Run into brick walls (3 sets)
Jump through hoops
Perform mental gymnastics
Bob and weave at the podium for thirty seconds
Cool down with 12-oz curls (as many as you need)

Don't forget these favorites:
--Misinterpret higher headquarters tasker, thereby doubling required workload
--12 hour run with hair on fire in response to above tasker
--Submit/Resubmit staff coordination/decision packet (at least 5 reps, usually with two reconsiderations of non-concurrence by the same office for failing to change "happy" to "glad"
--distill 50 pages of text into 3 bullet .PPT slide for 30 second podium "bob and weave."

[ODB]

Must lose at least one of the following weekly for the standard badge, two a week gets you an expert badge, and for the master badge three or more weekly must get "lost".

1. Training concept done at the company or lower level.
2. Range request.
3. Ammo request.
4. NCOER.
5. Awards recommendation.
6. Any and all information requirements that "we" the staff asked for and was submitted by lower levels.

[120mm]

An analogy between the US Army, conventional capability and COIN:

The US Army is to COIN, like a fat, out-of-shape individual who explains to folks that they don't go to the gym, because they don't want to become "too muscular". Nevermind that being "too muscular" is not something that will actually accidentally just happen to someone who works out.

You see, the fat guy is that way pretty naturally, and will continue to be that way in perpetuity. Kind of like the US Army's conventional capability. We, as an army love HIC, because we're good at it, and it's relatively easy to do and train for.

Nevermind that even in our "weakened" state, we could still defeat the next 10 opponents put together, and nevermind that the great majority of our military threats are insurgent-based, and 8 years into this current conflict, we still suck at COIN.

We, as an Army, throw out the "but we don't to give up our conventional capability" as an excuse as to why that is so. We STILL have a huge excess of capability for any imaginable present or even near future threat. And we can spool up our ability to kill red hordes just about anytime we want, though maybe not by killing them the way we would've back in the day.

[William F. Owen]

We, as an army love HIC, because we're good at it, and it's relatively easy to do and train for.

Well good being a relative term. You, and we (UK) haven't faced a world class Combined Arms capability since 1945, and some light conventional forces proved challenging in both Korea and Vietnam.

I do not agree that it is easy to train for. Doing a Battle Group running replenishment, prior to performing a passage of lines, in full NBC kit and and with an air threat is extremely demanding. Do you need to be able to do that, is another question. A conventional capability lost, can be recovered, but will it be recovered in time and with the budget required?

Almost every Army in the world can do COIN, given the right training, leadership and small amounts of quite cheap equipment. It's the default setting for most armed forces. There are very few world class combined arms armies.


Nevermind that even in our "weakened" state, we could still defeat the next 10 opponents put together, and nevermind that the great majority of our military threats are insurgent-based, and 8 years into this current conflict, we still suck at COIN.

On one level I concur, but be careful of drawing a line between Insurgents and everyone else - and you don't "suck at COIN" IMO. The lesson of history is that, left to their own devices, the US Army learns fast.


We, as an Army, throw out the "but we don't to give up our conventional capability" as an excuse as to why that is so. We STILL have a huge excess of capability for any imaginable present or even near future threat. And we can spool up our ability to kill red hordes just about anytime we want, though maybe not by killing them the way we would've back in the day.

If you are saying that conventional capability has to adapt to a Geo-political reality, I'd agree. We might not agree on the precise detail of the Geo-political reality.

[Ratzel]

If you are saying that conventional capability has to adapt to a Geo-political reality, I'd agree. We might not agree on the precise detail of the Geo-political reality.

Absolutely, and I think its worth having this discussion. For one thing, if one makes the argument that we should be heavy in COIN capabilities, then they're basically saying we don't/won't face a major conventional threat. So, lets think for a minute; shall we?

The first country that comes to mind is China. If China threatened Taiwan, I'm pretty sure we wouldn't be invading the Chinese mainland? I'm not even sure if China has the capability of conducting a landing on Taiwan? Even if they could, I don't think our ground forces would be involved? This fight would mostly involve our sea and air forces. So this leads one to ask if raising COIN capabilities requires trade-offs that means cutting naval and air assets? The other possibility is facing China somewhere in Africa?

The next country is Russia. The most obvious location conflict could arise with the Russians would be somewhere in Eastern Europe or Central Asia? I see this as a more likely scenario than China.

The third possibility would be Iran? I don't know much about Iran's military, but I believe Iran's capabilities are greater in asymmetrical warfare.

I suppose North Korea could freak out one day, but again, I don't believe the North Koreans have the ability to sustain much of a war? The ROK Army is also quite capable, and I don't see the US maintaining strong HIC capabilities just for North Korea.

The another potential great power is Turkey, who seems to be growing more significant in the region.

Last, and IMO, the scenario that is potentially most dangerous, is a coalition of countries who are sick of the status quo. Lets say Turkey, Iran, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and various non-State actors decided to form an alliance with the intention of raising up oil prices, and throwing some muscle around the Eurasian land mass? This may require some serious conventional capabilities?

Of course, some of you will read this and laugh about how this could never happen! But remember, who in 1900 would of thought that Europe would be killing itself in 1916? And in 1920, who of thought in 1940 that Germany would control most of Europe? And in 1940, who of thought that the US and Russia would control all Europe? I could go on but I think you all get my point?

This thought experiment requires us to contemplate if its worth giving up our superior HIC capabilities for COIN capabilities? You must contemplate this in a world where no one ever predicts the next 20 years very accurately? I know one thing, we MUST remain the masters of the oceans and of the air. We cannot afford to trade the next generation of aircraft for increased COIN capabilities.

Bottom line: Why is it to our strategic advantage to give up our HIC capabilities (to include mastery of the air and of the sea) for increased COIN capabilities? It seems that the origin of the COIN argument is the idea that should transform the Middle east and Africa into "Democracies." How likely is it that we can do this? And is this goal more important than remaining the global hegemon?

I'll stop here, becuase I may be moving into a political type discussion? But I think we should at least *try* to have this conversation. The future of our force configuration pretty much depends on this discussion. I think we can handle it.

[Jimbo]

Niel,

good interview. You ae very true on he conventional capability concerns, and I am speaking as someone in an HBCT that should only be focused on high intensity operations (Korea). Good job.

[William F. Owen]

Absolutely, and I think its worth having this discussion. For one thing, if one makes the argument that we should be heavy in COIN capabilities, then they're basically saying we don't/won't face a major conventional threat. So, lets think for a minute; shall we?


Maybe you shall not, but I think it is a mistake to assume that conventional capabilities only have use against conventional forces.

Fallujah and the Lebanon spring to mind. Tanks are extremely useful and so are 155mm SPGs. Armoured personel carrier and MICVs are pretty much something you can't do without.

To sound like a stuck record, you can afford one army, and you have to do everything. Based on what the US Army now knows, that is not a challenge.

[82redleg]

...Based on what the US Army now knows, that is not a challenge.

It is a challenge, just a challenge that is executable, given the right resources (primarily time) and leadership.

[Ratzel]

but I think it is a mistake to assume that conventional capabilities only have use against conventional forces.


Yes, but in the future we will face trade offs as far as procurement, and are currently facing trade offs in terms of training. So when it comes between the F-22 and more COIN capabilities, or between a COIN rotation at NTC or a HIC conflict rotation, some decision making will have to be done?

I suppose we can train for both, but this might make us halfway trained for both instead of highly trained for one? Procurement is even more cut and dry. Do we buy the next generation of tanks, or do we use that money in ways that enhances our nation building capabilities?

Again, this will depend on what our interests and geopolitical needs are? Some claim that our safety will depend on our ability to nation build, or "shrink the Gap." Others claim that the China's looking big and bad, or that Russia's' on the rise.

Is it possible to have a force that can do it all? Is there a way to train the force that makes them just as good at both? For instance: Could a unit going through NTC spend half its time doing COIN, and half its time doing HIC? Maybe they can do HIC at NTC and COIN at home station?

[William F. Owen]

Yes, but in the future we will face trade offs as far as procurement, and are currently facing trade offs in terms of training. So when it comes between the F-22 and more COIN capabilities, or between a COIN rotation at NTC or a HIC conflict rotation, some decision making will have to be done?



History is a pretty good guide here. Very few armies ever come up with equipment that is so context specific, it can't be used for other things. Nukes being the obvious exception, but MRAPs are useful in high end warfighting, in that there are roles you can usefully apply them to.

...but you are absolutely correct.
The USAF has dropped the ball badly in this area, as has the RAF. The cost versus "spectrum of effect" analysis has been totally lacking. Effectiveness has got to be balanced against efficiency, especially in Air warfare. It is far less critical in land and naval domains.

[Schmedlap]

I suspect that I am inadvertently cherry-picking or that I am missing your point, but I'll throw it out there just in case it's relevent...

I've found the Air Force to be surprisingly relevant to current operations. Almost every operation on my last deployment had multiple Air Force (and possibly Navy) assets on station in the event that we needed them (and we often did), whether it was Spectre, F-16 (or maybe F-14 - in any case, it was carrying 500lb bombs), or something else. Also, isn't it the Air Force that is the lead proponent/agency for UAV's? We used UAV's on a daily basis for a myriad of purposes, often saving us significant manpower, time, and accomplishing the task more effectively.

[Eden]

I suspect that because most of us who haunt the forum are or were Army or Marines we miss the big point about designing forces for the next war. Land forces are much more flexible and adaptable (and considerably cheaper) than the air or sea services. You can take an armored battalion or an air defense battalion, park the vehicles somewhere, and use the personnel for a variety of purposes; we've been doing just that for years. When I was a tank battalion S-3 we guarded Haitian refugees at Gitmo and fought prairie fires - and this was in 1995. So you can design an army for high-intensity warfare and still be comfortable that you will have at least some capacity for lesser contingencies.

Not so much for the really expensive parts of the armed forces. Yes, carrier battle groups and F-16 squadrons have utility in small wars - but if you are designing a Navy or an Air Force to support wars like Afghanistan or Iraq, and 'accepting risk' like Sec Gates says we are, the weapon systems you buy would look much different from the ones we are currently acquiring. You would want air frames, for example, designed almost solely to accurately deliver ordnance (or bags of food); air superiority would not be a consideration.

Force structure would be even more different. What is not commonly realized is that cost is less of a consideration in force structure than manpower. There is always more money available, but congressionally mandated manpower caps are much more difficult to move. So the 10,000 or so bodies that we invest in a carrier battle group (a swag from a groundpounder, by the way, so don't quote me) would ideally be reinvested in brown water forces, CBs, special forces, or in the Army.

[William F. Owen]

I've found the Air Force to be surprisingly relevant to current operations. Almost every operation on my last deployment had multiple Air Force (and possibly Navy) assets on station in the event that we needed them (and we often did), whether it was Spectre, F-16 (or maybe F-14 - in any case, it was carrying 500lb bombs), or something else.

I'll clarify. The US Air Force is not just relevant, they are Essential. - and as you say, 500lb bombs. It don't matter if they come from an F-16, F-14, B-52 or P-3. It doesn't matter if you get air from the Air Force or Navy - both only exist to support ground operations, and their support is critical.


Also, isn't it the Air Force that is the lead proponent/agency for UAV's? We used UAV's on a daily basis for a myriad of purposes, often saving us significant manpower, time, and accomplishing the task more effectively.

There are vast range of assumptions about UAV operations, which once subjected to rigour, do not paint a clear choice between manned and un-manned aircraft, especially when it comes to COIN operations, and especially when it comes to cost. When it comes to UAV's "Lies, dam Lies and Statistics" are to the fore! It is very context and mission specific.

[William F. Owen]

Force structure would be even more different. What is not commonly realized is that cost is less of a consideration in force structure than manpower. There is always more money available, but congressionally mandated manpower caps are much more difficult to move.

DING Ding! - Exactly. That has been the central argument of my force development work for the last 7 years! - Kudos Eden. Didn't know the US had the same problem. Many thanks.

[Eden]

To illustrate a bit the problems staffers face when working on force structure changes, I can relate my own experience as a bit player in designing a Stryker Division - that is, a division element controlling three Stryker Brigades. This never came to fruition, but the boundaries we were given at the beginning of the process were as follows:

1. A manpower cap - I can't remember what it was but somewhere around 12-15,000.
2. Deployability - the whole division had to be deployable by air given so many sorties in a certain amount of time.
3. No post in Alaska or Hawaii could have fewer soldiers on it at the end of the process than they currently had - a politically imposed condition laid on in deference to the powerful senators from those states.
4. USARAK had to maintain its airborne capability.

Cost (in terms of dollars) never really came into it. But these are the kinds of things that cause otherwise intelligent organizations to do stupid stuff.

[Ken White]

Ratzel Said:
"I suppose we can train for both, but this might make us halfway trained for both instead of highly trained for one? Procurement is even more cut and dry. Do we buy the next generation of tanks, or do we use that money in ways that enhances our nation building capabilities?"Really good point. I think though, that the answer to the first question is that we were not much better than halfway trained for HIC in 2000. That is due to the fact that our obsolescent and really inefficient personnel system causes an annual rotation of 25-35% of all people in a unit -- so a really well trained unit at one point in time will degrade over the course of a year. That is reality.

That is also not as bad as it sounds; it is, in a word, good enough -- not great but good enough. That has almost always been true of all Armies. Long way of getting to the point that halfway trained for the full spectrum of warfare is acceptable. It's a lot better than being 90% trained for one form and then being confronted with another (See Iraq, 2003).

The answer to the second question is that, quite simply, outside of the Leopard 2A6, the M1A2 has no competition, therefor a new tank is not needed, merely continue to do some R and D. Which we are doing. So "that money" is or will be used to enhance our stability operations capability (see below).

Wilf said:
"The USAF has dropped the ball badly in this area, as has the RAF. The cost versus "spectrum of effect" analysis has been totally lacking. Effectiveness has got to be balanced against efficiency, especially in Air warfare. It is far less critical in land and naval domains.True, though I think from what I read both are finally starting to realize that and are slowly changing; also see below.

Eden said:
"So you can design an army for high-intensity warfare and still be comfortable that you will have at least some capacity for lesser contingencies.

Not so much for the really expensive parts of the armed forces. Yes, carrier battle groups and F-16 squadrons have utility in small wars - but if you are designing a Navy or an Air Force to support wars like Afghanistan or Iraq, and 'accepting risk' like Sec Gates says we are, the weapon systems you buy would look much different from the ones we are currently acquiring. You would want air frames, for example, designed almost solely to accurately deliver ordnance (or bags of food); air superiority would not be a consideration.Wilf's right, kudos for that. It often gets forgotten.

I agree but would point out that the HIC capability is critical to survival; the LIC capability is nice to have. It appears that many in the policy realm seem to think along that same line.

The cost of effective LIC systems is generally quite low (relatively speaking), so the diversion of only one Carrier Battle Group (for example) to oblivion would and will pay for both a few more spaces and possibly much equipment tailored for LIC. It is my perception that these trade-offs are being discussed and planned for implementation in the post 2014 period. The spending for the interim is already in place and there is no existential need to change it and Congress would likely not change it barring a major push by someone...
Force structure would be even more different. What is not commonly realized is that cost is less of a consideration in force structure than manpower. There is always more money available, but congressionally mandated manpower caps are much more difficult to move. A terrible truth. Also the driver of many more things than most realize. Congress is at the root of many perceived DoD-related problems...

[reed11b]

I suppose we can train for both, but this might make us halfway trained for both instead of highly trained for one? Procurement is even more cut and dry. Do we buy the next generation of tanks, or do we use that money in ways that enhances our nation building capabilities?

Again, this will depend on what our interests and geopolitical needs are? Some claim that our safety will depend on our ability to nation build, or "shrink the Gap." Others claim that the China's looking big and bad, or that Russia's' on the rise.

Is it possible to have a force that can do it all? Is there a way to train the force that makes them just as good at both? For instance: Could a unit going through NTC spend half its time doing COIN, and half its time doing HIC? Maybe they can do HIC at NTC and COIN at home station?
Ratzel, if you are using your armed forces as your primary tool of "statesmanship", you are using the wrong tool. Nation Building and "shrinking the Gap" is a primary mission of State, not defense. Of course I have long felt that we need to look at the "Foreign Policy" budget to include defense spending and allocate from there based on current and projected needs, but that is a different argument. How we structure the equipment and train to use the equipment we buy affects our COIN abilities more then the actual equipment. See Wilf's posts for more on that. Do we need UAV's, Yep. DO we need them at the BCT level, or should they belong only to the AF or Army? That is less clear. Another fallacious argument seems to based the thought that brigades have to be either "heavy" or "Light" or "Stryker". Why can't infantry units have organic armor support? Why does mech infantry have to be organized to be manpower short and receive less training on how to work minus the Bradley’s? See where I am going here? The DOD and the public and even, from time to time, members of this board, try to compartmentalize everything into black and white terms. The truth is that the world is grey. Train better, organize better, from the get go and this argument returns to the smoke and vapor it came from
Reed

[Entropy]

Land forces are much more flexible and adaptable (and considerably cheaper) than the air or sea services. You can take an armored battalion or an air defense battalion, park the vehicles somewhere, and use the personnel for a variety of purposes; we've been doing just that for years. When I was a tank battalion S-3 we guarded Haitian refugees at Gitmo and fought prairie fires - and this was in 1995. So you can design an army for high-intensity warfare and still be comfortable that you will have at least some capacity for lesser contingencies.

People are always going to be more adaptable than equipment - that much is obvious. So too is the fact that air and naval forces are more dependent on equipment to operate in their domains and so can be considered less flexible. But for "high tech" warfare, the Army is pretty much just as equipment dependent as the Navy and Air Force.


Force structure would be even more different. What is not commonly realized is that cost is less of a consideration in force structure than manpower. There is always more money available, but congressionally mandated manpower caps are much more difficult to move. So the 10,000 or so bodies that we invest in a carrier battle group (a swag from a groundpounder, by the way, so don't quote me) would ideally be reinvested in brown water forces, CBs, special forces, or in the Army.

You're completely correct about the limitations of manpower on force structure, but I think you're completely wrong in the assertion that manpower is cheap. It is not, especially once one considers that some legacy manpower costs are not part of the defense budget. Moreover, the budget for personnel is much less flexible. You can't save money and divert it to other things nearly as easily as you can with procurement and O&M money.

Additionally, moving personnel from one area (carrier battle group) to another (brown water, CB, SF, Army) is neither easy nor cheap. The skills and equipment requirements are quite different and, in a volunteer force at least, one cannot simply order that nuclear reactor tech to become a SEAL or CB or whatever. You can force them out and recruit replacements, or offer incentives to change, but both of those are expensive, and that's not even discussing the recruiting, retraining, decommissioning costs as well as costs to equip the force for the new task. And by "costs" I'm talking both money AND time. Changing force structure is therefore an expensive and slow process.


Not so much for the really expensive parts of the armed forces. Yes, carrier battle groups and F-16 squadrons have utility in small wars - but if you are designing a Navy or an Air Force to support wars like Afghanistan or Iraq, and 'accepting risk' like Sec Gates says we are, the weapon systems you buy would look much different from the ones we are currently acquiring. You would want air frames, for example, designed almost solely to accurately deliver ordnance (or bags of food); air superiority would not be a consideration.

Turn your argument on its head. Suppose we build a specialized force for small wars - what happens when a big war comes around? Then you're stuck with capabilities you can't use and then the argument is turned upside down. Better, I think, to have capabilities that can do both imperfectly than try to bet the farm on what the next war is going to be and create an ideal force for that particular war. This is actually what both the Air Force and Navy have been doing for almost 20 years now - getting rid of "one-trick-pony" capabilities in favor of more flexible capabilities. Does that have costs? Sure, but what is the alternative? Try to reconfigure most of your force with every new conflict? One can certainly do that to some extent (and all the services are), but changing a carrier battle group into something optimized for small wars may not be practical or wise for a whole host of reasons.

[reed11b]

Turn your argument on its head. Suppose we build a specialized force for small wars - what happens when a big war comes around? Then you're stuck with capabilities you can't use and then the argument is turned upside down. Better, I think, to have capabilities that can do both imperfectly than try to bet the farm on what the next war is going to be and create an ideal force for that particular war. This is actually what both the Air Force and Navy have been doing for almost 20 years now - getting rid of "one-trick-pony" capabilities in favor of more flexible capabilities. Does that have costs? Sure, but what is the alternative? Try to reconfigure most of your force with every new conflict? One can certainly do that to some extent (and all the services are), but changing a carrier battle group into something optimized for small wars may not be practical or wise for a whole host of reasons.

Perhaps I am wrong, but I do not hear anyone calling for specialized forces tailored for small wars. I think everyone is pointing out that this is not practical. I hear a lot of shouting past each other. The only real change I hear being advocated for budget wise, is to take some of the focus off of buying new equipment (not buying new equipment desighned for COIN) and re-focus those funds on training and getting and keeping the right personel.
Reed

[Ken White]

You're completely correct about the limitations of manpower on force structure, but I think you're completely wrong in the assertion that manpower is cheap.He didn't say it was cheap; he said -- fairly correctly I think, that there's plenty of money. See below.
You can't save money and divert it to other things nearly as easily as you can with procurement and O&M money.That's true but that revolves around Congress' penchant for micromanaging personnel issues simply because Service people can vote (wrongly in my view but that's another thread). More important to Congress, so can their families vote (as they should be able to). All that said, it has been done and can be done.
Additionally, moving personnel from one area (carrier battle group) to another (brown water, CB, SF, Army) is neither easy nor cheap.He didn't say that either. I'm the one that used the CVBG example and you noted, I hope that I postulated that well in the future -- IOW, yes, it takes time to do that. However, it has been done and can be again. Likely will...
Changing force structure is therefore an expensive and slow process.I think we all agree on that; today's arguments by those that count, not by us, translate into 2018 or later actions.
...This is actually what both the Air Force and Navy have been doing for almost 20 years now - getting rid of "one-trick-pony" capabilities in favor of more flexible capabilities.True, they have -- but I'd be remiss if I did not point out that over the last 20 years, both those services (and the Army and Marines) have not been very astute in pursuing that flexibility until someone forced their hand. Alacrity is not a strong point...Nor, regrettably does vision seem to be.
but changing a carrier battle group into something optimized for small wars may not be practical or wise for a whole host of reasons.It's a trade off and I suspect that decisions already been made. It'll be fought, no matter which way it goes, that's all American. :D

Your argument might be more appreciated if the Navy had not gone through the Burke / Zumwalt fiasco, had not decided the LCS was not really the ship needed for the job and if the USS GHWB didn't cost about $2B MORE than her class predecessors (and considering that the MPN and OMN annual cost is about 20% of build cost...). Carriers are great, no question. The issue is how many CVBGs are needed...

Oh, I've also heard on pretty good authority that smaller carriers are being relooked -- again... ;)

[Schmedlap]

This is from another thread, but it reminded me of the issues on this thread...


Afghanistan: The New War for Hearts and Minds (http://www.mensjournal.com/new-war-for-hearts-and-minds)
Men's Journal
Wed, Jan 21, 2009
While articles like this make me cringe, I have to say that it is more in line with reality than the views espoused by many Colonels, Generals, and think-tank pontificators, regarding how well the military has adapted to COIN. A lot of leaders "get it." Many don't. And most of the Soldiers don't. The reporter in that article didn't just luck out in finding a flamboyant, disgruntled NG Soldier or a disturbingly out-of-touch LT. That's about par for the course. Sadly, many of the people who write about, ponder about, and advise our civilian masters about military affairs have been separated from the line and segregated amongst fellow intellectuals for so long that their vision of reality is shaped more by their theories and published works than by their past experiences and the current situation. That's why I roll my eyes when people think that we're too focused on COIN.

Maybe our doctrine writers are too focused on it. I think that you could make that argument - or at least argue that too many intellectuals focused on military affairs are too enamored of COIN doctrine to the expense of other issues. Our Soldiers and small unit leaders aren't spending much time internalizing the lessons, training, and certainly not the doctrine. I can't count the number of E-4s and even NCOs whom I had to explain to, repeatedly, that our mission was to protect the population, not to just employ mass punishment if one local opted to fire an RPG at us. It was like explaining to them that the Sun revolves around the Earth and the Moon is made of green cheese. And then there were the LTs who wanted to suppress and flank with an entire platoon of brads in response to a 16-year-old who empties a magazine, drops his weapon, and runs. Thank you, school house, for teaching them nothing but 7-8 battle drills (hopefully, at least THAT has changed).

Some say COIN is the graduate level of war. That's nice. But our force is still in 2nd grade of COIN school and repeating its sophomore year of conventional high school. Maybe we need a No Soldier Left Behind act for our lackluster training?

[Bob's World]

A couple of things worth considering:

1. The newly signed and approved Irregular Warfare Directive opens by stating emphatically that "IW is as strategically important as traditional warfare.."

Ok, I can follow orders as well as the next guy, and a directive is an order, so salute and move out. As I do so though, I still offer that it is probably more helpful to consider this more as a change of environment than as a change of warfare.

While concepts like "4th and 5th generation warfare," "global insurgency" and "hybrid warfare" are all the rage among those who are searching to describe the dynamics of conflict in todays globalized world; I prefer to take a more pragmatic approach. Warfare has not changed, but the environment has changed significantly, and the wise warrior always seeks whatever advantage his environment offers; while the warrior burdened by too much doctrine tends to use what worked last time until his opponent forces him to adjust.

I've always said "train as you fight" is a rediculous cliche'. My position is: "You will fight as you have trained, until the enemy trains you to fight differently."


2. America is still blessed with oceans on either flank, a stable ally to the north, and no strong state threats from the south. We have the luxury of time and space. So as we determine how the military needs to train, organize and equip for the future, we must first determine how we will shape our other tools of foreign policy and engagement to facilitate our national interests in this bold new world.

America is a peace loving, warrior nation. Our national leaders forget the first half of that to our peril; and those who would oppose us forget the second half to theirs.

http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/300007p.pdf

[Ken White]

...I've always said "train as you fight" is a ridiculous cliche'. My position is: "You will fight as you have trained, until the enemy trains you to fight differently."Never heard 'train as you fight." In my day it was ALWAYS "you will fight as you train." Not the same thing at all.

I disagree quite strongly with the thought "You will fight as you have trained, until the enemy trains you to fight differently." That accedes the initiative to him and I don't buy that for a second. I'll set the mood and tempo, thank you very much. I know that can be done because I've done it in my own little corner of a number of fights...:cool:

In the last 30 years, a lot of things that were learned the hard way were thrown out by a bunch of smart people -- who should have known better -- and we're now getting to relearn them. We no longer use random names for operations but use catchy titles. That's dumb.

Our training is seriously deficient and the word Warrior is vastly overused. A good soldier should be able to whip a good warrior any day of the week. A warrior is an amateur fighter. He may be experienced but he's an amateur. A soldier by definition is a professional in today's Army and a good pro can whip a gifted amateur any day of the week. Or should be able to. If our performance in today's combat is merely okay and is not superb it is because we have not properly trained...

[Bob's World]

Come on Ken, you're kind of arguing with yourself! Will I, or won't I fight the way I was trained? And if I change, won't it be because I have learned, and therefore evolve to be more successful against the given threat/environment? We're really saying the same thing. Be prepared, but be adaptive.

I think you may be getting too symantic on the "warrior" vs "soldier." America has fielded several armies of ametures armed with a warrior spirit that did just fine against a some top-rate professional armies, from the Revolution through WWI and WWII.

Professional armies in America are a fairly new-fangled Cold War invention, and the jury is still out as to if it is a good idea or not IMHO. I get your point, in that a good boxer is going to take out a great untrained fighter without breaking a sweat. That's why we don't fare so well in "first battles." But when that fighter dusts himself off and gets back on his feet, the wiser for the knock-down; the boxer better be prepared to either start adapting or start sweating thanks to the training he just provided to his opponent.

[Ratzel]

Ratzel, if you are using your armed forces as your primary tool of "statesmanship", you are using the wrong tool. Nation Building and "shrinking the Gap" is a primary mission of State, not defense.

I think you're correct that this mission has traditionally been the responsibility of the State dept, but if nation building becomes part of America's foreign policy goals, then this will have to change. For example, if we had 200,000 foreign service professionals and sent them to Iraq today and pulled the military out; would we be better off? Probably not.

The most fanatical supporters of nation building (Barnett) make it clear that we need something "in between" the military and State, what Barnett calls a "System Administrator force," that appears to be a mix of peacekeeper troops, private contractors, diplomats, the private sector, the peace corps, and the USMC (for muscle). The opportunity cost of building such a force would be the big systems needed for State on State warfare.

[jmm99]

America has fielded several armies of ametures armed with a warrior spirit that did just fine against a some top-rate professional armies, from the Revolution through WWI and WWII.

after they had been trained by a core of pros - and after they had their clocks cleaned in early engagements because they were amateurs.

Having a warrior spirit without adequate training and equipment doesn't do it (e.g., Task Force Smith, 5 Jul 1950 - despite the RA serial numbers).

The Minuteman is a wonderful symbol - it is not a realistic option in a world where a nation needs legions - which is what we have (thankfully, IMO).

PS: certainly a bold signature - worthy of John Hancock :D

[Ken White]

Come on Ken, you're kind of arguing with yourself!I'll leave that to all you smart lawyers... ;)
Will I, or won't I fight the way I was trained?Yes, you're likely to do so as are all of us. The issue, though is not that.

The issue is if your training was good enough to enable you to survive to:
...therefore evolve to be more successful against the given threat/environment? We're really saying the same thing. Be prepared, but be adaptive.We are saying that; be prepared and be adaptive but I submit the differences I cited are more than just semantic. I don't think you can or should "train as you fight" because you do not know enough going in to know how you will fight, thus I agree with you that is a meaningless cliche. OTOH, the phrase "you will fight as you train" is a message to do it right. Thus my citing it was in agreement with you on that point and to substitute the older version which may also be a cliche but I think is a cautionary...

A cautionary we have forgotten to our detriment.

I also still strongly disagree that "...until the enemy trains you to fight differently." is an accurate statement or even a good statement. I think it is a bad statement and cedes initiative to the opponent. That is not a good idea; being prepared and adaptive is good, letting the other guy train you is bad. As another lawyer once told me, words are important...:wry:
I think you may be getting too symantic on the "warrior" vs "soldier." America has fielded several armies of ametures armed with a warrior spirit that did just fine against a some top-rate professional armies, from the Revolution through WWI and WWII.Yes, they did fine but only after they stopped being amateurs at war -- warriors -- and became soldiers and had learned from getting decimated by those other soldiers early on in each of those wars. Warrior is a bad term IMO, we can disagree on that.
Professional armies in America are a fairly new-fangled Cold War invention, and the jury is still out as to if it is a good idea or not IMHO.That's incorrect. The US army had been a professional force for all of its 233 years other than 10 years of major war and the 20 years of Draft during the Cold War. I hardly think that 13% of the Army's lifetime as other than a professional force qualifies as 'new fangled.' Nor am I sure that reverting to the normal state of a professional force nearly 40 years ago can be counted as 'new fangled.' Though I'll grant you that for 38 years we have been trying to run a professional Army as if it was full of amateurs...

We can disagree on whether it's a good idea; I think it's great -- and I served in it when it had the Draft and was not very professional for a variety of reasons. Then later got to serve with the professional force as an adjunct civilian employee. It's good but it could be better and better training is the need.

[Bob's World]

That's incorrect. The US army had been a professional force for all of its 233 years other than 10 years of major war and the 20 years of Draft during the Cold War. I hardly think that 13% of the Army's lifetime as other than a professional force qualifies as 'new fangled.' Nor am I sure that reverting to the normal state of a professional force nearly 40 years ago can be counted as 'new fangled.' Though I'll grant you that for 38 years we have been trying to run a professional Army as if it was full of amateurs...

We can disagree on whether it's a good idea; I think it's great -- and I served in it when it had the Draft and was not very professional for a variety of reasons. Then later got to serve with the professional force as an adjunct civilian employee. It's good but it could be better and better training is the need.

Ken,

Totally agree that a full-time, well trained and equipped Army is best for no-notice warfare; but up until the Cold War the American Populace was not willing to fund such a force, and in fact, for the first 100 years or so of the nation did not even trust having such a force.

I think we are over the trust issues, and the Cold War model has gone on for so long that most without a background in history don't realize what an anomaly it is.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:US_military_personnel_and_expenditures.png

This graph on wikipedia tells the story better than I can. The history of America is one that maintains a small professional cadre in times of peace to man garrisons, write doctrine, and provide a nucleus to build upon in time of war. Each war has then been fought by a vast influx of citizen soldiers, who quickly returned to civilian life once the conflict was over. Which brings us to another downside of a professional Army, is that we don't have a lot of vets stepping into key civilian leadership roles after their short stint for the duration.

Absolutely we maintained a professional core of an Army, but that isn't what we fought and won our wars with. Guard, Militia, Volunteers, Draftees; not Regulars.

Today we think it normal that we have this huge army and massive footprint overseas and at home. Maybe we need it. I don't know. We sure have our fingers in a lot of pies around the world these days.

Now that the Cold War is 20 years behind us, the Army is just one of many institutions, policies, relationships and perspectives that were formed for a particular purpose, but that have been around so long we forget the real reason we formed them. High time for a full review and recalibration across the board.

[Entropy]

Our training is seriously deficient and the word Warrior is vastly overused. A good soldier should be able to whip a good warrior any day of the week. A warrior is an amateur fighter. He may be experienced but he's an amateur. A soldier by definition is a professional in today's Army and a good pro can whip a gifted amateur any day of the week. Or should be able to. If our performance in today's combat is merely okay and is not superb it is because we have not properly trained

I'm with you on the "warrior" thing. I don't like it at all. Warriors, in my mind, fight for personal or tribal glory. Professional soldiers do not.

I do agree with Col. Jones, however, that a large, standing professional military can grow to threaten Republicanism.

[Ken White]

but up until the Cold War the American Populace was not willing to fund such a force, and in fact, for the first 100 years or so of the nation did not even trust having such a force.Not Correct. It was not so much the populace as the Congress and not so much unwilling as unable -- the Federal Government take of total government revenue was only about 12-15% until the Income Tax Amendment was ratified in 1913, then it slowly climbed until Franklin was elected, began a steady and more rapid climb and hit about 60% of all government intake by the end of WW II where it has essentially stayed since. We had a big Army during the Cold War because, for the first time in a period of peace, we could afford it.
I think we are over the trust issues, and the Cold War model has gone on for so long that most without a background in history don't realize what an anomaly it is.We never had a trust issue except for the 10-15% fringes on both the left and right. That lack of trust is still there, big time -- in fact, for the far left, it's worse than ever. I do agree with you that the Cold War was an anomaly -- an era of phony 'not peace but no war' except for Korea and Viet Nam when, as is true today, the Army and Marines went to war, supported by the Air Force and Navy while DoD and the rest of the nation did NOT go to war. You're also correct in saying that many do not realize what an anomaly the cold war era was -- the world is now back to business as usual. Messy, isn't it? :D
This graph on wikipedia tells the story better than I can. The history of America is one that maintains a small professional cadre in times of peace to man garrisons, write doctrine, and provide a nucleus to build upon in time of war. Each war has then been fought by a vast influx of citizen soldiers, who quickly returned to civilian life once the conflict was over. Which brings us to another downside of a professional Army, is that we don't have a lot of vets stepping into key civilian leadership roles after their short stint for the duration.That was partly true, that small Regular Army fought several wars without the Militia. Different world, though. Today's speed of communication and travel make a return to what was the norm before WW II not a sensible proposition; make it a dangerous idea in fact. You are of course correct in the lack of veterans for civilian leadership roles being a negative but I suspect we'll survive.
Absolutely we maintained a professional core of an Army, but that isn't what we fought and won our wars with. Guard, Militia, Volunteers, Draftees; not Regulars.True and if we have a big war, I suspect we'll do the same thing again.
Today we think it normal that we have this huge army and massive footprint overseas and at home. Maybe we need it. I don't know. We sure have our fingers in a lot of pies around the world these days.Yep. In 1939 the Army and AAC were at 189K, 50K overseas, the Army and AAC were about .15% of the US population. Today the Army and USAF total about 866K, about 220K overseas, they are about .28% of the population. So we're twice a big on a per capita basis now as then -- mostly because we can afford it -- and we have about five time as many overseas -- that's due to that speed of communication and travel I mentioned...

Still well less than one half of one percent of the nation serving in the active Army and air arm. I don't think we need to worry about being a garrison state for a while. :wry:
Now that the Cold War is 20 years behind us, the Army is just one of many institutions, policies, relationships and perspectives that were formed for a particular purpose, but that have been around so long we forget the real reason we formed them. High time for a full review and recalibration across the board.This is another of your anomalies. The cold war Army ran between 700K and 900K with ~40% overseas. This Army is 500K with less than 35% overseas -- and the big batch of that will return to CONUS over the next couple of years. The Cold War Army had 10 to 19 divisions; we now have 40 plus Bdes. This Army bears very little resemblance to the Army of 20 years ago, one with which I was thoroughly familiar.

The reason we -- Congress -- formed the active Army was to be an instrument of national power where and when force was required. That was true in 1840, true in 1940 -- and it's true today. I don't think anyone has forgotten that reason.

[Ken White]

As the commercial used to say...:D


I'm with you on the "warrior" thing. I don't like it at all. Warriors, in my mind, fight for personal or tribal glory. Professional soldiers do not.Does this mean I have to turn in all my ARCOMS??? :eek:
I do agree with Col. Jones, however, that a large, standing professional military can grow to threaten Republicanism.I don't disagree with the premise but as I said in the post above, giving actual numbers in that comment and ending with: "Still well less than one half of one percent of the nation serving in the active Army and air arm. I don't think we need to worry about being a garrison state for a while."

IOW, it isn't large. Not by a long shot. Check Bob'sworld's link and graph -- from 1950 until 1990, over a 40 year period we consistently had from 750K to 1M plus in the Army (and the Republic survived...); essentially we're at a half that -- and there's a war on...:eek:

I'm sure you also object to a large Air force and Navy as you did say Military and not just Army. I'm equally sure you're aware of the even larger cuts those two services have sustained in the last 20 years. ;)

I'll also point out that the increase of the Army from 475K in 2001 to 546K (or whatever it is this week) while welcomed by AUSA and some in the Army was resisted by others in the Army, objected to by me and will be the first thing to be cut when Afghanistan and Iraq are history -- and they will become that sooner rather than later.

[Entropy]

Ken,

I don't disagree with your last comment at all, just simply pointing out the danger that might come through creeping normalcy and the passage of time, as well as the need for some amount of vigilance.

[Ken White]

Ken,

I don't disagree with your last comment at all, just simply pointing out the danger that might come through creeping normalcy and the passage of time, as well as the need for some amount of vigilance.Code Pink is vigilant! So is our great media crowd. Representative Waxman. Many others who 'support the troops' but not the war and wouldn't let their sons and daughters near a uniform... :rolleyes:

Not a worry to me; we had forty years of a much bigger Army and Jimmy Carter in that time frame; ideal coup conditions and not a glimmer... :D

And Burt Lancaster has expired... ;)

Seriously, after 45 years of the fabled 24/7 involvement, that is not even a teensy fear to me. I'm firmly convinced that too many in uniform would not stand for any foolishness on the part of one of their own or a politician or group of pols.

[Steve Blair]

Not Correct. It was not so much the populace as the Congress

Actually it was the populace as well. The military never really occupied a position of respect in this country until the 20th century. It was viewed throughout the 1800s as a refuge for drunkards, unemployable dullards, and foreigners looking to learn English. Officers were respected to a degree, but that was usually based on Volunteer service during either the Mexican War or the Civil War and not Regular service. It's easy to get sucked into the fiscal debates, but aside from Thomas Nast there were few actual "soldier-boosters" around during the latter part of the 1800s...and those who were typically wanted to make some green off the boys in blue.

I would also question the long-term impact of citizen-soldiers who step into leadership positions after their term expired. Historically some of the biggest opponents to a standing force, and indeed good training and equipment for that force, were those same volunteers/draftees who later rose to political prominence. And if you think the officer corps is political now, you should look back through some of the stuff they were writing in the 1880s or so.

[Ken White]

Actually it was the populace as well. The military never really occupied a position of respect in this country until the 20th century. It was viewed throughout the 1800s as a refuge for drunkards, unemployable dullards, and foreigners looking to learn English...was the real issue. That was the realm of the Congress.

What you say is true but that enlisted population constitution was as much or more a result of the extremely low wages paid as anything else, that and the tendency of older communities to shun newer communities of immigrants. You get what you pay for was as or more true then than it is today. The popular attitude was due to the perceived quality of the troops, a quality directly attributable to what it was paid...

Witness today. The combat arms are enlisting better than average quality in all aspects young men and women from the middle classes from all across the US. That's because we now pay a sensible wage. That also attracts larger than normal quantities of immigrants from newer communities.

Not that the current great quality is treated much better by many in as well as outside the services than were their 19th and early 20th century counterparts...:rolleyes:
I would also question the long-term impact of citizen-soldiers who step into leadership positions after their term expired. Historically some of the biggest opponents to a standing force, and indeed good training and equipment for that force, were those same volunteers/draftees who later rose to political prominence. And if you think the officer corps is political now, you should look back through some of the stuff they were writing in the 1880s or so.Very true. Many World War II graduates in positions of civil leadership also did not do anyone any favors.

[Steve Blair]

What you say is true but that enlisted population constitution was as much or more a result of the extremely low wages paid as anything else, that and the tendency of older communities to shun newer communities of immigrants. You get what you pay for was as or more true then than it is today. The popular attitude was due to the perceived quality of the troops, a quality directly attributable to what it was paid...

And now that I've managed to wander us into a tangent....:D

The pay issue was certainly true in the period after 1900, but prior to that it wasn't as bad as one might think (not great, but it compared reasonably well with some other common wages of the time). There were men who enlisted because the pay was better than what they could make as a day laborer, and as always the quality went up when the economy went down, but the majority of the information I've looked at cited the low social status of the regular soldier as being more of a deterrent to qualified applicants than the low pay ("Soldier soldier will you work? No indeed I'll sell my shirt" was a line from a ditty of the time-roughly post Civil War-that reflected popular sentiment rather well) . The immigrant communities most common in the army throughout this period were the Irish and the Germans; and the Germans tended to enlist because they had often been in one of the many small German state armies before coming to the US. The Irish are an interesting story in and of themselves, but I won't divert the thread any more than I already have. I promise....:o

[Bob's World]

I would also question the long-term impact of citizen-soldiers who step into leadership positions after their term expired. Historically some of the biggest opponents to a standing force, and indeed good training and equipment for that force, were those same volunteers/draftees who later rose to political prominence. And if you think the officer corps is political now, you should look back through some of the stuff they were writing in the 1880s or so.

I don't know, just to name a few:

George Washington - LTC of Militia French and Indian War
Abe Lincoln- Captain of Volunteers, Blackhawk Indian War
Andrew Jackson - General of Volunteers, rivermen and pirates, War of 1812
Kennedy, Nixon, Ford, etc: JOs in WWII
Truman: Missouri NG FA Battery CDR, WWI


Obviously these are just a few, it was such a part of the fabric of our culture that virtually every President either served in war as a young man, or was a General coming off off a big victory.


My point is not that we don't need a big army though. If we keep the mission what it is now the Army needs to be even bigger. My point is that we should not see having a large standing army as being mandatory. We need to conduct a major review of all of our foreign policy tools, policies, and institutions in the context of a National Grand Strategy for how we move forward from where we are right now. Once we have a strategy and that review, the size and role of the Army and all of DoD need to be on the table just like everything else.

As many have stated, the Army is doing a lot of things that aren't very "Army-like," and that detract from the ability to train and equip for "Army" missions. Until we create new organizations to do those things, the Army will remain the catch-all.

So here is my question: If it comes down to a choice of an Army half the current size that just focuses on war fighting, with the creation of a new organization that does nation building; or keeping the Army the current size with the current full range of missions, which one will the boys in the Pentagon sign up for??

[Ken White]

...My point is that we should not see having a large standing army as being mandatory.I'm not sure that everyone does see that, certainly some do but I think there are more that do not see it as desirable, much less mandatory. I do think a good many see it as an unavoidable necessity at this time.
We need to conduct a major review of all of our foreign policy tools, policies, and institutions in the context of a National Grand Strategy for how we move forward from where we are right now. Once we have a strategy and that review, the size and role of the Army and all of DoD need to be on the table just like everything else.Ideally you're correct, practically speaking, I believe it highly unlikely anything along that line will occur. If it should, it won't last. Our governmental system with potentially major changes every two years and almost certainly every four or eight years won't support such continuity of purpose. There are many myths that say we did that -- exercise continuity of purpose -- during the Cold War but they are not true. Each new administration brought major changes. We have one abiding strategic interest which does carry forward with every governmental change -- we do not tolerate threats. I think that's adequate, not great -- but adequate.
As many have stated, the Army is doing a lot of things that aren't very "Army-like," and that detract from the ability to train and equip for "Army" missions. Until we create new organizations to do those things, the Army will remain the catch-all."Many" should read or recall more history. The US Army has done that for all of my lifetime; for all it's lifetime, in fact (and as do Armies in other nations). See the Corps of Engineers history and their Locks, Lakes and Dams for a small example. Think Lewis and Clark, roadbuilding in the early US, schoolteaching in the Philippines in the early 20th century, the CCC, McNamara's Project 100,000, Northern Watch and the Kurds to Guam, Kosovo...
So here is my question: If it comes down to a choice of an Army half the current size that just focuses on war fighting, with the creation of a new organization that does nation building; or keeping the Army the current size with the current full range of missions, which one will the boys in the Pentagon sign up for??The latter because the former is totally lacking in flexibility, effectively locks the US into a strategy that hews to 'nation building' which generally is NOT in our interest and which we should avoid to the extent we are able and the boys in the Pentagon know that (well, most of 'em anyway) -- it's for those reasons and not just because the latter is the status quo, provides for a larger budget, keeps control in the hands of DoD and does not adversely impact warfighting capability though those factors also count. ;)

[Bullmoose Bailey]

Don't forget these favorites:
--Misinterpret higher headquarters tasker, thereby doubling required workload
--12 hour run with hair on fire in response to above tasker
--Submit/Resubmit staff coordination/decision packet (at least 5 reps, usually with two reconsiderations of non-concurrence by the same office for failing to change "happy" to "glad"
--distill 50 pages of text into 3 bullet .PPT slide for 30 second podium "bob and weave."

Very good gents.

And my other mandatory events:

-making mountains out of molehills
-running around in circles
-digging yourself in deeper

[Bullmoose Bailey]

I'm not sure that everyone does see that, certainly some do but I think there are more that do not see it as desirable, much less mandatory. I do think a good many see it as an unavoidable necessity at this time.Ideally you're correct, practically speaking, I believe it highly unlikely anything along that line will occur. If it should, it won't last. Our governmental system with potentially major changes every two years and almost certainly every four or eight years won't support such continuity of purpose. There are many myths that say we did that -- exercise continuity of purpose -- during the Cold War but they are not true. Each new administration brought major changes. We have one abiding strategic interest which does carry forward with every governmental change -- we do not tolerate threats. I think that's adequate, not great -- but adequate."Many" should read or recall more history. The US Army has done that for all of my lifetime; for all it's lifetime, in fact (and as do Armies in other nations). See the Corps of Engineers history and their Locks, Lakes and Dams for a small example. Think Lewis and Clark, roadbuilding in the early US, schoolteaching in the Philippines in the early 20th century, the CCC, McNamara's Project 100,000, Northern Watch and the Kurds to Guam, Kosovo...The latter because the former is totally lacking in flexibility, effectively locks the US into a strategy that hews to 'nation building' which generally is NOT in our interest and which we should avoid to the extent we are able and the boys in the Pentagon know that (well, most of 'em anyway) -- it's for those reasons and not just because the latter is the status quo, provides for a larger budget, keeps control in the hands of DoD and does not adversely impact warfighting capability though those factors also count. ;)

"Unavoidable Necessity" Roger that. The US Founding Fathers of course hated the idea of standing armies. Bear in mind of course that the "State Militias", to use the old verbage, have proven invaluable to the Federal Government goals of late also.

I must disagree with the sometime prevalent NPR aired attitude of anti-militarism, i.e. the Army is brutish, broken and banal to broader bliss. Generally NPR and the MSM in sum doesn't give the same degree of scrutiny to their "illuminated" pacificts, Global-Communists & sputnicks who have been entrenched over at State for decades now. GEN Powell, I believe, realised too late that he should've started from scratch because America, as it turns out, doesn't have a foreign policy other than the one that comes in the mail every month from the CFR...America, as it were, has a "globalist policy" and her people never consented for that.

[Umar Al-Mokhtār]

James Mattoon Scott :wry:

Increasing the Armed Forces is necessary today in light of our large commitments and the stress they put on the members of those forces. Now there are those who maintain that maintaining a large "army" poses a threat to the republic. Yet for every Scott there are more 'Jiggs' Caseys around. :D

As Ken has pointed our military was larger during the 60's and 70's and there were no hints of a coup. Even in 1949 the "Revolt of the Admirals" was entirely political and there was never a hint of a military coup, and the actions of Louis Johnson would have done so in some other countries.

The Founding Fathers were rightfully leery of standing armies in their era, because then the army and navy were solely property of the monarch. Thus much easier to be used against an unruly populace or turn against their master (see France 1789). Our republic has matured much in the last couple centuries to where the maintanence of both a good sized armed force, both active and reserve, can be safely done. Yes it bears watching but isn't that what Congress is for? Then again quis custodiet ipsos custodes?