Weight of Combat Gear Is Taking Toll

[SWJED]

Weight of Combat Gear Is Taking Toll (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/01/31/AR2009013101717.html)- Ann Scott Tyson, Washington Post

Carrying heavy combat loads is taking a quiet but serious toll on troops deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan, contributing to injuries that are sidelining them in growing numbers, according to senior military and defense officials.

Rising concern over the muscle and bone injuries -- as well as the hindrance caused by the cumbersome gear as troops maneuver in Afghanistan's mountains -- prompted Army and Marine Corps leaders and commanders to launch initiatives last month that will introduce lighter equipment for some U.S. troops.

As the military prepares to significantly increase the number of troops in Afghanistan -- including sending as many as 20,000 more Marines -- fielding a new, lighter vest and helmet is a top priority, Marine Corps Commandant Gen. James Conway said recently. "We are going to have to lighten our load," he said, after inspecting possible designs during a visit to the Quantico Marine base...

[William F. Owen]

:mad:

This really annoys me. It's as if the corporate memory of every army ever involved in combat operations from the last 60 years, has just evaporated.

The question not being asked is why, when everyone knows how to lighten the load, are they not doing it? Sure, it involves running risk. Risk is inherent to the job.

[Schmedlap]

The new equipment, called a "plate carrier," would protect vital organs and weigh less than 20 pounds. It would not include additional pieces that troops currently use to shield sides, shoulders, arms, the groin and other areas -- pieces that, with a helmet, weigh about 35 pounds. There is also the issue of agility. In our zeal to turn every Soldier into a walking fortress, I think some lose sight of the fact that our doctrine and tactics are about taking the fight to the enemy, rather than absorbing enemy fire and calling for exfil. You simply cannot move if you're kitted out like King Arthur and your effectiveness is degraded. Let's not forget why Soldiers are out there: to find and kill the enemy. In OIF III, we fielded the shoulder guards. I have never seen anything so restrictive to one's arm and shoulder movement. They might as well have issued us straight-jackets. We refused to wear them and sent them back to the warehouse to be removed from our property book. Eventually, "higher" deemed that only turret gunners were required to wear them. We generally complied (METT-T dependent).

As for the total weight, it is surprising that if these items are only 35 pounds that Soldiers are still carrying so much weight. I wonder where the statistics come from. Obviously, Afghanistan requires heavier loads simply due to water requirements alone. But in Iraq, the average combat load for us was 13 magazines (probably less for most units), 1 gallon of water, 2 frags (probably less for most units), a first aid kit that weighed maybe a pound or so, another pound for an NVD, and then either a radio, shotgun with 8 rounds (probably not carried by most units), or some other item - none of which weighed more than 10 or 12 pounds. By my guestimation, that's about 40 or 50 pounds (I'm overestimating to account for batteries), to include an M4, at the most, added to the 35 pounds of armor and helmet. SAW gunners and M240B gunners did not carry the "other item" so the total weight wasn't too much more for them - maybe 10 pounds more at the most. (Note the several instances of "probably less" and "overestimate"). If all of this weight were being carried in an ALICE pack, then I could see how it would get old really quickly. But given how we carry this stuff now - close to the body, distributed evenly - this amount of weight was barely noticable. I've really got to question the physical training of someone who feels overly weighted down by this.

Regarding one item of protection noted - the groin protection - that weighs almost nothing. I kept it folded up, underneath my RACK and when the shooting started simply leaned forward and brushed the guard down into position. I'll take the risk of muscular-skeletal injury over the risk of losing the family jewels.

Lastly, there are some legitimate points in this article, but I've got to raise the BS flag on this part...

Sgt. Waarith Abdullah, 34, is struggling to recover at Fort Stewart, Ga., from a lower-back injury that he says was caused by the strain of wearing body armor for long hours each day during three deployments to Iraq and Saudi Arabia.

Abdullah's injury flared up painfully during his most recent 15-month deployment to Balad, Iraq, where he had to maneuver to search vehicles and stand for 12-hour shifts in guard towers.
(emphasis added)
What the heck is going on in Saudi Arabia that requires wearing heavy "combat" gear? "Maneuver" to search vehicles? And what is this guy weighted down with while standing in a guard tower? Body armor, according to the article, is 35 pounds. What other gear is this guy carrying, versus having readily available at his post? Could the author have found a more ridiculous example to illustrate an otherwise legitimate observation? I've seen pregnant Soldiers able to work harder than this.

[selil]

Light weight, capable, flexible, is known. Pick up an REI catalog or GALLS. We've talked about this before, but nobody is listening.

Next time somebody snags a Taliban insurgent, weigh his entire kit.

[Schmedlap]

Next time somebody snags a Taliban insurgent, weigh his entire kit.
I think the usefulness of that observation is limited. If we kill 100 Taliban in one day, our adversaries don't lose much sleep. If we lose 5 Soldiers in one day, it imperils public support for the war. Hence the body armor.

Also, the Taliban can afford to travel light because he can hide among the people. If he runs out of ammo, he can throw down his weapon and mingle with the locals. If a Soldier runs out of ammo, then he's probably getting his head chopped off.

[Bob's World]

Light weight, capable, flexible, is known. Pick up an REI catalog or GALLS. We've talked about this before, but nobody is listening.

Next time somebody snags a Taliban insurgent, weigh his entire kit.

True, but when the much heavier kit is more bulletproof, the senior leaders who made the right decision to go with the lighter gear will be crucified by the same media for not giving the soldiers the very best (now defined by how resistent vs how light) it is.

Real Catch-22.

I had to chuckle a bit at GEN Chiarelli's comments about humping a heavy ruck. I really like this guy as a person and have tremendous respect for him as an officer. This is a general who walks the walk when it comes to taking care of soldiers. The reason I chuckled though, is because he is Cav/Armor thru and thru, and is far more likely to put a dash of fuel in his coffee than ever hump a ruck! I had the privelege of working for him back in 2002 in Army G-3 during football season, and as he is a Univ of Washington alum, it led to some good banter with this Oregon State product.

For weeks I had endured good natured ribbing about us SOF guys and our dewrags and general disregard for good military decorum. Come the week of the big game between UW and OSU I challenged him to a small wager during the evening shift change (which this 2-star never missed, morning and night he ran the rehearsal and the actual brief...not to cover his ass, but to ensure he knew the issues and the product was tight, and he did and it was). Gen C was immediately up for the bet and asked me what I would be willing to wager. Simple, if my team lost, I would stand the next shift change wearing a Kevlar. If his team lost, he would stand the next shift change wearing a dewrag. Suffice it to say the wager was too large...

But I know this, whatever the best combination of light weight and good protection is available, this general will bet his stars to see that the soldier receives it.

[max161]

S**t is still a hundred pounds" as the old saying goes.

Part of the problem is that we default to a technical solution for everything. As we miniaturize something and make it smaller and more compact and lighter we (or industry) comes up with something new that will enhance our missions that much more. Communications, computers, more weapons and ammunition and of course the emphasis on force protection (which is not a bad thing but we have to understand that protecting a soldier from a kinetic weapon requires sufficient mass). And as long as we have large rucksacks and load bearing equipment and vests on which we can attach and hang things we are always going to add something new that we think we will need or supposedly help us to better accomplish the mission or protect us. Like nature abhors a vacuum, if there is space on a soldier (or in his ruck) we will fill it!!

[reed11b]

The thing that bugs me, is equipment that is fairly effective will be the first on the "cut" list. Body armor has grown, and perhaps needs to be scaled back, but I do not buy that it is the key weight holding us back. Part of this is from how the weight of the armor is carried and part is from what I have seen many units carry in the fields. I have seen units carry breaching kits on every patrol, take way more snivel gear then they need to survive, overload ammo, water etc etc. These items are carried in a backpack that carries the weight off balance from the body, while the armor weight is distributed across the torso. And really, do you need a breaching kit on every patrol? Why not keep it in the support vehicle and call it up if you need it, unless your going specifically on a raid. Just becouse there is space in your "3 day assualt pack" does not mean you need to fill it. I'll stop here before I wander too far from my point.
Reed

[Jason Port]

I remember this discussion occurring during Desert Storm/Shield, where the average dismounted 11C seemed to be carrying 700 pounds and a labrador retriever everywhere in the reports. Is it true that whereever there is space on the soldier, we feel a need to fill it. However, we have definitely lost sight of the METT-TC analysis which should go into equipping soldiers pre-mission. While we do the best we can for risk mitigation (Shoulder armor, groin protector et al), the point on the breaching kit is right on. In motorized maneuver, where the dismount is supported with vehicles, it is only appropriate to factor this support into the equation.

I also found it interesting the quantity of injuries and 10th MTNs story of success. While I agree that the average human structure is not really designed to carry the full weight of the basic combat load, the reality is that with proper conditioning, everyone can carry the 35 pounds of IBA and ACH. The truest warrior athletes train harder and are even more capable of enduring the additional weight. Does it suck? Sure, but conversely it beats the alternative. Improve the pre-mob physical training, and I suggest that the results will improve.

I am left to wonder though, if the decrease in physical fitness of the incoming soldier is related to this as well. I remember seeing 18-20 year old trainees who struggled to do a 10 minute mile at Reception station in the late 90's. I was recently at Ft. Bragg and saw two shaved headed non-combat patched members of the 82nd, who looked barely old enough to be in uniform. They were chowing at Arby's and were clearly doughy. I assumed that they had just gotten there, as they certainly didn't make the profile of the Airborne yet. I suspect that upon donning their gear, they would break under the weight. My point is - Does the incoming post-teenager now represent a physically weaker specimen? I am sure I would have struggled at 10,000 feet as a 34 year old platoon sergeant, but I could see these two getting injured doing gate vehicle checks and standing in the tower above.

Further the technology provided by industry is also at fault here. Radios down to the individual - I get it. Tacking on additional sensors? As a tech guy, I dig it. However, as a trooper I am only carrying it if there is real, responsive, and tangible benefit to me at the end of the day. So if the sensor gathers raw video data for example about the mission, then analyze it immediately, and feed it back to my platoon's leadership, so that tomorrow I am smarter because of what we did. If not, the sensor is getting left under my hammock. The reality is that too many current sensors or information requirements do not really assist the troopers who feed the data into the information monster. Close the loop and then I will carry it. To Reed's point, we would instead cut the effective stuff in exchange for the shiny objects.

[carl]

My comments are those of a civilian who has no practical experience in this area beyond camping and chasing juvenile deliquents down the street after jumping out of a patrol car so I expect to get torn to pieces. But...

This problem has been around for a long time. Hoplites could never catch peltasts unless they wanted to get caught or made a big mistake. Peltasts generally couldn't hold against hoplites. You needed both. Maybe we are reaching that point again. Maybe we need to develop a corps of skirmishers of some kind who would have some chance of catching or keeping up with a Taliban running up a mountain.

I think no matter how fit a heavily armored trooper is, he isn't going to match a very lightly equipped man in moving about.

If I remember correctly, one of the things used to judge increased American success againt the VC/NVA was how many contacts were initiated by them against us vs. how many were initiated by us against them. This is probably being tracked in Afghanistan. If some units are going about less heavily burdened than others, might this not affect how many contacts they started and could that be compared to other units?

Lastly, I talked to a guy once who was in the South African Army when they used to run long patrols in Namibia and Angola. The troops were given very wide latitude in deciding what they did and didn't want to carry. Would this be an option for our troops?

[Danny]

I have fairly detailed coverage of body armor at my site. I have called for weight reductions so many times I have lost count. But there is something that everyone should face regarding this issue, or there will be no path forward on it.

The low hanging fruit has been picked. Period. The soft panel armor has been scaled back to minimal, losing only ounces or at the most a few pounds. The carrier (which is very low weight itself except for the groin and neck protection itself on the MTV) is light, the soft panels slightly more weighty, but the ESAPI plates HEAVY.

Unless and until we invest the dollars into the innovative design and testing of new hard plates (ceramic or otherwise), there will be no further weight reduction while maintaining the same level of protection. We must find a way to reduce the weight of the ESAPI plates. Our Soldiers and Marines deserve it. This means dollars, national labs, studies in fracture mechanics with finite elements codes, and real commitment rather than just nice words.

Now, for the weight. The IBA (and Marine newest, MTV or its replacement in Afghanistan which reduces the soft panel coverage a little) is about 32 pounds, give or take a few ounces. It's almost all due to ESAPI plates (well, maybe that's a slight exaggeration, but the majority of it is plates). But when you hear about the heavier loads, it's because, of course, they attach other gear (e.g., gun via a carabiner, ammunition, eye wear such as ballistic glasses, hydration system, etc., etc.). Most of the time the systems total out at 65 - 85 pounds, and that is if they don't have a backpack, at which point they might cross the line at 110 pounds.

Body armor is weighty, but it isn't the only thing that adds load to our troops. But the main target of weight reduction if we wish to improve the IBA / MTV is the ESAPI plates. I come back to this point again and again, because it is so true and obvious that I'm surprised that anyone even tries anything else to decrease weight. I advocate spending dollars where it will make a difference rather than trying to pick high-hanging fruit that won't help.

Best, HPS

[Schmedlap]

1. If we're talking about the weight carried on Soldiers' backs, then I agree that we need to find ways to reduce weight. Climbing around mountains with 85 pounds of gear on your torso, plus a full weight (60? 80 pounds more?) on your back, and doing it everyday for a year in sweltering heat - we need to work on that.

2. If we're only talking about standard equipment that Soldiers wear on their torsos then I don't see any issue. Okay, so we've got 85 pounds (usually less) of vest, plates, ammunition, explosives, first aid kit, water, weapons, NVDs, and communication gear. As it is worn now, that's not a problem. It is distributed evenly and close to the body.

I agree that the body is generally not going to react well to the heavy weight, giant ruck, and steep terrain trio (paragraph 1). But if you can't keep up with the standard equipment evenly distributed and closely held to your torso (paragraph 2), then you're probably in the wrong line of work. I think the R&D, in that regard, would be better spent on breathable, cooler uniforms that reduce sweating, thus reducing water intake.

[Danny]

I am assuming, Schmedlap, that the low hanging fruit has been picked for the other gear like it has for body armor. It really doesn't make any difference to the warrior whether the weight is coming from his backpack, hydration system, first aid supplies (for Corpsmen or Combat lifesaver), ammunition or body armor.

The point is that we can fiddle with the small stuff that won't make any difference, or we can attack the large stuff that will. ESAPIs are the gold mine. Fix this problem and you fix the problem of battle space weight.

[Schmedlap]

I think that where the weight is carried is very significant. Years of humping a 60 to 120 pound ALICE pack - before the advent of the interceptor or SAPIs - always sucked, no matter how much training preceded it. Patrolling in 85 pounds of gear distributed around my torso was nothing.

I agree that reducing ESAPI weight would be a significant step in reducing overall weight. But I also think that even if we reduced the amount of weight on the torso to zero, things aren't going to change all that much for the guy humping a ruck in the mountains of Afghanistan. Let Soldiers patrol those mountains with just a rucksack and no vest/plates/load-carrying equipment/etc and they're still going to develop the muscular-skeletal problems discussed. Figure out a way for them to patrol with the standard equipment that Soldiers have in Iraq, but no ruck, and I think the problem goes away.

Unfortunately, for the Soldier in Afghanistan, I don't see any way to supply him with water, food, batteries, and ammunition without requiring him to carry it.

[Danny]

With the above.

Best,

HPS

[carl]

Unfortunately, for the Soldier in Afghanistan, I don't see any way to supply him with water, food, batteries, and ammunition without requiring him to carry it.

How about pack animals?

[politicsbyothermeans]

The question I asked myself, and had my Team Sergeant ask our bubbas, is "Do I really need this?" If the answer was no, put it in your bugout bag or in the truck. If the answer was yes, hang it somewhere. Even so, the reality of our tactical situation often had us with loads that were certainly a consideration in planning the missions. Our agility was certainly not what it would have been without the armor but I imagine agility is also heavily degraded when 7.62x39 or shrapnel are investigating your innards. Not a truly serious point there but I can safely say that I saw guys saved by their armor and I can't think of a single instance where someone was wounded/killed as a result of wearing their armor.

There is little doubt that the weight of gear needs to be reduced but I'll be darned if I can find where that is going to happen. Sure, lighter armor is a good place to start. But, the truth of the matter is that it is on the leadership to evaluate the tactical situation and plan the approach load appropriately. That is, until Mother Army gets around to designing our nano everything gear.

[Surferbeetle]

...reported on this a while back (http://www.popsci.com/node/3409), interesting, but I am not sure about it's practicality in the real world. I suspect that's why we are still issued rucks :rolleyes:

Politicsbyothermeans,

Vehicles are indeed nice to have. Good to see another ca-bubba here.

Regards,

Steve

[William F. Owen]

But, the truth of the matter is that it is on the leadership to evaluate the tactical situation and plan the approach load appropriately.

Methods for doing that have existed for nearly 100 years, yet the US Army does not employ them. Each time I brief a solution, there's the old "Oh we can't do that." - "too dangerous, too risky, we'll get sued etc etc etc."

Everything I see, says the situation is set to get worse.

[Schmedlap]

How about pack animals?
I think that addresses the medical concerns, but not always the tactical ones. I understand some ODAs had good experiences with them. But I can't imagine that working well for the types of missions that an Infantry Battalion will be doing; at least not to a degree where the Soldiers will all be able to ditch their rucks.

[politicsbyothermeans]

Methods for doing that have existed for nearly 100 years, yet the US Army does not employ them. Each time I brief a solution, there's the old "Oh we can't do that." - "too dangerous, too risky, we'll get sued etc etc etc."

Everything I see, says the situation is set to get worse.

Agreed.

If only we could remember to worry less about our OERs and more about our dudes, we might not be having this discussion right now.

[bismark17]

It reminds me of the Ranger telling me about how he jumped into Grenada with 100 pounds of light weight gear.

[Bullmoose Bailey]

Must feel that the process has now reached certain logical conclusions.

Wish to address armour on men & trucks.

(not tanks since I feel armour belongs on them...seperate issue)

The flak vest and gun shield have evolved into quite obtuse systems which constrict movement severely.

In the nature of adaptation the counter to Coalition vehicular plate overcastings has been the implementation of penetrating devices, commonly called EFPs , which essentially render all vehicle armor useless.

I expect that armour penetrating rounds could be improvised for sniper rifles, etc. that would place dismounts in the same over-dressed, unprotected state.

Change is continuous in all conflict.

[Schmedlap]

I remember a Pentagon briefing, several years ago, when the MOLLE gear was first being introduced and the latest ruck was being modeled. A spokesman on the podium said something to the effect of, "this new ruck will allow Soldiers to carry 150 pound loads comfortably." And, to demonstrate, a short, older woman wearing spit-shined jumpboots was standing proudly on the podium, sporting the full ruck, apparently quite comfortable with it bearing down on her shoulders (I have no idea whether it was full of ammo or pillows).

While I do not miss the lackluster training or garrison-minded madness of the pre-9/11 force, I have to admit that spectacles like that did provide for an occasional good laugh.

[BayonetBrant]

For the guys at PEO-Soldier, I wish to offer this nugget, from a guy who's schlepped many a bag on his back over the years (military and civilian) -

There is no comfortable way to carry 150 pounds of gear. There are varying ranges of discomfort, but it'll never feel as good as when you take the pack off.

[BayonetBrant]

Lastly, I talked to a guy once who was in the South African Army when they used to run long patrols in Namibia and Angola. The troops were given very wide latitude in deciding what they did and didn't want to carry. Would this be an option for our troops?

Sadly, no. Because those South African commanders never appeared before a hearing full of never-been-in-the-military Congressional reps being beseiged by letter-writers from back home demanding to know why their sons/daughters weren't weighed down with every single potential life-saving gizmo we could possibly buy.
No commander wants to have to face the klieg lights of C-SPAN and try to explain to people (who are proud of the fact that they don't understand) what life's like when you're chasing targets up the side of a mountain with 150 pounds of lightweight gear nestled comfortably in your MOLLE ruck...

[politicsbyothermeans]

I was looking at some pictures of my grandfather and great uncles in WWII (and, my great grandfather in WWI) and I was pretty well struck by them wearing ties... into combat. I do not doubt that the ties were quickly discarded but it does serve to remind us that soldiers have been doing this whole war thing for quite some time and armor is hardly new. The apt pupil will note that even though armor has shifted the balance towards "safe" war for some, it has invariably been sidelined by some advance in weaponry.

Apart from that, I do wonder if the answer to our question lies more in the realm of the logistician and the UAV crowd than at PEO Soldier. Afterall, if we could reliably (and I admit therein lies the rub) provide the correct classes of supply in a very timely manner, why would we need to hump everything? Only certain items would really need to be carried while other classes of supply could easily be either air dropped or brought forward after the fight. Anyone that has done long range movement to the objective understands the concept of the cache. What say those with the large pulsing veins in their foreheads to an aerial cache system? Something that allows our guys to put everything important on it and then meet us at a predesignated point... say that mountain we're trying to climb?

[William F. Owen]

Sadly, no. Because those South African commanders never appeared before a hearing full of never-been-in-the-military Congressional reps being beseiged by letter-writers from back home demanding to know why their sons/daughters weren't weighed down with every single potential life-saving gizmo we could possibly buy.
.

...and there you have it. Until your Army is an institution that accepts risk taking, and does not have a culture of risk mitigation, you are screwed.

Certain armies and certain units, just do not have a load carrying problem, because they leaders and manpower prepared to make the choices.

Sorry to sound harsh, but there it is.

[BayonetBrant]

Afterall, if we could reliably (and I admit therein lies the rub) provide the correct classes of supply in a very timely manner, why would we need to hump everything? Only certain items would really need to be carried while other classes of supply could easily be either air dropped or brought forward after the fight.


Just remember that rucks come in one size: full.

If you build it, they will fill it.

[Steve Blair]

Only certain items would really need to be carried while other classes of supply could easily be either air dropped or brought forward after the fight. Anyone that has done long range movement to the objective understands the concept of the cache. What say those with the large pulsing veins in their foreheads to an aerial cache system? Something that allows our guys to put everything important on it and then meet us at a predesignated point... say that mountain we're trying to climb?

This was tried by some units in Vietnam, and it was discovered that it required a fair amount of aviation support. To the best of my knowledge only the 1st Cav was able to pull it off on a regular basis, and even then it was criticized by some company-level officers as making their units too dependent on available LZs and compromising unit location each time the log birds came in. It's also rather terrain focused. The Cav could pull it off in the III CTZ because it was reasonably flat, but units like the 101st in I CTZ had problems due to the mountains (and this was especially true for the 4th ID in II CTZ), and the Americal found it almost impossible due to an extended AO and limited aviation support. The Marines had issues similar to those experienced by the Americal, although it did ease somewhat in 1969 when some organizational changes were made.

[politicsbyothermeans]

This was tried by some units in Vietnam, and it was discovered that it required a fair amount of aviation support. To the best of my knowledge only the 1st Cav was able to pull it off on a regular basis, and even then it was criticized by some company-level officers as making their units too dependent on available LZs and compromising unit location each time the log birds came in. It's also rather terrain focused. The Cav could pull it off in the III CTZ because it was reasonably flat, but units like the 101st in I CTZ had problems due to the mountains (and this was especially true for the 4th ID in II CTZ), and the Americal found it almost impossible due to an extended AO and limited aviation support. The Marines had issues similar to those experienced by the Americal, although it did ease somewhat in 1969 when some organizational changes were made.

I'm completely with you and hope I don't sound the least bit snotty when I say that I hope that our logistical/technical skills have increased sufficiently in the last four decades that we could relook this issue.

Perhaps this problem will receive more attention as we shift focus away from the vehicle centric movements in Iraq to more dismounted operations in A'Stan.

[Meinertzhagen]

This is very much how we conducted operations on my last rotation to Northeast Afghanistan. On overnight operations, platoons would leave the Firebase dismounted with a light load enroute to support-by-fire positions or a village for a cordon and search. At one of the hub FOBs, prepo packages of water, MREs and other supplies usually contained in body bags nicknamed "speedballs" would be air-assaulted to resupply positions during the operation. These packages were designed to quickly and easily resupply elements while keeping excess low and their fighting load light. I'm not a logistician, but the system seemed to work well and certainly prolonged our small unit endurance in the extraordinarily difficult terrain of Kunar, Laghman and Nuristan Provinces.

[Ken White]

Bayonet Brant:"No commander wants to have to face the klieg lights of C-SPAN and try to explain to people (who are proud of the fact that they don't understand) what life's like when you're chasing targets up the side of a mountain with 150 pounds of lightweight gear nestled comfortably in your MOLLE ruck..."Wilf:"Until your Army is an institution that accepts risk taking, and does not have a culture of risk mitigation, you are screwed."Steve Blair:"This (aerial resupply) was tried by some units in Vietnam,"It does require a fair amount of aviation support but the key is decentralization. The 1st Bde of the 101st in 65-67 was able to do it regularly in all three northern Corps areas; the 101st Div over organized it and it did not work. It also works best if you resupply platoons (best) or companies (achievable) and not battalions (almost impossible); It's totally do-able today(but see Wilf's comment).

Meinertzhagen:This is very much how we conducted operations on my last rotation to Northeast Afghanistan.As did 1/82 on OEF6. To include vehicle borne patrols as well as Platoons/Companies on foot.

Bottom line is that Commanders today can reduce the weight carried -- but at a cost of reducing the protection and lethality of their troops. That should be a tactical decision allowed to Company commanders. Period.

Bayonet Brant's comment is true now -- but only because DoD has allowed that to happen; the media is terribly ignorant about the military and Congress has not been educated by DoD. Realistically, I see little chance for change, unfortunately. Though there is one thing that might be considered; if we go to war in another sub tropical jungle, there will be either no armor -- or a whole lot of heat casualties...

[Ron Humphrey]

This is very much how we conducted operations on my last rotation to Northeast Afghanistan. On overnight operations, platoons would leave the Firebase dismounted with a light load enroute to support-by-fire positions or a village for a cordon and search. At one of the hub FOBs, prepo packages of water, MREs and other supplies usually contained in body bags nicknamed "speedballs" would be air-assaulted to resupply positions during the operation. These packages were designed to quickly and easily resupply elements while keeping excess low and their fighting load light. I'm not a logistician, but the system seemed to work well and certainly prolonged our small unit endurance in the extraordinarily difficult terrain of Kunar, Laghman and Nuristan Provinces.

At least one step closer to that dream I have of ADDCLM's

Artillery Delivered Danger Close Logistics munitions:wry:

Not only get's the beans and bullet's there but just think of how acurate those FA bubbas are gonna be when you really get in a jam and aren't asking for jam:D

[RJ]

Today there was this headline about a hearing in Washington, DC

Military: Improved body armor is too heavy

By Richard Lardner - The Associated Press
Posted : Wednesday Feb 4, 2009 20:02:39 EST

It is long and many quotes Army Brass and statements about the weight and some deficient plates for the new body armor.

It ends the story with these comments;

“Over time, the body armor, it does wear on your body,” said Army Staff Sgt. Fred Rowe, who has done two combat tours in Iraq. “I couldn’t imagine doing what I did, carrying what I carried, in Afghanistan.”

Rowe appeared at the hearing along with several senior Army officers, including Maj. Gen. Robert Lennox, who oversees operations and training.

Brig. Gen. Michael Brogan, head of the Marine Corps Systems Command in Quantico, Va., agreed with Army leaders who said that the vast majority of requests from commanders in the field, especially those in Afghanistan, ask that the troops’ load be lightened.

“We must balance levels of protection in order to maintain the agility, mobility and lethality of our Marines,” according to Brogan’s written testimony.

I hope the powers that be read Gen. Brogan's written testimony. But have the nagging feeling they didn't.

[politicsbyothermeans]

I shall not name the GO but I know of a GO that decided that he and his staff would wear their IBAs (with the Division standard loadout) while in the HQ for one week so that they could experience what their folks were dealing with. This was despite the Div CSM pointing out that office operations were not combat operations.

For those of you with the sickened feeling in your stomach area, you will be pleased to know that, after a few days, the GO declared the experiment a success and told his folks they could return their IBAs to the bottom of their duffle bags, or wherever Fobgoblins keep their crap.

[sapperfitz82]

I haven't the time to look/link it.

As for those who feel 85 lbs is an acceptable combat load, I applaud you and say your nuts.

Been both places, can attest that the MOLLE I absolutely will not carry 150 lbs, the frame will break about 30% of the time with just 80 lbs in it.

Old women can't climb the Hindu Kush, I know, I watch the young women fail to do with just an IBA, forget the ruck.

We are over what every study has shown to be the ideal fighting load (about 35-45 lbs) by exactly the weight of the IBA. My last fighting load was 73 lbs. Don't tell me to leave the snivel at home, I have evaced soldiers for hypothermia and burned my C4 to keep others alive. We had no snivel, unless one bivy sack per two men counts, and my emergency approach march load was weighed at 143 when I came back! Extra? Water, batteries, 1 UBL, C4. I drank a quart a day for 11 days and ate a 2 power bars and an MRE every day. I lost over 25 lbs (from 143 lb).

How do I know these weights? Because they had a study group weighing us and all our gear at departure and return. Because the study (in 2003) said we were carrying too much. Because they have only added more to our mandatory kit, and I take a deep and abiding interest in its weight.

10 lbs for every size larger in the IBA. I now wear a small, not a medium. Those of you with a large IBA are carrying 20 lbs more armor than I do. Weight has changed our tactics. We used to walk those mountains, now we drive the valleys.

Those of you who are commanders and have decided that an 80 lbs fighting load is acceptable are part of the problem, plain and simple. It is not. Try some simple tests. Conduct a combat assault course or any O course in full kit (with ammo). Your unit will not meet your expectations. My platoon had a PT average in the 280s and were studs, plain and simple. We did the A course regularly. Full kit broke it off. After we had done 6 months walking in Astan. The loads are simply too much. Since the Hoplites, we have found that the army standard 35-45 lbs is the most weight one can carry and still fight effectively for a long period.

[Schmedlap]

If combat were long periods of intense physical activity such as that engaged in on an obstacle/assault course, punctuated by brief periods of inactivity, then I think that performance on such a course would be a useful metric. But combat is the opposite - long periods of inactivity, punctuated by intensity.

Like most others on the board, I've spent a fair amount of time patrolling, fighting, and doing other random tasks in Iraq, for long periods of time, in ridiculously hot temperatures, in around 85 pounds of gear. It's not ideal, but it's acceptable. There were days where we were involved in some sphincter-puckering situations and we, too, felt like someone had broken it off in us - probably very similar to how folks felt after the assault course. I don't think the determination of the ideal weight has anything to do with whether you feel refreshed immediately following a firefight. I think it has more to do with whether you had the gear you needed and whether you're the guy consolidating and reorganizing on the objective, rather than the guy who's lying motionless on it. Unfortunately, "need" is determined by more than tactical considerations. Dead American Soldiers undermine public support. So long as the load does not get so heavy as to prevent us from prevailing in a firefight, I don't see the weak political will of the American people allowing us to go sans SAPI.

I suspect that my views on the weight of our gear would differ if I were in Afghanistan's steep terrain - perhaps that's a relevant variable - though the reality of public opinion wouldn't change.

Loads of 140 pounds or more - yeah, I'd say that would suck just about anywhere.

One other thought - perhaps it's not the number of pounds, but the percentage of one's body weight that matters. All of our machine gunners were tall guys. Long legs seem to make carrying the gun easier. Taller guys were generally heavier folks. I recall one guy in the unit who weighed about 120 or 130, soaking wet, and there was no talk of making him a machine gunner.

[reed11b]

One other thought - perhaps it's not the number of pounds, but the percentage of one's body weight that matters. All of our machine gunners were tall guys. Long legs seem to make carrying the gun easier. Taller guys were generally heavier folks. I recall one guy in the unit who weighed about 120 or 130, soaking wet, and there was no talk of making him a machine gunner.

What unit was that!! :eek: I weighed between 120 and 145 while in service and I was a mortarman or RTO on active and both a 240B and and SAW gunner in the guard. I remember one night patrol when I had both the SAW and the singars and my SL saw an Iraqi out past curfew and yelled for me to chase him. I was like "yeah right" but I did anyway.
Reed

[ODB]

Training!

[Ken White]

Great choice of words... :D

[ODB]

Do most of these threads keep coming back to that word? How many times will I have to shout it from the top of my lungs until they get it?

Maybe can work with you on the age thing, but rich is non-wavierable:D

[Ken White]

tends to benefit only a few congressional districts while hardware with multiple sub contractors benefit many. Good trainers are hard to find. Hard to do it well. Too much early attrition to invest too much in it. High 'no-Go' rates don't make the School / TC look good. Lot of reasons -- none good in my opinion but there sure are a bunch of excuses....

Be careful with those lungs; 'bout ruined mine screaming it. ;)

Hang tight, I'm buying Lottery tickets. :D

[Kiwigrunt]

I came across this:

http://defenceoftherealm.blogspot.com/2008/05/not-taking-it-seriously.html

Reported recently by Popular Mechanics (a surprisingly good source of reliable military information) is a new technique introduced by the US forces in Afghanistan. This is the GPS-guided or "smart" parachute – known as the Joint Precision Airdrop System (JPADS).

It can be used by high-flying transport aircraft to make precision drops of supplies to isolated outposts, reducing the need to use ambush-prone vehicle convoys and avoiding the hazards involved in helicopter re-supply. So successful has been the technique that the USAF delivered 313,824 pounds of supplies between August 2006, when the programme began, to September 2007 – keeping an estimated 500+ convoys off the roads.

First time I've heard of it but as it is a few years old I assume most of you will know about it?! It mentions here the supply of outposts but would this system work for supplying small patrols? Even from helicopters at altitude. What say you......

[RTK]

Training!
So I see after a week and a half off the net that I haven't missed much. :D

[RJ]

"What unit was that!! I weighed between 120 and 145 while in service and I was a mortarman or RTO on active and both a 240B and and SAW gunner in the guard. I remember one night patrol when I had both the SAW and the singars and my SL saw an Iraqi out past curfew and yelled for me to chase him. I was like "yeah right" but I did anyway."
Reed 11B

My Marine Battalion (3/5) seemed to lean towards Machine gunners who were short and wiry and strong or short and built like fire plugs. Stocky and strong! i commented on the height issue to a Gunnery Sgt. and he said that the shorter the gunner, the less there is for the enemy to hit.
As good a theory as any, I guess. :D

I saw a gunner running across a rice paddy dike slip and fall into a freshly manured paddy. As his body arched out, off the dike, he pushed the gun off his shoulders and rotate his body to hit the water on his back. The picture of his wrists and forearms holding the gun out of the water was the most impressive thing I ever saw. We applauded him when his A/Gunner pulled him above the funky water.

Guns Up!

The "MG" in those days was the LMG 30.

[Ken White]

So I see after a week and a half off the net that I haven't missed much. :DHey -- we're consistent. ;)

Hard not to be when confronted with such a massive long standing error. :wry:

[ODB]

So I see after a week and a half off the net that I haven't missed much. :D

But it does cover a lot (might be an understatement) of the issues discussed. I will have to go back an consult my post where I used the thesaurus so I can use different words to say the same thing.

[Schmedlap]

Are we saying that more/proper training...
a) will reduce the need for so much gear because we won't need it to be effective
b) better physically condition Soldiers so that the weight is not an issue
c) both
d) neither

This is one of those occasions where the connection between the problem identified and the solution suggested isn't completely obvious to me.

[jcustis]

I came across this:



First time I've heard of it but as it is a few years old I assume most of you will know about it?! It mentions here the supply of outposts but would this system work for supplying small patrols? Even from helicopters at altitude. What say you......

In the Corps, we call them Sherpa drops. Witnessed three of them used to resupply us near the Syrian border in 2004. The require a logistics tail though to retrieve the equipment and parachutes after the drop is done (at least in a semi-permissive environment). They could absolutely be utilized for in-extremis resupply and left behind as required.

We have utilized helicpopters to deliver fuel, food, and water to forces in the battlespace during this rotation, but aerial resupply is dicey when you add up weather, limited visibility flight qualifications, etc.

[Ken White]

Are we saying that more/proper training...
a) will reduce the need for so much gear because we won't need it to be effectiveas well what little must be taken * and what should be left behind -- and more importantly, decent training will also develop leaders that can and will conduct risk assessments and who will allow (and take) responsibility for tactical decisions that may lessen 'necessary equipment' carried, 'force protection' or 'safety' restrictions to provide better conditions for mission accomplishment.This is one of those occasions where the connection between the problem identified and the solution suggested isn't completely obvious to me.Unfortunately, it is also not obvious to many in high places.

I fully understand the political and media pressures on several levels that preclude better training, inhibit the ability of willing commanders to take risks and cause excessive emphasis on force protection.

I also understand that the American people -- as opposed to the political and chattering classes -- are able to discern what's important and make sensible decisions. It is my belief that we can train and operate a great deal more effectively if we stop trying to placate Congress and the media (which we will never really manage to do), stop trying to tap dance on the head of a pin (to convince people how special we are) and just concentrate on doing the job right...


* How much of what now 'must' be taken is a technological substitute for poor training?

[ODB]

Are we saying that more/proper training...
a) will reduce the need for so much gear because we won't need it to be effective
b) better physically condition Soldiers so that the weight is not an issue
c) both
d) neither

This is one of those occasions where the connection between the problem identified and the solution suggested isn't completely obvious to me.

a) Ken hit some key points on this. Additionally through training we learn how to work those assets available for resupplies. Caches IMO are a lost art in the military today. Do operations for the sole purpose of caching supplies for future operations. There are a multitude of things that can be learned by training. Why carry 5 pound bolt cutters when I can carry .25 pound dikes? One has to train with the equipment to know what works, what can be utilized for multiple purposes, when and where something does or doesn't work.

b) This is a big one. The human body IMO is amazing with it's ability to adapt. We all know we are going to wear body armour, but how many PT in body armour? Weekly runs in body armour make a difference. To add to this, sorry the alotted PT time is not enough, individuals need to take there own time to condition themselves. How many times do leaders check soldier loads when conducting training marches? Sorry but a PT score does not tell me a single thing about a soldiers conditioning. So because a guy can score 300 he is a stud? Not at all, he knows how to pass a test. Pushing soldiers physically with heavy loads, physically demanding training will prepare them for the rigors they will face. Run those same "studs" through a 4 mile litter run in body armour, rope climbs, log drills, the list goes on......point is one has to train accordingly to the demands they will face. They have to train harder than those demands so when they face them they can reflect back on harder times and realize this is nothing compared to the time when we did this....

Finally I'll add that we need to get out of the risk averison mode we have entered. We are the business of accepting risks, but we must not continue to avoid risks. Yes, risk mitigation is a must. How do we learn to mitigate those risks, through training.

Yes, IMO most of this whinning can be avoided through proper training.

Anyone know why the Army stopped doing top down building clearing? If you do then you'll know how we have ended up where we are today.

[reed11b]

a) b) This is a big one. The human body IMO is amazing with it's ability to adapt. We all know we are going to wear body armour, but how many PT in body armour? Weekly runs in body armour make a difference. To add to this, sorry the alotted PT time is not enough, individuals need to take there own time to condition themselves. How many times do leaders check soldier loads when conducting training marches? Sorry but a PT score does not tell me a single thing about a soldiers conditioning. So because a guy can score 300 he is a stud? Not at all, he knows how to pass a test. Pushing soldiers physically with heavy loads, physically demanding training will prepare them for the rigors they will face. Run those same "studs" through a 4 mile litter run in body armour, rope climbs, log drills, the list goes on......point is one has to train accordingly to the demands they will face. They have to train harder than those demands so when they face them they can reflect back on harder times and realize this is nothing compared to the time when we did this....


I would disagree w/ you on the APFT (it is a fairly good indicator of overall fitness) except for the 2 mile run. 2 mile run is more of a skill then a fitness test. You do learn how to run the 2 mile. The rest of your post rings true with me however.
Reed

[Schmedlap]

This thread seems to get more generalized with every post.

Humping 140 pounds everyday up 15,000-foot peaks for 12 months? I'd say something is wrong. And I think that was the issue that began this thread. If physical training is the solution to that, then my credulity is strained more than those Soldiers' ligaments. If better training on Soldier skills is the solution, in order to remove the necessity of carrying all that gear and in order to give leaders a better sense of what they really need to bring - okay, got it. Agree on the latter.

I think that is the full scope of the problem - crazy big loads in rough terrain. But it is tough to distinguish whether some of the comments are referring to Iraq, Afghanistan, or both. I don't think there is a problem with the weight of our gear in Iraq. I say, if patrolling relatively flat terrain in Iraq in 85 pounds of gear is too much weight, then you need to see the gynecologist. If the concern is not that it's too much weight, but rather that "it could be less"... well, that's nice. I suppose that my teeth could be whiter, too. If the stuff that we're carrying gives us a significant edge and our Soldiers have the strength and conditioning to shoulder it and still operate effectively, then I want to know a good reason for leaving it behind - something better than just a general preference for being lighter.

[Ron Humphrey]

a) Caches IMO are a lost art in the military today. Do operations for the sole purpose of caching supplies for future operations. There are a multitude of things that can be learned by training. Why carry 5 pound bolt cutters when I can carry .25 pound dikes? One has to train with the equipment to know what works, what can be utilized for multiple purposes, when and where something does or doesn't work.



I'm always amazed at how you often don't hear talk about how much the history of large forces involves "livin off the land" stuff for exactly the reasons that we work so hard to overcome.

Guess it's cause it takes ????????? to know how to do it:D:cool:

[carl]

I am deeply skeptical that any amount of physical conditioning will allow a 160 pound soldier carrying 85 pounds of equipment to catch or even keep up with a Taliban fighter carrying an AK and a blanket roll; especially if the race continues for several days. I also think it important that we be able to at least keep up with the Taliban in that race.

So this interested civilian doesn't see any alternative to shedding some of the weight. Also, as Ken said, if we ever get back into the tropics that weight will have to come off, so might as well get started now.

[ODB]

One should not have to chase the Taliban for days if one utilizes our doctrine and assets available.

1. Find them
2. Fix them
3. Finish them

So with that in mind I do not see an issue of trying to run down the Taliban for days on end. Worse case everything falls off with a pull of a few tabs if it truely comes down to that.

As I shake the cobwebs from the memory of Afghanistan in 02'. I have commented before about my load and lessons learned from that time. We wore IBA with mag pouches and one utility pouch. We carried 3 day assault packs with food (a lot of power bars and for myself milkbone dog biscuits and peanut butter), water, and ammo (cross loaded for the mortars or machine guns). In the mountains you threw in some snivel gear and a sleep system (usually bivy sack and patrol bag). Not a heavy load, very easily managable. We utilized UH-60s for resupply, mainly water. Was this the exception because I had decent leadership? To this day I question our lack of use of filteration pumps, chlorine tablets, etc..... Understand the focus not being on Afghanistan the past years and can see if there is a lack of assets in country to conduct resupplies, but also do not see how proper planning and coordination can't make it happen. Then do all resupplies need to be done by air?

Are we allowing technological advances to dictact what we carry, IMO the short answer = yes. Basically it comes down to the fact that we have forgotten basic skills that have worked for centuries, because we think technology is the answer. We have become soft and forgotten how to survive on what is available.

Wanted to stay generalized vs getting into "war stories" but do have specific examples of both ends of the spectrum from both theaters of operation.

[Schmedlap]

To this day I question our lack of use of filteration pumps, chlorine tablets, etc..... Are we allowing technological advances to dictact what we carry, IMO the short answer = yes. Basically it comes down to the fact that we have forgotten basic skills that have worked for centuries, because we think technology is the answer. We have become soft and forgotten how to survive on what is available.

I don't think it's a matter of "getting soft" or forgetting anything. What takes more time?
a) Locating, procuring, filtering, and chlorinating water
b) Bringing water with you
Answer: depends on the mission. I would argue that for the overwhelming majority of missions - your specific cases perhaps being the exception - the answer is (b). That's not "getting soft" or forgetting. That's doing what makes more sense.

I remember retired Soldiers complaining about us having bottled water in Iraq when I got back from my first deployment. I guess they thought that we were drinking Evian water and munching on caviar or something. I tried explaining to them that it simplified logistics and field sanitation, thus freeing up time for other stuff. Their response was, "back in my day, we drank water from our canteens and we filled our helmets with water to shave." That's nice. And that was better for what reason? I respect their nostalgia. I don't understand how it makes us more effective.

Regarding the earlier note about caching - same issue. For situations such as your anecdotal experiences, perhaps it makes sense. For most, if not all, operations in Iraq and probably many in Afghanistan, it seems like an unnecessary time killer. I don't know if you've deployed in a conventional unit since 9/11, but their responsibilities are significantly different than those of an AOB operating in the same AOR. In OIF III, my Infantry Company's tasks, just off the top of my head, included route security, fixed site security, OPs, training IA, IP, MoD (all at once - in different locations), securing new IA and IP sites as they are being built, flooding the AOR with small teams to eliminate IED emplacers in the act and maintain a state of paranoia amongst the insurgency (helping to make area more permissive for the ODAs to move about it), providing QRF and/or outer cordons for ODA missions, and providing QRF for MiTTs. Those are just off the top of my head. I could brainstorm dozens more. Those tasks are extremely time and manpower intensive - especially when you throw in the logistics and life support and the fact that we're operating from a patrol base where we provide our own security (couldn't hire Peshmerga guards like the ODAs could). Add to that mix specific missions to go out and cache supplies? Time and troops available are already tapped out. Joe is going to need to carry his ammo and water.

[ODB]

Did OEF 02' and OIF 03' with 101st. Went SF in 04.

[Ken White]

I don't think it's a matter of "getting soft" or forgetting anything.Wrong issue, I think -- soft isn't the question. The issue should be what works best for that AO and that mission. One does not have to practice to be miserable -- but one, if a soldier, should be prepared to do what it takes to get the job done. I'm sure you always did and always would. Most guys and gals do. Only a few will try to sluff for various reasons. Today, many are not inclined to take risks or to commit people to the boonies without eleventy gallons of water each even if that makes mission sense. Each theater, each AO, each individual mission deserves a clean sheet look. Preconcieved ideas of what's needed or best get people killed. Every situation differs.What takes more time?
a) Locating, procuring, filtering, and chlorinating water
b) Bringing water with you
Answer: depends on the mission. I would argue that for the overwhelming majority of missions - your specific cases perhaps being the exception - the answer is (b). That's not "getting soft" or forgetting. That's doing what makes more sense.True -- based on your experience in Iraq. What is the mission of the average rifle company in Afghanistan? How many Platoons are out there, scuffling around away from the Flag Pole. How many even smaller elements are out there. Different AO, different everything. Carrying water may be necessary, may not be....Their response was, "back in my day, we drank water from our canteens and we filled our helmets with water to shave." That's nice. And that was better for what reason? I respect their nostalgia. I don't understand how it makes us more effective.It wasn't better, it was the best that could be done at the time -- the point is not that it's better, it obviously is not -- point is simply it was done when it was necessary and could be again; METT dependent. Lacking a steel helmet to shave in, why not just go a couple of weeks without shaving? Quelle Horreur...:eek:

My personal best is 94 days without a shower and fourteen days on the button without shaving or brushing my teeth. That was then, this is now -- but I have no doubt that any number of troops today can do that without falling apart. I also have no doubt that whole units can do that and still be combat effective. The body will take a lot of abuse -- it'll pay you back later but why worry...;)...Add to that mix specific missions to go out and cache supplies? Time and troops available are already tapped out. Joe is going to need to carry his ammo and water.Make no sense in Iraq or for some in Afghanistan, it all depends, as you said, on the mission. For SF and for light infantry distributed patrols in Platoon or smaller size, caches can makes sense or not -- it all depends on the mission, routes, time, intel -- all those things. Caches can also be planted by Unit A in January for Unit E to use a year later. I don't think he means it should always be done, just citing it as a technique. So is a rendezvous with a wheeled or tracked resupply effort or routing a patrol to a friendly outpost for resupply. All sorts of options.

My point and that of ODB (I think. He can speak for himself but I think I know where he's coming from...) and those old dudes is just that you do what needs to be done and preconceived notions about what is good may need to be relooked. Proper training would enable more people to do that, partly by letting them know what's possible and how to do some things if they become necessary, partly by letting them know it's not only alright to think differently, it is in fact, in combat a really good idea to do so. Such training would also teach people that they could shave with less than a Porta Cabin sink or an electric razor, that you can find and drink local water and get by on a canteen a day for a week or two with no great harm if that enhances mission accomplishment and that you don't need ten magazines and any more clothing changes than three pair of socks fo a couple of weeks or month on extended operations.

Soldiering is not as nice as life can be elsewhere, discomfort is not really necessary in many cases but where it is probably necessary to do some things like that, one should be able to order it done or to do it knowing that it's temporary and it can be done.

It's a lot easier to do -- and to order it done -- if folks know how to do it and the one ordering it knows they know how. That's where we've erred...

[Ken White]

Did OEF 02' and OIF 03' with 101st. Went SF in 04.Both do good work -- but they don't understand each other.

Almost as bad as SF and the whole Army..... :D

[sapperfitz82]

I did eleven day patrols in Afghanistan and saw no water any where the whole time. Other times, it would have been unsafe regardless of the cholrine tabs. Water in that AO is so polluted with heavy metals, you would not want to risk it (in most places.)

Conditioning? You're kidding right?

I won't toot their horn, but the platoon I was attached to were good, very good, at staying in shape. Yeah, we rucked twice a week, lots of weight, usually 6 miles. The did IBA and pro mask runs. The regime was tough. Regardless, they did not make more than about 1200 m a day around Babol Kehyl. I think some of you may know the area, it was the scene of OP Anaconda. The loads were not excessive, but the mortars and MGs were toting a lot of weight. We simply could not move fast enough to be of any tactical use. Sure, could drop weight and work out of a PB, we did, but the bad guys know where you are and simply avoid contact.

This scenario is specfic to illustrate a larger point. We are conceding a great deal of our mobility. I don't see the payoff. Those with enough rank to refuse the pressure to add more armor, or set theatre policy to wear all of it, have that rank to ensure the soldiers are employed within their capability for a successful mission. It aint happen.

[Ken White]

I did eleven day patrols in Afghanistan and saw no water any where the whole time. Other times, it would have been unsafe regardless of the cholrine tabs. Water in that AO is so polluted with heavy metals, you would not want to risk it (in most places.)Sometimes you don't. Usually you don't. Most of the photos my kid in the 82d sent back from the 'Stan showed some water nearby.

Dicey water can hurt -- or not. Having drunk out of more rice paddies than I care to recall and never really having had an problems from eating or drinking locally all over the world, I'll now reveal my secret ;) :

Old Marine Gunnery Sergeant who had been around most of Central America between the world wars, as well as on a Cruiser in the Asian Squadron and all through WW II told me "Whenever you get to a new country, eat and drink the local stuff. Your stomach will rebel at the change of diet for a day or two and then you'll be okay. That way if you have to live off local food you can do it without getting dysentery when you least need it." He seemed to know what he was talking about so I did that in about 20 or so countries over the next 40 plus years. Worked for me.

When I got all the later pitches about not eating or drinking locally because of this or that bug, I just ignored 'em and continued to eat and drink local food and water. Annoyed the daylights out some folks... :D

[Schmedlap]

My personal best is 94 days without a shower and fourteen days on the button without shaving or brushing my teeth.
We may be neck and neck there. I don't have the exact dates. I took a shower in Kuwait in March 2003. My next was in June - at a car dealership in Baghdad. That was one funky uniform.

Proper training would enable more people to do that, partly by letting them know what's possible and how to do some things if they become necessary, partly by letting them know it's not only alright to think differently, it is in fact, in combat a really good idea to do so.
On most threads, I'm with you on the lackluster training. I don't think it's an issue here. If I'm not caching supplies, purifying water, going 3 months without a shower, or eating bugs - it's not for lack of training. It's because it's been unnecessary since the summer of 2003.

Most of the skills discussed are not the lost art that they are perceived to be. When we first arrived in Baghdad in April 2003, we were chlorinating and rationing water, conducting operations without night vision, radios, or flashlights (we had no batteries), living off the city (rather than the land), and not shaving or bathing. There was no "uh oh" moment where we thought, "yikes - chlorinating water wasn't part of our last gunnery density - how do we do this?" or "Gee, I can't go patrolling at night without seeing everything in a shade of green." Everybody knew how to use tracers and knew that it was easier to see objects at night if you don't look directly at them.

Maybe the old school techniques are necessary in Afghanistan - but I'd be surprised. I'd be curious to know the competing variables, such as impact on the mission (route selection, likelihood of water being too contaminated to purify, etc), how much weight is actually going to be shed, troops and time available, likelihood of cache sites being discovered and boobytrapped/stolen or observed as they are emplaced. Mr. Tallyban knows those hills better than the Soldiers. For many discussions on this board, lack of training is an obvious culprit because we can see substandard performance that would not exist were it not for substandard training. In the case of what Soldiers carry versus what they cache, leave behind, obtain en route, etc, that's not so obvious. We don't know the competing variables.

My take on the issues on this thread are as follows...
1) If the part of the mission is to significantly minimize casualties, then that is a risk aversion imposed by the civilian masters. That's not a error on the part of the chain of command. As much as I hated the mentality of the Army pre-9/11, it was driven by the civilian leadership. Risk aversion was a specified task in Bosnia. Just because the leadership made it happen, it didn't mean that they thought it made any sense. Given that it was simply absurd, as opposed to unlawful, I don't see what choice they had. Though less drastic, the same dynamic is pushing against us in Iraq and Afghanistan. Can you imagine the hoopla that would have surrounded combat death number 5,000, had it occurred when President Bush was still in office? The media and anti-war protesters would have been dancing in the streets.
2) Earlier suggestions on this thread that leaders weigh down their Soldiers due to concern about their OERs are, for the most part, absurd and insulting. Who are these commanders who care more about their OERs than their men? I've had my share of oddballs and even some incompetent ones, but none that were just flat out evil.
3) 85 pounds in flat terrain - ok. 140 pounds in steep terrain - probably not. The former can be (and has been) solved by physical training. The latter is a physiological issue if it's continuous.
4) If your equipment gives you a significant edge, then I don't care if it's heavy, unless the loss of mobility offsets the edge that your equipment gives you. In Afghanistan, maybe that's the case. I find it hard to believe that leaders are routinely failing to adequately balance those variables.

[Ken White]

On most threads, I'm with you on the lackluster training. I don't think it's an issue here. If I'm not caching supplies, purifying water, going 3 months without a shower, or eating bugs - it's not for lack of training. It's because it's been unnecessary since the summer of 2003.I think you just made one of mine. Point, I mean.

The fact that it's been unnecessary in your experience in a theater for five plus years is, all things considered, an anomaly -- and a dangerous anomaly. Other wars in other places may be vastly different and while I have no doubt that you and millions of other Iraq-style combat veterans can and will adapt to other forms and locales, the question is how many people will be killed unnecessarily while the Army learns anew?

Recall that the year and a half after the summer of 2003 were painful for the Army and th units that were there -- simply because they didn't know what they were supposed to do. The Army there had not been trained for the situation they were in. Conversely for the Army to take the post 2005 Iraq and turn it into the teaching model would do a great disservice to those who might confront different situations in the future.Most of the skills discussed are not the lost art that they are perceived to be. When we first arrived in Baghdad in April 2003... Everybody knew how to use tracers and knew that it was easier to see objects at night if you don't look directly at them.I'm sure -- welcome to the world of mobile warfare as opposed to a static COIN Op. Now take your OIF 1 experience and tack another 11 months on it while forgetting your later Iraq experience...

That experience gives you an edge over those who didn't make OIF 1 but only were there subsequently and think all war is like that. It isn't and most everyone knows that deep down -- but on the conscious level, that's the experience and that's what they'll try to emulate elsewhere. Unless initial training is thorough and firmly inculcates the basics. Right now it is not thorough it leaves most of the basics out of the mix. Those gaps are filled by 'experience' -- and if the experience confirms bad habits that may not be applicable in another war, another place...Maybe the old school techniques are necessary in Afghanistan...We don't know the competing variables.I'm fortunate in having a son who's been an infantryman (light; a mildly different world) in both theaters and there are some very significant differences not only in terms of opponents and terrain, in rural versus urban but in the characteristics of the local populations. I think the answer is that for some units there, some older ideas are better, for others, not so much. Distance away from the flagpole and other things. METT...

I don't think caches are the be all and end all and they're only really appropriate for small and stealthy patrols (I know there are some in Afghanistan but also know there aren't nearly as many as I think there should be). Caching doesn't work for Platoons and above, the signature is too great. Hiding small ones from natives under their noses is totally possible if you know what you're doing.

That, however is off the track -- the track IMO is training people to fight competently with minimal equipment rather than having them have to learn things are possible by default when the system fails to keep up. We are masters of ad-hocery; good for us. We should also better prepare people to deal with ALL the vagaries of combat so they do not have to learn by doing but shift to low maintenance mode automatically with no hitches -- and no unnecessary casualties...My take on the issues on this thread are as follows...
1) If the part of the mission is to significantly minimize casualties, then that is a risk aversion imposed by the civilian masters. That's not a error on the part of the chain of command...Can you imagine the hoopla that would have surrounded combat death number 5,000, had it occurred when President Bush was still in office? The media and anti-war protesters would have been dancing in the streets.Totally true on both counts. However, I believe there is a valid question of how readily the Armed Forces military leadership bowed to the civilian masters on the issue of force protection back in the 70-90 time frame (which developed the habits that do us no favors today). I'm suggesting that the lack of push back on their part for several reasons was in fact a tactical error that has compounded things to the point where your second aspect takes over. I'm pretty sure that if the casualty count edges upward significantly next year that the noise directed at Obama will not be as strident or as well publicized but will exist. The problem is academic -- we are where we are and force protection is and will be unduly emphasized to the detriment of getting jobs done. So be it. Until there's a war involving HIC. Like Armor vests in the tropics, the leaders will learn that excessive force protection efforts cause more friendly and civilian casualties; in a COIN Op, that's justifiable and acceptable -- it is not likely to be in a mobile, HIC war.2) Earlier suggestions on this thread that leaders weigh down their Soldiers due to concern about their OERs are, for the most part, absurd and insulting. Who are these commanders who care more about their OERs than their men? I've had my share of oddballs and even some incompetent ones, but none that were just flat out evil.If you say someone said that, I'll take your word for it, I don't recall it but unlike you, in a longer career, I have seen some who cared more for their OERs than their troops -- very few but some. I've met a far greater number that would prefer not to fight city hall on an issue that they're pretty sure they'll lose. Fortunately, I've met an adequate number that would fight -- or would just do what they thought was right without asking.3) 85 pounds in flat terrain - ok. 140 pounds in steep terrain - probably not. The former can be (and has been) solved by physical training. The latter is a physiological issue if it's continuous.Agreed. I'd also say that one cannot fight well if one is carrying more than 30-40 pounds. Some Metrically inclined soul ought to do a cost benefit study on the number of casualties due to excess weight x the number of persons saved by Armor x the loss of mission capability due to excess weight and the resultant casualties from that lack of success.4) If your equipment gives you a significant edge, then I don't care if it's heavy, unless the loss of mobility offsets the edge that your equipment gives you. In Afghanistan, maybe that's the case. I find it hard to believe that leaders are routinely failing to adequately balance those variables.In reverse order; I do not find it hard to believe that too many but certainly not all leaders are failing to balance those variables (City hall fights one will lose...). On the issue of 'the edge' I broadly agree with your statement but I also believe that the definition of that 'edge' will vary significantly from leader to leader and that variance will all too often depend upon his or her own skills and training (or lack thereof -- and not education...) and, more importantly, his or her (or, regrettably, their Bosses...) perception of the skills and capabilities of the led.

The technological edge can be disrupted by EMP or battery resupply ;) . Or even dumb directives from above (Among several others, I'm thinking of the change to AR 190-11 years ago that said all vehicles carrying ammunition had to have an armed SFC or higher aboard. Every tank in Germany had to offload their ammo to ASPS well in the rear...). Well trained troops have an edge all their own and they are far, far less easily disrupted.

I am firmly convinced that we are too prone to substitute technology for training because buying the technology:

- Is easier than training people thoroughly and adequately.

- Is cheaper than training people for jobs two levels above their current ranks.

- Provides more jobs in more Congressional districts.

So, again, I don't disagree with what you say, if it gives an edge, use it -- if it's 90% or better reliable -- just don't succumb to "I can't go to war without it..." and do be prepared to think it through -- and get along without it.

[Schmedlap]

I think we're largely in agreement and you raise a few more good points.

I'm thinking of the change to AR 190-11 years ago that said all vehicles carrying ammunition had to have an armed SFC or higher aboard.
I recall getting a call one night when I was acting S-3 (in garrison) because our hand grenades were dropped off at the range on the night prior to training. The problem was that the Soldiers who signed for the pallet and were assigned to "guard" the pallet did not have a weapon or ammo - a regulation that I either overlooked or was not aware of. I responded to the staff duty officer: "of course they have an armed guard. The guards are armed with hand grenades." I then quickly hung up.

Brigade mulled for 2 hours over whether it was acceptable that the guy be armed with frags. That was enough time for us to open the arms room, obtain a weapon and some ammo, and send it out to the guys guarding the frags. In hindsight, I guess it makes sense to guard a pallet of frags, but I'd spent the previous 3 out of 4 years in places other than garrison and I just wasn't well versed on regs.

[Ken White]

I think we're largely in agreement and you raise a few more good points.On the agreement; points may be good or not -- all learned the hard way... :wry: I responded to the staff duty officer: "of course they have an armed guard. The guards are armed with hand grenades." I then quickly hung up....I'd spent the previous 3 out of 4 years in places other than garrison and I just wasn't well versed on regs.Good Job! Who can be well versed on Regs. Penalty of hiring civilians to write them; once you hire 'em, you can't fire 'em and they have to have SOMETHING to do -- so they rewrite Regs. Dumb.

My pet was a one page -- one sentence, actually -- change to FM 21-75 that came out of Benning in the late 80s or early 90s. Sayeth: "Patrol is a verb, the word will not be used to name an operational element."

I'm still a strong devotee of the dictum "Regulations were meant to be intelligently disregarded." Dangerous attitude in this age but that's only because DA and DoD have been at peace since 1947. Yeah, I know -- but they don't or, well, too many up there forget too often...

Not a big prob; the guys on the ground make it work in spite of things on high, they always have and by far the largest majority mean well, do well and make up for the slackness here and there.

[ODB]

To those recently returned from Afghanistan what the hell were you carrying?

Why did you carry said items?

Could go on but think we get the jist of it......

Let's get to the heart of this, lets disect the loads and maybe help some future leaders in their decision making process. More knowledge on these boards than most units, lets put it to work and see what we can come up with.

Additionally we can look at Iraq, but think the main issue lies with Afghanistan.

Again this is key IMO: Finally I'll add that we need to get out of the risk averison mode we have entered. We are the business of accepting risks, but we must not continue to avoid risks. Yes, risk mitigation is a must. How do we learn to mitigate those risks, through training.

And can anyone answer this one: Why did the Army stopped doing top down building clearing?

In regards to caches, water purification etc..... just throwing out other options, imagination is a good thing, after all I seem to remembering hearing somewhere that war is a thinking mans game.

Speed balls don't work so well when they are in a compression sack being kicked out from a UH-60 as it is screaming by trying to get the hell outta there.

[Schmedlap]

And can anyone answer this one: Why did the Army stopped doing top down building clearing?
I didn't realize it did. Did this occur in 2008, after I ETS'd? We frequently did this in 2005 during cordon and search operations conducted at night whenever we were able to infiltrate the objective before anyone woke up. We would enter adjacent buildings, climb across the roofs, and then go top-down. If you're strictly speaking about clearing buildings in terms of actually killing the dudes inside, I don't recall ever doing that in a top-down fashion, simply because the situation never dictated it. Whenever we cleared a building under fire, it was in a react to contact mode. We usually had the option of hitting the building that we were taking fire from -OR- hitting the building next to it first and then jumping onto the roof of the target building and going top-down. The extra minute needed to do the latter would result in the attackers getting away.

Most recently, I recall watching, via UAV, at least one ODA go top-down on a raid in 2007, though it was a dry hole.

[sapperfitz82]

Worn on Body/Uniform:
*

·******* M4 Carbine with PEQ-2 Laser/PAQ-4 Laser,
ACOG/CCO,and 30 rounds of 5.56mm
ball ammunition.
·******* Desert Camouflage Uniform with
Infrared Tape on left sleeve (1”x 1”).
·******* Desert Combat Boots.
·******* Dog Tags.
·******* ID Card.
·******* Undershirt.
·******* Socks.
·******* Tactical gloves.
·******* Interceptor Body Armor with two
Small Arms Protective Inserts.
·******* Advanced Combat Helmet with
night vision mounting plate.
·******* Rigger belt.
·******* Notebook and pen.
·******* Watch.
·******* Knee and elbow pads.
·******* Sun, Sand, and Dust type Goggles or
Wiley-X Goggles.
·******* Folding Knife/Multi-tool.
Worn on Fighting Load Carrier/
Interceptor Body Armor:
*

·******* MOLLE Fighting Load Carrier with modular
MOLLE pouches.
·******* 180 rounds of 5.56mm ball ammunition.
·******* Bayonet.
·******* Fragmentation grenade.
·******* 64 ounces of water in two 1 quart canteens.
·******* Casualty and witness cards.
·*******100 ounces of water in hydration system.
Flex cuffs for personnel under custody.
·******* Night vision equipment (PVS-14/PVS-7).
·******* Iodine tablets.
·******* Lensatic compass.
·******* Flashlight.
·******* Chemlight.
·******* First Aid dressing and pouch.
·******* Canteen Cup.
·******* Ear plugs.

The combination of these
two lists makes up the
Fighting Load (Avg=63 lbs)

Carried in Assault Rucksack:
*
·******* MOLLE Assault Rucksack or commercial assault rucksack, with MOLLE attachments.
·******* 500ml intravenous fluids bag with starter kit.
·******* 70 ounces of water in hydration system.
·******* Two Meals, Ready to Eat (MREs).
·******* Poncho and/or Bivy Sack.
·******* Poncho liner.
·******* Undershirt.
·******* Spare batteries.
·******* Two pair of socks.
·******* Polypropylene or silk long sleeve undershirt.
·******* M4/M16 Rifle Cleaning Kit.
·******* Personal hygiene kit.
·******* Rubber gloves.
·******* Sling rope with two snap links.

Assault Rucksack + Fighting Load=
Approach March Load (Avg=96 lbs)

Carried in Main Rucksack: (Main rucksacks were rarely taken
on operations during study)
*
·******* MOLLE main rucksack with Sleeping Bag Carrier or Large ALICE rucksack.
·******* Improved Sleeping Bag (usually Green bag carried one per two men).
·******* Long Underwear or Polypropylene Jacket and Coveralls.
·******* Two Undershirts.
·******* Two pairs of socks.
·******* Cold Weather Gloves.
·******* Knit/Fleece Cap.
·******* Additional ammunition.
·******* Two Meals, Ready to Eat (MREs).
·******* Sleeping pad.

Main Rucksack + Fighting Load +
Assault Rucksack (sometimes)=
Emergency Approach March Load
(Avg=127 lbs)

That was the rifleman, course, he can only move as fast as the slowest guy.

If you want to see more, check out CALL. Look for the Devil CAAT study.


Anyway, why the hell are we so insistent on ignoring our own FMs? Those old guys already learned these lessons. What does FM 21-18 have to say about all this?

[Cavguy]

Again this is key IMO: Finally I'll add that we need to get out of the risk averison mode we have entered. We are the business of accepting risks, but we must not continue to avoid risks. Yes, risk mitigation is a must. How do we learn to mitigate those risks, through training.

And can anyone answer this one: Why did the Army stopped doing top down building clearing?


1) I think we have developed a much, much greater risk tolerance in the GPF than was present in 2001 or 2003, for that matter. Acceptance of tactical and operational risk defined the turnaround in Iraq.

2) I encouraged top down clearing - whenever possible. Often, it was simply impossible unless I had dedicated helcopters or really tall ladders, neither of which I ever had. I never received any guidance stating not to, nor have heard of such guidance.

[J Wolfsberger]

Not a big prob; the guys on the ground make it work in spite of things on high, they always have and by far the largest majority mean well, do well and make up for the slackness here and there.

Quote from a Soviet general (I think Voroshilov, but can't find the note):

"The difficulty in planning against the Americans is they don't read their manuals and feel no obligation to follow their doctrine."

Case in point: A friend, troop commander in the 11th circa late 1970s. NATO MapEX with Soviet observers. Friend's troop is cutoff. He orders troop on cross border raid to hit Soviet POL dump. Soviets go ballistic. "YOU PROMISED NO ATTACKS ACROSS BORDER!" :mad:

Friend gets verbal reprimand: "Bad boy! No biscuit!" :(

BUT...

After that, in their training exercises, the Soviets started leaving heavier protection at their log points and dumps. :D

I'm with you, Ken. The troops in the field will find a way to make it work.

[Schmedlap]

Regarding the list posted by Fitz...

The Iraq load differed as such...

For the worn items - we didn't carry the ID card or wear elbow pads; so long as each patrol element had a notepad, pen, and multi-tool, that was good enough for us. But, I doubt this accounts for more than a pound (though ditching the elbow pads significantly helps with blood circulation and mobility)

For the MOLLE - we carried more ammo (at least 9 mags worn) and two grenades. But, we did not bother with bayonets, canteens, the canteen cup, or iodine tablets. One compass per patrolling element was fine. But, those items probably make sense in Afghanistan.

For the Assault Rucksack - for us, just one MRE, no poncho, no bivy, no poncho liner, no undershirt or socks, no cleaning kit (other than a rag and one rod per fire team), and no hygiene kit. But, Iraq doesn't get as cold as Afghanistan. Regardless, I don't see much weight difference - perhaps less bulk. Usually, the team didn't even bother with the assault ruck unless the patrol was going to last more than 24 hours (we did a lot of fire team missions that were 48 to 72 hours).

There are also items such as radios, shotguns, pistols, star clusters, smoke, and 40mm rounds. Those add weight quickly. We tried to maximize use of MBITRs, but some teams had to use the 119 (E model).

No rucks for us.

[Ken White]

Why no ID card?

Why so much Ammo?

Why no cleaning kit per man?

[Schmedlap]

1. No ID card because we had ID tags. The ID card is less durable, so if the ID tags are unreadable, then the ID card most likely will be as well. Besides, if things get that bad, the Army has our DNA samples on file.

2. Extra ammo per man was to compensate for the need for each man to fire more rounds. This was due to us operating in smaller teams than would be ideal. In order to do everything that we were tasked with, we had to do most of our dismounted missions in 3-man teams. The same number of targets, divided by fewer weapons = more rounds fired per weapon and, thus, more magazines per man who carried those weapons.

3. One cleaning kit per team sufficed because no more than one guy per team would ever be cleaning his weapon at one time.

[Ken White]

Though, since I'm old and out of date, I'm reminded of the ancient (Tutankhamun's army, I think...) Staff Ossfiers Dictum; "Answer the question, answer the question that should have been asked and answer the questions your answer will generate." This is probably my fault for being too dumb to ask the right question and detail. However, more curiosity:

1. In the unlikely event you're asked to produce said card by someone who like an airline ticket clerk or a busybody MP who wants to see a picture ID...

Guess what you did was okay but I'm having trouble following the logic of not carrying a 1/87 ounce item... :confused:

2. I understand that. Also understand having to leave a dismount or two with the Brad. However, since I wasn't in Iraq I can't speak to the target sets you might meet but assuming, hopefully, that you almost never if ever fired on anything but semi-auto, nine mags x three people is 810 rounds. Allowing for 10% hits (hopefully better), that's 81 targets??? Not trying to give you a hard time nor am I disputing the need or logic; can't know without being there but I don't think I ever fired more than 100 rounds in any fight -- including one rolling 20+ hour job and one rather intense deal that was almost 8 solid hours. In the several with two to four folks, if you didn't knock 'em down or break contact * in less than a few minutes, you were toast. Just trying to gain some understanding.

3. Understand. Hopefully, no one ever got separated or was the only guy left and had to take care of himself. Or no dodo broke the rod or lost the bore brush. Or the guy with the kit didn't get evaced and we forgot to get the kit...

As we both said, every situation is different and what works well one place at one point in time might not be a good solution for the next place...

I'm not being obtuse or criticizing, just trying to learn and reconcile with significant differences from my experience.

* I don't guess a WP grenade taped to a Claymore with three seconds of fuze and an M60 Fuse Igniter could be used for breaking contact there, huh? :D

[Schmedlap]

1. In the unlikely event you're asked to produce said card by someone who like an airline ticket clerk or a busybody MP who wants to see a picture ID...
That was the beauty of operating from a patrol base. I did travel to a FOB after being in theater for a few months and encountered what you speak of, but it didn't apply to patrols within our AOR. On that occasion, the gate guard wanted to see our ID cards. We didn't have them. I explained to the old lady (yes, a little old lady wearing a helmet and a plate carrier that I doubt could have stopped a BB), that I was not going to drive 45 minutes back to my patrol base to round up ID cards. If 4 American-looking HMMWVs, full of American-looking Soldiers in American-looking uniforms, carrying lots of American-looking equipment, operating on frequency hop with the correct COMSEC fill, sporting Warlocks, etc, etc, was not good enough, then we were going to have some problems - especially since we would not have enough fuel unless we entered the base and got more. She reluctantly "let" us in after taking down my name, rank, etc. It was a foreshadowing of the madness that we would witness in the next 45 minutes.

Guess what you did was okay but I'm having trouble following the logic of not carrying a 1/87 ounce item... :confused:
It had no purpose on patrol and it was easy to lose. At the same time, it was a big deal for a Soldier to lose it. I've also seen ID cards featured prominently in terrorist/insurgent propaganda. I just couldn't think of one good reason to bring them on patrol, nor did anyone ever suggest one.

... hopefully, that you almost never if ever fired on anything but semi-auto, nine mags x three people is 810 rounds. Allowing for 10% hits (hopefully better), that's 81 targets???
There were a bunch of reasons - I could probably type until my hands hurt. None of the reasons below, by themselves, justify that much ammo. Taken together, I think they make a good case. I'm familiar with your take on fire discipline from other threads. Without wiping my butt with every bit OPSEC guidance I've ever received, I don't think I can sufficiently convey the nature of how we operated to answer this adequately. But, if I could, I think that you would agree with our rationale (I'm about 90% sure). Keep in mind, for simplicity, I'm only discussing how many Infantry company operated in OIF III.
- Using your numbers above, I would not say 81 targets per fire team. I would say 27 targets per Soldier. Not to nitpick, but the team isn't going to all rush over and focus on one sector - they still need to maintain 360 security. So the relevant concern is targets per Soldiers, not targets per team. Diversionary attacks were common. Obviously, you interlock sectors of fire when possible, but you're just not going to have much overlap with a fire team that's pulling 360. Our rationale was that if you're taking fire from three buildings in your sector of fire that have 5 or 6 windows in each building facing you, then you've got 15 to 18 targets (yes, far less than 27). All of our dismount patrols would establish temporary OPs in mutually supporting positions. If one took fire, it would generally suppress while another team would maneuver onto it. That could take a while, which meant multiple shots into each known or suspected position. If you figure one round through one window every second, two minutes will use 4 mags. The mission doesn't end at that point. You've now had your position compromised and there was more than one occasion when QRF got ambushed.
- I only recall one occasion when a fire team almost ran out of ammo, but that one occasion made it worthwhile. They got hit from 3 directions, the only fire team that could support them had just maneuved upon an attack 5 minutes earlier against a different position and had taken a casualty who couldn't walk, and almost every element within the company was either in contact or in a different part of the city and hauling ass to get there. Aside from that, I don't think that anyone ever fired more than 6 magazines, but there is a certain degree of comfort in having 3 magazines left, rather than 3 rounds.
- More mags allowed Soldiers greater leeway in putting in a fresh mag during a lull in the action. It was conceivable that you could fire half a basic load, but have used all of your mags if there were several lulls in the action where you put in a fresh mag.
- Many of us would load mags differently for day and night or specific targets. For example, many would maintain one mag of just armor piercing ammo, for vehicles. Some leaders would have a mag of straight tracer in their well during the day. At night, most of us kept a mag with no tracers in the well (no need for tracers at night, if your team can see your IR laser). So, if you're engaging just dismounts at night, you're playing with 7 mags - the mag of AP and the mag of tracer aren't getting touched unless absolutely necessary, or until the sun comes up, or until a VBIED comes barreling at you.

I don't recall anyone ever firing on burst. To me, that always seemed like an unhappy medium where it is no more effective than semi and significantly less useful than full auto.

3. ... Hopefully, no one ever got separated or was the only guy left and had to take care of himself. Or no dodo broke the rod or lost the bore brush...
Really, it wouldn't surprise me if some patrols didn't bother with any cleaning kit (other than a rag). Our dismount patrols generally involved dismounted movement for 30 minutes, establishment of an OP for 12 to 24 hours, and then repeat once or twice, and then return to base. Weapons really did not get that dirty, aside from some carbon buildup after a firefight, but if a team got into contact, they were usually extracted shortly thereafter because it was virtually impossible for them move about unobserved afterwards.

* I don't guess a WP grenade taped to a Claymore with three seconds of fuze and an M60 Fuse Igniter could be used for breaking contact there, huh? :D
Unfortunately, no.

[Ken White]

As I suspected, it all makes sense; I just had some difficulties adapting to today (my wife and kids say that is a constant... :o ).

Say no more:"We didn't have them. I explained to the old lady (yes, a little old lady wearing a helmet and a plate carrier that I doubt could have stopped a BB), that I was not going to drive 45 minutes back to my patrol base to round up ID cards...[plus]it was a big deal for a Soldier to lose it...":eek::rolleyes:

The Ammo makes sense in your sitchyation and I do agree -- not that it matters; y'all were there and I as not. I don't second guess under that circumstance; get curious, yeah -- but no "You should have..." from me.

Same deal on the cleaning kit (except I'd have carried mine anyway ;) old habits die hard). Like the man said "Whatever works..."

Thanks again for the effort and detail. Gives me a far better picture.

[GC13]

Yeah, I don't think any soldier who had to fire his rifle in a firefight ever complained about having too much ammunition left over.

... Too much ammunition that he wasn't carrying for the automatic rifleman, anyway.

[William F. Owen]

rusiresources.com/equippingmilitary/Owen%20(Session%204).ppt

This was a presentation I gave at the RUSI. Upset everybody at the time. May be of some use here.

My basic contention should be obvious and one well known to the regular crowd here.

[goesh]

- if Jr. has on 400 lbs of plate armor, they feel better, it's a perception of competency/protection, essentially political IMO - may as well be humping a portable X-ray machine too.......

[Tom Odom]

Funny that I have the "old style" that closes down the front and everytime I go out, the guys around me tell me they wish they had the same as the overthehead stuff weighs another 30 light weight pounds.

I feel like the younger brother in Christmas Story after Mom has dressed him to go to school in the snow, sort of an armored plated Michelin Man. :cool:

Tom

[ODB]

Sorry for the delay in the top down building clearing answer. Many years back 10-12 years ago. I was doing some testing for the folks out of Benning. We were testing MOUT ladders, when I asked about the old grappling hook method we had been using, I got an interesting response. The Army stopped doing that, due to soldiers no longer possessing the upper body strength to pull themselves up the rope. Hence we were testing other options. Just think this was pre body armor days.

[jcustis]

In the Marine Corps, I don't think the doctrinal texts tell a different story yet, but a squad of grunts turned writers after Fallujah v.2.0 drafted the superb AAR that is is terribly difficult to get a wounded and dying guy up and out of a 2nd story room if he weighs 250 lbs, and the bad guys still own the 1st floor.

[Schmedlap]

The Army stopped doing that, due to soldiers no longer possessing the upper body strength to pull themselves up the rope. Hence we were testing other options. Just think this was pre body armor days.
When I was a cadet preparing for jump school, we were told that every morning we needed to do 10 pull-ups prior to the start of PT (true) and that if you could not perform 10 pull-ups with perfect form, unassisted, after getting "smoked" at that time, on any day, then you would be dropped from the course (definitely not true). We did our preparation. Then when we got there, I think we were the only ones (other than the Navy folks who were on their way to becoming SEALs) who could do so. Most could do no more than 4 or 5. Some could barely do ONE. And these we largely skinny kids with not much weight to pull over the bar. Nintendo generation.

[RJ]

The Marine Corps just issued a field order that states Battalion and Squadron Commanders will determine the body armor policy in their Area of Operations.

The Corps determined Regimental Commanders (Col.) can over rule , but it is the BN. (Lt. Col.) Commander who is closer to the reality and intimate with the terrain and tactical situations their Rifle Companies are fighting in.

Politics and touchy, feely considerations may have just received a reality check.

The Field Order was dated April 20, 2009

[carl]

Here is an interesting article from the Sunday Star & Stripes about a patrol in Afghanistan; temp. peaked in the low 90's, what appeared to be flat terrain and multiple heat casualties, including two that needed med-evac.

http://www.stripes.com/article.asp?section=104&article=62285

[Schmedlap]

Army looks to lighten load for Soldiers in Afghanistan

FORT BELVOIR, Va. (Army News Service, Oct. 15, 2009) -- The Army is poised to introduce a plate-carrier vest to provide Soldiers more lightweight gear in the challenging operational environments of Afghanistan.

An $18.6 million contract for 57,000 plate carriers was awarded Oct. 8, to KDH Defense Systems....

The primary objective in providing Soldiers with a plate carrier is to reduce the weight of their body armor and to significantly reduce heat stress, enhancing combat performance in extreme temperatures, PEO Soldier officials said.

The vest will carry standard hard armor plates for vital ballistic protection, but cover less of the Soldier's body than the Interceptor Body Armor system...

The full-up plate carrier (including front and side hard armor plates) represents a weight reduction of 10 to 15 pounds compared with the complete Improved Outer Tactical Vest with front and side hard armor plates...

[William F. Owen]

an $18.6 million contract for 57,000 plate carriers was awarded Oct. 8, to KDH Defense Systems....

The primary objective in providing Soldiers with a plate carrier is to reduce the weight of their body armor and to significantly reduce heat stress, enhancing combat performance in extreme temperatures, PEO Soldier officials said.
Wow. They finally got to where a whole bunch of folks have been for the last 4-5 years - in other words a time period where WW2 and 1 would have been before they got it right.
Good news. Pity about the time. I bet the "system" not the "people" will get the blame though. :mad: