Great COIN discussion over at AM [Archive]

Ken White

01-20-2009, 05:24 PM

I'm sure a lot of people here are regular readers at Abu Muqawama's site - I know I am. I found this exchange between Col. Gentile and an anonymous (but well-informed) poster very fascinating and informative. (http://abumuqawama.blogspot.com/2009/01/gian-gentile-versus-abu-muqawama-round.html) Scroll down and look for the exchange between "Looking Glass" and Col. Gentile. Great stuff:

Read the whole thing. I think he was able to poke more holes in Col. Gentile's arguments than anyone else I've read, and I consider myself more a "Gentilist" than not.What the articulate Looking Glass says in even more words than I would use is that:

- We blew the well done fighting entry into Iraq because we had no doctrine for, had not trained for and did not plan for Phase 4 / occupation -- and the likely ensuing activity. True. Most all of that simply due to a lack of training; we wiped it out of syllabii and no one knew what to do.

- We're not really practicing COIN operations in many ways because we're still in a pre-2001 NTC mindset. True -- but hopefully he realizes that's because all the Generals and Colonels are products of that period and are reverting, as we all do, to the way they were trained *...

- We can probably produce a force that can do both MCO and LIC if simply train correctly. True.

- Our training is pathetic. True.

So, yeah, he's got it pretty well right and he's trying to educate Gian... :D

* Equally hopefully, Gian realizes that he is correct on the need to emphasize conventional warfare but that if we simply change the way we train as ol' Looking glass, I and others have been advocating, then the problem seen by Gian on the one hand and the COIN advocates on the other will no longer exist.

[ Count the number of times the word 'train' or its derivatives appear in this post. ;) ]

Fuchs

01-20-2009, 08:50 PM

I'm always a bit perplexed that the 'COIN and/or HIC discussion' is usually (pretty much always) discussed from the lens of order-receiving military personnel.
Even generals aren't at the top of the food chain; politicians are.
It needs a political analysis to decide the matter, and politicians need to think about much more/different things than troops.

Most importantly, they decide whether warfare is advantageous or not (at least they should).
The effort / benefit ratio of COIN in distant, even non-allied countries is about as good as if you wanted to fight lung cancer by throwing chewing gums (substitute to cigarettes) from a plane.
It sucks.
Tell me a single COIN war in a distant country that justified the effort (fiscal effort and damage to society & individuals).
There's a reason why we know so few bright, shining exemplary COIN wars; they suck as a category.

It's in my opinion absolutely intolerable to prepare an army for small wars in the future because that's simply wrong planning; it's planning for moving intentionally into terrible situations. It's stupid. (Yes, I believe that Gates is a terrible SecDef, one who makes others feel good and who knows how to look as if he makes good decisions, but he's terrible.)

Preparations for more small wars in the future?
Prepare some special forces, military intelligence and the military police for COIN, that will suffice.
Downsize the rest to what's necessary to keep the alliance safe (no-one who doesn't promise to stand by us in advance deserves to be protected by us, so let's just care about allies) - and determine this size by taking into account all allied forces/powers (which means: The new size would be small and truly affordable).

Ken White

01-20-2009, 11:02 PM

I'm always a bit perplexedNot to worry, give it some thought... that the 'COIN and/or HIC discussion' is usually (pretty much always) discussed from the lens of order-receiving military personnel.Some give orders too; over here they're asked for their opinion -- sometimes they're listened to, sometimes not but here everyone has a right to state their opinion and most of us will.
Even generals aren't at the top of the food chain; politicians are.
It needs a political analysis to decide the matter, and politicians need to think about much more/different things than troops.You're living in a dream world; most western politicians today have stayed as far away from the armed forces as they possibly could.Most importantly, they decide whether warfare is advantageous or not (at least they should).Agree they should, shame they don't -- or when they do, don't do a better job of it...The effort / benefit ratio of COIN in distant, even non-allied countries is about as good as if you wanted to fight lung cancer by throwing chewing gums (substitute to cigarettes) from a plane.
It sucks.Yep. Makes no difference. Those politicians you talked about earlier will keep sending soldiers off to do work that sucks...
Tell me a single COIN war in a distant country that justified the effort (fiscal effort and damage to society & individuals).There's a reason why we know so few bright, shining exemplary COIN wars; they suck as a category.Greece. Philippines -- didn't we do this before? Why bother; what's past is irrelvant; politicians not only can't spell Army, few of them know much history.It's in my opinion absolutely intolerable to prepare an army for small wars in the future because that's simply wrong planning; it's planning for moving intentionally into terrible situations. It's stupid. (Yes, I believe that Gates is a terrible SecDef, one who makes others feel good and who knows how to look as if he makes good decisions, but he's terrible.)I'll forward your recommendation to the White House; you'll hear from them soon, I'm sure.Preparations for more small wars in the future? Prepare some special forces, military intelligence and the military police for COIN, that will suffice. Downsize the rest to what's necessary to keep the alliance safe (no-one who doesn't promise to stand by us in advance deserves to be protected by us, so let's just care about allies) - and determine this size by taking into account all allied forces/powers (which means: The new size would be small and truly affordable).There you go, being logical -- you don't need to tell us all that -- tell the politicians.

Schmedlap

01-21-2009, 12:06 AM

I don't know who Looking Glass is, but I like the cut of his jib.

Just look at the MITT/ETT program... the treatment and support of these teams when they operate in another's battlespace tells most of all how much our Army "gets" COIN.

Gentlemen, while you address this matter in such scholarly fashion, men are in crude places poorly supported and repeatedly countermanded by senior officers, your brethren, who just plain don't "get it." As long as that is a consistent narrative, any discussion of, "has our Army gone too far with this COIN thing?" is pointless.EXACTLY! This never-ending debate is like the kid who checks under the bed and checks the closet every night, afraid that the bogeyman is there. He's not. But the kid keeps worrying. Gone too far with COIN? The doctrinal publications are very nice. They have neat illustrations and interesting concepts. The cover designs are swell. But back in the real world, the SSG, 1LT, and CPT don't even have a decent interpreter. The MITT needs to bum batteries off of a line unit's supply sergeant. Commanders deploy overconfident that they're the next Robert Thompson and within a month revert back to what they are comfortable with: raids, ambushes, cordons & searches, OPs, "presence patrols", and the like. The average infantryman still exudes the attitude that, "these people should show some fricken gratitude - we liberated their damn country." And back home, over half of the pre-deployment training is the same old weapons qual, reflexive fire, squad/section evaluations, and Table 8/Table 12. Procurement is still churning out big heavy vehicles, boats, and aircraft. And Officers are still learning how to draw big sweeping arrows (though now in PowerPoint format, projected on a 42" plasma screen).

Gentile (Is he a LTC, LTC(P), or COL?) responds:
Your quip about our discussions here of being "scholarly" has a whiff of condescension and implies a muddy-boots view of the ivory tower... this blog has many participants some with experience, but most with lots of knowledge and interest in these important matters.It's a damned good muddy-boots view of the ivory tower, in my opinion. The discussions are purely academic, in spite of the operational experience of the participants. The debate has become a past-time among military buffs that is occasionally perceived by outsiders as something mirroring reality. It's more of a hobby for the participants and a free online broken-record seminar for onlookers. Anyone who thinks that we've gone too far with COIN, or are in danger of doing so, significantly overestimates how far we've actually gone. While some leaders "get it" they are still unable to implement it. And, not to worry - most don't "get it" anyway.

Gian P Gentile

01-21-2009, 12:42 AM

Gentile (Is he a LTC, LTC(P), or COL?)

Since you ask I am an active duty Army Colonel presently posted as an associate professor of history at West Point where I run the military history program. I have done two runs in Iraq. The first was in 2003 as a BCT XO in 4ID in Tikrit and the second was again in 4ID in west Baghdad in command of an armored recon squadron in 2006.

For whatever it is worth I wrote my doctoral dissertation on the Air Force's World War II Strategic Bombing Survey and in it I was highly critical of the air force for using it to shape their future visions of an independent air arm.

I find it personally ironic that in a previous life most of my scholarly work was in criticism of the Air Force and airmen; now I am teamed up with an Air Force MG and providing critical views of the American Army's approach to coin.

Ken White

01-21-2009, 01:12 AM

...The debate has become a past-time among military buffs that is occasionally perceived by outsiders as something mirroring reality. It's more of a hobby for the participants and a free online broken-record seminar for onlookers.Totally true and it will have no effect on what really happens -- but I'm retired and don't have much else to do... :D

It doesn't really mirror reality because most of those decisions have been made for the next five years and the few that haven't been will be made mostly by Congress and not be me or anyone involved in the debate including the big names or the Think Tanks -- or their graduates. Or Gian. Or Looking Glass. ;)Anyone who thinks that we've gone too far with COIN, or are in danger of doing so, significantly overestimates how far we've actually gone. While some leaders "get it" they are still unable to implement it. And, not to worry - most don't "get it" anyway.I don't think we have and know we will not go far enough to get good at it -- we can and likely will go far enough to do okay for the most part.

I still contend however, that we should avoid it where possible; it's un-American. That, BTW, is a serious comment, we're too impatient and selfish to do it well. More importantly, we are too widely disliked in most of the world to do it because we become targets, everybody wants a shot at the big guy. On top of that, the One Third and Two Year rules apply. :eek:

Fuchs

01-21-2009, 01:15 AM

Well, Ken, then let us begin all future statement about "HIC and/or COIN" with

"It's a political failure to enter small wars abroad, but when the politicians force the armed services to ..."

It's badly misleading if the first choice is widely accepted as achievable but not available dud to political failure and the second choice is discussed publicly as if it was a first choice.

Maybe the politicians wouldn't start small wars in the future if the armed services tell the world that small wars abroad are a no-win proposition because they're exceedingly difficult to win with less harm than benefit to the own nation.

Let's assume that the armies of the NATO countries are well prepared for COIN in structure, training, doctrine and equipment. You can bet that this would lead to a lot of ####ty, avoidable and probably outright criminal wars launched by our politicians.

Show them a blunt sword and they'll think twice.

Cavguy

01-21-2009, 02:09 AM

I find it personally ironic that in a previous life most of my scholarly work was in criticism of the Air Force and airmen; now I am teamed up with an Air Force MG and providing critical views of the American Army's approach to coin.

That is interesting. I need to read your dissertation on Strategic Bombing, I saw it mentioned on the loop the other day.

Ken White

01-21-2009, 04:38 AM

Well, Ken, then let us begin all future statement about "HIC and/or COIN" with

"It's a political failure to enter small wars abroad, but when the politicians force the armed services to ..."We could do that but is seems a waste of effort to me because most military folks and civilian military analysts are fully aware that it's a truth and that the politicians don't pay much attention to it.It's badly misleading if the first choice is widely accepted as achievable but not available dud to political failure and the second choice is discussed publicly as if it was a first choice.Two ifs; big ones...

I don't recall any western democracy including the US taking that route. All have tried other options -- perhaps not the right ones but they tried. I cannot recall any instance since WW II where western nations have elected war as a first choice.Maybe the politicians wouldn't start small wars in the future if the armed services tell the world that small wars abroad are a no-win proposition because they're exceedingly difficult to win with less harm than benefit to the own nation.That was the purpose of the Weinberger and Powell Doctrines; they guided US policy in that vein from 1984 until 2001. The thrust was no COIN ops, don't go to war unless major US interests were involved. George W. Bush ran for election as President essentially saying "...no nation building, no sticking our nose in other peoples business." After we went to Afghanistan, he got roundly criticized for not doing what he said he would do. Lyndon Johnson got elected in 1964 saying his opponent would expand the Viet Nam war -- got elected and proceeded to expand it himself.

The problem is that the politicians aren't going to war so the fact that some are harder than others doesn't matter to them.Let's assume that the armies of the NATO countries are well prepared for COIN in structure, training, doctrine and equipment. You can bet that this would lead to a lot of ####ty, avoidable and probably outright criminal wars launched by our politicians.

Show them a blunt sword and they'll think twice.I doubt it. Most of 'em aren't smart enough to figure that out. They've been known to threaten people with blunt swords. The US has gone to big wars eight times, Viet Nam was the last (Desert Storm was not a war and neither Afghanistan or Iraq is a big war by any definition) -- all eight of those saw us with an essentially blunt sword and the politicians knew and went anyway. Aside from those wars, we have since 1801 engaged in over 200 incursions, raids and what have you on the sovereign territory of others; swords were blunt most of those times.

The armed forces of any nation have a responsibility to be as prepared for all eventualities as possible. The US, for example was not prepared for stability operations in Afghanistan or Iraq -- we erred. We should not do so again. You may be a nice guy and opposed to war -- there are a lot folks out there who aren't nice and will start a war in a second...

Bill Moore

01-21-2009, 05:11 AM

I'm not going to fool anyone, I have been involved in the COIN debate with other SWJ members for a few months. I don't know if my apparent flip flopping on whether I support or oppose Gian's views are due to some underlying medical issue, or if I'm just not sure what the debate is really about.

Posted by Ken,

* Equally hopefully, Gian realizes that he is correct on the need to emphasize conventional warfare but that if we simply change the way we train as ol' Looking glass, I and others have been advocating, then the problem seen by Gian on the one hand and the COIN advocates on the other will no longer exist.

I have agreed with Ken on this point several times, and I'm not sure why we feel obligated to support one position or the other? The argument seems to be dividing us unnecessarily, if you support COIN you're in the Moose Party and if you support conventional war you're in the Bear Party. Fortunately, our situation isn't that complex. We're American fighting men and women who took an oath to defend our Constitution against "all enemies" foreign and domestic. Many of our potential foes present a conventional military threat, while many of our foes present an irregular combatant threat. There is no debate, we "must" be prepared to fight and win against both. How we prepare is arguable, and in Gian's defense I don't think he ever argued that we ignore COIN or the irregular threat.

I found much to agree with Looking Glass's post, and unfortunately the truth frequently hurts. There is a big difference between really getting and doing it and paying lip service to it; it being COIN.

Once an operatonal mold is set, it is hard to break out of it. I remember one of the dumbest statments I heard from a very smart senior officer. Don't worry about it Bill, it's Iraq, so we got it, which was one way of saying we been there before and we're going to do the same thing again when we go back, don't worry about the new intelligence reports. Most leaders are not as courageous and intelligent as GEN Petreaus in my opinion, and his leadership has been courageous and decisive, and I think his surge strategy (or right sizing) was instrumental in reducing the violence in Iraq. By no means was the surge the sole factor, but I don't believe all the other contributing factors would have made much of an impact without the surge. The argument is academic at this point because we'll never really know what would have happened if we didn't surge, but still I would like to hear Gian's arguments on why he believes the surge wasn't effective in reducing the violence?

Now I'm going to flip flop (I'll see the doc tomorrow) and support one of Gian's arguments. His point about our COIN doctrine being largely focused on counter-Mao insurgency strategies is accurate, and it is a major shortfall. To be fair it does address other types of insurgencies, but it doesn't address different strategies for dealing with them. In many areas of the world there will not be a large majority of fence sitters in the affected populace just waiting to be won over by either the insurgent or the counterinsurgent. Who they support is sometimes a given, especially in identity based insurgencies/struggles. How do you wage a successful COIN campaign when the populace will not support you (and the HN you're supporting) with our current doctrine? I think the courses of action available (regardless of feasibility) are obvious, even if some of them are not politically correct. But onward to the most important post,

Schmedlap posted,

But back in the real world, the SSG, 1LT, and CPT don't even have a decent interpreter. The MITT needs to bum batteries off of a line unit's supply sergeant. Commanders deploy overconfident that they're the next Robert Thompson and within a month revert back to what they are comfortable with: raids, ambushes, cordons & searches, OPs, "presence patrols", and the like. The average infantryman still exudes the attitude that, "these people should show some fricken gratitude - we liberated their damn country."

COIN is a reality, we'll have to be proficient at it at all levels and we're not. There is much to fix; and to fix with a great sense of urgency. We have guys and gals in harms way now who are not properly trained or resourced for the fight they're in today, which is sinful this far along into the fight. So once again, what is the COIN debate about?

Ken White

01-21-2009, 05:27 AM

...We have guys and gals in harms way now who are not properly trained or resourced for the fight they're in today, which is sinful this far along into the fight. So once again, what is the COIN debate about?The debate is, at this level, whiling away time and stating opinions. Most of the big decisions for the next five years are already in concrete in any event.

Wat is not in concrete is our training. That can be changed -- and, as you point out, it needs to be...

Bullmoose Bailey

01-21-2009, 05:43 AM

excellent discussion...

thanks for pointing this exchange out here. have felt that the "adaptive" application of the numerous tools in our weaponry at the full spectrum of diplomacy through total warfare is called for. this spontaneous improvisation may be the true measure of genius in small wars.

William F. Owen

01-21-2009, 07:40 AM

To jump in behind Bill Moore

OK, I have no dog in this fight, but as an "informed" outside observer it strikes me that this debate between Col Gentile, and the post-modernist is getting off track in terms of being useful.

What I find extremely useful in Gentile's attitude is his forewarning that the loss of Combined Arms dispersed mobile warfare skills, against a peer or even near peer competitor, are extremely easy to loose and very expensive and difficult to recover. It is this level of operations which armies find difficult to do.

COIN is the basic standard for ALL armies, or should be. It's cheap to train for, relies mostly on education, and is very context specific.
(EG: for the UK, force generating units like the Ulster Defence Regiment was extremely easy compared to force generating Armoured Infantry regiments)
Sadly is not often done well, because of these things. Cheap is bad, and "education is for pussies", while "training is for warriors."

It is neither true nor useful to say that all future wars will be small wars. Does the US need to improve it's COIN training and education - YES!
Can it afford to let its High End slide - NO!

The solution all lies in the correct training and doctrine, constrained by a limited budget and finite time and resources. Unless some fundamentals are put in place, this debate serves neither side well.

Schmedlap

01-21-2009, 09:09 AM

Visit any unit in Iraq or Afghanistan and tell me that what you see is a COIN force, rather than a conventional force occasionally engaging in COIN. I think you'll be hard pressed to do so with a straight face. In terms of organizational culture, MTOE, and the basic mindset of the average Soldier, we are a conventional force engaged in LIC. This is even more apparent if you observe training, stateside. I think people on both sides of the COIN too-much vs not-enough debate overestimate how well we've adapted. The debate is academic and the views and memories of the participants have been clouded through the passage of time and overexamination, imo. I think that a lot of very smart people are wasting their time, arguing themselves into irrelevance. The new doctrine, the continuous churning out of new op-eds, and the glossy think tank studies are neat. But training is not keeping pace with the rhetoric.

Gian P Gentile

01-21-2009, 11:31 AM

Niel: The little thing was turned into a book by NYU Press a few years back but don’t buy it since the price has become somewhat prohibitive. I bet the Leavenworth library has a copy of it. Anyway, just as you quipped a few weeks ago that I would be proud of you for mentioning the need to maintain hic capabilities I think you would be pleased with my criticism of the air force and airmen in their zeal to create an independent air arm and the arguments they were making at the time for the absolute decisiveness of air power.

Bill: Agree and good question: "what is the Coin debate about?" To me it is not a maximalist set of arguments of an either or proposition on things. As I have said before, the different view always acknowledge the others positions; eg, Niel acknowledges the need to maintain conventional capabilities, or John Nagl always does the same too. And I have never said that the army should not maintain its capability to do coin because it must. I think where the debate is at, prompted rightly by discussions on the SWJ and AM and specifically by folks like Herschel Smith, is to get at a clear and detailed understanding of what we really mean by "balance." Ken has weighed in often very clearly on these matters. It seems to me that as Herschel stated we have to take out the red-pen, we have to make choices. And I imagine if you put a Coin proponent in a room with me as a "Con" proponent and said take this list of defense resources and start cutting, then produce a scheme for how to organize and train the military and specifically the army for the future, well at that point agreement would most likely go away. I for one, in simplistic terms, would not want to trade-off armor and firepower in the force for more light infantry and soft-power-like systems. Certainly there is a need for the latter, but if it came to a tradeoff (which invariably all of these things must come to that) my vote would be for firepower and protection as a key element in the force.

Schmedlap: Well the exchange between me and LG has been interesting. I have made my points about his well articulated but in my mind still discrete views. But stepping forward a bit, if he is correct along with you about a bunch of rhetoric out there as to how Coinized the army has become but in reality it is not even close to that ideal, then I think we are in actually more trouble than less. That is to say we have the worst of both possible worlds here; an army that still can’t do Coin and an Army that in so trying to do Coin has become deficient in its capabilities at the higher end of the fighting spectrum.

BayonetBrant

01-21-2009, 12:51 PM

In discussing the debate on COIN around the office here (small IT defense contractor with about 40% prior-military or current reservists), we are all of a similar mind about one thing: The Army might train for a lot of COIN missions, or undertake a lot of COIN operations - and we've done so for a large part of the existence of the US military (ie, the Indian Wars from 1800-1890 or so). But at this point in time, there are a variety of agencies involved in COIN/SASO operations - USAID, State, CIA, USDA, etc - but only one agency responsible for, and capable of, fighting a war, and that's DoD.

This is not to say that COIN/SASO needs to be sloughed off onto a variety of other agencies. What it does say is that the US military cannot lose sight of its primary purpose to fight and win the nation's wars. And any task that takes away from that basic mission should be viewed with a healthy dose of skepticism and analysis to truly assess the need/value of that task.

I think COL Gentile's statement about "tradeoffs" above rather well-encapsulates that idea, and I support his assertions, as do most of my co-workers here.

William F. Owen

01-21-2009, 01:00 PM

Gian P Gentile

01-21-2009, 01:34 PM

BayonetBrant: Agree.

Wilf: Agree with your thesis. Moreover, history generally suggests this to be the case too.

Ron Humphrey

01-21-2009, 02:19 PM

Simple Thesis.

It is easier for a Conventional "war fighting unit" to learn COIN skills, than it is for a COIN trained unit to learn or recover "War fighting skills"

If someone wants to jump in with the antithesis, or state the thesis more usefully, then I suggest that we the grounds a useful debate.

With 100, 000 men and one good commander nations can be conquered,
With 1000 men and 10 strong leaders one could set the world on fire.

Which one would you rather go against; and why:(

William F. Owen

01-21-2009, 02:27 PM

With 100, 000 men and one good commander nations can be conquered,
With 1000 men and 10 strong leaders one could set the world on fire.

Which one would you rather go against; and why:(

I'm not sure I agree with the veracity of the statement.

I guess I could reply that a Hamster with lit match is more dangerous to a bale of hay, than a snake with a flick knife.

Ron Humphrey

01-21-2009, 03:24 PM

I'm not sure I agree with the veracity of the statement.

I guess I could reply that a Hamster with lit match is more dangerous to a bale of hay, than a snake with a flick knife.

As to it's veracity me thinks if we turn to our good friend webster

1 : devotion to the truth : truthfulness
2 : power of conveying or perceiving truth
3 : conformity with truth or fact : accuracy
4 : something true <makes lies sound like veracities>

It would seem that both yours and my statements fit the bill.

That said perhaps it's applicability to the discussion might be called into question.

Then again maybe not.

Consider that the underlying premise is approach to a problem set
In each we find that a what might seem to be a less dangerous problem but in truth can be found to be much larger in its overall effect on the environments within which it exists.

Now in an effort to tie this into your initial presentation
It is easier for a Conventional "war fighting unit" to learn COIN skills, than it is for a COIN trained unit to learn or recover "War fighting skills"

Training is the real answer to this(I know big duh)
Honestly wars are fought by individuals the only differentiations in the long run are how many and in what context. Perhaps it is true as many seem to be concerned that working effectively in larger groups takes much more work to perfect than smaller yet potentially just as effective groups. Not to mention that in order to bring to bare resources and capabilities associated with large scale operations requires a much greater effort to collaborate and keep those involved on the same page.

One highly over simplified question is if the foundation isn't as important as the house why even build it. If one accepts that the foundation of any armed forces is the men and women of which it is comprised and then that they must be good at what they do then learn to do it together; would it not make just as much sense that the same premise follows all the way through to the highest levels. If one brigade commander has one really well trained battalion and several more not so much how well will they stand against a moderately well trained collection of battalions. Same for a Div, Corps, Army, etc.

If you get 6 Brigades trained well in infantry and supporting functions and each of their mechanized counterparts are equally comfortable with their tasks then the adjustment up or down the scale should be equally doable. Either extreme would seem to make it excessively difficult to transition without considerable hardship and unfortunate costs both human and otherwise.

It is true that soldiers are not police, it is however equally true that they are not natural born killers(Exceptions aside). They are at the base simply men and women who have chosen to do a job and deserve to be adequately trained to do it. When $#^ hits the fan they can and will adjust up or down as necessary the key is knowing if you've done your job getting them ready for it.

This is why the very argument itself is so unfulfilling, This is NOT a zero sum game whether we would like it to be or not. So despite the fact that there are limited funds and political intrigues, and touchy feely human interests there are men and women who are doing their best and deserve to be given every bit of knowledge, preparation, and skill you can give them.

Seems like we need to quit worrying about what type of war we want, need, expect and put meat and muscle behind every soldier, airmen, marine with whatever we've got to help them do whatever they have to. :(

Surferbeetle

01-21-2009, 04:16 PM

One highly over simplified question is if the foundation isn't as important as the house why even build it. If one accepts that the foundation of any armed forces is the men and women of which it is comprised and then that they must be good at what they do then learn to do it together; would it not make just as much sense that the same premise follows all the way through to the highest levels. If one brigade commander has one really well trained battalion and several more not so much how well will they stand against a moderately well trained collection of battalions. Same for a Div, Corps, Army, etc.

If you get 6 Brigades trained well in infantry and supporting functions and each of their mechanized counterparts are equally comfortable with their tasks then the adjustment up or down the scale should be equally doable. Either extreme would seem to make it excessively difficult to transition without considerable hardship and unfortunate costs both human and otherwise.

It is true that soldiers are not police, it is however equally true that they are not natural born killers(Exceptions aside). They are at the base simply men and women who have chosen to do a job and deserve to be adequately trained to do it. When $#^ hits the fan they can and will adjust up or down as necessary the key is knowing if you've done your job getting them ready for it.

This is why the very argument itself is so unfulfilling, This is NOT a zero sum game whether we would like it to be or not. So despite the fact that there are limited funds and political intrigues, and touchy feely human interests there are men and women who are doing their best and deserve to be given every bit of knowledge, preparation, and skill you can give them.

Seems like we need to quit worrying about what type of war we want, need, expect and put meat and muscle behind every soldier, airmen, marine with whatever we've got to help them do whatever they have to. :(

Ron,

Excellent points all. (And the foundation analogy especially gladdens the heart of this civil engineer :D)

Ken likes to beat this drum as well; it does indeed all come down to training the troops. Like you, my part of this particular melody is that we need to accept the realities of what we find on the ground and craft appropriate solutions to them as opposed to coming in with strong preconceptions and refusing to adjust to the facts.

Excellent military forces do indeed excel at MCO but they are not just thoroughbred one trick ponies who should only be taken out of the barn for carefully prepared for MCO events. In the real world pickup trucks, tractors, quarter horses, mustangs, and mule's are used to get many things done around the ol' farm as well. Once upon a time I learned about the importance of combined arms and I still think that it's a valid concept...

Best,

Steve

ipopescu

01-21-2009, 05:27 PM

Ken said:

The armed forces of any nation have a responsibility to be as prepared for all eventualities as possible. The US, for example was not prepared for stability operations in Afghanistan or Iraq -- we erred. We should not do so again.

Ken,
I think this pretty much nails it, and I don't think many people really object to this. I would only add that the probability of an eventuality should determine the emphasis given to it in terms of resource allocation, training, doctrine, etc. At the end of the day, in the US system elected civilian leaders are responsible for the decision to engage in the wars that they judge to be necessary to protect the national interest. If current leaders came to the conclusion that a COIN is something the US needs to be involved in now and in the near future, it is normal for the US military services to adapt accordingly to what's being asked of them. My prof Peter Feaver, a former Bush NSC official, recently summarized what I believe may be a commonly held position inside the former administration here (http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/01/19/the_real_debate_about_coin) on the Foreign Policy website. One of the paragraphs for this thread is pasted below;
Ionut.

"First, anti-COIN is a convenient way to argue against American military involvement in any fashion because the most urgentnear-term threats requiring military operations involve COIN... If the U.S. military cannot or will not do COIN, then the U.S. military cannot and will not be operational."

Rob Thornton

01-21-2009, 05:42 PM

For those capable of accessing AKO - the Army has hung its UNCLASS "Army Strategy 2008" document there (just run a search). This is a good document - it is not so much a strategy as we might consider the NSS or NDS, however it does reference them. It is more of a capability generation strategy and addresses the full spectrum of required capabilities. I like that it frames the discussion in terms of "strategic choices" and "strategic questions".

There is a good deal of thought devoted to IW capabilities, SFA capabilities, MCO capabilities, ARFORGEN, personnel practices, areas of relevant DOTMLPF, spin out capabilites and modernization, AC/RC practices. etc.

If you have access, I think it will inform much of this and other discussion. Its the first time I've seen such a document. I think it is the appropriate focus for the Army as a force and capability provider to the GCCs.

If you have a .mil addy, ping me and I'll send it to you.

Best, Rob

Entropy

01-21-2009, 05:52 PM

And I imagine if you put a Coin proponent in a room with me as a "Con" proponent and said take this list of defense resources and start cutting, then produce a scheme for how to organize and train the military and specifically the army for the future, well at that point agreement would most likely go away. I for one, in simplistic terms, would not want to trade-off armor and firepower in the force for more light infantry and soft-power-like systems. Certainly there is a need for the latter, but if it came to a tradeoff (which invariably all of these things must come to that) my vote would be for firepower and protection as a key element in the force.

Schmedlap: Well the exchange between me and LG has been interesting. I have made my points about his well articulated but in my mind still discrete views. But stepping forward a bit, if he is correct along with you about a bunch of rhetoric out there as to how Coinized the army has become but in reality it is not even close to that ideal, then I think we are in actually more trouble than less. That is to say we have the worst of both possible worlds here; an army that still can’t do Coin and an Army that in so trying to do Coin has become deficient in its capabilities at the higher end of the fighting spectrum.

Col. Gentile,

After some thought, I think you and LG were talking past each other a bit. Specifically it appears you each are looking at slightly different timeframes. Your writings strike me as more focused on the future while LG is focused on the present.

And time is a problem in this debate. There's a distinction, I think, between what we should be doing now and what we should be doing down the road over the long term (once Iraq and Astan wind down). As it stands now, my perspective is that current OPTEMPO in the ground forces simply do not allow enough TIME for sufficient training in both HIC and COIN. It would be nice to have a full-spectrum force, but unless the force can be increased (unlikely) or unless commitments in Iraq and Astan decrease (likely, the question is when), I don't see how the ground forces can maintain competency in both areas. And, judging from the debate between you and LG, it seems we might be at (or on our way) to what you correctly describe as the "worst of all possible worlds" which is incomplete competence in both areas.

So, what should we do over the short term? How will those short-term decisions affect what we do over the long term? It seems to me your concern (which I share) is that going full-bore COIN now will make the creation of a balanced force in the future more difficult - a problem that only complicates the "tradeoffs" you describe above. If we go "all in" for COIN now, how long will it take to recover those HIC skills once OPTEMPO allows more training time? Will the Army's future leadership, raised on COIN, develop a COIN "mindset" and eschew HIC as LG believes the current leadership is eschewing COIN? What are the alternatives? This brings us back to the problem of trying to fight a high-optempo COIN war while trying to maintain HIC proficiency. Our force ain't big enough to do both right now. Something's got to give or we'll continue to muddle through.

Schmedlap

01-21-2009, 07:21 PM

... if he is correct along with you about a bunch of rhetoric out there as to how Coinized the army has become but in reality it is not even close to that ideal, then I think we are in actually more trouble than less. That is to say we have the worst of both possible worlds here; an army that still can’t do Coin and an Army that in so trying to do Coin has become deficient in its capabilities at the higher end of the fighting spectrum.

That is about 95% right, imo. Were it not for the lackluster training that occurred prior to 9/11, I think that statement would be 100% correct. The only reason that I don't think we've become deficient at the higher end is because we already were. The reality check that occurred on 9/11 (that we might actually have to fight real enemies, rather than OPFOR at NTC), has forced some degree of realism and some relaxation of safety standards in training, both of which could do nothing less than improve the quality of training.

Ken White

01-21-2009, 09:42 PM

This post addresses several comments above but not in chronological order.

ipopescu said:"At the end of the day, in the US system elected civilian leaders are responsible for the decision to engage in the wars that they judge to be necessary to protect the national interest. If current leaders came to the conclusion that a COIN is something the US needs to be involved in now and in the near future, it is normal for the US military services to adapt accordingly to what's being asked of them."That's true -- and efforts by the Army to deter them from COIN-like commitments from 1975 until 2001 were successful only because said civilians did not see a need. Once one of those civilians saw a need, we were off to COIN city. Well, sort of...

Ipopescu also posted this quote:

""First, anti-COIN is a convenient way to argue against American military involvement in any fashion because the most urgent near-term threats requiring military operations involve COIN... If the U.S. military cannot or will not do COIN, then the U.S. military cannot and will not be operational.""

I do not agree totally with that statement -- some in the Army have done that on that basis but they're fooling themselves, the real problem is that the US military will be told to go do it, ready or not. If, OTOH, even the partial intent of the statement is to say those are the only types of wars that can be seen in the near future -- I disagree on that score as well. No one can reliably predict that we will not become engaged in a major conventional combat next week, much less three years form now. That inference, COIN will rule, Attempts to make a guess into a statement of fact and it presupposes a choice that could be exceedingly dangerous.

Friend ipopescu homed in on the last part of my statement he quoted -- he should have paid more attention to the far more important first phrase: "The armed forces of any nation have a responsibility to be as prepared for all eventualities as possible."

Gian said:"I for one, in simplistic terms, would not want to trade-off armor and firepower in the force for more light infantry and soft-power-like systems. Certainly there is a need for the latter, but if it came to a tradeoff (which invariably all of these things must come to that) my vote would be for firepower and protection as a key element in the force."Since you're an Armor Officer, I'm sure you wouldn't -- I suspect some Light Infantry Officers might disagree... :D

However, isn't that really an argument looking for a home? I see no move by the Army to build more Tanks at this point nor do I see any inclination to get rid of any that we possess. So why bring this up? Because the added personnel are going to infantry Bdes perhaps. Makes sense -- Armor is expensive and if you're going to add more spaces -- almost certainly temporarily -- and there is no need for added armor at this time, it seems unwise to add any. There are also discussions about moving some heavy Bde sets into the ARNG; an idea with some merit if we get to the point where we can again have a strategic reserve.If the issue is truly the defense of the US instead of branch partisanship, neither of those things should be a problem.

Entropy said -- and this is important:"As it stands now, my perspective is that current OPTEMPO in the ground forces simply do not allow enough TIME for sufficient training in both HIC and COIN. It would be nice to have a full-spectrum force, but unless the force can be increased (unlikely) or unless commitments in Iraq and Astan decrease (likely, the question is when), I don't see how the ground forces can maintain competency in both areas. And, judging from the debate between you and LG, it seems we might be at (or on our way) to what you correctly describe as the "worst of all possible worlds" which is incomplete competence in both areas.In reverse order, "the worst of all possible worlds" is about where we are today. That is as a result of bad decisions by the Army in the 1989-2001 period, of mediocre training and of the ever ongoing generational change. Senior Commanders today received no COIN or stability ops training while they were developing and thus they did not practice those skills and embed them in muscle memory (so to speak). They're all smart guys, they can read, they go to schools, they learn new things -- but old habits die hard. Almost all adapt, some in a truly outstanding manner, the majority more than adequately but it is still an adaptation and it is not an experience and training derived skill. That's why the application is spotty and varies from person to person, why some above mention that we are not doing many things as well as one could hope.

Which leads to the fact that the current OPTEMPO does not allow time for adequate training. I'm not sure I agree with that but I will acknowledge that the way we currently train coupled with that OPTEMPO almost guarantee marginal training. We need better initial entry training so that both new Officers and new EM have the basics of soldiering firmly instilled. If the basics are acquired, branching out is simple -- without mastery of the ground floor of the profession, everything new becomes chaos. There are some good efforts taking place all over the Army to address this, Basic and AIT as well as the Officer Basic courses are being fixed and that's great. We are slowly --too slowly -- introducing Outcome Based Training. We simply need to take it a step further and double the time to allow mastery of the basics. It would help if we also had a series of courses on how to delegate and how not to micromanage. :wry:

That needed fix does not address the requirement for a full spectrum force and how it is trained. That is not a problem -- except that again the OPTEMPO now intrudes; if everyone has to rotate to a theater on a one on - one off schedule, there is no chance for specialization or multi spectrum training. Everyone has to train for the fight we're in, period. There shouldn't even be any argument about that. To train on unneeded skills is to waste training time and will put the troops at unnecessary risk. Lest I be misunderstood, a 19B or 19K needs to be able to shoot, move and communicate -- but he does not have to be a Master Gunner...

Later, post Iraq and Afghansitan (and they will become history) we simply divide training into a roughly 70:30 (or 80:20 -- the ratio will vary from unit to unti) time and effort routine with the light folks doing Stability ops : MCO and the Heavy guys doing MCO : Stability ops. Note I say stability ops and not COIN. The US should diligently avoid COIN situations. There will be those that say we cannot do that. We can -- however we may still have to do some now and then, thus we must have, as nearly everyone now agrees, the doctrine in hand and everyone trains at least a bit for that eventuality.

Entropy also said:"This brings us back to the problem of trying to fight a high-optempo COIN war while trying to maintain HIC proficiency. Our force ain't big enough to do both right now. Something's got to give or we'll continue to muddle through."Yes. Muddle through. That's what we're doing but we have a lot of practice at that, I got to watch us muddle through -- and believe, muddle is kind -- two earlier wars and we really do that well. So, muddle through we will. Hopefully, we'll improve our training and PME and thus get as good as we were in 1945 but do it without three hard years of a really hard war to get there. it can be done.

Ron Humphrey said:"If you get 6 Brigades trained well in infantry and supporting functions and each of their mechanized counterparts are equally comfortable with their tasks then the adjustment up or down the scale should be equally doable.
. . .
...This is NOT a zero sum game whether we would like it to be or not. So despite the fact that there are limited funds and political intrigues, and touchy feely human interests there are men and women who are doing their best and deserve to be given every bit of knowledge, preparation, and skill you can give them."Exactly.. The issue is not what we're going to buy -- those decisions are mostly locked in concrete for the next five years. The issue is how we train.

The answer is -- not very well.

As Schmedlap said:"The only reason that I don't think we've become deficient at the higher end is because we already were. The reality check that occurred on 9/11 (that we might actually have to fight real enemies, rather than OPFOR at NTC), has forced some degree of realism and some relaxation of safety standards in training, both of which could do nothing less than improve the quality of training."Sadly true on all counts.

All this discussion isn't really about equipment buys, force structure or strategic focus -- it is simply about training. Contrary to our inability to affect major policy and budget decisions, we can affect training decisions. Well, I can't -- but most of you guys can...

Gian P Gentile

01-21-2009, 10:46 PM

Entropy: Agree with your post, and in a sense you are right in that we may have been talking past each other. LG is focussed on the now, while I am viewing the now but with a longer eye toward the future and the effects that the current wars in astan and iraq will have on it. I have stated this point in many of my published writings that--as you point out too--the Army must maintain its focus on coin now since the operational environment demands it. If a BCT is slated to deploy to Astan in 8 months then of course it should be training on counterinsurgency at the NTC instead of staring down the 11th Gaurds MRR in the VOD. My point all along has been to argue that the Army needs to accept how consumed it has become with counterinsurgency (again with good and understandable reasons) and then look honestly at itself in what that focus has done to its conventional capabilities. FM 3-24 is a different but related story. My criticisms of it have been toward its selectivity in theory and historical underpinnings at the expense of a doctrine that offers options other than nation-building. Did the Army need an updated counterinsurgency manual? yes of course it did. Was FM 3-24 a good cut at it based on the time constraints involved? Maybe. Is FM 3-24 the endstate for American counterinsurgency doctrine? In my mind it should not be.

Ken: My point about trade-offs was not an argument for building an armor-only force as your post suggests when it uses the term branch parochialism. Of course the Army needs an infantry capability. But if the Army is not careful we may wake up one day and look around and see the majority of its combat brigades as infantry with its few remaining mech and armor bcts in the national gaurd. That i do not think is a wise move. And hey Ken, what infantryman on the ground in Falujah in 04 didnt love having that Bradley in his hip pocket backing him up? Read David Belavia's book "House to House" to get a feel for the importance of firepower and protection even for dismounted infantry forces.

gian

Ken White

01-22-2009, 12:05 AM

"Ken: My point about trade-offs was not an argument for building an armor-only force as your post..."I did not think it was and did not mean to say or imply that you did."...suggests when it uses the term branch parochialism.Not an accusation, merely a possibly unwarranted caution. I do not believe that is your motivation."Of course the Army needs an infantry capability. But if the Army is not careful we may wake up one day and look around and see the majority of its combat brigades as infantry with its few remaining mech and armor bcts in the national gaurd. That i do not think is a wise move.I think that would depend on how many Bdes went where, how it was done -- but I certainly do not think under any circumstances that all the heavy stuff should go to the Guard. We need to keep at least about 9 Heavy Bdes active. I think we also need at least 2 ACRS active and three or four in the Guard.And hey Ken, what infantryman on the ground in Falujah in 04 didnt love having that Bradley in his hip pocket backing him up?Actually, my son the Grunt was there at the time and he said Brads were great for crashing through gates. :D . He also sent me a great pic of an M1A2 resting on its Cupola in a ditch along with an 88 Crew that looked like they'd love to be anywhere else. ;) "Read David Belavia's book "House to House" to get a feel for the importance of firepower and protection even for dismounted infantry forces.I will. Having wandered through Seoul and Uijongbu with Tanks to run antisocial types out of town I'm sort of aware of that importance. :wry: There's no doubt in my mind that tracks are good things (though I've gotta admit to never having been a Brad fan) and as a former M26 Gunner and M41 TC as one of the world's better Cav Platoon Sergeants, not to mention a Mech Bde Ops SGM who had to teach all the new guys how to drive an M577A2 -- I'm not against the heavy guys at all...

All for 'em, in fact. As you may recall, I agree with you that MCO is and must be the driver, that we need to be proficient at that and that then, oh by the way, we can do stability ops as well as a lesser chore. I hope you now see that I agree with you on the value of Armor. Where we really differ, I believe, is on the subject of how much the Army and its units can do -- I think they are capable of much more than we currently ask of them -- but I do know that to get there, we have to invest in training and that is not a popular thing to fund.

The force structure for the next few years is locked and I'm not going to affect that -- what I wish I could affect is our training -- even though it's better now than it's ever been, we just do not do it as well as we could

Gian P Gentile

01-22-2009, 01:52 AM

Ken:

good post; and agree.

I too think a well trained combat outfit can do many, many missions of different types. My point, and this has been beat around pretty well in other threads, is that the most flexible and adaptable combat units are ones trained primarily in the higher end of the fighting spectrum because in that training they would have honed their basic combat skills (regardless if they are infantry, armor, cavalry, etc). What I just said is an ideal, an organizing principle of sorts, and not, NOT a call to stop coin training for units that are deploying so that they can train on hic. But at some point if we are able to wind down in Iraq these questions will start to arise.

The interesting thing about Belavia's book if you get the chance to read it is that he writes from an infantryman's perspective in urban combat and acutally is explicitly dismissive of armor at various points in the book, but when he describes fighting in houses at the end of the engagement there always seems to be a bradley outside either breaking the wall down or pumping rounds wherever needed.

If I had a dollar for your combat experience relative to mine I would be a rich man.

v/r

gian

Ken White

01-22-2009, 02:16 AM

In order:

I agree.

I 'll get the book -- or my son the Military historian to be may already have it.

Nah. Different times breed different events, it's all relative. With all mine and a buck, I can get a cup of coffee in a cheap restaurant (which is really bad when one remembers a Nickel a cup in a good restaurant...). What counts is that we both brought back as many as we could, we both care and we're still here to pick on each other and mayhap, some day, buy each other a drink. ;)

Gian P Gentile

01-22-2009, 03:20 AM

Ken:

what a nice thing to say!!

your eloquence moved me.

we did bring back as many as we could; and the ones we didnt, well that is the bond that we share.

very respectcully

gian

ps; if you are ever in the new york city area you have an open invite to spend a day with me at west point in the classroom with future lieutenants who you in past times taught and trained.

BayonetBrant

01-22-2009, 01:03 PM

I too think a well trained combat outfit can do many, many missions of different types.

Sir,

I wholeheartedly agree. And I think that combat-focused training is starting to lose traction as the 'experts' offer their 'help' to the current leaders charged with executing these wars.

I wonder if at least some of the 'muscle memory' that's ben referred to above is less about the difference between COIN/HIC and as much, or more, about risk aversion. COIN is inherently dangerous work, and it involves exposing yourself to all manner of dangerous possibilities. But COIN can't be successfully accomplished from inside the wire, or outside the wire in brigade-size movements to contact.

Are the leadership today more afraid of appearing on C-SPAN with a well-hones "Yes, Senator. No, Senator" soundtrack than they are of failing at COIN because they were too tentative in their FOB-based approach?

I guess I'm trying to ask if the old habits that die hard aren't more the result of endless 'risk assessments' in training that have more to do with snakebites and heat cramps than with mission failure.

It's easy to justify casualties in HIC - there's a shooting war going on. But it's harder to tell some kid's parents that they were patrolling without body armor on because the local populace were more likely to open up to the soldiers and provide better info to them when they weren't wearing it.

RTK

01-22-2009, 01:10 PM

I too think a well trained combat outfit can do many, many missions of different types. My point, and this has been beat around pretty well in other threads, is that the most flexible and adaptable combat units are ones trained primarily in the higher end of the fighting spectrum because in that training they would have honed their basic combat skills (regardless if they are infantry, armor, cavalry, etc). What I just said is an ideal, an organizing principle of sorts, and not, NOT a call to stop coin training for units that are deploying so that they can train on hic. But at some point if we are able to wind down in Iraq these questions will start to arise.

Sir,

I've always thought this was the crux of your argument. It's spot on.

Basics and fundamentals don't change. Their application may, but basic battle drills, action drills, contact drills and reports are the exact same. Dealing with other people in other cultures and our own in the way they should be treated as equals and peers and not in the "I'm-American. I'm- wicked-way-smarter-than-you" methodology we've been known to use
doesn't have to be a battalion training event.

Cavguy

01-22-2009, 02:59 PM

I too think a well trained combat outfit can do many, many missions of different types.

I don't think anyone disagrees with this - but - how do we educationally prepare soldiers for full-spectrum ops?

I, like many others, did not feel that the army provided sufficent grounding in COIN basics prior to 2003 as part of our professional military education, and as a result we committed major avoidable errors in tactical COIN 2003-2004.

I think the answer lies more in professional education versus training, as I look back at my OBC and CCC I realize nearly all of it was training. In line units, only three commanders (two BN and one CO) of mine had any regular sort of formal OPD program.

It may be easy to criticize Galula, but I would submit if more officers had read that book as part of a general military education (alongside all other works), we may have created less problems than we ultimately did in OIF.

Niel

Gian P Gentile

01-22-2009, 03:56 PM

I don't think anyone disagrees with this - but - how do we educationally prepare soldiers for full-spectrum ops?

I, like many others, did not feel that the army provided sufficent grounding in COIN basics prior to 2003 as part of our professional military education, and as a result we committed major avoidable errors in tactical COIN 2003-2004.

I think the answer lies more in professional education versus training, as I look back at my OBC and CCC I realize nearly all of it was training. In line units, only three commanders (two BN and one CO) of mine had any regular sort of formal OPD program.

It may be easy to criticize Galula, but I would submit if more officers had read that book as part of a general military education (alongside all other works), we may have created less problems than we ultimately did in OIF.

Niel

Niel: right, and now with the operational demands of coin we must train our formations to perform the mission they are getting ready to conduct which means until we ramp-down we must maintain our operational training focus on coin. But as I said that comes at a cost, there is risk involved. Now the Coin advocates response is well, really, so what, because we must win the wars we are in now so don’t worry about the future. I don’t buy that logic, and I think it to be irresponsible. This gets to your question about education. Certainly at places like the Army War College and other defense educational institutions there is an important place for coin, irregular war as subjects for education. But we should not turn these places into Coin Academies where that is all that they do there. Why? Because we must be able to think beyond the current wars in terms of policy and strategy, do otherwise would be to ignore a duty that we have to our elected leaders and the people of the United States.

finally, you and I will never agree on your other points. I think it is just flat-wrong to think counterfactually that if more soldiers had read Galula things would have turned out differently. You cannot prove that anyway. But what I can prove at least through the record as it is given to us from the most recent credible histories written is that the majority of American Army tactical units transitioned quickly to full-spectrum operations and within that were conducting many best practices in coin. Were these capabilities as wide-spread as they were under the Surge? Probably not, but they still were wide-spread and the delta so to speak was not decisive.

Such arguments of "if we had done this or that" are really a big large trope within the american army for trying to fight vietnam all over again in iraq but this time win.

gg

Cavguy

01-22-2009, 04:20 PM

Sir,

Understand, but I just think we need to develop a broad based, rigorous "liberal" education for our officers covering the "full spectrum" of warfare.

As of this moment, TRADOC has no such beast or articulation therof - what are our educational learning objectives/standards for our Officers and NCO's? I feel they should have an understanding of the principles of all forms of conflict, supported by broad reading.

Yes, we adapted quicky, but I (along with many observers) think we missed our window in Iraq between April 10 and August 17 (UN Bombing, IIRC). Yes, we "rapidly" adapted tactically, slower operationally. In my view, we did lose whatever chance we had to gain the cooperation of the population in that period, mostly through ignorance of COIN principles. The fact that we learned later doesn't mean that it was okay to not know in the first place. If you read Kalev Sepp's taxonomy (http://usacac.army.mil/CAC/milreview/English/MayJun05/MayJun05/sepp.pdf) of best/worst COIN practices, it largely describes everything we did in 2003-2004.

You do have a point that no amount of better tactics would have fixed the lack of strategic clarity and direction at that time.

Niel

selil

01-22-2009, 04:30 PM

I don't think anyone disagrees with this - but - how do we educationally prepare soldiers for full-spectrum ops?

I think the answer lies more in professional education versus training, as I look back at my OBC and CCC I realize nearly all of it was training. In line units, only three commanders (two BN and one CO) of mine had any regular sort of formal OPD program.

Most of what I have seen the Army do is training not education. Training is task oriented while education is concept oriented. There is often a misunderstanding in expectations between the two paradigms. The result is also often the criticism heaped upon academia that what is taught isn't immediately relevant. That is because the educational model creates flexibility to changing environments and adaptability. You educate a student on operating systems not Windows XP. They can then figure out any operating system.

The way you get past limitations in training is you identify the concepts, patterns, and educate troops on those. We often refer to the Army of today as the best, brightest, smartest in history. It may be true that there are officers with doctorates, or multiple masters degrees, but we aren't talking about the outliers. We are talking about the base of the pyramid where the job gets done not talked about.

Well dropping a bunch of superlatives on the deck as evidence does not make it true. A highly trained Army will do specific tasks within that paradigm of training. As a root cause the methods and educational tools used to train soldiers require intensive instruction that is single minded in the execution. That system produces skilled soldiers with silos of training. If you expand that training model you can cross train soldiers through further intensive training and make special operations forces. At some point in time through that model falls apart as we see in the COIN/HIC argument when training resource time runs out.

The problem though is solvable. There is another way but y'all won't like it.

You have to educate soldiers and eradicate the diffidence between academic and military culture. Embrace the scholar soldier and produce thinkers. Then you can educate based on patterns of conflict versus task oriented training. I am not even suggesting you abandon all training. There are specific skills that are required for EVERY soldier and those should be learned. If you want a cross functional Army capable of taking on any mission at any time without large times spent re-training then you will have to change the educational models and expectations.

This is not a discussion of semantics. The vocational training system versus higher education debate has raged for a long time. The result is that thinking, problem solving, risk management, and other thinking strategies are becoming highly sought over. These would be exactly the same skills needed at the root of a fully flexible military branch.

There are a lot more things that could be said but in general the arguments will be around; 1) There isn't enough time in the training cycle (applying the wrong model from the onset); 2) Soldiers aren't that smart (even though they are getting older and more educated, wrong again); 3) We have to train for the fight we have today (again same wrong model as evidence against being prepared); 4) There is no way to integrate that kind of training with the current staff (presupposing the failure based on the inadequacy to develop staff will always fail, but how did we get armor?); 5) Various other similar rebuttals following the same pattern.

The fact is it would be a success, it would work, it has worked in previous conflicts, and as the national education system abandoned liberal arts and social sciences, so did the military drive towards a vocational model that now is seen as a restriction on mission capability.

Put succinctly the abject failure to reform military training to an educational model from a vocational model is a direct and substantial impact on national security capability.

max161

01-22-2009, 04:33 PM

I don't think anyone disagrees with this - but - how do we educationally prepare soldiers for full-spectrum ops?

I, like many others, did not feel that the army provided sufficent grounding in COIN basics prior to 2003 as part of our professional military education, and as a result we committed major avoidable errors in tactical COIN 2003-2004.

I think the answer lies more in professional education versus training, as I look back at my OBC and CCC I realize nearly all of it was training. In line units, only three commanders (two BN and one CO) of mine had any regular sort of formal OPD program.

It may be easy to criticize Galula, but I would submit if more officers had read that book as part of a general military education (alongside all other works), we may have created less problems than we ultimately did in OIF.

Niel
I hate to sound cliche but when GEN Schoomaker was CDR USSOCOM (or CINCSOC back in the day!!) he always admonished that we "train for certainty and educate for uncertainty." The certainty is you have to be able to shoot, move, and communicate in any situation. We need to train and maintain proficiency in all our combat skills (both for US operations in MCO and to be able to impart those skills to friends, partners, and allies when necessary). But operations in an Irregular Warfare environment will always be uncertain and require creative problem solving. So we do not need to focus on training for IW. We need to educate for the possibilities we may face but also realize that we cannot identify every possible threat or complex situation. The "irony" is that I think if we really look critically at our military, particulalry our ground forces (Army and Marines) I think we will find many Officers and NCOs who have had sufficient education and were very adept at problem solving in complex operational environments and have done so since we began operaitons in 2001. They were able to do this because they were tactically and technically proficient, they possessed initiative and sufficient lattitude from their chain of command, and they were mentally agile and creative to solve or assist in solving complex problems. I think we find many of these Officers and NCOs at the Brigade and Regimental level and below. What is always the difficult part is developing and orchestrating an integrated and synchroniched operational campaign that supports strategic aims. Training occurs best in our units. Our PME for officers and NCOs needs to focus more on education and less on training.

Ken White

01-22-2009, 04:49 PM

Bayonet Brant said:"...I wonder if at least some of the 'muscle memory' that's ben referred to above is less about the difference between COIN/HIC and as much, or more, about risk aversion."That, too. I 'd say in about equal measures across the board, varying in percent of each between individual commanders.

RTK said:"Basics and fundamentals don't change. Their application may, but basic battle drills, action drills, contact drills and reports are the exact same. Dealing with other people in other cultures and our own in the way they should be treated as equals and peers and not in the "I'm-American. I'm- wicked-way-smarter-than-you" methodology we've been known to use
doesn't have to be a battalion training event."Couldn't have said it better m'self... :D

CavGuy said:"I think the answer lies more in professional education versus training, as I look back at my OBC and CCC I realize nearly all of it was training. In line units, only three commanders (two BN and one CO) of mine had any regular sort of formal OPD program.Having run an instructional branch charged with training OBC and AOAC students at the Armor School for five years and having come up with some fairly innovative -- and effective -- training at the time only to see it go back to below humdrum in a matter of months after I left and being broadly familiar with the Infantry versions over the years, I can believe that your experience was all training and little education. Mostly poor training and not nearly enough of it at that.

That's why I continually beat the drum about the fact that our initial entry training does not prepare people for service in a professional army. We are still training people as if they were destined for a rapidly mobilizing wartime force. It's stupid. I know that both the OBC and CCC curricula are undergoing changes -- good ones -- but we haven't gone far enough. We're doing better than we used to but we can do even better.

CavGuy later added:"Understand, but I just think we need to develop a broad based, rigorous "liberal" education for our officers covering the "full spectrum" of warfare.

As of this moment, TRADOC has no such beast or articulation therof - what are our educational learning objectives/standards for our Officers and NCO's. I feel they should have an understanding of the principlesI strongly agree but would suggest you better do that for the NCOs as well or you'll suffer later.

I'd also suggest that education has to start for both officers and the enlisted folks at entry. Most everyone who comes in the Army will operate in jobs at least one and often two ranks higher than that actually held BEFORE they go to the level of school to 'equip' them for the higher position. Our PME has never adapted to that fact. At Knox, in the 70s, almost all Captains had commanded and been on a staff before they came to the advanced course. We had one ANCOC course where every single student had already been a Platoon Sergeant...

Gian said:"...now with the operational demands of coin we must train our formations to perform the mission they are getting ready to conduct which means until we ramp-down we must maintain our operational training focus on coin. But as I said that comes at a cost, there is risk involved."True and the risk has to be accepted for now but given the effort to turn the overly massive bureaucracy that is TRADOC it is time to start setting in place revised POIs for all training and education, IET through the War College that truly, at lower levels thoroughly inculcates the basics of the profession and at upper levels encourages calculated risk taking, decentralization and independent thought.

We are not going to restore our ability to trust subordinates until we do that and no armed force can operate effectively without trust.

ADDED: And what Max161 said; train the basics on entry, educate the leaders... ;)

Surferbeetle

01-22-2009, 05:11 PM

Cherry picked from the White House Web site on Defense (http://www.whitehouse.gov/agenda/defense/) (got the link from SWJ - thanks!)

President Obama and Vice President Biden will invest in a 21st century military to maintain our conventional advantage while increasing our capacity to defeat the threats of tomorrow. They will ensure our troops have the training, equipment and support that they need when they are deployed.

Invest in a 21st Century Military

* Rebuild the Military for 21st Century Tasks: Obama and Biden believe that we must build up our special operations forces, civil affairs, information operations, and other units and capabilities that remain in chronic short supply; invest in foreign language training, cultural awareness, and human intelligence and other needed counterinsurgency and stabilization skill sets; and create a more robust capacity to train, equip, and advise foreign security forces, so that local allies are better prepared to confront mutual threats.

Ken White

01-22-2009, 05:36 PM

that it was carried forward to the WH Web site. I have no quarrel with any of that provided it is done sensibly and as truly needed based on a thorough assessment, is not done automatically mostly as a counterpoint to the predecessor and does not get in the way of full spectrum capability. We need to and can do all those things without going overboard.

I doubt he'll pay much more attention to me than Bush did but I can hope they'll do right instead of just doing something... :wry:

marct

01-22-2009, 05:42 PM

I find it intriguing that "training" is often listed as a component of PME; it shouldn't be.

Sam is quite correct in his critique of the differences but, while he says that it isn't a discussion of semantics, it is really. "Semantics" is the science of meaning (or the study of meaning) and that is exactly what this entire training vs. education debate is about, and it is also one of the reasons why people are talking past each other.

Ken White

01-22-2009, 06:26 PM

Nor, I know, did you say I was... :D

However, to clarify...

My goal is better training -- particularly upon entry -- which will give people a thorough grounding in the basics of performance required to survive and to be successful in combat. That training must include a smattering of education because the new career includes subject matter never before acquired or even in many case encountered or considered.

Follow on PME should be mostly education -- but the application of that education in practical exercises at the educational institution constitutes some training as well. Too many years of practical effort have pretty well proven that even purely cognitive skills can be embedded with three practical repetitions of application.

Aside from institutional training and education, continued self-education is required and in the conduct of day to day business and in field exercises, all previous training and education should be put into practice in what the Armed Forces usually call 'training.' As is sometimes said "Everything is training is everything."

Thus the conmingling. ;)

Surferbeetle

01-22-2009, 06:33 PM

Most of what I have seen the Army do is training not education. Training is task oriented while education is concept oriented. There is often a misunderstanding in expectations between the two paradigms. The result is also often the criticism heaped upon academia that what is taught isn't immediately relevant. That is because the educational model creates flexibility to changing environments and adaptability. You educate a student on operating systems not Windows XP. They can then figure out any operating system.

There are a lot more things that could be said but in general the arguments will be around; 1) There isn't enough time in the training cycle (applying the wrong model from the onset); 2) Soldiers aren't that smart (even though they are getting older and more educated, wrong again); 3) We have to train for the fight we have today (again same wrong model as evidence against being prepared); 4) There is no way to integrate that kind of training with the current staff (presupposing the failure based on the inadequacy to develop staff will always fail, but how did we get armor?); 5) Various other similar rebuttals following the same pattern.

The fact is it would be a success, it would work, it has worked in previous conflicts, and as the national education system abandoned liberal arts and social sciences, so did the military drive towards a vocational model that now is seen as a restriction on mission capability.

Put succinctly the abject failure to reform military training to an educational model from a vocational model is a direct and substantial impact on national security capability.

Sam,

Do you have any case studies which discuss costs in terms of time and money for the two models that you would be willing to provide links for?

The NYT has an interesting opinion piece (http://fish.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/01/18/the-last-professor/?ref=opinion) by Dr. Stanley Fish (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stanley_Fish) who ruminates about some of your points.

In previous columns and in a recent book I have argued that higher education, properly understood, is distinguished by the absence of a direct and designed relationship between its activities and measurable effects in the world.

This is a very old idea that has received periodic re-formulations. Here is a statement by the philosopher Michael Oakeshott that may stand as a representative example: “There is an important difference between learning which is concerned with the degree of understanding necessary to practice a skill, and learning which is expressly focused upon an enterprise of understanding and explaining.”

So, how do I build a training or education system to keep my charges alive, make as many of the opposition as needed die for their system, and separate/protect/stabilize and perhaps improve the lives of the innocents caught in the middle of the conflicts that we are in? Do you have any case studies of successful systems to share?

Best,

Steve

Ken White

01-22-2009, 06:56 PM

Do you have any case studies which discuss costs in terms of time and money for the two models that you would be willing to provide links for?While I am painfully aware that your parameters have been used by the Army (the other services do so as well but not to as great an extent) for years to justify marginal training that produces a barely acceptable product -- enlisted and officer -- who is sent to a unit which, quality of unit dependent may or may not better prepare him or her for the job. The good folks will also better educate and train themselves (both are required) while the lesser people will not exert the effort to do so (but will continue to be tolerated instead of being encouraged to seek another career). I think two points are in order:

- Individuals and units should not have to do that to the extent they now do.

- Is time/money the proper arbiter or should the arbiters be competence and proficiency to better enable the future survival of self and subordinates to insure successful mission accomplishment (as opposed to a flawed job that has excessive costs in many terms).

I'm quite conversant with the time/cost aspect having managed an Army multi-million buck budget for a number of years and thus learning how the system really works (not!). I also know that our use of those two inhibitors is a smokescreen. We continue to tolerate poor training because we are unwilling -- not unable; unwilling -- to spend what is required and to take the time needed not because we can't afford either, we can -- but simply because we've never done it that way and change is difficult. Every objection Sam lists has been used by many to me over the years -- and, as Sam says, everyone is hogwash.

Surferbeetle

01-22-2009, 07:14 PM

While I am painfully aware that your parameters have been used by the Army (the other services do so as well but not to as great an extent) for years to justify marginal training that produces a barely acceptable product -- enlisted and officer -- who is sent to a unit which, quality of unit dependent may or may not better prepare him or her for the job.

Ken,

Just because I too have also been subjected to marginal training does not mean that I advocate it my friend. Like it or not however, time and money are measuring sticks, and what I am seriously seeking is a better example of how to do things which addresses these parameters.

The good folks will also better educate and train themselves (both are required) while the lesser people will not exert the effort to do so (but will continue to be tolerated instead of being encouraged to seek another career). I think two points are in order:

- Individuals and units should not have to do that to the extent they now do.

- Is time/money the proper arbiter or should the arbiters be competence and proficiency to better enable the future survival of self and subordinates to insure successful mission accomplishment (as opposed to a flawed job that has excessive costs in many terms).

I'm quite conversant with the time/cost aspect having managed an Army multi-million buck budget for a number of years and thus learning how the system really works (not!). I also know that our use of those two inhibitors is a smokescreen. We continue to tolerate poor training because we are unwilling -- not unable; unwilling -- to spend what is required and to take the time needed not because we can't afford either, we can -- but simply because we've never done it that way and change is difficult. Every objection Sam lists has been used by many to me over the years -- and, as Sam says, everyone is hogwash.

An analogous discussion would be on engineering specifications: performance based versus prescriptive. For military and engineering situations education & experience of the people one works with dictates what route I choose and/or advocate.

My personal vote is always for quality (leaning towards the performance based end of things) education & training...I have spent my money & time on three degrees; and over twenty years of my training time on military themes.

Perhaps we are not so far apart as you may think (internet nuances and all that...) I am seriously looking for a better way to do things.

Best,

Steve

Ken White

01-22-2009, 07:33 PM

Just because I too have also been subjected to marginal training does not mean that I advocate it my friend. Like it or not however, time and money are measuring sticks, and what I am seriously seeking is a better example of how to do things which includes these parameters.I'm also painfully aware they are real measuring sticks -- the issue is what priority are they accorded in determining the balance of Needed training vs. cost vs. time available.

My contention is that the Army has placed far too high a value on costs for initial entry training on the rationale that many won't make it through their term of service and thus are disposable (and that has a concomitant effect on the individuals -- who aren't stupid...); that our time 'constraints' are due to the WW II / Mobilization base mentality and are unnecessarily restrictive on the lower end of the spectrum while granting an unduly long term hiatus of a sort at the upper end, Officer and Enlisted.

So. I hear you and know those are considerations -- they just need to be placed in the proper perspective. They have gained credence at current levels not because they are correct but simply because of bureaucratic inertia and acceptance of almost good enough instead of truly good enough training and education in all too many cases.

If that were not true, this thread would not exist....I am seriously looking for a better way to do things.So am I, so are we all -- and I suggest we will not find such a way by approaching the problem over the same routes we have always used.

Surferbeetle

01-22-2009, 07:59 PM

My contention is that the Army has placed far too high a value on costs for initial entry training on the rationale that many won't make it through their term of service and thus are disposable (and that has a concomitant effect on the individuals -- who aren't stupid...); that our time 'constraints' are due to the WW II / Mobilization base mentality and are unnecessarily restrictive on the lower end of the spectrum while granting an unduly long term hiatus of a sort at the upper end, Officer and Enlisted.

America and its military are tough enough to get it done, it's just gonna hurt...:eek:

It's difficult for me to articulate in this short space how rapidly informational vehicles change; from transistor radios and wall mounted telephones to ipods & cellphones in just a flash.

The upheaval apparant in newspapers & on campus with regards to the digital divide will also hit the Army soon...the requirements and failures that GWOT has made apparent to us all guarantees it. A 24/ lifestyle, the internet, video games, google earth, wiki's, SWJ-style learning & interaction are just some of the educational & training vehicles that will/do help us to improve both content and availability of education and training to all of our forces.

Those of us who have suffered and lived through the BS and nastiness that results from lack of planning/training/etc. (and there are many...) will continue to speak out and push for change for the better. We have as examples those who are even older and who have lived through even more who still continue to push for change (dont we :D).

Ken White

01-22-2009, 08:24 PM

America and its military are tough enough to get it done, it's just gonna hurt...:eek:Yep....We have as examples those who are even older and who have lived through even more who still continue to push for change (dont we :D).Yeth, I do hope tho... ;)

(Spake by old Dude, no teef...)

reed11b

01-22-2009, 08:40 PM

My contention is that the Army has placed far too high a value on costs for initial entry training on the rationale that many won't make it through their term of service and thus are disposable (and that has a concomitant effect on the individuals -- who aren't stupid...); that our time 'constraints' are due to the WW II / Mobilization base mentality and are unnecessarily restrictive on the lower end of the spectrum while granting an unduly long term hiatus of a sort at the upper end, Officer and Enlisted.

BINGO! It also explains partly why the retention rate for 4 year initial contracts is higher then 2 year initial contracts (though I imagine that those that do 2 year contracts are less devoted to begin with). I would dump those two year contracts if I could. I think it also explains why we micro-manage (believe me, one clueless private on your fire-team will test even the most laid back sergeant) and why we do not train in manner that encourages initiative and thinking. How many disillusioned soldiers quit after one or two enlistments because they tired of being treated like children. There is a low ratio of prior service E-5 and below on this board, so this may not be the best sounding board for that info, but my personal experience working with vets suggest the number is higher then it should be.
Reed

Ken White

01-22-2009, 09:00 PM

...How many disillusioned soldiers quit after one or two enlistments because they tired of being treated like children. There is a low ratio of prior service E-5 and below on this board, so this may not be the best sounding board for that info, but my personal experience working with vets suggest the number is higher then it should be.One can also ask how many disillusioned LTs and CPTs depart...

Poor education and training works its evil from the bottom to the top. You and I talked about the bottom but as you go up, it's sort of telling that the pet song of several AOAC Classes back in my day was "Wasted Days and Wasted Nights." That may have changed and I really hope it has -- but I don't think I want to bet on it just yet.

Some would be amazed at the number of Officers I've met from long ago to recently who went or are going out of their way to avoid Leavenworth or the Pebntagon -- or the number of MSGs I have known and know that have tried or are trying to figure out how to avoid the USASMA. Many will say bad things about those kinds of folks. Possibly correctly -- but I suggest that those attitudes are indicative of a problem. The system forces in one way or another all those things as stepping stones and everyone knows that. Yet, some, a few to be sure, still try to 'escape.'

Been my observation that if you do it right, people fight to be included...

Umar Al-Mokhtār

01-23-2009, 12:15 AM

selil

01-23-2009, 12:54 AM

Surferbeetle,

Though it looks like your original question has been OBE, I'll do my best to give some insights.

First, there is a substantial body of literature around educational techniques with many different vectors and metrics for creating understanding. For example you can read about the socratic method, and the deeper seated learning that occurs with that versus simplistic lecture. The example though shows that even with the educational system there are better ways of doing things too.

So as to creating expertise on a cost/time/output type I'm afraid it isn't their are higher or lower costs just differences. As was alluded to by ken in "wasted days, and wasted nights" the primary costs are found in the "TIME" not in the delivery. As such you change the delivery and expectations mechanisms and perhaps some of the patterns being taught. You want a LIC/HIC type soldier to see those patterns and be able to respond and function correctly as rapidly as training.

Since what we're talking about is revolutionary to us now we need a model. We can look back in time and see when older, more educated people were entering into the service and perhaps make comparisons. We can look at todays educated cadre and compare them to non-educated cadre. Looking through ERIC (educational research database) I did not find any examples. That may be due the human subjects shield that is in place for military, but I was actually a little surprised nobody has done a similar type of study.

My basis for the primary elements of my argument though are grounded in the work by Bloom (1954) and others. My favorites?

Instructional design (second edition), Smith & Ragan
Beyond constructivism, Lesh & Doerr
The nature of expertise, Chi, Glaser, & Farr
Knowing what students know: The science and design of educational assessment, NRC
How people learn: Brain, mind, experience, and school, NRC

There is a large body of punditry that points out many of the issues with higher education such as "ProfScam" by Charles Sykes. Another example of a contrary opinion (sort of) is "Excellence without a soul" by Harry Lewis. I always try and look at both sides of an equation and in this case I am fairly convinced.

The United States military education system is broken at the most basic level. I'm not talking about the academies, the universities or colleges. I am talking about where the rubber hits the road and the reason it is broken is all of what I said before.

Sorry that may be a weaker argument than you might expect but what we're talking about is not easy, is not soft, and requires a substantial amount of reading. The study of the problem with money though is simply not the mark you need to consider. It is a wash and the system could be changed bottom up (to middle where I think it flips) in a matter of a few years. The results won't happen today, we are talking generational change, just like the way we got here.

Gian P Gentile

01-23-2009, 01:21 AM

I hate to sound cliche but when GEN Schoomaker was CDR USSOCOM (or CINCSOC back in the day!!) he always admonished that we "train for certainty and educate for uncertainty." The certainty is you have to be able to shoot, move, and communicate in any situation. We need to train and maintain proficiency in all our combat skills (both for US operations in MCO and to be able to impart those skills to friends, partners, and allies when necessary). But operations in an Irregular Warfare environment will always be uncertain and require creative problem solving. So we do not need to focus on training for IW. We need to educate for the possibilities we may face but also realize that we cannot identify every possible threat or complex situation. The "irony" is that I think if we really look critically at our military, particulalry our ground forces (Army and Marines) I think we will find many Officers and NCOs who have had sufficient education and were very adept at problem solving in complex operational environments and have done so since we began operaitons in 2001. They were able to do this because they were tactically and technically proficient, they possessed initiative and sufficient lattitude from their chain of command, and they were mentally agile and creative to solve or assist in solving complex problems. I think we find many of these Officers and NCOs at the Brigade and Regimental level and below. What is always the difficult part is developing and orchestrating an integrated and synchroniched operational campaign that supports strategic aims. Training occurs best in our units. Our PME for officers and NCOs needs to focus more on education and less on training.

Dave:

Supremely stated!! Couldnt agree more.

gian

Gian P Gentile

01-23-2009, 01:33 AM

a trip to Leavenworth's dusty, musty archives to search for Major Gentile's thesis:

http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA383740&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf

Also of interest:

http://www.maxwell.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/saas/mcmullen.pdf

Although this gem: “Advocacy or Assessment? The United States Strategic Bombing Survey of Germany and Japan” is proving a tougher nut to crack.

:D

UAM, thanks for the shout-out. Oh to be a major again, alas those days are long gone. The essay of mine that you provide a link to was a SAMS monograph that parts of it actually became an additional chapter to my dissertation that New York Univerisity Press published into a book in 2001 titled "How Effective is Strategic Bombing? Lessons Learned from World War II to Kosovo."

Not as big of a seller to be sure as that book about eating soup with a utensil. In fact the darn thing never even went into paperback. Oh well, I guess one book is better than none.

gian

patmc

01-23-2009, 02:01 AM

CPTs are still trying to avoid the CCC. I was trying to deploy again, but HRC found me and sent me a RFO. In my old unit, only 1 commander has attended CCC, and 2 of my buddies are on 2nd commands before CCC. The FACCC specifically, has a real bad reputation with junior officers. FA as a branch has had retention problems, and after a near 90% MiTT assignment class, FACCC was struggling to fill classes. Literature says this has been fixed, but little birds tell me otherwise. The curriculum has switched several times the last couple years, and is still having an identity problem.

Personally, I wanted to deploy instead of MICCC, but now that I am here, I am really enjoying myself. They've changed the curriculum, and yes there is still HIC IPB and MDMP, but they've added better targetting, COIN, and MiTT for those lucky few (RUMINT: we get assignments next week). There is probably still room for improvement, especially with adding Security Manager instruction (this is 90% of the actual S2 job unfortunately), but overall I'm impressed with the instruction. My buddy that just graduated MCCC (combined Armor and Infantry) had nothing but good things about the course too. Its getting better, but not fixed.

One can also ask how many disillusioned LTs and CPTs depart...

Poor education and training works its evil from the bottom to the top. You and I talked about the bottom but as you go up, it's sort of telling that the pet song of several AOAC Classes back in my day was "Wasted Days and Wasted Nights." That may have changed and I really hope it has -- but I don't think I want to bet on it just yet.

Ken White

01-23-2009, 02:43 AM

I finally got a look at most of the basic / OSUT POI and there are a lot of great things going on -- still too short but progress is there. I get mixed reviews on OBC and generally positive stuff on changes to the CA CCC. If we can keep Outcome Based Training integration going all over that Army, that'll help. It's harder for the instructors but that's okay; it does take more time but that's needed in any event -- and it costs no more.

I think most everyone realizes that we cannot go back to pre 2001, it just takes time to shift the bureaucracy and get the nay sayers (who, like the rich, are always with us...) on board. Training is better than ever IMO -- but still needs work...

Speaking as a one time Bn and Bde Intel Sgt, put that young MSG on all the security Manager stuff so you can do the S2 gig properly. He'll get it done and still have time to help with the other (while hating me for suggesting that to you :D).

Marauder Doc

01-27-2009, 05:42 AM

Since it was mentioned earlier, I was just going to jump in here with something crazy in regards to procuring equipment for HIC and COIN.

It seems to me that, contrary to what would be intuitive, armor requirements for COIN work can exceed those of a HIC.

Why were we able to conduct OIF I with so many units in unarmored vehicles, or lacking SAPI plates, then all of a sudden when we settle in to the nation building effort personal and vehicle armor become a huge issue? Why does the MBT continue to have a valuable role in stabilization operations, long after conventional wisdom would suggest that its use had reached the point of diminishing returns?

In HIC, you have options, concealment and mobility play a huge role in force protection. You can blitz the enemy and get inside their OODA loop with overwhelming force. But in Phase IV, where do you move to? Where do you hide your guys when you are guarding a conference of tribal elders? In a dumpster? Your stuck, exposed, whether it's at a checkpoint or a reconstruction project, everyone knows where it is, and that they might get a chance to shoot at Americans if they show up.

For COIN I want armored everything, Abrams with TUSK upgrades, up armored HMMWV, the Strykers can come play if they've got their cages on, etc. They have to be able to shrug off a ton of hurt when they're stuck watching an intersection.

For HIC I want light and deployable. Recent HICs have been absurdly fast, measured in days. If we wanna play in those we gotta be able to get in there fast. Not maritime prepositioning fast, C-17 fast. Or else it'll be settled in the UN before we even get there.

William F. Owen

01-27-2009, 05:55 AM

It seems to me that, contrary to what would be intuitive, armor requirements for COIN work can exceed those of a HIC.

True and has been since the 1916 Easter Uprising. It's not counter-intuitive at all. That's actually pretty well covered, and widely recognised.

Ken White

01-27-2009, 05:19 PM

Glad to have you. it would be nice if you'd go to this LINK (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?p=65337#post65337) and add a little about yourself to that thread.It seems to me that, contrary to what would be intuitive, armor requirements for COIN work can exceed those of a HIC.Exceed is perhaps not a good word but there's no denying the benefit if not 'need.'Why were we able to conduct OIF I with so many units in unarmored vehicles, or lacking SAPI plates, then all of a sudden when we settle in to the nation building effort personal and vehicle armor become a huge issue? Why does the MBT continue to have a valuable role in stabilization operations, long after conventional wisdom would suggest that its use had reached the point of diminishing returns?It became a huge issue because we had lost our COIN experience and knowledge and blundered about for 18 months, thus giving the opponents time to mount an intensive campaign of attacking with the tons of explosives that Saddam had deliberately scattered all over the nation for just that purpose. Those conditions may or may not ever prevail again.For COIN I want armored everything, Abrams with TUSK upgrades, up armored HMMWV, the Strykers can come play if they've got their cages on, etc. They have to be able to shrug off a ton of hurt when they're stuck watching an intersection.You may want to consider what real value the Tanks offer in an urban setting and contemplate their vulnerability in a city before you spend $5M a pop to buy a bunch. I'd also suggest that you take, there are many better vehicles -- the up armored HMMWV exists because it was relatively cheap and rapidly available, not because it's good for much of anything. There are a great many far better vehicles available. I'd also ask why you want to watch an intersection.For HIC I want light and deployable. Recent HICs have been absurdly fast, measured in days. If we wanna play in those we gotta be able to get in there fast. Not maritime prepositioning fast, C-17 fast. Or else it'll be settled in the UN before we even get there.You might also consider that the recent HIC involving the West (or Russia) have also been a major state attacking a comparatively fifth rate opponent instead of a near peer. Desert Storm was a total aberration; OIF 1 was close to being the same and the Russian incursion in Georgia was a political effort; a great FSB operation that just happened to use the Russian Armed Forces. Those are all very poor examples to use in determining what future HIC will be like. Lebanon in 2006 is probably closer than any of the others I cited.