General invite to attend undergraduate COIN course via Skype & in person

[Meh]

Hi all,

Further to my previous couple of posts, I'm teaching a COIN seminar through Tufts' ExCollege. This is the second time I'm teaching COIN. The previous course was in bog-standard lecture format. This time it's supposed to be student-driven and highly interactive.

First half of the course deals with Iraq; second half with Afghanistan (aka urban/rural COIN). Each half starts at tactical perspective; we then move into the operational and finally the strategic level.

The class runs Tuesdays and Thursdays, 1800-1915 EST.

To enable wider participation, I'm setting up Skype teleconferences that will broadcast every class and allow those on the line to get involved in the conversation (although I request moderation, since the students should still do most of the talking).

Of course there's also the option of making your way to Tufts' campus just north of Boston.

If you're interested in participating, please pm me with your skype id and I'll include you in the conference call that starts at 17:55 (or give you the room number).

We've got some highly decorated Marine NCOs coming to this week's classes in order to speak about their combat experiences. I'll update as appropriate with details of further guests.

Syllabus follows (with dates).

-Toby

PS: There's also a COIN simulation on the weekend of March 6th, if you're interested in participating as an advisor, opfor, civilian or NGO.

[Meh]

Questions, criticisms of, and comments about the syllabus are, of course, appreciated.

Please note that where it says "Blackboard Readings" these are available online to anyone. Go here (http://blackboard.tufts.edu/). Click "user login". Click "preview" on the left side of screen. Click "Course Catalog" in top-left corner. Under "Course Search", enter "EXP-62". Click on result and then "Readings".

27 January - Class 4: House to House, Street to Street

Examination of the tactical aspects of urban warfare, segueing into the operational level.

- West, The Strongest Tribe, Ch's 5 (64-83), 6 (84-105), 9 (130-147), 22 (310-316).
- Mansoor, Baghdad at Sunrise, Ch’s 4 (117 - 125, 126 - 129, 132 - 147), 5 (155 - 57, 162 - 179).
- Blackboard Reading:

o Excerpt from Nathan Sassaman with Joe Layden, Warrior King: the triumph and betrayal of an American commander in Iraq.
o Dexter Filkins, The Fall of the Warrior King.
o Thomas Ricks, Fight Club.

29 January - Class 5: Fallujah

Marines' experiences in the first and second battles of Fallujah. The challenges of urban warfare from the tactical perspective, with an emphasis on moral ambiguities and the concept of Three-Block Warfare. Guest speaker.

- West, The Strongest Tribe, Ch's 3 (26-42), 4 (43-63).
- FM 3-24, Ch 7: Leadership and Ethics for Counterinsurgency (pp. 236-254)
- Mansoor, Baghdad at Sunrise, Ch’s 3 (85 - 113), 9 (277 - 295, 299 - 301, 303)

3 February - Class 6: From Whack a Mole to FM 3-24

The evolution of urban combat in Iraq, from early counterinsurgency efforts in 2003 to the more unified efforts of today.

- FM 3-24, Ch 1: Insurgency and Counterinsurgency (pp. 1-52)
- West, The Strongest Tribe, Ch's 7 (pp. 106-112), 8 (pp. 107-130)
- Mansoor, Baghdad at Sunrise, Ch’s 4 (179 - 187), 9 (295 - 299), 10 (304 - 333)
o Blackboard readings:

o Paul Yingling, A Failure in Generalship.
o LTC Raymond Millen, Thinking Small: Applying Hobbes to Counterinsurgency.

5 February - Class 7: Morning in Mesopotamia

How the Sunnis came in from the cold - the importance of local politics in counterinsurgency.

- West, The Strongest Tribe, Ch's 13 (173-186), 16 (208-215), 18 (224-245), 21 (280-292), 22 (292-300 only), 23 (327-331).
- Mansoor, Baghdad at Sunrise, Ch. 8 (242 - 276).
- Blackboard Readings:

o William McCallister, Sons of Iraq: A Study in Irregular Warfare.
o Niel Smith and Sean MacFarland, Anbar Awakening: The Tipping Point.

10 February - Class 8: Building the Iraqi Security Forces

Building host nation security capabilities: U.S. forces face the challenge of creating their local successors. Guest teacher from Harvard.

- West, The Strongest Tribe, Ch's 14 (87-196).
- Mansoor, Baghdad at Sunrise, Ch. 4 (192 - 194).
- FM 3-24, Ch 6: Developing Host-Nation Security Forces (199-235).
- Blackboard Reading:

o Nagl, Institutionalizing Adaptation.

12 February - Class 9: Operational-level Problem Set

Review of take-home problem sets and in-class problem-solving exercise.

17 February - Class 10: Perception is Everything: Building an Accurate Picture at the Operational and Strategic Levels

Strategic-level leaders face intense challenges in how they gather, filter and analyze information on their own efforts and that of the enemy. We will examine successful and unsuccessful examples of the use of intelligence in counterinsurgency.

- West, The Strongest Tribe, Ch's 11 (159-166), 15 (197-207), 17 (216-223), 23 (317-333).
- FM 3-24, Ch 3: Intelligence in Counterinsurgency (79-135).
- Smith, Ch 7 (269-307).
- Blackboard Readings:

o John P. Sullivan, The Frontiers of Global Security Intelligence.
o Excerpt from Thomas Ricks, Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq (149-172).
o HR McMaster, The Human Element: When Gadgetry Becomes Strategy.

No class on 19 February!


24 February - Class 11: The Battle for the Iraqi Shia

What does the “endgame” in Iraq look like? How much influence in Iraq does Iran truly have? How much influence do American leaders have over the outcomes?

- West, The Strongest Tribe, Ch's 19 (246-272), 20 (277-279 only), 22 (300-303 only), 23 (325-326), 24 (351-355).
- Blackboard Reading:

o Michael R. Gordon, The Last Battle.
o Marc Lynch, Politics First: Why Only U.S. Withdrawal Can Spur Iraqi Cooperation.
o Kenneth Katzman, Iran's Influence in Iraq.
o Sherifa Zuhur, Iran, Iraq, and the United States.
o Nathaniel Rabkin, Who Speaks for Iraqi Shiites?

26 February - Class 12: The War at Home / Debate on Iraq

Examination of the perception of Iraq in United States politics.

- West, The Strongest Tribe, Ch's 24 (355-357 only), 25 (371-373).
- Blackboard Readings:

o Michael R. Stobl, Taking Chance.

Is the current US strategy working? What lessons does it hold for the future? Are 'surges' and other strategies replicable? The debate raging in the military today.

- West, The Strongest Tribe, Ch. 24 (342-351 only).
- Smith, Ch 8 (308-334).
- Blackboard Readings:

o Spencer Ackerman, The Colonels and The Matrix.
o Gian Gentile, Misreading the Surge Threatens US Army's Conventional Military Capabilities.
o Gian Gentile, A (Slightly) Better War: A Narrative and its Defects.
o Peter Mansoor, Misreading the History of the Iraq War.

[Meh]

3 March - Class 13: The Hardest of All Victories

A look at why the British succeeded at the tactical level in Malaya while the United States - contrary to common wisdom of “won the battles but lost the war: - failed to win battles in Vietnam.

- Blackboard reading:

- Colonel I.A. Rigden, OBE, The British Approach to Counter-Insurgency: Myths, Realities and Strategic Challenges.
- Excerpt from Michael McClintock, "Instruments of Statecraft", Ch. 11 - The Decolonization Conundrum & The Problem of Administration.
- Marston & Malkasian, Ch 2: Counterinsurgency in the Philippines.
- Marston & Malkasian, Ch 6: From Search and Destroy to Hearts and Minds: The Evolution of British Strategy in Malaya 1948-1960.
- Marston & Malkasian, Ch 7: Counterinsurgency in Vietnam: American Organizational Culture and Learning.

5 March - Class 14: Welcome to the Jungle

An intro to the tactical level of rural insurgencies. We will discuss the perpetual fear and uncertainty racing through the minds of soldiers in Malaya and Vietnam. We will also discuss challenges the insurgent faces and early, brute force attempts to subdue these insurgencies. Guest speaker (USMC).

- West, The Strongest Tribe, Appendix A.
- Blackboard reading:

o Michael Yon, Death in the Corn.
o Nagl, Ch 4 (59-85).
o Marston & Malkasian, Ch 8: Red Wolves and British Lions: The Conflict in Aden.
o Marston and Malkasian, Ch 12: Lessons in 21st-Century Counterinsurgency: Afghanistan 2001-07.
o NPR, Conversations: What's Next for Afghanistan?; with Sarah Chayes, November 17, 2008.

WEEKEND OF 6 MARCH: COIN FIELD EXERCISE

10 March - Class 15: Tactical Problem Set Review

Review of take-home problem sets and in-class problem-solving exercise.

12 March - Class 16: The Battle for the Afghan Countryside

Rural counterinsurgency also provides quite a different picture for commanders hunting the opposition. We will contrast the fight among Iraq's sophisticated urban population centers with the battles against the Taliban in one of the world's poorest countries.

- Rashid, Ch 7 (125-145).
- Blackboard reading:

o Sebastian Junger, Into the Valley of Death.
o Bo Kyi, Kilcullen on Afghanistan: "It's still winnable, but only just".
o Col. Patrick Donahue & LTC Michael Fenzel, Combating a Modern Insurgency: Combined Task Force Devil in Afghanistan.

SPRING BREAK

24 March - Class 17: The Graveyard of Empire

Afghanistan from the operational level. How battalions of 650-1,000 soldiers provide the crucial link between individual soldiers and grand strategy, and how they operate in rural environments.

- Rashid, Ch’s 12 (240-265), 15 (317-338).
- Blackboard readings:

o Dave Kilcullen, Twenty-Eight Articles.
o Except from Lester Grau, The Bear Went over the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan.
o Excerpt from David Hackworth, Steel My Soldiers' Hearts.

26 March - Class 18: The Civilians Strike Back (non-violently, of course)

The development of infrastructure as a critical component of COIN and Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan.

- West, The Strongest Tribe, Ch 23(326 only), 24(338-341 only).
- Smith, Ch 5 (183-225).
- Rashid, Ch 9 (171-196).
- FM 3-24, Ch 2: Unity of Effort: Integrating Civilian and Military Activities (53-77).
- Blackboard reading:

o Excerpt from PRT Handbook.
o Excerpt from US Government Interagency Counterinsurgency Guide.
o Pamela Constable, Inexplicable Wealth of Afghan Elite Sows Bitterness.

31 March - Class 19: Operational Level Problem Sets

Review of take-home problem sets and in-class problem-solving exercise.

2 April - Class 20: The Pakistan Problem

How and why does Pakistan exercise influence in Afghanistan and the challenges of a failing nuclear state on the doorstep to an insurgency.

- Rashid, Ch’s 11 (pp.219-240), 13 (265-293).
- Blackboard Readings:

o Shuja Nawaz, Crossed Swords: Pakistan, Its Army, and the Wars Within, Introduction (xxvii-xliii)
o LTC Marc Jamison "Sanctuaries: A Strategic Reality, An Operational Challenge".
o Reuel Marc Gerecht, Our Pakistan Problem.

7 April - Class 21: Losing Afghanistan?

Why is the United States losing ground in Afghanistan? We'll discuss the policy and resource constraints placed upon counterinsurgency campaigns.
- Rashid Ch 17 (349-373).
- Blackboard Readings:

o Gen Barry McCaffrey (Ret), Afghanistan After-Action Report.
o Anthony Cordesman, Losing the Afghan-Pakistan War.
o Except from Lester Grau, The Bear went over the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan.

9 April - Class 22: Turning the Tide

How, and if, Afghanistan can be salvaged. Moreover, should it? A group discussion during which students are encouraged to refer to their readings of previous conflicts for possible courses of action in Afghanistan.

- FM 3-24, Ch 8: Sustainment (pp. 255-285).
- Smith, Ch. 9 (335-373).
- Rashid, Conclusion (374-405).
- Blackboard Readings:

o Vikram J. Singh and Nathaniel C. Fick, Surging Statecraft to Save Afghanistan.
o Anthony Cordesman, Winning the War in Afghanistan.

14 April - Class 23: Strategic Problem Set

Review of take-home problem sets and in-class problem solving exercise.

16 April - Class 24: Strategic Problem Set (cont'd)

In-class problem solving exercise continued.

21 April - Class 25: What Then is to be Our War

What is the new defense paradigm?

- Smith, Conclusion (pp. 374-415).
- Blackboard Readings:

o Jonathon Morgenstein and Eric Vickland, The Global Counterinsurgency.
o Dave Kilcullen, Countering Global Insurgency.
o Bruce Hoffman, The Myth of Grass-Roots Terrorism.
o Marc Sageman and Bruce Hoffman, Does Osama Still Call the Shots?
o Gian Gentile, Let's Build An Army to Win All Wars.
o John Nagl, Let's Win the Wars We're In.

23 April - Class 26: The Future of Warfare

From the Maginot Line to Cyber Warfare, the past teaches us that the present's popular predictions about the future of warfare are frequently wrong. What kind of person is best prepared to predict future conflicts? Through a final brainstorming session, we'll come up with scenarios that prove every assumption about warfare we've made during the past twenty-five classes invalid.

- Blackboard readings:

o Robert Kaplan, How We Would Fight China.
o Azar Gat, The Return of the Authoritarian Great Powers.
o Robert Gates
• Oxford Analytica Speech. September 19, 2008.
• Evening Lecture at the U.S. Military Academy, April 21, 2008.

[Ken White]

3 March - Class 13: The Hardest of All Victories

A look at why the British succeeded at the tactical level in Malaya while the United States - contrary to common wisdom of “won the battles but lost the war: - failed to win battles in Vietnam.
. . .
An intro to the tactical level of rural insurgencies. We will discuss the perpetual fear and uncertainty racing through the minds of soldiers in Malaya and Vietnam. We will also discuss challenges the insurgent faces and early, brute force attempts to subdue these insurgencies...Obviously your syllabus is abbreviated and does not state in detail what will be covered in the class. Equally obviously, it is your class and your sources so by all means do whatever you think correct but I believe you have two very incorrect postulations here:

The statement that the US failed to win battles in Viet Nam is quite incorrect and I'd also suggest that the premise of 'won the battles but lost the war' is at best misleading.

I spent two tours in Viet Nam as an Infantry NonCommissionedOfficer and I saw absolutely no evidence of of "perpetual fear and uncertainty," indeed of much fear or any uncertainty, in the vast majority of those with whom I came in contact.

In short but based solely on what you have presented here, to include books, authors, editors and experts, I question the validity of your sources.

[pjliddy]

This course looks interesting. Are the sessions open to the public?

[Meh]

Obviously your syllabus is abbreviated and does not state in detail what will be covered in the class. Equally obviously, it is your class and your sources so by all means do whatever you think correct but I believe you have two very incorrect postulations here:

The statement that the US failed to win battles in Viet Nam is quite incorrect and I'd also suggest that the premise of 'won the battles but lost the war' is at best misleading.

I spent two tours in Viet Nam as an Infantry NonCommissionedOfficer and I saw absolutely no evidence of of "perpetual fear and uncertainty," indeed of much fear or any uncertainty, in the vast majority of those with whom I came in contact.

In short but based solely on what you have presented here, to include books, authors, editors and experts, I question the validity of your sources.

Good points. I must admit that, in polishing off the syllabus, I focused more on finding the best readings than finding better wordings for the class descriptions. That "fear and uncertainty" part is definitely piffle and I apologise. That shouldn't have survived into the final version. The actual goal is to take apart the civilian notion that soldiers are somehow victims, so the wording runs pretty much in the opposite direction of the actual things discussed. Definitely mea culpa.

The "lost the battles" part will question whether we focused on the right battles - "hearts and minds" versus conventional search and destroy. I understand the pride felt by those who ravaged communist forces in Vietnam but, to be blunt, there's something odd about in claiming victory in a rugby match when your opponent was playing cricket.

We will discuss those US forces which were quite successful in their AO (from Hackworth to CAP), but will also do this with reference to the U.S.' inability to come up with the sort of overarching doctrinal change that FM 3-24 represents.

PS: My last class had a more extensive evaluation of Tet - military victory versus strategic defeat back home and the shape of a pathetically weak South Vietnamese government. Think along those lines for what I mean by "lost the battles".

[Ken White]

Good points. I must admit that, in polishing off the syllabus, I focused more on finding the best readings than finding better wordings for the class descriptions. That "fear and uncertainty" part is definitely piffle and I apologise. That shouldn't have survived into the final version. The actual goal is to take apart the civilian notion that soldiers are somehow victims, so the wording runs pretty much in the opposite direction of the actual things discussed. Definitely mea culpa.Not a problem, I wouldn't have mentioned it other than it did not track with most of your other items and comments. Such fear did exist, of course in very small minority, not perpetual but often if contact was likely. Most didn't show much or just stifled it well and got on with the job, a few had no apparent fear of much of anything. I don't recall any real dread on the part of anyone. Reporters do miss a lot.
The "lost the battles" part will question whether we focused on the right battles - "hearts and minds" versus conventional search and destroy. I understand the pride felt by those who ravaged communist forces in Vietnam but, to be blunt, there's something odd about in claiming victory in a rugby match when your opponent was playing cricket.No question about that. My comment was aimed at several things but, since you mention rugby and cricket, I 'll do them in 60s chronology. There is no question the US Army blew it in Viet Nam. GEN Paul Harkins (formerly Patton's Third Army G3 in WW II...) and his replacement Westmoreland tried to fight a campaign in northwest Europe in the paddies of southeast Asia. Not a good plan. Abysmally stupid in fact. That ran from 62 until Westmoreland left in 68. Almost seven wasted years.

Wesmoreland's last deputy was Bruce Palmer, a Cavalryman with Pacific as opposed to European experience (and that made a huge difference, just as Templer's Italian and SOE vs. NW Europe experience made a difference) who advised the new Commander, Creighton Abrams (another NW Europe alumnus but a smart one) to radically change what was being done. Unlike Westmoreland, Abrams listened -- and acted. Also unlike Westmoreland, he reined in the MACV Staff which was dangerously out of touch (and filled with Tankers -- Infantry war, Tankers had to go somewhere. This is important, see below), CORDS was the result and the whole character of the Viet Nam war changed. No sense discussing that, Google should have tons.
We will discuss those US forces which were quite successful in their AO (from Hackworth to CAP), but will also do this with reference to the U.S.' inability to come up with the sort of overarching doctrinal change that FM 3-24 represents.That's what I suspected and that's what's wrong. In order; Hackworth was a legend in his own mind, there were many units more successful in fact and not just under a hotshot publicity seeking commander (there were several of those) but for most of their service in country, not just for a brief period under a Showboat. What many miss and what the well meaning but woefully ignorant reporters missed at the time is that the US Army units that went to VN in in 1965-66 were pretty professional, were competent and had been training for COIN for several years; most officers and NCOS had a working knowledge of Fall and Galula and the units were good. For a year. They were extremely successful even as the MACV staff tried to push "Search and Destroy" -- many units, including both Airborne Brigades just ignored them and did the COIN thing. Then everyone rotated out.

In late 1966 the second string arrived. Literally. Brand new partly and poorly trained Privates, NCOs from the training base and Reserve unit advisors, some who hadn't been involved in any active army training for years. Officers scraped out of headquarters here and there to include many out of units in Europe -- who had never trained in COIN and couldn't spell Fall, much less Galula. Things predictably got rapidly worse instead of better. In late 1967, another changeover, to the 3rd string. Including NCOs with six months in the Army and who were graduates of a NCO Candidate course of 90 days. Officers from the DA staff. Even things that could not get worse did so...
PS: My last class had a more extensive evaluation of Tet - military victory versus strategic defeat back home and the shape of a pathetically weak South Vietnamese government. Think along those lines for what I mean by "lost the battles".Oh, I did. You might want to do some research on Tet and why it led to the strategic defeat you say. It is not as cut and dried as most 'historians' would have you believe. The Press and some really flawed reporting are involved; not a conspiracy, just incompetence and ignorance and a refusal to acknowledge errors.

A current day counterpart is the response to Hurricane Katrina which was not that bad -- but the media said it was, so bad it will stay..

But my narrative was up to Tet. Look deeper at that. Far more importantly, you might want to read this: LINK (http://www.amazon.com/Better-War-Unexamined-Victories-Americas/dp/0156013096). It discusses the war after Tet -- more importantly but similarly, after the media lost interest in it.

I first went to VN in early 66 and watched us pretty quickly and effectively start cleaning things up and by the time my year was up, things were on an upswing. Went back to VN right after Tet. I was flat horrified to see how much damage had been done in about a year. Friend of mine attributed to new commanders doing what the MACV Staff said do -- search and destroy. So you've got that right but it needs to be taken in context.

Most of 1968 consisted of switching gears, CORDS really got up to speed in 1969 -- and it worked. But by then nobody cared. The troop quality continued to deteriorate, no question -- but the effort turned around. Those Tankers I mentioned above, most had a lot of European and no Asian experience so they flooded the staffs and tried to fight big battles, a muddy Infantry LTC Bn Cdr is no match for a spiffily starched MACV Staff Colonel who flies in an says do it my way. Rugby and cricket indeed. :wry:

Another point if I may; any comparison of Viet Nam and Malaya should consider these facts:

In Malaya, Britain WAS the government, in Viet Nam the US had to ask VN permission to do most everything.

In Malaya, British troop units served for three years, in VN, US troop units lost 10% or usually more of their strength every month, Officers were rarely in position for more than six months and the one year tour effectively crippled the entire campaign.

In Malaya, the British were aided by an effective civil service and well trained and efficient Police These had been in place for many years. In VN, neither of those things existed and the poor substitutes that did were not under US control.

In Malaya there was only a short easily interdicted land border and the neighboring nation was essentially friendly. In VN, the border was long, complex abutted three nations and the neighbors were not friendly.

I could go on with a dozen more differences but you get the picture -- anyone who attempts to make comparisons betwen Malaya and Viet Nam is not thinking clearly.

Anyone who categorically says the US lost in Viet Nam may be stating a fact in some terms -- but one that is far from true in all terms. Such a view is one that likely missed the military and political lessons of Viet Nam while hewing to the media and academic 'lessons' of Viet Nam. Lost or won doesn't mean much, really, nor is there any sense in playing what might have been. What was, was and what is, is...

Not trying to change your mind on anything, just pointing out that all is not as most of the flawed histories purport to report. One thing for sure about VN -- Lot of myths about that war... ;)

[Meh]

Ken, as I suspected, we're actually singing off the same song sheet, here!

I remember taking a class on Vietnam during my second year of War Studies at the University of London. For a whole semester, I squirmed in my seat as my professor pontificated on the war. What was apparently the main effort of the war? What decided the whole thing? Rolling Thunder!!! That was all we seemed to talk about! Talk about academics out of touch. We never once discussed CORDS or even the grunt war.


Not a problem, I wouldn't have mentioned it other than it did not track with most of your other items and comments. Such fear did exist, of course in very small minority, not perpetual but often if contact was likely. Most didn't show much or just stifled it well and got on with the job, a few had no apparent fear of much of anything. I don't recall any real dread on the part of anyone.

Come to think of it, when I wrote the original syllabus description, I think I meant the uncertainty of patrolling the countryside when ambushes are likely. Sort of redundant since urban warfare's the same. I'll make sure I clearly describe the difference between rural and urban at the tactical levels in the class.

Don't worry, if I get things wrong and misrepresent the realities, the guests in attendance will rip out my eyes and sku...you get the picture.


In order; Hackworth was a legend in his own mind, there were many units more successful in fact and not just under a hotshot publicity seeking commander (there were several of those) but for most of their service in country, not just for a brief period under a Showboat.

Hack's one of my original heroes. What I specifically want to use him for is as an example of an excellent killer. I became a fan in my teens after picking up About Face from my father's bookshelf, read Steel My Soldiers' Hearts when it first came out and was impressed by his turnaround of a battalion. But upon further reading a few years later, I realised that Hack was, if anything, excellent at the job that was holding the US back - search and destroy. He never really engaged in hearts and minds while in the conventional role (nor later on, if I recall from About Face). Hack was a red herring. His notion of "out-G-ing the G" worked excellently from a tactical point of view, but operated in a political vacuum. Men like him were needed for certain missions, but "hearts and minds" had to be carried out by someone else. [I'm not in the know to comment on the veracity of his public persona]


You might want to do some research on Tet and why it led to the strategic defeat you say. It is not as cut and dried as most 'historians' would have you believe. The Press and some really flawed reporting are involved; not a conspiracy, just incompetence and ignorance and a refusal to acknowledge errors.

Absolutely agreed. I do subscribe to what I believe is the conventional wisdom on Tet: mangled the VC, seemingly refuted the president's claims and thus equally mangled the war at home.

No tactical improvements could make up for the loss of political and public will that occurred due to Westmoreland and Johnson's visions of the war. We'll be pre-exploring this part in class 12 about "the war at home", although that's not on the syllabus' description. I'll raise it towards the end of the discussion to throw people a fast ball.


Most of 1968 consisted of switching gears, CORDS really got up to speed in 1969 -- and it worked. But nobody cared. The troop quality continued to deteriorate, no question -- but the effort turned around. Those Tankers I mentioned above, most had a lot of European and no Asian experience so they flooded the staffs and tried to fight big battles, a muddy Infantry LTC Bn Cdr is no match for a spiffily starched MACV Staff Colonel who flies in an says do it my way. Rugby and cricket indeed. :wry:

That dictum we get taught in training about "a good plan now is better than a perfect plan too late" seems to apply here. We may be heading down that way in Afghanistan. We certainly headed that way in Vietnam. I'm not sure whether we'll discuss CORDS in depth rather than mentioning it in passing. Even with CORDS, the U.S. as a whole got the timing wrong - so, now the COIN effort was going better, but the conventional effort that would have negated the NVA was being wound down. I really don't envy Abrams. Anywho, the main reason we're not discussing Vietnam very much is because of the focus of the class. I tried to include everything last time and the price was paid elsewhere.

The clearest and to me most important parallel between Vietnam and OIF/OEF is the weakness of host governments. You can only pass the baton if there's another hand to grab it.


Another point if I may; any comparison of Viet Nam and Malaya should consider these facts:

In Malaya, Britain WAS the government, in Viet Nam the US had to ask VN permission to do most everything.

In Malaya, British troop units served for three years, in VN, US troop units lost 10% or usually more of their strength every month, Officers were rarely in position for more than six months and the one year tour effectively crippled the entire campaign.

And don't worry, we'll differentiate between Malaya and Vietnam. In fact, the focus of that class' discussion will be on guiding the students towards figuring out the differences.


Anyone who categorically says the US lost in Viet Nam may be stating a fact in some terms -- but one that is far from true in all terms. Such a view is one that likely missed the military and political lessons of Viet Nam while hewing to the media and academic 'lessons' of Viet Nam. Lost or won doesn't mean much, really, nor is there any sense in playing what might have been. What was, was and what is, is...

Not trying to change your mind on anything, just pointing out that all is not as most of the flawed histories purport to report. One thing for sure about VN -- Lot of myths about that war... ;)

Agreed, actually. I think. In the end, whether you lost 10-0 (Peace and Justice Studies view) or 10-9 due to an own goal (revisionist view) doesn't matter if there isn't a rematch. You've lost. That's it. But there certainly are lessons that we'll touch upon.

Alas, I don't have the time to examine Vietnam in depth this semester. What I'm sure we can both agree on - and what seriously pisses me the bloody hell off - is that the students won't learn those lesson from other university courses on Vietnam. And that's a serious shame.

-Toby

[Meh]

This course looks interesting. Are the sessions open to the public?

Indeed.

[Cavguy]

5 February - Class 7: Morning in Mesopotamia

How the Sunnis came in from the cold - the importance of local politics in counterinsurgency.


o Niel Smith and Sean MacFarland, Anbar Awakening: The Tipping Point.


If you're interested in getting the co-author online to participate, let me know.

Niel Smith

(also featured in CH 7 of West - company performance in Tal Afar)

[Ken White]

Hack's one of my original heroes. What I specifically want to use him for is as an example of an excellent killer... He never really engaged in hearts and minds while in the conventional role (nor later on, if I recall from About Face). Hack was a red herring. His notion of "out-G-ing the G" worked excellently from a tactical point of view, but operated in a political vacuum. Men like him were needed for certain missions, but "hearts and minds" had to be carried out by someone else. [I'm not in the know to comment on the veracity of his public persona]He and I were in the same Bde on our respective first tours in VN. As an Acting Recce Platoon leader, I was OpCon to him, an Acting Bn Cdr, for a three day mission. He told what what he wanted, how to do it in great detail and threatened emasculation and worse for failure to perform. I saluted, said "Yes, Sir" -- and went off; did it my way because his would have entailed friendly casualties. Came back, he was ticked I had not done it his way but was smart enough to say nothing as the job had been done to better standard than he had requested or expected and in less time. I was and am not a fan.
No tactical improvements could make up for the loss of political and public will...I'll raise it towards the end of the discussion to throw people a fast ball.Good plan, 'cause it's important. Poor generalship (or operational execution) not only engenders unnecessary casualties and costs, it has knock on political effect that can be even more significant.
That dictum we get taught in training about "a good plan now is better than a perfect plan too late" seems to apply here.Emphatically.
We may be heading down that way in Afghanistan.If you figure out where we headed on that one, will you let me know??? :wry:
I'm not sure whether we'll discuss CORDS in depth rather than mentioning it in passing. Even with CORDS, the U.S. as a whole got the timing wrong - so, now the COIN effort was going better, but the conventional effort that would have negated the NVA was being wound down.Not really. But no matter, your class of course but the point to me on CORDS is that doing the right thing at the wrong time doesn't count -- it is imperative that a major power's military force be prepared for operations in diverse locales and in various scenarios and just as important that the rest of government be prepared to do their part. It is also important IMO, to point out that while the required degree of capability is exceedingly difficult to maintain in a democracy during a period of peace, failure to do so has a cost.
Anywho, the main reason we're not discussing Vietnam very much is because of the focus of the class. I tried to include everything last time and the price was paid elsewhere.Understood -- it's a quagmire... :D
And don't worry, we'll differentiate between Malaya and Vietnam. In fact, the focus of that class' discussion will be on guiding the students towards figuring out the differences.Definitely worthwhile...

[William F. Owen]

And don't worry, we'll differentiate between Malaya and Vietnam. In fact, the focus of that class' discussion will be on guiding the students towards figuring out the differences.


Toby, why not just state, that there is nothing useful to be had from comparing the two conflicts. It's like comparing Korea with the Boer War. Two completely different conflicts.

Looks and interesting course, but where is the Clausewitz, or even the Kitson? Nothing on Northern Ireland? No Colin Gray - Another Bloody Century? I submit that these may merit some serious attention.

Regardless of that and all due respect, it seems to have it's routes very much in the US "sudden learning of COIN", rather than in bones of a very traditional and well covered form of warfare.

However, I am extremely impressed you that you took the time to knock this out. Good job, and well done.

[Bob's World]

Toby, why not just state, that there is nothing useful to be had from comparing the two conflicts. It's like comparing Korea with the Boer War. Two completely different conflicts.

Looks and interesting course, but where is the Clausewitz, or even the Kitson? Nothing on Northern Ireland? No Colin Gray - Another Bloody Century? I submit that these may merit some serious attention.

Regardless of that and all due respect, it seems to have it's routes very much in the US "sudden learning of COIN", rather than in bones of a very traditional and well covered form of warfare.

However, I am extremely impressed you that you took the time to knock this out. Good job, and well done.

I really enjoy history and tactics myself; but have found that real learning comes by continually asking "why" and comparing and drilling down into every case study looking for what the root causes, or "truths" if you will, are there to be extracted. Much of what is written on Iraq and Afghanistan is much more about TTPs based largely on that current experience than about any great analysis seeking the truths about the root causes and solutions to the problem.

I see a lot of what I call "Dust Bowl Strategy": A lot of people replowing the the top 6" of the problem; creating a lot of dust and noise, but never getting to the root of the problem.

My one piece of advice is for you to challenge your students to look past the vignettes and the conclusions of "experts," and to take their own journey to to attempt to get deeper into the question of why such conflicts occur in general, and what aspects of the relationship between the distinct populaces and governments that you study caused these factors to manifest in violence, and then, to look at how all this combined with the total environment and military/insurgent actions and reactions to lead to what was then captured in history. This might be hard if your syllabus is too much like the Platte river: A mile wide and an inch deep.

Not a show stopper, just keep everyone focused on WHY.

[Meh]

Wow. Thank you very everyone for the lively responses. This is wonderful.


Not really. But no matter, your class of course but the point to me on CORDS is that doing the right thing at the wrong time doesn't count -- it is imperative that a major power's military force be prepared for operations in diverse locales and in various scenarios and just as important that the rest of government be prepared to do their part.

Go on. I'm keen to follow this Vietnam conversation through. What did you mean by "not really"? Sorry if my language in the previous post was unclear; I trying to make the same point about "right thing at the wrong time". Where are we missing each other?


Toby, why not just state, that there is nothing useful to be had from comparing the two conflicts. It's like comparing Korea with the Boer War. Two completely different conflicts.

There's always something useful to be had from gaining any two conflicts. We, for once this semester, will have some time for historical comparison in this class. The fact that Malaya was a rural war makes it a prime candidate for comparison. So does the ostensible difference Brits/Yanks. Of course I could have chosen a myriad others (you'll notice that I worked in Aden) but, to be blunt about the reasons for comparing Malaya to Vietnam: I want my co-teacher - an extremely talented sophomore(!) - to teach that class and he happens to have read Nagl :D.


Looks and interesting course, but where is the Clausewitz, or even the Kitson? Nothing on Northern Ireland? No Colin Gray - Another Bloody Century? I submit that these may merit some serious attention.

I'll post the syllabus of my previous course sometime soon as a basis for comparison. Kitson was in there. A guest lecture gave us Clausewtiz. Gray wasn't in there, because it was a retrospective course.

Remember that my audience was (and still is) novice undergraduates with no knowledge of military studies. The goal was to teach them the basic tenets of COIN. Those basic principles are, IMHO, timeless. I remember how often I said "remember that from war x?" that semester. It became repetitive to cram every conflict in when the lessons were largely the same. Great as a history survey course. But too few chances to practice and internalise the principles. Picking best-ofs seemed in order - and picking those is of course not going to please everyone (/anyone).

This is ideally a two-part course. You can teach basic COIN in two semesters. That was my original intent: make this an advanced class for those who've studied the history of COIN in my previous course or elsewhere. Tufts vetoed this at the last minute and I had to figure out ways to make this accessible to novices. There are many disadvantages to this change. The advantage is that class enrolment is more than single digits. I recently spoke to a Tufts professor about undergraduate interest in COIN, who stated that there are a lot of students who fancy themselves as knowing about COIN, but very few who are willing to properly study it. Lower the entry requirements, and you double the number of students (since few have the prerequisites).


Regardless of that and all due respect, it seems to have it's routes very much in the US "sudden learning of COIN", rather than in bones of a very traditional and well covered form of warfare.

The syllabus only covers the readings. It doesn't cover what I intend to discuss in class. The fact that COIN significantly predates OIF/OEF is quite important and will be mentioned frequently, but this semester a practical 'toolbox' is more important than detailed knowledge of history. The exciting thing about the class format is that we can (re-)discover COIN as the US does in Iraq. Obviously the suppression of COIN prior to 2003 will factor in since it's the cause of the re-discovery process.


My one piece of advice is for you to challenge your students to look past the vignettes and the conclusions of "experts," and to take their own journey to to attempt to get deeper into the question of why such conflicts occur in general, and what aspects of the relationship between the distinct populaces and governments that you study caused these factors to manifest in violence, and then, to look at how all this combined with the total environment and military/insurgent actions and reactions to lead to what was then captured in history. This might be hard if your syllabus is too much like the Platte river: A mile wide and an inch deep.

Cheers for bringing this up. That lesson I definitely learned teaching the first time round. To understand COIN, there has to be much, much more than plain history lectures and the occasional paper. This class will constantly challenge students to test principles. Written assignments will take lessons and principles, and throw students a fast ball (e.g. the improvement in COIN conduct as described by William Owen in this thread - sometimes the best TTPs are of no use if the macro-political part is going down the drain). Everything about COIN will be up for questioning. One thing I'm keen to point out to students over and over is that insurgencies are simply the violent end of the spectrum of political subversion. The first sentence of my course description asks,
"What is a greater threat--a man with a bomb or another handing out cash to the poor?"
A little hammy, I know, but it gets the point across (or at least raises the question). At the same time, this course is designed to fill a gap. If regular Tufts classes are going to explain one thing well, it's the socio-political origins of insurgencies. What they fail at miserably is the conduct of war (in fact, that's true for insurgencies as much as conventional warfare). I had a rather lively debate with a Peace and Justice Studies professor yesterday who will teach you about inequalities until the cows come home, but has absolutely no idea how hearts & minds works in practice. The military is utterly alien to him beyond baby killing and blowing stuff up.
So, I'm trying to balance teaching purely the aspects that are neglected by Tufts with teaching holistically (and repeating some things they'll learn in other classes). The course becomes mechanical if I focus too much on the former, and superfluous if I focus too much on the latter.

One final point about the class: I'm also trying to counteract what I perceive as delusions of grandeur in academic environments. Students and academics focus such a great deal on strategic studies that you'd think they're off to run a country or two. They're happy to play president and general but not Lieutenant and Sergeant. Well, what are they going to be after they graduate (of course the academics are never going to be anything)?
Stating this is probably going to cause a ruckus, but I believe one reason we got off to a messy start in Iraq is because the US and UK were led by a bunch of people who'd done a whole lot of strategic studies and had no idea of the realities on the ground. And it starts on the campuses they attended. So that, to me, is another excellent reason to focus on the tactical and operational level for most of the course.


If you're interested in getting the co-author online to participate, let me know.

Niel Smith

(also featured in CH 7 of West - company performance in Tal Afar)

Absolutely!!! Once I'm back at my computer, there'll be a pm inbound to you at the speed of a thousand greased gazelles.

[Meh]

For those wishing to skype in on the course, the new permanent skype ID is COINcourse. Make me a contact (or whatever the skype terminology is) and I'll include you in the conference call that starts at 17:55 EST, Tuesdays and Thursdays.

Here are some details on the upcoming field training exercise. I'll try to balance placing the students under a lot of stress with not taking the whole thing too seriously (hence, the exercise is called EX Walter Mitty). The desired endstate is that they have a much greater understanding of the basics of counterinsurgency operations.

Date: 7-9 March
Venue: Paintball facility in MA (1x village and 1x refugee camp)
# Participants:
24 counterinsurgents
6-8 insurgents
5 NGO workers
2 journalists
25 civilians
Cost: approx $50 for combatants, $20 for non-combatants.

The framework for the scenario is the border region of two fictitious countries faced with an influx of what I can best describe as refugees similar to the post-genocide Hutus, with the some characteristics of the Northwest Frontier Province thrown in. There'll be a lot of ambiguity on all sides, especially so for the NGO workers and counter-insurgents. Here's the basic conops:

Sat, 7 March. Counterinsurgent group (undergraduates) arrives in the evening, divided into squads (probably 2 total); each squad assigned a military mentor who teaches squads basic patrolling skills. Squads test their skills and build cohesiveness through recce patrols and CTRs until 0400 on Sunday (if patrols and CTRs end early, squads will catch rest and create rosters to provide sentries for the platoon harbour). Secondary goal is to fatigue students in preparation for stresses on Sunday.

Sun, 8 March. Reveille at 0800. Civilian, NGO and insurgent groups arrive by 0830. Exercise starts 0900. Squads rotate through approx. 12 COIN scenarios throughout the morning, day and evening within context of a larger fictitious conflict (civil war in Kyrzturkbaijanistan). At 2000, squads embed in settlements to provide security to civilians during the night. NGO group, some insurgents and most civilians leave by 2000.

Mon, 9 March. ENDEX by 0800. Return to Tufts by 0900.

Sample scenarios (squads run through each scenario twice, once at village and once at refugee camp; every scenario fast-forwards to a later point in time).

Scenario 1. Overall situation is a border area modelled roughly on the NWFP. Refugee camp is located by a border fort whose soldiers are initially hostile towards the refugees. 1st Squad attempts to diffuse tensions. The nearby village is peaceful, although several villagers carry arms. 2nd Squad patrols the village, finds and establishes rapport with local leaders.

Scenario 2. Refugee camp is now squalid and some refugees have left to join growing insurgency. 1st Squad meets with leaders, who plead for help. One insurgent takes a few potshots at students and flees. Students choose whether or not to pursue. In the village, 2nd Squad meets with local leaders, who express their concerns that they are increasingly harassed by insurgents. Students come up with a security plan of their choosing, but are ultimately told by command that they are to withdraw.

Scenario 3. While students debate with NGO representatives who are ambiguous about military presence, a firefight occurs in the refugee camp between students, insurgents and border guards, with civilians caught in the middle. 1st Squad has to quickly assess the situation, particularly who's friend or foe, and avoid civilian casualties. In the village, an IED explodes and 2nd Squad deals with the civilian casualties while hunting for the trigger man.

Scenario 4. 1st Squad clears area around camp of insurgents and arms caches. In village, civilians scatter into homes as 2nd Squad enters. Ambush.

Scenario 5. Based on intel gathered in previous scenarios, squads conduct raids on targets in both refugee camp and village. In village, 2nd Squad is given faulty intel and raid wrong house. Civilians are antagonised in both camp and village.

Scenario 6. 1srt Squad provides aid to restore relations with refugee camp and antagonises NGOs in the process. In the village, 2nd Squad sets up OP and observe villagers. Receive reports of mysterious insurgent leader known as "The Colonel".

Scenario 7. Squads gather and collate intel to figure out location of The Colonel.

Scenario 8. Combined assault on The Colonel's stronghold and take him out.

Scenario 9. Students have been briefed that insurgency will end now that the head has been cut off. Instead, insurgency continues with ambush as students return to village.

Scenario 10. IEDs explode in village and refugee camp. CASEVAC scenario.

Scenario 11. Squads once again attempt to de-escalate tensions in village and refugee camp.

Scenario 12. Terrified villagers and refugees request that squads embed with them for the night. squads must find best way to embed while balancing force protection and hearts & minds.

Scenario 13. Squads must deal with figures sneaking through camp/village.

Scenario 14. Informant approaches 1st Squad in refugee camp and promises to lead them to insurgent spy - except he lives in the village. 1st Squad must choose which action to take (expose refugee by leaving? Split forces? Send runner?) and avoid fratricide if they choose to enter village. 2nd Squad will be hastily notified that armed unidentified armed group is entering village.


Feel free to rip the current conops to shreds. I only have a month left to perfect it.

[stu]

I would love to skype in for this, it sounds great. However, it seems I missed the beginning lectures. Such lectures wouldn't have been recorded and placed online, would they?

Best regards,

Stu

[Boot]

maybe I missed it.
I don't see any speakers or Soldiers and Marines who served on Transition teams or any study of the role of advisors in COIN. Maybe even advisors from Vietnam or SF types who did a lot of thankless work in places like El Salvador and Africa. Obviously your in the execution phase of your class but that might be a view which IMO is very important to COIN, maybe even a cornerstone of any COIN strategy.


Boot

[Meh]

I would love to skype in for this, it sounds great. However, it seems I missed the beginning lectures. Such lectures wouldn't have been recorded and placed online, would they?

Best regards,

Stu

I'm afraid, that due to my limited expertise, it came down to either skyping or recording. We're starting Afghanistan on Tuesday, though. Back in time to 2001.


maybe I missed it.
I don't see any speakers or Soldiers and Marines who served on Transition teams or any study of the role of advisors in COIN. Maybe even advisors from Vietnam or SF types who did a lot of thankless work in places like El Salvador and Africa. Obviously your in the execution phase of your class but that might be a view which IMO is very important to COIN, maybe even a cornerstone of any COIN strategy.


Boot

Actually, this is the result of not being able to edit these posts to reflect updates in the syllabus: we just had one Marine who did multiple tours as an advisor to Iraqi security forces do an entire guest lecture. For the class on "the civilians strike back", we'll have some PRT people. When I visit the UK in March, I'm going to attempt to persuade a British officer who just worked as an advisor to skype in; and I'm still pestering a CA reservist to tell us about his experiences. So don't worry, we've got a decent number.

My holy grail right now is finding someone who's done extensive advising in Afghanistan. Would love to hear from everyone who knows anyone.

As for vets of Vietnam or other 20th century wars, I will keep that in mind the next time I teach the historical survey course I taught last time. This course is definitely about OIF/OEF, though.

Now I have get back to figuring two things out: finding more TACs/DS for the exercise and deciding whether Battlestar Galactica has jumped the shark.

[Boot]

sounds like you have it covered. As for BSG...???I'm a fan but I want it to be done with. I feel like its dragging out, but there are only 3 episodes left so, maybe it has.


Boot

[Ken White]

As for vets of Vietnam or other 20th century wars, I will keep that in mind the next time I teach the historical survey course I taught last time. This course is definitely about OIF/OEF, though.Eighteenth and nineteenth century types need love, too... :D

Seriously, good job.