Open Thread – Which US DoD Dinosaurs Would You Slay?

[SWJED]

After 30-plus years in this business; I’ve come to the conclusion many, many times along the way; that the Department of Defense, the Joint Staff, the Services, and associated activities have an abundance of antiquated and dysfunctional commands, organizations, offices, programs, and processes. Go figure. With two-plus wars, an ungodly optempo and shrinking resources we really cannot afford the excess baggage anymore.

I’d like to highlight some specifics in a potential Small Wars Journal article and SWJ Blog posting. I’d like this to be a Council effort and therefore asking our members to lay it out in this thread.

The ground rules are:


Antiquated and/or dysfunctional commands, organizations, offices and processes that hinder progress and are high-impact. Not General Joe Blow “who didn’t get it” or a dysfunctional battalion in Operation ABC. Think big, critical, and long term.

Identify the problem, cite, and provide recommendations to correct – and be reasonable.

"Write" - don't ramble or bulletize.

For those who wish to remain anonymous – e-mail or PM me – as long as I can verify your authority to make such commentary and recommendations you can rest assured your identity “goes to the grave”.


That is all.

[Entropy]

Quick question:

Are you asking only for things that we should be rid of completely or things that can be done better/reformed, or both?

[John T. Fishel]

My first follows from CPT Crispin Burke's op-ed in the Journal. He is railing there at an outdated education system coupled with a dysfunctional personnel system. My candidate for dinosaur is the latter in its OPMS XXI guise. While single tracking served to give more predictability to a career - FAOs, for example, could expect to retire as O5 or O6s rather than as Majors - but they will never again see stars. Surely, we can develop an officer personnel system that allows for dual tracking without destroying a career and gets some unique and desirable skills/experience into the GO ranks.

My second candidate for dinosaur is the USAR (and by extension the AFR) - event though I was a USAR officer for 28+ years. The problem is that there is a significant redundancy in higher HQs. Why do we need a National Guard Bureau and an Army Reserve Command? COL (ret.) Charles Heller would argue that the USAR is a Federal Reserve while the NG is the state militia updated. But that argument has been proven false by the post-DS/DS use of the RC as operational reserves (if it ever was true). Merging the Guard and Reserve would be appropriate and, since the NG has constitutional status while the Reserves do not, then any merger must be into the NG. Might just get rid of a whole bunch of unneeded senior officers....

Cheers

JohnT

[SWJED]

Quick question:

Are you asking only for things that we should be rid of completely or things that can be done better/reformed, or both?

Both.

[reed11b]

First, I second John T. on the OPMS and would further it to include all "up or out" or "zero defect" policies. I could not find the exact orders (Ken??) but many of the orders stating that training, manning and fitness (readiness) are the responsibility and priority of the individual as opposed to the unit's responsibility. How we PTS and man units should be looked at from a clean slate as well. See, I don't ask for much! :rolleyes:
Reed

[Ken White]

I came up with several things when I read his fist post in the thread this morning. My problem with all of them is that -- like OPMS and the USAR / ARNG problem (and I very much agree both are major problems) they're things that DoD or the service has had to based on either law or significant Congressional pressure.

I'm not saying that all the inefficiencies can be laid at the feet of Congress; the Services are quite capable of doing some strange things but the really big things that immediately popped to mind are all Congressionally driven. I suspect that will make them difficult to change. I'd guess that, given the right rationale, change to OPMS would be attainable; change to NGB and the USARC are so deeply political I'm not sure they're adjustable.

Difficult, however, is not impossible. Many things need to be changed and Congress can be strange but they also are not totally unreasonable. I think when we proffer a problem, the issue(s) that make(s) it a problem and recommend solution(s), we need to bear in mind that if the item has interest from the Hill, we'll need to give a rationale that they can or will accept and that accords with the legislative cycle.

That is going to be time dependent. For example, many items in OPMS were pushed by Congress in an effort to be very fair to all concerned; to be fair to the point that they accepted degradation of effectiveness and officer competence and capability that resulted; that and the effort to be 'objective' in evaluations as opposed to subjective (as if that were possible...). Point is , a Republican majority just might revisit that 'fairness' angle, a Democratic majority is less likely to do so.

I could cite some things in the Army enlisted promotion system but my spies tell me that is in flux right now. So the status of a system or process -- and very current knowledge of it -- and whether it's embedded or in flux can have an effect on what one recommends...

I mention all that only as a mild caution...

[Entropy]

I'm not saying that all the inefficiencies can be laid at the feet of Congress; the Services are quite capable of doing some strange things but the really big things that immediately popped to mind are all Congressionally driven. I suspect that will make them difficult to change.

A lot of the stuff that immediately popped into my mind falls into that category, so I'm going to spend some time thinking about things that are politically realistic.

[ODB]

That might be because I am, in comparison to what I would like to see disappear: Future Combat System. Sorry but IMO the technology they are looking to, to be the solution in my mind is not the solution. Only after we pump billions upon billions of dollars into it will we still not have the answer. By the time this thing is done it'll make current bail outs look like chump change. Take that money and apply it to the platform that needs it. The soldier train the soldier. No matter how much technology you throw at the soldier if he doesn't know how to properly employ it it will be useless. What do I need an exoskeleton for? Been done for hundreds of years without it. So I can carry more UAVs to see the battlefield from 10,000. The picture up there does not let me know the feeling on the ground. I know I'll need it to carry the amount of batteries it will take for me to keep all my stuff powered up. Replacing individual knowledge and skills with technology will not make us more effective, we will only become more dependent.

In reality this may be just a smaller piece of the overall bigger process for the DOD and acquistions. I look back at all the blunders from the Commanche to the XM8 and the amount of money wasted. Not sure what the right answer is. One thought I have for say the next rifle. Form a committee of actual end users and experts to test and develop what we need not what someone so far removed from the fight thinks we need.

By no means an expert here, just my perspective on one of the largest misuse of funds IMO. Would like to learn from those in the process how we can fix this. I'm sure at this point there is no pancea for it, but maybe we can stop some of the bleeding.

[Surferbeetle]

DOD is filled with information silos that do not like to talk to one another and many, many layers of redundant management and functions.

Being a product of the American military system makes me think in terms of staff functions (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/General_Staff). Having worked for the Navy (DPW) I also think about the reasons for distinctions between Line (Restricted (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Restricted_line_officer) and Unrestricted (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Line_officer)) and Staff personnel.

Do we really need all of the different Communications, Personnel, Finance, and Logistics systems (USA, USN, USAF, USMC, USCG, Reserves and Guard)? How about a single Civil Service for all of DOD? Finally, and nearest and dearest to my heart: a standardized communications platform run by a single CTO (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chief_technology_officer) organization. We need to break down Information Silo’s within DOD.

Imagine the possibilities with regards to unity of command, training, and economies of scale.

I shudder to think of the screams of protest and howls of outrage...:eek:

[John T. Fishel]

that many issues discussed here are major Congressional rice bowls. But, that is precisely the reason I phrased my proposal on merging the reserves (Army & AF) into the NG, not the other way around. There are precisely 100 Senators who have an interest in the NG along with 435 representatives and a bunch of non-voting Delegates. There is no such unanimous constituency for the Reserves. Nor are all reservists supportive of a separate Reserve. So, I really think you could win on this one.

Regarding OPMS: I was still teaching at Leavenworth when OPMS XXI was being developed there. Based on what I saw, I don't believe there was much, if any, Congressional influence on most of the issues and changes made. It seems to me that this was - and is - largely a case of bureaucratic politics internal to the services as institutions. So, here's one where, in the immortal words of Albert the Alligator (of Pogo Possum fame), "We have met the enemy and he is us!":wry:

Cheers

JohnT

[Ken White]

that many issues discussed here are major Congressional rice bowls. But, that is precisely the reason I phrased my proposal on merging the reserves (Army & AF) into the NG, not the other way around... So, I really think you could win on this one.Based on what you said, I agree. Then we get to the two 250 pound Orangutans -- the active Army and AF. Are they likely to agree to A Reserve component that is quite a bit larger than they are? I think that goes back to why there was ever a Medical Officer Reserve then an ORC that morphed into today's animal. I think it also points, again, to Congress -- if the majority of people (read: Voters) are with the RC, then Congress will favor the RC; the AC Generals know that...

They're also sharp enough to get the Hamiltonians (who want big, all powerful federal guvmint) on their side and those people, in Congress, will undetected if possible short circuit their States to enhance federal power -- or, in this case, support the Federal entity as opposed to the State entity

However, note also that while Congress can do really pretty much whatever it wants, the Constitution says they are empowered:
". . .
To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions;

To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States, reserving to the States respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress; ..."

Note that they can pass laws about the Militia and can provide for calling them out -- and as you know, they sort of ignored the Constitution and said the NG was the Militia, the Constitution does not -- but as you know they can raise and support Armies (plural -- and thus the U.S. Army and that other organization, the Army of the United States) but must provide and maintain a Navy.

The point is that Congress has been taken to court for ignoring the Constitution or twisting it to their benefit and that could happen if they play with the status quo to a too great extent. Not saying you're wrong or should not push the issue, just reminding you that it's a very complex bucket with a somewhat muddy history and many competing and highly vested interests.
Regarding OPMS:...Based on what I saw, I don't believe there was much, if any, Congressional influence on most of the issues and changes made.May not have been, not that familiar with OPMS XXI -- I am however very familiar with DOPMA, know the principal author and am pretty sure that that the 'changes made' you mention were those rom DOPMA to OPMS -- and DOPMA was very much a Congressional baby. Further, OPMS was not able to change many of the legislated elements of DOPMA (Though I've been told the Army wanted to do that).

Not trying to rain on your parade, John, really -- but just reminding you that the tentacles of Congress are awfully deep and sometimes hidden.

[John T. Fishel]

we agree more than disagree. While I still think that a concerted effort to merge the Reserve into the NG would succeed, (1) I know that the opposite would fail before it even got off the ground as it has on several past occasions, and (2) that it would be harder to accomplish than I first thought for the reasons you posit.

Of course, DOPMA is the authority for the implementation of any internal system like OPMS. Changing DOPMA would, I think, be harder to do than tampering with the Reserves, except at the margins. But internal implementation policies and regulations - like OPMS - don't usually engage the interest of the Congress. When I discuss OPMS XXI, I talk about the FAO program because I know it and because it is a great case of both positive change and negative unintended consequences. I really did not enjoy having to tell promotible captains who were thinking about FAO that they were risking retiring as Majors. But it was my obligation to do so because it was unfair to them to let them think that their decision would not affect their careers. So, the plus side of OPMS XXI was that it made the career more predictable for the vast majority of FAOs. It even improved their chances for promotion to Colonel. That said, it was negative for the Army because it deprived the institution of the services of some really outstanding talent at the GO level because FAOs were never going to be looked at and had not done anything in their basic branch since they were Captains. (An example of a successful dual tracked FAO/MI officer pre- OPMS XXI was MG John Stewart who became Southcom J2 because of both his FAO and MI qualifications. Today's John Stewarts will retire as Colonels.

Cheers

JohnT

[Xenophon]

I want to second the motion to slay the Future Combat System, and add the people who came up with it as well. (Figuratively, of course)

[Ken White]

we agree more than disagree.

...Changing DOPMA would, I think, be harder to do than tampering with the Reserves, except at the margins. But internal implementation policies and regulations - like OPMS - don't usually engage the interest of the Congress. True, forgot that aspect. The rest of your comment is distressingly true and there a couple of other winners in OPMS needing a 21st Century thought process applied...

[Schmedlap]

Speaking as someone who never served above the battalion level (I don't mean to brag:D)...

Get rid of all of those ankle-biter company-level programs, like safety officer/NCO; just a waste of time that gets pencil-whipped prior to command inspections and takes leaders away from more important things (like time with their Soldiers) so that they can attend 40-hour courses on whatever additional duty they are "responsible for" and fabricate a 3-ring binder full of paperwork.

Those programs exist and have company-level personnel responsible for them because that is what Army Regulation dictates. Change the regulations. It is a tremendous drain upon companies that forces them into one of two alternatives: 1) obey the regulation and suffer the consequences of leaders being distracted from their work or being absent to attend random 40-hour courses -OR- 2) disobey the regulations in order to sustain actual readiness (versus paper readiness).

[patmc]

I agree they are a drain on manpower, and often an annoyance, but what does not get checked, does not get done. As an XO during a Corps ORA, and then the BN OIC for a BN CI, most of these regs are not followed to the letter, and are too much detail for a BN to track. If company level reps didn't take the courses, do the paperwork, and "enforce" the regs, it definately would not get done. I don't know a better alternative, other than eliminating regs, but like most things in the Army, they probably exist for a good reason. Just because leaders are not enforcing the regs does not mean they don't serve a purpose. I hate the term eat the elephant one bit at a time (due to overuse in my unit), but if leaders actually worked their areas over the course of the year, not just during inspection prep, it would not be overwhelming. Units probably waste/lose more time going into inspection prep where all other training ceases.

Don't know if it is a dinosaur per se, but stop changing uniforms for no good reason. The backlash against the new blue Army uniform continues, but doubt it will change anything.


Speaking as someone who never served above the battalion level (I don't mean to brag:D)...

Get rid of all of those ankle-biter company-level programs, like safety officer/NCO; just a waste of time that gets pencil-whipped prior to command inspections and takes leaders away from more important things (like time with their Soldiers) so that they can attend 40-hour courses on whatever additional duty they are "responsible for" and fabricate a 3-ring binder full of paperwork.

Those programs exist and have company-level personnel responsible for them because that is what Army Regulation dictates. Change the regulations. It is a tremendous drain upon companies that forces them into one of two alternatives: 1) obey the regulation and suffer the consequences of leaders being distracted from their work or being absent to attend random 40-hour courses -OR- 2) disobey the regulations in order to sustain actual readiness (versus paper readiness).

[reed11b]

I agree they are a drain on manpower, and often an annoyance, but what does not get checked, does not get done. As an XO during a Corps ORA, and then the BN OIC for a BN CI, most of these regs are not followed to the letter, and are too much detail for a BN to track. If company level reps didn't take the courses, do the paperwork, and "enforce" the regs, it definately would not get done. I don't know a better alternative, other than eliminating regs, but like most things in the Army, they probably exist for a good reason. Just because leaders are not enforcing the regs does not mean they don't serve a purpose. I hate the term eat the elephant one bit at a time (due to overuse in my unit), but if leaders actually worked their areas over the course of the year, not just during inspection prep, it would not be overwhelming. Units probably waste/lose more time going into inspection prep where all other training ceases.

Don't know if it is a dinosaur per se, but stop changing uniforms for no good reason. The backlash against the new blue Army uniform continues, but doubt it will change anything.
After some thought, I think I agree with patmc on this one even if though I really like what schmedlap is saying. I think what would really help would be allowing officers to spend more then a year in a position :eek: Nowhere in the real world are you mandated to get a new job title every year.
Reed

[Schmedlap]

I agree they are a drain on manpower, and often an annoyance, but what does not get checked, does not get done.
I would further assert that what gets checked also, often, does not get done. It just gets fabricated. I'm not defending it - I'm just pointing it out.


If company level reps didn't take the courses, do the paperwork, and "enforce" the regs, it definately would not get done. I don't know a better alternative, other than eliminating regs, but like most things in the Army, they probably exist for a good reason.
You and I part ways at the word "probably." I think one can see why they exist by reading the article linked in this thread (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=6285). Someone gets a bright idea and the authority to implement it to its fullest and they get so focused on their specific issue that they start to think it is the most important issue out there. Suddenly you've got someone in the Pentagon dictating the implementation of some administrative nightmare that reaches its tentacles all the way down to the company/battery/troop level.

The COIN/conventional debate seems to assume that we are not able to train on both, due to time constraints and limitations on how many trades jack can be a master of. I think we far exceed those limitations when it comes to administrative programs. Just because we ensure that one NCO and/or officer in each unit is an "SME" on a program, that doesn't mean that the Soldiers in that unit will be any more capable of processing the slew of rules and regulations foisted upon them. It just means that 50 "SMEs" will be bugging them about 50 sets of rules that they cannot possibly remember. I don't see how you can get adequate enforcement of those volumes of regs without taking away from mission-oriented proficiency. I also don't see how we expect Officers to faithfully execute the 8 to 10 additional duties that they are saddled with, without detracting significantly from their other more important work. Realistically speaking, they don't. And I've never seen a commander get upset about it.


"Besides, every time I learn something new, it pushes some old stuff out of my brain. Remember that time I took a home wine making course and forgot how to drive?" - Homer Simpson

[Cavguy]

I agree they are a drain on manpower, and often an annoyance, but what does not get checked, does not get done. As an XO during a Corps ORA, and then the BN OIC for a BN CI, most of these regs are not followed to the letter, and are too much detail for a BN to track. If company level reps didn't take the courses, do the paperwork, and "enforce" the regs, it definately would not get done. I don't know a better alternative, other than eliminating regs, but like most things in the Army, they probably exist for a good reason. Just because leaders are not enforcing the regs does not mean they don't serve a purpose. I hate the term eat the elephant one bit at a time (due to overuse in my unit), but if leaders actually worked their areas over the course of the year, not just during inspection prep, it would not be overwhelming. Units probably waste/lose more time going into inspection prep where all other training ceases.

Don't know if it is a dinosaur per se, but stop changing uniforms for no good reason. The backlash against the new blue Army uniform continues, but doubt it will change anything.

But here is the problem identified by Shmed ...

Dr. Lenny Wong "Stifled Innovation? (http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubid=279)" Strategic Studies Institute, 2002. A MUST READ if you haven't before.


Of the 365 days in the year, approximately 109 days are unavailable for training due to weekends, federal holidays, payday activities, and the Christmas half-day schedule. This results in a total of about 256 available days for company commanders to plan and execute training.

Requirements for mandatory training at the company level riginate from Army Regulation 350-1, Army Training, policy letters, command training guidance, and other directives. Scrubbing all levels of command down to the Brigade level, to include Department of the Army, Major Army Command (MACOM), Corps, Division, and installation level, for anything that generates a training requirement results in the identification of over 100 distinct training requirements. Table 1 shows a partial listing of the requirements.

... Note that, as expected, most directedmission-related training requirements come from Division-level or below. More importantly, most directed nonmission-related training requirements originate from DA and MACOM levels. This is critical since policy actions may be most effective in reducing the DA and MACOM requirements.

Incorporating the amount of time necessary to execute each directed training requirement (for example, training on “The Benefits of an Honorable Discharge” takes about 60 minutes a year) results in approximately 297 days of directed training.

Of the 297 days, about 85 percent (or 254 training days) is mission-related training and 15 percent (or 43 training days) is nonmission-related training.

The number of days required by all mandatory training directives literally exceeds the number of training days available to company commanders. Company commanders somehow have to fit 297 days of mandatory requirements into 256 available training days.

When you do this, and the chain of command expects it all done, you get integrity problems. I too shared Schmedlap's late 90's experience of personally observing flat out falsification of reports to meet this unattainable standard. It was a big reason for the exodus of CPTs in the 94-97 year groups before 9/11, given in the Army's 2001 study on officer attrition.

Unfortunately, It took a war to get this shoved out the window. (for now)

[William F. Owen]

I want to second the motion to slay the Future Combat System, and add the people who came up with it as well. (Figuratively, of course)

I'd second this if you get rid of the "Land Warrior" thing as well. The whole FCS thing is based on failing to understand the combined arms approach, and letting engineers think "outside the box." The box exists for good reason and often you need a better box, not the the box you are currently in.

Classic example is the Stryker Brigade concept where the US Army ended up with a good answer to a problem, that did not exist so had to be invented to get the SBCT as the answer, which is very far from a good solution, though has some excellent traits.

[82redleg]

But here is the problem identified by Shmed ...

When you do this, and the chain of command expects it all done, you get integrity problems. I too shared Schmedlap's late 90's experience of personally observing flat out falsification of reports to meet this unattainable standard. It was a big reason for the exodus of CPTs in the 94-97 year groups before 9/11, given in the Army's 2001 study on officer attrition.

Unfortunately, It took a war to get this shoved out the window. (for now)

I agree with Schmed & Cavguy (I'm a YG 97 officer, so a near contemporary of Cavguy). Most of these regulatory requirements exist to cover someone's 4th point of contact, not "for a good reason" (Patmc).

I think that most of "good reasons" are better dealt with through good leadership, and if you don't have that leadership, find a leader that does. A simplified example is the "Safetygrams" that come out regularly and are required to be posted on the unit safety bulletin board. Does a piece of paper that troopers don't read on the bulletin board make them less likely to misuse their equipment in ways that get them killed? Or is it more likely properly planned and executed training, supervised by competent NCOs?

This almost goes back to our "green army" and our "tan army" (although this doesn't work so well in the world of ACUs. In CONUS, tactical situations are "canned" and the BN or BCT level, with almost any important decision made there. Down range, we have PLs and PSGs (mostly), sometimes SLs and section SGTs, outside executing, with the full power to do everything up to employing lethal force- heck, most of the time, even that decision is made by either a E1-E4 gunner, or at most, the SGT vehicle commander in charge of the HMMWV. We trust them there, with life and death, but not here, with a whole multitude of things that are relatively less important.

[patmc]

I agree 100% that all those regs, required training, etc... eat up a lot of time, and are often a pain, but that does not mean you should finger drill them. That is a leadership failure if you are directing or allowing your NCOs and officers to just make up data. If something didn't get done, you need to be honest and tell higher. A false report is a false report. That said, I do suspect a lot of false data is created, but does not make it right.

I was the HHB XO, and the only LT in the Battery, so I was the OIC of every area for a Corps ORA 3 months after we returned from a deployment. I relied on all my NCO's to do their job, and told them to be honest with their areas. If things could not get done because we had no time, they developed a plan to fix them, and we continued mission. We got 90% of the stuff done, and told the commander a plan to fix the 10%, and this was briefed by my battery commander to the battalion commander. My commander was/is a good man, and he wanted an honest assessment. Same deal on the BN CI. I worked with the Commanders and 1SG's to get the inspections and fixes they needed, but I would not fudge the results, and the colonel got an accurate assessment of his battalion.

I agree training days are limited, and that is why commanders assume risk in their plans. If you are going to forgoe an area, you need to be willing to tell higher why, and not cover it up. When we start picking what regs or rules we follow, that is a slippery slope. And I will say, after both of those experiences, a lot of the regs do make sense, in the larger picture. When you see the forest, they do some good. Covering a 4th point of contact may have been the reason originally, but that does not mean it does not serve another purpose.

I will give "Stiffled Innovation" a read this week, sadly it looks accurate from the blurb.

[Bob's World]

Number one thing the army needs to unload is "The Senior Rater Profile"!

A classic "win-lose" system fostering an unhealthy form of competition, that focuses subordinates on making the boss happy over taking care of their soldiers and accomplishing the mission. This system also selects for leaders who are conservative, unimaginative, and self-serving; none of which to me are traits we want to foster in our senior leadership.

Simply adopting an objective system like the current NCOER would be a vast improvement.

I am not optimistic that such a change will ever occur, as every senior leader was by definition, successful under the senior rater profile system. To challenge the system is to challenge their very validity of their own success.

[patmc]

Well, decided to read it now, and though written in 2002, it covered a lot of the issues I experienced 2004-present. That said, I think the overwhelming problem addressed in the monograph is the command climate, not regulations.

The required training does take up many theoretical training days, but from my experience, a lot can be done concurrently to free up training. The BDE/BN Commander, however, set the tone and tempo for training. If a Commander wants Training Meetings/Command and Staff to take up a whole day, they will. If a Commander wants Command Maintenance every Monday, all day, it will be so. If a Commander wants to tell the commanders what to train, he/she will.

Preparing for a deployment, my battery commander was given the freedom to plan training, and execute. We spent weeks out in the field, training on convoys, and still conducted the mandatory training. I was the Battery Training Officer, and had to fit the Battery Commander's training in with the mandatory training, but we did it. The BN CDR told Battery Commanders to train, and actually let them. Teaching senior officers to trust their subordinates is bigger than teaching junior officers to be innovative. If given the freedom, they will be. That monograph is definately worth the read though. Thank you, sir.

[82redleg]

Pat,

I agree that we shouldn't finger drill or falsely report, and agree it is mostly a function of command.

I also agree that picking and choosing of regulations is a slippery slope.

The problem is that, as every senior leader I've ever worked for acknowledges, we've made so much "stuff" a matter of regulation (some for good reason, some to CYA, some as a matter of "fairness" or "equality" in some form or another- OPMS XXI may be an example of this) that commander's are forced to pick and choose, because it is impossible to do it all. Commanders that are going down range (vs those that just came back) are going to be focused on getting ready for that. Safety councils, POSH training, sensing sessions, etc, etc, etc, that distract from that are going to get over-ridden at some level.

Part of the problem is absolute adherence to policies (not regulations) enforced by people (either staff or senior NCOs) that aren't commanders. When I was a BC, our containers arrived back from deployment. I wanted to execute the inventory on three consecutive days. Since WED is "supposedly" SGT's Time Training, I talked over with my 1SG executing that training on THUR, in order to execute the inventory on M-T-W. When we briefed this in the BN TNG MTG, it was overridden by the S3 and CSM (the CDR was absent that week for whatever reason), because "SGTs Time has to happen on WED". Never mind that we were executing the intent (in fact, the exact same, NCO-led, NCO-planned, section level training), certain leaders can't get past it.

[Ken White]

observation...

Let me piggy back on 82redleg's comment:
"...The problem is that, as every senior leader I've ever worked for acknowledges, we've made so much "stuff" a matter of regulation (some for good reason, some to CYA, some as a matter of "fairness" or "equality" in some form or another- OPMS XXI may be an example of this) that commander's are forced to pick and choose, because it is impossible to do it all.This was true to an extent back in th 50s and as I stuck around, the level increased every decade. When I retired from the DAC job in 1995 the sheer volume -- not only at Co level but all through the chain had a tremendously adverse impact.

The really sad thing is that in my estimation the ratio of 'good reason : CYA : equality' in 1995 was about 10 : 70 : 20. Working backwards, fairness and equality are great -- war is not fair and it should not be equal if possible...

The CYA category does include some 'lower validity' items that have morphed into CYA status because not enough time is allowed to do more than pay them lip service. The percentage of 'valid' items is in the eye of the beholder but IMO, it is abysmally low by any measure compared to the other two categories.
...it was overridden by the S3 and CSM (the CDR was absent that week for whatever reason), because "SGTs Time has to happen on WED". Never mind that we were executing the intent (in fact, the exact same, NCO-led, NCO-planned, section level training), certain leaders can't get past it.I'm not surprised; angry, saddened -- but not surprised. The S3 made a bad decision and good commanders will not let their their Staffs intrude in that way; in the absence of the Cdr, someone was the Acting Cdr and the issue should have been resolved by him if a Battery Cdr and the 3 had a disagreement (and the 3, if senior, was the one who had a duty to refer it to the Acting Cdr and to not overrule a subordinate Cdr). The CSM deserved consultation (perhaps...) but he should've kept his nose out of it as long as the NCO element, SGTs Time, was covered. He also IMO, should have told the S3 privately he was exceeding his authority. CSMs don't have much positive power but they do have a whole lot of negative power and they should use it wisely (In my observation most do but the exceptions give the rest of us a bad name :mad: ).

What should be and what is, alas, are rarely the same. I have known over the years a number of senior people who were acutely aware of these growing problems (training distractors and staff interference) and have vowed to do something as they advanced . Some tried -- but most were constrained in what they could do by exactly the same impactors as they reached higher command -- too many Alligators and the imperiousness of the always overlarge, overpowerful, underemployed and therefor overly intrusive next higher staff.

These are problems that can only be fixed by the senior leadership of the Army raking some drastic and radical steps because the Alligators will just reproduce...

[patmc]

Sadly, I've seen stuff like that too, and again goes to command climate. I can't remember if the Bragg SGT's Time policy letter states mandated day of week, or just hours per week, but common sense should allow a commander room as long as its given equal or more time that same week. CDR, or S3 in his place, should allow it, but it is their choice to make. Those who did it a certain way back in their day are often hesitant to reinvent the wheel. I was fortunate as a battery LT, and then staff CPT, that more often than not, the Battalion Commander and CSM gave the batteries room to maneuver. Except on MEDPROS stats, but that is a different debate.



Part of the problem is absolute adherence to policies (not regulations) enforced by people (either staff or senior NCOs) that aren't commanders. When I was a BC, our containers arrived back from deployment. I wanted to execute the inventory on three consecutive days. Since WED is "supposedly" SGT's Time Training, I talked over with my 1SG executing that training on THUR, in order to execute the inventory on M-T-W. When we briefed this in the BN TNG MTG, it was overridden by the S3 and CSM (the CDR was absent that week for whatever reason), because "SGTs Time has to happen on WED". Never mind that we were executing the intent (in fact, the exact same, NCO-led, NCO-planned, section level training), certain leaders can't get past it.

[Steve Blair]

I would slay the basic personnel assignment system. It's clearly broken, and has been so for MANY years. Up or out doesn't work, and neither does a system that rotates commanders so frequently that they never really get a chance to become familiar with their troops. It undermines trust, encourages careerism, and generally works to the detriment of the military.

I'd replace it with something that harks back to the original branch system with a healthy dose of regimental identity thrown in. Maybe this is a bit "bigger" than the original intent of the question, but I do feel that the majority of our problems stem from this system.

Barring that, I'd make the Air Force adopt an NCO promotion system more in line with that of the other services. Not meeting a board until you're up for Senior Master Sergeant (they test for all other ranks) just doesn't make sense.

[Ken White]

on a large number of promotion boards at unit and DA level, I'm here to tell you the Board process is far from an all encompassing solution... :(

Testing for promotion has merit -- as do boards if properly structured but when things occur as they did at one DA Board I was involved with where the President told us what parameters the then-OPM Personnel Actions chief told him HAD to be applied to all potential selectees and the prime criteria was the picture...

However, your point that the current systems are archaic, out of touch, seem to exist to serve the personnel managers rather than the services is well taken.

[marct]

However, your point that the current systems are archaic, out of touch, seem to exist to serve the personnel managers rather than the services is well taken.

Too true, Ken. What bothers me is the ad that's been showing up for me on this thread after your post...


http://googleads.g.doubleclick.net/pagead/imgad?id=CPbSi7_AhcSQMhCsAhj6ATIIXxZqTA8cfbY

[Entropy]

Actually, the Navy doesn't use boards either until E-7. I've seen some units use a local board at the unit level to screen candidates for E-7 in the Air Force, but that seems pretty rare.

I had a big pretty post all typed up on the topic of this thread and somehow I lost it. Very frustrating. I'll try to get it back together later so I can make a substantive comment to this post.

[reed11b]

Ranger School.
Reed

[Umar Al-Mokhtār]

First the only President Appointed, Senate approved individuals in DoD should be the SecDef, DepSecDef, and undersecretaries. All the rest should be hired by the SecDef within criteria set by the Congress and be career SESs.

Second, nearly all Defense Agencies and Field Activities probably could be eliminated or scaled down considerably. The litmus test would be:

What do you do to directly support the warfighter?

What functions/capabilities do you have that are not already resident in the Joint Staff, COCOMs, and Services?

If you scrubbed hard you could eliminate a lot of beauracracy and use the savings realized to plus up the similar functions/capabilities within the Mil Deps. It would be cheaper and more efficient.

[selil]

Please delete "cyber" anything. It is my specialty but like an electric engineer told me no other utility has there own department why does something as ubiquitous as computing have "cyber" agencies?

Another little thing. If you are in the military you fight. Everybody fights. I don't give a freaking flying monkey bungler if you have twelve stars on your shirt and a small boy to sweep before you. If you wear the uniform you fight. You don't sit in a command shed a continent away and "coordinate". Remove impediments to understanding by requiring EVERYBODY to fight. Staff positions are ancillary to fighting.

As a second point even more high flying and involving illicit substances if it isn't done by a soldier it isn't done. Flexible, capable, smart, and prepared are not supported by a contracting staff who quiver and charge un-godly wages of sin and sue for sexual harassment in a war zone. Everybody will say they need their contractor prepared Hagen Daz and Pizza pie.. WTF?

People whining about carrying batteries into combat (subject to explosion upon contact with water), but they want there dots ice cream. In a 130 degree heat.

Building the green zone is the biggest boondoggle in the history of the American military. The cost, the expense, the strange logistical trials of supporting that monstrosity.

Weapons and weapons systems should be serviceable in the field by the war fighter with the tools attached to the system or light enough. Lighter, faster, cleaner, sustainable, capable should be the technology feats. Not more battery, more logistics, more support... Critical, brittle, high-tech are what make contractors rich. Not a military that can fight wars.

I have more but I've likely peeved about EVERYONE off. Now to be told why none of that will happen.

[Schmedlap]

I have more but I've likely peeved about EVERYONE off.

Anyone peeved by what you wrote about the Green Zone should probably have their heads examined. I think the Green Zone should be placed under responsibility of the National Park Service and designated as a national monument... to fraud, waste, and abuse.

[CR6]

Another little thing. If you are in the military you fight. Everybody fights. I don't give a freaking flying monkey bungler if you have twelve stars on your shirt and a small boy to sweep before you. If you wear the uniform you fight. You don't sit in a command shed a continent away and "coordinate". Remove impediments to understanding by requiring EVERYBODY to fight. Staff positions are ancillary to fighting.

As a second point even more high flying and involving illicit substances if it isn't done by a soldier it isn't done.

In no way angered by what you write Sam, but am curious about how to reconcile one and two. I wear a uniform but my current job makes me responsible for the refurbishment of equipment returning from combat to prepare it for the next deployment. When I went to war, I carried a weapon and was prepared to fight. That goes with the job. But now I am a continent away. If, because I am a soldier, I should be fighting who should do my job in CONUS? According to your second point, a soldier, but how can that be done if all the soldiers are fighting? What am I missing?

Ben

[John T. Fishel]

and Senator (and the Pres, while you're at it). DOD political appointees(about 1300 in all) are there because the Congress and the Executive want them. they want to make sure the President's (and Congress') policies are followed and not misinterpreted by the permanent bureaucracy (civilian and uniformed) as happened in DS/DS with the PSRC. One of Pres Obama's best appointments, IMO, is Michelle Flournoy as USD-Policy. But where do you think she got her experience that qualified her for the post? In the Clinton Administration she was a DASD and Principal DASD (political appointments just below the level of Senate confirmation). So, there is reason for the political appointments as they stand, whether we agree or not. (BTW, the Brits do it kind of like you suggest but their career civil service has far more power than ours does.)

Cheers

JohnT

[Bullmoose Bailey]

True, forgot that aspect. The rest of your comment is distressingly true and there a couple of other winners in OPMS needing a 21st Century thought process applied...

Also the National Guard exists as one of the last vestiges of The Sovereign State, which edifice of history the post Lincolnian, post Dick Act Federal Government remedied by eliminating their officers in 1933. Today all NG Os are actually AR Os assigned to NG units which seems to mean that during peacetime deployments (ref: US Constitution, The "wartime" clause) they have a different Commander-in-chief from the Soldiers they lead.

Don't ask me if that means now, i.e. The Ol' Joint Congressional Resolution as War Declaration Question, I know not.

Probably insignificant.

Very significant however is the fact that every Governor disagrees with every President on who controls the National Guard. Yes; including Clinton & GW Bush disagreeing with themselves on they day they moved from the Governor's Mansion to The White House.

The State Control has been a big issue in OIF, although mostly in smoky back rooms. I assert that the Governor's collectively refusing "combat" assignments for their respective forces led Pres. GW Bush to begin de-escalation & Iraquification here, among other variables.

The name "National Guard" is at once an homage to our French co-liberators of 1783 & a rather deceptive indicator of non-ownership.

Governor v. President arguments usually happen like this:

Governor: Good afternoon Mr. President.

President: Good afternoon John, how are things in your State house.

Gov: Very well; thank you for supporting that bill

Pres: Well you know I'm counting on your guardsmen to help in the war effort.

Gov: Actually I don't think the people of my State want that to happen.

Pres: Well actually, I'm The Commander-in-chief and we're at war.

Gov: Well then if that's how it is why don't you finance them ?

Pres: I'm sorry I'm late for a.......meeting. Say hello to your family for me.


I feel this controversey was at work in the GW Bush administration's odd decision to defrock the US global military zone commander's of the title Commander-in-chief in favor of Combatant Commander which isn't even accurate or logical.

To those who keep saying there's only 1 C-in-c now might I be so bold as to say actually 58 ?

In previous wars (again we could discuss whether we're at "war" per se Tm: Now) the Guardsmen were not federalized, not deployed, not op-conned, not called forth, not called up but "Drafted" into The National Army, WWI, or The Army of The United States, WWII, Korea, Viet-Nam; distinct from the United States Army, or regular Army. The Army of The United States is what AUS stands for.

Seperately, I was highly offended by the statement: "People used to join the Guard for just that reason: to stay out of the regular Army that got shipped overseas and not used to bolster a destroyed dying military the way they are used now in Iraq" at http://wiki.answers.com/Q/Can_people_in_the_National_Guard_be_drafted

There are a great many laws involved here (from Wikipedia):

"The United States Congress has enacted various laws which control the National Guard

The Militia Act of 1792
Providing for the authority of the President to call out the Militia, and providing federal standards for the organization of the Militia.
For the 111 years that the Militia Act of 1792 remained in effect, it defined the position of the militia in relation to the federal government. The War of 1812 tested this uniquely American defense establishment. To fight the War of 1812, the republic formed a small regular military and trained it to protect the frontiers and coastlines. Although it performed poorly in the offensive against Canada, the small force of regulars backed by a well-armed militia, accomplished its defensive mission well. Generals like Andrew Jackson proved that, just as they had in the Revolution, regulars and militia could be effective when employed as a team.
The Insurrection Act
The Militia Act of 1862

Providing for the service of persons of African descent in the Militia, and the emancipation of slaves owned by Confederates.
Title 18, U.S. Code, Section 1385: The Posse Comitatus Act of 18 June 1878
Reaction in Congress against the Reconstruction-era suspensions of Southern states' rights to organize militias led to the passage of the Posse Comitatus Act, restricting any person's use of the U.S. Army and, as later amended, the U.S. Air Force in domestic law enforcement (use of the Navy and Marine Corps, being uniformed services within the Department of Defense, is similarly restricted by statute [16]). The U.S. Coast Guard, in its peacetime role within the Department of Homeland Security, and the National Guard, when not in Federal Service, are specifically not limited by this act.
The States revise the military codes - 1881 to 1892
The Militia Act of 1903
Established the creation of the National Guard of the United States as the primary organized reserve force for the U.S. armed forces.
National Defense Act of 1916
This act abandoned the idea of an expandable Regular Army and firmly established the traditional concept of the citizens' army as the keystone of the United States defense forces. It established the concept of merging the National Guard, the Army Reserve, and the Regular Army into the Army of the United States in time of war. The act further expanded the National Guard's role, and guaranteed the State militias' status as the Army's primary reserve force. The law mandated use of the term "National Guard" for that force, and the President was given authority, in case of war or national emergency, to mobilize the National Guard for the duration of the emergency. The number of yearly drills increased from 24 to 48 and annual training from five to 15 days. Drill pay was authorized for the first time.
The National Defense Act Amendments of 1920
This act established that the chief of the Militia Bureau (later the National Guard Bureau) would be a National Guard officer, that National Guard officers would be assigned to the general staff and that the divisions, as used by the Guard in World War I, would be reorganized.
The National Guard Mobilization Act, 1933
Made the National Guard a component of the Army.
The National Defense Act of 1947
Section 207 (f) established the Air National Guard of the United States, under the National Guard Bureau.
The Total Force Policy, 1973
Requires all active and reserve military organizations be treated as a single force.
The Montgomery Amendment to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1987
provides that a governor cannot withhold consent with regard to active duty outside the United States because of any objection to the location, purpose, type, or schedule of such duty. This law was challenged and upheld by the Supreme Court of the United States in 1990 in Perpich v. Department of Defense.[15])
The John Warner Defense Authorization Act of 2007 Pub.L. 109-364
Federal law was changed in section 1076 so that the Governor of a state is no longer the sole commander in chief of their state's National Guard during emergencies within the state. The President of the United States will now be able to take total control of a state's National Guard units without the governor's consent.[16] In a letter to Congress all 50 governors opposed the increase in power of the president over the National Guard.[17]
The National Defense Authorization Act 2008 Pub.L. 110-181
Repeals provisions in section 1076 in Pub.L. 109-364 but still enables the President to call up the National Guard of the United States for active federal military service during Congressionally sanctioned national emergency or war. Places the National Guard Bureau directly under the Department of Defense as a joint activity. Promoted the Chief of the National Guard Bureau from a three-star to a four-star general."

The States have lost so much power in the last century; most significantly the power of electing Senators; this is part of what leads to controversies like The Blogojevich Senate Auction & The Kennedy-Schlossberg Campaign for one vote & similar nonsense due to the Constitution being stood on its head in 1917 in order to even further advance Federal Totalitarianism.

So needless to say the Governor's are in no rush to give up their National Guard Units.

FYI : Linkeage for my above legal list

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Guard_(United_States)

[selil]

In no way angered by what you write Sam, but am curious about how to reconcile one and two. I wear a uniform but my current job makes me responsible for the refurbishment of equipment returning from combat to prepare it for the next deployment. When I went to war, I carried a weapon and was prepared to fight. That goes with the job. But now I am a continent away. If, because I am a soldier, I should be fighting who should do my job in CONUS? According to your second point, a soldier, but how can that be done if all the soldiers are fighting? What am I missing?

Ben


Appologies. I should have constrained the point about fighting to in theater. In CONUS lord help us and the river don't rise we shouldn't be doing to much fighting, but a whole lot of training.

Previously in another thread I posted about "b" billets which is also a good idea for soldiers returning and to take the wear out of the training cycle. What can't be forgotten though is while serving in "b" billets "you" are in the kill chain. Everybody in that chain should be military. I know that is a huge military personnel component but it is also a lot more flexible. Every time we toss a contractor into the chow hall to serve food that is a job/billet that has to be compensated outrageously in the field. When we talk about CONUS every soldier should train. I imagine you do that. You do your job in CONUS but more importantly if you are serving in that capacity in CONUS you take that experience to the conflict zone...

I'm remembering Beirut 1982-3 and Cafeteria carts being delivered to Marines from ship for their hot meal. Another example of a systemic break down. MCAGCC supposedly has all contractor staff. Who feeds Marines in the field and what is the logistical chain to support that effort?

In barracks or in the field the roles should remain. In the Marines, every Marine is a rifleman loses something when there are 200+ contractors on a FOB necessitating protection beyond what a "b" billet Marine would require.

Highly flexible, sustainable, capable, agile, war fighter centric, mission ready, low-drag, cross-trained they all sound great and appear to be missing in the current military.

That said I critique because I take ownership and in my own small way to try to help make things right.

[Bob's World]

National Guard:

I am a huge fan of the National Guard for many reasons, but there is one important inaccuracy in Bullmoose's filabuster. I don't know the exact %, but the Guard is roughly 96% funded with federal dollars due to it's national warfighter mission. This is a tremendous value back to the states that only have to pay for what they actually use in response to a state emergency (pay, wear and tear on equipment, flight hours), and for facilities.

So when Governors try to say "I need the Guard at home in case of emergency" or "We wore out our equipment fighting a war." They really dishonor themselves by not being honest about the nature of the bargain. They get a great resource of highly trained, highly motivated, well equipped men and women that they can use whenever they want at virtually no cost to the state. The payback is that when the President calls, they go. To complain that the trucks provided to them for warfighting got worn out in the process of warfighting is little more than an attempt to PSYOP the state's populace to oppose the war on false pretenses. Not what I expect from a Governor.

[Ken White]

First a request -- try to avoid posting lengthy quotes, to avoid copyright issue and to conserve bandwidth, it's better to provide a link if at all possible,


Also the National Guard exists as one of the last vestiges of The Sovereign State, which edifice of history the post Lincolnian, post Dick Act Federal Government remedied by eliminating their officers in 1933. Today all NG Os are actually AR Os assigned to NG units which seems to mean that during peacetime deployments (ref: US Constitution, The "wartime" clause) they have a different Commander-in-chief from the Soldiers they lead.I'm not sure that's totally correct. As you know, they are Officers of the Army of the United States (AUS); one of the Armies (plural) the Constitution says that Congress may raise and fund. The AUS as opposed to the USA (as in US Army, the regular army that Congress has also raised and funded) consists of the ArNG (for Federal purposes), the USAR and the USA.

The issue of a 'declared' war is IMO a false one. Forces committed to combat operations constitute a war and if the Congress funds it, they have declared it a war; if, as is true for the current fights, Congress has passed a Resolution authorizing force then they effectively declared war. Thus, ArNG troops federalized for deployments have the same CinC as their Officers; the President.
Very significant however is the fact that every Governor disagrees with every President on who controls the National Guard. Yes; including Clinton & GW Bush disagreeing with themselves on they day they moved from the Governor's Mansion to The White House.It is a fact though we disagree on its significance. The Governors are entitled to their opinions and political preferences but my suspicion is that as long as the US Government pays in excess of 80% of the costs of the ArNG, Congress and the Courts will not be sympathetic. Membership in the ArNG is totally voluntary; anyone who was in the Guard in early 2003 should have been able to see what was going to occur as sholud anyone who joined the Guard since 2003. The Governors have no case -- political pleading, yes; legitimate complaint, no.

That said, it is my opinion that the Guard has been misused to an extent in all this; that many Guardsmen and reservists have suffered due unexpected short notice and lengthy deployments and that the Guard has done a great job.
The State Control has been a big issue in OIF, although mostly in smoky back rooms. I assert that the Governor's collectively refusing "combat" assignments for their respective forces led Pres. GW Bush to begin de-escalation & Iraqification here, among other variables.I strongly doubt that but do not know.
The name "National Guard" is at once an homage to our French co-liberators of 1783 & a rather deceptive indicator of non-ownership.Let me remind you that the Constitution requires Congress:

"To provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the union, suppress insurrections and repel invasions;

To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the militia, and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the United States, reserving to the states respectively, the appointment of the officers, and the authority of training the militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress;"

Seems to me that clearly states that Congress is to pay for a Militia -- and that said payment allows them to specify when the Militia may be called up for Federal duties AND that Congress may prescribe the training regimen. I'll remind you that the National Guard wanted to be the "Militia" and lobbied hard for the Dick Act; Dick himself being a MG in the Ohio Guard. That may be an example of "be careful what you want, you may get it."
Governor v. President arguments usually happen like this:
. . .
Gov: Well then if that's how it is why don't you finance them ?

Pres: I'm sorry I'm late for a.......meeting. Say hello to your family for me.I think you should do a great deal of research into what share of your peacetime support is paid by your State (not counting add-ons like free College and other benefits that the State Guard got through the legislators) and what is paid by the Federal government. That guy at your State Headquarters is, after all, the 'US Property and Fiscal Officer,' not the ____P&FO
I feel this controversey was at work in the GW Bush administration's odd decision to defrock the US global military zone commander's of the title Commander-in-chief in favor of Combatant Commander which isn't even accurate or logical.That wasn't the Administration, that was the then SecDef; his idea -- I ignored him, I still call them CinCs as did and do a great number of people.
To those who keep saying there's only 1 C-in-c now might I be so bold as to say actually 58 ?Sarah Palin agrees with you. I agree with you -- until the guard is Federalized; then there's one Cinc at the top and the Joint Command Cincs a little lower.
In previous wars (again we could discuss whether we're at "war" per se Tm: Now) the Guardsmen were not federalized, not deployed, not op-conned, not called forth, not called up but "Drafted" into The National Army, WWI, or The Army of The United States, WWII, Korea, Viet-Nam; distinct from the United States Army, or regular Army. The Army of The United States is what AUS stands for.Terminology varies widely and can be confusing. Facts matter. Like it or not, the US is involved in a war that the Congress has funded, it is thus deemed legal by most. You and others may not agree but you're a small minority. ArNGg units have been activated, deployed and done well. If you do not agree with that, it would seem your decision might be to leave the ArNG at the earliest legal opportunity. No sense staying in an organization that you believe is being wronged when it is a voluntary organization.
Seperately, I was highly offended by the statement: "People used to join the Guard for just that reason: to stay out of the regular Army that got shipped overseas and not used to bolster a destroyed dying military the way they are used now in Iraq"I agree, that's offensive to me on several counts.
The States have lost so much power in the last century; most significantly the power of electing Senators; this is part of what leads to controversies like The Blogojevich Senate Auction & The Kennedy-Schlossberg Campaign for one vote & similar nonsense due to the Constitution being stood on its head in 1917 in order to even further advance Federal Totalitarianism.Possibly true but that wanders off thread, into political territory and this is not a political board. Political aspects pertaining to war fighting are fair game, general politics should be left outside.
So needless to say the Governor's are in no rush to give up their National Guard Units.I suspect some senior people in the Regular Army would like to see the ArNG absorbed by the USAR. Others would like to see both disappear and the resources they consume devoted to the Army. Neither of those things is likely to occur so I imagine that regular Army agrees with Governors; lets keep our Guard.

[Umar Al-Mokhtār]

totally agree Flournoy is an excellent choice for USD(P) but I think her real experience was perhaps better suited for the position of DSD (plus she has no 'big defense contractor stink' on her. IMHO anyone considered for a senior position in defense should recuse themselves if they have worked in any capacity for any of the top 10 defense contractor in the last five years, is it just me, or is it smart to let the wolves guard the henhouse?). At CSIS she cowrote BGN I & II and as DSD could actually have seen them put into effect quicker, although her position in USD(P) is also well placed for that, assuming POTUS, the SD, and DSD agree. While her ASD experience certainly makes her familiar with the inner workings of the building it is her subsequent work with CSIS and CNAS that IMO really saw her rise to the top.

I did note the the USDs should remain PASs since they are PSAs to the SD/DSD. It's the appointments beneath them that should not be political. Two reasons, one is that while they work for the SD they don't always feel that they answer to him. Second, RAND and CSIS studies have shown the average turnover in politicals is about 2.5 years. Not an effective way to provide leaderhip and governance for a vast enterprise that functions like a small country (as Sec Gates has noted).

Some of the career folks can additionally be a part of the problem since they are usually aware of the 2.5 year average and will take the stance that they can slow roll many issues until the political appointee leaves, then just let it die.

I have little faith my congressman would change things, but Jim Webb might. :D

Plus I might be in a better spot than either of them. :cool:

[Ken White]

and Senator (and the Pres, while you're at it). DOD political appointees(about 1300 in all) are there because the Congress and the Executive want them. they want to make sure the President's (and Congress') policies are followed and not misinterpreted by the permanent bureaucracy (civilian and uniformed) as happened in DS/DS with the PSRC. One of Pres Obama's best appointments, IMO, is Michelle Flournoy as USD-Policy. But where do you think she got her experience that qualified her for the post? In the Clinton Administration she was a DASD and Principal DASD (political appointments just below the level of Senate confirmation). So, there is reason for the political appointments as they stand, whether we agree or not. (BTW, the Brits do it kind of like you suggest but their career civil service has far more power than ours does.)Totally correct and unlikely to change. Sadly.

The 'however' above is for the fact that all of them -- as often happens -- put a band aid on a festering problem which affects not only DoD but most government agencies and particularly including that agency -- politicization.

The Federal Civil service is bureaucratically constrained from doing a good job by a mass of conflicting laws and regulations. It has also become politicized in several senses of that word but one dangerous trend which Congress has fostered with well intentioned (mostly...) but dumb laws is their penchant for inertia and keeping the comfort of the status quo by simply stalling or obstructing, item dependent, until the political climate changes or sheer exhaustion overtakes those with a policy sensed by the SES types as 'wrong.' it makes little difference to them whether the grounds are moral, practical or a delusion -- they had the power to affect it because they're almost un-fireable.

Attempts to change that in many Administrations were thwarted by Congress on several grounds but the real issue is protecting congressional sources and pets in the CS system plus cozying up to the employee Unions and Associations (most of which are de facto Unions).

The correct solution is to fix Civil Service and hold the SES accountable. Those about 1300 appointees in DoD are matched by broadly similar numbers on a pro rata basis throughout the government and not only is their quality in many cases (Paul D. Wolfowitz, Douglas J. Feith.Michael D. Brown, George C. Deutsch, George Tenet, John M. Deutch and a host of others...) quite poor, the rotation factor and resultant lack of continuity is literally dangerous -- and inimical to every new Administration.

Not smart...

(Yes, I know some of those were in the 'ought to be Presidential appointee in all cases' category -- but all of them got their start in lower level jobs and went on to prove the Peter Principle works in later administrations.)

[Bullmoose Bailey]

I'm not sure that's totally correct. As you know, they are Officers of the Army of the United States (AUS); one of the Armies (plural) the Constitution says that Congress may raise and fund. The AUS as opposed to the USA (as in US Army, the regular army that Congress has also raised and funded) consists of the ArNG (for Federal purposes), the USAR and the USA.

.

Very good commentary, sir. Am in agreement on the "War Declaration", State Control & The C-in-c titular roles.

Also FYI: There has not been an AUS since 1975.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Army_of_the_United_States

[Ken White]

Also FYI: There has not been an AUS since 1975.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Army_of_the_United_StatesOther than those who are still around who retired with AUS behind their name...

Quiescent until the Draft is reinstituted -- thus hopefully, never... ;)

[Schmedlap]

As far as processes, my pet peeve as a Company XO was our antiquated ULLS procedures. As recently as 2006, my supply sergeant and I were hand-carrying 3.5" floppy disks and dot-matrix printouts (you know, the ones that you tear the edges of the paper off?) from our ULLS clerks, who typed on what appeared to be circa. 1995 486 computers running MS-DOS 5.0, to place our orders. Unfrickingbelieveable.

[Ken White]

from the World War II model but the Cl IX / ULLS process has not advanced from the Ford Motor Company parts supply to Dealers that McNamara imposed on DoD in 1962. It has never worked well, it has always been a burden -A training personnel and logistic burden) and has not done what it was supposed to do; provide an easy audit trail for the Bean counters. It is particularly bad at handling demand surges due to increased OpTempo; it can take almost a year to react with some items. We were able to afford that dealy in OEF /OIF -- will we be able to in future deployments?

Bad system. Why, then, is it still here? Inertia. Our training has progressed a bit but all of our 'systems' are way out of date and changes are resisted not because they don't make sense -- but because some are worried about erring, some about 'accountability' and others are worried about turf. Dumb.

We've been talking about 'just in time logistics,' cutting out middlemen and some good experiments have taken place -- no big changes though; "change BAD..." :mad:

Yeah, I know it costs -- everything does. Costs less if you do it right instead of doing it due to a false sense of saving money...

[Entropy]

Here's the short version of the longer post that was eaten by the internet ghouls:

Two basic concepts: standardization and centralization of some tasks/activities.

Move all ancillary training to a computer-based system that is centrally tracked. Servicemembers can complete the training online around their own schedules and on their own time - even at home. The system would track progress and send alerts when it's time for refresher training. This solves the problems of pencil-whipping training for inspection purposes and actually makes inspections much easier since there's no paperwork.

The Air Force has the beginnings of this kind of system now and is expanding it. At first I was skeptical, but it's been a huge time-saver for those of us in the Reserve and Guard components. No longer do we have to spend 1-2 UTA's a year on mass-gaggle, death-by-powerpoint training evolutions.

It also has the potential to limit the paperwork hassles where someone's "additional" duty ends up becoming their de facto primary duty. With a central computer-based system, there's no paperwork to track or go out of date, or have the wrong signature when a supervisor or commander changes. There's no three-ring-binder to get lost. When a servicemember changes units, he/she doesn't have re accomplish all the training he/she just did a couple of months ago in the old unit.

I see no reason why all training can't be tracked and managed this way. Not only does it ease the paperwork burden, but it also pushes responsibility downward.

A lot of similar benefits could be had by using centralized service or DoD systems for stuff besides training. In particular I'm thinking of medical and personnel records. As someone who had to go through the ass-pain caused by the personnel section losing my record (and having to rebuild it), I am all in favor of making them fully electronic. Make it possible to conduct most personnel actions online. Too often I've gone to the personnel section to find they're closed or "in training" that day and are unable to help me.

All that little queep takes a lot of time when added up - time best spent on real, substantive training. It also helps reduce the cost of support - with online records one doesn't need as many personnelists, for example.

The DoD could use a lot more standardization, especially since we are increasingly joint. Make standardized officer and enlisted evaluation forms - better yet, make it all online. It's not uncommon nowadays to have people from one service (ore even civilians) writing evaluations for someone from another service. I've seen good people get unjustifiably sub-par evals simply because their rater didn't understand the arcana of another service's system. A standardized format would be a good start toward preventing that

SIPRnet. I've said it before and I'll say it again - SIPRnet sucks. Especially for those areas of greatest importance for our current operations. The websites for many of the major players constantly and needlessly change format. A new unit or new commander comes in (and maybe someone needs an eval bullet), so the entire site gets redesigned. Usually the designs are unintuitive and difficult to navigate, not to mention they also confuse search engines and break links on other sites and our bookmark files, making it frequently impossible to find information.

Some units put out products on their own sites at lower levels, some do not. Some use password protection to horde their information, while the unit next door does not. All this taken together creates a ton of wasted effort and frustration, not to mention operational danger due to the high chance of missing some important piece of information.

And let's not get started on wasted bandwidth from poor site design (5mb logos on each page makes my slow connection cry)

What SIPR needs is some standardization and enforced continuity with an eye toward easing information exchange. Standardize site design and especially site organization. Mandate creating low-bandwidth versions of sites and/or important products. There's no reason I should have to download a gig of powerpoint slides every morning to figure out what's gone on in theater and my AO in the last 24 hours. Archive everything and maintain PERSISTENT links so search engines can archive it and links and bookmarks don't break. Each unit that is capable of producing information of operational or intelligence value should be given a turn-key sipr space to put their products and to keep them there.

Finally, there's procurement, which everyone agrees is a huge problem. Here's what needs to happen in my perfect world:

First, restrict the services so they are only able to buy equipment with technology that has already been developed. Currently, procurement programs are no longer about procurement - they are bloated R&D, creeping requirements sinkholes. In short, R&D and procurement must be separated.

Second, we have Darpa that does basic research in high-risk/high payoff areas. We need more of that, but more importantly, we need another Darpa-like agency that would do the R&D and engineering to take a promising technology to maturation. The services would provide their wish lists of capabilities, which would then be prioritized and developed.

Third, once those technologies reach some point of maturation, THEN they can be purchased by the services. This should reduce costs considerably as well as provide a lot less risk of a capability gap.

That's enough for now I think!

[Schmedlap]

Move all ancillary training to a computer-based system that is centrally tracked. Servicemembers can complete the training online around their own schedules and on their own time - even at home. The system would track progress and send alerts when it's time for refresher training. This solves the problems of pencil-whipping training for inspection purposes and actually makes inspections much easier since there's no paperwork.
I was in a unit that did this and my experience was entirely negative - but it was largely organizational culture, rather than a technical issue. However, that is why I oppose it - the Army organizational culture will repeat what I saw.

By making this training so easy to issue out, suddenly, it began to multiply. I must have completed 6 different anti-terrorism/force protection "training" modules online. Why 6 instead of 1? Because someone on staff kept finding new training available online and there was a general consensus that more is better. "Look at all of the training we've completed! And here's the documentation!" Everyday that I showed up at work, it seemed like we had two or three more of these time-wasters that would eat up 30 minutes each if you did them correctly. If you did them incorrectly, well, you could finger-drill it in 5 minutes. But, in that case, what is the point?

Most of the "training" consisted of disinterested Soldiers clicking through the modules as quickly as possible and largely guessing or taking educated guesses on the questions at the end, having neither listened to nor read the material. It was the ultimate finger drill.

I will say that allowing Soldiers to click-through and finger-drill many of these things on their own time is preferable to gathering them in one location for a full hour and having them sleep through a briefing. However, the former does not preclude the latter. On my last deployment, we deployed as small teams, so we were required to go through SRC (there's a lengthy gripe for another day). We brought all of the documentation with us of the click-through finger-drills that we did to satisfy our SRC briefing requirements. Didn't matter. We still had to sit through the briefings. So it did not save one minute of our time.

[Entropy]

Schmedlap,

I've seen the same sorts of failed efforts as well. What changed my opinion on the new Air Force system is that it is run at the service level, so idea fairies can't tack-on extra training and there is continuity no matter where you are.

I also hear you with regard to clicking through as fast as possible. I would only point out that some variation of that is going to happen regardless of how the training is given. The tests at the end are not difficult, but are sufficiently rigorous to ensure individuals know the important stuff. With the mass-gaggle briefings we had before, there was no testing at all - only an attendance record. So some kind of test is to demonstrate some level of knowledge is an improvement, IMO. The ability to click through to the end and take the test is a benefit as well since many people already know the subject and don't need to get into it in great detail. If they pass the test then that just shows they remember all the key points. If they don't, they have to go back and relearn.

[Steve Blair]

Schmedlap,

I've seen the same sorts of failed efforts as well. What changed my opinion on the new Air Force system is that it is run at the service level, so idea fairies can't tack-on extra training and there is continuity no matter where you are.

I also hear you with regard to clicking through as fast as possible. I would only point out that some variation of that is going to happen regardless of how the training is given. The tests at the end are not difficult, but are sufficiently rigorous to ensure individuals know the important stuff. With the mass-gaggle briefings we had before, there was no testing at all - only an attendance record. So some kind of test is to demonstrate some level of knowledge is an improvement, IMO. The ability to click through to the end and take the test is a benefit as well since many people already know the subject and don't need to get into it in great detail. If they pass the test then that just shows they remember all the key points. If they don't, they have to go back and relearn.

Uh...we're seeing issues with some of this in AETC. Good to hear that it's working in other places, though.

[Entropy]

Uh...we're seeing issues with some of this in AETC. Good to hear that it's working in other places, though.

My perspective on this is as a reservist/guardsman. We have very limited training time, so freeing up two days every year has, imo, a significant impact on what we're able to accomplish. The benefit for active duty isn't going to be as big and certainly the system isn't perfect, but I still see it as an overall improvement.

For another example, there is the information assurance training needed to get computer accounts. When I go TDY, and need a local account, my IA certificate is good at any AF unit. Previously, in many cases I'd have to do some kind of local or majcom-driven training at my TDY location to get an account.

We can debate the benefits of this specific case, but overall, I think a general move toward putting and tracking stuff online is worth the downsides.

[Steve Blair]

I agree that it's a good idea. AETC just has a tendency to over-complicate some things and not necessarily communicate them in an optimal manner. Hopefully they'll get the snags sorted out soon.

[Entropy]

I agree that it's a good idea. AETC just has a tendency to over-complicate some things and not necessarily communicate them in an optimal manner. Hopefully they'll get the snags sorted out soon.

No disagreement there. I don't know what it is about training commands, but they spend too much time on nitnoid crap. I saw the same thing in the Navy. Take lunches as just one example. For pipeliners post-boot training is a lot like boot. For lunch they have to form up and march to the chow hall. Everyone does this at roughly the same time, so they all arrive at the same time. It takes forever for them to get their chow and eat it. Then they form back up and march back to class. The whole evolution can take two hours. What a waste of time. No effort is made to either stagger arrival times at the chow hall or take some other measure so that lunch can be accomplished in an hour or less. When you're talking a six-month course, like the enlisted intel school, an hour a day adds up.

[ODB]

leads to nothing more than 1 person doing everyone's "mandatory" training. I see the benefits, but why do I need to take the same exact terrorism awareness course yearly? The same OPSEC courses? Bottom line, do it once then have shorten bulleted refresher courses.

I am not a fan of everything being moved to "distance learning". Sorry but the Army does not do a good job of putting good products together for these courses. My experience has been that I learn more from my peers than my instructors due to the constraints of the POI. Everyone says do it on your own time. I already use my own time to stay in shape, to become a SME or attempt to, and to pursue my college degree.

Above all when would I have time to add my .02 cents to these boards?

[Entropy]

I think the question of whether we should have a particular piece of training is one that is separate from how that, or any other, training might be managed. Like you, SFC B, I certainly have no love for a lot of the ancillary training out there, but as long as it remains a requirement I think that putting it online is the least bad option. Truly important training, for obvious reasons, should not be given online, but I think there are benefits to be had from moving the training management online.

[Courtney Massengale]

I would completely remove the current standards for gunnery/crew qualification for all weapons systems and replace them with a system that allows for input by Commanders.

Our ranges – from the M16 to the Abrams – are rote, unchanging, scripted exercises in play-acting instead of marksmanship. This has been addressed a dozen times in my career without any action. Everyone agrees that it needs to change, but nobody can seem to come up with a new standard.

I propose that the Army develop a core series of tasks for each weapon, then allow Commanders down to the Battalion level to decide which ones are required to qualify a Soldier, much in the same way you develop a METL. This would allow for differentiation between unit types (Light Infantry vs Heavy Mech) and also for METT-TC (Korea vs Iraq vs TRADOC).

For the "table" systems, this would train crews for what the unit's mission entailed; not tasks they will never do in combat. For example, the M1 Abrams: There could be a Korea-specific tank gunnery that focuses on firing from slopes. An urban gunnery that focuses on the crew serve weapons. And of course the standard gunnery but with different types, frequencies and distances for targets to shape crews proficiency.

This system would also do away with the requirement to "unqualify" a crew if it didn't meet specific manning gateways. The entire notion of "minimally manned and combat capable" is a joke. Either they can accomplish the mission with what they have or they can't. This would allow a less than fully manned crew to "prove" that they were qualified on the tasks their Commander views as essential.

[reed11b]

My peer and I were discussing what we liked and disliked about the Army the other day and I brought up my disagreements on unit manning and training and up or out. My peer stated "The Army does not do units, it does temporary collections of individuals." I think that sums it up about perfectly.
Reed

[Schmedlap]

Our ranges – from the M16 to the Abrams – are rote, unchanging, scripted exercises in play-acting instead of marksmanship. This has been addressed a dozen times in my career without any action. Everyone agrees that it needs to change, but nobody can seem to come up with a new standard.
I kind of cracked the code on that when I was an S-3. It took weeks of haggling with range control, enough memos to kill 3 ink cartridges and a forest of trees, a bunch of signatures, and enough BS to fill in the hole at ground zero, but we managed to inject a little bit of spontaneity, training value, and variety into our ranges and cut back on the safety-gone-wild. Obviously, this is not the preferred long-term solution, but it can be done.

When I finally obtained GO approval and range control's nod to allow Soldiers to holster loaded sidearms and do transition fire while moving, I felt as though I had moved heaven and Earth. The thought of holstering a loaded weapon nearly caused some safety nazis to faint. The thought of not having a safety rod your M-4 when you run out of ammo, before you draw that loaded sidearm and continue to engage? Heresy! Seriously, the contractor in the tower refused to let the range go hot even after I showed him the stack of memos. It took 15 minutes of bickering with him, range control, and some other yahoo before we were able to start training that day. I don't miss it.

We also added a little more free-play into our dismount lanes, made "shoot houses" more than just clearing one room (managed to get approval for hallways, multiple rooms, using up to two squads in a building at once), and even made table XII halfway realistic.

[Tom Odom]

The Unified Command Plan, which is neither unified nor a plan. It is rather a disconnected interlocking system of territorial and/or mission fiefdoms designed on communications capabilities from WWII.

The only thing more outdated than the UCP is the Department of State's continued adherence to country missions modeled on the days of wax sealed messages dispatched by sailing ships.

Tom