Weight of Combat Gear Is Taking Toll

[carl]

Carl, there are units and there are units.

On my patch little discretion was allowed in what kit to take on patrols. I listed it and together with my sergeant all kit was inspected before moving out. Anything discarded had to be buried and camouflaged (under supervision).

One learns a lot about a unit from such anecdotes. ;)

In fairness I must clarify one thing. The VN guy actually said they didn't wear body armor, not that they discarded it on the sly. I suspect that the unit just made the decision not to use it. I yielded to the temptation to use a colorful turn of phrase when a simple fact would have been better.

[JMA]

In fairness I must clarify one thing. The VN guy actually said they didn't wear body armor, not that they discarded it on the sly. I suspect that the unit just made the decision not to use it. I yielded to the temptation to use a colorful turn of phrase when a simple fact would have been better.

Fair enough. I wonder under today's circumstances what would be the outcome if a soldier were wounded through not having plates in? I guess it is not discreationary so his commanders would be in trouble and presumably he could lose his service/medical benefits?

[David I Evans]

Bearing in mind the "coroner test" to what extent are the use of plates a matter of individual disgression?

None what soever.

The Army only just bought enough large plates for osprey so not enough for training for one Brigade in the UK on MST, getting ready to deploy whilst the Brigade out in theatre was active. Once in country it was large plate front and rear and small plates on both sides plus tier 2 nappies. No changes to that policy at all ever.

3 litres was the size of the issue camelback so you might as well fill :-)

Given the weight of stuff I was carrying at times, 300 rounds 5.56mm. 2 smoke, 1 HE, 2 WP, HF Radio plus spare battery, 200 rounds 7.62mm link and 3 litres of water as one days load any more weight was avoided :-) I'd have loved to brew up sometime :-)

The reference to patrol, contact, airstrike and home for tea was disparagingly referred to in a small article in BAR (British Army Review) as Dog bark patrolling

The article put it as "We go out, we get barked at, we go home" and contrasted the USMC response which was to promptly turn and go straight to the shooting at all times

It wasn't a very complimentary article.......

[jcustis]

The reference to patrol, contact, airstrike and home for tea was disparagingly referred to in a small article in BAR (British Army Review) as Dog bark patrolling

The article put it as "We go out, we get barked at, we go home" and contrasted the USMC response which was to promptly turn and go straight to the shooting at all times


Is it possible to find this article online?

[davidbfpo]

Is it possible to find this article online?

Jon,

If this article appeared in BAR, it will not be online. BAR remains a print only, internal publication and non-official access is much harder now. You maybe able to get access via the BDLS or a friendly liasion officer.

If as David Evans notes:
It wasn't a very complimentary article then I'd be surprised it was in BAR. In recent years the threshold for different overtly expressed opinionms has shrunk - due to direction from on high.

[David I Evans]

Jon,

If this article appeared in BAR, it will not be online. BAR remains a print only, internal publication and non-official access is much harder now. You maybe able to get access via the BDLS or a friendly liasion officer.

If as David Evans notes: then I'd be surprised it was in BAR. In recent years the threshold for different overtly expressed opinionms has shrunk - due to direction from on high.

It was during a brief spate about 2006 - 2010 when a more robust and forthright editing policy was in place.

The deliberate restriction on expressing a viewpoint that doesn't match the groupspeak of the Army is indicative of the Mindset of the army

[JMA]

Given the weight of stuff I was carrying at times, 300 rounds 5.56mm. 2 smoke, 1 HE, 2 WP, HF Radio plus spare battery, 200 rounds 7.62mm link and 3 litres of water as one days load any more weight was avoided :-) I'd have loved to brew up sometime :-)

Why you carry an HF radio? You speaking back to the UK? ;)

Please show me the breakdown of weight that comes out at 32kgs (or 70.5lbs)

[JMA]

The deliberate restriction on expressing a viewpoint that doesn't match the groupspeak of the Army is indicative of the Mindset of the army

Not only the British army... you touch a nerve here and the yanks get all agressive and defensive as well ;)

[David I Evans]

Why you carry an HF radio? You speaking back to the UK? ;)

Please show me the breakdown of weight that comes out at 32kgs (or 70.5lbs)

We were carrying HF as we were struggling with the VHF net, a problem found to be due to a fill for the VHF radios that had become corrupted.

Breakdown

Weapon + 6 full mags 9kgs
HE, Smoke, WP, UGL+ link 5kgs
Radio + spare batteries 3kgs
Osprey + small plates 7kgs
12 hr ration pack + 2litres of water 3kgs
Commanders Kit + FIST 5Kgs


FIST (future infantry soldier technology) is pretty much all the shiny new TI and HMNVS sights and LLM

Topped out at 32kgs for a Section Cmdr.

[JMA]

We were carrying HF as we were struggling with the VHF net, a problem found to be due to a fill for the VHF radios that had become corrupted.

The mind boggles...

The Bowman system continues to be a cock-up it seems. It is tempting to write off the British procurement cock-ups as due to idiots - both soldiers and civilians - in MoD but perhaps an investigation to look for possible corruption would seem to be the appropriate course going forward.


Breakdown

Weapon + 6 full mags 9kgs
HE, Smoke, WP, UGL+ link 5kgs
Radio + spare batteries 3kgs
Osprey + small plates 7kgs
12 hr ration pack + 2litres of water 3kgs
Commanders Kit + FIST 5Kgs

Topped out at 32kgs for a Section Cmd

You tell me where you can cut 10kg from that list. The alternative is to amend the role of the infantry to remove the ability to "close with and kill the enemy". So what role would the Michelin Men of the modern infantry have? To act as decoys to draw the enemy out for the purpose of putting in an airstrike?


FIST (future infantry soldier technology) is pretty much all the shiny new TI and HMNVS sights and LLM

Doesn't seem to have helped in Helmand...

[David I Evans]

JMA

Bowman is not too bad in the HF, VHF and UHF roles as a radio. Data has been a complete busted flush and has never worked outside Salisbury plain
But. TBH. I suspect that it's mostly MoD's fault messing around with perfectly good systems for the hell of it. Paying to removing GPS cards from within the VHF systems to then waste money on attached GPS systems or taking a HF/VHF radio and removing the VHF facility as 2 examples

There is weight that can be removed, 5kgs can be slimmed down quite quickly

If you're in CEFO+daysack order on a day time patrol why do you need the full commanders kit of Orders cards, TAMS, model kit and all the night sights ? You're not going to be giving any more orders with a model and you should be able to get away with HMNVS as a just in case. The G4 chain should be able to bring up equipment as required, otherwise you might as well carry everything "Just In Case"

The TI and HMNVS has proved useful. Helped me PID a firing point at night and engage with GPMG from a sanger one night and has allowed us to pretty much move at will at night.......

[BushrangerCZ]

We were carrying HF as we were struggling with the VHF net, a problem found to be due to a fill for the VHF radios that had become corrupted.

Breakdown

Weapon + 6 full mags 9kgs
HE, Smoke, WP, UGL+ link 5kgs
Radio + spare batteries 3kgs
Osprey + small plates 7kgs
12 hr ration pack + 2litres of water 3kgs
Commanders Kit + FIST 5Kgs


FIST (future infantry soldier technology) is pretty much all the shiny new TI and HMNVS sights and LLM

Topped out at 32kgs for a Section Cmdr.

I understand NVG and let´s say IR strobo, plus VS17 panel as a FIST, plus field notebook with all the stuff needed, map, compass, and GPS. It goes about 3 kg, so we got 2kg down. 3kg VHF radio is quite heavy, AN/PRC 148 plus spare battery, multiband antenna, and headset fits easily into 2 kg. So one more kg down. Osprey 7kg (if included all the pouches and stuff, ballistic plates and also helmet) is reasonable weight, I would guess more. However something like TYR PICO plate carrier would cut down at least one kg just by using better technology and design. We can´t go down on ammo, frag and smoke, it´s already minimum. So yes 5 kg can go down, but it´s not decisive. And no one is going to issue light infantry guy with TYR Pico etc., unless you are very lucky and from very rich country. That it probably actually costs less than Osprey makes no difference. Also IFAK would take another 1kg up. Good to see no pistol, what an utter bull..it to issue it to every infantry soldier.

Only viable solution from my point of view is to ditch body armour where it´s not needed or even counter productive - and it´s not gonna happen.

[Granite_State]

A two-pronged problem we face in carried loads is centered on the almost unquenchable appetite for battery power. In the first prong we have increased a patrol's carried load for force protection purposes with the addition of body-worn counter-IED devices. In the second prong we have not been disciplined enough to curb our demand for tactical information, which in turn drives up the weight penalty due to the suites of communication equipment carried.

We have created this vicious circle of demanding unrealistic reporting of reams of information, and it drives dismounted operations to carry ridiculous quantities of batteries to support 24-hour radio usage.

It goes back to uneducated, ill-informed tactical planning by folks inclined to carry the kitchen sink as insurance against all threats, rather than conduct a smart analysis of requirements and the tactical risks involved.

Couldn't agree more sir. And it infects everything, from majors at regiment calling down demanding storyboards for a cache find of a rusty old AK with two magazines to the expectation that we will have positive VHF comms at all times (God forbid HF be primary at a division exercise).

Far too often we're in the risk avoidance business instead of the risk management business (let alone the calculated risk taking business).

[JMA]

Only viable solution from my point of view is to ditch body armour where it´s not needed or even counter productive - and it´s not gonna happen.

I agree it seems that a sane and unemotional discussion on this matter is not possible. I do wonder though whether any studies have been carried out as to the wounds that have been prevented by body armour as opposed to all wounds that have been caused due to lack of proper route selection by stumbling, bumbling over loaded soldiers?

[BushrangerCZ]

I agree it seems that a sane and unemotional discussion on this matter is not possible. I do wonder though whether any studies have been carried out as to the wounds that have been prevented by body armour as opposed to all wounds that have been caused due to lack of proper route selection by stumbling, bumbling over loaded soldiers?

Very good question...

[BushrangerCZ]

This rounds it up nicely:

http://www.everyjoe.com/2014/06/30/politics/examining-our-soldiers-loads-what-are-they-carrying/

[JMA]

This rounds it up nicely:

http://www.everyjoe.com/2014/06/30/politics/examining-our-soldiers-loads-what-are-they-carrying/

As does this:

Donkeys led by Lions (http://www.wapentakes.com/donkeys.pdf)

... but is anybody listening?

[David I Evans]

This rounds it up nicely:

http://www.everyjoe.com/2014/06/30/politics/examining-our-soldiers-loads-what-are-they-carrying/


I'm wondering at the weight of 6 MREs. That's in the wrappers I presume ?

That's 48hrs of food. The equivalent British 24Hr Ration pack is about 2.1kgs packed or 4.6lbs ish. That's a 1lb shaved off. Once you start dumping stuff, I suspect you could shave at least 2lbs off and maybe 3.

From experience the MRE pack generates a mass of rubbish, nearly a large bin big per platoon the one time I lived on MREs as part of a Rifle Company on exercise in the States The 24Hr ration pack has nowhere near the same level of packaging as MREs

[BushrangerCZ]

Unfortunately the only way how to get soldiers moving again is to dump body armour on missions which does not require body armour - or where is it downright counterproductive (recce). But it seems to me that ordinary infantry is doomed with incredibly stupid presence patrols forever, getting hunted instead of being hunters, doing only overt ops "Here I am shoot at me if you wish".

[jcustis]

I'm wondering at the weight of 6 MREs. That's in the wrappers I presume ?

That's 48hrs of food. The equivalent British 24Hr Ration pack is about 2.1kgs packed or 4.6lbs ish. That's a 1lb shaved off. Once you start dumping stuff, I suspect you could shave at least 2lbs off and maybe 3.

From experience the MRE pack generates a mass of rubbish, nearly a large bin big per platoon the one time I lived on MREs as part of a Rifle Company on exercise in the States The 24Hr ration pack has nowhere near the same level of packaging as MREs

We got a little bit better with a new ration that left out a ton of the BS packaging.

http://www.mreinfo.com/us/fsr/first-strike-ration.html


The development of the FSR came from the fact that prior to deployment, soldiers would "field strip" their MREs. Field stripping involves removing all the excess MRE packaging and unwanted items - bags, boxes, heaters, extra spoons, accessory packs, etc. Creative field stripping could reduce 3 MREs - one day's worth - down to the same size as a single MRE. While this practice reduced the soldier's load by only packing the most critical MRE parts, it also led to increased waste and a reduced consumption of food. A single FSR, which is 24 hours worth of food, is approximately 50% the size and weight of three MREs.

1 FSR = 2,900 calories

3 MREs = 3,800 calories

[carl]

This rounds it up nicely:

http://www.everyjoe.com/2014/06/30/politics/examining-our-soldiers-loads-what-are-they-carrying/

From the article you linked to comes this statement:

"The body armor and winning the war are mutually incompatible. If we can’t contemplate giving that up, at least as a day in, day out piece of equipment, then we need to contemplate simply giving up on fighting wars. Of course, ultimately that means our national extinction."

That strikes me as pretty profound statement.

[jcustis]

It absolutely is a profound statement because it is a profound problem.

And it all goes back to the worry that there will be gnashing of teeth from Mom or Dad if Joe or Johnny is killed via an injury which--while of very low probability--might have been prevented by a protective plate.

Because after all, troops in the movies leap tall buildings in a single bound and aren't constrained by any off that body armor stuff. :wry:

[Granite_State]

Unfortunately the only way how to get soldiers moving again is to dump body armour on missions which does not require body armour - or where is it downright counterproductive (recce). But it seems to me that ordinary infantry is doomed with incredibly stupid presence patrols forever, getting hunted instead of being hunters, doing only overt ops "Here I am shoot at me if you wish".

Agreed. The armor is 60% of the equation, the risk-averse overloading of batteries, water, C-IED, ammo and food is the rest of it. The terrifying thing is that in most of Afghanistan the "war" is very low risk, and even in the worst parts of Helmand and RC-East it can't be compared to Vietnam.

I think we all know what the problem is, but no one at upper levels has the moral courage to make changes. That, and the nature of limited wars means that few individuals, and zero institutions, are playing for a win.

[ganulv]

The armor is 60% of the equation

Do the U.S. Army and Marine Corps have official doctrine on the use of body armor in jungle operations? That’s one environments where I find it hard to imagine that the benefits would outweigh the costs.

[JMA]

As does this:

Donkeys led by Lions (http://www.wapentakes.com/donkeys.pdf)

... but is anybody listening?

I would have thought comment on this document would have opened up a new line in this thread. Alas not. Where are the enquiring minds.

TE Lawrence lamented way back then of the British officer being too much body and too little head. Lind tells us that this crisis extends to the US military as well. Deeply troubling times.

[JMA]

Importantly - for the Brits in Afghanistan - the vast majority of their movement has been within spitting distance of their FOBs where they have (mostly) medium mortars, artillery and a vehicle mounted Fire-support Team based with air support on call. For the British when did this 'load' madness start?


Agreed. The armor is 60% of the equation, the risk-averse overloading of batteries, water, C-IED, ammo and food is the rest of it. The terrifying thing is that in most of Afghanistan the "war" is very low risk, and even in the worst parts of Helmand and RC-East it can't be compared to Vietnam.

I think we all know what the problem is, but no one at upper levels has the moral courage to make changes. That, and the nature of limited wars means that few individuals, and zero institutions, are playing for a win.

[JMA]

Carl, I suggest Lind's comments on the weakness of officer leadership are germane to this discussion.

This psychological need for all this equipment "just in case" would normally be levelled at non-combat experienced leaders. Surely this is no longer the case in Afghanistan with both the yanks and the Brits?


From the article you linked to comes this statement:

"The body armor and winning the war are mutually incompatible. If we can’t contemplate giving that up, at least as a day in, day out piece of equipment, then we need to contemplate simply giving up on fighting wars. Of course, ultimately that means our national extinction."

That strikes me as pretty profound statement.

[carl]

Do the U.S. Army and Marine Corps have official doctrine on the use of body armor in jungle operations? That’s one environments where I find it hard to imagine that the benefits would outweigh the costs.

I don't know. But your comment reminds me of something that I have for a long time thought would be a good idea. The military should wargame some old situations the we know the outcome of and introduce modern elements to see what effect they would have upon the outcome. The thing that made me think of this was the Marines fighting their way out of the frozen Chosin through Red Chinese light infantry. Would they have been able to do it if the Red Chinese had had something like shoulder fired anti-aircraft missiles, something that light infantry could carry, that would have kept the Corsairs and Skyraiders off their backs?

I asked Gian Gentile once if that had ever been done and I think he said he didn't know. But it would be an extremely useful thing to do now, especially in the light of your observation.

Say we took the example of the 5307th Composite Unit (Provisional), Merrill's Marauders. That unit operated for a long time in the tropics, depended upon mobility and eventually broke down because the men were just pushed too far. If people who knew what they were about looked at the experience of that unit and added 30 pounds of body armor to each man's load, what would the result be? That would be very useful, and probably alarming, information.

You could do the same thing with all of our WWII ops in the Pacific, with the 3rd Infantry Division's ops in Sicily, even with Roger's Rangers. You could do it with LRRPs in Vietnam. Those guys had important effects on the fighting. Could they have done it with 30 pounds of body armor?

The basic premise is that the need for those types of ops will arise again and when they do could the modern Army and USMC do what they successfully did in the past.

[carl]

Carl, I suggest Lind's comments on the weakness of officer leadership are germane to this discussion.

This psychological need for all this equipment "just in case" would normally be levelled at non-combat experienced leaders. Surely this is no longer the case in Afghanistan with both the yanks and the Brits?

Military leadership is the heart of the thing. If you haven't you must read Muth's Command Culture ( http://www.amazon.com/Command-Culture-Education-1901-1940-Consequences/dp/1574415336 ). He does a very good job of explaining why the American officer education system just gets it wrong. And it has been wrong for a long time. Bill Mauldin wrote once that they were amazed that a German medic stayed with a wounded German officer who couldn't be moved until they were both captured. He was amazed because the chances front line troops accepting surrender weren't all that good and neither he nor any of his mates could think of a junior American officer they would do that for.

A WWI French general opined that American infantry was just terrible. And we were ( http://www.amazon.com/The-School-Hard-Knocks-Expeditionary/dp/1603442979 ). Straggling (desertion) was so bad in 1918 that the American Army in Europe may not have been a viable combat force if the war had lasted into 1919 (my opinion, the author didn't specifically say that). And Ken White (come back if you can Ken) always said that the US military structure and especially the personnel system were WWI products and haven't been changed. We have gotten away with all this for various reasons of historical and political accident for a century but things have changed. The Royal Navy isn't around anymore.

As far as combat guys changing things, they may be able to fight, with bullets, anybody in the world to standstill and better. But they can't buck the big green machine, or even influence it much. It is just too powerful. I terribly fear only an outside actor can change it, like Napoleon changed the Prussians in 1806 or the Spanish changed the Aztec system. One group survived the change. One group didn't.

[carl]

I would have thought comment on this document would have opened up a new line in this thread. Alas not. Where are the enquiring minds.

TE Lawrence lamented way back then of the British officer being too much body and too little head. Lind tells us that this crisis extends to the US military as well. Deeply troubling times.

I re-read that article and the thing about it that was even more distressing than the soldiers carrying too much weight was the HQs burdening themselves with so much useless make work that they are approaching the point where they can't function. They sling a lot of trons, the HQ people are all sleep deprived from overwork and mountains of 'product' are produced but they are approaching the point where they can't do what they exist for, guide and assist troops in combat. Napoleon and Grant did that for hundreds of thousands of men with pen and paper.

We are in a bad place.

[davidbfpo]

I think Jim Storr's book 'The Human face of War' has been mentioned elsewhere; it looks at many modern aspects of modern war, not IIRC the weight of combat kit, certainly command & control. A paperback edition is due out, though not shown here:http://www.amazon.co.uk/Human-Face-War-Birmingham-Studies/dp/1847065236

Thanks to JMA for the copy of the BAR article 'Donkeys Led by Lions'. As the BAR is still print only and kept within the UK military, very few outsiders will have seen that.

At a recent presentation a British soldier displayed his kit, he was the Section machine gunner and explained if he laid down he had to helped up so heavy was his load. Asked if it was practical he said no and hinted as much as possible was dumped If the OiC was brave enough and no-one was watching.

[BushrangerCZ]

If you ask US Army LRS what type of missions they do in Afghanistan, they will give you answer - recce. Overt recce in Hummwees, more like kind of demonstrative overwatch. Only very few units dare to ditch body armour (one mission mentioned in "No Easy Day" - good book) including SOF units. If they go like: "OK don´t wear it, but if you get killed, your family probably gets no money" what you gonna do?

Just for adding a bit of (ironic) fun to this sad thread:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1X6HnOA88vw
(end of the video is relevant to our discussed problem)

[Compost]

Wider appreciation for risk aversion and overloading might be developed by ordering that duty wear for HQ personnel include body armour and 24 hours of water. Any such regimen would need to apply without exception.
It would presumably be necessary to enforce aperiodic checks of armour and containers.

The residual difficulty would be finding senior officers prepared to issue such orders.

So return to square one. The starting and restarting point where chiefs lay out unvarnished options and politicians make the decisions which can/should/might be publicised.

[JMA]

Carl,

This weight issue will not easlily be solved. The rotations are getting shorter and as a result commanders only start to get the idea when they are on the way home.

From a book currently to hand - and a re-read for the umpteenth time we hear 20 year old 2Lt Sidney Jary who learned the lesson early after D-Day (1944) has to convince his new/replacement company commander to allow his platoon - which was to be the forward platoon of the forward company in the attack on the town of Bedburg - to leave the small packs behind so as to allow them to 'move faster'.

From page 102, 18 Platoon by Sidney Jary (http://www.amazon.com/18-Platoon-Sydney-Jary/dp/1901655016/ref=sr_sp-atf_title_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1406830584&sr=1-1&keywords=18+platoon):


I asked Freddie if 18 Platoon could fight without small packs until we had consolidated at Bedburg. If we could leave them on the Company transport with our picks and shovels we could certainly move faster. Freddie had not been with the Company when we had made our rapid advance at Vernonnet and did not understand the advantage that could be gained by very rapid movement in the type of situation which I sensed now existed. After some discussion, he finally agreed and 18 Platoon with considerable relief loaded their small packs into the 15 hundredweight Bedford.

Carl, you will find this book worth the cost or the effort to find a cheaper copy someplace else as this outstanding officer managed, writing some 40 years after the war to explain his wartime experiences better than anyone else I know of. Much of what gets discussed around here were experienced back then and the lessons learned. Annoying that so many youngsters of today - and sadly others too - perfer to talk about issues rather than read to learn and benefit from the experiences of others. We remain a long way from enlightned discussion around here.


I re-read that article and the thing about it that was even more distressing than the soldiers carrying too much weight was the HQs burdening themselves with so much useless make work that they are approaching the point where they can't function. They sling a lot of trons, the HQ people are all sleep deprived from overwork and mountains of 'product' are produced but they are approaching the point where they can't do what they exist for, guide and assist troops in combat. Napoleon and Grant did that for hundreds of thousands of men with pen and paper.

We are in a bad place.

[BushrangerCZ]

Thanks for a good read tip JMA. Prices are insane, however I will try to ask around to borrow the book.

[JMA]

Try this place, cheapest I know of:

http://www.riflesdirect.com/18-platoon-1053-p.asp



Thanks for a good read tip JMA. Prices are insane, however I will try to ask around to borrow the book.

[BushrangerCZ]

Try this place, cheapest I know of:

http://www.riflesdirect.com/18-platoon-1053-p.asp

Thanks for a link!

[jcustis]

Wider appreciation for risk aversion and overloading might be developed by ordering that duty wear for HQ personnel include body armour and 24 hours of water. Any such regimen would need to apply without exception.
It would presumably be necessary to enforce aperiodic checks of armour and containers.

The residual difficulty would be finding senior officers prepared to issue such orders.

So return to square one. The starting and restarting point where chiefs lay out unvarnished options and politicians make the decisions which can/should/might be publicised.

I am stealing this.

[davidbfpo]

From a book currently to hand - and a re-read for the umpteenth time we hear 20 year old 2Lt Sidney Jary who learned the lesson early after D-Day (1944) has to convince his new/replacement company commander to allow his platoon - which was to be the forward platoon of the forward company in the attack on the town of Bedburg - to leave the small packs behind so as to allow them to 'move faster':18 Platoon by Sidney Jary (http://www.amazon.com/18-Platoon-Sydney-Jary/dp/1901655016/ref=sr_sp-atf_title_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1406830584&sr=1-1&keywords=18+platoon):

I've not this book so wondered about the author. ARSSEE has this from 2008, which refers to other recommended books, only George McDonald Fraser's have I read:
Yes I believe Sydney Jary is still very much alive and well. He is a regular contributor to the British Army Review (BAR). The latest issue BAR 144 has an excellent article by him on "Readjustment". This covers the end of the War in Germany and demob, as far as 18 Platoon were concerned. The Platoon have arrived at Wilstedt, North of Bremen, having fought all the way from Normandy to get there. It ends with Sydney leaving his beloved 18 Platoon of the SLI and going back to the Hampshires.

In my humble opinion his book - 18 Platoon, Brigadier ED "Birdie" Smiths - Even The Brave Falter, George MacDonald Frasers - Quartered Safe Out Here and Major Bill Bellamy's - Troop Leader are the best and most human books written about WW2. Link:http://www.arrse.co.uk/community/threads/information-on-sydney-jary-author-18-platoon.88903/

Sidney Jary is still alive, he retired ten years ago from giving talks to officers cadets @ Sandhurst and is still spritely - from a friend who saw him recently.

In my Google search I found this fasconating extract from Anthony King's 2013 book 'The Combat Soldier: Infantry Tactics and Cohesion in the Twentieth and Twenty-First Centuries (another book I'd missed, after all I've never been a soldier :wry: ):http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=RUZoAgAAQBAJ&pg=PA192&lpg=PA192&dq=Sidney+Jary&source=bl&ots=GEOI8efin3&sig=77X8lQ6OcqQFnM3mz4N1LITa0NY&hl=en&sa=X&ei=UjHdU9iANJGY1AXouIGoCg&ved=0CDcQ6AEwAzgK#v=onepage&q=Sidney%20Jary&f=false

Link to Amazon.uk for this expensive book:http://www.amazon.co.uk/The-Combat-Soldier-Twentieth-Twenty-First/dp/0199658846/ref=cm_cr_pr_product_top

[davidbfpo]

The Daily Telegraph has a set of photos showing a soldier's kit from 1066 to 2014, mainly those who served in the British Army and the photo is the latest:http://i.telegraph.co.uk/multimedia/archive/02994/army-helmand_2994181k.jpg


From:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/history/world-war-one/11006139/Inventories-of-war-soldiers-kit-from-1066-to-2014.html?frame=2994181

[Kiwigrunt]

Mark and David, I hate you guys. If I end up destitute, it will be your fault. But at least – if I end up living in a cardboard box – I shall have some nice books in it.

18 Platoon: ordered (been chasing this for years).
The Combat Soldier: still pondering, credit card dangerously within range.
(The Human Face of War: also still pondering.)

[JMA]

Sydney Jary MC, is unique because he brings perspective to his narratives. A proven battlefield commander able to translate his experiences into a tool for the enlightenment and education of soldiers, especially young officers to be.

A book that needs to be re-read periodically IMHO as I discover new perspectives with each re-read. A classic.

Herewith an article from him in the J R Army Med Corps in 2000:

Reflections on the Relationship Between the Led and the Leader (http://www.ramcjournal.com/content/146/1/54.full.pdf)

Pure magic... don't know about the last paragraph though.


I've not this book so wondered about the author. ARSSEE has this from 2008, which refers to other recommended books, only George McDonald Fraser's have I read:

Link:http://www.arrse.co.uk/community/threads/information-on-sydney-jary-author-18-platoon.88903/

Sidney Jary is still alive, he retired ten years ago from giving talks to officers cadets @ Sandhurst and is still spritely - from a friend who saw him recently.

In my Google search I found this fasconating extract from Anthony King's 2013 book 'The Combat Soldier: Infantry Tactics and Cohesion in the Twentieth and Twenty-First Centuries (another book I'd missed, after all I've never been a soldier :wry: ):http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=RUZoAgAAQBAJ&pg=PA192&lpg=PA192&dq=Sidney+Jary&source=bl&ots=GEOI8efin3&sig=77X8lQ6OcqQFnM3mz4N1LITa0NY&hl=en&sa=X&ei=UjHdU9iANJGY1AXouIGoCg&ved=0CDcQ6AEwAzgK#v=onepage&q=Sidney%20Jary&f=false

Link to Amazon.uk for this expensive book:http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=RUZoAgAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q&f=false

[Firn]

While some might disagree with aspects of the odd selection, especially when it comes to the older stuff, this is a stunning way to browse through the ages. Great way to present and compare kit through the ages. Kudos to the guy who came up with it and for the Telegraph to feature it.

[JMA]

From the sandals and beret for example there are a number of items which would surely not be taken on four hour foot patrol?

Does anyone have a list of items with individual weights?



The Daily Telegraph has a set of photos showing a soldier's kit from 1066 to 2014, mainly those who served in the British Army and the photo is the latest:http://i.telegraph.co.uk/multimedia/archive/02994/army-helmand_2994181k.jpg


From:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/history/world-war-one/11006139/Inventories-of-war-soldiers-kit-from-1066-to-2014.html?frame=2994181

[carl]

I don't know which is why I am asking, but of how much utility are knee pads? It seems to me, no practical experience have I, that kneeling is sort of a betwixt and between position, it doesn't seem as if you could see and move as good as you could standing and you aren't as stable for shooting and are much more visible than prone. And humans aren't really constructed to kneel for long periods of time.

Like I said, I have no practical experience but everybody seems to have knee pads and I wonder how useful they really are.

[Granite_State]

I don't know which is why I am asking, but of how much utility are knee pads? It seems to me, no practical experience have I, that kneeling is sort of a betwixt and between position, it doesn't seem as if you could see and move as good as you could standing and you aren't as stable for shooting and are much more visible than prone. And humans aren't really constructed to kneel for long periods of time.

Like I said, I have no practical experience but everybody seems to have knee pads and I wonder how useful they really are.

Taking a knee on patrol is pretty common, especially in the IED environment. And sometimes microterrain makes it a good idea regardless. Knee pads look (non-PC pejorative), but they're a plus in an urban environment or on other really hard ground. Most of Helmand, not necessary IMO.

[Chris jM]

Sydney Jary MC, is unique because he brings perspective to his narratives. A proven battlefield commander able to translate his experiences into a tool for the enlightenment and education of soldiers, especially young officers to be.


JMA, what did you think of Sydney Jary's view on popular opinion versus the reality of men suited for soldiering? I remember he mentioned, towards the end of 18 Platoon, that he would prefer to have poets in his platoon that were philosophically inclined and more capable of enduring hardship and suffering than the aggressive, alpha type that is often associated with infantry and elite infantry units.

[tankersteve]

If you ask US Army LRS what type of missions they do in Afghanistan, they will give you answer - recce. Overt recce in Hummwees, more like kind of demonstrative overwatch. Only very few units dare to ditch body armour (one mission mentioned in "No Easy Day" - good book) including SOF units. If they go like: "OK don´t wear it, but if you get killed, your family probably gets no money" what you gonna do?



Actually, this is an urban myth. For US military, SGLI pays out no matter the cause of death - suicide, not wearing PPE, etc. However, if he survives the wounds, the unit could court-martial him.

As for kneepads, they help when going prone too, especially in rocky terrain. A sharp hit in the shins is excruciating. The new combat pants with build-in knee pads are awesome and finally solve all the issues about the clunky straps and skiing or skateboarding derivatives with their bulkiness.

Tankersteve

[Firn]

Having read and experienced quite a bit of electric mobility and battery technology I have a couple of question regarding the problem of energy consumptions. As jcustis has put it:


A two-pronged problem we face in carried loads is centered on the almost unquenchable appetite for battery power. In the first prong we have increased a patrol's carried load for force protection purposes with the addition of body-worn counter-IED devices. In the second prong we have not been disciplined enough to curb our demand for tactical information, which in turn drives up the weight penalty due to the suites of communication equipment carried.

We have created this vicious circle of demanding unrealistic reporting of reams of information, and it drives dismounted operations to carry ridiculous quantities of batteries to support 24-hour radio usage.

It goes back to uneducated, ill-informed tactical planning by folks inclined to carry the kitchen sink as insurance against all threats, rather than conduct a smart analysis of requirements and the tactical risks involved.


1) From what I understand most 'future combat systems' introduce and spread new capabilities which consume additional energy. Far more tactical information with additional elements like tablets/smartphones as well as additional battery-powered things like thermal scopes. From my humble point of view it seems that at the current state those projects should increase the battery load considerably, especially for longer missions. Any ideas on that?

2) The energy densities for batteries increased over the last two decades at about 7-10% per year with prices coming down even sharper. This positive trend offers high incentives to replace the batteries of various systems at a rather rapid pace. Is this happening?

3) The demand for energy comes from many different, isolated system with many different batteries. The latter increases considerably the load compared to a few standardized ones for obvious reasons. How far are we down that route?

I have another couple of points on my mind, for example recharging, but will leave it there for now.

I'm pretty sure that in decades if not centuries to come that aspect of the combat load, just as the overall one, will be a big topic. Technological advances offer opportunities to lighten it but add true and perceived needs which still will have to be handled properly with good leadership and METT-TC in mind.

[David I Evans]

2) The energy densities for batteries increased over the last two decades at about 7-10% per year with prices coming down even sharper. This positive trend offers high incentives to replace the batteries of various systems at a rather rapid pace. Is this happening?



The difference is that the average civilian commercial battery powered device is in use by their owners for maybe 18 months to 3 years at most.

Most battery powered military devices tend to be in use for at least 10 years and have a range of requirements that civilian batteries doesn't always match.

[Tukhachevskii]

The Combat Soldier: still pondering, credit card dangerously within range.


Or at least until you have heard the podcast (http://podcasts.ox.ac.uk/combat-soldier-infantry-tactics-and-cohesion-twentieth-and-twenty-first-centuries)by the same author. Personally I would think twice (even three times) before accepting the conclusions of anyone who thinks S.L.A. Marshall was "misunderstood" or that any of his work can be considered valid even after his reputation (and thus the truth content of his research) has been so roundly trounced.

Marshall Myth letter in MILITARY REVIEW May-June 2000

"I am continually amazed and bitterly disappointed to find the S.L.A. Marshall ratio-of-fire myth alive and well in today’s Army. I refer to Major Kelly C. Jordan’s use of that myth in “Harnessing Thunderbolts” in the January-February 2000 issue of Military Review. Like many of his
peers, Jordan apparently does not know that Marshall’s ratio-of-fire has been debunked. If he is unaware of why the debunking, I will gladly send him the information.

I commanded a rifle company in the 84th Infantry Division in northwest Europe for four months during three campaigns from 1944 to 1945 and have disputed Marshall’s findings ever since they first appeared in the old Infantry Journal in 1946- 1947. Marshall never spent a day in combat with any infantry unit in Europe but claimed to have first-hand experience. I want to point out again that Marshall’s ratio of fire has no substance. I would bet that every West Point cadet believes in it, judging from the number of instructors at the Academy who apparently believe it.

My major complaint with Jordan’s article, though, centres on Marshall’s Operations Research Office (ORO) study, which he did for Johns Hopkins University in 1951. I have an original copy of the study, but I am certain its pagination is the same as the copy Jordan uses. Jordan also states that he uses information that can be substantiated from other than Marshall’s own somewhat suspicious data and a secret formula that died with him in 1977" to demonstrate that “the American infantry platoon’s ratio of fire increased from a high of 25 percent in World War II to approximately 55 percent by the end of the Korean War”. Secret formula? Get real! Other sources? Footnote 6 does not list those sources, but Jordan does tell us in that same footnote that he is publishing another article in a different publication on the same subject. Perhaps he will list those “other” sources with that article. I am looking forward to reading it.

I would refer your readers to the ORO study, pages 59-62. In those pages, Marshall tells how he arrived at his figure supporting the statement that “well in excess of 50 percent of troops actually committed to ground where fire may be exchanged directly with the enemy will make use of one weapon or another in the course of an engagement”. He then qualifies his estimate: “In the Korean fighting, there is manifestly a higher percentage of participation by riflemen . . . than in operations during World War II. This can be felt, rather than accurately counted, and therefore, it is difficult to arrive at an accurate percentage figure indicative of the increase. However, averaging
out the night and day operations (emphasis mine) . . . it is considered that . . . well in excess of 50 percent used a weapon”. What a reliable system!

Marshall also points out the differences between offensive and defensive operations and the different ratios of fire between the two types of operations. He excuses the soldiers in Korea from firing during an offensive operation because of the terrain, but I do not remember him giving us the same slack in Europe during World War II.

In my opinion, Marshall’s findings in Korea are as much a myth as are his World War II findings, at least as far as a ratio of fire is concerned. Yelling, screaming, shouting at each other? In the defence? Fine. In the offense? Seldom is this sort of thing necessary, except occasionally by leaders. But Marshall loves this sort of thing, so let us make his followers happy.

Finally, did my men fire? I haven’t the slightest idea, and I question whether any other company commander in northwest Europe during 1944 and 1945 went around after an action checking to determine who did and who did not fire. I remember querying a senior officer who had commanded a company at Hamburger Hill during the Vietnam War on this subject. He assured me every one of his men fired, despite the fact a number had been killed or seriously wounded before they ever got into close firing range. I wanted to know how he knew his men fired. He just knew they did, that’s how. Sounds like S.L.A. Marshall, doesn’t it?"
LTC Albert N. Garland,
US Army, Retired,
Columbus, Georgia