Weight of Combat Gear Is Taking Toll

[SWJED]

Weight of Combat Gear Is Taking Toll (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/01/31/AR2009013101717.html)- Ann Scott Tyson, Washington Post


Carrying heavy combat loads is taking a quiet but serious toll on troops deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan, contributing to injuries that are sidelining them in growing numbers, according to senior military and defense officials.

Rising concern over the muscle and bone injuries -- as well as the hindrance caused by the cumbersome gear as troops maneuver in Afghanistan's mountains -- prompted Army and Marine Corps leaders and commanders to launch initiatives last month that will introduce lighter equipment for some U.S. troops.

As the military prepares to significantly increase the number of troops in Afghanistan -- including sending as many as 20,000 more Marines -- fielding a new, lighter vest and helmet is a top priority, Marine Corps Commandant Gen. James Conway said recently. "We are going to have to lighten our load," he said, after inspecting possible designs during a visit to the Quantico Marine base...

[William F. Owen]

:mad:

This really annoys me. It's as if the corporate memory of every army ever involved in combat operations from the last 60 years, has just evaporated.

The question not being asked is why, when everyone knows how to lighten the load, are they not doing it? Sure, it involves running risk. Risk is inherent to the job.

[Schmedlap]

The new equipment, called a "plate carrier," would protect vital organs and weigh less than 20 pounds. It would not include additional pieces that troops currently use to shield sides, shoulders, arms, the groin and other areas -- pieces that, with a helmet, weigh about 35 pounds. There is also the issue of agility. In our zeal to turn every Soldier into a walking fortress, I think some lose sight of the fact that our doctrine and tactics are about taking the fight to the enemy, rather than absorbing enemy fire and calling for exfil. You simply cannot move if you're kitted out like King Arthur and your effectiveness is degraded. Let's not forget why Soldiers are out there: to find and kill the enemy. In OIF III, we fielded the shoulder guards. I have never seen anything so restrictive to one's arm and shoulder movement. They might as well have issued us straight-jackets. We refused to wear them and sent them back to the warehouse to be removed from our property book. Eventually, "higher" deemed that only turret gunners were required to wear them. We generally complied (METT-T dependent).

As for the total weight, it is surprising that if these items are only 35 pounds that Soldiers are still carrying so much weight. I wonder where the statistics come from. Obviously, Afghanistan requires heavier loads simply due to water requirements alone. But in Iraq, the average combat load for us was 13 magazines (probably less for most units), 1 gallon of water, 2 frags (probably less for most units), a first aid kit that weighed maybe a pound or so, another pound for an NVD, and then either a radio, shotgun with 8 rounds (probably not carried by most units), or some other item - none of which weighed more than 10 or 12 pounds. By my guestimation, that's about 40 or 50 pounds (I'm overestimating to account for batteries), to include an M4, at the most, added to the 35 pounds of armor and helmet. SAW gunners and M240B gunners did not carry the "other item" so the total weight wasn't too much more for them - maybe 10 pounds more at the most. (Note the several instances of "probably less" and "overestimate"). If all of this weight were being carried in an ALICE pack, then I could see how it would get old really quickly. But given how we carry this stuff now - close to the body, distributed evenly - this amount of weight was barely noticable. I've really got to question the physical training of someone who feels overly weighted down by this.

Regarding one item of protection noted - the groin protection - that weighs almost nothing. I kept it folded up, underneath my RACK and when the shooting started simply leaned forward and brushed the guard down into position. I'll take the risk of muscular-skeletal injury over the risk of losing the family jewels.

Lastly, there are some legitimate points in this article, but I've got to raise the BS flag on this part...


Sgt. Waarith Abdullah, 34, is struggling to recover at Fort Stewart, Ga., from a lower-back injury that he says was caused by the strain of wearing body armor for long hours each day during three deployments to Iraq and Saudi Arabia.

Abdullah's injury flared up painfully during his most recent 15-month deployment to Balad, Iraq, where he had to maneuver to search vehicles and stand for 12-hour shifts in guard towers.
(emphasis added)
What the heck is going on in Saudi Arabia that requires wearing heavy "combat" gear? "Maneuver" to search vehicles? And what is this guy weighted down with while standing in a guard tower? Body armor, according to the article, is 35 pounds. What other gear is this guy carrying, versus having readily available at his post? Could the author have found a more ridiculous example to illustrate an otherwise legitimate observation? I've seen pregnant Soldiers able to work harder than this.

[selil]

Light weight, capable, flexible, is known. Pick up an REI catalog or GALLS. We've talked about this before, but nobody is listening.

Next time somebody snags a Taliban insurgent, weigh his entire kit.

[Schmedlap]

Next time somebody snags a Taliban insurgent, weigh his entire kit.
I think the usefulness of that observation is limited. If we kill 100 Taliban in one day, our adversaries don't lose much sleep. If we lose 5 Soldiers in one day, it imperils public support for the war. Hence the body armor.

Also, the Taliban can afford to travel light because he can hide among the people. If he runs out of ammo, he can throw down his weapon and mingle with the locals. If a Soldier runs out of ammo, then he's probably getting his head chopped off.

[Bob's World]

Light weight, capable, flexible, is known. Pick up an REI catalog or GALLS. We've talked about this before, but nobody is listening.

Next time somebody snags a Taliban insurgent, weigh his entire kit.

True, but when the much heavier kit is more bulletproof, the senior leaders who made the right decision to go with the lighter gear will be crucified by the same media for not giving the soldiers the very best (now defined by how resistent vs how light) it is.

Real Catch-22.

I had to chuckle a bit at GEN Chiarelli's comments about humping a heavy ruck. I really like this guy as a person and have tremendous respect for him as an officer. This is a general who walks the walk when it comes to taking care of soldiers. The reason I chuckled though, is because he is Cav/Armor thru and thru, and is far more likely to put a dash of fuel in his coffee than ever hump a ruck! I had the privelege of working for him back in 2002 in Army G-3 during football season, and as he is a Univ of Washington alum, it led to some good banter with this Oregon State product.

For weeks I had endured good natured ribbing about us SOF guys and our dewrags and general disregard for good military decorum. Come the week of the big game between UW and OSU I challenged him to a small wager during the evening shift change (which this 2-star never missed, morning and night he ran the rehearsal and the actual brief...not to cover his ass, but to ensure he knew the issues and the product was tight, and he did and it was). Gen C was immediately up for the bet and asked me what I would be willing to wager. Simple, if my team lost, I would stand the next shift change wearing a Kevlar. If his team lost, he would stand the next shift change wearing a dewrag. Suffice it to say the wager was too large...

But I know this, whatever the best combination of light weight and good protection is available, this general will bet his stars to see that the soldier receives it.

[max161]

S**t is still a hundred pounds" as the old saying goes.

Part of the problem is that we default to a technical solution for everything. As we miniaturize something and make it smaller and more compact and lighter we (or industry) comes up with something new that will enhance our missions that much more. Communications, computers, more weapons and ammunition and of course the emphasis on force protection (which is not a bad thing but we have to understand that protecting a soldier from a kinetic weapon requires sufficient mass). And as long as we have large rucksacks and load bearing equipment and vests on which we can attach and hang things we are always going to add something new that we think we will need or supposedly help us to better accomplish the mission or protect us. Like nature abhors a vacuum, if there is space on a soldier (or in his ruck) we will fill it!!

[reed11b]

The thing that bugs me, is equipment that is fairly effective will be the first on the "cut" list. Body armor has grown, and perhaps needs to be scaled back, but I do not buy that it is the key weight holding us back. Part of this is from how the weight of the armor is carried and part is from what I have seen many units carry in the fields. I have seen units carry breaching kits on every patrol, take way more snivel gear then they need to survive, overload ammo, water etc etc. These items are carried in a backpack that carries the weight off balance from the body, while the armor weight is distributed across the torso. And really, do you need a breaching kit on every patrol? Why not keep it in the support vehicle and call it up if you need it, unless your going specifically on a raid. Just becouse there is space in your "3 day assualt pack" does not mean you need to fill it. I'll stop here before I wander too far from my point.
Reed

[Jason Port]

I remember this discussion occurring during Desert Storm/Shield, where the average dismounted 11C seemed to be carrying 700 pounds and a labrador retriever everywhere in the reports. Is it true that whereever there is space on the soldier, we feel a need to fill it. However, we have definitely lost sight of the METT-TC analysis which should go into equipping soldiers pre-mission. While we do the best we can for risk mitigation (Shoulder armor, groin protector et al), the point on the breaching kit is right on. In motorized maneuver, where the dismount is supported with vehicles, it is only appropriate to factor this support into the equation.

I also found it interesting the quantity of injuries and 10th MTNs story of success. While I agree that the average human structure is not really designed to carry the full weight of the basic combat load, the reality is that with proper conditioning, everyone can carry the 35 pounds of IBA and ACH. The truest warrior athletes train harder and are even more capable of enduring the additional weight. Does it suck? Sure, but conversely it beats the alternative. Improve the pre-mob physical training, and I suggest that the results will improve.

I am left to wonder though, if the decrease in physical fitness of the incoming soldier is related to this as well. I remember seeing 18-20 year old trainees who struggled to do a 10 minute mile at Reception station in the late 90's. I was recently at Ft. Bragg and saw two shaved headed non-combat patched members of the 82nd, who looked barely old enough to be in uniform. They were chowing at Arby's and were clearly doughy. I assumed that they had just gotten there, as they certainly didn't make the profile of the Airborne yet. I suspect that upon donning their gear, they would break under the weight. My point is - Does the incoming post-teenager now represent a physically weaker specimen? I am sure I would have struggled at 10,000 feet as a 34 year old platoon sergeant, but I could see these two getting injured doing gate vehicle checks and standing in the tower above.

Further the technology provided by industry is also at fault here. Radios down to the individual - I get it. Tacking on additional sensors? As a tech guy, I dig it. However, as a trooper I am only carrying it if there is real, responsive, and tangible benefit to me at the end of the day. So if the sensor gathers raw video data for example about the mission, then analyze it immediately, and feed it back to my platoon's leadership, so that tomorrow I am smarter because of what we did. If not, the sensor is getting left under my hammock. The reality is that too many current sensors or information requirements do not really assist the troopers who feed the data into the information monster. Close the loop and then I will carry it. To Reed's point, we would instead cut the effective stuff in exchange for the shiny objects.

[carl]

My comments are those of a civilian who has no practical experience in this area beyond camping and chasing juvenile deliquents down the street after jumping out of a patrol car so I expect to get torn to pieces. But...

This problem has been around for a long time. Hoplites could never catch peltasts unless they wanted to get caught or made a big mistake. Peltasts generally couldn't hold against hoplites. You needed both. Maybe we are reaching that point again. Maybe we need to develop a corps of skirmishers of some kind who would have some chance of catching or keeping up with a Taliban running up a mountain.

I think no matter how fit a heavily armored trooper is, he isn't going to match a very lightly equipped man in moving about.

If I remember correctly, one of the things used to judge increased American success againt the VC/NVA was how many contacts were initiated by them against us vs. how many were initiated by us against them. This is probably being tracked in Afghanistan. If some units are going about less heavily burdened than others, might this not affect how many contacts they started and could that be compared to other units?

Lastly, I talked to a guy once who was in the South African Army when they used to run long patrols in Namibia and Angola. The troops were given very wide latitude in deciding what they did and didn't want to carry. Would this be an option for our troops?

[Danny]

I have fairly detailed coverage of body armor at my site. I have called for weight reductions so many times I have lost count. But there is something that everyone should face regarding this issue, or there will be no path forward on it.

The low hanging fruit has been picked. Period. The soft panel armor has been scaled back to minimal, losing only ounces or at the most a few pounds. The carrier (which is very low weight itself except for the groin and neck protection itself on the MTV) is light, the soft panels slightly more weighty, but the ESAPI plates HEAVY.

Unless and until we invest the dollars into the innovative design and testing of new hard plates (ceramic or otherwise), there will be no further weight reduction while maintaining the same level of protection. We must find a way to reduce the weight of the ESAPI plates. Our Soldiers and Marines deserve it. This means dollars, national labs, studies in fracture mechanics with finite elements codes, and real commitment rather than just nice words.

Now, for the weight. The IBA (and Marine newest, MTV or its replacement in Afghanistan which reduces the soft panel coverage a little) is about 32 pounds, give or take a few ounces. It's almost all due to ESAPI plates (well, maybe that's a slight exaggeration, but the majority of it is plates). But when you hear about the heavier loads, it's because, of course, they attach other gear (e.g., gun via a carabiner, ammunition, eye wear such as ballistic glasses, hydration system, etc., etc.). Most of the time the systems total out at 65 - 85 pounds, and that is if they don't have a backpack, at which point they might cross the line at 110 pounds.

Body armor is weighty, but it isn't the only thing that adds load to our troops. But the main target of weight reduction if we wish to improve the IBA / MTV is the ESAPI plates. I come back to this point again and again, because it is so true and obvious that I'm surprised that anyone even tries anything else to decrease weight. I advocate spending dollars where it will make a difference rather than trying to pick high-hanging fruit that won't help.

Best, HPS

[Schmedlap]

1. If we're talking about the weight carried on Soldiers' backs, then I agree that we need to find ways to reduce weight. Climbing around mountains with 85 pounds of gear on your torso, plus a full weight (60? 80 pounds more?) on your back, and doing it everyday for a year in sweltering heat - we need to work on that.

2. If we're only talking about standard equipment that Soldiers wear on their torsos then I don't see any issue. Okay, so we've got 85 pounds (usually less) of vest, plates, ammunition, explosives, first aid kit, water, weapons, NVDs, and communication gear. As it is worn now, that's not a problem. It is distributed evenly and close to the body.

I agree that the body is generally not going to react well to the heavy weight, giant ruck, and steep terrain trio (paragraph 1). But if you can't keep up with the standard equipment evenly distributed and closely held to your torso (paragraph 2), then you're probably in the wrong line of work. I think the R&D, in that regard, would be better spent on breathable, cooler uniforms that reduce sweating, thus reducing water intake.

[Danny]

I am assuming, Schmedlap, that the low hanging fruit has been picked for the other gear like it has for body armor. It really doesn't make any difference to the warrior whether the weight is coming from his backpack, hydration system, first aid supplies (for Corpsmen or Combat lifesaver), ammunition or body armor.

The point is that we can fiddle with the small stuff that won't make any difference, or we can attack the large stuff that will. ESAPIs are the gold mine. Fix this problem and you fix the problem of battle space weight.

[Schmedlap]

I think that where the weight is carried is very significant. Years of humping a 60 to 120 pound ALICE pack - before the advent of the interceptor or SAPIs - always sucked, no matter how much training preceded it. Patrolling in 85 pounds of gear distributed around my torso was nothing.

I agree that reducing ESAPI weight would be a significant step in reducing overall weight. But I also think that even if we reduced the amount of weight on the torso to zero, things aren't going to change all that much for the guy humping a ruck in the mountains of Afghanistan. Let Soldiers patrol those mountains with just a rucksack and no vest/plates/load-carrying equipment/etc and they're still going to develop the muscular-skeletal problems discussed. Figure out a way for them to patrol with the standard equipment that Soldiers have in Iraq, but no ruck, and I think the problem goes away.

Unfortunately, for the Soldier in Afghanistan, I don't see any way to supply him with water, food, batteries, and ammunition without requiring him to carry it.

[Danny]

With the above.

Best,

HPS

[carl]

Unfortunately, for the Soldier in Afghanistan, I don't see any way to supply him with water, food, batteries, and ammunition without requiring him to carry it.

How about pack animals?

[politicsbyothermeans]

The question I asked myself, and had my Team Sergeant ask our bubbas, is "Do I really need this?" If the answer was no, put it in your bugout bag or in the truck. If the answer was yes, hang it somewhere. Even so, the reality of our tactical situation often had us with loads that were certainly a consideration in planning the missions. Our agility was certainly not what it would have been without the armor but I imagine agility is also heavily degraded when 7.62x39 or shrapnel are investigating your innards. Not a truly serious point there but I can safely say that I saw guys saved by their armor and I can't think of a single instance where someone was wounded/killed as a result of wearing their armor.

There is little doubt that the weight of gear needs to be reduced but I'll be darned if I can find where that is going to happen. Sure, lighter armor is a good place to start. But, the truth of the matter is that it is on the leadership to evaluate the tactical situation and plan the approach load appropriately. That is, until Mother Army gets around to designing our nano everything gear.

[Surferbeetle]

...reported on this a while back (http://www.popsci.com/node/3409), interesting, but I am not sure about it's practicality in the real world. I suspect that's why we are still issued rucks :rolleyes:

Politicsbyothermeans,

Vehicles are indeed nice to have. Good to see another ca-bubba here.

Regards,

Steve

[William F. Owen]

But, the truth of the matter is that it is on the leadership to evaluate the tactical situation and plan the approach load appropriately.

Methods for doing that have existed for nearly 100 years, yet the US Army does not employ them. Each time I brief a solution, there's the old "Oh we can't do that." - "too dangerous, too risky, we'll get sued etc etc etc."

Everything I see, says the situation is set to get worse.

[Schmedlap]

How about pack animals?
I think that addresses the medical concerns, but not always the tactical ones. I understand some ODAs had good experiences with them. But I can't imagine that working well for the types of missions that an Infantry Battalion will be doing; at least not to a degree where the Soldiers will all be able to ditch their rucks.

[politicsbyothermeans]

Methods for doing that have existed for nearly 100 years, yet the US Army does not employ them. Each time I brief a solution, there's the old "Oh we can't do that." - "too dangerous, too risky, we'll get sued etc etc etc."

Everything I see, says the situation is set to get worse.

Agreed.

If only we could remember to worry less about our OERs and more about our dudes, we might not be having this discussion right now.

[bismark17]

It reminds me of the Ranger telling me about how he jumped into Grenada with 100 pounds of light weight gear.

[Bullmoose Bailey]

Must feel that the process has now reached certain logical conclusions.

Wish to address armour on men & trucks.

(not tanks since I feel armour belongs on them...seperate issue)

The flak vest and gun shield have evolved into quite obtuse systems which constrict movement severely.

In the nature of adaptation the counter to Coalition vehicular plate overcastings has been the implementation of penetrating devices, commonly called EFPs , which essentially render all vehicle armor useless.

I expect that armour penetrating rounds could be improvised for sniper rifles, etc. that would place dismounts in the same over-dressed, unprotected state.

Change is continuous in all conflict.

[Schmedlap]

I remember a Pentagon briefing, several years ago, when the MOLLE gear was first being introduced and the latest ruck was being modeled. A spokesman on the podium said something to the effect of, "this new ruck will allow Soldiers to carry 150 pound loads comfortably." And, to demonstrate, a short, older woman wearing spit-shined jumpboots was standing proudly on the podium, sporting the full ruck, apparently quite comfortable with it bearing down on her shoulders (I have no idea whether it was full of ammo or pillows).

While I do not miss the lackluster training or garrison-minded madness of the pre-9/11 force, I have to admit that spectacles like that did provide for an occasional good laugh.

[BayonetBrant]

For the guys at PEO-Soldier, I wish to offer this nugget, from a guy who's schlepped many a bag on his back over the years (military and civilian) -

There is no comfortable way to carry 150 pounds of gear. There are varying ranges of discomfort, but it'll never feel as good as when you take the pack off.

[BayonetBrant]

Lastly, I talked to a guy once who was in the South African Army when they used to run long patrols in Namibia and Angola. The troops were given very wide latitude in deciding what they did and didn't want to carry. Would this be an option for our troops?

Sadly, no. Because those South African commanders never appeared before a hearing full of never-been-in-the-military Congressional reps being beseiged by letter-writers from back home demanding to know why their sons/daughters weren't weighed down with every single potential life-saving gizmo we could possibly buy.
No commander wants to have to face the klieg lights of C-SPAN and try to explain to people (who are proud of the fact that they don't understand) what life's like when you're chasing targets up the side of a mountain with 150 pounds of lightweight gear nestled comfortably in your MOLLE ruck...

[politicsbyothermeans]

I was looking at some pictures of my grandfather and great uncles in WWII (and, my great grandfather in WWI) and I was pretty well struck by them wearing ties... into combat. I do not doubt that the ties were quickly discarded but it does serve to remind us that soldiers have been doing this whole war thing for quite some time and armor is hardly new. The apt pupil will note that even though armor has shifted the balance towards "safe" war for some, it has invariably been sidelined by some advance in weaponry.

Apart from that, I do wonder if the answer to our question lies more in the realm of the logistician and the UAV crowd than at PEO Soldier. Afterall, if we could reliably (and I admit therein lies the rub) provide the correct classes of supply in a very timely manner, why would we need to hump everything? Only certain items would really need to be carried while other classes of supply could easily be either air dropped or brought forward after the fight. Anyone that has done long range movement to the objective understands the concept of the cache. What say those with the large pulsing veins in their foreheads to an aerial cache system? Something that allows our guys to put everything important on it and then meet us at a predesignated point... say that mountain we're trying to climb?

[William F. Owen]

Sadly, no. Because those South African commanders never appeared before a hearing full of never-been-in-the-military Congressional reps being beseiged by letter-writers from back home demanding to know why their sons/daughters weren't weighed down with every single potential life-saving gizmo we could possibly buy.
.

...and there you have it. Until your Army is an institution that accepts risk taking, and does not have a culture of risk mitigation, you are screwed.

Certain armies and certain units, just do not have a load carrying problem, because they leaders and manpower prepared to make the choices.

Sorry to sound harsh, but there it is.

[BayonetBrant]

Afterall, if we could reliably (and I admit therein lies the rub) provide the correct classes of supply in a very timely manner, why would we need to hump everything? Only certain items would really need to be carried while other classes of supply could easily be either air dropped or brought forward after the fight.


Just remember that rucks come in one size: full.

If you build it, they will fill it.

[Steve Blair]

Only certain items would really need to be carried while other classes of supply could easily be either air dropped or brought forward after the fight. Anyone that has done long range movement to the objective understands the concept of the cache. What say those with the large pulsing veins in their foreheads to an aerial cache system? Something that allows our guys to put everything important on it and then meet us at a predesignated point... say that mountain we're trying to climb?

This was tried by some units in Vietnam, and it was discovered that it required a fair amount of aviation support. To the best of my knowledge only the 1st Cav was able to pull it off on a regular basis, and even then it was criticized by some company-level officers as making their units too dependent on available LZs and compromising unit location each time the log birds came in. It's also rather terrain focused. The Cav could pull it off in the III CTZ because it was reasonably flat, but units like the 101st in I CTZ had problems due to the mountains (and this was especially true for the 4th ID in II CTZ), and the Americal found it almost impossible due to an extended AO and limited aviation support. The Marines had issues similar to those experienced by the Americal, although it did ease somewhat in 1969 when some organizational changes were made.

[politicsbyothermeans]

This was tried by some units in Vietnam, and it was discovered that it required a fair amount of aviation support. To the best of my knowledge only the 1st Cav was able to pull it off on a regular basis, and even then it was criticized by some company-level officers as making their units too dependent on available LZs and compromising unit location each time the log birds came in. It's also rather terrain focused. The Cav could pull it off in the III CTZ because it was reasonably flat, but units like the 101st in I CTZ had problems due to the mountains (and this was especially true for the 4th ID in II CTZ), and the Americal found it almost impossible due to an extended AO and limited aviation support. The Marines had issues similar to those experienced by the Americal, although it did ease somewhat in 1969 when some organizational changes were made.

I'm completely with you and hope I don't sound the least bit snotty when I say that I hope that our logistical/technical skills have increased sufficiently in the last four decades that we could relook this issue.

Perhaps this problem will receive more attention as we shift focus away from the vehicle centric movements in Iraq to more dismounted operations in A'Stan.

[Meinertzhagen]

This is very much how we conducted operations on my last rotation to Northeast Afghanistan. On overnight operations, platoons would leave the Firebase dismounted with a light load enroute to support-by-fire positions or a village for a cordon and search. At one of the hub FOBs, prepo packages of water, MREs and other supplies usually contained in body bags nicknamed "speedballs" would be air-assaulted to resupply positions during the operation. These packages were designed to quickly and easily resupply elements while keeping excess low and their fighting load light. I'm not a logistician, but the system seemed to work well and certainly prolonged our small unit endurance in the extraordinarily difficult terrain of Kunar, Laghman and Nuristan Provinces.

[Ken White]

Bayonet Brant:
"No commander wants to have to face the klieg lights of C-SPAN and try to explain to people (who are proud of the fact that they don't understand) what life's like when you're chasing targets up the side of a mountain with 150 pounds of lightweight gear nestled comfortably in your MOLLE ruck..."Wilf:
"Until your Army is an institution that accepts risk taking, and does not have a culture of risk mitigation, you are screwed."Steve Blair:
"This (aerial resupply) was tried by some units in Vietnam,"It does require a fair amount of aviation support but the key is decentralization. The 1st Bde of the 101st in 65-67 was able to do it regularly in all three northern Corps areas; the 101st Div over organized it and it did not work. It also works best if you resupply platoons (best) or companies (achievable) and not battalions (almost impossible); It's totally do-able today(but see Wilf's comment).

Meinertzhagen:
This is very much how we conducted operations on my last rotation to Northeast Afghanistan.As did 1/82 on OEF6. To include vehicle borne patrols as well as Platoons/Companies on foot.

Bottom line is that Commanders today can reduce the weight carried -- but at a cost of reducing the protection and lethality of their troops. That should be a tactical decision allowed to Company commanders. Period.

Bayonet Brant's comment is true now -- but only because DoD has allowed that to happen; the media is terribly ignorant about the military and Congress has not been educated by DoD. Realistically, I see little chance for change, unfortunately. Though there is one thing that might be considered; if we go to war in another sub tropical jungle, there will be either no armor -- or a whole lot of heat casualties...

[Ron Humphrey]

This is very much how we conducted operations on my last rotation to Northeast Afghanistan. On overnight operations, platoons would leave the Firebase dismounted with a light load enroute to support-by-fire positions or a village for a cordon and search. At one of the hub FOBs, prepo packages of water, MREs and other supplies usually contained in body bags nicknamed "speedballs" would be air-assaulted to resupply positions during the operation. These packages were designed to quickly and easily resupply elements while keeping excess low and their fighting load light. I'm not a logistician, but the system seemed to work well and certainly prolonged our small unit endurance in the extraordinarily difficult terrain of Kunar, Laghman and Nuristan Provinces.

At least one step closer to that dream I have of ADDCLM's

Artillery Delivered Danger Close Logistics munitions:wry:

Not only get's the beans and bullet's there but just think of how acurate those FA bubbas are gonna be when you really get in a jam and aren't asking for jam:D

[RJ]

Today there was this headline about a hearing in Washington, DC

Military: Improved body armor is too heavy

By Richard Lardner - The Associated Press
Posted : Wednesday Feb 4, 2009 20:02:39 EST

It is long and many quotes Army Brass and statements about the weight and some deficient plates for the new body armor.

It ends the story with these comments;

“Over time, the body armor, it does wear on your body,” said Army Staff Sgt. Fred Rowe, who has done two combat tours in Iraq. “I couldn’t imagine doing what I did, carrying what I carried, in Afghanistan.”

Rowe appeared at the hearing along with several senior Army officers, including Maj. Gen. Robert Lennox, who oversees operations and training.

Brig. Gen. Michael Brogan, head of the Marine Corps Systems Command in Quantico, Va., agreed with Army leaders who said that the vast majority of requests from commanders in the field, especially those in Afghanistan, ask that the troops’ load be lightened.

“We must balance levels of protection in order to maintain the agility, mobility and lethality of our Marines,” according to Brogan’s written testimony.

I hope the powers that be read Gen. Brogan's written testimony. But have the nagging feeling they didn't.

[politicsbyothermeans]

I shall not name the GO but I know of a GO that decided that he and his staff would wear their IBAs (with the Division standard loadout) while in the HQ for one week so that they could experience what their folks were dealing with. This was despite the Div CSM pointing out that office operations were not combat operations.

For those of you with the sickened feeling in your stomach area, you will be pleased to know that, after a few days, the GO declared the experiment a success and told his folks they could return their IBAs to the bottom of their duffle bags, or wherever Fobgoblins keep their crap.

[sapperfitz82]

I haven't the time to look/link it.

As for those who feel 85 lbs is an acceptable combat load, I applaud you and say your nuts.

Been both places, can attest that the MOLLE I absolutely will not carry 150 lbs, the frame will break about 30% of the time with just 80 lbs in it.

Old women can't climb the Hindu Kush, I know, I watch the young women fail to do with just an IBA, forget the ruck.

We are over what every study has shown to be the ideal fighting load (about 35-45 lbs) by exactly the weight of the IBA. My last fighting load was 73 lbs. Don't tell me to leave the snivel at home, I have evaced soldiers for hypothermia and burned my C4 to keep others alive. We had no snivel, unless one bivy sack per two men counts, and my emergency approach march load was weighed at 143 when I came back! Extra? Water, batteries, 1 UBL, C4. I drank a quart a day for 11 days and ate a 2 power bars and an MRE every day. I lost over 25 lbs (from 143 lb).

How do I know these weights? Because they had a study group weighing us and all our gear at departure and return. Because the study (in 2003) said we were carrying too much. Because they have only added more to our mandatory kit, and I take a deep and abiding interest in its weight.

10 lbs for every size larger in the IBA. I now wear a small, not a medium. Those of you with a large IBA are carrying 20 lbs more armor than I do. Weight has changed our tactics. We used to walk those mountains, now we drive the valleys.

Those of you who are commanders and have decided that an 80 lbs fighting load is acceptable are part of the problem, plain and simple. It is not. Try some simple tests. Conduct a combat assault course or any O course in full kit (with ammo). Your unit will not meet your expectations. My platoon had a PT average in the 280s and were studs, plain and simple. We did the A course regularly. Full kit broke it off. After we had done 6 months walking in Astan. The loads are simply too much. Since the Hoplites, we have found that the army standard 35-45 lbs is the most weight one can carry and still fight effectively for a long period.

[Schmedlap]

If combat were long periods of intense physical activity such as that engaged in on an obstacle/assault course, punctuated by brief periods of inactivity, then I think that performance on such a course would be a useful metric. But combat is the opposite - long periods of inactivity, punctuated by intensity.

Like most others on the board, I've spent a fair amount of time patrolling, fighting, and doing other random tasks in Iraq, for long periods of time, in ridiculously hot temperatures, in around 85 pounds of gear. It's not ideal, but it's acceptable. There were days where we were involved in some sphincter-puckering situations and we, too, felt like someone had broken it off in us - probably very similar to how folks felt after the assault course. I don't think the determination of the ideal weight has anything to do with whether you feel refreshed immediately following a firefight. I think it has more to do with whether you had the gear you needed and whether you're the guy consolidating and reorganizing on the objective, rather than the guy who's lying motionless on it. Unfortunately, "need" is determined by more than tactical considerations. Dead American Soldiers undermine public support. So long as the load does not get so heavy as to prevent us from prevailing in a firefight, I don't see the weak political will of the American people allowing us to go sans SAPI.

I suspect that my views on the weight of our gear would differ if I were in Afghanistan's steep terrain - perhaps that's a relevant variable - though the reality of public opinion wouldn't change.

Loads of 140 pounds or more - yeah, I'd say that would suck just about anywhere.

One other thought - perhaps it's not the number of pounds, but the percentage of one's body weight that matters. All of our machine gunners were tall guys. Long legs seem to make carrying the gun easier. Taller guys were generally heavier folks. I recall one guy in the unit who weighed about 120 or 130, soaking wet, and there was no talk of making him a machine gunner.

[reed11b]

One other thought - perhaps it's not the number of pounds, but the percentage of one's body weight that matters. All of our machine gunners were tall guys. Long legs seem to make carrying the gun easier. Taller guys were generally heavier folks. I recall one guy in the unit who weighed about 120 or 130, soaking wet, and there was no talk of making him a machine gunner.

What unit was that!! :eek: I weighed between 120 and 145 while in service and I was a mortarman or RTO on active and both a 240B and and SAW gunner in the guard. I remember one night patrol when I had both the SAW and the singars and my SL saw an Iraqi out past curfew and yelled for me to chase him. I was like "yeah right" but I did anyway.
Reed

[ODB]

Training!

[Ken White]

Great choice of words... :D

[ODB]

Do most of these threads keep coming back to that word? How many times will I have to shout it from the top of my lungs until they get it?

Maybe can work with you on the age thing, but rich is non-wavierable:D

[Ken White]

tends to benefit only a few congressional districts while hardware with multiple sub contractors benefit many. Good trainers are hard to find. Hard to do it well. Too much early attrition to invest too much in it. High 'no-Go' rates don't make the School / TC look good. Lot of reasons -- none good in my opinion but there sure are a bunch of excuses....

Be careful with those lungs; 'bout ruined mine screaming it. ;)

Hang tight, I'm buying Lottery tickets. :D

[Kiwigrunt]

I came across this:


http://defenceoftherealm.blogspot.com/2008/05/not-taking-it-seriously.html

Reported recently by Popular Mechanics (a surprisingly good source of reliable military information) is a new technique introduced by the US forces in Afghanistan. This is the GPS-guided or "smart" parachute – known as the Joint Precision Airdrop System (JPADS).

It can be used by high-flying transport aircraft to make precision drops of supplies to isolated outposts, reducing the need to use ambush-prone vehicle convoys and avoiding the hazards involved in helicopter re-supply. So successful has been the technique that the USAF delivered 313,824 pounds of supplies between August 2006, when the programme began, to September 2007 – keeping an estimated 500+ convoys off the roads.

First time I've heard of it but as it is a few years old I assume most of you will know about it?! It mentions here the supply of outposts but would this system work for supplying small patrols? Even from helicopters at altitude. What say you......

[RTK]

Training!
So I see after a week and a half off the net that I haven't missed much. :D

[RJ]

"What unit was that!! I weighed between 120 and 145 while in service and I was a mortarman or RTO on active and both a 240B and and SAW gunner in the guard. I remember one night patrol when I had both the SAW and the singars and my SL saw an Iraqi out past curfew and yelled for me to chase him. I was like "yeah right" but I did anyway."
Reed 11B

My Marine Battalion (3/5) seemed to lean towards Machine gunners who were short and wiry and strong or short and built like fire plugs. Stocky and strong! i commented on the height issue to a Gunnery Sgt. and he said that the shorter the gunner, the less there is for the enemy to hit.
As good a theory as any, I guess. :D

I saw a gunner running across a rice paddy dike slip and fall into a freshly manured paddy. As his body arched out, off the dike, he pushed the gun off his shoulders and rotate his body to hit the water on his back. The picture of his wrists and forearms holding the gun out of the water was the most impressive thing I ever saw. We applauded him when his A/Gunner pulled him above the funky water.

Guns Up!

The "MG" in those days was the LMG 30.

[Ken White]

So I see after a week and a half off the net that I haven't missed much. :DHey -- we're consistent. ;)

Hard not to be when confronted with such a massive long standing error. :wry:

[ODB]

So I see after a week and a half off the net that I haven't missed much. :D

But it does cover a lot (might be an understatement) of the issues discussed. I will have to go back an consult my post where I used the thesaurus so I can use different words to say the same thing.

[Schmedlap]

Are we saying that more/proper training...
a) will reduce the need for so much gear because we won't need it to be effective
b) better physically condition Soldiers so that the weight is not an issue
c) both
d) neither

This is one of those occasions where the connection between the problem identified and the solution suggested isn't completely obvious to me.

[jcustis]

I came across this:



First time I've heard of it but as it is a few years old I assume most of you will know about it?! It mentions here the supply of outposts but would this system work for supplying small patrols? Even from helicopters at altitude. What say you......

In the Corps, we call them Sherpa drops. Witnessed three of them used to resupply us near the Syrian border in 2004. The require a logistics tail though to retrieve the equipment and parachutes after the drop is done (at least in a semi-permissive environment). They could absolutely be utilized for in-extremis resupply and left behind as required.

We have utilized helicpopters to deliver fuel, food, and water to forces in the battlespace during this rotation, but aerial resupply is dicey when you add up weather, limited visibility flight qualifications, etc.

[Ken White]

Are we saying that more/proper training...
a) will reduce the need for so much gear because we won't need it to be effectiveas well what little must be taken * and what should be left behind -- and more importantly, decent training will also develop leaders that can and will conduct risk assessments and who will allow (and take) responsibility for tactical decisions that may lessen 'necessary equipment' carried, 'force protection' or 'safety' restrictions to provide better conditions for mission accomplishment.
This is one of those occasions where the connection between the problem identified and the solution suggested isn't completely obvious to me.Unfortunately, it is also not obvious to many in high places.

I fully understand the political and media pressures on several levels that preclude better training, inhibit the ability of willing commanders to take risks and cause excessive emphasis on force protection.

I also understand that the American people -- as opposed to the political and chattering classes -- are able to discern what's important and make sensible decisions. It is my belief that we can train and operate a great deal more effectively if we stop trying to placate Congress and the media (which we will never really manage to do), stop trying to tap dance on the head of a pin (to convince people how special we are) and just concentrate on doing the job right...


* How much of what now 'must' be taken is a technological substitute for poor training?

[ODB]

Are we saying that more/proper training...
a) will reduce the need for so much gear because we won't need it to be effective
b) better physically condition Soldiers so that the weight is not an issue
c) both
d) neither

This is one of those occasions where the connection between the problem identified and the solution suggested isn't completely obvious to me.

a) Ken hit some key points on this. Additionally through training we learn how to work those assets available for resupplies. Caches IMO are a lost art in the military today. Do operations for the sole purpose of caching supplies for future operations. There are a multitude of things that can be learned by training. Why carry 5 pound bolt cutters when I can carry .25 pound dikes? One has to train with the equipment to know what works, what can be utilized for multiple purposes, when and where something does or doesn't work.

b) This is a big one. The human body IMO is amazing with it's ability to adapt. We all know we are going to wear body armour, but how many PT in body armour? Weekly runs in body armour make a difference. To add to this, sorry the alotted PT time is not enough, individuals need to take there own time to condition themselves. How many times do leaders check soldier loads when conducting training marches? Sorry but a PT score does not tell me a single thing about a soldiers conditioning. So because a guy can score 300 he is a stud? Not at all, he knows how to pass a test. Pushing soldiers physically with heavy loads, physically demanding training will prepare them for the rigors they will face. Run those same "studs" through a 4 mile litter run in body armour, rope climbs, log drills, the list goes on......point is one has to train accordingly to the demands they will face. They have to train harder than those demands so when they face them they can reflect back on harder times and realize this is nothing compared to the time when we did this....

Finally I'll add that we need to get out of the risk averison mode we have entered. We are the business of accepting risks, but we must not continue to avoid risks. Yes, risk mitigation is a must. How do we learn to mitigate those risks, through training.

Yes, IMO most of this whinning can be avoided through proper training.

Anyone know why the Army stopped doing top down building clearing? If you do then you'll know how we have ended up where we are today.

[reed11b]

a) b) This is a big one. The human body IMO is amazing with it's ability to adapt. We all know we are going to wear body armour, but how many PT in body armour? Weekly runs in body armour make a difference. To add to this, sorry the alotted PT time is not enough, individuals need to take there own time to condition themselves. How many times do leaders check soldier loads when conducting training marches? Sorry but a PT score does not tell me a single thing about a soldiers conditioning. So because a guy can score 300 he is a stud? Not at all, he knows how to pass a test. Pushing soldiers physically with heavy loads, physically demanding training will prepare them for the rigors they will face. Run those same "studs" through a 4 mile litter run in body armour, rope climbs, log drills, the list goes on......point is one has to train accordingly to the demands they will face. They have to train harder than those demands so when they face them they can reflect back on harder times and realize this is nothing compared to the time when we did this....


I would disagree w/ you on the APFT (it is a fairly good indicator of overall fitness) except for the 2 mile run. 2 mile run is more of a skill then a fitness test. You do learn how to run the 2 mile. The rest of your post rings true with me however.
Reed

[Schmedlap]

This thread seems to get more generalized with every post.

Humping 140 pounds everyday up 15,000-foot peaks for 12 months? I'd say something is wrong. And I think that was the issue that began this thread. If physical training is the solution to that, then my credulity is strained more than those Soldiers' ligaments. If better training on Soldier skills is the solution, in order to remove the necessity of carrying all that gear and in order to give leaders a better sense of what they really need to bring - okay, got it. Agree on the latter.

I think that is the full scope of the problem - crazy big loads in rough terrain. But it is tough to distinguish whether some of the comments are referring to Iraq, Afghanistan, or both. I don't think there is a problem with the weight of our gear in Iraq. I say, if patrolling relatively flat terrain in Iraq in 85 pounds of gear is too much weight, then you need to see the gynecologist. If the concern is not that it's too much weight, but rather that "it could be less"... well, that's nice. I suppose that my teeth could be whiter, too. If the stuff that we're carrying gives us a significant edge and our Soldiers have the strength and conditioning to shoulder it and still operate effectively, then I want to know a good reason for leaving it behind - something better than just a general preference for being lighter.

[Ron Humphrey]

a) Caches IMO are a lost art in the military today. Do operations for the sole purpose of caching supplies for future operations. There are a multitude of things that can be learned by training. Why carry 5 pound bolt cutters when I can carry .25 pound dikes? One has to train with the equipment to know what works, what can be utilized for multiple purposes, when and where something does or doesn't work.



I'm always amazed at how you often don't hear talk about how much the history of large forces involves "livin off the land" stuff for exactly the reasons that we work so hard to overcome.

Guess it's cause it takes ????????? to know how to do it:D:cool:

[carl]

I am deeply skeptical that any amount of physical conditioning will allow a 160 pound soldier carrying 85 pounds of equipment to catch or even keep up with a Taliban fighter carrying an AK and a blanket roll; especially if the race continues for several days. I also think it important that we be able to at least keep up with the Taliban in that race.

So this interested civilian doesn't see any alternative to shedding some of the weight. Also, as Ken said, if we ever get back into the tropics that weight will have to come off, so might as well get started now.

[ODB]

One should not have to chase the Taliban for days if one utilizes our doctrine and assets available.

1. Find them
2. Fix them
3. Finish them

So with that in mind I do not see an issue of trying to run down the Taliban for days on end. Worse case everything falls off with a pull of a few tabs if it truely comes down to that.

As I shake the cobwebs from the memory of Afghanistan in 02'. I have commented before about my load and lessons learned from that time. We wore IBA with mag pouches and one utility pouch. We carried 3 day assault packs with food (a lot of power bars and for myself milkbone dog biscuits and peanut butter), water, and ammo (cross loaded for the mortars or machine guns). In the mountains you threw in some snivel gear and a sleep system (usually bivy sack and patrol bag). Not a heavy load, very easily managable. We utilized UH-60s for resupply, mainly water. Was this the exception because I had decent leadership? To this day I question our lack of use of filteration pumps, chlorine tablets, etc..... Understand the focus not being on Afghanistan the past years and can see if there is a lack of assets in country to conduct resupplies, but also do not see how proper planning and coordination can't make it happen. Then do all resupplies need to be done by air?

Are we allowing technological advances to dictact what we carry, IMO the short answer = yes. Basically it comes down to the fact that we have forgotten basic skills that have worked for centuries, because we think technology is the answer. We have become soft and forgotten how to survive on what is available.

Wanted to stay generalized vs getting into "war stories" but do have specific examples of both ends of the spectrum from both theaters of operation.

[Schmedlap]

To this day I question our lack of use of filteration pumps, chlorine tablets, etc..... Are we allowing technological advances to dictact what we carry, IMO the short answer = yes. Basically it comes down to the fact that we have forgotten basic skills that have worked for centuries, because we think technology is the answer. We have become soft and forgotten how to survive on what is available.

I don't think it's a matter of "getting soft" or forgetting anything. What takes more time?
a) Locating, procuring, filtering, and chlorinating water
b) Bringing water with you
Answer: depends on the mission. I would argue that for the overwhelming majority of missions - your specific cases perhaps being the exception - the answer is (b). That's not "getting soft" or forgetting. That's doing what makes more sense.

I remember retired Soldiers complaining about us having bottled water in Iraq when I got back from my first deployment. I guess they thought that we were drinking Evian water and munching on caviar or something. I tried explaining to them that it simplified logistics and field sanitation, thus freeing up time for other stuff. Their response was, "back in my day, we drank water from our canteens and we filled our helmets with water to shave." That's nice. And that was better for what reason? I respect their nostalgia. I don't understand how it makes us more effective.

Regarding the earlier note about caching - same issue. For situations such as your anecdotal experiences, perhaps it makes sense. For most, if not all, operations in Iraq and probably many in Afghanistan, it seems like an unnecessary time killer. I don't know if you've deployed in a conventional unit since 9/11, but their responsibilities are significantly different than those of an AOB operating in the same AOR. In OIF III, my Infantry Company's tasks, just off the top of my head, included route security, fixed site security, OPs, training IA, IP, MoD (all at once - in different locations), securing new IA and IP sites as they are being built, flooding the AOR with small teams to eliminate IED emplacers in the act and maintain a state of paranoia amongst the insurgency (helping to make area more permissive for the ODAs to move about it), providing QRF and/or outer cordons for ODA missions, and providing QRF for MiTTs. Those are just off the top of my head. I could brainstorm dozens more. Those tasks are extremely time and manpower intensive - especially when you throw in the logistics and life support and the fact that we're operating from a patrol base where we provide our own security (couldn't hire Peshmerga guards like the ODAs could). Add to that mix specific missions to go out and cache supplies? Time and troops available are already tapped out. Joe is going to need to carry his ammo and water.

[ODB]

Did OEF 02' and OIF 03' with 101st. Went SF in 04.

[Ken White]

I don't think it's a matter of "getting soft" or forgetting anything.Wrong issue, I think -- soft isn't the question. The issue should be what works best for that AO and that mission. One does not have to practice to be miserable -- but one, if a soldier, should be prepared to do what it takes to get the job done. I'm sure you always did and always would. Most guys and gals do. Only a few will try to sluff for various reasons. Today, many are not inclined to take risks or to commit people to the boonies without eleventy gallons of water each even if that makes mission sense. Each theater, each AO, each individual mission deserves a clean sheet look. Preconcieved ideas of what's needed or best get people killed. Every situation differs.
What takes more time?
a) Locating, procuring, filtering, and chlorinating water
b) Bringing water with you
Answer: depends on the mission. I would argue that for the overwhelming majority of missions - your specific cases perhaps being the exception - the answer is (b). That's not "getting soft" or forgetting. That's doing what makes more sense.True -- based on your experience in Iraq. What is the mission of the average rifle company in Afghanistan? How many Platoons are out there, scuffling around away from the Flag Pole. How many even smaller elements are out there. Different AO, different everything. Carrying water may be necessary, may not be.
...Their response was, "back in my day, we drank water from our canteens and we filled our helmets with water to shave." That's nice. And that was better for what reason? I respect their nostalgia. I don't understand how it makes us more effective.It wasn't better, it was the best that could be done at the time -- the point is not that it's better, it obviously is not -- point is simply it was done when it was necessary and could be again; METT dependent. Lacking a steel helmet to shave in, why not just go a couple of weeks without shaving? Quelle Horreur...:eek:

My personal best is 94 days without a shower and fourteen days on the button without shaving or brushing my teeth. That was then, this is now -- but I have no doubt that any number of troops today can do that without falling apart. I also have no doubt that whole units can do that and still be combat effective. The body will take a lot of abuse -- it'll pay you back later but why worry...;)
...Add to that mix specific missions to go out and cache supplies? Time and troops available are already tapped out. Joe is going to need to carry his ammo and water.Make no sense in Iraq or for some in Afghanistan, it all depends, as you said, on the mission. For SF and for light infantry distributed patrols in Platoon or smaller size, caches can makes sense or not -- it all depends on the mission, routes, time, intel -- all those things. Caches can also be planted by Unit A in January for Unit E to use a year later. I don't think he means it should always be done, just citing it as a technique. So is a rendezvous with a wheeled or tracked resupply effort or routing a patrol to a friendly outpost for resupply. All sorts of options.

My point and that of ODB (I think. He can speak for himself but I think I know where he's coming from...) and those old dudes is just that you do what needs to be done and preconceived notions about what is good may need to be relooked. Proper training would enable more people to do that, partly by letting them know what's possible and how to do some things if they become necessary, partly by letting them know it's not only alright to think differently, it is in fact, in combat a really good idea to do so. Such training would also teach people that they could shave with less than a Porta Cabin sink or an electric razor, that you can find and drink local water and get by on a canteen a day for a week or two with no great harm if that enhances mission accomplishment and that you don't need ten magazines and any more clothing changes than three pair of socks fo a couple of weeks or month on extended operations.

Soldiering is not as nice as life can be elsewhere, discomfort is not really necessary in many cases but where it is probably necessary to do some things like that, one should be able to order it done or to do it knowing that it's temporary and it can be done.

It's a lot easier to do -- and to order it done -- if folks know how to do it and the one ordering it knows they know how. That's where we've erred...

[Ken White]

Did OEF 02' and OIF 03' with 101st. Went SF in 04.Both do good work -- but they don't understand each other.

Almost as bad as SF and the whole Army..... :D

[sapperfitz82]

I did eleven day patrols in Afghanistan and saw no water any where the whole time. Other times, it would have been unsafe regardless of the cholrine tabs. Water in that AO is so polluted with heavy metals, you would not want to risk it (in most places.)

Conditioning? You're kidding right?

I won't toot their horn, but the platoon I was attached to were good, very good, at staying in shape. Yeah, we rucked twice a week, lots of weight, usually 6 miles. The did IBA and pro mask runs. The regime was tough. Regardless, they did not make more than about 1200 m a day around Babol Kehyl. I think some of you may know the area, it was the scene of OP Anaconda. The loads were not excessive, but the mortars and MGs were toting a lot of weight. We simply could not move fast enough to be of any tactical use. Sure, could drop weight and work out of a PB, we did, but the bad guys know where you are and simply avoid contact.

This scenario is specfic to illustrate a larger point. We are conceding a great deal of our mobility. I don't see the payoff. Those with enough rank to refuse the pressure to add more armor, or set theatre policy to wear all of it, have that rank to ensure the soldiers are employed within their capability for a successful mission. It aint happen.

[Ken White]

I did eleven day patrols in Afghanistan and saw no water any where the whole time. Other times, it would have been unsafe regardless of the cholrine tabs. Water in that AO is so polluted with heavy metals, you would not want to risk it (in most places.)Sometimes you don't. Usually you don't. Most of the photos my kid in the 82d sent back from the 'Stan showed some water nearby.

Dicey water can hurt -- or not. Having drunk out of more rice paddies than I care to recall and never really having had an problems from eating or drinking locally all over the world, I'll now reveal my secret ;) :

Old Marine Gunnery Sergeant who had been around most of Central America between the world wars, as well as on a Cruiser in the Asian Squadron and all through WW II told me "Whenever you get to a new country, eat and drink the local stuff. Your stomach will rebel at the change of diet for a day or two and then you'll be okay. That way if you have to live off local food you can do it without getting dysentery when you least need it." He seemed to know what he was talking about so I did that in about 20 or so countries over the next 40 plus years. Worked for me.

When I got all the later pitches about not eating or drinking locally because of this or that bug, I just ignored 'em and continued to eat and drink local food and water. Annoyed the daylights out some folks... :D

[Schmedlap]

My personal best is 94 days without a shower and fourteen days on the button without shaving or brushing my teeth.
We may be neck and neck there. I don't have the exact dates. I took a shower in Kuwait in March 2003. My next was in June - at a car dealership in Baghdad. That was one funky uniform.


Proper training would enable more people to do that, partly by letting them know what's possible and how to do some things if they become necessary, partly by letting them know it's not only alright to think differently, it is in fact, in combat a really good idea to do so.
On most threads, I'm with you on the lackluster training. I don't think it's an issue here. If I'm not caching supplies, purifying water, going 3 months without a shower, or eating bugs - it's not for lack of training. It's because it's been unnecessary since the summer of 2003.

Most of the skills discussed are not the lost art that they are perceived to be. When we first arrived in Baghdad in April 2003, we were chlorinating and rationing water, conducting operations without night vision, radios, or flashlights (we had no batteries), living off the city (rather than the land), and not shaving or bathing. There was no "uh oh" moment where we thought, "yikes - chlorinating water wasn't part of our last gunnery density - how do we do this?" or "Gee, I can't go patrolling at night without seeing everything in a shade of green." Everybody knew how to use tracers and knew that it was easier to see objects at night if you don't look directly at them.

Maybe the old school techniques are necessary in Afghanistan - but I'd be surprised. I'd be curious to know the competing variables, such as impact on the mission (route selection, likelihood of water being too contaminated to purify, etc), how much weight is actually going to be shed, troops and time available, likelihood of cache sites being discovered and boobytrapped/stolen or observed as they are emplaced. Mr. Tallyban knows those hills better than the Soldiers. For many discussions on this board, lack of training is an obvious culprit because we can see substandard performance that would not exist were it not for substandard training. In the case of what Soldiers carry versus what they cache, leave behind, obtain en route, etc, that's not so obvious. We don't know the competing variables.

My take on the issues on this thread are as follows...
1) If the part of the mission is to significantly minimize casualties, then that is a risk aversion imposed by the civilian masters. That's not a error on the part of the chain of command. As much as I hated the mentality of the Army pre-9/11, it was driven by the civilian leadership. Risk aversion was a specified task in Bosnia. Just because the leadership made it happen, it didn't mean that they thought it made any sense. Given that it was simply absurd, as opposed to unlawful, I don't see what choice they had. Though less drastic, the same dynamic is pushing against us in Iraq and Afghanistan. Can you imagine the hoopla that would have surrounded combat death number 5,000, had it occurred when President Bush was still in office? The media and anti-war protesters would have been dancing in the streets.
2) Earlier suggestions on this thread that leaders weigh down their Soldiers due to concern about their OERs are, for the most part, absurd and insulting. Who are these commanders who care more about their OERs than their men? I've had my share of oddballs and even some incompetent ones, but none that were just flat out evil.
3) 85 pounds in flat terrain - ok. 140 pounds in steep terrain - probably not. The former can be (and has been) solved by physical training. The latter is a physiological issue if it's continuous.
4) If your equipment gives you a significant edge, then I don't care if it's heavy, unless the loss of mobility offsets the edge that your equipment gives you. In Afghanistan, maybe that's the case. I find it hard to believe that leaders are routinely failing to adequately balance those variables.

[Ken White]

On most threads, I'm with you on the lackluster training. I don't think it's an issue here. If I'm not caching supplies, purifying water, going 3 months without a shower, or eating bugs - it's not for lack of training. It's because it's been unnecessary since the summer of 2003.I think you just made one of mine. Point, I mean.

The fact that it's been unnecessary in your experience in a theater for five plus years is, all things considered, an anomaly -- and a dangerous anomaly. Other wars in other places may be vastly different and while I have no doubt that you and millions of other Iraq-style combat veterans can and will adapt to other forms and locales, the question is how many people will be killed unnecessarily while the Army learns anew?

Recall that the year and a half after the summer of 2003 were painful for the Army and th units that were there -- simply because they didn't know what they were supposed to do. The Army there had not been trained for the situation they were in. Conversely for the Army to take the post 2005 Iraq and turn it into the teaching model would do a great disservice to those who might confront different situations in the future.
Most of the skills discussed are not the lost art that they are perceived to be. When we first arrived in Baghdad in April 2003... Everybody knew how to use tracers and knew that it was easier to see objects at night if you don't look directly at them.I'm sure -- welcome to the world of mobile warfare as opposed to a static COIN Op. Now take your OIF 1 experience and tack another 11 months on it while forgetting your later Iraq experience...

That experience gives you an edge over those who didn't make OIF 1 but only were there subsequently and think all war is like that. It isn't and most everyone knows that deep down -- but on the conscious level, that's the experience and that's what they'll try to emulate elsewhere. Unless initial training is thorough and firmly inculcates the basics. Right now it is not thorough it leaves most of the basics out of the mix. Those gaps are filled by 'experience' -- and if the experience confirms bad habits that may not be applicable in another war, another place...
Maybe the old school techniques are necessary in Afghanistan...We don't know the competing variables.I'm fortunate in having a son who's been an infantryman (light; a mildly different world) in both theaters and there are some very significant differences not only in terms of opponents and terrain, in rural versus urban but in the characteristics of the local populations. I think the answer is that for some units there, some older ideas are better, for others, not so much. Distance away from the flagpole and other things. METT...

I don't think caches are the be all and end all and they're only really appropriate for small and stealthy patrols (I know there are some in Afghanistan but also know there aren't nearly as many as I think there should be). Caching doesn't work for Platoons and above, the signature is too great. Hiding small ones from natives under their noses is totally possible if you know what you're doing.

That, however is off the track -- the track IMO is training people to fight competently with minimal equipment rather than having them have to learn things are possible by default when the system fails to keep up. We are masters of ad-hocery; good for us. We should also better prepare people to deal with ALL the vagaries of combat so they do not have to learn by doing but shift to low maintenance mode automatically with no hitches -- and no unnecessary casualties...
My take on the issues on this thread are as follows...
1) If the part of the mission is to significantly minimize casualties, then that is a risk aversion imposed by the civilian masters. That's not a error on the part of the chain of command...Can you imagine the hoopla that would have surrounded combat death number 5,000, had it occurred when President Bush was still in office? The media and anti-war protesters would have been dancing in the streets.Totally true on both counts. However, I believe there is a valid question of how readily the Armed Forces military leadership bowed to the civilian masters on the issue of force protection back in the 70-90 time frame (which developed the habits that do us no favors today). I'm suggesting that the lack of push back on their part for several reasons was in fact a tactical error that has compounded things to the point where your second aspect takes over. I'm pretty sure that if the casualty count edges upward significantly next year that the noise directed at Obama will not be as strident or as well publicized but will exist. The problem is academic -- we are where we are and force protection is and will be unduly emphasized to the detriment of getting jobs done. So be it. Until there's a war involving HIC. Like Armor vests in the tropics, the leaders will learn that excessive force protection efforts cause more friendly and civilian casualties; in a COIN Op, that's justifiable and acceptable -- it is not likely to be in a mobile, HIC war.
2) Earlier suggestions on this thread that leaders weigh down their Soldiers due to concern about their OERs are, for the most part, absurd and insulting. Who are these commanders who care more about their OERs than their men? I've had my share of oddballs and even some incompetent ones, but none that were just flat out evil.If you say someone said that, I'll take your word for it, I don't recall it but unlike you, in a longer career, I have seen some who cared more for their OERs than their troops -- very few but some. I've met a far greater number that would prefer not to fight city hall on an issue that they're pretty sure they'll lose. Fortunately, I've met an adequate number that would fight -- or would just do what they thought was right without asking.
3) 85 pounds in flat terrain - ok. 140 pounds in steep terrain - probably not. The former can be (and has been) solved by physical training. The latter is a physiological issue if it's continuous.Agreed. I'd also say that one cannot fight well if one is carrying more than 30-40 pounds. Some Metrically inclined soul ought to do a cost benefit study on the number of casualties due to excess weight x the number of persons saved by Armor x the loss of mission capability due to excess weight and the resultant casualties from that lack of success.
4) If your equipment gives you a significant edge, then I don't care if it's heavy, unless the loss of mobility offsets the edge that your equipment gives you. In Afghanistan, maybe that's the case. I find it hard to believe that leaders are routinely failing to adequately balance those variables.In reverse order; I do not find it hard to believe that too many but certainly not all leaders are failing to balance those variables (City hall fights one will lose...). On the issue of 'the edge' I broadly agree with your statement but I also believe that the definition of that 'edge' will vary significantly from leader to leader and that variance will all too often depend upon his or her own skills and training (or lack thereof -- and not education...) and, more importantly, his or her (or, regrettably, their Bosses...) perception of the skills and capabilities of the led.

The technological edge can be disrupted by EMP or battery resupply ;) . Or even dumb directives from above (Among several others, I'm thinking of the change to AR 190-11 years ago that said all vehicles carrying ammunition had to have an armed SFC or higher aboard. Every tank in Germany had to offload their ammo to ASPS well in the rear...). Well trained troops have an edge all their own and they are far, far less easily disrupted.

I am firmly convinced that we are too prone to substitute technology for training because buying the technology:

- Is easier than training people thoroughly and adequately.

- Is cheaper than training people for jobs two levels above their current ranks.

- Provides more jobs in more Congressional districts.

So, again, I don't disagree with what you say, if it gives an edge, use it -- if it's 90% or better reliable -- just don't succumb to "I can't go to war without it..." and do be prepared to think it through -- and get along without it.

[Schmedlap]

I think we're largely in agreement and you raise a few more good points.


I'm thinking of the change to AR 190-11 years ago that said all vehicles carrying ammunition had to have an armed SFC or higher aboard.
I recall getting a call one night when I was acting S-3 (in garrison) because our hand grenades were dropped off at the range on the night prior to training. The problem was that the Soldiers who signed for the pallet and were assigned to "guard" the pallet did not have a weapon or ammo - a regulation that I either overlooked or was not aware of. I responded to the staff duty officer: "of course they have an armed guard. The guards are armed with hand grenades." I then quickly hung up.

Brigade mulled for 2 hours over whether it was acceptable that the guy be armed with frags. That was enough time for us to open the arms room, obtain a weapon and some ammo, and send it out to the guys guarding the frags. In hindsight, I guess it makes sense to guard a pallet of frags, but I'd spent the previous 3 out of 4 years in places other than garrison and I just wasn't well versed on regs.

[Ken White]

I think we're largely in agreement and you raise a few more good points.On the agreement; points may be good or not -- all learned the hard way... :wry:
I responded to the staff duty officer: "of course they have an armed guard. The guards are armed with hand grenades." I then quickly hung up....I'd spent the previous 3 out of 4 years in places other than garrison and I just wasn't well versed on regs.Good Job! Who can be well versed on Regs. Penalty of hiring civilians to write them; once you hire 'em, you can't fire 'em and they have to have SOMETHING to do -- so they rewrite Regs. Dumb.

My pet was a one page -- one sentence, actually -- change to FM 21-75 that came out of Benning in the late 80s or early 90s. Sayeth: "Patrol is a verb, the word will not be used to name an operational element."

I'm still a strong devotee of the dictum "Regulations were meant to be intelligently disregarded." Dangerous attitude in this age but that's only because DA and DoD have been at peace since 1947. Yeah, I know -- but they don't or, well, too many up there forget too often...

Not a big prob; the guys on the ground make it work in spite of things on high, they always have and by far the largest majority mean well, do well and make up for the slackness here and there.

[ODB]

To those recently returned from Afghanistan what the hell were you carrying?

Why did you carry said items?

Could go on but think we get the jist of it......

Let's get to the heart of this, lets disect the loads and maybe help some future leaders in their decision making process. More knowledge on these boards than most units, lets put it to work and see what we can come up with.

Additionally we can look at Iraq, but think the main issue lies with Afghanistan.

Again this is key IMO: Finally I'll add that we need to get out of the risk averison mode we have entered. We are the business of accepting risks, but we must not continue to avoid risks. Yes, risk mitigation is a must. How do we learn to mitigate those risks, through training.

And can anyone answer this one: Why did the Army stopped doing top down building clearing?

In regards to caches, water purification etc..... just throwing out other options, imagination is a good thing, after all I seem to remembering hearing somewhere that war is a thinking mans game.

Speed balls don't work so well when they are in a compression sack being kicked out from a UH-60 as it is screaming by trying to get the hell outta there.

[Schmedlap]

And can anyone answer this one: Why did the Army stopped doing top down building clearing?
I didn't realize it did. Did this occur in 2008, after I ETS'd? We frequently did this in 2005 during cordon and search operations conducted at night whenever we were able to infiltrate the objective before anyone woke up. We would enter adjacent buildings, climb across the roofs, and then go top-down. If you're strictly speaking about clearing buildings in terms of actually killing the dudes inside, I don't recall ever doing that in a top-down fashion, simply because the situation never dictated it. Whenever we cleared a building under fire, it was in a react to contact mode. We usually had the option of hitting the building that we were taking fire from -OR- hitting the building next to it first and then jumping onto the roof of the target building and going top-down. The extra minute needed to do the latter would result in the attackers getting away.

Most recently, I recall watching, via UAV, at least one ODA go top-down on a raid in 2007, though it was a dry hole.

[sapperfitz82]

Worn on Body/Uniform:
*

·******* M4 Carbine with PEQ-2 Laser/PAQ-4 Laser,
ACOG/CCO,and 30 rounds of 5.56mm
ball ammunition.
·******* Desert Camouflage Uniform with
Infrared Tape on left sleeve (1”x 1”).
·******* Desert Combat Boots.
·******* Dog Tags.
·******* ID Card.
·******* Undershirt.
·******* Socks.
·******* Tactical gloves.
·******* Interceptor Body Armor with two
Small Arms Protective Inserts.
·******* Advanced Combat Helmet with
night vision mounting plate.
·******* Rigger belt.
·******* Notebook and pen.
·******* Watch.
·******* Knee and elbow pads.
·******* Sun, Sand, and Dust type Goggles or
Wiley-X Goggles.
·******* Folding Knife/Multi-tool.
Worn on Fighting Load Carrier/
Interceptor Body Armor:
*

·******* MOLLE Fighting Load Carrier with modular
MOLLE pouches.
·******* 180 rounds of 5.56mm ball ammunition.
·******* Bayonet.
·******* Fragmentation grenade.
·******* 64 ounces of water in two 1 quart canteens.
·******* Casualty and witness cards.
·*******100 ounces of water in hydration system.
Flex cuffs for personnel under custody.
·******* Night vision equipment (PVS-14/PVS-7).
·******* Iodine tablets.
·******* Lensatic compass.
·******* Flashlight.
·******* Chemlight.
·******* First Aid dressing and pouch.
·******* Canteen Cup.
·******* Ear plugs.

The combination of these
two lists makes up the
Fighting Load (Avg=63 lbs)

Carried in Assault Rucksack:
*
·******* MOLLE Assault Rucksack or commercial assault rucksack, with MOLLE attachments.
·******* 500ml intravenous fluids bag with starter kit.
·******* 70 ounces of water in hydration system.
·******* Two Meals, Ready to Eat (MREs).
·******* Poncho and/or Bivy Sack.
·******* Poncho liner.
·******* Undershirt.
·******* Spare batteries.
·******* Two pair of socks.
·******* Polypropylene or silk long sleeve undershirt.
·******* M4/M16 Rifle Cleaning Kit.
·******* Personal hygiene kit.
·******* Rubber gloves.
·******* Sling rope with two snap links.

Assault Rucksack + Fighting Load=
Approach March Load (Avg=96 lbs)

Carried in Main Rucksack: (Main rucksacks were rarely taken
on operations during study)
*
·******* MOLLE main rucksack with Sleeping Bag Carrier or Large ALICE rucksack.
·******* Improved Sleeping Bag (usually Green bag carried one per two men).
·******* Long Underwear or Polypropylene Jacket and Coveralls.
·******* Two Undershirts.
·******* Two pairs of socks.
·******* Cold Weather Gloves.
·******* Knit/Fleece Cap.
·******* Additional ammunition.
·******* Two Meals, Ready to Eat (MREs).
·******* Sleeping pad.

Main Rucksack + Fighting Load +
Assault Rucksack (sometimes)=
Emergency Approach March Load
(Avg=127 lbs)

That was the rifleman, course, he can only move as fast as the slowest guy.

If you want to see more, check out CALL. Look for the Devil CAAT study.


Anyway, why the hell are we so insistent on ignoring our own FMs? Those old guys already learned these lessons. What does FM 21-18 have to say about all this?

[Cavguy]

Again this is key IMO: Finally I'll add that we need to get out of the risk averison mode we have entered. We are the business of accepting risks, but we must not continue to avoid risks. Yes, risk mitigation is a must. How do we learn to mitigate those risks, through training.

And can anyone answer this one: Why did the Army stopped doing top down building clearing?


1) I think we have developed a much, much greater risk tolerance in the GPF than was present in 2001 or 2003, for that matter. Acceptance of tactical and operational risk defined the turnaround in Iraq.

2) I encouraged top down clearing - whenever possible. Often, it was simply impossible unless I had dedicated helcopters or really tall ladders, neither of which I ever had. I never received any guidance stating not to, nor have heard of such guidance.

[J Wolfsberger]

Not a big prob; the guys on the ground make it work in spite of things on high, they always have and by far the largest majority mean well, do well and make up for the slackness here and there.

Quote from a Soviet general (I think Voroshilov, but can't find the note):

"The difficulty in planning against the Americans is they don't read their manuals and feel no obligation to follow their doctrine."

Case in point: A friend, troop commander in the 11th circa late 1970s. NATO MapEX with Soviet observers. Friend's troop is cutoff. He orders troop on cross border raid to hit Soviet POL dump. Soviets go ballistic. "YOU PROMISED NO ATTACKS ACROSS BORDER!" :mad:

Friend gets verbal reprimand: "Bad boy! No biscuit!" :(

BUT...

After that, in their training exercises, the Soviets started leaving heavier protection at their log points and dumps. :D

I'm with you, Ken. The troops in the field will find a way to make it work.

[Schmedlap]

Regarding the list posted by Fitz...

The Iraq load differed as such...

For the worn items - we didn't carry the ID card or wear elbow pads; so long as each patrol element had a notepad, pen, and multi-tool, that was good enough for us. But, I doubt this accounts for more than a pound (though ditching the elbow pads significantly helps with blood circulation and mobility)

For the MOLLE - we carried more ammo (at least 9 mags worn) and two grenades. But, we did not bother with bayonets, canteens, the canteen cup, or iodine tablets. One compass per patrolling element was fine. But, those items probably make sense in Afghanistan.

For the Assault Rucksack - for us, just one MRE, no poncho, no bivy, no poncho liner, no undershirt or socks, no cleaning kit (other than a rag and one rod per fire team), and no hygiene kit. But, Iraq doesn't get as cold as Afghanistan. Regardless, I don't see much weight difference - perhaps less bulk. Usually, the team didn't even bother with the assault ruck unless the patrol was going to last more than 24 hours (we did a lot of fire team missions that were 48 to 72 hours).

There are also items such as radios, shotguns, pistols, star clusters, smoke, and 40mm rounds. Those add weight quickly. We tried to maximize use of MBITRs, but some teams had to use the 119 (E model).

No rucks for us.

[Ken White]

Why no ID card?

Why so much Ammo?

Why no cleaning kit per man?

[Schmedlap]

1. No ID card because we had ID tags. The ID card is less durable, so if the ID tags are unreadable, then the ID card most likely will be as well. Besides, if things get that bad, the Army has our DNA samples on file.

2. Extra ammo per man was to compensate for the need for each man to fire more rounds. This was due to us operating in smaller teams than would be ideal. In order to do everything that we were tasked with, we had to do most of our dismounted missions in 3-man teams. The same number of targets, divided by fewer weapons = more rounds fired per weapon and, thus, more magazines per man who carried those weapons.

3. One cleaning kit per team sufficed because no more than one guy per team would ever be cleaning his weapon at one time.

[Ken White]

Though, since I'm old and out of date, I'm reminded of the ancient (Tutankhamun's army, I think...) Staff Ossfiers Dictum; "Answer the question, answer the question that should have been asked and answer the questions your answer will generate." This is probably my fault for being too dumb to ask the right question and detail. However, more curiosity:

1. In the unlikely event you're asked to produce said card by someone who like an airline ticket clerk or a busybody MP who wants to see a picture ID...

Guess what you did was okay but I'm having trouble following the logic of not carrying a 1/87 ounce item... :confused:

2. I understand that. Also understand having to leave a dismount or two with the Brad. However, since I wasn't in Iraq I can't speak to the target sets you might meet but assuming, hopefully, that you almost never if ever fired on anything but semi-auto, nine mags x three people is 810 rounds. Allowing for 10% hits (hopefully better), that's 81 targets??? Not trying to give you a hard time nor am I disputing the need or logic; can't know without being there but I don't think I ever fired more than 100 rounds in any fight -- including one rolling 20+ hour job and one rather intense deal that was almost 8 solid hours. In the several with two to four folks, if you didn't knock 'em down or break contact * in less than a few minutes, you were toast. Just trying to gain some understanding.

3. Understand. Hopefully, no one ever got separated or was the only guy left and had to take care of himself. Or no dodo broke the rod or lost the bore brush. Or the guy with the kit didn't get evaced and we forgot to get the kit...

As we both said, every situation is different and what works well one place at one point in time might not be a good solution for the next place...

I'm not being obtuse or criticizing, just trying to learn and reconcile with significant differences from my experience.

* I don't guess a WP grenade taped to a Claymore with three seconds of fuze and an M60 Fuse Igniter could be used for breaking contact there, huh? :D

[Schmedlap]

1. In the unlikely event you're asked to produce said card by someone who like an airline ticket clerk or a busybody MP who wants to see a picture ID...
That was the beauty of operating from a patrol base. I did travel to a FOB after being in theater for a few months and encountered what you speak of, but it didn't apply to patrols within our AOR. On that occasion, the gate guard wanted to see our ID cards. We didn't have them. I explained to the old lady (yes, a little old lady wearing a helmet and a plate carrier that I doubt could have stopped a BB), that I was not going to drive 45 minutes back to my patrol base to round up ID cards. If 4 American-looking HMMWVs, full of American-looking Soldiers in American-looking uniforms, carrying lots of American-looking equipment, operating on frequency hop with the correct COMSEC fill, sporting Warlocks, etc, etc, was not good enough, then we were going to have some problems - especially since we would not have enough fuel unless we entered the base and got more. She reluctantly "let" us in after taking down my name, rank, etc. It was a foreshadowing of the madness that we would witness in the next 45 minutes.


Guess what you did was okay but I'm having trouble following the logic of not carrying a 1/87 ounce item... :confused:
It had no purpose on patrol and it was easy to lose. At the same time, it was a big deal for a Soldier to lose it. I've also seen ID cards featured prominently in terrorist/insurgent propaganda. I just couldn't think of one good reason to bring them on patrol, nor did anyone ever suggest one.


... hopefully, that you almost never if ever fired on anything but semi-auto, nine mags x three people is 810 rounds. Allowing for 10% hits (hopefully better), that's 81 targets???
There were a bunch of reasons - I could probably type until my hands hurt. None of the reasons below, by themselves, justify that much ammo. Taken together, I think they make a good case. I'm familiar with your take on fire discipline from other threads. Without wiping my butt with every bit OPSEC guidance I've ever received, I don't think I can sufficiently convey the nature of how we operated to answer this adequately. But, if I could, I think that you would agree with our rationale (I'm about 90% sure). Keep in mind, for simplicity, I'm only discussing how many Infantry company operated in OIF III.
- Using your numbers above, I would not say 81 targets per fire team. I would say 27 targets per Soldier. Not to nitpick, but the team isn't going to all rush over and focus on one sector - they still need to maintain 360 security. So the relevant concern is targets per Soldiers, not targets per team. Diversionary attacks were common. Obviously, you interlock sectors of fire when possible, but you're just not going to have much overlap with a fire team that's pulling 360. Our rationale was that if you're taking fire from three buildings in your sector of fire that have 5 or 6 windows in each building facing you, then you've got 15 to 18 targets (yes, far less than 27). All of our dismount patrols would establish temporary OPs in mutually supporting positions. If one took fire, it would generally suppress while another team would maneuver onto it. That could take a while, which meant multiple shots into each known or suspected position. If you figure one round through one window every second, two minutes will use 4 mags. The mission doesn't end at that point. You've now had your position compromised and there was more than one occasion when QRF got ambushed.
- I only recall one occasion when a fire team almost ran out of ammo, but that one occasion made it worthwhile. They got hit from 3 directions, the only fire team that could support them had just maneuved upon an attack 5 minutes earlier against a different position and had taken a casualty who couldn't walk, and almost every element within the company was either in contact or in a different part of the city and hauling ass to get there. Aside from that, I don't think that anyone ever fired more than 6 magazines, but there is a certain degree of comfort in having 3 magazines left, rather than 3 rounds.
- More mags allowed Soldiers greater leeway in putting in a fresh mag during a lull in the action. It was conceivable that you could fire half a basic load, but have used all of your mags if there were several lulls in the action where you put in a fresh mag.
- Many of us would load mags differently for day and night or specific targets. For example, many would maintain one mag of just armor piercing ammo, for vehicles. Some leaders would have a mag of straight tracer in their well during the day. At night, most of us kept a mag with no tracers in the well (no need for tracers at night, if your team can see your IR laser). So, if you're engaging just dismounts at night, you're playing with 7 mags - the mag of AP and the mag of tracer aren't getting touched unless absolutely necessary, or until the sun comes up, or until a VBIED comes barreling at you.

I don't recall anyone ever firing on burst. To me, that always seemed like an unhappy medium where it is no more effective than semi and significantly less useful than full auto.


3. ... Hopefully, no one ever got separated or was the only guy left and had to take care of himself. Or no dodo broke the rod or lost the bore brush...
Really, it wouldn't surprise me if some patrols didn't bother with any cleaning kit (other than a rag). Our dismount patrols generally involved dismounted movement for 30 minutes, establishment of an OP for 12 to 24 hours, and then repeat once or twice, and then return to base. Weapons really did not get that dirty, aside from some carbon buildup after a firefight, but if a team got into contact, they were usually extracted shortly thereafter because it was virtually impossible for them move about unobserved afterwards.


* I don't guess a WP grenade taped to a Claymore with three seconds of fuze and an M60 Fuse Igniter could be used for breaking contact there, huh? :D
Unfortunately, no.

[Ken White]

As I suspected, it all makes sense; I just had some difficulties adapting to today (my wife and kids say that is a constant... :o ).

Say no more:
"We didn't have them. I explained to the old lady (yes, a little old lady wearing a helmet and a plate carrier that I doubt could have stopped a BB), that I was not going to drive 45 minutes back to my patrol base to round up ID cards...[plus]it was a big deal for a Soldier to lose it...":eek::rolleyes:

The Ammo makes sense in your sitchyation and I do agree -- not that it matters; y'all were there and I as not. I don't second guess under that circumstance; get curious, yeah -- but no "You should have..." from me.

Same deal on the cleaning kit (except I'd have carried mine anyway ;) old habits die hard). Like the man said "Whatever works..."

Thanks again for the effort and detail. Gives me a far better picture.

[GC13]

Yeah, I don't think any soldier who had to fire his rifle in a firefight ever complained about having too much ammunition left over.

... Too much ammunition that he wasn't carrying for the automatic rifleman, anyway.

[William F. Owen]

rusiresources.com/equippingmilitary/Owen%20(Session%204).ppt

This was a presentation I gave at the RUSI. Upset everybody at the time. May be of some use here.

My basic contention should be obvious and one well known to the regular crowd here.

[goesh]

- if Jr. has on 400 lbs of plate armor, they feel better, it's a perception of competency/protection, essentially political IMO - may as well be humping a portable X-ray machine too.......

[Tom Odom]

Funny that I have the "old style" that closes down the front and everytime I go out, the guys around me tell me they wish they had the same as the overthehead stuff weighs another 30 light weight pounds.

I feel like the younger brother in Christmas Story after Mom has dressed him to go to school in the snow, sort of an armored plated Michelin Man. :cool:

Tom

[ODB]

Sorry for the delay in the top down building clearing answer. Many years back 10-12 years ago. I was doing some testing for the folks out of Benning. We were testing MOUT ladders, when I asked about the old grappling hook method we had been using, I got an interesting response. The Army stopped doing that, due to soldiers no longer possessing the upper body strength to pull themselves up the rope. Hence we were testing other options. Just think this was pre body armor days.

[jcustis]

In the Marine Corps, I don't think the doctrinal texts tell a different story yet, but a squad of grunts turned writers after Fallujah v.2.0 drafted the superb AAR that is is terribly difficult to get a wounded and dying guy up and out of a 2nd story room if he weighs 250 lbs, and the bad guys still own the 1st floor.

[Schmedlap]

The Army stopped doing that, due to soldiers no longer possessing the upper body strength to pull themselves up the rope. Hence we were testing other options. Just think this was pre body armor days.
When I was a cadet preparing for jump school, we were told that every morning we needed to do 10 pull-ups prior to the start of PT (true) and that if you could not perform 10 pull-ups with perfect form, unassisted, after getting "smoked" at that time, on any day, then you would be dropped from the course (definitely not true). We did our preparation. Then when we got there, I think we were the only ones (other than the Navy folks who were on their way to becoming SEALs) who could do so. Most could do no more than 4 or 5. Some could barely do ONE. And these we largely skinny kids with not much weight to pull over the bar. Nintendo generation.

[RJ]

The Marine Corps just issued a field order that states Battalion and Squadron Commanders will determine the body armor policy in their Area of Operations.

The Corps determined Regimental Commanders (Col.) can over rule , but it is the BN. (Lt. Col.) Commander who is closer to the reality and intimate with the terrain and tactical situations their Rifle Companies are fighting in.

Politics and touchy, feely considerations may have just received a reality check.

The Field Order was dated April 20, 2009

[carl]

Here is an interesting article from the Sunday Star & Stripes about a patrol in Afghanistan; temp. peaked in the low 90's, what appeared to be flat terrain and multiple heat casualties, including two that needed med-evac.

http://www.stripes.com/article.asp?section=104&article=62285

[Schmedlap]

Army looks to lighten load for Soldiers in Afghanistan


FORT BELVOIR, Va. (Army News Service, Oct. 15, 2009) -- The Army is poised to introduce a plate-carrier vest to provide Soldiers more lightweight gear in the challenging operational environments of Afghanistan.

An $18.6 million contract for 57,000 plate carriers was awarded Oct. 8, to KDH Defense Systems....

The primary objective in providing Soldiers with a plate carrier is to reduce the weight of their body armor and to significantly reduce heat stress, enhancing combat performance in extreme temperatures, PEO Soldier officials said.

The vest will carry standard hard armor plates for vital ballistic protection, but cover less of the Soldier's body than the Interceptor Body Armor system...

The full-up plate carrier (including front and side hard armor plates) represents a weight reduction of 10 to 15 pounds compared with the complete Improved Outer Tactical Vest with front and side hard armor plates...

[William F. Owen]

an $18.6 million contract for 57,000 plate carriers was awarded Oct. 8, to KDH Defense Systems....

The primary objective in providing Soldiers with a plate carrier is to reduce the weight of their body armor and to significantly reduce heat stress, enhancing combat performance in extreme temperatures, PEO Soldier officials said.
Wow. They finally got to where a whole bunch of folks have been for the last 4-5 years - in other words a time period where WW2 and 1 would have been before they got it right.
Good news. Pity about the time. I bet the "system" not the "people" will get the blame though. :mad:

[Sylvan]

Roman legion humped 25 miles a day with 70 pounds of armor and kit if Vegetius is to be believed.

90% of the soldiers who got hurt wearing armor (or at least claimed it for the VA) were out of shape pogues who failed to prepare themselves physically.
a 5 day dismounted romp is a pretty rare excusion for all but the most elite.

Standard kit.
Front and Rear Sapi
Basic load
2 frags
smoke
7 banger
JEMS
Camelback
Pistol (which I always say I will leave behind but never do)
IFAK
100 round saw pouch with binos/laser/pen flares/CLP/boresnake/GPS
Compass
M4/ACOG/PEC/Flashlight/Grip Pod (yes, I used it and liked it.)
Humped klicks uphill and down, and, while tiring, is doable. I also ran on days not out of the wire.

What would you have me leave behind?

[carl]

As an always been a civilian, I will risk getting excoriated for the following comments by those who've been there and done that.

The Romans put a lot of effort into building extremely good roads so their soldiers could march those distances with those loads.

"a 5 day dismounted romp is a pretty rare excusion for all but the most elite."
This quote begs the question-why just the most elite? Why not everybody else? Wouldn't there be more options available if the less elite could stay out as long? Wouldn't it be easier to stay out so long if less weight was carried.

"Humped klicks uphill and down, and, while tiring, is doable." The question isn't whether it can be done. The important question is can it be done so as to keep the Taliban looking over their shoulders thinking those guys might be gaining on them.

"What would you have me leave behind?" I talked to a South African once who went on long patrols in Namibia. They were allowed to take what they wanted and thought they could carry and still move at the speed required. I think our people should be trusted to take what they want and leave what they don't need.

[Uboat509]

Roman legion humped 25 miles a day with 70 pounds of armor and kit if Vegetius is to be believed.

90% of the soldiers who got hurt wearing armor (or at least claimed it for the VA) were out of shape pogues who failed to prepare themselves physically.
a 5 day dismounted romp is a pretty rare excusion for all but the most elite.

Standard kit.
Front and Rear Sapi
Basic load
2 frags
smoke
7 banger
JEMS
Camelback
Pistol (which I always say I will leave behind but never do)
IFAK
100 round saw pouch with binos/laser/pen flares/CLP/boresnake/GPS
Compass
M4/ACOG/PEC/Flashlight/Grip Pod (yes, I used it and liked it.)
Humped klicks uphill and down, and, while tiring, is doable. I also ran on days not out of the wire.

What would you have me leave behind?

That would depend on the mission. There are times when body armor is need and times when it is not. There are also times when 7 bangs might be needed and times when they would probably not. Other things could also be adjusted as needed.

[Ken White]

...The important question is can it be done so as to keep the Taliban looking over their shoulders thinking those guys might be gaining on them.
...
I think our people should be trusted to take what they want and leave what they don't need.Both items... :D

Actually, the first is not, the fact that we are not doing that as often or as well as most over there wish is however, very risk averse, USA Today-ish. The second probably really is un-American. It certainly is un-
Armyish... ;)

[GI Zhou]

That would depend on the mission. There are times when body armor is need and times when it is not. There are also times when 7 bangs might be needed and times when they would probably not. Other things could also be adjusted as needed.

An Australian infantry warrant officer, weel versed in hidstory, did a study on weights carried by the Britsh then Australian soldier since 1788. Guess what, nothings changed weight wise. As soon as someone develops a lighter weapon, ammunition another piece of equipment is added.

I trained with 16kg of equipment, (I never went on ops and in my day theer was little bosy armour about), plus weapon normally a L2 7.62x51mm automatic rifle (same weight as a SAW) or SLR (FN-FAL) or Steyr AUG. This included equivalent weights of ammuniton (270 rounds of 5.56mm or 180/200 rounds of 7.62mm) cleaning kit, four litres of water, trauma kit, a simple swiss army knife attached to my shirt with a long piece of 'hootchie' cord, Buck clasp knife atatched to my belt, torch and a brew kit good for 48 hours.

I worked in the derst/tropical savannah and I had space for a night sight and an old wooden handled entrenching and radio if need be and food as I felt I needed it. being the assistant or squad commander and carrying the AR meant no radio. The ground was like rock. One karrabiner was carried as I put my rifle sling through it. Good for closing cut concertina wire too.

Go from an operational unit to a REMF unit and they expected you to carry everything but the kitchen sink. Thought they were fighting NATO Central and the many of the girls collapsed under the weight before they even started!

I don't think people realise the biggest issues are water, food and now batteries. If you can't go without a meal for 24 hours except sweets, canned stone fruits and coffee/tea you really are in the wrong business.

If operating in snow or cold wet weather the weight changes considerably and outside this discussion as it becomes a battle against the elements as much as the enemy.

[Sylvan]

We won't ever break down our loads to what the taliban carries.
I have run down taliban when using effective fire and manuever. You overall weight isn't going to change much, as somebody here noted. You train to the load and thats as fast as you are going to go.
I dropped side sapis for most missions unless actually doing a raid.
A 5 day mission is a recce. You are going to trade armor and ammo for food and batteries (or solar charger) YOu aren't going to be looking for trouble.

In a firefight, you want the armor. It doesn't beat cover, but allows you to take risks under fire you wouldn't take otherwise. I fought fine with my load and I wouldn't trade my two main plates for anything else.

You will note that food wasn't on there. All I had was goo packets in my pants pockets. I got hungry, but food isn't a priority.

Taliban carried an ICOM, 3 mags and a bag of chinese vet pills.
My load will never be close to that level regardless, so trying to out light fight the taliban is a stupid direction to go.
You want to slow up the taliban? Aviation or fix with fires.

[JMA]

An Australian infantry warrant officer, weel versed in hidstory, did a study on weights carried by the Britsh then Australian soldier since 1788. Guess what, nothings changed weight wise. As soon as someone develops a lighter weapon, ammunition another piece of equipment is added.

I trained with 16kg of equipment, (I never went on ops and in my day theer was little bosy armour about), plus weapon normally a L2 7.62x51mm automatic rifle (same weight as a SAW) or SLR (FN-FAL) or Steyr AUG. This included equivalent weights of ammuniton (270 rounds of 5.56mm or 180/200 rounds of 7.62mm) cleaning kit, four litres of water, trauma kit, a simple swiss army knife attached to my shirt with a long piece of 'hootchie' cord, Buck clasp knife atatched to my belt, torch and a brew kit good for 48 hours.

I worked in the derst/tropical savannah and I had space for a night sight and an old wooden handled entrenching and radio if need be and food as I felt I needed it. being the assistant or squad commander and carrying the AR meant no radio. The ground was like rock. One karrabiner was carried as I put my rifle sling through it. Good for closing cut concertina wire too.

Go from an operational unit to a REMF unit and they expected you to carry everything but the kitchen sink. Thought they were fighting NATO Central and the many of the girls collapsed under the weight before they even started!

I don't think people realise the biggest issues are water, food and now batteries. If you can't go without a meal for 24 hours except sweets, canned stone fruits and coffee/tea you really are in the wrong business.

If operating in snow or cold wet weather the weight changes considerably and outside this discussion as it becomes a battle against the elements as much as the enemy.

Greetings gentlemen, I come out of that small war of 30 years ago... Rhodesia. I see this issue of weight of kit still is a major issue - some things never change. Do you have the ability to load according to the type of operation or are the equipment tales fixed?

[jcustis]

The tables tend to be fixed at the worst times. We call it "sticking to the SOP (standard operating procedure)", and unfortunately, there are more times than not where little thought is applied to just what needs to be carried, where it should be located on one's body, and why it is needed in the first place.

Take the current USMC-issued first aid kit. It tends towards the bulky and almost unnecessary when you look at the components. The trauma supplied as essential, for sure, but the boo-boo kit takes up about half of its girth, and yet the corpsman carries copious quantities of small bandages, salves, and the like. I trimmed mine down to just the trauma care pieces and moved the rest to a small pouch in my camelbak on my back, and the remnant is still bigger than I wish it was.

As a military, we learned some bad lessons from our smaller conflicts, such as Task Force Ranger's fight in Mogadishu in 1993, where night vision was not carried on the raid, yet reportedly was desired when day turned to night. The actual effectiveness of any IR optics without IR aiming lights remains dubious if you ask me, yet that scenario was trumped out during Officer Candidate School for me a few years later. We hoard gear as a result of the urban legends surrounding incidents like that.

[politicsbyothermeans]

My team and I (Civil Affairs) operated with a fair amount of autonomy. The guys we helped were a little fuzzy on how much of our butt the CSM was going to be able to chew when our stuff was non-standard and nowhere near their SOP. And, we were far away from our own flagpole so I never had to worry about my boss crying when the CG showed up to hand out impact Bronze Stars to mechanics and wanted to know why in Sam Hell we didn't have our baby tackle dummy corded to our legs.

Anyway...

Even in our situation, common sense and the mission (all too often not the same thing) dictated that we carry the things we needed to get the job done, nothing else, and STILL our individual loads were often oppressive. And, since most guys didn't really appreciate having to take the CA guys out, we often coordinated to redistribute part of the escorting unit's load on us.

We weren't carrying one piece of stupid gear just because some knucklehead said we had to. Still... man... I fondly remember bopping around in an LBV, medium ruck and K pot "back then".

I have to acknowledge that my contemporary operational experience is only in Iraq and can only imagine guys out for days on end with all the crap we carried.

[stanleywinthrop]

Back in the day at TBS, A Soldier's Load and the Mobility of a Nation (http://www.amazon.com/Soldiers-Load-Mobility-Nation/dp/0686310012) was required reading. Then they'd proceed to load us up with all sorts of #### when we went to the field. As I realized back then irony comes easy to the Marine Corps.

[qp4]

"a 5 day dismounted romp is a pretty rare excusion for all but the most elite."
This quote begs the question-why just the most elite?

Five days of expected contact is a really long time, no matter the war.

One of the things I think that is missing from this thread is what is the combat load of a long range recce light and what is the combat load of a mounted Soldier. Maybe it's a cavalry thing, but off-ramping into a fight is a lot different load out than what is carried onto the vehicle as part of the SOP packing list. Hopping off for a 5 and 25 is usually vest and weapon, which is a lot different than what you take for an OP or even a shorter SKT.

GI Zhou pointed out that the biggest thing is water. In my OIFs and NTCs that was the back breaker. We'd go out for a day or two, and someone had to carry the jug.

[JMA]

Roman legion humped 25 miles a day with 70 pounds of armor and kit if Vegetius is to be believed.

90% of the soldiers who got hurt wearing armor (or at least claimed it for the VA) were out of shape pogues who failed to prepare themselves physically.
a 5 day dismounted romp is a pretty rare excusion for all but the most elite.

Standard kit.
Front and Rear Sapi
Basic load
2 frags
smoke
7 banger
JEMS
Camelback
Pistol (which I always say I will leave behind but never do)
IFAK
100 round saw pouch with binos/laser/pen flares/CLP/boresnake/GPS
Compass
M4/ACOG/PEC/Flashlight/Grip Pod (yes, I used it and liked it.)
Humped klicks uphill and down, and, while tiring, is doable. I also ran on days not out of the wire.

What would you have me leave behind?

I dunno... could you repeat that in English?

[Schmedlap]

I dunno... could you repeat that in English?

I'm guessing these were the terms that seemed unclear. You can google the translations for photos.

SAPI = Small Arms Protective Insert
Basic Load = varies by weapon/unit; often shorthand for "7 30-round magazines"
7 banger = 7 magazines? I guess redundant give "basic load" above
Camelback = water bladder 64 to 120oz, usually; google it for a photo
IFAK = Individual First Aid Kit
ACOG = Advanced Combat Optical Gunsight
PEC = I think that refers to a PEQ-4

As for JEMS and Grip Pod, you got me. Must be something that came out after I ETS'd.

[Kiwigrunt]

Grippods (http://www.grippod.com/grip-pods.html) appear to be getting very popular, also with the Brits.

[JMA]

I'm guessing these were the terms that seemed unclear. You can google the translations for photos.

SAPI = Small Arms Protective Insert
Basic Load = varies by weapon/unit; often shorthand for "7 30-round magazines"
7 banger = 7 magazines? I guess redundant give "basic load" above
Camelback = water bladder 64 to 120oz, usually; google it for a photo
IFAK = Individual First Aid Kit
ACOG = Advanced Combat Optical Gunsight
PEC = I think that refers to a PEQ-4

As for JEMS and Grip Pod, you got me. Must be something that came out after I ETS'd.

Thanks for that effort. I think the JEMS is an "intra team radio" and the gripod is a bipod for the rifle as per other posted info..

[Chris jM]

This is a relevant, interesting and all-too obvious lesson that is not unique to any theatre or time-period (but in this case relates to the 1994/5 Chechyan War):


One piece of Russian equipment that the Chechens initially used but soon discarded was individual protective gear. The Chechens found the use of helmets and body armor (flak jackets) impaired the mobility of their fighters in the urban environment. Already weighted down with ammunition and supplies the Chechens found that when they used captured body armor it led to a higher rate of Chechen casualties due to the loss of speed and mobility.
http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/kaimov.pdf

The SWJ library is an amazing resource that I never really appreciated until this afternoon - what was supposed to be a quick scan to brush up on what actually happened in Chechnya turned into a four hour marathon.

An army serves national policy, and right now it seems that national policy for the western world is directing that you have to go into harms way you do so with the best and most lavish equipment available.

[GI Zhou]

Harking back to an earlier post - it's 0120 and insomnia and pain are a bitch. What is snivel?

It's not an issue what you carry when you are a young soldier etc in the field, as people seemed to accept it as part of the job. 20 years later fighting your compensation claim it all seems too long ago to the pen pushers in the other side of the desk.

One thing I noticed in my field (I was a clerk) was the increased number of females and older folks as my career (1977 - 1995). This example fro the early 1990s was on an exercise defending an air base in the in the Outback of Australia. No prizes for guessing where.

One section/squad of seven or eight guys in the field was nicknamed 'Dad's Army' as they has a combined average age of 52, which was only because one guy was 28! They had to carry the same kit as the younger fellas so eventually many of the older guys lot ended up on full pensions over the next few years, as they went on more ground war exercises, for stuffed backs and joints. I couldn't envisage them being deployed to patrol in theatre.

The males ended up building the bunkers, carrying the heavy kit, laying the barbed wire etc. When you see a WOD (RSM), two Staff Sergeants, and a Corporal at 33 who was the youngest laying sandbags in 90 degree plus heat and high humidity, and all the younger troops (exclusively female) are inside because they couldn't phyically carry them you knew something was wrong. We were told it was NOT to be inlcuded in the post-exercise report.

Was this an issue in Iraq as I haven't seen any thing on it?

[Uboat509]

I'm guessing these were the terms that seemed unclear. You can google the translations for photos.

SAPI = Small Arms Protective Insert
Basic Load = varies by weapon/unit; often shorthand for "7 30-round magazines"
7 banger = 7 magazines? I guess redundant give "basic load" above
Camelback = water bladder 64 to 120oz, usually; google it for a photo
IFAK = Individual First Aid Kit
ACOG = Advanced Combat Optical Gunsight
PEC = I think that refers to a PEQ-4

As for JEMS and Grip Pod, you got me. Must be something that came out after I ETS'd.


Bangers refers to Flashbang grenades, that is, grenades that are designed to temporarily stun anyone in the room where they are thrown for a second or two, long enough for the operator to get in and clear the room.

JEMS, you got me on as well. This (http://www.grippod.com/) is the grip pod.

[Uboat509]

Harking back to an earlier post - it's 0120 and insomnia and pain are a bitch. What is snivel?

I didn't see the post you are talking about but generally we use the term "snivel" or "snivel gear" to refer to anything you wear to keep warm and or dry. I imagine that it was originally meant to be a derisive term but it has just become just another slang term in the US Army lexicon.


Was this an issue in Iraq as I haven't seen any thing on it?

I personally don't know too many guys with more than a few years in the infantry or SF who don't have some sort of orthopedic problems, knees, ankles, backs, shoulders, you name it. Some of it is self-inflicted, not being smart about how we do PT (physical training- exercise) and some of it is just accumulated damage from years of walking through the woods with heavy stuff on or running with heavy stuff or falling down with heavy stuff on or, well, you get the point...

[GI Zhou]

I personally don't know too many guys with more than a few years in the infantry or SF who don't have some sort of orthopedic problems, knees, ankles, backs, shoulders, you name it. Some of it is self-inflicted, not being smart about how we do PT (physical training- exercise) and some of it is just accumulated damage from years of walking through the woods with heavy stuff on or running with heavy stuff or falling down with heavy stuff on or, well, you get the point...

Unfortunately too well....

[Schmedlap]

Bangers refers to Flashbang grenades, that is, grenades that are designed to temporarily stun anyone in the room where they are thrown for a second or two, long enough for the operator to get in and clear the room.

We carried M84 Stun Hand Grenades. Carrying 7 of those seems ridiculous (besides, our entire Company was only authorized 12 - pet peeve). I'm guessing the flashbangs are smaller? Or is this guy stuffing these things in an assault pack?

[Sylvan]

JEMS is the updated MBITR. 3 pound radio that works on multiple band width. SATCOM and SINCGARs primarily for me. I could talk with fixed wing, my local units and probably the Taliban if I knew what I was doing (which I really didn't)
A 7 banger is a flashbang that goes off 7 times (about 1 "bang" per second). More distracting than a single shot, though heavier. I don't do Hostage Rescue, so I throw one in if I am not sure if bad guys or not. I know what the noise is, unknowns don't. Mutliple uses when things are going wrong.
My assault bag had more ammo, smokes and some target designation stuff.
More goo packs and jerky, too.

Sorry about the confusion.

[jps2]

Don't know if that topic have been debated yet, if so please tell me on what thread attach this one.
If the subject seems to be sensitive, please remove this topic.

One of the major enhancement for Infantry, without saying arms and ammunitions, seems to be networking the coy of infantry.

As I can see some enhancements to put more tools in the hands of heavy infantry-mens, as they can leave some of them in the armored personnel carrier, I'm quite puzzled about benefits for light infantry, when I heard that the platoon level will have to choose what item is taken and what other not regarding to mission requirements.
It will be temptation to take all items (nvg, lr bino, max protection, com ...) as nobody ever now :
- what will be the new mission, or next sub-mission
- when it will be possible to have access to his/her own package
same problem as "what quantity of ammunition does I have to take ?" plus, nowadays, how many batteries shall I need ?
And by that nullifying the purpose of networking by reducing maneuver ability ?

If taking all items are not possible (size, load), how logistics will deal with it ? (give the right collective unit (package) to the right coy)

Regards
JpS

[JMA]

Don't know if that topic have been debated yet, if so please tell me on what thread attach this one.
If the subject seems to be sensitive, please remove this topic.

One of the major enhancement for Infantry, without saying arms and ammunitions, seems to be networking the coy of infantry.

As I can see some enhancements to put more tools in the hands of heavy infantry-mens, as they can leave some of them in the armored personnel carrier, I'm quite puzzled about benefits for light infantry, when I heard that the platoon level will have to choose what item is taken and what other not regarding to mission requirements.
It will be temptation to take all items (nvg, lr bino, max protection, com ...) as nobody ever now :
- what will be the new mission, or next sub-mission
- when it will be possible to have access to his/her own package
same problem as "what quantity of ammunition does I have to take ?" plus, nowadays, how many batteries shall I need ?
And by that nullifying the purpose of networking by reducing maneuver ability ?

If taking all items are not possible (size, load), how logistics will deal with it ? (give the right collective unit (package) to the right coy)

Regards
JpS

"Networking"? What do you mean?

I suggest it is obvious that the personal equipment carried by a soldier will be dictated to by the nature and duration of the operation undertaken. This should not be a personal choice but rather dictated by SOP and confirmed in the verbal orders for that particular operation.

I am supposing that the troops (be it a platoon or smaller patrol) will deploy from a base and will recover to that base once the operation has been completed.

Where the troops are to be resupplied in the field for further and maybe a different type of operation (say from OP [observation] to say ambush) then according to prearranged and prepacked scales of equipment and/or against SOP scales this resupply can be dropped off with them.

[jps2]

Ken, Thanks for correcting me.

JMA : Networking is the ability given to coys, team & platoon leaders to "see" where there subordinates are, (gps related), to send/receive small messages (like sms), to report ammunition consumption and so one : all functions given by new features of FFW (called IdZ, Felin, ... in Europe). These gears have their own weight, and needs batteries...

My question is relative to your advices/thinks regarding the balance between natural trend to bring the whole package and minimizing weight for better maneuver especially in high intensity conflicts and for light infantry, when nobody will knows when refilling/complement will be possible.
(For armor infantry, the problem is quite different as they are not supposed to fight without/far from their armored carrier.)

We have to think to future conditions and not focus on currents operations, when refilling/complement can be done within the 12h at worst, using our capabilities to operate by night. That ability will not be more effective against opponents with manpad and night vision devices.

[Infanteer]

Weight was always one of my biggest fights. I always tried fiddling with what we carried but no matter what you do, you were burdened.

My patrol loadout in Afghanistan consisted of:
- Body Armour, Helmet and Ballistic Eye-wear
- Carbine and 7 Mags
- 1 Frag Grenade
- 2 Smoke Grenades
- 1 First Aid Kit
- 1 GPS
- 1 set of binos
- 1 liter water
- MBITR (small VHF radio)
- 4 glowsticks
- Small Folding Knife
- Map, Pens, Paper

In my bag I would have:
- 2 x Rations (MREs; this was 24 hours)
- 3-6 extra liters of water
- 2 extra smoke
- 1 belt 7.62 or M-72 (all patrolmen carry something with omph)
- Ranger Blanket (got stuck once without it, never again)

I would normally take the bag out if I was operating away from the vehicle/outpost for more than 4-6 hours.

This is not much stuff, and it was heavy. If a guy had a support weapon or a radio, he was double screwed. Me and my NCOs looked at it, and you can't really get rid of much more. As someone already pointed out, the big key is to get rid of the weight of the hard armour somehow. The armour adds alot of weight and, usually, adds it in an uncomfortable and constricting way that only fatigues a soldier faster.

[William F. Owen]

As someone already pointed out, the big key is to get rid of the weight of the hard armour somehow. The armour adds alot of weight and, usually, adds it in an uncomfortable and constricting way that only fatigues a soldier faster.
That's a policy choice. It's not a military one.
There is obviously one highly classified piece of data that informs the judgement as to why you "need" to wear hard armour.
Excepting that, you are back to an issue of coverage and protection standard. Reducing each leads to some fairly major weight savings.

[Infanteer]

To an extent - I was searching more for a technical solution (ie: lighter ceramics, more breathable material, etc) as the real key.

[JMA]

There is obviously one highly classified piece of data that informs the judgement as to why you "need" to wear hard armour.
.

Again the truth gets shrouded in secrecy.

There is only one reason why the the "full Monty" of body armour needs to the worn and that's because ops data confirms a significant reduction in KIA / WIA... oh yes, other than that it just might be that an old school chum owns the body armour manufacturing process.

[JMA]

To an extent - I was searching more for a technical solution (ie: lighter ceramics, more breathable material, etc) as the real key.

I agree and state that if an incentive went out to design a full set of body armour at one third the weight they would get the contract to supply the whole US army and USMC and get a US$2m bonus on to you would see some action.

[JMA]

Weight was always one of my biggest fights. I always tried fiddling with what we carried but no matter what you do, you were burdened.

My patrol loadout in Afghanistan consisted of:
- Body Armour, Helmet and Ballistic Eye-wear
- Carbine and 7 Mags
- 1 Frag Grenade
- 2 Smoke Grenades
- 1 First Aid Kit
- 1 GPS
- 1 set of binos
- 1 liter water
- MBITR (small VHF radio)
- 4 glowsticks
- Small Folding Knife
- Map, Pens, Paper

In my bag I would have:
- 2 x Rations (MREs; this was 24 hours)
- 3-6 extra liters of water
- 2 extra smoke
- 1 belt 7.62 or M-72 (all patrolmen carry something with omph)
- Ranger Blanket (got stuck once without it, never again)

I would normally take the bag out if I was operating away from the vehicle/outpost for more than 4-6 hours.

This is not much stuff, and it was heavy. If a guy had a support weapon or a radio, he was double screwed. Me and my NCOs looked at it, and you can't really get rid of much more. As someone already pointed out, the big key is to get rid of the weight of the hard armour somehow. The armour adds alot of weight and, usually, adds it in an uncomfortable and constricting way that only fatigues a soldier faster.

Can you put some individual weights to each item please?

[William F. Owen]

Again the truth gets shrouded in secrecy.
For good reason. Armour performance, as opposed to "armour standards" are classified. The OA that defines the standards is quite properly not up for discussion in open sources.
However, anyone with any understanding of body armour could make some well informed estimates.

There is only one reason why the the "full Monty" of body armour needs to the worn and that's because ops data confirms a significant reduction in KIA / WIA.
Correct. It is the OA that supports the "Specification," - and that is what informs the policy. However a substantial part of that policy is based on risk mitigation balanced against trade offs.

Thanks to the "Nimrod Case" there is very little appetite for taking risk right now.

[JMA]

Ken, Thanks for correcting me.

JMA : Networking is the ability given to coys, team & platoon leaders to "see" where there subordinates are, (gps related), to send/receive small messages (like sms), to report ammunition consumption and so one : all functions given by new features of FFW (called IdZ, Felin, ... in Europe). These gears have their own weight, and needs batteries...

My question is relative to your advices/thinks regarding the balance between natural trend to bring the whole package and minimizing weight for better maneuver especially in high intensity conflicts and for light infantry, when nobody will knows when refilling/complement will be possible.
(For armor infantry, the problem is quite different as they are not supposed to fight without/far from their armored carrier.)

We have to think to future conditions and not focus on currents operations, when refilling/complement can be done within the 12h at worst, using our capabilities to operate by night. That ability will not be more effective against opponents with manpad and night vision devices.

What weight are we talking about here?

Is it progress or is it technology for the sake of technology?

First versions of radios etc were too heavy and not very good. They got better with time. If this stuff is really needed then one must persevere with it until the nano-tech get interested then it will be a breeze from there.

I don't really have a problem with every soldier getting to be a hi-tech warrior but have serious concerns as to what happens to all this stuff when the first enemy armoured division starts over running your front lines?

[jps2]

Well i'm balancing between
in tactical domain :
- more immediate beedback to team member and team/platoon leader directly "on scene" can be an advantage to stay in contact, check progression, communicate silently.
- Interferences from higher level than platoon and also leaders more concern in their tools than leading their guys (video games paradox).
in mobility
- more protection given by body armor means less mobility
- less mobility means also more "targetable" infantrymen, moving slowly, tired quickly, less long-lasting capabilities

For currents operations, you can plan active times followed by recovery times but what makes me anxious is high intensity fights, when recovery will not manageable : does that extra weight will not put us down ?

When we looks at high intensity modern urban fights (I think to Grozny), and the localization of wondering, our body armors won't protect the boys, they will be injured (perhaps not heavily nor killed). So my concern is : does FFW items gain such advantage over classic infantrymen in hard/classic fights ?

[jps2]

To JMA :
When I was 2Lt (peace time, never been deployed), your package for 48h was between 10 and 15kg. If you add it the shield, the radio+batteries+Pda, the NVG, the 2 way telescope for everyone plus large Pda & LR Bino/LRF for team leaders it will be an extra weight i compute between 7kg (coy) and >10kg (leaders).

So, I have the same concern as you regarding a modern armored opponent.

[Uboat509]

The problem with body armor now has more to do with risk adversity than anything else. The body armor we use now was not originally designed to be used the way we do now. It was intended for short duration use on an assault, especially in MOUT. In MOUT, and CQC in particular, the ranges at which combat takes place necessitate the use of some kind of body armor. Weight is less of an issue because of the shorter distances moved (versus contact in a wooded area or an open area), and the need for protection outweighs the need for speed or endurance. The problem came about when it was determined that the need for protection outweighed all other factors in all cases. As Ken often points out, when politicians become too involved in military operations bad things happen. In this case it became popular to attack the Bush administration and Rumsfeld in particular for sending our troops to combat "without adequate protection," including, among other things, body armor and increasing amounts of armor on our vehicles. It eventually reached the point where, if little Johnny is killed and he wasn't wearing body armor, there is a good chance that some elected official or other is going to want to look into why. In those cases, any viable reasons either for or against the policy tend to get lost in the political catfighting and the troops on the ground get stuck with whatever policy is most politically viable, regardless of whether or not it is tactically viable.

[jps2]

So why do we continue to patrol on roads rather than patrol by foot avoiding roads and paths. And by the way, why patrolling instead of staying and living with the good guys, ambushing the bad armed ones during night ?

please notice that I'm not an innocent about the "natives" expectations, everybody knows that the "natives" will have to stay there after we left.

[Uboat509]

So why do we continue to patrol on roads rather than patrol by foot avoiding roads and paths. And by the way, why patrolling instead of staying and living with the good guys, ambushing the bad armed ones during night ?

We do that, although not necessarily as much as or where we should. One of the issues is the distances involved. Many of the areas that we go are not really within walking distance. Travel cross-country in vehicles is problematic for a number of reasons, not the least of which is that there is a good deal of terrain that is only passable to vehicle traffic where the roads are. It would be nice if we had enough rotary wing assets to be able to severly reduce the amount of vehicle traffic that we have but we do not and will not anytime in the forseeable future. As such, our guys walk when they can and drive when they have to.

[jps2]

Thanks for clearing that point, Uboat509.
In the same idea, do you think that FOBs are the best way for us to understand the expectations/limits of Afghanis and for them to accept us ?

[JMA]

To JMA :
When I was 2Lt (peace time, never been deployed), your package for 48h was between 10 and 15kg. If you add it the shield, the radio+batteries+Pda, the NVG, the 2 way telescope for everyone plus large Pda & LR Bino/LRF for team leaders it will be an extra weight i compute between 7kg (coy) and >10kg (leaders).

So, I have the same concern as you regarding a modern armored opponent.

Am I correct in understanding that apart from your uniform and boots your load for a 48hr deployment is about 20-25 kg? Then you add the 20 odd kg for the body armour?

[JMA]

The problem with body armor now has more to do with risk adversity than anything else. The body armor we use now was not originally designed to be used the way we do now. It was intended for short duration use on an assault, especially in MOUT. In MOUT, and CQC in particular, the ranges at which combat takes place necessitate the use of some kind of body armor. Weight is less of an issue because of the shorter distances moved (versus contact in a wooded area or an open area), and the need for protection outweighs the need for speed or endurance. The problem came about when it was determined that the need for protection outweighed all other factors in all cases.

OK, so body armour is being used universally as opposed to what you believe it was intended for (which I happen to agree with you on).

While the Brits are tight lipped on to what extent body armour has reduced KIA/WIA is there any open source info on this from the US side?

[jps2]

Am I correct in understanding that apart from your uniform and boots your load for a 48hr deployment is about 20-25 kg? Then you add the 20 odd kg for the body armour?
There is different weight in body armor and I was trying to compute the extra weight for the guys having to fight with these new "toys" [my reference weight was an infantryman of 80', without backpack] (some sources said 25kg for a FFW complete suit, including 1 day food : body armor, weapon, helmet ammunition, definitive version is slightly different than that link especially the aiming device (http://defense-update.com/products/f/felin.htm) )

I'm trying to imagine the impact of that extra weight on efficiency. Less casualties is a political requirement. Does it means we have to completely give up mobility ? or does it means that nobody thinks that future opponents will be highly mobile and with modern weapons and TTP ?

[JMA]

There is different weight in body armor and I was trying to compute the extra weight for the guys having to fight with these new "toys" [my reference weight was an infantryman of 80', without backpack] (some sources said 25kg for a FFW complete suit, including 1 day food : body armor, weapon, helmet ammunition, definitive version is slightly different than that link especially the aiming device (http://defense-update.com/products/f/felin.htm) )

I'm trying to imagine the impact of that extra weight on efficiency. Less casualties is a political requirement. Does it means we have to completely give up mobility ? or does it means that nobody thinks that future opponents will be highly mobile and with modern weapons and TTP ?

Well to their credit the Brits have a programme to address the weight issue:

Reducing the Burden on the Dismounted Soldier Capability Vision
Task 1 – Lightweight Personal Protection (http://www.science.mod.uk/controls/getpdf.pdf?150)

It is noted from that document:

"This reduction in burden will lead to a reduction in casualties/physical injuries and hence fulfil a wider duty of care to individuals."

I accept that there is a real issue with weight adversely affecting combat performance. The pendulum has swung to far in one direction now and it is certainly hoped that initiatives like the above programme will help bring all aspects into balance.

[jps2]

Thanks for the link JMA, will look at that carefully.

[JMA]

Thanks for clearing that point, Uboat509.
In the same idea, do you think that FOBs are the best way for us to understand the expectations/limits of Afghanis and for them to accept us ?

A question on FOBs. What percentage of the otherwise fighting troops are tied down in situ at any time so as to defend these FOBs?

Another question on FOBs. What percentage of the vehicle travel requirements are generated by having to resupply these FOBs?

[JMA]

We do that, although not necessarily as much as or where we should. One of the issues is the distances involved. Many of the areas that we go are not really within walking distance. Travel cross-country in vehicles is problematic for a number of reasons, not the least of which is that there is a good deal of terrain that is only passable to vehicle traffic where the roads are. It would be nice if we had enough rotary wing assets to be able to severly reduce the amount of vehicle traffic that we have but we do not and will not anytime in the forseeable future. As such, our guys walk when they can and drive when they have to.

OK, so there is a requirement for chopper lift capacity. If adequate lift was available by what % would the vehicle movement reduce? And likewise by what % would the requirement to walk between points where there is no specific tactical reason to do so?

[William F. Owen]

I accept that there is a real issue with weight adversely affecting combat performance. The pendulum has swung to far in one direction now and it is certainly hoped that initiatives like the above programme will help bring all aspects into balance.
Don't hold your breath. The document is asking for the wind.
If we really wanted to, you could already make a substantial weight saving by reducing coverage and ballistic standards. We can do that now. We choose not to.
It's nothing to do with science and technology. It is an entirely policy based discussion.

[Infanteer]

A question on FOBs. What percentage of the otherwise fighting troops are tied down in situ at any time so as to defend these FOBs?

What do you consider a FOB? I ask because there is a difference between a piece of tactical infrastructure with a battalion on it and when where a platoon operates out of? Are we critiquing all tactical infrastructure?

I ask because a Company in a FOB or three Platoons dispersed into small compounds in villages would likely require the same amount of people to secure the position.


Another question on FOBs. What percentage of the vehicle travel requirements are generated by having to resupply these FOBs?

Probably most - remember, that vehicle traffic would be required either way if the soldiers were in a FOB or not; it would probably require more traffic if delivery of classes of supply wasn't centralized at a few key FOBs.

[stevepower]

The issue at hand is how we look at Force Protection. Both in our vehicles and our dismounted combat equipment, there is a tendency to want to achieve Force Protection passively, through protective equipment. The mindset is that protecting a Soldier from threats involves wrapping him with protective layers. By doing this, his equipment protects him even from threats that he is surprised by or cannot react quickly enough to avoid. Unfortunately, this aspect of Force Protection is the one that adds the most weight and bulkiness to our Soldiers and our vehicles. This increased weight has several downsides associated with it that the Army has not prioritized in the equation adequately. Long-term injuries are one of those downsides, but I feel that the very Force Protection the equipment exists to provide degrades it.

To solve the issue of weight, the Army as an organization should start concentrating more on the other aspects of Force Protection: Mobility, Lethality, Situational Awareness, and Maneuver. Each of these contributes as much to Force Protection as Kevlar and Ceramics do. If we prioritize these four things as much as we do ballistic protection, and therefore outfit our Soldiers with lighter gear, we will see a positive impact on casualties and mission accomplishment.

Mobility, Lethality, Maneuver, and Situational Awareness are just as important to Force Protection and Mission Accomplishment as protective gear is. Mobility enables forces to vary their routes, surprise the enemy, and once in contact move around the enemy’s engagement area. Maneuver adds accurate fires to that mobility to allow the Soldier to close with the enemy and accomplish his mission. Lethality allows the Soldier to kill the enemy before the enemy can place effects on friendly forces. Situational Awareness is crucial to all three. Too much of the heavy and bulky gear commonly associated with Force Protection are the biggest detriment to these four factors of force protection. Too little protective gear also affects a Soldiers ability to perform these tasks. The goal is the correct balance between burdensome and inadequate.

The impacts of too much weight on mobility and maneuver are obvious, but keep in mind the impacts of temperature, equipment load, and Solder fitness on lethality and situational awareness as well. Shooting accurately and thinking clearly in contact is hard enough without having to do it with the burden of dozens of extra pounds on your head and body. It is very difficult to see the enemy, or his IED, before he sees you, when you are barely able to walk and keep the sweat out of your eyes under the load you are carrying.

As the Army makes decisions about how to equip our Soldiers, we must keep in mind that Force Protection is not a decision about protective gear alone. We need to look at Force Protection holistically and understand that the more weight Soldiers carry the worse they become at the other elements of Force Protection and their job.

-- MAJ Steve Power, Student, Command and General Staff College

The views expressed in this blog post are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

[40below]

I don't have an opinion on combat load except to say after slogging around Afgh in body armour and helmet, it's a PITA, but a few commentators have brought up the issue of drinking local water rather than carrying it, and after six months of treatment, during which time I lost 25 per cent of my body weight for what was eventually diagnosed as a form of blastocystis that hadn't been seen in the west since 2001, all I can say is DON'T.

Got caught in the Aghan thing where it's impolite to refuse tea. My tropical diseases specialist later told me it wasn't the tea or the water but the cup, which probably hadn't been washed since a Soviet drank from it.

[GI Zhou]

I came back from a posting to South east Asia having explosive diarrhea. Some tropical bug I had picked up which saw me lkosing one kg a day at one stage. Finally got it sorted but I feel for you. Posting to the tropics often sees people end up with undiagnosed fevers of all sorts, until tested for them. I wonder sometimes why I keep going back.

[JMA]

The issue at hand is how we look at Force Protection. Both in our vehicles and our dismounted combat equipment, there is a tendency to want to achieve Force Protection passively, through protective equipment. The mindset is that protecting a Soldier from threats involves wrapping him with protective layers. By doing this, his equipment protects him even from threats that he is surprised by or cannot react quickly enough to avoid. Unfortunately, this aspect of Force Protection is the one that adds the most weight and bulkiness to our Soldiers and our vehicles. This increased weight has several downsides associated with it that the Army has not prioritized in the equation adequately. Long-term injuries are one of those downsides, but I feel that the very Force Protection the equipment exists to provide degrades it.

To solve the issue of weight, the Army as an organization should start concentrating more on the other aspects of Force Protection: Mobility, Lethality, Situational Awareness, and Maneuver. Each of these contributes as much to Force Protection as Kevlar and Ceramics do. If we prioritize these four things as much as we do ballistic protection, and therefore outfit our Soldiers with lighter gear, we will see a positive impact on casualties and mission accomplishment.

Mobility, Lethality, Maneuver, and Situational Awareness are just as important to Force Protection and Mission Accomplishment as protective gear is. Mobility enables forces to vary their routes, surprise the enemy, and once in contact move around the enemy’s engagement area. Maneuver adds accurate fires to that mobility to allow the Soldier to close with the enemy and accomplish his mission. Lethality allows the Soldier to kill the enemy before the enemy can place effects on friendly forces. Situational Awareness is crucial to all three. Too much of the heavy and bulky gear commonly associated with Force Protection are the biggest detriment to these four factors of force protection. Too little protective gear also affects a Soldiers ability to perform these tasks. The goal is the correct balance between burdensome and inadequate.

The impacts of too much weight on mobility and maneuver are obvious, but keep in mind the impacts of temperature, equipment load, and Solder fitness on lethality and situational awareness as well. Shooting accurately and thinking clearly in contact is hard enough without having to do it with the burden of dozens of extra pounds on your head and body. It is very difficult to see the enemy, or his IED, before he sees you, when you are barely able to walk and keep the sweat out of your eyes under the load you are carrying.

As the Army makes decisions about how to equip our Soldiers, we must keep in mind that Force Protection is not a decision about protective gear alone. We need to look at Force Protection holistically and understand that the more weight Soldiers carry the worse they become at the other elements of Force Protection and their job.

-- MAJ Steve Power, Student, Command and General Staff College

The views expressed in this blog post are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.


Well put.

I can't see how to win this argument when one operates in such normally open terrain such as Afghanistan. Maybe removing the requirement for wearing protective gear when operating at night? Would this be a step in the right direction?

[dwightphillips]

MAJ Steve Power has made some good points about thinking about Force Protection holistically. However, I think that Mobility, Lethality, Maneuver, and Situational Awareness have only limited utility as a remedy to the Force Protection weight dilemma for both the individual soldier and fighting vehicle. I will just focus on the individual soldier in this thread.

Recent historical experience has demonstrated that the US soldier often makes contact only when the enemy has engaged him (small arms fire, RPG, or IED). Not surprisingly, enemy-initiated contact is much more lethal for our soldiers. Although I lack hard data, I suspect that usually these casualties occur in the first moments of contact (IED explosion, first few rounds of fire). At this most lethal moment, I would argue that Mobility, Lethality, and Maneuver have little impact on soldier survivability.

Now, we ought to ask how Situational Awareness, Mobility, Lethality, and Maneuver could change this situation. First, despite our intensive efforts to improve Situational Awareness through UAVs and sensors, the US soldier has continued to discover that his adversaries exploit complex terrain (especially urban terrain) to avoid detection. For the individual soldier, the question is how much does “body armor” decrease his situational awareness to the point that he does not see the enemy combatant or IED? While certainly the weight degrades soldier performance and alertness over time, is the degradation that significant?

One could argue that an individual soldier with more Mobility (due to less weight) would be able to avoid contact by using different routes. However, in my experiences in Afghanistan, our individual force protection systems prevented dismounted maneuver on only the most treacherous terrain. Otherwise, the body armor had little impact on the dismounted routes we chose.

I would also argue that it is the Lethality of the US soldier and his weapon systems that have caused our adversaries to choose longer-range engagements or the use of IEDs. One could argue that a more lightly equipped soldier could Maneuver better, and kill the enemy more quickly, thus ending the contact more quickly, and providing increased force protection. However, I wonder if we will ever win the “dismounted” foot race – our adversaries will almost always be more lightly armed and equipped than we are, and they will often know the terrain better, and will have preplanned escape routes. Instead, the US soldier gains a Maneuver advantage by maneuvering other elements of combat power (attack aviation, indirect fires, fighting vehicles, other dismounted forces) to kill the enemy.

We ought to also consider the effect of full spectrum/COIN operations on combat engagements. In stability and COIN operations, the US soldier is forced to be somewhat predictable in routes, times of movement, and “objective areas” (location where the soldier conducts a military activity – checkpoints, meetings with local political leaders, joint police patrols, etc.). In these types of military operations, we are requiring the soldier to accept greater risk of the enemy initiating contact, and we place constraints on his Mobility, Lethality, and Maneuver.

Finally, we ought to consider the psychological component of Force Protection. Individual force protection systems give soldiers greater confidence that they can survive contact. Moreover, after they pass through the initial moments of contact, individual force protection systems give the soldier confidence to sustain the contact, assess & develop the situation, and then respond with precise, lethal fires. Also, in some ways, individual force protection systems have made the individual soldier more maneuverable: one reason for our soldiers’ aggressiveness in close combat and the MOUT fight is their confidence in their individual force protection systems to protect them from becoming a serious casualty.

The point of this thread is not to say that soldiers should wear the “full kit” of individual force protection components on every mission – certainly the commander should make decisions about the level of protection based on the mission. However, based on the battlefield environment the US soldier will continue to face (full spectrum missions on complex terrain), the best solutions to our force protection weight dilemma are probably lighter systems (based on realistic expectations of what these systems ought to accomplish). Improvements in Mobility, Lethality, Situational Awareness, and Maneuver will have only a limited effect on protecting the soldier at the most critical and lethal moment: the first seconds of enemy-initiated contact.

MAJ Dwight Phillips, Student, Command and General Staff College

-- The views expressed in this blog post are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

[Ken White]

Recent historical experience has demonstrated that the US soldier often makes contact only when the enemy has engaged him (small arms fire, RPG, or IED). Not surprisingly, enemy-initiated contact is much more lethal for our soldiers. Although I lack hard data, I suspect that usually these casualties occur in the first moments of contact (IED explosion, first few rounds of fire). At this most lethal moment, I would argue that Mobility, Lethality, and Maneuver have little impact on soldier survivability.All you say is true. Starting at the top, that the enemy initiates most contacts became true after mid 1968 in Viet Nam as several bad decisions (one year rotation or six months for many officers, infusion program, in-country training and others). That it has been generally -- but not always -- true in Afghanistan and Iraq is nothing more than an indictment of our poor training system adopted in the early 70s and not fully adapted to the current demographic. This led to today's essentially mediocre training AND to our risk aversion. Both those hand initiative to the enemy. There are admittedly other factors but they are minor; those two things are the major cause.

Thus we have a couple of chicken-egg situations. Is risk aversion caused by our mediocre tactical ability demonstrated in too many but again, not all, cases or is our risk averse nature causing tactical ineptitude?

Does our mediocre training foster a need for the SAPI plates or does the availability of that allow us to not train as well or hard as we should?

Most casualties seem to occur because we repeatedly do the same things and present lucrative targets. Given IEDs as a major producer of casualties, your point that mobility and maneuver have little impact on soldier survivability is obviously correct. Given small arms or indirect fire that would not be the case, agility / mobility are as good or, usually, better lifesavers than a SAPI plate.
...First, despite our intensive efforts to improve Situational Awareness through UAVs and sensors...Most such do not do the individual soldier, your announced focus, much good...
the US soldier has continued to discover that his adversaries exploit complex terrain (especially urban terrain) to avoid detection.Thus it has always been so. Therefor the statement that he "continues to discover" this raises the question 'why?' Why does he not know this from his training?
...While certainly the weight degrades soldier performance and alertness over time, is the degradation that significant?METT-TC. Try plate carriers in the jungle. As the Cockney said, "It ain't the 'eat, it's the 'oomidity."
One could argue that an individual soldier with more Mobility (due to less weight) would be able to avoid contact by using different routes. However, in my experiences in Afghanistan, our individual force protection systems prevented dismounted maneuver on only the most treacherous terrain. Otherwise, the body armor had little impact on the dismounted routes we chose.On the routes. What about speed of movement? What about agility to avoid fire and / or engage an enemy force?
However, I wonder if we will ever win the “dismounted” foot race – our adversaries will almost always be more lightly armed and equipped than we are, and they will often know the terrain better, and will have preplanned escape routes. Instead, the US soldier gains a Maneuver advantage by maneuvering other elements of combat power (attack aviation, indirect fires, fighting vehicles, other dismounted forces) to kill the enemy.Your comment on enemy capability is correct for most FID and similar missions, it may or may not be true in mid-intensity combat or major combat operations against a peer force. However, aside from the fact that one cannot depend on the availability of aviation or indirect fire, much less fighting vehicles due to a number of factors one still has to prevail or at least survive. Therefor, one must assess the terrain to determine possibilities and then out think the enemy.. That is admittedly difficult when this is the case:
In stability and COIN operations, the US soldier is forced to be somewhat predictable in routes, times of movement, and “objective areas” (location where the soldier conducts a military activity – checkpoints, meetings with local political leaders, joint police patrols, etc.)...one reason for our soldiers’ aggressiveness in close combat and the MOUT fight is their confidence in their individual force protection systems to protect them from becoming a serious casualty.No question on any of that. Though I would submit that soldiers lacking individual force protection systems ( an appellation that is a minor indictment in its own right... :wry:) have in many previous wars been every bit as aggressive. One wonders if being a bit better trained in some aspects made the difference -- or if a less risk averse society was responsible in some measure.:confused:

Regardless this is correct:
...certainly the commander should make decisions about the level of protection based on the missionCouldn't agree more. My suspicion, based on talking to some who've been or are there and open source material is that the "commander" making that decision is often at an unduly high level...

IOW, I agree with you, SAPI plate and carrier have great merit in the right place at the right time. The bad guys are initiating too many contacts; we, too few. Mobility, lethality and maneuver cannot in all instances substitute for protection (conversely, protection cannot ever substitute for mobility, lethality or maneuver). Commanders on the scene need to make sensible decisions based on METT-TC.

The only thing I addressed that you did not, I think, is agility. Unless things have changed a great deal from my day and I suspect they have not, agility is in its fullest sense, intellectually and tactically more critically important for both survival and mission accomplishment than force protection, mobility, lethality or maneuver.

[Kiwigrunt]

Given IEDs as a major producer of casualties, your point that mobility and maneuver have little impact on soldier survivability is obviously correct.

Just some questions for clarification, neither for or against body armour. Do the plates offer reasonable protection against IEDs or are they mainly meant to protect against bullets (and shrapnel)? I should think that we need to differentiate between anti personnel IEDs (mines) and anti vehicle. For anti personnel the plates do nothing for the person stomping on the mine but may offer protection to bystanders (Not that they should be walking hand in hand to begin with of course:cool:)? Or are they not worth their weight in this case?

Fuchs also tied the issue back to conventional warfare some time ago suggesting (IIRC) that body armour does little against HE, which is the biggest killer on the battle field. I would agree with regards to the blast but not necessarily with regards to shrapnel.

If I’m not mistaken, hardhats first came in (some 100 years ago) for protection against shrapnel more than anything else, although they have of course been known to stop or deflect bullets.

[SethB]

Haven't read anything definitive on it, but I would assume that the soft insert can stop shell fragments. It has pretty good coverage, too.

The plates will stop almost all common rifle rounds.

Not knowing any better, I would think that in a high HE environment I'd want an ACH, soft armor and a shovel.

[JMA]

Recent historical experience has demonstrated that the US soldier often makes contact only when the enemy has engaged him (small arms fire, RPG, or IED). Not surprisingly, enemy-initiated contact is much more lethal for our soldiers. Although I lack hard data, I suspect that usually these casualties occur in the first moments of contact (IED explosion, first few rounds of fire). At this most lethal moment, I would argue that Mobility, Lethality, and Maneuver have little impact on soldier survivability.

I suggest that this is the crux of the problem. The best place to start is to figure out why so much of the action is initiated by the enemy. If one can reverse this situation it would go a long way towards reducing own force casualties... and of course increasing the kill rate.

[Infanteer]

I suggest that this is the crux of the problem. The best place to start is to figure out why so much of the action is initiated by the enemy. If one can reverse this situation it would go a long way towards reducing own force casualties... and of course increasing the kill rate.

A big reason is that the enemy will be a farmer until it is time to fight. Initiative is hard to gain when your foe mingles amongst his people.

[JMA]

A big reason is that the enemy will be a farmer until it is time to fight. Initiative is hard to gain when your foe mingles amongst his people.

And these are the same farmers/locals on whom so much "hearts and minds" stuff is being showered? Don't you think that by the time he and others in his village have decided to take up arms against you its time get the message and to take the gloves off?

[Infanteer]

And these are the same farmers/locals on whom so much "hearts and minds" stuff is being showered? Don't you think that by the time he and others in his village have decided to take up arms against you its time get the message and to take the gloves off?

Yup.

What do you mean take the gloves off?

[JMA]

Yup.

What do you mean take the gloves off?

Idiom Definitions for 'Gloves are off' (http://www.usingenglish.com/reference/idioms/gloves+are+off.html)

"When the gloves are off, people start to argue or fight in a more serious way. ('The gloves come off' and 'take the gloves off' are also used. It comes from boxing, where fighters normally wear gloves so that they don't do too much damage to each other.)"

or

"with the gloves off Informal (of a dispute, argument, etc.) conducted mercilessly and in earnest, with no reservations"

[Infanteer]

I know what the expression means. What does your interpretation of "gloves off" mean with regards to small wars - shooting farmers in their fields?

[JMA]

I know what the expression means. What does your interpretation of "gloves off" mean with regards to small wars - shooting farmers in their fields?

You need to decide what the guy is. Is he an insurgent or an insurgent doing a little domestic agric work? Is he a farmer who is also a part time insurgent or an insurgent who does a little farming to feed his family? Once who have that decided then what to do will become easily apparent.

[Ken White]

Once who have that decided then what to do will become easily apparent.Correct. Er, uh, hopefully you have some suggestions on how to accurately determine which variant he happens to be...

My recollection is that posed a significant problem a couple of places we've been before and my perception is that it's a problem in all the places -- not just Afghanistan -- we're operating today. So if you have a solution, even partial, it would be quite helpful.

[Infanteer]

Er, uh, hopefully you have some suggestions on how to accurately determine which variant he happens to be...

Indeed.

[GI Zhou]

Rememebr, Rule .303 wasn't allowed as a defence in a Court Martial. Probably only because the priest was white, but there you go.

[Rex Brynen]

I know what the expression means. What does your interpretation of "gloves off" mean with regards to small wars - shooting farmers in their fields?

Well, perhaps it is worth remembering what the Soviet version of it looked like in Afghanistan: c1 million dead civilians, even more maimed, 5 million driven out of the country.

It didn't work all that well, either.

[William F. Owen]

Well, perhaps it is worth remembering what the Soviet version of it looked like in Afghanistan: c1 million dead civilians, even more maimed, 5 million driven out of the country.

It didn't work all that well, either.
Yes, but we know why it failed. It's not a mystery. 16,000 KIA on the Soviet side.
If the US hadn't sponsored the armed opposition, the Soviets would still be there today.

[40below]

Yes, but we know why it failed. It's not a mystery. 16,000 KIA on the Soviet side.
If the US hadn't sponsored the armed opposition, the Soviets would still be there today.

Enough has been written about the failure of Soviet strategy, but the reason the Mujahadeen were so successful with those 16,000 KIAs, a staggering number given the imbalance between the sides, is that the Soviets had air support in theory but in practice it was hours away, allowing the Afghans to stage and carry out convoy ambushes and then fade into the countryside again. When the SAMs arrived, Soviet close air support pretty much disappeared entirely, but the Mujahadeen were doing quite well by themselves (well, with some help from the ISI) before they started getting U.S. help.

[JMA]

Correct. Er, uh, hopefully you have some suggestions on how to accurately determine which variant he happens to be...

My recollection is that posed a significant problem a couple of places we've been before and my perception is that it's a problem in all the places -- not just Afghanistan -- we're operating today. So if you have a solution, even partial, it would be quite helpful.

Ken, this is all about knowing your enemy. If the enemy in Afghanistan can't be identified and dealt with is there any wonder why the situation there is getting to be so "difficult"?

One minute we are being told that the fight is for the "hearts and minds" of the villagers (assuming that the Taliban is some outside force demanding support from the same villagers), the next we are told is that the same villagers are actually the ones using weapons against ISAF. Which one is it? The first, the second or both? If its the second or both then surely its time to admit the war for the "hearts and minds" has been lost (in that particular village)? If so then getting rid of the poppies and the opium trade will have no affect on already offsides villager?

Who said anything about shooting civilians?

If the 'farmer' is a part time insurgent then he is fair game for detention or whatever? Like a bank robber, he does not rob banks everyday but makes a hit now and again when a target presents itself.

[Infanteer]

(assuming that the Taliban is some outside force demanding support from the same villagers)

This is a poor assumption to make - one that is assumed by way too many outside viewers. I think it is a case of "situating the estimate" so that some can fit an FM 3-24 solution onto the problem.

[Ken White]

Ken, this is all about knowing your enemy. If the enemy in Afghanistan can't be identified and dealt with is there any wonder why the situation there is getting to be so "difficult"?Uh, no, not at all. Most of us understand that's a significant part of the problem that is Afghanistan. however, stating that obvious fact doesn't answer the query: "...hopefully you have some suggestions on how to accurately determine which variant he happens to be..."

Thus I take it you have no viable suggestions. :wry:
One minute we are being told that the fight is for the "hearts and minds" of the villagers (assuming that the Taliban is some outside force demanding support from the same villagers), the next we are told is that the same villagers are actually the ones using weapons against ISAF. Which one is it?The first, the second or both?Umm, how about "'C,' both of the above."
If its the second or both then surely its time to admit the war for the "hearts and minds" has been lost (in that particular village)? If so then getting rid of the poppies and the opium trade will have no affect on already offsides villager?Rather simplistic, don't you think? What about the relatives and friends of those villagers in nearby villages? What about tribal cohesion and xenophobic reaction to outsiders killing local no matter what the problem. More importantly, what about the opinions of those citizens of the western nation whose troops were / are involved and who strongly disagree with your "offsides" assessment or the right of their troops to even make such an assessment in the first place...
Who said anything about shooting civilians?No one. However, your 'gloves off' statement is a really neat example of plausible deniability. Good job. :D
If the 'farmer' is a part time insurgent then he is fair game for detention or whatever? Like a bank robber, he does not rob banks everyday but makes a hit now and again when a target presents itself.True, and while the Rules of Evidence in the criminal sense do not fully apply, the wily P'than are masters at feigning innocence and outrage at attempts to accuse them of such perfidy. All gaming on their part, I know -- as do the Troops -- but the constraints of western civil society are applied even where totally inappropriate. More regrettably, the media types present in Afghanistan either do not understand just how wily the guy is or they sympathize with him regardless. In many senses, Afghan opinions while important, are not nearly as important as are those of the citizens of western nations involved...

All that forces the Troops to just keep slogging in a sea of frustrations. That, as they say, is COIN writ large. Regrettably, most such operations and third party interventions are like that. Rarely is one fortunate enough to find the unique series of circumstances that existed in Rhodesia...

So I can put you down as, like the rest of us, having easily identified the readily apparent problem but having no ready or real solution. ;)

[JMA]

This is a poor assumption to make - one that is assumed by way too many outside viewers. I think it is a case of "situating the estimate" so that some can fit an FM 3-24 solution onto the problem.

Outside viewer can rightly be concerned that firstly not only the mission in Afghanistan is some what vague but also it seems the troops on the grounds ability to identify their enemy is somewhat confused.

I sympathise with soldiers on the ground having to operate under such circumstances.

So the people who are there or have been there say "OK, you tell us who the enemy is and how to deal with him".

It just gets worse. As the school playground retort "OK, you do better then" doesn't wash when it comes to a war.

The Brits are of course saying that if that had enough troops and resources for those troops they would have done better and this is true. But we wait their ability to acknowledge that they could have and should have done better tactically as well (without the additional troops and resources).

Having been in these areas of operation for years now one would have thought that at least the ISAF troops would have been able to identify who their enemy was.

Is the man hoeing his field today who fired on your troops yesterday your enemy?

How is it possible to have reached the level of insanity where today because he has a hoe in his hands and no AK47 you greet him in passing and hand out Mars bars and footballs to his kids? Oh yes and the medic, bandages a cut on a village child's foot.

That night daddy helps plant and IED which kills a soldier the following day daddy is there to take a shot at the CASEVAC helo on its way in with his trusty RPG7.

Back in his fields the next day he is greeted by a passing patrol and his kids get some more Mars bars and footballs (or maybe a Frisbee this time)... oh yes, and the little girl gets the cut on her hand bandaged.

The cycle of madness continues.

[Red Rat]

Having been in these areas of operation for years now one would have thought that at least the ISAF troops would have been able to identify who their enemy was.

Is the man hoeing his field today who fired on your troops yesterday your enemy?

How is it possible to have reached the level of insanity where today because he has a hoe in his hands and no AK47 you greet him in passing and hand out Mars bars and footballs to his kids? Oh yes and the medic, bandages a cut on a village child's foot.

That night daddy helps plant and IED which kills a soldier the following day daddy is there to take a shot at the CASEVAC helo on its way in with his trusty RPG7.

Back in his fields the next day he is greeted by a passing patrol and his kids get some more Mars bars and footballs (or maybe a Frisbee this time)... oh yes, and the little girl gets the cut on her hand bandaged.

The cycle of madness continues.

The application of biometrics and forensic techniques (swabbing for explosives residue et al) is making it both easier to identify individuals (many of whom do not carry ID with them) and easier to identify individuals involved in illegal activities.

However we have no legal right to detain indefinitely and it is very difficult to get a prosecution through AFG courts. So, we take an individual's biometrics, he tests positive for having fired a firearm, he gets arrested, handed over to the ANP and then released 24 hours later either for lack of evidence or because he has paid a bribe. He then returns to the village...

On most patrols and operations the ANP and ANA provide an IFF (Identification Friend or Foe - RAF talk!) capability as they know the people in a way that outsiders would take decades to develop. So they can spot relative outsiders, whether from the next village, valley, province or country.

One of the key lessons from Iraq was that you had to know who the population was first, before you could start to build up any meaningful insurgent identity database. If everyone carries 3-5 (valid) IDs in different names (or no IDs at all), where there has been no census so you do not know who is supposed to live where and with whom, then it is very difficult to join the dots. Hence the introduction of biometrics on the battlefield and the push for units to conduct a census. Once that is established and we have a working justice framework then we might get somewhere faster.

Oh - but this is Afghanistan! So you also have to factor in that Tribe X runs the ANP which Tribe Y resents (mostly because a large part of the money raised through extortion comes from them), so Tribe Y attacks you because you are seen as supporting the police (they don't actually support the Taleban at all). You cannot significantly change the composition of the local ANP because the Chief of Police has paid his $40k monthly retainer to the Ministry of Interior to ensure his security of tenure (he recoups the money (plus) through his ANP) and because his tribe has traditionally been the dominant tribe in the area and therefore holds more political sway in Kabul. The ANP Chief of Police also keeps his links to the Taleban open just in case the Coalition leaves, and, as in any good arrangement, there is a bit of mutual give and take to keep things moving reasonably smoothly. The NDS (Security Service) is very professional, but politically an unknown quantity and there are continuing legal issues about handing over prisoners or intelligence to them or using intelligence provided by them; a tricky issue often encountered when a Liberal Western Democracy tries to aid a non-Liberal, non-Western sort of democracy in its endeavours...:rolleyes:
Welcome to Afghanistan! :D

[William F. Owen]

However we have no legal right to detain indefinitely and it is very difficult to get a prosecution through AFG courts. So, we take an individual's biometrics, he tests positive for having fired a firearm, he gets arrested, handed over to the ANP and then released 24 hours later either for lack of evidence or because he has paid a bribe. He then returns to the village...

On most patrols and operations the ANP and ANA provide an IFF (Identification Friend or Foe - RAF talk!) capability as they know the people in a way that outsiders would take decades to develop. So they can spot relative outsiders, whether from the next village, valley, province or country.

As I think I may have pointed out before, the two primary pillars of conducting Irregular Warfare do not exist.
Doesn't matter really how good we get if we cannot detain and we cannot track and ID, in terms of building intelligence.

[40below]

One of the key lessons from Iraq was that you had to know who the population was first, before you could start to build up any meaningful insurgent identity database. If everyone carries 3-5 (valid) IDs in different names (or no IDs at all), where there has been no census so you do not know who is supposed to live where and with whom, then it is very difficult to join the dots. Hence the introduction of biometrics on the battlefield and the push for units to conduct a census. Once that is established and we have a working justice framework then we might get somewhere faster.


And good luck with that. When I was in Sarposa Prison in Khar (as a visitor, I got to leave), the warden was still struggling to maintain an ID system for inmates for the reason that you mention (no birth certificates, multiple IDs.) The best they could do was a loose leaf folder of mug shots but the camera that the ANA who ran the prison had kept breaking. Well, there were other problems, but I can't see doing a head count in a country in which the putative authorities can't even put names to the people under 24 hour detention.

[davidbfpo]

Couldn't resist this, no doubt a brilliant scientific discovery, but the headline is great! Subtitled:
British scientists have created a liquid body armour suit that hardens and absorbs shrapnel on impact using – "bullet-proof custard".

Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/howaboutthat/7886699/Scientists-create-custard-armour-to-protect-soldiers.html

Might offer less body armour weight to carry.

[JMA]

Oh - but this is Afghanistan! So you also have to factor in that Tribe X runs the ANP which Tribe Y resents (mostly because a large part of the money raised through extortion comes from them), so Tribe Y attacks you because you are seen as supporting the police (they don't actually support the Taleban at all). You cannot significantly change the composition of the local ANP because the Chief of Police has paid his $40k monthly retainer to the Ministry of Interior to ensure his security of tenure (he recoups the money (plus) through his ANP) and because his tribe has traditionally been the dominant tribe in the area and therefore holds more political sway in Kabul. The ANP Chief of Police also keeps his links to the Taleban open just in case the Coalition leaves, and, as in any good arrangement, there is a bit of mutual give and take to keep things moving reasonably smoothly. The NDS (Security Service) is very professional, but politically an unknown quantity and there are continuing legal issues about handing over prisoners or intelligence to them or using intelligence provided by them; a tricky issue often encountered when a Liberal Western Democracy tries to aid a non-Liberal, non-Western sort of democracy in its endeavours...:rolleyes:
Welcome to Afghanistan! :D

Well it is a problem when the ISAF forces are seen to be defending the indefensible. A corrupt and illegitimate government and a corrupt system. On a hiding to nothing.

[JMA]

However we have no legal right to detain indefinitely and it is very difficult to get a prosecution through AFG courts. So, we take an individual's biometrics, he tests positive for having fired a firearm, he gets arrested, handed over to the ANP and then released 24 hours later either for lack of evidence or because he has paid a bribe. He then returns to the village...

A mere technicality like this has never been allowed to get in the way of the Brits before, so why now? ;)

[Tukhachevskii]

...courtesy of the US CALL.

The Modern Warrior's Combat Load: Dismounted Operations in Afghanistan, April-May 2003 (http://thedonovan.com/archives/modernwarriorload/ModernWarriorsCombatLoadReport.pdf)

[William F. Owen]

A mere technicality like this has never been allowed to get in the way of the Brits before, so why now? ;)
....cos we're drinking the bong water and not trying to win wars. We're "nation building."

[Infanteer]

Hey, at least it is cutting-edge, academic level bong water!

[jcustis]

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/8455741/Britains-donkey-soldiers-are-losing-the-war-in-Afghanistan.html


Britain's 'donkey' soldiers are losing the war in Afghanistan
A senior Army officer has warned that Britain risks losing the war in Afghanistan because commanders are more concerned with protecting soldiers than defeating the Taliban.

tacking the British strategy in Helmand, the officer claims that soldiers are now so laden with equipment they are unable to launch effective attacks against insurgents.

The controversial account of situation in Afghanistan appears in the latest issue British Army Review, a restricted military publication designed to provoke debate within the Army.

Writing anonymously, the author reveals that the Taliban have dubbed British soldiers "donkeys" who move in a tactical "waddle" because they now carry an average weight of 110lbs worth of equipment into battle.

The consequences of the strategy, he says, is that "our infantry find it almost impossible to close with the enemy because the bad guys are twice as mobile".

The officer claims that by the end of a routine four hour patrol, soldiers struggle to make basic tactical judgements because they are physically and mentally exhausted.

"We're getting to a point where we are losing as many men making mistakes because they are exhausted from carrying armour (and the things that go with it) than are saved by it," he warns.

Britain's military's command structure in Afghanistan also comes in for criticism and is described as a "bloated over complex system that sucks the life out of operations" and where "decision and action get lost in Chinese whispers and Chinese parliaments that turn most of operational staff 'work' into operational staff waste".

In Helmand, a quarter of the 9,500 British troops deployed are involved in management or management support roles in various headquarters, according to the report's author. In Kabul, the combined strength of the US and Nato headquarters amount to more than 4,000 personnel.

The report is entitled "Donkeys Led by Lions", with combat troops likened to pack animals and headquarters staff to "fat, lazy" lions.

The author states that while researching the article he discovered that in the early 1900s, New Zealand loggers limited mule and pony loads to 128lbs, a sixth of their body weight while working in temperatures of 25C.

Even seaside donkeys, the author states, carry just over a quarter of their body weight and rarely work in temperatures above 30C. By contrast, British soldiers are expected to fight in temperatures of over 40C carrying 65 per cent of their body weight.

As the threat facing British soldiers has changed so has the composition of body armour, which now consists of front, rear and side plates designed to protect soldiers from small arms fire and IED blasts but weighs around 40lbs.

In addition to body armour, a typical soldier on patrol in Afghanistan will carry: a weapon (10 to 20lbs); radio, batteries electronic equipment (40lbs); water (10lbs); ammunition (20lbs); Javelin missile (25lbs). Soldiers will also be required to wear eye, groin, ear and knee protection as well as gloves and a helmet.

The officer adds: "A straw poll of three multi-tour companies found only two platoons that had successfully closed with an ambushing enemy. Our unscientific poll might be showing exceptions but rumour control suggests that the lack of closure is common. Some soldiers only do firefights because they know manoeuvre is a waste of effort when they're carrying so much weight.

"The result is that apart from a few big operations where we have used machines to encircle the enemy there are so few uninjured insurgents captured in contact that it's simply not worth recording."

But some of the most stinging criticism was saved for the headquarters running the campaign.

The author wrote: "Lions, contrary to Victorian opinion, aren't brave or noble; they are fat, lazy creatures that lie around all day licking themselves.

"They get others to do the dirty work and they have a penchant for infanticide. We are not saying our commanders are fat, lazy child killers, far from it, but it has reached a point where their headquarters are."

The larger that headquarters become the more the staff there force soldiers into wasteful activity which results in lots of people "who aren't doing anything about the enemy; they aren't even thinking about the enemy; they're thinking about how to make a pretty picture of how they think someone else ought to think about the enemy."

The article also states that British headquarters deployed in Afghanistan now produced a terabyte of written orders and reports every month – equivalent to hundreds of thousands of documents.

The report continues: "In one Afghan headquarters, it took a man nine days to read one day's worth of email exchanges – and he didn't have to open any attachments.

"The further we get back from the patrol base the worse the problem becomes. By the time we get back to the UK there are more people managing the operation than are actually deployed."

The article concludes by reminding readers of past conflicts and asking whether soldiers of a previous generation would have been able to march across the Falklands carrying "all the extra kit we have now?"

The officer writes: "Consider what the logistical and tactical impact of that extra 45lbs for Burma, Dunkirk or Normandy. How would these operations have played out if it took weeks to plan minor operations.

"If we don't work out now how we are going to lose that weight we will do the old trick of starting the next war by repeating the mistakes of this one."

A spokesman for the Ministry of Defence said: "The issue of weight carried by soldiers on operations is well recognised and work is constantly under way to reduce the amount carried by soldiers.

"Since June 2010 a number of weight savings measures have reduced the weight carried by soldiers by up to 26lbs."

[carl]

Jon:

I have a question. It will sound smart alecky but it is serious and was brought mind with the parts of the story that talked about taking nine days to read emails and a terabyte a month.

Do you think, all things considered, we might be better off without the computers, or at least some of the computers?

[jcustis]

Computers are the devil, in a combat environment, when we let them take over and supplant a lot of the basic fieldcraft and otherwise reliable technology we already possess.

One example is the use of the various digital combat operations center components that we currently employ. As it gets to the higher echelons, reporting becomes nothing more than a blip on a screen and a line of text. When I was last in Iraq, and weather and technical problems put our COC down for a while, we could not perform even the most basic reporting to higher headquarters because no one monitored the radio nets that have for so long been bread and butter for combat reporting.

I think that in every troops in contact situation, watch officers at the echelons above the battalion actively in the fight need to have a speak set by the watch officer's desk. He can fiddle with CPOF tracks and UAV feeds all he wants, but he needs to listen to the voice reporting that is happening, to give him the context he needs to understand what is going on on the ground. Anything less is really hollow stuff, and we suffer for it.

As for the plethora of computer assets that sit in shelters, converted buildings, and SWA huts around Afghanistan and Iraq, easily 3/4 of them could be chucked. Get those people who seemingly have nothing to do but watch the movie of the night or latest episode of Burn Notice off the shared drive, off their ass and out walking the line, or even better yet, beyond the fenceline and on a patrol.

[Ken White]

I think that in every troops in contact situation, watch officers at the echelons above the battalion actively in the fight need to have a speak set by the watch officer's desk. He can fiddle with CPOF tracks and UAV feeds all he wants, but he needs to listen to the voice reporting that is happening, to give him the context he needs to understand what is going on on the ground. Anything less is really hollow stuff, and we suffer for it.I'd urge one minor point of caution on that. I strongly agree that it should be done, however, said Watch or Duty Officers / NCOs need to be constantly reminded that initial reports of contact almost always tend to be exaggerated. What was initially reported as 600 Insurgents with Artillery and 35 DShKas as well as air support turns out to be about 30 bods with a couple of RPMs and a pair of RPG launchers while a few buzzards circle overhead hoping for lunch. :wry:

First reports always need to be given a few minutes or to settle down and get real (without any hassling by the folks in the TOC/ COC...). That flawed reporting pretty much goes away with a little experience and a newly arrived unit takes from one to three months to get settled down, unit and situation dependent and given our current personnel and rotation policies. Given a bit of recent experience the problem is less but it is always a possibility and the S2/S3 crowd needs to be aware of it.

[Pete]

I think that in every troops in contact situation, watch officers at the echelons above the battalion actively in the fight need to have a speaker set by the watch officer's desk. He can fiddle with CPOF tracks and UAV feeds all he wants, but he needs to listen to the voice reporting that is happening, to give him the context he needs to understand what is going on on the ground. Anything less is really hollow stuff, and we suffer for it.
That bothers me. I can't imagine command radio nets not being monitored. I was on a JRX at Eglin AFB in 1983 where a logistics TOC had a remote unit connected to an AN/VRC 46 radio mounted in an M151A1 jeep parked 100 feet away. In the JRX the 7th ID were the Blue forces and the Red ones were a brigade of the 82nd plus attached armor. The command net in the TOC was dead :eek: and I had to explain patiently to its commo MOS E7/SFC that the BA-30 batteries in the remote unit needed to be replaced ... that fixed the problem and presto the net came alive with traffic. We learn such things in the Field Artillery ...

[Pete]

By the way, that JRX at Eglin AFB in '83 turned into the invasion of Grenada. Those of us playing in the FTX war games at Eglin were the reinforcements to be deployed just in case the Cubans had gotten frisky. They didn't and we weren't.

[jcustis]

Absolutely Ken, absolutely. I was think more along the lines of the watch officer having the opportunity to hear that folks on the ground are getting shot at, and yes, they need support right now. Higher headquarters cannot handle voice reporting anymore, not with the various formatted reports that have to be filled out and forwarded to everybody on a distribution list that requires daily scrubs just to keep updated.

I learned long ago that the first report is usually wrong, and during my second deploy we took the initial contact report, and then gave the on scene commander thirty minutes to come up on the net and describe what happened. Until that mark, the fight was his. If he needed more time, all he (not a radio operator) needed to do was ask.

[Ken White]

As usual... :o

[JMA]

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/8455741/Britains-donkey-soldiers-are-losing-the-war-in-Afghanistan.html

"We're getting to a point where we are losing as many men making mistakes because they are exhausted from carrying armour (and the things that go with it) than are saved by it," he warns.

From the source document - The British Army Review Number 150 - the following:


...The real problem with soldier load is not leg and back injuries but the tactical impact. Our infantry find it almost impossible to close with the enemy because the bad guys are twice as mobile.

...Some of our soldiers only do firefights because they know manoeuvre is a waste of effort when they’re carrying so much weight. The result is that apart from a few big operations where we have used machines to encircle the enemy there are so few uninjured insurgents captured in contact that it’s simply not worth recording.

...We’re getting to a point where we are losing as many men making mistakes because they are exhausted from carrying armour (and the things that go with it) than are saved by it. The weight of protection and firepower also induces some unusual and undesirable combat behaviour.

...Spotting the soldier load problem is easy; doing something about it will be very hard. No commander will ever risk the false ire of the press, the llinformed judgment of coroners or the genuine grief of relatives by dumping body armour, firepower or gadgets. There aren’t many soldiers or marines who would voluntarily dump kit and risk their own lives for some vague idea about the collective good.

[bumperplate]

Not sure exactly what the quote means: "There aren’t many soldiers or marines who would voluntarily dump kit and risk their own lives for some vague idea about the collective good."
But, if it's implying that not many in uniform would dump kit to save tactical execution, then the article is way off base. Soldiers and Marines are dumping kit constantly in order to save weight, move around, and execute the tactical fight.

We're going to have to accept that there will be a few more dead bodies with holes in them where a SAPI plate would have covered them. Or, we're going to have to accept tactical defeat.

Unless the DOD is willing to allow (and provide) real performance enhancing substances, then human physiological limits will have to be taken into account.

[Pete]

First reports always need to be given a few minutes or to settle down and get real (without any hassling by the folks in the TOC/ COC...). That flawed reporting pretty much goes away with a little experience ...
That's one of the verities of the profession that is repeated again and again when one reads military history. "Tiger tanks, hundreds of 'em ... "

[120mm]

Actually, it's time to get the God Damned medical corps out of the business of making what are in effect tactical command decisions about what armor a soldier wears.

I see these reports from idiot f*cking doctors who keep talking about how one more plate put right "here" or making this bit just a little bit bigger or thicker that would allegedly help save XX number of troops a year, and these MD morons have no clue nor do they give a #### about what that collection of "just one more piece of armor" does for the burden that soldiers are forced to wear by cowardly, risk averse chains of command.

[davidbfpo]

120mm,

Would I be correct that US Army doctors never wearing body armour? Not even in pre-deployment training or basic training?

Unsure about the British Army, another contributor may be along shortly.

[slapout9]

120MM,There is a lot of medical evidence to support just what you saying. Anything that creates "Vertical Compression of the Spinal Cord" is bad. Carrying a large rucksack or ballistic vest over long periods of time will do you a lot of damage (can be severe).

[Pete]

The use of statistics on morbidity and mortality is quite common in medical publications such as the New England Journal of Medicine and The Lancet. Occasionally those data shed light on positive correlations between one thing happening and another condition, or even cause-and-effect relationships between the two. It is through the study of those statistics that the causes of many tropical diseases and other illnesses have been determined. On the other hand some researchers take cheap shots, such as in medical journal articles that show a positive correlation between the presence of firearms and incidents involving them.

[Pete]

Actually, it's time to get the God Damned medical corps out of the business of making what are in effect tactical command decisions about what armor a soldier wears.
Neither the U.S. Army Surgeon-General nor his Medical Department run the U.S. Army -- but the conbat arms gunfighters in positions of high command do. The current policies on force protection go back to around the end of the Vietnam conflict, when senior leaders came to believe that mounting casualties would undermine public support for operations overseas.

What has been missing from the operational equation for around 40 years, maybe longer, has been achieving decisive results in a hurry. To an extent force protection and the desire to appear to be "reasonable" about the use of military force undermine our ability to get the job done in a decisive manner. There have been disconnects between strategic goals and the military operations used to achieve them; for domestic political reasons we decide to "do something" with military forces but then we don't think through the ends and means.

[Pete]

There have been disconnects between strategic goals and the military operations used to achieve them; for domestic political reasons we decide to "do something" with military forces but then we don't think through the ends and means.
It happens again and again. When LBJ sent the first Marine Corps infantry battalions to Da Nang in 1965 to protect the air base it was to appease domestic political pressure. He had to "do something."

What was missing from the decision to send combat troops to Vietnam was a strategic appreciation of the situataion -- had we invaded North Vietnam and approached its northern border the Chinese may have come in, like in Korea; we had a fictitious and make-believe peace agreement in Laos where major elements of the NVA and the Ho Chi Minh Trail were located. For that reason ops in Laos were all CIA, MACV Special Studies Group and SF, concealed as it were from the U.S. State Department ambassador there. Thus we were stuck with attrition warfare within the geographic confines of South Vietnam and supporting a complacent government and armed forces run by a corrupt ruling elite.

At the highest levels of our government there is a passive-aggressive attitude between the administration in office and DoD and the armed forces. More four-stars should have the stones to ask, "Mr. President is your goal to 'do something,' win this war or get out of it?"

[JMA]

From the source document - The British Army Review Number 150 - the following:

I suggest one needs to go beyond the focus on the body armour even though it undoubtedly is unacceptably restrictive.

The weight of the body armour is 13 kgs - 29 pounds (for Brits) out of an all up weight of 45.5 kgs -100 pounds or more whilst restrictive is clearly not the biggest issue.

The SA80 with optic and full mag weighs 4.98 kg (11.0 lb) which is nothing so it is really down to all the other stuff carried. ammo, water and what?

The article referred to a short patrol as follows:


They’ll never be more than a few thousand meters from the patrol base as they take a wide counterclockwise loop from base to hamlet and
back. They aim to be back in about five hours; taking it steady but back in the patrol base before the day gets really hot.

How much water does a soldier need for a five hour patrol? The article says:


Everyone carries a litre more fluid than they think they’ll need

Does this imply that everyone can load as much as they like? How much of this water obsession is as a result of poor acclimatisation procedures on arrival in Afghanistan? etc etc

So even if one carried 1 litre per hour plus 1 that would be 6 litres = 6 kg (13.2 pds) - which would be over the top anyway.

No food required for a 5 hour patrol other than maybe some dog biscuits (or whatever they are called now).

A quick addition brings that to a total of 23.98 kg (52.8 pounds).

So what makes up the other 21.52 kgs (47.3 pounds) for a 5 hour patrol? Ammo and what?

Just to repeat... the basis of this post is the above quoted article and it is accepted that this may differ from other Brit forces and certainly US forces.

[Fmr11A]

I suggest one needs to go beyond the focus on the body armour even though it undoubtedly is unacceptably restrictive.

The weight of the body armour is 13 kgs - 29 pounds (for Brits) out of an all up weight of 45.5 kgs -100 pounds or more whilst restrictive is clearly not the biggest issue.

The SA80 with optic and full mag weighs 4.98 kg (11.0 lb) which is nothing so it is really down to all the other stuff carried. ammo, water and what?

...

So even if one carried 1 litre per hour plus 1 that would be 6 litres = 6 kg (13.2 pds) - which would be over the top anyway.

A quick addition brings that to a total of 23.98 kg (52.8 pounds).

So what makes up the other 21.52 kgs (47.3 pounds) for a 5 hour patrol? Ammo and what?


Possibilities (quick brainstorm - I'm sure there's lots of other stuff):
- first aid kit (tourniquet, IV bag w/needle, pressure dressing, etc)
- communication equipment
- night vision devices
- batteries
- flashlights
- ancillary equipment on weapons (optics, infrared aiming lights, white light)
- tripods
- litters
- cameras (still and/or video)
- mine detectors
- biometric scanners
- information products to distribute to population
- humanitarian supplies
- spare barrels for MGs
- smoke/frag/stun/incendiary grenades
- grenade launcher & ammo

[golani_2]

So even if one carried 1 litre per hour plus 1 that would be 6 litres = 6 kg (13.2 pds) - which would be over the top anyway.


What if a soldier gets a heat stroke?

What if they are engaged/change missions and are forced to stay for a longer tine?

Water is not something you want to be skim about (especially not in an environment like Afghanistan and not when carrying all that weight, notice the catch 22?) , I'd personally throw my body armor way before I'd give up my water.

[Fuchs]

I have a 50's book written by a team led by a WW2 GHQ officer. He wrote after the war that soldiers must never be weighed down again.
His unrealistic demand was for a 10 kg weight limit.

Then he went on to devise what equipment would be necessary and I guessed that incl. clothes at abut 20 kg and it was just the basic personal equipment.

It's a choice between the devil and the deep blue sea. There's not much to be gained by optimisation, and playing around with a mix of light and heavy infantry (weight-wise) isn't going to succeed due to political and bureaucratic dynamics.


In case of doubt, delegate the decision to company level (with the power to delegate it further) and never criticise your well-trained company leaders for a wrong load of their troops.

[JMA]

What if a soldier gets a heat stroke?

What is the chance of that among fully acclimatised, fit and well led troops on a five hour patrol?

I'm being serious. We must assume that having slept in base the previous night that they woke fully rehydrated on the day of the patrol. No sick or unfit or otherwise unsuitable soldiers are selected for the patrol. Then during their final inspection prior to the patrol (do they still do such a thing?) each man drinks a litre of water containing rehydration "salts" (or whatever they are called in various parts of the world) under close supervision of the platoon sergeant and patrol commander. The patrol leader then paces the speed of the patrol to make sure the patrol members never reach a state of exhaustion where they are unable to function in combat.

So if a soldier goes down with heat stroke the platoon commander/platoon sergeant/patrol commander would be required to provide some answers.

Spoken about this sort of stuff in the Brits in Afghanistan thread some time ago. This paranoia over water is a direct result of poor officer leadership, lack of acclimatisation, an obvious failure to teach and enforce water discipline during training. This stuff comes back to bite an army later when they really don't want it to.

You will however note that I (begrudgingly) accepted the 6 litre water load as part of the unavoidable stuff.


What if they are engaged/change missions and are forced to stay for a longer tine?

What and stay out at night? You must be joking ;) If that were ever to happen I would apply the term "resupply" (but only in the context of the local water being designated unusable due to chemical contamination) as they would also need food. I hope here you are not suggesting that when going out on a five hour patrol you pack extra in anticipation of an extended deployment?


Water is not something you want to be skim about (especially not in an environment like Afghanistan and not when carrying all that weight, notice the catch 22?) , I'd personally throw my body armor way before I'd give up my water.

The problem (as stated up front in the article in The British Army Review Number 150) was that:


...We’re getting to a point where we are losing as many men making mistakes because they are exhausted from carrying armour (and the things that go with it) than are saved by it. The weight of protection and firepower also induces some unusual and undesirable combat behaviour.

So what we should really do is accept that water is but only one component of the combat load and discuss exactly what the realistic water requirements are/should be for ISAF soldiers on patrol in Afghanistan. Always comparing this with what the locals and Afghan forces require/use.

[JMA]

I have a 50's book written by a team led by a WW2 GHQ officer. He wrote after the war that soldiers must never be weighed down again.
His unrealistic demand was for a 10 kg weight limit.

Was that an all up weight including personal weapon?


Then he went on to devise what equipment would be necessary and I guessed that incl. clothes at abut 20 kg and it was just the basic personal equipment.

Well if he could not get near his own target load then his original target was indeed unrealistic... unless he based the 10kgs on a load which would marginally impair mobility and movement of individual soldiers.


It's a choice between the devil and the deep blue sea. There's not much to be gained by optimisation, and playing around with a mix of light and heavy infantry (weight-wise) isn't going to succeed due to political and bureaucratic dynamics.

The question to ask at each point is "what is the mission?"

Remember (maybe you do from another discussion about patrolling) where the question I asked was what was/is the aim of wandering around in the open areas of Helmand where the TB can initiate contact at long ranges if your patrol does not walk into a prearranged IED field? Here they talk about:


They’ll be trying to dominate some ground, ‘show presence’ and maybe win a few hearts and minds.

Aimless stuff, actually surprised the casualties have been so low. Must be something to do with the third grade enemy with poor shooting skills.

You apply a specific load table or equipment table for the specific type of operation. If you (as patrol commander) play the what if game then eventually you get to a chronic overload level. I do understand that there appears to be more top down load enforcement (like for body armour) which to an extent lets battalion, company and platoon officers off the hook.

Has it not reached the point where patrols are tasked on missions they have no chance of attaining?


In case of doubt, delegate the decision to company level (with the power to delegate it further) and never criticise your well-trained company leaders for a wrong load of their troops.

You must be joking. In this risk averse world that is not going to happen. Some would suggest that company level leaders are not of the required competence and training to receive this degree of delegation of authority.

[golani_2]

What is the chance of that among fully acclimatised, fit and well led troops on a five hour patrol?

I'm being serious. We must assume that having slept in base the previous night that they woke fully rehydrated on the day of the patrol. No sick or unfit or otherwise unsuitable soldiers are selected for the patrol. Then during their final inspection prior to the patrol (do they still do such a thing?) each man drinks a litre of water containing rehydration "salts" (or whatever they are called in various parts of the world) under close supervision of the platoon sergeant and patrol commander. The patrol leader then paces the speed of the patrol to make sure the patrol members never reach a state of exhaustion where they are unable to function in combat.
There are too many "if's" about it.
You're talking about a single, specific scenario, while I'm trying to include a larger verity.

Not all soldiers are always fully acclimated and not all soldiers wake up fresh after a good full night sleep (to say the vary least).

Of course there are ways around it, there could be a squad/platoon water pack or something of that sort, but that's not my point really- which is, in the weight department, aside from whatever technology would bring us, the biggest bone in the infantryman's throat is armor, which is not only heavy but is also clumsy, prevents you from assuming proper positions, accelerates dehydration, etc.

All in all I think armor as a concept does more damage then good, I personally saw people who were saved by the armor, no doubt, I also heard of people who were more severely hurt because of it, but there are no numbers (and there will probably never be...) of how many people got shot because they had armor on, because they presented a bigger-easier target, because they weren't flexible enough, because they were exhausted.


Spoken about this sort of stuff in the Brits in Afghanistan thread some time ago. This paranoia over water is a direct result of poor officer leadership, lack of acclimatisation, an obvious failure to teach and enforce water discipline during training. This stuff comes back to bite an army later when they really don't want it to.
I'm no medical expert- but I don't reckon the human body can be trained into needing less water and unlike food deprivation, lack of water can result in irreversible damage.
Is the correct distribution of water a subject that should be taught? definitely.
Can 'water discipline' be trained? I'm not sure.


What and stay out at night? You must be joking ;) If that were ever to happen I would apply the term "resupply" (but only in the context of the local water being designated unusable due to chemical contamination) as they would also need food. I hope here you are not suggesting that when going out on a five hour patrol you pack extra in anticipation of an extended deployment?
You should always strive to be ready for what can happen, not going mad about it, but postponing an opportunity due to lack of water is unfortunate, again- (lack of) food is doable and not as urgent.


So what we should really do is accept that water is but only one component of the combat load and discuss exactly what the realistic water requirements are/should be for ISAF soldiers on patrol in Afghanistan. Always comparing this with what the locals and Afghan forces require/use.
On the bottom line I'd have to agree that the authority should be delegated to the battalion/company level (depending on the level of operations etc.) that's what we started doing here and so far it seems to be doing well, in training anyway.

[JMA]

There are too many "if's" about it.
You're talking about a single, specific scenario, while I'm trying to include a larger verity.

Yes I am talking about the contents of a specific article which I assume not too many people here have access to. So go ahead and talk more broadly if you wish.


Not all soldiers are always fully acclimated and not all soldiers wake up fresh after a good full night sleep (to say the vary least).

Acclimatisation of troops is a command responsibility and newly deployed troops should not be deployed on tasks where the exertion required tests them beyond their acclimatisation level. I tend to think that a mere five hour patrol should be within the capabilities of newly deployed troops who are fit and healthy (unless they are ridiculously overloaded, that is).

Let me talk about that for a moment. There are five factors relating to body adjustment during the acclimatisation process: Skin, cardio-vascular system, fluid-salt balance, glare and time to acclimatize (as per the Brit manual).

Further:


Acclimatization. The time it takes to become acclimatized depends on the season and location. For example, during the hot season in the North African Western Desert and Sinai it usually takes about two weeks, in the Arabian Peninsula about a month, provided that troops work in the heat and sweat. A very few men cannot acclimatize properly and they have to be sent home. Fit, thin men do well in the heat. Fat men cannot lose heat so easily and hard work in high temperatures can be dangerous for them. Some desert and gebel climates are so hot in the summer that operations requiring considerable exertion should be carried out at night.

... more

Even during the hottest months, provided troops are fit, work in the heat and sweat profusely for two hours a day, 80% acclimatization can be achieved within four days and 100% in a fortnight.

I did not suggest that troops for a day patrol wake up "fresh after a good full night sleep". I mentioned that they likely "woke fully rehydrated" (sleep - length of, or broken or comfortable or peaceful in an operational area in close proximity to the enemy is a separate subject beyond the infantryman's load).

So patrol member wakes rehydrated and takes in a litre with rehydration salts before departure under supervision.


Of course there are ways around it, there could be a squad/platoon water pack or something of that sort, but that's not my point really- which is, in the weight department, aside from whatever technology would bring us, ...

A "a squad/platoon water pack"? What would that be?


... the biggest bone in the infantryman's throat is armor, which is not only heavy but is also clumsy, prevents you from assuming proper positions, accelerates dehydration, etc.

I agree but add the comment that according to my calculations the weight of items carried other that personal weapon, body armour and water (and presumably rations as well as not being needed for a five hour patrol) amount to 21.52 kgs (47.3 pounds). This would be ammo and other stuff. What?


All in all I think armor as a concept does more damage then good, I personally saw people who were saved by the armor, no doubt, I also heard of people who were more severely hurt because of it, but there are no numbers (and there will probably never be...) of how many people got shot because they had armor on, because they presented a bigger-easier target, because they weren't flexible enough, because they were exhausted.

Your personal experience seems to similar to that expressed in the article where it was stated:


...We’re getting to a point where we are losing as many men making mistakes because they are exhausted from carrying armour (and the things that go with it) than are saved by it. The weight of protection and firepower also induces some unusual and undesirable combat behaviour.

Perhaps it is time to discuss the unusual and undesirable combat behaviour again. Maybe those who were so quick to defend the circus out there will now be able to revise their positions, put their finger on the problem and figure out how to fix it all.


I'm no medical expert- but I don't reckon the human body can be trained into needing less water and unlike food deprivation, lack of water can result in irreversible damage.
Is the correct distribution of water a subject that should be taught? definitely.
Can 'water discipline' be trained? I'm not sure.

OK I think we need to discuss "water discipline": From the Brits again:


Water Discipline. The human body cannot be trained to function without water or to operate on a reduced intake. If there is a shortage of water, the following rules of water discipline should be enforced:

a. There have to be orders for drinking to prevent troops husbanding supplies and precipitating a state of dehydration leading to a deterioration in performance.

b. All water should be sterilized before being used for drinking or for washing and cooking food. Water for personal washing does not need to be purified unless grossly polluted. All water sources should be reported; their positions logged at unit or formation HQ and a medical officer should test them for diseases and poisons. Individual sterilising kits are issued for use whenwater is not available from a military water point.

c. Issue of water has to be strictly controlled. Sources likely to be required for drinking must not be polluted by washing or by animals.

d. If drinking has to be temporarily restricted when supplies are inadequate, fluid balances must be fully restored by the end of each 24 hour period.

So can we agree that nobody is suggesting the human body can function on reduced water intake but water discipline over how the water is used is indeed desirable.


You should always strive to be ready for what can happen, not going mad about it, but postponing an opportunity due to lack of water is unfortunate, again- (lack of) food is doable and not as urgent.

It should be carefully considered. If it means that you throw a few more kgs to each soldier on the basis of just in case, I say no. I suggest that junior leaders and patrol commanders should be required/trained to solve these problems at their level.


On the bottom line I'd have to agree that the authority should be delegated to the battalion/company level (depending on the level of operations etc.) that's what we started doing here and so far it seems to be doing well, in training anyway.

Got to be careful with one thing here. Often you hear battalion HQ officers demanding that more authority be delegated to them... which if they receive they don't always delegate to the doers down the line. There are control freaks at every level who tend to want to carry the main command decision making with them as they move up the command structure. Dangerous people.

[golani_2]

Yes I am talking about the contents of a specific article which I assume not too many people here have access to. So go ahead and talk more broadly if you wish.
If you're talking about a specific micro-level event without deducing broader conclusions then at least my part in the debate is futile, I don't know the incident I don't personally believe it's effective.



Acclimatisation of troops is a command responsibility and newly deployed troops should not be deployed on tasks where the exertion required tests them beyond their acclimatisation level.
In this specific case- true, on a broader level- it's not always possible.



I did not suggest that troops for a day patrol wake up "fresh after a good full night sleep". I mentioned that they likely "woke fully rehydrated" (sleep - length of, or broken or comfortable or peaceful in an operational area in close proximity to the enemy is a separate subject beyond the infantryman's load).

It is a "stand alone subject" but I can't agree that it's separate it intertwines with other subjects, the infantrymen's load for example and directly effect a broader issue which is the end result, physical capabilities, viewing each subject separately and separately alone can lead to many errors.


A "a squad/platoon water pack"? What would that be?
Just like any other company level weapon if you will, a dedicated soldier that carries extra/emergency water instead of further burdening the men.


I agree but add the comment that according to my calculations the weight of items carried other that personal weapon, body armour and water (and presumably rations as well as not being needed for a five hour patrol) amount to 21.52 kgs (47.3 pounds). This would be ammo and other stuff. What?
I didn't see the breakdown of equipment nor do I have much knowledge of the specific equipment needed to carry their specific task (or- what was the purpose of the patrol- "standard"- fine, no extra equipment needed, but civic affairs? explosive i.d? etc. all require dedicated equipment).

So again, in this very specific incident you might be right, but what happens when you're set to operate, say 24 hours based on what you're carrying alone, I'd probably drop the armor before anything else in most scenarios.


Perhaps it is time to discuss the unusual and undesirable combat behaviour again. Maybe those who were so quick to defend the circus out there will now be able to revise their positions, put their finger on the problem and figure out how to fix it all.
Sorry but I jumped in rather late in the debate, therefore I have no idea what you mean.


OK I think we need to discuss "water discipline": From the Brits again:

So can we agree that nobody is suggesting the human body can function on reduced water intake but water discipline over how the water is used is indeed desirable.
Very well, but these are all examples-solution of a higher-level of activity/deployment, none of these are solutions to an Lt. that is tangled in an engagement and running low on water.

Of course not all bases can be covered, ever, but water seems so basic that the notion of deliberately reducing it is too much for me.


Got to be careful with one thing here. Often you hear battalion HQ officers demanding that more authority be delegated to them... which if they receive they don't always delegate to the doers down the line. There are control freaks at every level who tend to want to carry the main command decision making with them as they move up the command structure. Dangerous people.
I have an inherent dislike to HQ types ( ;) ) but nonetheless the battalion/company should have the say on this given they are more in touch (and in fact are the) doers.

[Fuchs]

Was that an all up weight including personal weapon?

That's at least one interpretation of what he wrote, he wasn't very specific.

He advocated assault rifle, helmet and Korean-style body armour IIRC; already 10 kg without ammo.

[JMA]

That's at least one interpretation of what he wrote, he wasn't very specific.

He advocated assault rifle, helmet and Korean-style body armour IIRC; already 10 kg without ammo.

It has a lot to do with who you are fighting. If you are fighting an enemy armed with a AK's and the odd RPG7 and maybe a RPD then you tool up accordingly.

Nothing beyond 1st line ammo needed, a medic pack and some odds and ends and a bottle (litre) or two of water. The ability to lighten up on the load increases with experience and confidence and the reliability of CAS and resupply should it be required.

Photo RLI Fire Force stick circa around 1978:

http://farm5.static.flickr.com/4058/4499965120_088f0c6c57_z.jpg

Should be very similar in Afghanistan other than the load requirement for anti IED stuff. As to experience and confidence with quick rotations (short tours) the 6-month wonders never reach that level.

(As an aside I remain pretty surprised that Brit patrols see the inclusion of Javelin rocket(s) as essential kit on a patrol. At 11.8 kg (26 lb) at a cost of $40,000 (£20,000) per missile can't see the point. Why not buy a bunch of RPGs from some (now friendly) ex-Warsaw Pact country and issue to the troops? I'm told the explosive (thermobaric) warhead is a sweetheart.)

Mentioned too elsewhere that instead of (Brit troops) going to Kenya for a month pre-Afghanistan training rather to do a two weeks to a month battle camp held in Afghanistan should be carried out. This allows for acclimatization and all the other good things (including the realistic training which due to the Health and Safety nazis can't be carried out in the UK) before the newly deployed soldiers are deployed operationally.

[Fuchs]

The thermobaric warhead works by pressure and this again works best inside structures.


The 'Western RPG-7' issue has been debated a lot. Essentially, the 'Western RPG-7' is the 40mmx46MV round.

[BushrangerCZ]

It´s beating the dead horse. Risk aversion is the motto of this war.

[JMA]

It´s beating the dead horse. Risk aversion is the motto of this war.

If you read back a few posts of mine I accept that half the infantryman's weight is in his personal weapon, his body armour and his water.

The other half would be his 1st line ammo plus a bunch of other stuff, 45 pounds worth.

Agree with you that the chances of the body armour being dumped are slim. But that weight is not the major weight problem (although it has a massive negative effect on mobility). So where to cut?

[Fuchs]

There are actually two weight problems;
1) on the march, which limits march mobility and exhausts
2) in combat, which limits tactical options

1) can be solved by dependence on carriers (vehicles, animals, humans)
2) is more tricky

[JMA]

The Marine Corps just issued a field order that states Battalion and Squadron Commanders will determine the body armor policy in their Area of Operations.

The Corps determined Regimental Commanders (Col.) can over rule , but it is the BN. (Lt. Col.) Commander who is closer to the reality and intimate with the terrain and tactical situations their Rifle Companies are fighting in.

Politics and touchy, feely considerations may have just received a reality check.

The Field Order was dated April 20, 2009

I wonder if this order is still in effect?

[BushrangerCZ]

From my personal experiences, dumping the plates and wearing a soft cap instead of K-pot would make a decisive difference in my mobility. Of course it´s all mission dependent.

[JMA]

There are actually two weight problems;
1) on the march, which limits march mobility and exhausts
2) in combat, which limits tactical options

1) can be solved by dependence on carriers (vehicles, animals, humans)
2) is more tricky

If you need to carry weight then (from my experience) you carry the combat essentials in your chest and hip webbing and all the other stuff mainly food and water and additional ammo etc in your Bergen. On contact hit the quick release belt-buckle and drop the Bergen and get on with the fight. First few minutes with the weight off you and the adrenalin it feels like you are walking on air. Kind of addictive. Go back and get your other kit later.

The stuff on your chest and belt only can't be too much more than 10kgs unless you are a machine gunner.

The change that is necessary for these longer ops is that the kidney pouches are removed from the back of the belt so the Bergen can ride on the hips.

[JMA]

From my personal experiences, dumping the plates and wearing a soft cap instead of K-pot would make a decisive difference in my mobility. Of course it´s all mission dependent.

Without the plates is the other stuff still necessary?

[BushrangerCZ]

Without the plates is the other stuff still necessary?

For example MARCIRAS plate carrier still offers ballistic protection against shrapnels even without plates, and makes a good platform for ammo/grenade pouches, first aid pouch, radio and so on. I can imagine to wear it even for a longer dismounted patrol in the mountains (without plates) with the rucksack and still be able to move fast and maneuver, although it´s not so breathable as assault vest/chest rig/webbing.

[Fuchs]

If you need to carry weight then (from my experience) you carry the combat essentials in your chest and hip webbing and all the other stuff mainly food and water and additional ammo etc in your Bergen. On contact hit the quick release belt-buckle and drop the Bergen and get on with the fight. First few minutes with the weight off you and the adrenalin it feels like you are walking on air. Kind of addictive. Go back and get your other kit later.

The stuff on your chest and belt only can't be too much more than 10kgs unless you are a machine gunner.

The change that is necessary for these longer ops is that the kidney pouches are removed from the back of the belt so the Bergen can ride on the hips.

German tradition is to separate Rucksack and a small combat pouch (rear, on the belt). The Rucksack is almost never worn, though (exception: mountain troops). It's hard to impossible to find exercise or wartime photos where infantrymen carry Rucksacks. Platoon trailers and later squad vehicles carried the stuff.

Very early 1870-1914), soldiers were often portrayed or photographed with moderate march packs on their back, but that weighed less than a Rucksack.

[JMA]

German tradition is to separate Rucksack and a small combat pouch (rear, on the belt). The Rucksack is almost never worn, though (exception: mountain troops). It's hard to impossible to find exercise or wartime photos where infantrymen carry Rucksacks. Platoon trailers and later squad vehicles carried the stuff.

Very early 1870-1914), soldiers were often portrayed or photographed with moderate march packs on their back, but that weighed less than a Rucksack.

Yes that is very much like the Brit system I grew up with. The "big pack" had spare clothing etc and was always in a vehicle in B Echelon for access when out of "the line". Then we had a '44 Pattern pack which was small on the back and was good for bedding and a few days rations and water but never taken into battle under conventional circumstances. Then there was the basic (hip) webbing which was all that was worn for combat.

Unconventional war/counter insurgency changed all that. If you were to search a river-line (for example) for sign of the enemy and it would take 8 days then you had to carry food for 8 days and spare this and spare that but water was obtained locally. The patrol was essentially a fighting patrol so when you bumped into them you needed to be able to fight immediately and could do so only if you dumped your pack/Bergen. Very seldom if ever established a patrol base camp and patrolled out from there.

[Kiwigrunt]

The perils of armour in days gone by.

link (http://www.auckland.ac.nz/uoa/home/news/template/news_item.jsp?cid=408088)

[tequila]

Some additional data from Tom Ricks' blog:

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/files/fp_uploaded_documents/RiflePlatoon.pdf

Rifle Platoon Basic Load OEF XII
1st PLT, Alpha Co., 2/504 PIR

Some bullet points:

Average Paratrooper bodyweight - 184.7 lbs

Average Paratrooper 72hr kit - 103.69 lbs

Paratroopers are carrying 55% of bodyweight

Nothing new, of course, but thought some might like the most up-to-date info.

The PDF breaks down the loadouts by billet in the platoon as well.

[gute]

What is a Thor? What about a Goldie?

[Tzeentch]

Thor - IED jamming system

Wolf Hound - radio direction finder

Goldie - IED parts detector (not familiar with this system)

Minehound - Ground penetrating radar system and metal detector

Gizmo - metal detector

[slapout9]

Have known this was out there for sometime but could not remember the exact title so it was very difficult to find. This is one the most complete Load Bearing Equipment studies about the modern Infantryman. They even tested what the proper width of shoulder straps should be, the detailed reference bibliography is a gold mine. Enjoy!



"A Survey Of The Effects Of Load Carrying And Equipment Design Upon Tasks Performed By The Combat Infantryman" from 1962
http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/294993.pdf

[Fuchs]

http://www.breachbangclear.com/site/10-blog/306-we-shoot-and-communicate-but-dont-move-so-much.html

[carl]

In the January 28, 2013 edition of Aviation Week and Space Technology on page DT4 it states "It is not uncommon in Afghanistan to have a section/squad leader carrying 100 kg (220 lb.) including body armor, helmet and weapon." This statement refers to the British Army.

I hope the reporters made a mistake and are referring to 100 lbs, not 100 kg. If they are actually referring to 100 kg, western armies will never win another war. Never. The Brits can't be that far out of the mainstream and any military organization that would put that burden on a man has no clue at all what it is about.

[BushrangerCZ]

In the January 28, 2013 edition of Aviation Week and Space Technology on page DT4 it states "It is not uncommon in Afghanistan to have a section/squad leader carrying 100 kg (220 lb.) including body armor, helmet and weapon." This statement refers to the British Army.

I hope the reporters made a mistake and are referring to 100 lbs, not 100 kg. If they are actually referring to 100 kg, western armies will never win another war. Never. The Brits can't be that far out of the mainstream and any military organization that would put that burden on a man has no clue at all what it is about.

I am afraid even 100 lbs makes the same conclusion...

[castellanoc1]

There are a few things to be optimistic about in terms of weight savings. The first is a slew of somewhat new materials such as Blue Force Gear's Helium Whisper, which is significantly lighter, stronger, and more abrasion resistant than standard 1000 weight cordua nylon. With Helium Whisper and similar materials, we are starting to see some plate carriers, chest rigs, pouches, etc with huge weight savings and much slimmer profiles over standard counterparts. It is understood that the vast majority of conventional units won't be rocking the latest breed of plate carriers anytime soon, but it is at least a positive indication of things to come. In the meantime, many conventional units are ok with their men shaving a few pounds with better pouches and web gear.

The second aspect to be somewhat optimistic about is ammo weight. More SOF units have become comfortable with a 4-magazine loadout for their m4's, mk18s, etc. The readably accessible AAR, "The Eagle Went Over the Mountain" has a good reference to this. Better training, better optics, more accurate ammo, and increasingly accurate weapons have led to more accurate target engagement. However, it will be interesting to see how, or even if, this plays out in conventional units in the future. Less training = more rounds spent, and more ammo required. Furthermore, with the USMC and the m27 IAR, many infantry squads are finding themselves carrying more magazines than ever in order to spread-load the weight/bulk.

Finally, improving load carriage techniques have begun to not necessarily lower the weight, but to improve mobility and performance. Wearing a plate carrier or full armor vest with double m4 pouches all in front makes shooting in the prone an art-form, not a comfort zone. All the weight on the shoulders sucks. The first generation of the USMC MTV's that came out were heavy as hell, but were supposed to transfer weight onto the hips more. Me and my men didn't notice much of that, but we did notice our hips being worn raw by the placement of the side SAPIs. That actually became a planning consideration for me as I alternated mounted and dismounted patrols for the squads of my platoon. In a "back to the future" move, you see more guys now slimming down what they put on the front of their vests, and putting more ammo and kit on padded warbelts. The new generation of packs such as the USMC Pack are finally designed from the ground up to integrate with armor. When significant weight savings are impractical, improved load carriage is everything.

[Fuchs]

50 grams of cloth saved will lead to 50 grams of additional batteries carried.

The weight issue is a demonstration of leadership failure, not an issue with excessive heaviness of equipment. The enemy doesn't have technology for lighter equipment, and all is relative in warfare.

[ganulv]

50 grams of cloth saved will lead to 50 grams of additional batteries carried.

The weight issue is a demonstration of leadership failure, not an issue with excessive heaviness of equipment. The enemy doesn't have technology for lighter equipment, and all is relative in warfare.

Ergo the American idiom, “100 pounds of the lightest weight gear.”

[davidbfpo]

I suspect this short comment, with video clip, is not new. A joint ANA-US Army action April 2013:http://www.offiziere.ch/?p=11922


Time and again this happens: the Afghans outpace the Americans and the Americans must reel them back in. The pace of the raid slows even further when the combined patrol rounds up several Afghan villagers and must enroll them in a biometric database using wireless devices that take 20 minutes to boot up.

(Ends)"I hate minehounds,” Mullins growls, unfairly blaming technology — rather than the U.S. Army’s own unwieldy tactics compared to the Afghans — for his platoon’s failure to capture Mohammad.

[jcustis]

Gents,

I am on a smart device and it is maddening to try to search through this thread, but does anyone recall mention of an older pack ( it might even be in a different thread) that had a design allowing it to clip into a socket or such on the wearer's belt. It definitely is not MOLLE generation 1, which I know had a ball and socket setup which was done away with.

I want to say it was some sort of limited distro
Lowe pack, but am not certain.

Thanks in advance.

[ganulv]

I want to say it was some sort of limited distro Lowe pack, but am not certain.

This one (http://www.usmilitariaforum.com/forums/index.php?/topic/103197-cfp-90-ruck-sack/#entry765620), possibly?

http://i40.photobucket.com/albums/e211/sgtmonroe/IIFS/iifs_04.jpg

ETA: It doesn’t look like the belt is removable. It looks like the belt is designed like this one (http://youtu.be/icRidugL7BU?t=28s) with two pockets to accept the end of the stays, but that might not be what you meant by “clip into.”

[jcustis]

Now that I think about it, maybe it was the CFP-90 pack with stays and an adjustable yoke that I was thknking of.

[David I Evans]

In the January 28, 2013 edition of Aviation Week and Space Technology on page DT4 it states "It is not uncommon in Afghanistan to have a section/squad leader carrying 100 kg (220 lb.) including body armor, helmet and weapon." This statement refers to the British Army.



Project Payne identified the load of a Section Commander (what we call the Squad Leader) on Junior Breacon, the tactics course for promotion to full Corporal in the Infantry, without any specialist equipment and on a patrol not planned to last more than 12 hours, with no wet kit or warm kit, torches or cooking equipment as 32kgs, or 70.5lbs. The GPMG gunner was carrying 46Kgs, or 101lbs.

[JMA]

Interesting how there seems to be no major breakthrough in this regard. I guess this leads to the need to change the role of the infantry fundamentally.

If these basic weights are really essential equipment then it is not possible to carry out fire-and-movement (or as it was called in my day skirmishing).

That statement made let me relate some experience going back to Rhodesia 1976.

I was preparing my patrol of two 4-man sticks (total of 8 men) for a 8-day patrol task into Mozambique. We would be flown in and dropped off by Arospatiale Alouette III helicopters (which at that stage was all we had). I was instructed to send one of my gunners over to the airforce (all aircraft were airforce) to be weighed. Weighed separately, his gun, the FN MAG (M240 in yank speak), his webbing and pack/bergen/ruck came in at 108lbs (or 49kg in the new language).

Now the drill was that only non fighting equipment - water, rations, spare batteries, sleeping bag etc were carried in the bergen (a pack with a frame). All ammo, grenades, a little water, compass, binos, maps etc (as applicable for individual role) were carried in the belt webbing. Action on making contact was to drop the begen and fight wearing only the belt webbing. There was... is... no way a soldier can fight with the kind of loads carried today (in places like Afghanistan). Dropping your pack brings the soldiers weight down to around or below 50lbs (23kgs) (bearing in mind the prescribed US fighting load (http://thedonovan.com/archives/modernwarriorload/ModernWarriorsCombatLoadReport.pdf) is 48lbs / 22kg).

I guess we come back to the issue of body armour. Without getting sidetracked in an argument over the weight of body armour lets take 30lbs / 14kgs as the basis for this discussion.

From the weights provided if the weight of body armour (which I assume is included in the 70.5lbs / 32kg) is removed then it does bring the fighting load down to within the prescribed US fighting load (except for the GPMG gunner who will still be over the limit by far).

However, if body armour is not included then the Brits have a real problem.

To finish my story the individual weight - as mentioned - led to a reduction from 4 to 3 men in the helicopter load for such patrols thereafter.


Project Payne identified the load of a Section Commander (what we call the Squad Leader) on Junior Breacon, the tactics course for promotion to full Corporal in the Infantry, without any specialist equipment and on a patrol not planned to last more than 12 hours, with no wet kit or warm kit, torches or cooking equipment as 32kgs, or 70.5lbs. The GPMG gunner was carrying 46Kgs, or 101lbs.

[David I Evans]

JMA

Osprey with the small plate front and rear weighs about 7Kg

[JMA]

JMA

Osprey with the small plate front and rear weighs about 7Kg

Hi David,

Did your original figures include the 7kg for the Osprey? Also meaning do they train with that additional load?

Also what would be considered 'specialist equipment' and how would this affect individual loads across the section/platoon?

[David I Evans]

that you can find and drink local water and get by on a canteen a day for a week or two with no great harm if that enhances mission accomplishment

Just as an aside. About 20 odd years there was a massive spike in men of about 70 years of age suffering from kidney related problems, some of them quite serious. Every single one of these men had one thing in common

Service between 1942 to 1944 in North Africa where at some point these men had been rationed to one canteen of water a day for prolonged periods.

But I agree, soldiers are going to have to get used to being wet or cold in the field again. The Project Payne brief has very funny image of a squaddie shuffling into an assault so weighed down he can't run

[David I Evans]

Hi David,

Did your original figures include the 7kg for the Osprey? Also meaning do they train with that additional load?

Also what would be considered 'specialist equipment' and how would this affect individual loads across the section/platoon?


JMA, Yes, those figures include Ospery.

My trip on Herrick 15 started training in January, about 5 months before mobilisation(I'm a reservist) with just ECBA, which is lighter but doesn't have the facility to attach pouches to it. We only got Osprey in time for the last major exercise before deployment but that was without the large plates.

Specialist equipment can be anything from assault ladders, cutters, ECM, Vallon and all the stuff that goes with marking, cameras and crap....

Most of it is just bulky and awkward. The current issue assault ladder is a bit lighter but still a sod to carry

[JMA]

OK thanks, David.

I guess we get to the question as to whether the British Army actually believe that a soldier can engage in any reasonably intense combat carrying the sort of loads you mention?

As a matter of interest how much water is included in that load you mention?




JMA, Yes, those figures include Ospery.

My trip on Herrick 15 started training in January, about 5 months before mobilisation(I'm a reservist) with just ECBA, which is lighter but doesn't have the facility to attach pouches to it. We only got Osprey in time for the last major exercise before deployment but that was without the large plates.

Specialist equipment can be anything from assault ladders, cutters, ECM, Vallon and all the stuff that goes with marking, cameras and crap....

Most of it is just bulky and awkward. The current issue assault ladder is a bit lighter but still a sod to carry

[David I Evans]

OK thanks, David.

I guess we get to the question as to whether the British Army actually believe that a soldier can engage in any reasonably intense combat carrying the sort of loads you mention?

As a matter of interest how much water is included in that load you mention?

About 3 litres.

And I would say regardless of what the Army thinks, attempting to carry out the Mission of the Infantry, to close with and kill the enemy, was impossible with the normal weight I'd carry on a patrol intended to last only 4 - 6 hours and that was just equipment.

Food was maybe 2 or 3 snack bar of some sort , wet/warm kit was a gortex jacket which I never wore.

[davidbfpo]

There is a thread on the unofficial blogsite ARRSE which refers to Project Payne (which is a rather odd name choice, or humour):http://www.arrse.co.uk/community/threads/project-payne-ibs.201353/

If you search Google using "project payne" + army one of the hits is a MoD publication, with no GPMS markings (i.e. official restrictions on use), from the Small Arms School Corps in 2013, which on the last page has a short article and a pie chart showing the breakdown of kit:http://www.sasc-comrades.org/Journal_docs/SECTION_3.pdf

[Bill Moore]

OK thanks, David.

I guess we get to the question as to whether the British Army actually believe that a soldier can engage in any reasonably intense combat carrying the sort of loads you mention?

As a matter of interest how much water is included in that load you mention?

IMO the U.S. errors with their risk management process/ideology. We went from a primary and alternate (contingency) approach to patrolling to the PACE concept (primary, alternate, contingency, and emergency) sometimes with different equipment for each category (especially for comms). Now add the modern body armor and you have fully suppressed soldier. Our loads were frequently well over a 100lbs without live ammo.

The bottom line is commanders have to learn to assume intelligent risk again and not assume you can mitigate risk by putting an additional 50lbs of light weight gear in the soldier's ruck.

If you're moving behind enemy lines the signature you leave with that type of load a blind man could follow, not to mention the noise, the inability to maneuver (skirmish), etc. I think these loads have an impact our tactics also, and soldiers too quickly default to calling in air strikes to resolve a problem in a situation where it risks collateral damage, because they can't skirmish effectively with the loads they're carrying. I have four forms of comms that I can call in air support with:wry:

This is a serious problem that gets talked about a lot, but I have seen little movement to seriously address. The only thing I saw in theory was a walking robot accompanying soldiers carrying their rucks for them. That might work in some situations, but the infantry/SF I grew up in you wanted to avoid being detected if at all possible to enjoy the benefits of surprise (instead of being surprised), and I'm not sure you'll have that with a horse sized robot, but maybe it's quiet if you give it sufficient 3 in 1 oil? :D

[carl]

This is a serious problem that gets talked about a lot, but I have seen little movement to seriously address. The only thing I saw in theory was a walking robot accompanying soldiers carrying their rucks for them. That might work in some situations, but the infantry/SF I grew up in you wanted to avoid being detected if at all possible to enjoy the benefits of surprise (instead of being surprised), and I'm not sure you'll have that with a horse sized robot, but maybe it's quiet if you give it sufficient 3 in 1 oil? :D

Why not use an actual horse, mule or donkey? They don't need batteries.
The Comanches taught them to be quiet. Mules were used to carry things for the Army soldiers and Apache scouts when they ran down the other Apaches. They worked great and those ops if I remember correctly were paragons of mountain mobility and persistence.

[carl]

Oh, I have another question for you guys.

When a real hard war comes, how much of this problem will be solved by soldiers discarding equipment they judge not useful? It may be easier in a really hard war because command may have better things to do.

I ask this because of two stories I was told. The first was by a Vietnam War Army infantry man who said they ditched their body armor because it was too cumbersome and they judged it not useful. Nobody bugged them about doing so.

The second story was from a South African who went on long patrols in Namibia or somewhere around there. He said they were allowed to pick what equipment they each wanted to carry from a wide range of things available. He also said that the first small bit of the patrol's path could be found by tracing items of equipment dropped on the ground by guys who no longer felt the items were so useful.

[JMA]

Fear not the Marines still train to use them:

The Virtues of Stubbornness: Mules at War (http://www.defensemedianetwork.com/stories/the-virtues-of-stubbornness-mules-at-war/)

I suggest the key remains looking at what is being carried by the troops on operations. 70-100lbs load for a day patrol (6 hr ?) ... I can't imagine what 'essential' equipment comprises those loads.


Why not use an actual horse, mule or donkey? They don't need batteries.
The Comanches taught them to be quiet. Mules were used to carry things for the Army soldiers and Apache scouts when they ran down the other Apaches. They worked great and those ops if I remember correctly were paragons of mountain mobility and persistence.

[Bill Moore]

Why not use an actual horse, mule or donkey? They don't need batteries.
The Comanches taught them to be quiet. Mules were used to carry things for the Army soldiers and Apache scouts when they ran down the other Apaches. They worked great and those ops if I remember correctly were paragons of mountain mobility and persistence.

Carl,

SF actually has done a fair amount of training with horse and mules, but I don't know how much they're being used today in Afghanistan, if at all. I think they would be good fit in some scenarios, but not all. Furthermore, that doesn't address the need to reduce the load to what is truly essential and not pack for every possible contingency. If we keep the same mind set, it will be oh boy, we have a horse now we can give the team another 250lbs of gear. :(

[carl]

Everyone seems to agree that the basic problem is a human one, the attitude of command. So the question is what will it take to change command attitude? The past 13 years of experience hasn't changed it. My fear is that this problem, like so many of the problems we have, won't change short of a really big war resulting in a really big defeat. Is there any hope that things can change in an important way short of that?

Another example is contained in the post by Davidbfpo on May 7, 2013. A big bad guy was lost because we moved too slow. One helo was involved, a Kiowa. It occurred to me that in VN, if I read things correctly, an Aerorifle platoon might have been just the thing to do the mission shown in David's post. But I've also read that we just don't have the numbers of helos we used to have. One reason for that is Blackhawk's are far more capable but far more expensive than Hueys, so we just don't have as many. For this mission, a sophisticated machine wasn't needed, just something to get a few troops into a spot fast. But we didn't have it.

It seems like if things go on like this, we may have a perfect everything, but only one of them-one perfect rifle, one perfect MG, one perfect plane, one perfect helo etc. We'll lose of course but our stuff will be cooler than anbody else's. After a catastrophic loss though, then we might change. Again, I fear that.

[AmericanPride]

There's also a political dimension to this problem. Senior leadership can't justify to the American public the necessities of taking risks when the public doesn't understand the trade-offs involved in combat related decisions. What will be reported are the casualty statistics and the 'scandal' of that the administration did not properly equip soldiers to fight. The solution it seems would be to keep pursuing lighter equipment - though that doesn't address the problem Bill mentioned of adding more equipment to fall that gap.

[KenWats]

Carl (responding to Post #240 on the previous page)

Food for thought: Is the reason we don't have as many helos in Afg (compared to Viet Nam) the expense of the helos? Or is it possible that the logistics tail can only accommodate so much in Afg? There is no port to bring in fuel, spare parts, etc in country and the two routes somewhat open to us are both undesirable for different reasons. I'm not claiming either one is solely the reason and I have no more knowledge than any other bystander.

[JMA]

Senior leadership can't justify to the American public the necessities of taking risks when the public doesn't understand the trade-offs involved in combat related decisions.

The public? Or are you talking about congress?

[carl]

The public? Or are you talking about congress?

Mark, if the point of your question is what I think it may be, I very much agree. Out problem is mostly the leaders not the people. People out here in flyover country are pretty smart and would well understand how ability to move affects ability to win and ultimately keeps casualties lower, if the leaders took the time to explain it to them. The leaders don't, neither military or civilian. It is my opinion they don't for two reasons. First an awful lot of them, even military, are too stupid to get it themselves. Second, most of our leadership class is supremely arrogant and don't figure that the flyover population of the US has the smarts to get it. If they did admit to themselves that the flyover people do have the smarts to get it, where would that leave them?

[carl]

Carl (responding to Post #240 on the previous page)

Food for thought: Is the reason we don't have as many helos in Afg (compared to Viet Nam) the expense of the helos? Or is it possible that the logistics tail can only accommodate so much in Afg? There is no port to bring in fuel, spare parts, etc in country and the two routes somewhat open to us are both undesirable for different reasons. I'm not claiming either one is solely the reason and I have no more knowledge than any other bystander.

That leads us into a whole discussion about what the supply chain has to support. Given the nature of the war in Afghanistan over the past 13 years, did we need all the fast jets we have based there?

But as far a helos go, we should probably look to see how many helos were normally allocated to a unit in the VN era and how many are allocated to a unit now, which I don't know how to do. If there are fewer now, it would be a good guess that expense is a big reason.

In any event, it seems to me we can't do things we did in VN and what Mark's army did in Rhodesia, in both places using much less sophisticated tech than we have now.

[JMA]

JMA

Osprey with the small plate front and rear weighs about 7Kg

Bearing in mind the "coroner test" to what extent are the use of plates a matter of individual disgression?

[JMA]

About 3 litres.

Was this laid down or was it discretionary? Also were there any policies relating to water discipline?


And I would say regardless of what the Army thinks, attempting to carry out the Mission of the Infantry, to close with and kill the enemy, was impossible with the normal weight I'd carry on a patrol intended to last only 4 - 6 hours and that was just equipment.

Then what is the point of the patrol? (if you can't get amongst the enemy if contact is made).

From books and anecdotes it appears that patrols left the FOB in company minus strength and moved until contact was made (initiated by the Taliban), an airstrike was called in and the patrol went back to the FOB for tea, with enemy casualties being ascertained by monitoring the Taliban radios. The question being asked is what was the point?


Food was maybe 2 or 3 snack bar of some sort , wet/warm kit was a gortex jacket which I never wore.

Brew kit, got to have brew kit. ;)

[JMA]

As there are some new faces around here this is worthy of a repost:

Donkeys led by Lions (http://www.wapentakes.com/donkeys.pdf)


We’re getting to a point where we are losing as many men making mistakes because they are exhausted from carrying armour (and the things that go with it) than are saved by it.

[JMA]

Carl, there are units and there are units.

On my patch little discretion was allowed in what kit to take on patrols. I listed it and together with my sergeant all kit was inspected before moving out. Anything discarded had to be buried and camouflaged (under supervision).

One learns a lot about a unit from such anecdotes. ;)



Oh, I have another question for you guys.

When a real hard war comes, how much of this problem will be solved by soldiers discarding equipment they judge not useful? It may be easier in a really hard war because command may have better things to do.

I ask this because of two stories I was told. The first was by a Vietnam War Army infantry man who said they ditched their body armor because it was too cumbersome and they judged it not useful. Nobody bugged them about doing so.

The second story was from a South African who went on long patrols in Namibia or somewhere around there. He said they were allowed to pick what equipment they each wanted to carry from a wide range of things available. He also said that the first small bit of the patrol's path could be found by tracing items of equipment dropped on the ground by guys who no longer felt the items were so useful.

[jcustis]

A two-pronged problem we face in carried loads is centered on the almost unquenchable appetite for battery power. In the first prong we have increased a patrol's carried load for force protection purposes with the addition of body-worn counter-IED devices. In the second prong we have not been disciplined enough to curb our demand for tactical information, which in turn drives up the weight penalty due to the suites of communication equipment carried.

We have created this vicious circle of demanding unrealistic reporting of reams of information, and it drives dismounted operations to carry ridiculous quantities of batteries to support 24-hour radio usage.

It goes back to uneducated, ill-informed tactical planning by folks inclined to carry the kitchen sink as insurance against all threats, rather than conduct a smart analysis of requirements and the tactical risks involved.