Undergraduate Student, Help w/Counterinsurgency Debate

[FayeValentine]

This may seem trivial compared to what seems to be going on in the rest of these threads, but I'd appreciate any kind of help...

I am an undergraduate International Affairs student at Mercer University. I am enrolled in my first Int. Affairs class this semester. Each student is assigned a debate topic and position and placed against one other student. I am in the first debate this coming Thursday.

My Topic- Rise in Counterinsurgency.
My position (as given to me by my professor): Irregular warfare and counterinsurgency campaigns will define what the U.S. military will do in the future. The counterinsurgency doctrine emphasizes the use of minimal force, with the intent of winning the hearts and minds of a civilian population. The Army's adoption of counterinsurgency has made it a better more successful force.

My opponent's position: An internal Pentagon report is raising concerns about whether the Army's focus on counterinsurgency has weakened its ability to fight conventional battles. The claim that counterinsurgency improves the effectiveness of the Army encourages a more interventionist posture within the Army — a position that will make it easier for the Army to wage war in the future. The Army’s singular focus on counterinsurgency has in fact weakened it ability to wage conventional war.

I knew next to nothing about counterinsurgency before last night, and now have several days to make the best argument possible and to counter my opposition's argument well. My dad's best friend directed me to you guys. I've been researching nonstop. Any points, arguments, sources, opinions, ANYTHING, would be greatly appreciated. I'll treat you to a meal in our cafeteria next time you're in Georgia! Thanks so much.

[RTK]

This may seem trivial compared to what seems to be going on in the rest of these threads, but I'd appreciate any kind of help...

I am an undergraduate International Affairs student at Mercer University. I am enrolled in my first Int. Affairs class this semester. Each student is assigned a debate topic and position and placed against one other student. I am in the first debate this coming Thursday.

My Topic- Rise in Counterinsurgency.
My position (as given to me by my professor): Irregular warfare and counterinsurgency campaigns will define what the U.S. military will do in the future. The counterinsurgency doctrine emphasizes the use of minimal force, with the intent of winning the hearts and minds of a civilian population. The Army's adoption of counterinsurgency has made it a better more successful force.

My opponent's position: An internal Pentagon report is raising concerns about whether the Army's focus on counterinsurgency has weakened its ability to fight conventional battles. The claim that counterinsurgency improves the effectiveness of the Army encourages a more interventionist posture within the Army — a position that will make it easier for the Army to wage war in the future. The Army’s singular focus on counterinsurgency has in fact weakened it ability to wage conventional war.

I knew next to nothing about counterinsurgency before last night, and now have several days to make the best argument possible and to counter my opposition's argument well. My dad's best friend directed me to you guys. I've been researching nonstop. Any points, arguments, sources, opinions, ANYTHING, would be greatly appreciated. I'll treat you to a meal in our cafeteria next time you're in Georgia! Thanks so much.

Use the search button and look for the terms "Nagl" and "Gentile." That should give you the point/counterpoint you're looking for.

[Jedburgh]

There is a tremendous amount of discussion on that precise topic on this board. I recommend you do your own research on the forums and then come back with some more precise questions.

Lazy people don't really learn anything.

[Van]

Faye,
You have come to the right place. Check CavGuy's interview (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=6555)on NPR for the one side. David Kilcullen's newest book, The Accidental Guerrilla (http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0195368347?ie=UTF8&tag=smallwarsjour-20&linkCode=xm2&camp=1789&creativeASIN=0195368347), has an interesting spin on the discussion.

[jmcavin]

If you have the time and wish to add a historical perspective to the current situation, review Marine Corps involvement in the pre-WWII "Banana Wars", specifically Nicaragua and Haiti. Many WWII leaders (such as Puller) developed tacitcal skills that were successfully employed against the Japanese Empire, in "conventional" warfare.

[Schmedlap]

My Topic- Rise in Counterinsurgency.
My position (as given to me by my professor): Irregular warfare and counterinsurgency campaigns will define what the U.S. military will do in the future...
My opponent's position: An internal Pentagon report is raising concerns about whether the Army's focus on counterinsurgency has weakened its ability to fight conventional battles....
Before wading too deep into the discussions here, I would recommend that you read the op-eds by COL Gentile here (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2008/06/gentile-on-war-strategy-and-th/) and here (http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=4631). He lays out the argument of your opponent. Lucky for you, most people at this site build your argument (read the comments in the blog). Your challenge is choosing which points to use, since there are so many of them! There is also a point-counterpoint here (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2008/11/jfq-point-counterpoint-swj-ear/) and you may want to read today's op-ed in the WSJ (http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123302128074818175.html)by Mackubin Thomas Owens, who argues on your side. I suspect that your class is focusing on big picture issues free of jargon.

Those articles will give you context. Come back to the threads here at SWJ after reading those articles. Many of the participants in the threads here are practitioners, whether past or current, and the discussions may have too much jargon or "inside baseball" talk to be understandable or useful to you. But do read these threads here at SWJ because, while some of it might be hard for you to understand due to unfamiliarity, you'll be hard pressed to find a better place for a free flow of good ideas on the topic, conducted in a civil manner.

[jmm99]

so keep it simple.

Besides the links suggested by Schmedlap, you will want to read John Nagl here (http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/jfqnagl.pdf), two Gian Gentile articles here (http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/2008%20-%20Summer/full-Gentile.html) & here (http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/jfqgentile.pdf), Robert Haddick here (http://smallwarsjournal.com/mag/docs-temp/135-haddick.pdf), Shawn Brimley here (http://smallwarsjournal.com/mag/docs-temp/113-brimley.pdf), and Andrew Bacevich here (http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200810/petraeus-doctrine). These all are linked from Schmedlap's links.

If you manage to digest and think about all of these by Thursday, you will be doing well.

As to your opponent's position:


My opponent's position: An internal Pentagon report is raising concerns about whether the Army's focus on counterinsurgency has weakened its ability to fight conventional battles. The claim that counterinsurgency improves the effectiveness of the Army encourages a more interventionist posture within the Army — a position that will make it easier for the Army to wage war in the future. The Army’s singular focus on counterinsurgency has in fact weakened it ability to wage conventional war.

the underlined phrase seems to me a disconnect from reality.

From early Vietnam on to the present, the Army has been less interventionist than the civilian policy makers. The key decisions to engage in armed conflicts (of whatever nature) have been made by the Executive branch, more or less supported by Congress. The presence of any kind of additional military capacity will allow a more interventionist posture within the circle of civilian policy makers, if that is what they want. Not a big deal, but I thought the concept of an "interventionist" Army a bit odd.

[Bob's World]

My Topic- Rise in Counterinsurgency.
My position (as given to me by my professor): Irregular warfare and counterinsurgency campaigns will define what the U.S. military will do in the future. The counterinsurgency doctrine emphasizes the use of minimal force, with the intent of winning the hearts and minds of a civilian population. The Army's adoption of counterinsurgency has made it a better more successful force.

My opponent's position: An internal Pentagon report is raising concerns about whether the Army's focus on counterinsurgency has weakened its ability to fight conventional battles. The claim that counterinsurgency improves the effectiveness of the Army encourages a more interventionist posture within the Army — a position that will make it easier for the Army to wage war in the future. The Army’s singular focus on counterinsurgency has in fact weakened it ability to wage conventional war.



A couple of points worth considering:

Realizing that a good debate requires a certain polarity of thinking, I would contend that while both of these positions make valid points and raise legitimate issues; neither is "right" as they both are intentionally overstated as absolutes. The truth, as it often does, lies somewhere in between and is often obscured by all of the smoke and noise of those taking polar positions yakking at each other (that only sounds like a reference to congress, the media, etc):)

But before you can talk about insurgency, you need to gain some perspective for what it is; and before you can discuss a rise in insurgency, you must understand what has historically triggered such periods of popular political violence.

In general, insurgency occurs when a government "fails" its populace. Failure being not meeting some issue or issues that can fall across the full range of Maslows heirarchy that a significant segment of the populace feels is important enought to fight over, and where legitimate means for addressing the failure are not available. Not the same as effective governance, as government can be effective (British governance of American Colonies) and fail; or it can be ineffective and succeed. The only metric that matters is how he populace feels about its governance.

Insurgency falls into three broad categories: Revolution, to change the governance of the entire state; Separatist, to break some segment of the state off and form a new state; and Resistance. (In Iraq you see all three forms at the same time, and each requires a tailored approach to resolve).

COIN efforts tend to be long, drawnout affairs largely because Governments (politicians) are even worse than most people at taking responsibility for their shortcomings. Far better to blame such failures on others and focus on "fixing them," rather than being introspective and adjusting your own actions as your main effort, and addressing the symptoms of that failure as a supporting effort.

Finally, outbreaks of insurgency tend to occur after any major disruption ends a period of major governmental control that has suppressed the ability of a wide range of populaces to self-determine their own governance. As Spain crumbled as a major power at the turn of the century (led to popular uprisings and also a scramble by other states to take over payments on old colonies), At the end of WWI a major disruption of the European Colonial system occured with similar effect. The end of WWII led to many African and Asian uprisings. Concept of a common ideology for distinct events occurs as many of these populaces turn to an ideology of communism to rally the populace for change. Post Coldwar the areas released from suppression were central europe, the middle east. Russia in large part opted not to resist, so change was relatively bloodless in Central Europe. In the Middle East the US led west is resisting such changes to the political structures the worked so hard to shape and sustain, so there is conflict. Most of thest populaces are majority Muslim, so it makes a convenient ideology to rally the populace for change.

[John T. Fishel]

the theoretical position he noted was stated by Ted Robert Gurr in his 1970 classic, Why Men Rebel. It may be summarized as follows:
1. The absolutely deprived/oppressed do not rebel.
2. Neither do those who are doing well.
3. Rebellion happens after a period of social/political/economic improvement is followed by a sudden and relatively steep downturn causing the government to lose its legitimacy.
Gurr calls this "perceived relative deprivation."
It's still the best theoretical explanation for insurgency out there.

Good luck in your debate. And don't try to bite off too much. Unse the KISS principle - "Keep It Simple Stupid"

Cheers

JohnT

[William F. Owen]

.
Any points, arguments, sources, opinions, ANYTHING, would be greatly appreciated. I'll treat you to a meal in our cafeteria next time you're in Georgia! Thanks so much.

Well living in Georgia, you've seen one Russian invasion in the last year. State-v-State warfare has not gone away.

[Steve Blair]

Try the state of Georgia...United States, that is.... Last time I checked, the Red Hordes hadn't come pouring across any borders down there.

[reed11b]

Well living in Georgia, you've seen one Russian invasion in the last year. State-v-State warfare has not gone away.

I thought for sure Ft. Benning could have held them off, are they rolling into 'bama next?!?
Sorry Wilf, I could not resist, and I can never tell if you are joking or not
Reed :D

[William F. Owen]

I thought for sure Ft. Benning could have held them off, are they rolling into 'bama next?!?
Sorry Wilf, I could not resist, and I can never tell if you are joking or not
Reed :D


Try the state of Georgia...United States, that is.... Last time I checked, the Red Hordes hadn't come pouring across any borders down there.

Ahhhh!!! I figured they must have more than one cafeteria in Tbilisi!

:D - ah I kill me!!!

[tulanealum]

Faye,

I do hope you'll come back to let everyone here know how the debate turned out...

I do think the key weakness in your opponent's arguement (as pointed out by another poster) is the idea that a focus on COIN is going to somehow lead to a military that desires more intervention...

[FayeValentine]

I wanted to thank you guys, let you know how the debate went, and formally introduce myself. I’m sorry that I didn’t do that to begin with, please forgive me.

My name is Laurel McCormack. Faye Valentine is a femme fatale from a favorite TV series. Anyhow, I came into college thinking I wanted to be a photojournalist but knowing I wanted to do something with international affairs. We’ll see what comes of it.

I won the debate! After hearing first my and then my opponent’s case, the class voted between conventional and counterinsurgency techniques and which they thought the army should be focusing on. The score: 22 people for COIN and 2 for conventional. This is even cooler, because usually the class comes in having already made up their minds from the case study we all have to read, and the case study had more to back up conventional warfare. I’ve outlined my main points for you guys, not because it is an infallible or even great argument, but because I thought you might be interested to see what someone who’s only just got into this stuff pulled out of it.
1) Afghanistan and Iraq became deadly because the U.S. was not prepared to fight insurgents. Conventional war techniques DO NOT work in insurgency warfare, as the large amount of U.S. casualties at the middle of these wars prove, when insurgents began their attacks. Later successes in Iraq were because specific leaders were able to teach their troops counterinsurgency. In Iraq, U.S. troop causalities dropped by two-thirds from 2006 to 2008. There were only a fourth as many Iraqi civilian casualties in 2008 as 2006.
2) COIN makes troops stronger, not weaker. Opponents argue that insurgents are not skilled enemies and will not be hard to fight. They can be far more dangerous than drafted soldiers in a huge state military (using the 7th cavalry’s experience in Baghdad in 2003 as an example). They know their terrain like the back of their hands, they believe wholly in what they’re fighting for, and they do not adhere to the rules and etiquette of conventional warfare, so anything goes. As a result, troops have to become extremely mentally flexible and adaptive out of necessity. As the Counterinsurgency Field Manual states, “In COIN, the side that learns faster and adapts more rapidly usually wins.” You’re going to become more disciplined, accurate, aware, and flexible, not less so. Counterinsurgency used to be regulated only to the Special Forces A-Team. Throughout history, they’ve gotten into big conventional fights and are renowned for how well they do in them. It is easier to switch from COIN warfare to conventional than vice-versa.
3) Of course pulling from Nagl, we must prepare for immediate dangers first. It is guaranteed that we will continue to need counterinsurgency in the next few years, and not at all that sure that we will be fighting on huge fronts again. It is irresponsible to put more emphasis on hypothetical future wars than the wars we are committed to right now. Learning before deployment results in fewer lives lost in combat. According to the COIN field manual, America’s military history is mostly stability operations. Out of hundreds of U.S. military operations since the American Revolution, only 11 were conventional wars. As Lt. Col. Steve Leonard states, the most the most likely threats to America will come from failing states rather than aggressor states, which are “breeding grounds for the threats that we fear the most, criminal networks, international terrorists, ethnic strife, genocide."

My opponent pulled her argument entirely from our textbook’s case study on counterinsurgency. She made three main arguments:
1) Conventional warfare is where we’ve had success in the past, what we’re known for.
2) From Gentile, cited in our textbook, “the Israeli Army that stumbled its way into south Lebanon in 2006 received a sharp response by Hezbollah fighters who operated like-small unit infantry. One of the reasons for the Israeli Army's poor performance… was their heavy focus on counterinsurgency operations in the Palestinian territories for the six preceding years.”
3) What if a nuclear arms race begins with Iran or China? Counterinsurgency will not help then.

In regards to her arguments, I said it is inadequate to cite an Israeli example of this when we do not have much evidence that this is true for U.S. troops. And also that if a true nuclear war begins, arguing between COIN and conventional warfare won’t be particularly important anymore, but if we were going to have to choose, counterinsurgency would still be more effective unless we invoked the Powell Doctrine before they began to fire anything off.

I prepared by pulling all-nighters and reading every article you guys recommended, along with some others that the man who directed me to you guys recommended. I owe each of you a huge thank you for tolerating my elementary questions and being willing to share your knowledge and passion for this topic with me. That being said, I can’t stop reading about it now. I already understand more world news and make connections everywhere, including while reading Plato’s “The Republic” last night when Socrates says, “Surely the same person is a good guardian of an army who is also good at getting to know the enemies’ deliberations and other actions by stealth?” I will definitely continue to read and learn from your discussions.

I’m assuming you guys already know that there is a large article in my afore-mentioned textbook (Global Issues, Selections from the CQ Researcher, 2009 edition), in the counterinsurgency case study chapter called, “Officers Cross Swords in Online Debate,” and it is almost entirely about Small Wars Journal, citing both articles and posts from the following users on this forums: Buck Elton, Gian P. Gentile, Peter Mansoor, “Cavguy,” and Charles J. Dunlap. As I’d already posted my question and read a lot from this site before I read the chapter, I freaked out. I’d be happy to try and photocopy it and link it for you guys.

Once more, thank you so much. Really. I will be around. In fact, I’ve got two more specific questions, though they are just as elementary. What are some specific instances at any point in history where U.S. troops have had success in switching from COIN to conventional warfare? Also, at http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2008/06/gentile-on-war-strategy-and-th/, Tim Starr said, “If we focus solely upon conventional preparation, our enemies will hit us unconventionally. If we focus solely upon unconventional operations, our enemies will hit us conventionally.” It seems to me that this is true. I’m glad to be able to learn about all of this, but does it not endanger national security to have the COIN field manual online or for news outlets and officers, either retired or active, to so openly express and debate over what kind of techniques and training our army is moving away from and more towards?

That’s all. Whew.:p

[Cavguy]

Also, at http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2008/06/gentile-on-war-strategy-and-th/, Tim Starr said, “If we focus solely upon conventional preparation, our enemies will hit us unconventionally. If we focus solely upon unconventional operations, our enemies will hit us conventionally.” It seems to me that this is true. I’m glad to be able to learn about all of this, but does it not endanger national security to have the COIN field manual online or for news outlets and officers, either retired or active, to so openly express and debate over what kind of techniques and training our army is moving away from and more towards?

That’s all. Whew.:p

First, you have hit the tension that drives this debate. A wise boss of mine said one thing was for sure, that we don't know who our next war will be against and what it will look like. It is very rare countries "saw it coming". First battles are often littered with dead because of failure by one or more sides to prepare for the kind of war they found themselves fighting.

As to your second point, I feel this debate is healthy for the nation - it keeps it honest to be in the public sphere instead of closed. As far as the enemy knowing what our strategy/approach will be, the discussions are far too general/theoretical to really give anyone a tactical advantage. If we were talking about retsricted stuff, like positions, plans, and capabilities, that's a different matter.

Good job on learning about a complex subject quickly. Now the nuance of all of the above is what really make it interesting.

[Van]

CavGuy,
You beat me to the punch on the 'endanger national security' point. Damn ISP...

Lauren,
Re:
What are some specific instances at any point in history where U.S. troops have had success in switching from COIN to conventional warfare?

You could make the case that World War One represented an instance of this transition. Prior to WWI, the U.S. Army was transitioning out of the Indian Wars and frontier policing and engaging in Small Wars along the U.S. Southern Border with Pancho Villa (N.B. this is where Patton won his spurs, and voiced his regret that he couldn't arrange a saber charge). In the space of two years, the Army swelled and retrained entirely to fight in Europe.

How successful the transition was is a matter for heated debate.

Having listened to extensive discussions of Operation Rolling Thunder and Operation Rolling Thunder II (air campaigns over Viet Nam), I'm sure some would argue that this transition occured during Viet Nam. Note that COIN never ended, we just took on a conventional fight in addition to the "Hearts and Minds".

Re:

does it not endanger national security to have ... for news outlets and officers, either retired or active, to so openly express and debate over what kind of techniques and training our army is moving away from and more towards

Two answers -
1) Like cavalry, speed is security. If we are adaptable, if we can make the truth change rapidly so it doesn't matter what the opponent knows about our thinking from last week.
2) Bruce Schneier (http://www.schneier.com/)(a computer security guru), says that a really secure cipher is the one where you can place the encryption algorithm, the message, and the public key in the opponent's hands, and he or she still can't break it. By analogy, if a counter insurgency methodology is so reliant on secrecy in its concept, I would be concerned about how valid a methodology it is. We obviously need to keep operational information secure, but the concepts and principles should be out where they can be subjected to discussion and peer review. Secrecy also breeds a false sense of security ("Oh, there's no way the bad guys know about this").


does it not endanger national security to have the COIN field manual online ...?

I'm afraid you're under the mistaken belief that the U.S. military reads its own doctrine. The classic quotes regarding this:


From a Russian document:
"one of the serious problems in planning against American doctrine is that the Americans do not read their manuals nor do they feel any obligations to follow their doctrine."

Quote from a German general officer:
"The reason that the American Army does so well in wartime, is that war is chaos, and the American Army practices chaos on a daily basis."

Congratulations on a job well done!

[Ron Humphrey]

Yep their real good at dealing with elementary questions, they've had lots of practice with some of us:wry:

OTOH I can't wait to see how Gentile will feel about several of the arguments you raise:D

[jmm99]

that "McC" advocacy has triumphed again - and by a wide margin. Good job.

Wouldn't worry too much about what you will do when you grow up. I'm still working on that one - as is Ken White (my observational analysis, not an alleged fact). :D

Now, when COL Gentile enters the debate ..... :eek:

PS: You also got to the core truth:


Also, at http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/200...rategy-and-th/, Tim Starr said, “If we focus solely upon conventional preparation, our enemies will hit us unconventionally. If we focus solely upon unconventional operations, our enemies will hit us conventionally.” It seems to me that this is true.

While this concept requires us to focus on both, the constraints are set by force levels and financing - since both require training and education in large measures. The "debate" in practical terms centers on this problem.

[Ken White]

...In fact, I’ve got two more specific questions, though they are just as elementary. What are some specific instances at any point in history where U.S. troops have had success in switching from COIN to conventional warfare?I can give you two more recent than Van's example -- sort of. I say sort of because they really show two units of the US Armed forces switching from conventional to COIN and back almost on demand. THE 1st Marine Division in Korea in 1950 went into a conventional fight, did that for several months and then in early 1951 was tasked with other units including the 5th Regimental combat Team of the US Army to clear some North Korean remnants who had been by passed in the US and South Korean attack to the north the previous fall. This was effectively a COIN operation that lasted three months and was successful. The Division reverted to conventional operations afterwards. Relatively short period but the ability to shift methods and techniques was almost instantaneous each way.

Another example may be found in the operations of the two Airborne Brigades in Viet Nam in 1965-66. Both had trained extensively in COIN techniques and for conventional operations on about a 50 : 50 basis overall (there were unit variances) for the previous couple of years both performed that mission. Both also were during that period in infrequent but heavy conventional battles and went from those battles to two days later delivering truckloads of Rice to villagers.

As I said, that's a sort of an answer to your question; not precisely what you asked. I'm sure I can think of an example or two that goes directly to your question but it may take a bit (I'm old...). However, what your question really asks is "can units switch gears to change from COIN to conventional" and I submit those two examples say -- absolutely.

I'm happy you won your debate and your example shows that good preparation can carry one through. Same thing is true with units and combat -- good training (preparation) enables them to excel...
...does it not endanger national security to have the COIN field manual online or for news outlets and officers, either retired or active, to so openly express and debate over what kind of techniques and training our army is moving away from and more towards?Van answered this well but I will throw in one more thought. It has been said that we can afford to lose COIN efforts but we cannot afford to lose a major war. That's true, I think -- and thus what we need is simply balance, we have to be able to do both and we can do that, not that hard.

Congrats on a good job.

P.S.

Pay no attention to JMM; he's worried about what he's going to do when he grows up -- I've determined to not grow up so I don't have the problem... :D

[William F. Owen]

Throughout history, they’ve gotten into big conventional fights and are renowned for how well they do in them. It is easier to switch from COIN warfare to conventional than vice-versa.

That is an outright lie! Sorry to put it so strongly, but who ever wrote that is talking utter garbage. It is absolutely not true, and entirely false. -what is more the British Army has proved this wrong over 100 years. The British Armies that did COIN from 45-95 where all Hi-intensity, nuclear war focussed forces! - FACT.

A lot of COIN concerns the Restriction of Force. If you don't have the levels of force to restrict, then you are lost.

Good armies can do both. This COIN-v-Conventional is utter BS. This is what is so dangerous about the COIN avant-garde, who seem to want to force the choice.

It takes less training to adapt a conventional force to COIN that it takes to turn a COIN force to conventional.

[Ken White]

...Good armies can do both. This COIN-v-Conventional is utter BS. This is what is so dangerous about the COIN avant-garde, who seem to want to force the choice.

It takes less training to adapt a conventional force to COIN that it takes to turn a COIN force to conventional.One just needs to concentrate on the basics and get them thoroughly inculcated. Then it all becomes relatively simple; it's not nearly as complex as some seem to assume.

[jmm99]

than an assertion of fact.

What I glean, from such as Nagl's and Krepinevich's books, is that COIN operations require a smaller logistics tail than conventional operations. This seems intuitively logical (e.g., helicopters, tanks and arty are maintenance and support-intensive).

If this be true (Wilf, Ken and everyone else ?), logistics would be another reason why shifting from COIN to conventional would be more difficult - and, perhaps, impossible in a limited timeframe for that shift.

PS - FV, you now know that there are some rough edges here; but Wilf does call them as he sees them. :)

[John T. Fishel]

I'm very glad you won your debate.:)
Another example of transition to big war from small war and back again: The Indian fighting army of 1861 found its officers leading huge armies against each other in the Civil War. After 1865, they went back to fighting Indians...

Everybody who says we have to do both is spot on. There are, of course, zealots on both sides of the debate but the reality is much more subtle. Gian Gentile is a particularly effective advocate of the conventional side but one who does not reject COIN. He thinks we need to focus more on big wars. OK, I don't agree, but he has a point ... The problem with his postition, as I see it, is that if he wins the argument, small wars issues will - as they always have in the past - be shoved onto the back burner and we will have to learn how to fight them all over again (as if we had never seen them before).

Please stay in the conversation, you have much to contribute.

Cheers

JohnT

[Schmedlap]

What I glean, from such as Nagl's and Krepinevich's books, is that COIN operations require a smaller logistics tail than conventional operations. This seems intuitively logical (e.g., helicopters, tanks and arty are maintenance and support-intensive).
That may be a paper truth. As you point out, it certainly does seem intuitively logical. But with the decentralized nature of COIN or SASO (is that still a doctrinal term?), and with the requirements to "hold and build," logistics in terms of bullets and arty rounds may get a little simpler, but the other stuff can get out of hand (humanitarian supplies, T-walls, jersey barriers, etc). Also, when a force is stationary, suddenly it starts building stuff (chow halls, barracks, entertainment facilities, etc) and those things require upkeep and supplies. It would not surprise me if COIN turned out to be more of a logistical challenge than fighting against a conventional opponent.

[Ron Humphrey]

That may be a paper truth. As you point out, it certainly does seem intuitively logical. But with the decentralized nature of COIN or SASO (is that still a doctrinal term?), and with the requirements to "hold and build," logistics in terms of bullets and arty rounds may get a little simpler, but the other stuff can get out of hand (humanitarian supplies, T-walls, jersey barriers, etc). Also, when a force is stationary, suddenly it starts building stuff (chow halls, barracks, entertainment facilities, etc) and those things require upkeep and supplies. It would not surprise me if COIN turned out to be more of a logistical challenge than fighting against a conventional opponent.{Emphasis Ron}

That actually seems to be the case. Of course haven't seen studies to back it up yet. Sure somebody is getting paid to look at it:wry:

[Ken White]

That may be a paper truth. As you point out, it certainly does seem intuitively logical. But with the decentralized nature of COIN or SASO (is that still a doctrinal term?), and with the requirements to "hold and build," logistics in terms of bullets and arty rounds may get a little simpler, but the other stuff can get out of hand (humanitarian supplies, T-walls, jersey barriers, etc). Also, when a force is stationary, suddenly it starts building stuff (chow halls, barracks, entertainment facilities, etc) and those things require upkeep and supplies...Exactly.

That is true on all counts. The logistics of bullets, beans and repair are mind boggling -- but the system is designed to cope with that and does it well. When all the Class X items (Aid supplies and civilian construction materials for example) are introduced, it does not cope well -- witness all the projects in Iraq that were terribly slow in starting and even slower in being completed. The contracting system is a big part of the problem; in a major war it can be ignored, in the small wars of peace it will not be. Schmedlap ends:
...It would not surprise me if COIN turned out to be more of a logistical challenge than fighting against a conventional opponent.I'm no Loggy but from watching it over the years, my perception is that he's quite correct.

An additional consideration is that in a COIN environment, too many people have too much time on their hands to worry about odds and ends and the little nice to have things which they then ask for * -- in a conventional war, such luxury is not available. There would be no barrack huts with A/C and flat screen TVs would not be a consideration; the PXs would be rudimentary if they were even around (Heaven knows what out Cl VI transport bill is...).

A COIN operation presents strange and unusual demands on the system; conventional war just places heavy but fairly consistent and constant demands on it. Most people engaged in the fight do not have time to worry about the exotic -- or troop comfort; just surviving becomes the issue.

The shift from one type to another should not be traumatic (except for supplies enroute if the shift is during an ongoing operation. Could be disconcerting to receive a pallet of coca-Cola instead of one 7.62 linked...) or really even troublesome. All the war fighting stuff gets shipped to COIN ops, just in far smaller quantities. So it would be a matter of less troop comfort and aid material while sending more war materiel. We can ramp up pretty well, we prove that over and over. The biggest problem would be getting the right combat service support unit mix in the right place in a timely fashion, I think...

As an aside, my perception is that Nagl and Krepinevich get several things wrong on several levels -- or skew things to make their points -- either way, neither they nor I are logistically qualified to state categorically which is likely to place the most heavy demand and, more importantly, I get to again point out that the ol' METT-TC intrudes on the answers (plural). :D

* That is not to denigrate anyone or anything so save the flames; MRAPS, Ballistic glasses, Camelbacks or PEQ2s and such like for everyone are great and I'm all for them. Most of that stuff is desirable, no question. If I were to go off to war again, I'd like to have much of it. However, whether most of it is necessary for combat is an entirely different matter.

[SethB]

That makes me wonder how much of the current tooth-to-tail ratio is driven by circumstance and attitude. I asked a professor of mine one time about his thoughts on T3R and he shrugged and said that a heavy logistical tail is the price of industrialized war. I'm not entirely convinced, given that there are ways to improve efficiency while increasing effectiveness (although I recognize that in many cases they are inverse.)

In 1917 the AEF deployed to France with almost 80% of its personnel in Combat Arms roles. 90 years later that favorable ratio has been inverted; only 25% of the total personnel are in Combat Arms units. That is including some contractors. (Search for an article called "The Other End of The Spear.")

The Power Surety Task Force undertook a project to insulate tents. Where they used this approach they were able to save 83% of the fuel that had previously been consumed for space cooling. In the future they will continue to switch from large air conditioners to smaller air conditioners, and they hope to make greater use geothermal heat pumps.

The end result is fewer convoys, fewer support troops, decreased force protection requirements, fewer ambushes, fewer road accidents, fewer expenditures, etc. The cost is minimal and the return on investment is almost as good as stealing.

So while the natural tendency might be towards more permanence and greater resource use, there are ways to have what you want (an air conditioned tent) without the baggage that comes along with it.

ETA: In 2001, 70% of the supplies that the Army carried by weight was fuel. I am unsure of more modern statistics in OIF/OEF, especially considering that much of the fuel is carried by contractors.

[jmm99]

It takes less training to adapt a conventional force to COIN than it takes to adapt [changing "turn" to "adapt"] a COIN force to conventional.

which seems to be something of a current "common doctrine" over the last few posts - which sums operational adaptation.

So, are we at the point where something like this is the postulate ?


It takes more added logistics to adapt a conventional force to COIN than it takes to adapt a COIN force to conventional.

This (if it be true) seems a practical counterpoint to the first proposition.

Is there any literature on the comparative logistical aspects of CONV > COIN & COIN > CONV ?

PS: Agree that Nagl and Krepinevich have written briefs, but so did Summers. My solution, as with all briefs (except my own :D ), is not to swallow everything I read.

"The Other End of The Spear" is linked here (http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/download/csipubs/mcgrath_op23.pdf).

An interesting bit of trivia - the other end of the spear was originally a useful combat tool - so sayeth this (http://www.fighttimes.com/magazine/magazine.asp?article=33).

Seems I recall someone saying that our non-combat forces should be better trained & retrained in combat skills. Perhaps, a figment of my imagination.

[Ken White]

Who made this statement you quoted:


It takes less training to adapt a conventional force to COIN than it takes to adapt [changing "turn" to "adapt"] a COIN force to conventional.

???:confused::eek:

[Ron Humphrey]

It is commonplace that it is asserted forces trained to fight conventionally can be re-trained to fight COIN easier than the other way around.

While I see the reasoning behind the argument it still sticks in my craw a little.

Soldiers- taught to fight //then soldiers taught how to fight what they fight.

If I were an enemy I think I'd be a lot more reluctant to fight someone if they're really good at fighting the close fight. In that case I have to worry about them in large formations but even if I managed to convince myself I could take out every bit of their heavier weaponry I would still have to be worried about how well my forces could handle them on the ground.

Doesn't seem to ring quite so true if you reverse it. :confused:

[jmm99]

which was quoted by you in post # 22. No claim made that you agreed with the quote - I thought it summed its position well.

After looking through "The Other End of The Spear", it focuses on three categories of components that would have to be compared in a switch from CONV to COIN, and vice versa: Combat, HQ-Admin, Logistics-Life Support (he often separates these last two, which would make 4 categories).

[Ken White]

which was quoted by you in post # 22. No claim made that you agreed with the quote - I thought it summed its position well.Oh, I agreed with Wilf's statement; Your quote with no attribution and a change OTOH modifies that statement into something I do not agree with. Not just semantic but a good military force can 'adapt' down (recall I strongly disagree that COIN is the 'graduate level of war'). The reverse is NOT true -- a COIN trained force has an attitudinal disconnect and will get clobbered in a big fight. They will need to be trained; thus 'turned' and cannot just adapt -- well they could and some have but it will hurt.

The downshift to COIN will come with excess violence in the COIN role but it can be done quickly with good well trained leadership who know the basics so that excess violence need not last nearly as long as it did in the downshift in Iraq in some units -- the good ones adapted fairly rapidly. I'd also point out we are and have long been remiss in the basics, so the leadership gets an Attaboy for doing good job qith less than ideal material.

Upshifting, on the other hand requires developing the habit of violence which takes a bit -- it can be done, just takes longer. Thus, to me adapting (nominally at the leader and commander levels) is only part of the problem. Training and inculcating the killer instinct in all the troops is a necessary change and it is more than an adaptation, it is a philosophical and practical change of significant impact and importance. Required also almost always will be a tedious refresher in critical combat skill not require or used in COIN efforts.

Much as I hate sports metaphors, the COIN effort is a really good High School or Junior College team; the conventional fighter is the Pro Team -- pick your sport. The Pro can play in the other Leagues or levels but the reverse is not true -- ordinarily not without some embarrassment or injury. All the Pro has to do to gear down is not be too rough...

Your other quote from above:
It takes more added logistics to adapt a conventional force to COIN than it takes to adapt a COIN force to conventional.Not a log person; my perception is that it's not so much more as it is different.
This (if it be true) seems a practical counterpoint to the first proposition.Perhaps. To me we're mixing Persimmons and Breadfruit. Training is the key to the first item; a focus shift and a purchase shift seem key to the second. Both can be problematic though the training issue will generally be the more prone to consume time. In any event, both are very much situationally dependent and I'd recommend not trying to postulate any hard and fast rules for either item.
Is there any literature on the comparative logistical aspects of CONV > COIN & COIN > CONV ?I'm sure there probably is but would not begin to know where to look. Perhaps someone with a Log background may know.
After looking through "The Other End of The Spear", it focuses on three categories of components that would have to be compared in a switch from CONV to COIN, and vice versa: Combat, HQ-Admin, Logistics-Life Support (he often separates these last two, which would make 4 categories).Huh? I'm sorry, I'm uncertain what you mean here. Why would we want to compare them? I read The Other End of the Spear some time ago and left it wondering why it was written. Sorry, I am just not a fan of the numerate approach -- I have seen too many military people seduced by the 'clarity' a metrics and matrices offer only to flail and fail when that effort failed.

Yes, all four (separation of log and life support is logical) of those categories differ in a (or any) COIN / Conventional comparison -- but they'll also likely differ significantly in some cases in comparing any two COIN theaters (Viet Nam / Afghanistan / Iraq / Philippines...) or two conventional Wars (WW I or WW II / Korea) or even small operations (Dominican Republic / Grenada / Panama). They all differ considerably in all parameters we've discussed.

[jmm99]

from Ken
The downshift to COIN will come with excess violence in the COIN role but it can be done quickly with good well trained leadership who know the basics so that excess violence need not last nearly as long as it did in the downshift in Iraq in some units -- the good ones adapted fairly rapidly. I'd also point out we are and have long been remiss in the basics, so the leadership gets an Attaboy for doing good job qith less than ideal material.

Upshifting, on the other hand requires developing the habit of violence which takes a bit -- it can be done, just takes longer. Thus, to me adapting (nominally at the leader and commander levels) is only part of the problem. Training and inculcating the killer instinct in all the troops is a necessary change and it is more than an adaptation, it is a philosophical and practical change of significant impact and importance. Required also almost always will be a tedious refresher in critical combat skill not require or used in COIN efforts.

If I get it (from above), "adapt" is a more limited adjustment - "turn" is taking off on a new bearing. Agree that, for most people, "thou shalt kill" is a harder nut for them to swallow than returning from that state to "thou shalt not kill". To me, all of that (what you say above) is adaptation down to Willie and Joe.

Whether a soldier doing COIN for a year has less killer instinct than one doing CONV for a year is outside my experience. I'm being observational of possible issues and disconnects - not judgmental.

As to the other three categories, "Why would we want to compare them?". Because they are possible variables - whether they turn out to be relevant and material is another issue, which can be answered only if you look.

[Cavguy]

Whether a soldier doing COIN for a year has less killer instinct than one doing CONV for a year is outside my experience. I'm being observational of possible issues and disconnects - not judgmental.



I would argue that there is no loss of "killer instinct" from performing COIN missions based off of my personal experiences and observations.

My unit in OIF 1 spent a year in an area of virtually no contact in SE Baghdad. On April 4, 2004, the Sadr uprising began, and overnight formerly peaceful Shia areas became free-fire zones. My Armor BN (and many others) were thrown into instant high intensity urban combat. For an overview of what happened in Sadr City that day, you can read Martha Radditz's account here (http://www.amazon.com/Long-Road-Home-Story-Family/dp/B0016493S4/ref=pd_bbs_sr_2?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1233465221&sr=8-2). The company commander's account of the assault into Sadr City and my BN CDR's account of the following two months in Najaf are in the ARMOR COIN issue (http://usacac.leavenworth.army.mil/cac2/coin/repository/Armor_COIN_Selected_Works.pdf). (Sadr City: The Armor Pure Assault in Urban Terrain by Captain John C. Moore & Task Force Iron Dukes Campaign for Najaf by Lieutenant Colonel Pat White)

The men instantly "flipped switches". No retraining on the "killer instinct" was needed. It doesn't take much of a switch to shoot back at those shooting at you.

Same observation over 15 months in the second tour. I have never seen anyone need retraining on "killer instinct" in today's military. The reverse, however, is not true to the same level. Learning to switch it on and off is the challenge when you have to return to "soft".

Tactical proficiency between HIC and COIN missions is a different matter, but I haven't sensed a psychological one.

[Ken White]

If I get it (from above), "adapt" is a more limited adjustment - "turn" is taking off on a new bearing. Agree that, for most people, "thou shalt kill" is a harder nut for them to swallow than returning from that state to "thou shalt not kill". To me, all of that (what you say above) is adaptation down to Willie and Joe.Well, those in most armies, anyway. That issue is skill and reaction time. The real issue, whether you call it adaptation or retraining and reorienting is the time factor. One can shiftdown pretty quickly; shifting upward takes a little more experience, time or training, not just a philosophical shift in the leadership echelons approach to problems but a refocusing of the entire unit into less often or never used skills....
Whether a soldier doing COIN for a year has less killer instinct than one doing CONV for a year is outside my experience. I'm being observational of possible issues and disconnects - not judgmental.Of you're being judgmental -- else you wouldn't insist on adapting as opposed to turning. ;) That's fine, call it what you wish and as for the 'killer instinct,' compare any period of months or years in Iraq with a like period from WW II, Korea or even Viet Nam which was half COIN. It's really an ROE acculturation problem.

Adapting from ROE that insists upon a ten digit grid for minimum collateral damage and be careful what or who you shoot to HIC ROE where collateral damage is far less an issue, a six digit grid will be the norm because no one has the time to work for constant tens and a maneuvering Army will not have all the electronic aids available today because the log system won't provide 'em in adequate quantity due to the cost, loss and replacement volumes which no one in either theater today has had to cope with. In that HIC environment, the issue is not be careful how and at whom you shoot but finding people in the wrong clothes at which to shoot. Once you see 'em, IF you do, you're encouraged to shoot them, no probable cause required, front, back -- immaterial.

CavGuy is right that these kids today can flip the switch psychologically -- that's because they were trained initially for HIC and their leaders geared them down for COIN; in that case, rapid shifting is possible as I said. I have pointed out several times that 1MarDiv did that in Korea and the Airborne Brigades did it early on in Viet Nam -- it is the purely COIN trained crowd who will have the 'adaptation' deficiency.

Again, the Pro can play in any League, the less experienced (or trained) will not be able to shift up without work -- and time.
As to the other three categories, "Why would we want to compare them?". Because they are possible variables - whether they turn out to be relevant and material is another issue, which can be answered only if you look.They aren't possible variables, they are certain variables; what's important is that they will differ from each other as well as type to type and within types from one episode to another for many reasons.

Relevant or material to what, may I ask? I might be more helpful if I had a clue what you're trying to do. :confused:

[Ken White]

...The reverse, however, is not true to the same level. Learning to switch it on and off is the challenge when you have to return to "soft".My observation is that varies with people. The "Kill 'em all and let god sort 'em out" types will use any excuse to pop a cap...:D

There is a gear down pause and hiccup, no question but firm leadership can usually handle it. However, my observation has also been -- and folks who are out there now confirm it's still a big problem -- that the small arms fire discipline in the US Army (and the Marines) is, uh, less than stellar. That contributes to shifting problems both ways. It's because we don't train 'em well in IET.

Though that may be changing, the use of Outcome Based Training in Basic and at OSUT is producing better trained, more capable and disciplined shooters so we may get rid of a problem that's been around in US forces since WW II.
Tactical proficiency between HIC and COIN missions is a different matter, but I haven't sensed a psychological one.True, I'm sure. HIC kids can shift the gears with just a little push. Good leaders enable that.

[jmm99]

for relevance and materiality, here


from Ken
Yes, all four (separation of log and life support is logical) of those categories differ in a (or any) COIN / Conventional comparison -- but they'll also likely differ significantly in some cases in comparing any two COIN theaters (Viet Nam / Afghanistan / Iraq / Philippines...) or two conventional Wars (WW I or WW II / Korea) or even small operations (Dominican Republic / Grenada / Panama). They all differ considerably in all parameters we've discussed.

Is there a difference (quantitative or qualitative) between, say, Life Support in two situations (one CONV; one COIN) ? Is the difference due (in whole or in part) to one being COIN, the other CONV ? If so, the difference is relevant. Whether it is material (important enough to be concerned about) is a matter of judgment (quantitative or qualitative).

If the other factors you mention obscure the picture ("due to what" or "how much is due to what" cannot be determined), relevance and materiality cannot be determined. That's the best I can "do" on this topic.

[William F. Owen]

What the COIN avant garde miss, is that it is quite easy to train for COIN. 90% of what is needed goes on at the platoon and company level, so needs little training resources and not that much time.

Compare that with wanting to rehearse a formation level opposed, nocturnal river crossing, or a Battle Group passage of lines under NBC conditions.... and yes, logistics is a huge factor.

What the Lebanon in 2006 showed, was what Korea and Vietnam already had proven, was that your enemy doesn't need to have Motor Rifle Regiments to cause you to have to conduct pretty intensive combat operations - look at Fallujah!

[Gian P Gentile]

...Gian Gentile is a particularly effective advocate of the conventional side but one who does not reject COIN. He thinks we need to focus more on big wars. OK, I don't agree, but he has a point ... The problem with his postition, as I see it, is that if he wins the argument, small wars issues will - as they always have in the past - be shoved onto the back burner and we will have to learn how to fight them all over again (as if we had never seen them before)...

Lots of good discussion here, as usual on SWJ blog. I especially agreed with some of the comments made by Ken and Wilf on the need to have an army that is well trained in the basics of combat skills.

I disagree with Niel when he states that the killer instinct is there in coin and readily transferable to HIC. Yes this might be the case for combat platoons or companies like Niel's and where it was at and the level of kinetic fighting involved. But "killer instinct" is a complex and layered thing in a large fighting army. That is to say, the way a corps commander displays his "killer instinct" in HIC is through many extended combat functions like command and control, operational level logistics that are vulnerable to attack, and to use WILF's example of a night river crossing into the teeth of a well-laid defense. In this sense it is wrongheaded to think that our army over the last seven years can just pick up from Iraq and Astan and do a corps level movement to contact into the teeth of an enemy who fights and stands sort of like Hiz did in 2006.

To John T: Boy I certainly hope and pray that that is not what happens, that in maintaining our focus on the higher end of fighting we had better not ditch the hard lessons won on coin over the past seven years. To be clear, that would be a huge mistake and I really just don’t see it happening. John, I think that fear is hyped to a good degree by folks who called for a focus on coin in the 80s and 90s after Vietnam but were shoved to the sidelines. I think at some point we should let the past go, so to speak, and not be controlled by fears of what happened before will necessarily raise its head again. In short there is no conventional bogeymen waiting in the wings to bring the army back to 1985, build more M1 tanks, recall Don Holder to active duty to write a revised version of airland battle. That bogeyman is simply not there, nor is he me.

gian

[Schmedlap]

Regarding transferability of skills...
I think it depends on the echelon. The intangible value of continuous combat operations for years is immeasurable at the levels where they occur: largely battalion and below. I also think the staff planning and coordination, while different from HIC, is likewise invaluable. Just the experience of continually working together in a real-world environment is immeasurably value. I think one can make a case that we're not too competent in terms of Corps-level conventional operations of the type of sweeping across the Fulda Gap and generally agree with COL Gentile's assessment of that. But I think we're hands-down exponentially more lethal at battalion and below.

I think of it this way:
Imagine conglomerate A. It sees a bunch of companies that manufacture scunion. The conglomerate buys them all, so as to achieve a scunion monopoly. In order to do so, the conglomerate must coordinate the activities of the companies, but their internal processes are largely okay as is.

Now imagine conglomerate B. It, too, seeks a scunion monopoly. Conglomerate B has a knack for quickly coordinating activities of subordinate companies. Unfortunately, conglomerate B purchases a bunch of companies that manufacture drip pans and chock blocks. Conglomerate B cannot leverage its organizational (or C2) capabililities until those subordinate companies revamp their internal processes.

I would say conglomerate A has the advantage.

[Ken White]

for relevance and materiality, here...
Is there a difference (quantitative or qualitative) between, say, Life Support in two situations (one CONV; one COIN) ? Is the difference due (in whole or in part) to one being COIN, the other CONV ? If so, the difference is relevant. Whether it is material (important enough to be concerned about) is a matter of judgment (quantitative or qualitative).Yes; Yes (in the former there is stasis, in the latter there is mobility -- difference between barracks with a/c or tents and sleeping in the mud). Relevant to what???
If the other factors you mention obscure the picture ("due to what" or "how much is due to what" cannot be determined), relevance and materiality cannot be determined. That's the best I can "do" on this topic.Uh. Okay. Ummm -- what's the topic???

If -- and that's a big if; you have been less than clear -- the topic is whether a COIN trained force can be switched to HIC more easily than a force trained for HIC can adapt to COIN operations, I'd say the most recent example is comparing the COIN-centric Israeli force that went into Lebanon in 2006 and got smacked with a hybrid (not even HIC; hybrid) buzz saw with the HIC trained Israeli force that went into Gaza last month and did rather well in an urban hybrid situation.

As to the logistics bit, not my thing. Any clarification on that will require someone with that knowledge and that isn't me. You want to discuss training and / or operations from individual fighter to Fire Team or individual Tank to Corps level, I can do that with some knowledge but my knowledge of high end log issues is non-existent.

[jmm99]

The immediate topic was an example using relevance and materiality - which is what I understood your question to be. To me, relevance and materiality are different. If fact A affects fact B in some way, then the two facts are mutually relevant. The next step is to determine materiality - how much does fact A affect fact B (is the relationship important - how much weight should be given).

Moving to the broader topic (shifting between COIN and convenrtional, and vice versa), what I glean for purposes of discussion is that force structure can be divided into four categories:

1. Combat

2. HQ-Admin

3. Logistics

4. Life Support

Niel's post #35, Wilf's, COL Gentile's and Schmedlap's ##39-41 all give me some insight into the questions of relevance and materiality applied to categories 1-4. Also, Niel's link to the Armor COIN issue did the same.

Those posts (and yours) primarily address 1. Combat issues in shifting between counter-insurgency and conventional operations, and vice versa.

My question is whether categories 2-4 also have to be taken into account and whether they are material factors in determining an appropriate force structure for counter-insurgency, on one hand, and conventional, on the other.

Perhaps, one force structure can be appropriate for both . I don't know, which is why I raised the question.


Using a Split T, rather than a single wing unbalanced right or left.

[Cavguy]

Moving to the broader topic (shifting between COIN and convenrtional, and vice versa), what I glean for purposes of discussion is that force structure can be divided into four categories:

1. Combat

2. HQ-Admin

3. Logistics

4. Life Support



I'd argue that our logistics are better prepared than they have ever been - from a combat survival standpoint. Jessica Lynch happened because of the fighting skills expected of logistics units training for operation in a linear, high intensity environment with secure rear areas. OIF/OEF has forced CSS guys to train for combat and take it seriously, and have done well adapting.

As far as establishing mobile refuel/rearm sites, field logisical functions, and supporting all classes of supply, they're probably in a skill deficit because so much has been contracted out.

[Ken White]

The immediate topic was an example using relevance and materiality - which is what I understood your question to be. To me, relevance and materiality are different. If fact A affects fact B in some way, then the two facts are mutually relevant. The next step is to determine materiality - how much does fact A affect fact B (is the relationship important - how much weight should be given).I understood that, what was not understood was to what the relevance and materiality were to pertain.
Moving to the broader topic (shifting between COIN and convenrtional, and vice versa), what I glean for purposes of discussion is that force structure can be divided into four categories...My question is whether categories 2-4 also have to be taken into account and whether they are material factors in determining an appropriate force structure for counter-insurgency, on one hand, and conventional, on the other.My answer is yes, they do have to be taken into account. If for no other reason the mobility of HIC versus the static locations usual in COIN but there are many other factors -- and all are or will be very much situation dependent. I'll also point out that one could provide alternative categorization to those four -- Combat and combat support would perhaps the simplest example.
Perhaps, one force structure can be appropriate for both. I don't know, which is why I raised the question.Military force structure is always a compromise effort -- and like any compromise, it is rarely as effective as a purpose designed structure. In the case of the US Army, it strongly biased toward HIC which means in a COIN effort, ad hoc arrangements are necessary. Due to the stasis, that's easily done (if annoying to have to do...). OTOH, a force designed for COIN could not adjust to HIC without considerable changes -- there would be few Tanks, for example.

The down side from a realistic perspective is that a force optimized (to an extent if not fully) for HIC will have a predilection for HIC-like action regardless of the scenario. That can be deterred by strong leadership and good training.

The flip side is that a force optimized for COIN will not have an inclination toward aggressive and rapid forward movement in spite of casualties. Units used to holding Memorial Services for every man killed will have to shift to seeing dozens killed and no time for services; Investigators of every death will no longer have a job...

Shifting gears upward can be done -- it just isn't as easy as down shifting.

[jmm99]

Jessica Lynch happened because of the fighting skills expected of logistics units training for operation in a linear, high intensity environment with secure rear areas.

you led me to this in the Armor COIN issue (just before your article) - p.24 (footnotes omitted below), Integrating Armor into Personnel Recovery Operations, by Captain Romeo P. Cubas, U.S. Marine Corps:


Unfortunately, the first unit to face this defense was a logistics company from Fort Bliss, Texas. The 507th Maintenance Company was part of an mpressive U.S. Army supply line, and its primary mission was to provide maintenance, supplies, and support to a patriot missile battery that would advance north toward Baghdad with the 3d Infantry Division. The 507th’s company commander entered the Army as a dental assistant and eventually worked his way into commanding mechanics, cooks, computer technicians, and clerks who lacked basic military fighting skills. He did not expect these support troops to see combat and even had his soldiers’ hand grenades and AT-4 antitank weapons collected and locked up prior to combat operations.
....
The 507th missed that turn, drove straight through downtown An Nasiriyah, and was ambushed with a “torrent of fire.” Eleven members of the 507th would eventually perish as a result of combat actions that morning. Seven others would become Operation Iraqi Freedom’s first prisoners of war (POWs).

Thus, a tragedy and a tough way to learn a lesson.

[Schmedlap]

He did not expect these support troops to see combat and even had his soldiers’ hand grenades and AT-4 antitank weapons collected and locked up prior to combat operations.
Safety first! Can't trust Soldiers with weapons, you know. And you surely can't trust their NCOs to train them on how to use them. Great example of the pre-9/11 Army mentality, at it's finest. Give that Safety Officer an ARCOM.

<sarcasm>Oh, how I long for the days when we cherished safety and fear of our weapons over combat effectiveness and ruthless lethality.</sarcasm>

[Ken White]

Jessica Lynch happened because of the fighting skills expected of logistics units training for operation in a linear, high intensity environment with secure rear areas.The incident happened because the necessary combat skills; known as a requirement since Korea ADDED:{When the Chinese routinely infiltrated our lines and attacked CSS element in the Corps Zones -- and occasionally far deeper.}, reinforced in Viet Nam and needed by all soldiers, were not adequately covered in training for Lynch, her leaders or her Commanders -- all of whom erred mostly because they were poorly trained -- over an obvious period of many years. That includes the 1990-2001 period when the Army knew it was likely to be deployed to stability ops but did nothing to prepare for it. The situation has improved, slightly, today but we still are turning out only partly trained Soldiers.

That incident happened partly because the Army wanted to save money and 'not train anyone for skills they may not require' ADDED: {and the practice of deferring f/ CSS MOS Tng in the Svc Schools most or all the the combat skills as 'Tasks to be trained in unit' -- which don't or did not bother.} Perhaps the money saved went to to buy a SP Artillery system and a new ScoutHelicopter... Oops, that didn't work out. Either time on the chopper...:mad:

I'll also say -- as I have before, that anyone since Korea who thinks life is going to be totally linear in the combat zone is not thinking clearly. ADDED:{While our training did head that way, our doctrine has not said that.} Too much flexibility is afforded all our potential opponents. They can buy NVG and laser pointers just as well -- cheaper, even, then we can. They're also likely to be more innovative and flexible than we can be...

[jmm99]

Richard E. Killblane, Circle the Wagons: The History of US Army Convoy Security, CSI OP13, which is here (http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/download/csipubs/killblane.pdf), tells the story of how the Army developed its doctrine for convoy protection during the Indian Wars up to WWI; lost it during WWI and WWII (linear battlefields, etc.); regained it to some extent during Korea; and then re-developed it in Vietnam.

The bulk of the article deals with Vietnam and US adaptations to face the challenges of Highway 19 - where French Mobile Group 100 was wiped out in 1954 (the opening scene of We Were Soldiers). Those lessons were in turn lost after Vietnam. An interesting article - especially for those of us who have played with re-building cars and trucks (some neat custom vehicles in the photos).

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Regardless of how you reacted to the outcome of the game, you had to love the 100-yard runback by the linebacker-defensive end !