Improving PSYOP (and CA as a tangent)

[Voodoun]

So the other thread really got some discussion going about those less sexy aspects of SOF, CA and PSYOP.

Clearly there are some very valid criticisms of the two organizations, so here's a thread to discuss those criticisms and brainstorm solutions.

Here's a thought I've had for a long time - doctrinally when a TPT goes out on a PSYOP mission, the 3-4 man team is effectively relegated to one or two men while the other two are left behind with the Humvee. Some discussion on that matter from people who have been down range a few times is that TPTs will often recruit a couple soldiers from their security element (say, the Infantry element they are supporting) to hold down that job, while the PSYOP trained soldiers are freed up to throw more PSYOP at the situation.

Is this a regular practice? Does it work? Should it work? If it does work, and there are no downsides, should it become doctrine?

[jkm_101_fso]

Here's a thought I've had for a long time - doctrinally when a TPT goes out on a PSYOP mission, the 3-4 man team is effectively relegated to one or two men while the other two are left behind with the Humvee. Some discussion on that matter from people who have been down range a few times is that TPTs will often recruit a couple soldiers from their security element (say, the Infantry element they are supporting) to hold down that job, while the PSYOP trained soldiers are freed up to throw more PSYOP at the situation. Is this a regular practice? Does it work? Should it work? If it does work, and there are no downsides, should it become doctrine?

I've been that mission commander that left PSYOPers pulling security; in hindsight, I was wrong to do that. Depending on the mission, I usually took their NCOIC with me.

In post-mission AARs, they seemed unhappy about it, but didn't complain. I will take the blame for a poor use of assets; but sometimes, I needed (or thought I did) the extra security. I utilized PSYOPs in many ways that I shouldn't have. But most of the time, I believe I gave them the ability to do their job (which at the time, I wasn't sure what that was, exactly). I tried very hard to incorporate them into every mission, regardless of what it was. I required the NCOIC to keep me informed of his independent operations and always tried to get his input in post-mission AARs, targeting meetings, etc. I never intended to misuse them, but to be honest, like I mentioned, I didn't know what exactly what they were supposed to do. My fault.

What REALLY annoyed me about the PSYOP team was the guidance they got from their company HQ (which was located a hundred miles from where we were). In many cases, the missions they were given by their own chain of command conflicted/didn't apply to our situation. That would be my biggest complaint with the employment of PSYOP teams; who do they work for? The unit they support/are attached to (in this case, my MiTT), or their company HQ? From what I understood, the answer was both. I think the reality was that their HQ was trying to "fill the gap" that existed because we didn't always employ them properly. In that same regard, the THT, EOD, JTAC, CA team and medics I had attached were all asked to things "out of their lane".

All of them did this without complaint and were excellent assets. I was thankful to have all of them. I've had a good experience with every PSYOPer I've ever worked with...even when I didn't understand what their mission was. I normally found that most PSYOPers to be folks that took initiative, and tried very hard to keep me and the Chain of Commmand informed of what they were doing/trying to do/wanted to do.

[Voodoun]

Sir, you probably shouldnt beat yourself up too much about that, because we're told from day one that while we work for our higher HQ, located 100's of miles away, we need to do what we can to assist the supported unit commander as long as it doesn't interfere with our mission objectives. Like you pointed out, everyone has do things out of their lane. Its our responsiblity to make sure we aren't being misused, not yours, right? But now knowing what you know, what would you have done differently?

[Schmedlap]

Here's a thought I've had for a long time - doctrinally when a TPT goes out on a PSYOP mission, the 3-4 man team is effectively relegated to one or two men while the other two are left behind with the Humvee.

What type of missions are they doing? Please don't tell me that they're handing out handbills or trinkets.

The primary use of PSYOP that we've leveraged on my deployments was non-interference messages on a raid or cordon & search and to inform bystanders immediately after a raid of what just occurred and why - both largely achieved by one guy driving and perhaps one or two on foot handing out mission-specific handbills. Less frequently, they were used to collect "atmospherics" on general attitudes and perceptions in a given area, in order to gauge the cognitive impacts of our operations. It was always up to the PSYOP team leader whether anyone on his 3-man team stayed with the vehicle - but he had the option of not doing so because they always traveled with a larger unit for security (can't ride around in one vehicle and many units won't allow you any less than 3 vehicles). Most recently, they were our lead guys in working with IA to set up the IA's own "IO" cell.

Like FSO, my biggest gripe was always with the TPD/TPC and/or their bosses. There were few pieces of information more worthless, in my opinion, than the weekly Measures of Performance rollup from the TPD's, yet it seemed to be their primary focus. They'd send us products that we never requested, purportedly to achieve effects inconsistent with our commander's intent, and then constantly badger us for current data on how many we handed out, while ignoring our requests for other products. You handed out x0,000 handbills in y location? Wonderful. You played x radio spots on y stations for a total of z minutes? Great. Do we have even the slightest hint as to Measures of Effectiveness (MoE)? Do we have any idea of how to measure the MoE? Then what is the point of the performance that we're measuring? Just to show that we're not sitting on our butts, doing nothing?

[jkm_101_fso]

But now knowing what you know, what would you have done differently?

Talk to the PSYOP CO leadership directly and help the Det NCOIC paint a picture of the AO, which was different from their CO HQ a hundred miles away. I never did this and I don't remember why. It's possible that my MiTT chief did, but as the team FSO/Ops guy, I normally was their direct contact for integration into the missions. PSYOP is an effect, an as the FSO, I was responsible for employing them, which I don't think I did well.

I wish I would have given them more latitude to do what they wanted. The Det NCOIC had a lot of plans and good ideas that we never got to try out; lack of time, lack of opportunity, etc.

Most of all, I wish I would have studied exactly what it is that PSYOP can provide, how it would have been beneficial to us; thus, employed them properly.

[Voodoun]

The absence of feedback loops, MoEs, etc, is endemic to social policy in general. Its a personal pet peeve of mine, glad to know its got real life impacts as well.

As far as the handing out trinkets aspect though, when properly employed its about far more than handing out the trinkets.

F2F ops need to have a vehicle to facilitate communication. Just imagine how awkward it would be to walk into say, a high school lunchroom, and try to accomplish some small simple change in behavior, like taking a different route home that evening. I personally might be able to walk into an Algerian coffee shop and not turn heads and make an ass of myself, but I promise you if I tried the same thing in say, Russia, I'd have a very hard time interacting successfully on my own (even though I've got zero Arab blood but my grandfather was born in Russia)

[jkm_101_fso]

What type of missions are they doing? Please don't tell me that they're handing out handbills or trinkets.

They did some of that. Mostly when they were just tagging along on a patrol. I usually got the 'terps to take a look at the "product" before they took it out. We did some incident-specific product distrobution that I think was helpful. I remember they had these really stupid comic books that portrayed the ISF as super-heroes. I had the 'terps read them to me; it was so lame. I imagine the Iraqi kids that read them laughed.


The primary use of PSYOP that we've leveraged on my deployments was non-interference messages on a raid or cordon & search and to inform bystanders immediately after a raid of what just occurred and why

We did some of this, I think it helped with crowd control in a few occasions.


Less frequently, they were used to collect "atmospherics" on general attitudes and perceptions in a given area, in order to gauge the cognitive impacts of our operations.

This was their major effort. The Det. NCOIC wanted to get out and do this on every mission, which I encouraged. I think his findings were skewed, in some cases. I didn't find the atmospheric reports all that helpful.


Most recently, they were our lead guys in working with IA to set up the IA's own "IO" cell.

For some reason, we didn't think of this until about half-way through the deployment. For one, the IA BN wasn't up to it, nor did they grasp the concept at first. The IO guy they ended up nominating was a PL that was fired for stealing. The PSYOP NCOIC put in a good effort and did successfully employ some IO themes into IA ops. Should have started it from day one.


Like FSO, my biggest gripe was always with the TPD/TPC and/or their bosses. There were few pieces of information more worthless, in my opinion, than the weekly Measures of Performance rollup from the TPD's, yet it seemed to be their primary focus.

I remember specifically the PSYOP company's effort to erect a billboard in one of the larger cities in the AO. We vehemently disagreed with the whole thing from the get-go. It was a "wanted" poster for an HTV. I can't remember exactly why my MiTT chief opposed it, but this went on for months. The billboard was eventually erected, and the locals destroyed it the next day.


They'd send us products that we never requested, purportedly to achieve effects inconsistent with our commander's intent, and then constantly badger us for current data on how many we handed out, while ignoring our requests for other products. You handed out x0,000 handbills in y location? Wonderful. You played x radio spots on y stations for a total of z minutes?

Ditto on all. Most that didn't apply we ignored.

[kville79]

First of all I'd like to say even though I don't post that much in this forum I'm a regular lurker, and the person who referred Voodoun to this board. After reading this thread I couldn't help myself but post on this topic.

First and foremost, it's been a current trend for commanders to use PsyOp as command information, i.e. handing out mission related messages and material to notify the populace of what the unit we're supporting is doing. This is a valid function of PsyOp, and a great way to utilize us as an asset. Mind you though, this is just the tip of the iceberg when it comes to our mission and possible capabilities. Not to mention it's probably the TPD's least favorite task.

As far as "atmospherics" the TPD send those to higher and that's what is used as a basis for products and missions that the TPD will receive. In essence that's one reason the Psyop team should establish good report with the unit they're supporting, the information they receive the more complete the information they send up will be. Every pair of boots on the ground is an intelligence collector.

I noticed the complaint on products requested and products received. I can tell you that the TPD does not choose the products, nor does even there Company... they can request, but doesn't mean that they will receive. More goes on in products than just the locality. If you want something that, for example, targets Sunnis or Kurds, and somehow that product can be misconstrued and used as propaganda by the Shiite, it won't be used because the chances of bleedover is high. Likewise you can't produce products that in anyway can be perceived to support or target any particular tribe, or group.

Comics, PsyOp has never had a good history with comics.. to note a previous such mistake would be the infamous Superman comic from Serbia/ Kosovo.

I have a few other things I would like to comment/ respond on, but I'll take a break for right now.

[Voodoun]

Hey Sarge - look what you started.

That's interesting that you bring up the superman land mine comic, because at the schoolhouse we're taught that that was a great success, and heavily pre and post tested, resulting in something like an 80% reduction in land mine injuries to children - can you expound on your perception?

[kville79]

Hey Sarge - look what you started.

That's interesting that you bring up the superman land mine comic, because at the schoolhouse we're taught that that was a great success, and heavily pre and post tested, resulting in something like an 80% reduction in land mine injuries to children - can you expound on your perception?

They obviously didn't tell you that in the end it was recalled due to the incident that little Serbian/Kosovar kids ended up in minefields thinking that superman was real and going to save them.

[Ken White]

"That's interesting that you bring up the superman land mine comic, because at the schoolhouse we're taught that that was a great success, and heavily pre and post tested, resulting in something like an 80% reduction in land mine injuries to children - can you expound on your perception?"


They obviously didn't tell you that in the end it was recalled due to the incident that little Serbian/Kosovar kids ended up in minefields thinking that superman was real and going to save them.Wasn't there, don't know but that's totally believable...

This is also why I continually annoy people by saying our training is REALLY bad...

[RTK]

This is also why I continually annoy people by saying our training is REALLY bad...

Ken, why do I keep getting deja vu about the training thing? :D

[Voodoun]

Were they recalled? I can believe their their efficacy is debateable, what isnt, but from what I understand numerous subsequent comic book series have been used all over. I wish there was some way to access the hard pre and post test data on that.

[Ken White]

Ken, why do I keep getting deja vu about the training thing? :DI've never said anything about that before... :D

(I am not going to admit I'm in a rut!!! :cool: )

[RTK]

Were they recalled? I can believe their their efficacy is debateable, what isnt, but from what I understand numerous subsequent comic book series have been used all over. I wish there was some way to access the hard pre and post test data on that.

It's doubtful you'll find any. It was recalled due to perception management. Kids rolled into a minefield looking for Superman. It didn't make good headlines. The command recalled the books. End of story. There wasn't a study. It was a command decision.

[Voodoun]

If they were recalled for that reason, why were they used in other mine awareness campaigns 5 years later in Latin America, that's the question I'm trying to get at. All PSYOP material is supposed to have MoE's attached to them, as I mentioned its a pet peeve of mine that we can't figure out what works and what doesnt based on hard data.

[82redleg]

...

First and foremost, it's been a current trend for commanders to use PsyOp as command information, i.e. handing out mission related messages and material to notify the populace of what the unit we're supporting is doing. This is a valid function of PsyOp, and a great way to utilize us as an asset. Mind you though, this is just the tip of the iceberg when it comes to our mission and possible capabilities. Not to mention it's probably the TPD's least favorite task.

...

I can speak from experience that this is because this is the only way that tactical commanders can influence what is put out. Anything that ISN"T command information is approved at levels way above reality. I'm not sure if this restriction came from the PSYOP chain of command or the regular chain of command, but it is out there. Wherever it came from, it was endorsed by the regular chain of command.

[RTK]

If they were recalled for that reason, why were they used in other mine awareness campaigns 5 years later in Latin America, that's the question I'm trying to get at. All PSYOP material is supposed to have MoE's attached to them, as I mentioned its a pet peeve of mine that we can't figure out what works and what doesnt based on hard data.

Different command and different command decision. Think of who was in charge and making decisions in Bosnia in 1996 (NATO). The 1996 version was 10 pages long. They were given out in orphanages, hospitals, and refugee camps - children with very little in life who were looking for hope and heroes.

Now think of who was in charge in Costa Rica, Nicaragua, and Honduras (SOCOM) in 1998. The 1998 version in Spanish was 32 pages long with more explanation and was given out by UNICEF, the government, the Ministry of Education, and SF Soldiers. It was a little smarter program.

Look into the PSYOPS archives for AARs of both operations. Go on CALL's JRTC cell and see if you can ask an RFI (the website walks you through it) and they should be able to help.

[Voodoun]

Thanks, thats sort of direction I needed to get it to click - thanks!

[ODB]

What is the turn around time for idea to implementation? We all know we are losing the information war here, so how do we streamline the process? Sorry two questions.

[Voodoun]

I think the War of Ideas is going to take more than just some ideas at this point, its going to take a national level coordination office, something we had during times of conflict during the 20th c., but has been loudly rejected and lambasted in the 21st (by the media and turf warring bureaucrats)

[RTK]

What is the turn around time for idea to implementation? We all know we are losing the information war here, so how do we streamline the process? Sorry two questions.

Q1: From good idea to products in hand of the indig should only take the design and production time, in my mind - if and only if the messages are known and the answer to #2 is true.
Q2: Trusting your subordinates to do the right thing for the overall mission.


I think the War of Ideas is going to take more than just some ideas at this point, its going to take a national level coordination office, something we had during times of conflict during the 20th c., but has been loudly rejected and lambasted in the 21st (by the media and turf warring bureaucrats)

I agree there needs to be a national message, but not necessarily another bureaucratic organization that "coordinates" and, thus, anchors progress.

What if the local message needs to counter the national level message for progress in the local area? How many loopholes would you have to jump through then?

If commander's intent is understood, why can it not be vetted locally (BDE/BN and below)? Wouldn't COL Maxwell or COL Gentile like the opportunity to design their IO messages as they see fit?

[Voodoun]

RTK, tactical PSYOP supports the battlefield commander, and its useful, but its not going to win the War of Ideas. In the 20th c. we created no less than 6 national level central Strategic PSYOP offices, and dismantled them when the time came, the last one met in 1987. Its been proven this works - the Cold War was a War of Ideas as well, and it was through the aggressive use of Influence Operations, mostly outside of the military, that put the first chinks in the Soviet armor, via Poland. Every War College assessment I've read of our failure in the War of Ideas has concluded that we need a strategic centralized office, as well as ever academic discussion I've come across.

[RTK]

RTK, tactical PSYOP supports the battlefield commander, and its useful, but its not going to win the War of Ideas. In the 20th c. we created no less than 6 national level central Strategic PSYOP offices, and dismantled them when the time came, the last one met in 1987. Its been proven this works - the Cold War was a War of Ideas as well, and it was through the aggressive use of Influence Operations, mostly outside of the military, that put the first chinks in the Soviet armor, via Poland. Every War College assessment I've read of our failure in the War of Ideas has concluded that we need a strategic centralized office, as well as ever academic discussion I've come across.

IO is larger than you. It's larger than PSYOP. My point is what the 98% of the force that doesn't have a TPD connected to it.

The young specialist rifleman does more PSYOP/CA/IO on a day to day basis than most PSYOP or CA teams do in a week. While the bureaucratic powers that be try to figure out the perfect way, the Soldiers and Marines on the ground are figuring out their own way that works in their AO regardless of a centralized strategy.

That's reality, regardless of studies, papers, or discussion.

[RTK]

Voodoun: Also, read here (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=2841), here (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=3855), and here (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=3805). A lot of this has been talked about.

The search button is your friend. :wry:

[Voodoun]

Of course IO is larger than me and larger than PSYOP, no one ever said it wasnt, its also larger than the entire DoD, and frankly, larger than America.

The notion that the average hard power rifleman does more to win the War of Ideas than anyone else is unsupported, and not contended in the links you provided. We are in an ideological struggle with Islamist militantism, and riflemen are not going to solve that conflict. Everyone from Bush, to Rice, to Petraeus has acknowledged this. We're talking about the War of Ideas here, not the ground operations that rely on IO, Influence Ops (more than Info Ops) to achieve their military goals.

The fact is that a national level organization worked in the past, and current experts unanimously support the notion, but have been unable ot generate the political will to create it. The OSI was shut down not because it was useless, but because it created too much popular opposition to be effective.

What is discussed on the SWJ bboard hardly trumps the ongoing and dedicated efforts at RAND, USAWC, and academic instutitons all across the Western world.


Cragin, Kim and Gerwehr, Scott. Dissuading Terror: Strategic Influence and the Struggle Against Terrorism. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2005

Gough, Susan L. “The Evolution of Strategic Influence” USAWC Strategy Research Project, 2003

Schleifer, Ron. Psychological Warfare in the Intifada: Israeli and Palestinian Media Politics and Military Strategies. Portland, Ore.: Sussex Academic, 2006.

Ward, Brad M. “Strategic Influence Operations – the Information Connection” USAWC Strategy Research Project, 2003

Phares, Walid. The War of Ideas: Jihad Against Democracy. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007.

Radvanyi, Janos. Psychological Operations and Political Warfare in Long Term Strategic Planning. New York: Praeger, 1990

Rosnau, William. “Waging the 'War of Ideas'” RAND Reprint, 2006

You can read the RAND stuff here:

http://www.rand.org/pubs/reprints/2006/RAND_RP1218.pdf (accessed December 2nd, 2008)

http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2005/RAND_MG184.pdf

As you can see, the issue that you took exception to (a centralized organization), is universally accepted. Now if you can provide examples of social science research contradicting this conclusion, I would be very interested in reading them. I'm always open to being proven wrong.

[RTK]

Of course IO is larger than me and larger than PSYOP, no one ever said it wasnt, its also larger than the entire DoD, and frankly, larger than America.

The notion that the average hard power rifleman does more to win the War of Ideas than anyone else is unsupported, and not contended in the links you provided. We are in an ideological struggle with Islamist militantism, and riflemen are not going to solve that conflict. Everyone from Bush, to Rice, to Petraeus has acknowledged this. We're talking about the War of Ideas here, not the ground operations that rely on IO, Influence Ops (more than Info Ops) to achieve their military goals.

The fact is that a national level organization worked in the past, and current experts unanimously support the notion, but have been unable ot generate the political will to create it. The OSI was shut down not because it was useless, but because it created too much popular opposition to be effective.

What is discussed on the SWJ bboard hardly trumps the ongoing and dedicated efforts at RAND, USAWC, and academic instutitons all across the Western world.


Cragin, Kim and Gerwehr, Scott. Dissuading Terror: Strategic Influence and the Struggle Against Terrorism. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2005

Gough, Susan L. “The Evolution of Strategic Influence” USAWC Strategy Research Project, 2003

Schleifer, Ron. Psychological Warfare in the Intifada: Israeli and Palestinian Media Politics and Military Strategies. Portland, Ore.: Sussex Academic, 2006.

Ward, Brad M. “Strategic Influence Operations – the Information Connection” USAWC Strategy Research Project, 2003

Phares, Walid. The War of Ideas: Jihad Against Democracy. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007.

Radvanyi, Janos. Psychological Operations and Political Warfare in Long Term Strategic Planning. New York: Praeger, 1990

Rosnau, William. “Waging the 'War of Ideas'” RAND Reprint, 2006

You can read the RAND stuff here:

http://www.rand.org/pubs/reprints/2006/RAND_RP1218.pdf (accessed December 2nd, 2008)

http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2005/RAND_MG184.pdf

As you can see, the issue that you took exception to (a centralized organization), is universally accepted. Now if you can provide examples of social science research contradicting this conclusion, I would be very interested in reading them. I'm always open to being proven wrong.

Talk to me again after you deploy and do it yourself. Be safe.

By the way, in the Army IO is Information Operations, not influence operations (FM 1-02, Operational Terms and Graphics).

[RTK]

From the Naval War College (http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA463268&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf)



Abstract: American and NATO forces are now engaged in what can be described as Influence Operations in Afghanistan. This paper demonstrates that in order to be effective, these Influence Operations must be tailored for each individual province and uniquely focused to account for how ethnic composition, geography, economic and agricultural factors affect the thoughts, actions, and behaviors of the population in each province.

[Voodoun]

That abstract doesnt contradict the conclusion that there needs to be a national level office.

Intelligence needs to be tailored for each individual province too, doesnt mean we shouldnt have a CIA.

Kinetic operations in Tikrit have to be tailored to Tikrit, but we still need a CENTCOM, don't we?

I'm not sure that my deployment on a TPT and getting experience tactically has any bearing on the strategic issue brought up when dealing with the War of Ideas.

Some of the best strategic thinkers in history were never tactically experienced.

[RTK]

From GEN Krulak (http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/usmc/strategic_corporal.htm)on the Strategic Corporal and his/her influence at the tactical level.

Another (http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/liddy.pdf), from this very site.

[jkm_101_fso]

Of course IO is larger than me and larger than PSYOP, no one ever said it wasnt, its also larger than the entire DoD, and frankly, larger than America.

If that's true, then as RTK pointed out, the an American rifleman's actions on the ground are all the more critical.


The notion that the average hard power rifleman does more to win the War of Ideas than anyone else is unsupported, and not contended in the links you provided.

I think RTK is suggesting something very obvious (and very true) to you. IT IS the American rifleman that is the direct link between all the great IO efforts and the people we are trying to influence. The great folks at RAND and other similiar institutions aren't the ones executing an IO theme. They are sitting in an office. The fellas with their boots on the ground are America's representation to the target audience. Their actions (good or bad) will be significant to our effort.


We are in an ideological struggle with Islamist militantism, and riflemen are not going to solve that conflict.

Not all by themselves, but it doesn't decrease the significance of their performance. Read up on the Anbar Awakening for an example.


Everyone from Bush, to Rice, to Petraeus has acknowledged this. We're talking about the War of Ideas here, not the ground operations that rely on IO, Influence Ops (more than Info Ops) to achieve their military goals.

I think that GEN Petraeus in particular recognizes the importance of the actions of American Soldiers on the ground. Their performance (in terms of ability to provide security and support HNF) has done much to influence our target audience. Granted, this would be specific to just Iraq and Afghanistan, but don't think the rest of the ME hasn't noticed the turn around in Iraq, which much of can be attributed to the work of American Soldiers.


The fact is that a national level organization worked in the past, and current experts unanimously support the notion, but have been unable ot generate the political will to create it. The OSI was shut down not because it was useless, but because it created too much popular opposition to be effective.

I don't know enough about OSI to speak intelligently. I do know that like many, I'm apprehensive about putting my faith into yet another government organization to head this effort.


What is discussed on the SWJ bboard hardly trumps the ongoing and dedicated efforts at RAND, USAWC, and academic instutitons all across the Western world.

The longer you read and post here, the more you will find the aforementioned statement to be false. I'll bet you that folks in RAND and the like, and particularly USAWC, lurk and post here. I will also bet they regard this place as pretty credible. I hope that some of them read this and chime in to support what I just said.

[Voodoun]

Clearly we're talking around eachother, because in no sense does the notion of the strategic corporal contradict my position.

Sure, the average soldier needs to gain a sense of sophistication, sure. No doubt. Doesnt mean that we don't need national level Strategic PSYOP campaigns focused on long term conversion efforts organized and executed at the national level.

Strategic Corporals can run around all day long and have zero affect on the War of Ideas. There is no military solution to this idealogical struggle - or do you disagree with Gen Petraeus?

You seem to be framing the argument in terms of what will benefit the military, what will allow the military to succeed in its mission.

The War of Ideas, to paraphrase you, is bigger than the military.

There is nothing that the strategic corporal can do to co-opt and redirect the message of al Manar, to bring the cultural power of MTV, Levis Jeans, and McDonald's to bear, to affect the curriculm of the madrassa in Saudi Arabia or the jamiat in Iraq, nor is that claim being made in the sources you're providing.

[Voodoun]

jkm, sorry, I come from an academic debate background, and frankly, straw men are being overly relied on in this exchange to make a point.

I *never* denied that the rifleman will affect perceptions and color the image of the US in the Arab world. Unfortunately, the War of Ideas is much bigger than that. Every Iraqi could love every American soldier, and we still wouldnt be winning the War of Ideas.

Arab kids LOVE American pop culture, and a huge proportion of Arabs highly value American ideals, but hate American policy. That can only be changed rapidly at the strategic level via an organized and concerted effort.

Islamists spent 30 years engaged in a disparate unorganized campaign to shape the curriculum at American universities, we don't have that kind of time.

William Donovan made a very astute observation 65 years ago:

The “inability to respond effectively in the modern war of words” and the need to “rely exclusively, or even primarily, on orthodox methods of warfare” was “appallingly costly in blood and treasure.”

And so he spearheaded a national level Influence Operations organization.

Now, maybe I'm wrong along with the vast majority - its possible, but a convincing argument has yet to be presented by either RTK or yourself.

I'll ask again - should CIA not exist, because its a centralized national level organization?

What about CENTCOM?

Every conflict of the modern era had an organization similiar to the one I've mentioned - it only dissapeared in the late 1980's.

[RTK]

That abstract doesnt contradict the conclusion that there needs to be a national level office.

Intelligence needs to be tailored for each individual province too, doesnt mean we shouldnt have a CIA.

Kinetic operations in Tikrit have to be tailored to Tikrit, but we still need a CENTCOM, don't we?

I'm not sure that my deployment on a TPT and getting experience tactically has any bearing on the strategic issue brought up when dealing with the War of Ideas.

Some of the best strategic thinkers in history were never tactically experienced.

We have the National Security Strategy. Another will be published soon. That document lays out the overall themes from the President. It's the duty of the JCS and State Department to ensure they are fulfilled down to MACOMs. It is then the responsibilities of joint staffs to get it to the tactical level.

What is strategy if not for the implementation at the tactical level? Will any MACOM win the war?

As for experience being brought up:

I don't think you're focused in the right direction. I also think you're going to piss off whoever you're going to work for with your contrarian approach to what's been presented to you. Studies say one thing. My experiences in over 24 months in theater as a combat leader indicate otherwise. To be honest, I think they wasted a tremendous amount of time and resources to give a utopian view of operations that contradict reality.

You're a relatively inexperienced E4(P) getting ready for your first deployment. I'd be far more concerned, at this stage of the game, of what YOU can effect at your level for the command you are assigned to than redesigning the operational and strategic infrastucture of American foreign policy and military planning. What are you going to do to shape the battlefield to make your commander and his unit successful? What information will you gather to provide the intelligence and situational awareness to leave you AO in better shape than you found it? That, above all else, is what you should focus on right now.

Read Three Cups of Tea, by Greg Mortenson, to see the power of individual action over a large area. I've seen Soldiers do the same thing.

[Voodoun]

RTK,

I appreciate your advice, but I'd like to point out that the contrarianism didn't start with me. I made a point, one that has been made repeatedly and is well accepted both professionally and academically, and has been since 2001, and was our standard procedure during the 20th c., and you told me I was wrong.

What I do as a tactical asset is absolutely unrelated to my ability (or the requirement to do just this as a grad student) to scrutinze and assess policy.

We are losing the War of Ideas. If you think a disparate and disorganized approach is the best way to recover ground on this front that was lost long before 9/11, I'd like to see that position defended. Again, I'm talking about the strategic level - you keep making reference to the tactical. You could be right. I think a lot of people would be interested in seeing a defense of that contention.

Who is going to coordinate Influence Ops between State and DoD?

DoD decided that a unified organization was important enough that after the OSI was shut down it created a Joint PSYOP support element to coordinate DoD efforts.

What about the Justice Dept?

How will the strategic corporal replicate the activities of the USIA? What can the strategic corporal do in Lebanon, or Syria, where he's not operating? How can he make al Hurra and Radio Sawa effective?

I am not *just* an E4 getting ready for deployment, I am also an academic specifically working on policy in this arena.

[RTK]

Again, I'm talking about the strategic level - you keep making reference to the tactical. You could be right. I think a lot of people would be interested in seeing a defense of that contention.

I talk tactical because that the only common ground you and I have right now. I'm a tactical level combat leader. You're a member of a TPT/D. OUr job is to fight and win. Strategy be damned, we're the ones that have to do it. How do WE make it better. You have yet to even address (or ask) what it is you need to do to be successful. You're shooting at the 500 meter target when you're getting tattooed by the 10 meter pop-up. Let me re-vector you to your inital question:


Here's a thought I've had for a long time - doctrinally when a TPT goes out on a PSYOP mission, the 3-4 man team is effectively relegated to one or two men while the other two are left behind with the Humvee. Some discussion on that matter from people who have been down range a few times is that TPTs will often recruit a couple soldiers from their security element (say, the Infantry element they are supporting) to hold down that job, while the PSYOP trained soldiers are freed up to throw more PSYOP at the situation.

Is this a regular practice? Does it work? Should it work? If it does work, and there are no downsides, should it become doctrine?

Whether you see it or not, I'm trying to get you to think of the things you're going to need to answer to before you meet the first commander you'll be supporting. He isn't going to care about your theories of strategy. If you come in with that he'll probably kick you out of his TOC.

You're out of acadamia and theory. You're in the realm of execution now. Get used to it. Embrace it. And don't forget that your action or inaction will impact the Soldiers around you.


Edited to add after you addition of your last line:

Regardless of what you're doing in your research, which is admirable and vital, you probably need to focus down. I have never referenced any Soldier as "just" and E4 or any other demeaning descriptor such as "just" or "only." My track record with the Soldiers I have worked with and lead indicate the same. Do NOT infer that I did it here.

[Voodoun]

Yup, we were clearly talking around eachother.

Tactically I'm not disagreeing with anything you're saying. I most certainly did ask what I needed to be successful tactically, as you pointed out, in my original question.

As you have said, I can affect my AO, I can assist my supported unit in accomplishing its mission, and certainly those are things I'm focusing on in getting ready for deployment. Well, I'm focusing on helping my unit get ready for that. Clearly we need to improve the sophistication of our ground soldiers, and as kville79, who is in my unit, can attest, I try to facilitate that every chance I get. Nothing chaps me more than hearing a PSYOPer talk about ragheads and about how we've been fighting them for thousands of years. I get it.

What I still don't get it how my comment, which is *widely* accepted, and drew fire from you, made me contrarian. Patronize me all you want about tactical concerns, I'm hear to learn about that stuff from you guys, and I only know what I've been taught.

But when we're discussing the War of Ideas, which is way bigger than my supported unit or my rank, and a matter largely outside of the Army's realm of responsiblity, I don't see my defense of a position unrelated to either your experience as a commander or mine as Jr. Enlisted as contrarian.

When I'm in uniform I'm perfectly capable of shutting up and being wrong, in that military way that has nothing to do with correct or incorrect, so I don't intend to be pissing off any commanders.

[reed11b]

Something about this and the SOF support thread has bugged me for a few days now. When the subject of CA and PSYOP soldiers was first raised by Voodoun, the immediate response was "those dirty undisciplined SF wannabe's". Yet when we learned that they are trained to use the equipment and methods that were listed as the reasons for them being "dirty undisciplined SF wannabe's" not one senior member of this council went "ah-ha, perhaps my perceptions were flawed and I need to make an effort to understand these assets better". Not a single one. I'll admit my initial perceptions of CA and PSYOPS mirrored yours, but hearing that some of what we thought was rather silly was trained, and done by the individual, makes me think "why do the soldiers trust the training even if it gets them negative attention from us ground pounder types?" Combined with some of the black and white tactical advice "Never ever ever cuff your sleeves because there is a slight chance of getting a really bad burn from hot brass" this shows a real narrow view on operational concepts (operational is the wrong word, just can't think of the right one at the moment), and we, as the front line on both thinking and discussion of fighting concepts and as professional soldiers can do better. We need to do better. This is were fallacious arguments like HIC vs COIN come from. The world is not black and white, it is grey. Voodoun, the members are very knowledgeable and always give there advice serious consideration, but you don't need to take it as gospel, trust your training and your own gut too.
Reed
I'll now go take my meds and find some good cover and concealment.

[Surferbeetle]

You have to listen closely with much more than just your intellect in order to understand what some of the wise people are saying both here at SWJ and downrange. You will need to apply that ability to listen in Iraq for yourself, your team, and your supported unit.

Wilmington has a beach at Ft. Fischer which has helped me, in the past, to still the whir of my intellectual gears and to really listen to what's around me. That beach helped me to prepare for and later to integrate my downrange experience with my civilian and academic experience.

Failing that there is always beer and women to help you with developing your listening skills...;)

[Voodoun]

<I have never referenced any Soldier as "just" and E4 or any other demeaning descriptor such as "just" or "only." My track record with the Soldiers I have worked with and lead indicate the same. Do NOT infer that I did it here.>

RTK, sorry, didn't mean to imply that you were doing that - *I* am calling myself just an E4 - I don't make any pretension to soldiering expertise. hell, E4 implies a level of competence I can certainly display, but is far beyond my comfort zone. I know that when I deploy I'm going to be growing INTO my rank, not out of it.

No need to pull any punches or anything, we're all grown ups. I know where my weaknesses are.

But RTK, I'd still like to know how I came across as contrarian, when I was just defending a point I made. I felt you were being contrarian, actually. Either way, I'm still interested in your opinion that is contrary to Bill Donovan's ;-)

[Voodoun]

Something about this and the SOF support thread has bugged me for a few days now. When the subject of CA and PSYOP soldiers was first raised by Voodoun, the immediate response was "those dirty undisciplined SF wannabe's". Yet when we learned that they are trained to use the equipment and methods that were listed as the reasons for them being "dirty undisciplined SF wannabe's" not one senior member of this council went "ah-ha, perhaps my perceptions were flawed and I need to make an effort to understand these assets better". Not a single one. I'll admit my initial perceptions of CA and PSYOPS mirrored yours, but hearing that some of what we thought was rather silly was trained, and done by the individual, makes me think "why do the soldiers trust the training even if it gets them negative attention from us ground pounder types?" Combined with some of the black and white tactical advice "Never ever ever cuff your sleeves because there is a slight chance of getting a really bad burn from hot brass" this shows a real narrow view on operational concepts (operational is the wrong word, just can't think of the right one at the moment), and we, as the front line on both thinking and discussion of fighting concepts and as professional soldiers can do better. We need to do better. This is were fallacious arguments like HIC vs COIN come from. The world is not black and white, it is grey. Voodoun, the members are very knowledgeable and always give there advice serious consideration, but you don't need to take it as gospel, trust your training and your own gut too.
Reed
I'll now go take my meds and find some good cover and concealment.
Reed, thanks, its good to see that sort of thoughtful response.

I actually brought up the cuffed sleeve thing with rather experienced NCO who has mutiple deployments since the mid 1990's with both other SOF and conventional forces. He laughed and said he could see the argument either way, but to consider that PSYOP soldiers are asked to make cerebral judgements that cannot be reflexive in nature the way that an infantryman can rely on his training to carry him through a dynamic firefight. Our brains don't work as well when we're over heated. He'd rather take a brass burn to the wrist than not be at 100% cognitively.

But I'd like to think we can move past the cuffed sleeve/uniform thing and talk about more mission-oriented ideas.

[RTK]

<I have never referenced any Soldier as "just" and E4 or any other demeaning descriptor such as "just" or "only." My track record with the Soldiers I have worked with and lead indicate the same. Do NOT infer that I did it here.>

RTK, sorry, didn't mean to imply that you were doing that - *I* am calling myself just an E4 - I don't make any pretension to soldiering expertise. hell, E4 implies a level of competence I can certainly display, but is far beyond my comfort zone. I know that when I deploy I'm going to be growing INTO my rank, not out of it.

No need to pull any punches or anything, we're all grown ups. I know where my weaknesses are.

But RTK, I'd still like to know how I came across as contrarian, when I was just defending a point I made. I felt you were being contrarian, actually. Either way, I'm still interested in your opinion that is contrary to Bill Donovan's ;-)

You appeared to argue for the sake of argument, regardless of what was presented to you. Judging from the tone and appearance, take a look at Surferbeetle and JKM. It appears they agreed.

I question reviving a system and agency that was brought down due to media backlash. If the coordinating agency for PSYOPs can be brought down by a media frenzy, and their purpose is to identify themes and messages to further strategic interests, doesn't it negate the purpose?

[Voodoun]

Thanks for taking the time to express that - argumentative and contrarian have different connotations, but to each his own. I was critiquing the validity of the material presented because it did not logically provide a contra-indication to my point, not arguing for the sake of arguing.

To address your point, that's a valid concern, but if the DoD shut down simply because its was being denigrated in the media, where would be? CIA, School of the Americas, NSA, all sorts of government agencies get bad press.

The media hasnt picked up on the Joint PSYOP SE in Fl.

It was the Public Affairs office at the Pentagon that launched a turf war against the OSI

http://www.usnews.com/usnews/news/articles/050425/25roots.b1.htm

that resulted in its media-driven closure.

I'm not resistant or closed to new ideas or attacks on my paradigm, I know I have new things to learn.

The assumption that a centralized organization would hinder adaptability on the ground doesn't hold water for me. Diplomats are expected to adapt to their unique situations, yet our diplomatic operations are centrally regulated. Same thing with kinetic and intelligence operations.

These examples all benefit from the sort of organization that we saw fit to employ throughout the 20th c. for Strategic Influence ops.

I don't see how we can ideologically confront Salafi jihadis through their media, social services, and educational networks simply by utlizing Army PSYOP (because essentially thats really the only place is resides in the military), the strategic corporal, and a rather small CIA office.

[reed11b]

The assumption that a centralized organization would hinder adaptability on the ground doesn't hold water for me. Diplomats are expected to adapt to their unique situations, yet our diplomatic operations are centrally regulated. Same thing with kinetic and intelligence operations.

These examples all benefit from the sort of organization that we saw fit to employ throughout the 20th c. for Strategic Influence ops.

I don't see how we can ideologically confront Salafi jihadis through their media, social services, and educational networks simply by utlizing Army PSYOP (because essentially thats really the only place is resides in the military), the strategic corporal, and a rather small CIA office.
I think the key argument against the centralized organization is twofold, at least in my mind.
1) Familiar with the term, too many chiefs, not enough Indians? What exactly is the centralized PSYOP office going to control? They are not going to countermand the BCT's, PA is already separate, and what about parallel but non-DOD efforts like the CIA?
2) I think that "ideologically confront Salafi jihadis through their media, social services, and educational networks " is not a primary DOD mission, it is a State and DNI mission. DOD provides support.

There is another thread here that you should probably check out, would like to see your opinion on it. LINK (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=6354&highlight=PSYOP)
For the record, I am a big believer that the "strategic corporal" and that proper training and unit structure in this arena would pay bigger dividends over any PSYOP restructure.
Reed

[Voodoun]

Reed, I think we're discussing two different things. I am not suggesting that *Army* PSYOP be tasked to some centralized national level organization - Army PSYOP is focused primarily on short term compliance operations, and should continue on that.

The spectrum of PSYOP continues far beyond that though.

http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB177/02_psyop-jp-3-53.pdf

I'm not in a position to have an opinion on who should control this organization, DoD, NSC, State, because that's organizational policy, a realm in which I avoid completely.

When I talk about a coordinating national level office I mean one that guides Strategic Influence for the nation, bringing coherence and focus to our Public Diplomacy, Aid, Information, Public Affairs, and Psychological Operations.

US Army PSYOP would remain mostly untouched, at most be given specific tasking and doctrinal guidance.

If I somehow communicated that I was advocating that the Army get involved in all of this, I was most certainly not.

[Ken White]

...consider that PSYOP soldiers are asked to make cerebral judgements that cannot be reflexive in nature the way that an infantryman can rely on his training to carry him through a dynamic firefight. Our brains don't work as well when we're over heated. He'd rather take a brass burn to the wrist than not be at 100% cognitively.That's essentially correct but it's also not really helpful because it tries to put a cerebral slant on a practical problem. In addition to the hot brass problem (which many of us in an earlier war had while wearing T-shirts as an outer garment... :rolleyes:) there is the senior Officer seeing someone 'out of unigram' problem. That's practical...

What's also practical is that the SOF and in particular the PsyOps communities are filled with smart and educated folks. What many in those communities often seem to forget is that there are some equally if not more smart and just as well or better educated guys wandering about in Rifle companies. That brings up two issues. There are more of them (smart 11Bs, not just all 11Bs) than there are of you and they really, really hate condescension form other communities. So I'd suggest that your experienced SOF NCO made a mildly condescending statement and you repeated it which brings totally cognitively approaching an issue into question. Is that really a good PsyOp-like effort... :D
But I'd like to think we can move past the cuffed sleeve/uniform thing and talk about more mission-oriented ideas.Shouldn't be a problem. If I could make a suggestion, don't let your previous (and possibly future) academic persona get too intermingled with your current about to deploy persona. By all means keep your values and your knowledge, state your opinions and question everything but usually, there's little to be gained by arguing the number of angels on that pin (even if it is fun on occasion ;) ).

Which gets to your valid point that we need a national approach to IO. I agree. I also think that will not happen for many reasons. We are a big diverse country with many points of view. Our politics reflect this and our political system mitigates against any coherent long range plan. The US Information Agency essentially did a good job while it was in existence. It was brought down by two things; the desire of the State Department to have total control over our 'message' and the fact that the left leaning among hated anything that tried to put the US in a good light. That same combination of bureaucratic turf battles (which you alluded to much earlier...) and ideology will short circuit the goal in the future (never say never but it is unlikely).

You also said:
"I don't see how we can ideologically confront Salafi jihadis through their media, social services, and educational networks simply by utlizing Army PSYOP (because essentially thats really the only place is resides in the military), the strategic corporal, and a rather small CIA office."Question. Do we really want to confront Salafi jihadis (or more properly in the PsyOps mode; persons engaged in hiraba) on an ideological basis? I'm not at all sure we want to confront them on that basis and my perception is that if we did we'd lose, big time.

The simple solution to the IO problem is to bring back and empower USIA. Not going to happen, I'm afraid. We'll muddle along -- it's the American way...:D

[Voodoun]

That's probably a very accurate appraisal of base rates - given that there are around 1500 Tactical PSYOP and probably 10% of our enlisted ranks have post-graduate educations, the odds are high that there's more enlisted 11b's with MA's, MBAs, and PhDs, than PSYOP. But take for intance the E4 I know in PSYOP with an MBA - I don't think he'd argue that his job is going to require him utilize that education in his job. I don't jack squat about being an infantryman - but Reed does - Reed, would you argue that when the #### hits the fan in *your* tactical arena (bullets flying all around) your frontal cortex is fully engaged? I know mine shuts off when dealing with novel fight or flight stimuli.

I think the dynamic situation that was being described to me was not one in which people were being shot at, but one in which the PSYOPer was caught in a delicate social situation that required him to use cognitive function in a manner that the average infantryman (we all assume, and maybe wrongfully so) doesnt generally.

<the fact that the left leaning among hated anything that tried to put the US in a good light. That same combination of bureaucratic turf battles (which you alluded to much earlier...) and ideology will short circuit the goal in the future (never say never but it is unlikely).>

Bingo. Is this acceptable? We have the power to ratchet past the turf wars, but we seem to lack the political will to confront this 'everything America does is bad' mentality.

an updated USIA would be a good start, that's for sure.

As far as do we want to confront the Salafi ideology? Well, that has certainly been the goal of policymakers at this point. Making judgements about whether thats the right or wrong thing to do is beyond my comfort zone.

[reed11b]

But take for intance the E4 I know in PSYOP with an MBA - I don't think he'd argue that his job is going to require him utilize that education in his job. I don't jack squat about being an infantryman - but Reed does - Reed, would you argue that when the #### hits the fan in *your* tactical arena (bullets flying all around) your frontal cortex is fully engaged? I know mine shuts off when dealing with novel fight or flight stimuli.



One, I am far far from the most experienced war fighter in this counsel. You should make that an open question. My experience is that no, when heavily engaged, I was not 100% cerebral. However heavily engaged was a rarity and most engagements allowed, in fact demanded, a thinking approach.
Two, on top of this, our day to day interactions with non-combatants had secondary and on-going effects, so we constantly had to consider our actions. The hostility towards PSYOPS and occasionally CA is the attitude that PSYOPS is a PSYOPS thing, you grunts wouldn't understand. Try us, we do it day to day.
It is also OK, even encouraged at times to just state that you agree to disagree and drop a topic if no new information is being brought forth.
Reed

[Voodoun]

<The hostility towards PSYOPS and occasionally CA is the attitude that PSYOPS is a PSYOPS thing, you grunts wouldn't understand. Try us, we do it day to day.>

All this from the relatively amused suggestion that maybe the reason we were trained to cuff our sleeves if it was scorching hot was because our jobs were more cerebral and we were less likely to be dealing with hot brass than an 11b.

Its *amazing* how deep some of this animosity runs!

Reed, absolutely - every PSYOPer out there should utilize his supported unit to be a force multiplier for his PSYOP mission.

Now let me turn this around a bit though. A good number of the tankers, MPs, 11b's, etc, that I've come across, are so far from culturally aware its embrassing. On FTX's when I've got the N word being flung around, and rag head this, and camel jockey that, and let me tell you the story about the time I shot a haji in his leg and he fell down 2 stories cracking his head open like a watermelon, and that bitch started wailing 'lulululululululu!" and don't touch 'em cause they've all got #### on their left hands, I find myself sitting off to the side with a couple other guys shaking our heads. I've made it a point to address this with my Unit twice so far, but when we're training with other units, no one is going to listen to one word we have to say - I've seen what happens when an E7 enters a hooch and tries to explain why maybe these sort of antics aren't the wisest move. As soon as he leaves everyone just starts making fun of him. And there's two of us off to the side just looking at eachother, with no idea what to do.

So while PSYOP and CA may come across as arrogant sometime, there's a reason.

When I was in Basic Training I was 30 years old. I had some 18 year old kid decide I must be an al Qaeda spy because I had a funny name, I was brown, and I told him to ease up when he was regaling us all with stories about how he was going to kill dirty hajis. (there was a 40 year old Iraqi 09L in our Company, btw, and I spoke up because this kid was way out of hand). Mind you, this AQ spy thing didnt stop with the one guy, it went on all cycle long.



That sort of thing colors our perceptions. Sure, PSYOP needs to rise above it, but let's be clear, there's some call for what you're seeing on your end.

[RTK]

Reed, would you argue that when the #### hits the fan in *your* tactical arena (bullets flying all around) your frontal cortex is fully engaged? I know mine shuts off when dealing with novel fight or flight stimuli.

Depends on how you deal with stress and process information. Can you integrate the 5 aspects of weather, the 5 aspects of terrain, the 7 forms of contact, safe distance zones, backdrops, weapons effects, mitigation of collateral damage, then look at both the pros and cons of each in a split second while, at the same time, weighing the combat multipliers, organic and inorganic to your unit, and bring them all to bear properly in a reasonable amount of time in order to maximize your element's opportunities for success in closing with and destroying your enemy?

Some see that as cerebral. Others see it as instinct after being well trained. Stress innoculation training, that is, to place Soldiers and Marines in those situations in a training environment that best replicate combat conditions. Others call it OODA. Whatever your thoughts are, warfare is cerebral whether you're yelling "gunner, sabot, tank" or dealing with how best to build a school in an impoverished area.


our day to day interactions with non-combatants had secondary and on-going effects, so we constantly had to consider our actions. The hostility towards PSYOPS and occasionally CA is the attitude that PSYOPS is a PSYOPS thing, you grunts wouldn't understand. Try us, we do it day to day.

I worked with 3 TPTs and 2 CA teams over two years. I can speak to the condescension firsthand. I'm fairly competent and well-read in a number of different areas. It astonished the TPT team that I knew their sole purpose wasn't to dump leaflets all over my 54 villages in my AO. They were speechless when I explained I knew their mission was to demoralize the enemy by causing dissension and unrest among his ranks, while at the same time convincing the local population to support American troops and providing me with atmospherics and the attitudes and behaviors of those I was trying to help and those who I was trying to capture or kill.

I think too many CA and PSYOP teams go into a OPCON/TACON relationship expecting to get the shaft. Many more enter into the relationship believing wholeheartedly they're going to get used and abused. Abused children abuse their own children. I think it's become so expected (and I think wrongly so) that it clouds candid and open discussion from the get go.

If anything, that might be the first thing that needs to get ironed out before all else in the CF/PSYOP/CA relationships.

[Voodoun]

<Depends on how you deal with stress and process information. Can you integrate the 5 aspects of weather, the 5 aspects of terrain, the 7 forms of contact, safe distance zones, backdrops, weapons effects, mitigation of collateral damage, then look at both the pros and cons of each in a split second while, at the same time, weighing the combat multipliers, organic and inorganic to your unit, and bring them all to bear properly in a reasonable amount of time in order to maximize your element's opportunities for success in closing with and destroying your enemy?>

Nope, sure can't. Wouldnt have a clue how to start.

[Ken White]

...would you argue that when the #### hits the fan in *your* tactical arena (bullets flying all around) your frontal cortex is fully engaged? I know mine shuts off when dealing with novel fight or flight stimuli.As RTK said, if you can't fight and think -- fast -- you're dead. Two wars, several other soirees and I never had a problem doing both. To imply otherwise is patronizing and will not win you allies.
...the PSYOPer was caught in a delicate social situation that required him to use cognitive function in a manner that the average infantryman (we all assume, and maybe wrongfully so) doesnt generally.Yes, you do assume -- and as they say that make an ass out of you and not me. Snark breeds snark, a PsyOps and internet truth... :D

That is a bad assumption for both current theaters and a really bad one for a more intense war. Indications are there folks aren't turning off their thinking for visceral / instinctive / drilled reactions. They rarely do, rumors to the contrary not withstanding.
Bingo. Is this acceptable? We have the power to ratchet past the turf wars,True but only if there is a really pressing need, an existential threat. We do not face such a threat now so the turf battles will continue.
...but we seem to lack the political will to confront this 'everything America does is bad' mentality.Not bad enough at this point to develop a consensus in opposition. If it gets worse (and it may not once everyone gets over their BDS), pressure from all us moderates and the as goofy as the 'America's wrong' crowd far right fringe will kill it -- or make it hide.
As far as do we want to confront the Salafi ideology? Well, that has certainly been the goal of policymakers at this point. Making judgements about whether thats the right or wrong thing to do is beyond my comfort zone.If you know that, you're ahead of me -- I have yet to see any goal other than to confront the actors and attack their funding and (to an extent and not too well done) their credibility. IMO, that's not the same thing as attacking the ideology -- which would be futile in any event.

[Ken White]

So while PSYOP and CA may come across as arrogant sometime, there's a reason.Nah, not really. Far from it, in fact. Some forget what it's like to be an 18 year old right out of high school, perhaps...

I'd also suggest that the stuff you cite doesn't happen in good unit -- well, it does happen, but it gets immediately squashed -- as you'll learn.

[reed11b]

Dang, must learn to type faster... Training is not the unit. Most of it is also hot air from insecure young males, they may laugh at the NCO, but I doubt they will cross him in the field. Also when units get deployed, a lot of that bravado disappears because most soldiers I know are VERY serious about doing a professional job. There are bad units where that behavior persists into a deployment but they are the exception, not the rule. It is also the reason that Ken and Wilf and I , along w/ many others, scream that initial training should be far more involved and that the current truism that real training does not start until a soldier gets to his unit must be placed on it's ear.
Reed

[Voodoun]

First off, I presented a case that was not MINE, I was RELAYING an explanation, I was not saying one thing was true and one wasnt, I was asking questions to explore a notion, and I was bending over backwards to qualify that discussion with words like 'assume' and 'perhaps wrongfully' but you're still jumping down my throat? Sure thing!


So what have we learned? Don't ask questions, don't be informed or have an informed opinion, because the only thing that matters here is military experience, accept everything presented at face value, never drill deeper for substantiation, absolutely never reject straw men and defend your contention, and most importantly we have just discovered that PSYOP is a job anyone can do, because there's no cognitive difference between being an infantry soldier and a PSYOP soldier, despite what former infantry guys turned PSYOP say about it - and even having the audacity to be curious about this, to simply want to discuss it, is condescending and insulting.

Got it. I'm on board now. How's that for snarkiness?

<If you know that, you're ahead of me -- I have yet to see any goal other than to confront the actors and attack their funding and (to an extent and not too well done) their credibility. IMO, that's not the same thing as attacking the ideology -- which would be futile in any event.>


http://www.usnews.com/usnews/news/articles/050425/25roots.htm

http://www.nctc.gov/press_room/speeches/20070910.pdf

"We must better coordinate departmental efforts to counter radicalization both at home and abroad"

"Strategic Offense: Analysis to guide national policy and policymakers in countering violent extremism and radical ideology as a threat to our way of life"

And in a scathing critique that cites numerous policy makers, thinktanks, and the president:

http://ics.leeds.ac.uk/papers/vp01.cfm?outfit=pmt&folder=339&paper=1803

So yes, when the president calls the GWOT a long lasting struggle with ideology, and launches a campaign directed to "transform Islam", I think its pretty safe to say we were confronting more than just the actors, but attempting to bring transformative change.

But my sleeves were cuffed while I pulled those up, so there's no validity to substantive points made.

I guess I'm just a raging dillhole that has clearly offended many of you with my unforgivable questions and constant reminders that I know very little about soldiering, and am just trying to learn and understand.

SWEET. Got it. <----------- tongue in cheek sarcasm, just to ensure no one misunderestimates my tone and intention

[Voodoun]

Hey, I hope you guys are right about that, but whether they cross him in the field is irrelevant, if their mind set includes 'its ok to use words like Haji that I don't understand in a perjorative manner, and to openly derogate their culture' then it seems natural that a PSYOPer wouldnt necessarily want to spend the time trying to re-educate them.

Again, *I don't know*, I really dont, I'm just thinking out loud.

But sorry, the examples above were not all while in institutional training - I've heard that sort of speech in my unit, and in other units we were training with on FTX

[Steve Blair]

Just a gentle reminder to everyone to lighten up and take a deep breath. We were all new here once. The internet can't capture things like tone and facial expressions, so it can be very hard at times to tell what someone intends to 'say' (or doesn't intend to 'say') through the typed word. That goes for both new folks and those who've been here for a time.

[marct]

Hey, I hope you guys are right about that, but whether they cross him in the field is irrelevant, if their mind set includes 'its ok to use words like Haji that I don't understand in a perjorative manner, and to openly derogate their culture' then it seems natural that a PSYOPer wouldnt necessarily want to spend the time trying to re-educate them.

No worries. BTW, there is always a lot of cross-cultural miscommunication that happens; even with the PSYOPS crowd ;).

[Voodoun]

hell, cross cultural nothing, there's miscommunication going on rampantly right here!

[kville79]

wow, I guess I have to start checking this board every day now... so much has gone on in this thread for me to even cover any informative response in less than two pages.

ok, where do I start.

I've noticed that a major point of contention is the value of a centralized governmental organization to manage PsyOp/Influence Ops? and corodinate between the State, Intelligence, and Defense departments, correct?

OSI, I really don't know much about the OSI... but my political leanings kinda kick in here, the concept reeked of OWI Orwellian propaganda. But I'm just a paranoid Libertarian, and that might be the cause of me perceiving it like that.

From what I've read most of the OSI's responsibilities have been transferred to the IO Task Force. But of course this is all run by the DOD. OK, I'm getting side tracked....

To put my PERSONAL opinion on the subject in very plain words.. is that a national level agency coordinating IO worldwide, broken down into regional operating areas might help in some aspects, but it would instantaneously be shut down just like the OSI by political turf wars and public dissension to such programs.

[kville79]

Another point contended in this post hits kinda close to home...

I'm not an elegant writer so I'm not going to use euphemism and literary tools like "rolled sleeves", "burned by brass" and their like, but I will try to convey my experiences and opinions as concisely as possible.

First off let me say, I'm a grunt... 11B, and a Marine 0331 before that. I will always be a grunt, regardless if my paperwork says 35F, or not.

When it comes down to the effectiveness of the "Tactical Corporal" being the end user of PsyOp Product or the deliverer of the message to the mass populace, he's just as good as the next guy. When it comes down to it 90% of an average low income Iraqi's image of the USA is that American soldier. He doesn't have MTV, he doesn't know enough English to understand what 2Pac is saying on that CD, even though he likes the beat. What he knows is the guys in ACU's who drives around his village once a week.

That being said, PsyOps is way more effective in handling situations that the "Tactical Corporal" can not, or should not be involved with. For example, dealing with local black marketers or gun/drug runners without shooting or arresting them. For you commanders out there... PLEASE use us like this!
There are thousands of ways that PsyOps can be utilized, and we only get used in 1% of our many facets. This is usually due to a bad CAPEs breif, but sometimes by the supported unit's commander's choice.


Another facet of the Grunt Vs. PsyOp, etc... argument is the mental capacity that is required for each task... and something about fight vs. flight adrenaline... reaction determined by training... blah, blah, etc.. etc...

OK, first off... from my personal experience, which is actually next to nil (only had rounds go my direction once), I can say training doesn't determine your actions. Training makes you instinctively ask questions, i.e. where are the shots coming from, All sorts of situation awareness questions like where am I situated amongst my comrades, are there any adjacent units, the list can go on, but I believe someone posted up a pretty good list of things earlier on in the thread. All this happens in a split second, I think only one question get asked after you start firing back... "What where those dang ROE's?"

[marct]

hell, cross cultural nothing, there's miscommunication going on rampantly right here!

Always :D! Part of the medium (BTW, I'm actually serious about that - miscommunication using text-form electronic exchange has a 400% increase in miscommunication over f2f communication).

[Ken White]

First off, I presented a case that was not MINE, I was RELAYING an explanation, I was not saying one thing was true and one wasnt, I was asking questions to explore a notion, and I was bending over backwards to qualify that discussion with words like 'assume' and 'perhaps wrongfully' but you're still jumping down my throat? Sure thing!Relaying hearsay and couching it as fact doesn't draw many backers; if you do it, then you should expect it to be challenged.
So what have we learned? Don't ask questions, don't be informed or have an informed opinion, because the only thing that matters here is military experience, accept everything presented at face value, never drill deeper for substantiation, absolutely never reject straw men and defend your contention...If that's what you learned from this, you weren't paying attention. You might have, possibly should have, learned that if you ask a question, you'll get an answer and if it's one that you don't agree with, that does not necessarily mean the answer is incorrect. There's nothing wrong with having an opinion and stating that opinion; you after all were welcomed here and encouraged to ask questions and if there's one thing that can be said about this board is that diverse opinions are welcome -- however, when you state an opinion that starts "I've been told..." you're probably going to catch some flak. You can drill deeper for substantiation but when several people confirm what you were originally told and you tell all them they're wrong because you were "told something else." they're going to lose interest in you pretty quickly.
most importantly we have just discovered that PSYOP is a job anyone can do, because there's no cognitive difference between being an infantry soldier and a PSYOP soldier, despite what former infantry guys turned PSYOP say about it - and even having the audacity to be curious about this, to simply want to discuss it, is condescending and insulting.That's an interesting take on what's above in this thread. I suggest you go back and relook it. The point made was simply that infantry types have cognitive requirements as well -- they differ, certainly, but they exist. RTK tried to point out a few of them and your response was a dismissive "Nope, sure can't. Wouldnt have a clue how to start." Not exactly top of the line discussion.

You provided three links; none of them refuted what I said:

"" If you know that, you're ahead of me -- I have yet to see any goal other than to confront the actors and attack their funding and (to an extent and not too well done) their credibility. IMO, that's not the same thing as attacking the ideology -- which would be futile in any event.""

The first is from 2005 when we were groping (we still are IMO, your mileage may vary --and that's okay); the second doesn't change much and the third sort of seems to agree with me citing 23 reasons given for the various wars...

So, you said
"So yes, when the president calls the GWOT a long lasting struggle with ideology, and launches a campaign directed to "transform Islam", I think its pretty safe to say we were confronting more than just the actors, but attempting to bring transformative change.

But my sleeves were cuffed while I pulled those up, so there's no validity to substantive points made."You quote a man who has given 23 different reasons for his actions -- which is irrelevant because all I did was state my opinion and suggest that attempts to attack an ideology would not succeed. history is pretty much on my side on that, I think...

Conversely, if one were to try to wean people away from an ideology, a quite different thing, one might succeed. Attacking ideologies (we've done it before) will get you a few fellow travelers and the marginally involved, it will not change the true believers an iota. That was my point.

So what you took as a personal attack wasn't even close to being one; I was merely making the point that no matter what was said, it's unlikely to happen.
I guess I'm just a raging dillhole that has clearly offended many of you with my unforgivable questions and constant reminders that I know very little about soldiering, and am just trying to learn and understand.

SWEET. Got it. <----------- tongue in cheek sarcasm, just to ensure no one misunderestimates my tone and intentionIt might help if you wouldn't try to impress everyone with your wit (my wife gets on me about that constantly for some reason... :D ) and would realize that no one here started there day with the mantra "Get Voodoun.' You ask questions, get answers, assess them, make up your own mind on what to retain and what to discard -- but if you respond to answers that you don't like with sarcasm or condescension, you're likely to get it right back and if you get overly defensive about flak you've almost invited -- and you did -- then things spiral out of control. Your choice.

No one's trying to pick a fight with you. How about you?

[SWJED]

... but to all.

Stay professional, civil, and on topic - do I need to type a tome to explain what I mean? Don't damage our reputation here at the Council. Won't tolerate it - to the new guys and the old timers - house rules.

Dave

[hdc_bst]

I signed up for the board primarily so I could jump into this thread.

In particular I want to share my thoughts on this little bit...


... and most importantly we have just discovered that PSYOP is a job anyone can do, because there's no cognitive difference between being an infantry soldier and a PSYOP soldier, despite what former infantry guys turned PSYOP say about it - and even having the audacity to be curious about this, to simply want to discuss it, is condescending and insulting.

As a CAPOC comrade, I think I can understand where this bit of sarcasm is coming from. It is pretty disheartening to hear that the time you sacrificed at SWCS does not make you a uniquely valuable asset. I will agree with the other posters (RTK and Ken White, I believe) that PSYOPs, and also CMO, can be performed by any soldier, they are not some arcane art.

So, why bother having a TPT or CAT-A anyway? Because someone somewhere (probably in Virginia) thought a TPT or CAT-A would be a valuable asset to a BN commander. It's up to you as a TPT or CAT-A member to prove them right, . You do this by being a SME - sure anyone can do PSYOPs, but you need to be able to do it more effectively. As a SME you can be assigned critical PSYOP missions, and assist identifying potential applications/effective tactics.

In my opinion CMO is very difficult to teach in a classroom environment, and I expect that PSYOP is similar. I seem to recall that you're relatively new - in which case it's very unlikely that you are the SME you need to be. If this is the case, let me encourage you to go into sponge mode. Learn as much as you can about tactical psyops from the NCOs leaving your unit, and from other sources outside of CAPOC, such as perhaps this board. Learn what people have done, what's worked and what hasn't. When you're deployed use your critical thinking skills, and figure out why things do or don't work as you experience them.

Oh yeah, and I'd recommend keep the knowledge that as a member of CAPOC you're on average more intelligent, better educated, and better looking than the rest of the armed forces internalized. Myth or reality, it's good for esprit de corps in the unit, not so much when playing our support role.

[Ken White]

he said grudgingly... ;)

Good post hdc_bst. Like somebody said, we're all in this together. Your advice on becoming the SME is important. Credibility is won by competence and little else. What one know counts not nearly as much as what one does...

[ODB]

kville79 Another point contended in this post hits kinda close to home...

I'm not an elegant writer so I'm not going to use euphemism and literary tools like "rolled sleeves", "burned by brass" and their like, but I will try to convey my experiences and opinions as concisely as possible.

Has nothing to do with "euphemisms" or "literary tools". Simple answers to simple questions, nothing more, nothing less.


When it comes down to the effectiveness of the "Tactical Corporal" being the end user of PsyOp Product or the deliverer of the message to the mass populace, he's just as good as the next guy. When it comes down to it 90% of an average low income Iraqi's image of the USA is that American soldier. He doesn't have MTV, he doesn't know enough English to understand what 2Pac is saying on that CD, even though he likes the beat. What he knows is the guys in ACU's who drives around his village once a week.

Actually kinda funny. Didn't know low income Iraqi's only image of the US was us soldiers. If memory serves me right these same low income families are the ones who are the most manipulated in the country. They are bought by a number of players on the ground in Iraq, be it us, local sheiks, foreign influences, criminals, the list goes on. Understand these "low income Iraqis" are where the fight is being won and lost on many levels. Sometimes it is as easy as employing them to wear PT belts and guard the highway, but to continue to foster that relationship sometimes one must "persuade" the local sheik to not be so greedy with his "take" of their profits. There are so many different levels to this, do not start to group them and put percentages on them. Last time I checked there were more houses with Satellite dishes than without. Do not underestimate their knowledge or perceptions.


That being said, PsyOps is way more effective in handling situations that the "Tactical Corporal" can not, or should not be involved with. For example, dealing with local black marketers or gun/drug runners without shooting or arresting them. For you commanders out there... PLEASE use us like this!
There are thousands of ways that PsyOps can be utilized, and we only get used in 1% of our many facets. This is usually due to a bad CAPEs breif, but sometimes by the supported unit's commander's choice.

Serious heartburn forming here, but will not diminish the effectiveness of this forum. Just remember that competency can go a long way. In reality I want to know what you can do for me, quite simply with you or without you I will change what is happening in my AOR. I will deal with the gray area guys, might already be doing so. Yes my perspective is different than others on here, but if you can't sell your abilities/capabilities then you end up not being utilized, but to pull security. Seems like you acknowledge the fact that it usually do to a bad CAPEs brief, so one only has to look as far as ones own product. For my own knowledge what quantifies PsyOps to deal with the black market/gun dealers/smugglers more so than the "Tactical Corporal"? This gets at the heart of my point about competency. Don't take this the wrong way, but if the info in your briefs resemble the info you post I can see why your under/misutilized.....just remember competency.



Another facet of the Grunt Vs. PsyOp, etc... argument is the mental capacity that is required for each task... and something about fight vs. flight adrenaline... reaction determined by training... blah, blah, etc.. etc...

Never have claimed to be a smart man. Obviously if I was I wouldn't be doing what I do for the same paycheck others get for doing less. Unfortunately I love what I do and wouldn't change it for the world. Has nothing to do with mental capacity of one vs the other. Simply some are more adept to things than others.


OK, first off... from my personal experience, which is actually next to nil (only had rounds go my direction once), I can say training doesn't determine your actions. Training makes you instinctively ask questions, i.e. where are the shots coming from, All sorts of situation awareness questions like where am I situated amongst my comrades, are there any adjacent units, the list can go on, but I believe someone posted up a pretty good list of things earlier on in the thread. All this happens in a split second, I think only one question get asked after you start firing back... "What where those dang ROE's?"

Violent disagreement here. Training does determine your actions. Human instinct is flight. No one in their right mind wants to stay around to be shot at. Luckily we overcome this instinct through training. Sorry but no questions arise here. Going in already know what I have available, the only thing is how I'm going to utilize it. Situational awareness should be constant, not something that you suddenly realize when the bullets start flying. I already know who is where and what assets I have. Through training I make the decision how to employ them and where. One reacts instinctively based on training, we rewire our brains, some better than others and then some just are not wired right to begin with, just ask my wife.

Again apologize if this seemed outta context, not eloquent with words like some are, but working on it.

[Schmedlap]

I can say training doesn't determine your actions. Training makes you instinctively ask questions, i.e. where are the shots coming from, All sorts of situation awareness questions like where am I situated amongst my comrades, are there any adjacent units, the list can go on, but I believe someone posted up a pretty good list of things earlier on in the thread.


Violent disagreement here. Training does determine your actions. Human instinct is flight. No one in their right mind wants to stay around to be shot at. Luckily we overcome this instinct through training.

I think you've both got a good point. I cannot speak from the perspective of the 19-year-old rifleman, because I never was one. But I can speak from the perspective of the LT and CPT. The thought of fleeing enemy contact never entered my head. In hindsight, with our training and doctrine in mind, it probably should have a couple of times. But, the "flight" reaction never kicked in (aside from physiological responses) because of a sense of duty and responsibility to my Soldiers. The duty is ingrained through organizational culture. The responsibility, in my opinion, is instinctive. We are pack animals. So, I think you're both right - training and instinct. Most of the time, I think the pack animal instinct reigned. But whenever I needed to think through a decision, the sense of duty seemed to dominate in my brain - "if I don't think through this properly, some of my guys are going die due to my stupidity."

Particularly when one is responsible for the pack (i.e. - the leader), one's instinctive protectiveness of one's clan kicks in. I suspect that it similarly kicks in for the PVT and SPC to protect the guys next to him.


Through training I make the decision how to employ them and where. One reacts instinctively based on training, we rewire our brains, some better than others and then some just are not wired right to begin with, just ask my wife.

I'd say that's true of things like reflexive firing, magazine changes, etc - things that are motor memory. To some extent, maybe even small unit coordination within a small unit that is cohesive - you just develop a sense of what the guy next to you is seeing and thinking based upon very subtle behaviors that he exhibits. But there is still a whole lot of decision-making that gets decided on the basis of how much ammo we've got left, how many casualties we've taken, how long before we're reinforced, et cetera. Those weren't instinctive. Those decisions were all followed by the thought of, "I hope I made the right decision."

[reed11b]

Violent disagreement here. Training does determine your actions. Human instinct is flight. No one in their right mind wants to stay around to be shot at. Luckily we overcome this instinct through training. Sorry but no questions arise here. Going in already know what I have available, the only thing is how I'm going to utilize it. Situational awareness should be constant, not something that you suddenly realize when the bullets start flying. I already know who is where and what assets I have. Through training I make the decision how to employ them and where. One reacts instinctively based on training, we rewire our brains, some better than others and then some just are not wired right to begin with, just ask my wife.



I have to violently disagree with you on this. If only training and drills kept soldiers from fleeing when they made contact w/ the enemy then M day National Guard soldiers would have all broken in Iraq. It is the sense of duty and the support of your peers that keeps us in the fight. I also feel that saying that "you must always have situational awareness, not just when the bullets start flying" is a cop out. While it is technically true, once the bullets start flying, obviously the situation has changed and how it has changed must be assessed. You do think in combat. The ability to make choices in high stress situations is what separates good leaders from bad ones and the ability to make far reaching decisions under stress is what separates great leaders from the merely good ones.
Reed

[RTK]

Violent disagreement here. Training does determine your actions. Human instinct is flight. No one in their right mind wants to stay around to be shot at. Luckily we overcome this instinct through training. Sorry but no questions arise here. Going in already know what I have available, the only thing is how I'm going to utilize it. Situational awareness should be constant, not something that you suddenly realize when the bullets start flying. I already know who is where and what assets I have. Through training I make the decision how to employ them and where. One reacts instinctively based on training, we rewire our brains, some better than others and then some just are not wired right to begin with, just ask my wife.


I think you've both got a good point. I cannot speak from the perspective of the 19-year-old rifleman, because I never was one. But I can speak from the perspective of the LT and CPT. The thought of fleeing enemy contact never entered my head. In hindsight, with our training and doctrine in mind, it probably should have a couple of times. But, the "flight" reaction never kicked in (aside from physiological responses) because of a sense of duty and responsibility to my Soldiers. The duty is ingrained through organizational culture. The responsibility, in my opinion, is instinctive. We are pack animals. So, I think you're both right - training and instinct. Most of the time, I think the pack animal instinct reigned. But whenever I needed to think through a decision, the sense of duty seemed to dominate in my brain - "if I don't think through this properly, some of my guys are going die due to my stupidity."


I have to violently disagree with you on this. If only training and drills kept soldiers from fleeing when they made contact w/ the enemy then M day National Guard soldiers would have all broken in Iraq. It is the sense of duty and the support of your peers that keeps us in the fight. I also feel that saying that "you must always have situational awareness, not just when the bullets start flying" is a cop out. While it is technically true, once the bullets start flying, obviously the situation has changed and how it has changed must be assessed. You do think in combat. The ability to make choices in high stress situations is what separates good leaders from bad ones and the ability to make far reaching decisions under stress is what separates great leaders from the merely good ones.
Reed

I think you're all talking on the same level. What I'm getting from all three of you is violent agreement with:

Have you been trained to place yourself in the proper mindset, sense of duty, loyalty to ones fellow Soldiers/Marines, and innoculated yourself of the stress that hinders decision making to the vast majority of people?

That begins on day 1 of basic training. I think each of you are on point. As they say in Arabiya "Al-tikrar yi'allim al-shuttar" - repetition teaches the clever ones.

[ODB]

From FM 7-8 Chapter 4

FM 25-101 defines a battle drill as "a collective action rapidly executed without applying a deliberate decision-making process."

a. Characteristics of a battle drill are--

They require minimal leader orders to accomplish and are standard throughout the Army.

Sequential actions are vital to success in combat or critical to preserving life.

They apply to platoon or smaller units.

They are trained responses to enemy actions or leader's orders.

They represent mental steps followed for offensive and defensive actions in training and combat.

b. A platoons ability to accomplish its mission often depends on soldiers and leaders to execute key actions quickly. All soldiers and their leaders must know their immediate reaction to enemy contact as well as follow-up actions. Drills are limited to situations requiring instantaneous response; therefore, soldiers must execute drills instinctively. This results from continual practice. Drills provide small units with standard procedures essential for building strength and aggressiveness.

They identify key actions that leaders and soldiers must perform quickly.

They provide for a smooth transition from one activity to another; for example, from movement to offensive action to defensive action.

They provide standardized actions that link soldier and collective tasks at platoon level and below. (Soldiers perform individual tasks to CTT or SDT standard.)

They require the full understanding of each individual and leader, and continual practice.

What one has to look at is at what point in the fight we are putting into context. I'm sensing a reoccuring theme here of late.......training.


Originally posted by reed11b

I also feel that saying that "you must always have situational awareness, not just when the bullets start flying" is a cop out.

How so? It's a cop out that I am constantly aware of my surroundings and changes to it. Be it everyday life, driving down the road, going out to dinner, the mall, you name it, to combat it constantly applies. If any thing I'd say it's the product of being properly trained somewhere along my career.

RTK.....I was getting there, just took me longer to type than you!

[Ken White]

I'm sensing a reoccuring theme here of late.......training.marry you :D

(Well not really -- but I could fall in love with your sensing. Particularly since you said it so I didn't need to... ;) )

[ODB]

marry you :D

(Well not really -- but I could fall in love with your sensing. Particularly since you said it so I didn't need to... ;) )

but I promised myself if this one runs away I'm marrying extremely rich and younger the next time.:)

I did have to consult the thesaurus because I myself am getting tired of the same word......training. Found the synonyms quite interesting:

background
basics
buildup
chalk talk
coaching
cultivation
discipline
domestication
drill
education
exercise
foundation
grounding
groundwork
guidance
indoctrination
instruction
practice
preliminaries
principles
readying
schooling
seasoning
sharpening
teaching
tuition
tune-up
tutelage
upbringing

Sums it up nicely.

[Ken White]

Good list. My wife likes that 'domestication' bit... :rolleyes:

I like the 'sharpening.' :cool:

[ODB]

in between domestication and indoctrination. Between the wife and daughter and the fact all pets are females it's a constant battle that I try to incorporate foundation, education, and principles.:D

[reed11b]

in between domestication and indoctrination. Between the wife and daughter and the fact all pets are females it's a constant battle that I try to incorporate foundation, education, and principles.:D
Geez, sounds like wife’s clan. Even the lone boy dog squats to pee.
Back to the matter at hand, yes we do agree 99% and the disagreement is minutia, but I feel the minutia is important. Drills are important, believe me, I am the guy that is bringing out the FM when we have wait time in the hurry up and wait cycle, but there utility is limited and they are far from the only or even the most important training. Confidence and independence matter far more then trained reflexisive response. That trained response only gives you a quick base to start from, it is what happens next that matters more.
One more minutia, when I said the constant awareness statement was a cop out, I did not mean to infer that it is not important or done, but that it does not equal not thinking or needing to re-assess a situation when the situation drastically changes, i.e an ambush or any other enemy initiated contact.
Reed
P.S. ODB, I know that usually when I respond to your comments, it is disagreement, but that is because when I agree (most of the time) there is very little constructive for me to add.

[Stan]

Depends on how you deal with stress and process information. Can you integrate the 5 aspects of weather, the 5 aspects of terrain, the 7 forms of contact, safe distance zones, backdrops, weapons effects, mitigation of collateral damage, then look at both the pros and cons of each in a split second while, at the same time, weighing the combat multipliers, organic and inorganic to your unit, and bring them all to bear properly in a reasonable amount of time in order to maximize your element's opportunities for success in closing with and destroying your enemy?

Some see that as cerebral. Others see it as instinct after being well trained. Stress innoculation training, that is, to place Soldiers and Marines in those situations in a training environment that best replicate combat conditions.




Nope, sure can't. Wouldn't have a clue how to start.

This has been one of literally hundreds of points made thus far. You may refute and argue these issues right up to the point you are in-country for the first 30 days. On that date, even a PhD won't save your alpha.

Diplomats around the globe are quasi centrally-managed because they tend to open their mouth, spout intellect and get the US Military into trouble, but are rarely around thereafter.

Please do us one favor: Get off the hot brass on the forearm already. You've taken it so far out of context.

[ODB]

I am now getting knee deep into FM 33-1-1 and FM 3-05.30 (Psychological Operations). As if I didn't already have enough psycological issues.....;)