Insights on DOS / country team culture?

[SWCAdmin]

I received this request via email:


I am in the military and do a lot of work with country teams (DOS), is there a book you recommend that really goes into DOS culture, how they think and the way they strategize?

Nothing immediately leapt to mind as being really deep on the matter, though a number of things give tangential insights. Can anyone think of a good recommendation, or just care to wax lyrically here?

[John T. Fishel]

published a memoir called Mr. Ambassador, OU Press in 2007 or 8 more or less. I haven't read it but I suspect it does give a view of the Contry Team.

Cheers

JohnT

[Bob's World]

We had a saying out at SOCPAC: "If you've seen one Country Team, you've seen one Country Team."

[John T. Fishel]

How true it is.:rolleyes: Still, there are common elements.

What I'm really waiting for is Tom Odom and Stan to chime in on this.

Cheere

JohnT

[DGreen]

Former U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan James Dobbins has written a book about this time in country which might be useful.

[CR6]

Robert Earle's Nights in Pink Motel (http://www.amazon.com/Nights-Pink-Motel-American-Strategists/dp/1591142253/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1234185616&sr=1-1) highlights how DOS worked with DOD personnel in Iraq in the '04-'05 period. Earle was Ambassador Negroponte's "thinker" (read strategist) on Iraq. While more memoir than proceedural it has some good insights on DOS culture and approach to strategy.

[Old Eagle]

Bob's point is too true. Been a member of four of them and each one was truly different. There are many reasons for this, but at the center is the fact that the ambassador is the president's (not DOS') rep in country and can do things pretty much however he/she wants. Instead of more specifics, I think I'll simply recommend The Special Forces Advisors' Reference Book by Research Planning, Inc. Think it was a contract for USASOC and may require AKO access. Some of the info is dated and there are a coupla inaccuracies, but overall, a good effort. Maybe Max 161 can secure a copy.

[Stan]

Where to begin?

Let’s start with my background as I rant herein…
Since 1984 I have worked in 14 Embassies. Not one was even remotely similar to the others (even though nine were in Africa and the remainder in Europe). With that, I’ll start by saying that Bob’s version is dead on the money. DOS should actually make Bob’s quote part of every State Department Magazine from this day forward :D

While Old Eagle is perfectly (and theoretically) correct - much like the Defense Attaché is in fact the SECDEF’s rep., the Ambassador is indeed the POTUS’ rep. But, that is where it starts and stops. Fact is (from my point of view), the Ambassador is unlikely during his/her tour to ever directly communicate with the POTUS (unless the POTUS or his better half visits your country), and much like the DATT, will unlikely ever meet the SECDEF (unless he happens to visit your country), yet alone communicate directly with him/her.

So what’s a Country Team and why ?

An executive measure granting the Ambassador the means to coordinate all USG activities to the max effectiveness of US foreign Policy in the country he/she is assigned. Holy Sierra !

The Ambassador is basically responsible for the entire U.S. effort and leadership at post. That is, all USA representatives in or at the country level at the US Embassy. There are actually two versions of country teams - Expanded and "overly classified" conferences. The former includes all the working folks that possess what the Country Team members actually don’t know, and the latter purportedly takes place where the big cheeses try to make sense of US and local policy.

Simpler terms…
Tom Odom (then Colonel Odom) opined “Puzzle Palace” while attempting to explain his abysmal position with (then) OPSCO Stan in Zaire. Not far off the mark even today :cool:.

The Ambassador is your Team Leader, and you could actually have one of at least three versions of Country Team Leaders.

1. First (and worst) is a Charge’ d’Affairs (stuck in limbo like an acting person in charge, but unlikely to ever be considered for the position);
2. Second (worst) a political appointee (typically business savvy and smart, but by no means a diplomat) and;
3. Third, a (career) Senior Foreign Service Officer (rising through the ranks with mucho time in service and many Sierra posts with which to back his/her experience as both a diplomat and leader).

I’ve seen shrinks and IGs come and go trying to determine what went wrong with the basic concept at post. We struggled with two primary issues: The Ambassador’s authority and the Ambassador’s abilities.

There’s nothing wrong with Country Teams and there’s no secret in dealing with them. It’s a leadership issue… plain and simple.

[Old Eagle]

Coupla more points.

As Stan points out, there are usually two levels of meetings in any embassy: a broad information-sharing meeting and a policy meeting. Broader meetings are useful to learn what other off-the-wall offices are doing and to share the U.S. government position on issues with a broad audience so that everyone is speaking with one voice. The smaller policy meetings are used to sync activities of those offices directly engaged with the HN on policy-type issues (DCM, POL/ECON/CIA/DATT-SDO).

As opposed to a military hierarchy, State types appear to enjoy getting "buy in" and consensus. It's a culture thing. Can you spell kumbahya?

In contrast to Stan, my experience with the politicos was more positive (2 out of 3). In fact, I was very comfortable working with the two business people because they understood resource management and WANTED to make decisions rather than water things down to a consensus. But I digress.

[John T. Fishel]

While I generally agree with Stan in his characterization of Charges d'Affaires, I have seen one who, in fact, assumed "command." that was Dave Passage in El Salvador between Tom Pickering and Ed Corr.

I'd also note that the "political" ambassadors come in many stripes - not all are businessmen. John Kennedy appointed Edwin Reischouer (sp?), the foremost US scholar of japan, as his ambassador to Japan to nearly universal praise. Kennedy also appointed John Kenneth Galbraith, the Harvard economist, as his ambassador to India where he did very well during the PRC invasion of India. Ronald Reagan appointed fellow actor ans Screen Actors Guild President, John Gavin, ambassador to Mexico to a chorus of "boos" from people who did not know that Gavin was a native Spanish speaker, a reserve Naval intel officer with an IMA assignment to USSOUTHCOM, and the private phone number of his friend Ronnie (something Galbraith had for Kennedy).

While the quality of FSO's as ambassadors tends to be both more even and generally high quality, there are some who are clearly better than others. As Stan says, it is a question of leadership and whether the ambassador exercises command or not and if he does, does it well. I have seen both.

Cheers

JohnT

[Ken White]

The desire for consensus is generally strong but sometimes DOS 'guidance' leaves little room for maneuver. As John T illustrates, there are sometimes personal connections that transcend the normal chain.

Stan is correct on the leadership issue -- but a weak Ambassador can be 'led' by an astute Political Counselor (one case) or CIA Station Chief (another case). An overly belligerent DAO can wreak havoc (a third case) with even a good and strong Ambassador. Surprisingly, in all three cases, IMO the net result was positive for the US.

[Stan]

In contrast to Stan, my experience with the politicos was more positive (2 out of 3). In fact, I was very comfortable working with the two business people because they understood resource management and WANTED to make decisions rather than water things down to a consensus. But I digress.

Colonel BB, Touché !

To quote one of the most formidable "highly classified" CT meetings I ever had the pleasure of leaving after informing the Leader of the need for awareness training to school-age children...


It seems like a lean end of year, accounting month, but it should correct itself though after the 30th (of September). One might nevertheless get a slight pay cut. I asked about mine safety... Although I explained, the response was - we have to watch expenses, OPSCO. Which is a bit like asking when the next bus goes and being told the subway station is at the end of the road. LMDAO (well, at least nowadays) !


I may have to write a book if I ever stop drinking beer :D

[Stan]

While I generally agree with Stan in his characterization of Charges d'Affaires, I have seen one who, in fact, assumed "command." that was Dave Passage in El Salvador between Tom Pickering and Ed Corr.

I'd also note that the "political" ambassadors come in many stripes - not all are businessmen. John Kennedy appointed Edwin Reischouer (sp?), the foremost US scholar of japan, as his ambassador to Japan to nearly universal praise. Kennedy also appointed John Kenneth Galbraith, the Harvard economist, as his ambassador to India where he did very well during the PRC invasion of India. Ronald Reagan appointed fellow actor ans Screen Actors Guild President, John Gavin, ambassador to Mexico to a chorus of "boos" from people who did not know that Gavin was a native Spanish speaker, a reserve Naval intel officer with an IMA assignment to USSOUTHCOM, and the private phone number of his friend Ronnie (something Galbraith had for Kennedy).

While the quality of FSO's as ambassadors tends to be both more even and generally high quality, there are some who are clearly better than others. As Stan says, it is a question of leadership and whether the ambassador exercises command or not and if he does, does it well. I have seen both.

Cheers

JohnT

Hey John,
I may have ever-so-slightly over exaggerated how inept a Charge could be :o
Concur, there have been several with leadership skills and to be fair, most end up manning the ship after the new administration dumps the Ambassador. Yet another issue regarding Country Teams.

Ken has a valid point: So long as the remainder of the Country Team is prepared to cover your back. In my days our Ambassador backed the DAO and snubbed the rest for not investigating their perceptions and findings. It wasn't long however (following the Ambassador's departure) before the Charge discounted our reporting based on his domestic's (cook's) "reports".

I don't think we have a cookbook for dealing with Country Teams. Old Eagle had four great tours and I had 12 Sierra Embassies and two OK Embassies (Estonia was not one of the OK tours BTW).

[Steve Blair]

I may have to write a book if I ever stop drinking beer :D

Hunter S. Thompson never let that slow him down....maybe you shouldn't either.

[Stan]

Hey Bob,
A brief response from Tom Odom (His server is blocking access to the discussion board at this time).


We had a saying out at SOCPAC: "If you've seen one Country Team, you've seen one Country Team."


As for Bob's world--tell him 2 Majors from group found out that one
country team was not the same as was the one I was in....

Best

Tom

[Outsidethewire]

A few thoughts in response to the original question below, having served in several embassies:

The country team SHOULD BE the mechanism that keeps all the disparate elements of an embassy in synch -- not unlike a daily or weekly BUA to a CG, but generally more interactive.

That said, a country team is like the NSC in that it ultimately reflects what the boss (the ambassador) wants/needs out of the team. It can be a tightly run synchronization process or a very loose Kaffeeklatsch, and being able to adapt is an important skill for those in the mix. As somebody said below, the effectiveness of the country team is at bottom a leadership issue.

Most country teams are far more "interagency" than just State and DOD -- generally any agency head is included, at least in the weekly routine, though it's true there is sometimes a "core" country team that may be smaller. Think USAID, CDC, Commerce, Customs, DEA, etc. etc. So for you bureaucratic cultural anthropologists out there, a good country team can be a gold mine!

Seriously, though, the country team may just be the most effective interagency coordination mechanism the USG has. Most of the time, participants understand they need to synchronize their efforts and act constructively. Yes, as in any office setting, there is usually one or two stereotypical characters to be found (the whiner, the withholder, the suck-up, the clueless, the climber, etc.). Those generally don't correspond to agency affiliations, either. But unless there is really a leadership vacuum at the top, you can usually expect to get done what you need to get done.

A lot of good basic information about how an embassy works can be found in the American Foreign Service Association's Inside a U.S. Embassy (http://www.amazon.com/Inside-U-S-Embassy-Foreign-Service/dp/0964948826). It doesn't go into the differences in corporate cultures between State and DOD, but it's otherwise informative. I'll try to post some observations I've learned about State-DOD cultural differences later.

OTW

[davidoff]

Does anyone know if DOS funding will increase soon, either directly or through the stimulus, to bridge the gap between the mission and our current capabilities?

[Tom Odom]

Hey John,
I may have ever-so-slightly over exaggerated how inept a Charge could be :o
.

Not in the case you and I lived through....


Yep I am back....

Freed at last to post

Tom

[John T. Fishel]

As I said at the beginning of my post, I generally agree with Stan on Chargees. I thought it was, however, useful to point out that that some are quite good at taking charge. I admit that it's rare. Ran into one DCM (was Chargee while Amb was out of town) who was really afraid of his own shadow. the only good thing he did was to schedule an appointment for me with the AMB.

Back in the dark ages of the 1960s, when I was doing my doctoral research in Peru, my dissertation advisor who was in country on a research project (for the first year of my work) characterized the Amb, whom he knew, as someone who would never make an error of commission. This guy was a careeer FSO - probably had been a Chargee more than once...

Cheers

JohnT

[BronwenM]

I have not read this book but it seems to offer insights into the institution, politics and professionalism, section on Iraq DoS engagement, org chart.

Career Diplomacy: Life and Work in the U.S. Foreign Service
by Harry W. Kopp (Author), Charles A. Gillespie (Author) October 2008

Table of contents - http://www.amazon.com/gp/reader/1589012194/ref=sib_dp_pt#reader-link

[Old Eagle]

Stan and I endured a coupla less than stellar Charges in Tallinn. I also know that Stan had issues with the Ambo, but I got along well (but then, I lived in Finland and commuted once or so a month.)

The main problem I had with career FSOs was that they were too beholden to the DoS bureaucracy -- "The desk doesn't think that's a good idea." For God's sake! A desk is an inanimate piece of furniture; I don't care what it thinks. Career guys always had one eye on follow-on assignments, so getting too full of themselves was not a great idea.

On the other hand, I had one politico who called the president's private secretary and scheduled an Oval Office visit that Main State had disapproved. Another called the Secretary of State AT HER HOME at 0500 to explain that her staff was misleading the leadership on a particular issue. Career FSOs aren't going to do that.

I also saw great FSOs who were out and about in adverse environments, acquiring ground truth and meeting with dissidents that would have been unaccessible otherwise.

So I guess the underlying lesson is that all generalizations are bad, even this one.

[John T. Fishel]

Of course, the politicos tend to remember that they are "the President's personal rep" and do not work for DOS or the SECSTATE. True for FSOs who resign to be amabassadors and then are reinstated but your point is well taken regarding the costs of going around former and future bosses.:eek:
OTOH, I knew a politico who thoght that because he was a Republican politician and had met Pres RR, he could ingnore DOS and rid roughshod over his FSO subordinates. He had a very short tenure as ambassador.:rolleyes:

Cheers

JohnT

[Abu Jack]

At one time I was responsible for preparing military guys to work in embassies. Having also worked in an embassy, I thought this is the best thing that I have seen that lays out the differences in mind set.

www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/ndu/dod_from_mars_state_from_venus.doc

[Tom Odom]

For anecdotal accounts I would offer my memoirs concerning life in around 6 dipomatic missions and inside two country teams, one disastrously dysfunctional and the other very well led. Journey into Darkness: Genocide in Rwanda reviewed on SWJ here (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=2186&highlight=Journey+Darkness)

I would also point to Ambassador Robert Gribbin's work on Rwanda In the Aftermath of Genocide: The US Role in Rwanda (http://regribbin.com/)

Another SWJ member's work is Contra Cross, which also offers insights on country teams. I reviewed it here (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=8834&postcount=4)

Best
Tom

[chrisleslie]

The country team meeting is the primary tool that the Ambassador uses to coordinate US policy for that country. How the Ambassador chooses to use that tool -- ie, structure and lead the meeting -- is up to them.

I've been in DOS for about 6 years, and after taking part in country team meetings under 5 Ambassadors and 2 CDAs I find Bob Jones's SOCPAC quote -- "if you've seen one country team, you've seen one country team" -- to be the most concise encapsulation of the country team experience I've ever come across.

As Stan, Old Eagle, Tom Odom, and others point out, the country team's meetings will reflect the style of that particular Ambassador or CDA. Some meetings will be a series of loosely-structured, section-by-section updates and free-wheeling issue discussions, whereas other meetings will be very concise and to the point. (I clocked my shortest country team meeting, in Burundi several years ago, at about 11 minutes.) Some meetings will be used to share information and make key decisions, other meetings can turn into free-for-alls, where even the GSO tries to have input on political or security/CT-related decisions, and most meetings will fall somewhere in between.

All of these types of meetings (yes, even the maddening free-for-alls...) can be useful when employed properly, and knowing how to function effectively in either environment is a critical survival skill for anyone with a role on the country team.

One point that should not be a revelation to anyone, but that still bears making, especially for those with limited country team & DOS experience, is just how much country team business actually gets done & decided *outside* the country team meeting. An Ambassador will probably arrive at the country team meeting with a fairly clear idea of where he wants to go with an issue; if not exactly where, then at least a good idea of the direction in which he wants things to move. A smart country team participant will prepare accordingly and will try to make sure, that for any issue that will be formally decided in country team, he has already talked with and lined up support from others with a stake in the issue. This includes talking with the Ambassador *before* the meeting. (I've been surprised at the number of people I've seen who've gotten this part dead wrong.)

As in any bureaucratic culture, the informal networks at an Embassy are often at least as important and influential as the formal networks. So playing Texas Hold 'Em and having a few beers on a Wednesday night with the A/RSO, the deputy from pol shop, the MSG Det Cmdr, the Commerce Dept rep, and the DCM's OMS's husband suddenly takes on a new importance...:D

As a counterpoint to one of Old Eagle's comments, many of us "State types" -- especially those of us hired in the last several years, many of whom come to the Department with significant private sector experience -- really do wish that there was more focus on results and less on process at DOS. Many of us "enjoy" this process the same way we would "enjoy" beating our heads against a brick wall all afternoon. At the same time, we understand that the structure of decision-making at State mainly operates through buy-in, compromise, and consensus, and so that's the game we play.

I just read the AF guide to State/DOD cultural differences for which Abu Jack posted a link. I think it's a great read and a concise explanation of both cultures, and would be useful for anyone from State or DOD who has to work with folks from the other Dept. I also found it fairly prescient in some areas, by anticipating the challenges that State and DOD have had in working closely together in Iraq and Afghanistan, given that it was written in 1998.

I'm curious if any of the other DOS folks on SWJ have any input here....?

[Outsidethewire]

I thought the Mars-Venus discussion was useful, too (if one keeps in mind always that generalizations do not reflect the full diversity of an organization, of course). Clearly, the differences are also linked to the nature of the mission. The "structure of decision-making at State mainly operates through buy-in, compromise, and consensus," as chrisleslie puts it, precisely because the nature of our mission is to make things happen through that same buy-in, compromise, and consensus. Shouldn't surprise that the institution therefore attracts the kind of people it does. However, by the end of the 1990's a lot of us were seeing that our mission was becoming more results-oriented, long before Dr. Rice announced we were going to be "transformational." We were doing a great deal of work in eastern Europe, for example, that aimed at actually shaping events rather than just reporting on and analyzing them. That requires more of the interagency/teamwork skills than the traditional individualist analyst skills of an earlier FS generation. Someone who can "make things happen" through teamwork and leadership is far more valued now than a decade ago.

[Old Eagle]

I am heartened to hear that the "shaping" mission is gaining traction in the FS. The "observe and report" crew, I think, was a phenomenon of the post-Vietnam era. As I mentioned above, I had the pleasure of serving with several great FSOs who were willing (some even thrived) getting outside the wire and mixing it up with the locals. Of those, many, if not most, had served in CORDS teams downrange. In this day of expanded connectivity and OSINT sources, members of overseas missions have to provide some meaningful value added. IMHO, shaping the security environment is a critical function of those missions.

[Outsidethewire]

There's always been a component of "shaping" to State Department work, it's just that until the last 15-20 years, the "target" of the shaping was different -- basically, it was other governments and governmental institutions. So an FSO did a lot of observing and reporting, but also under instruction would attempt to effect change (another way of saying "shape") in the behavior of the government or government institution he was accredited to (e.g. the MFA). Now, with non-governmental factors/issues/actors much more important in the international environment, the "shaping" mission has expanded to include these, and we therefore need to be working with a much broader cross-section of society in order to move things in a particular direction, no matter which country we're in. We also therefore need to have additional tools and skills, which is something frankly we're still lacking to a significant extent (Hello, Congress??).

What hasn't changed is that this still largely requires the persuasive, collaborative approach that sometimes drives my military colleagues crazy (though not the smart ones). You can't order a district council or municipal director around any more than you can order a Foreign Ministry official around!

[SteveO]

Does anyone know if DOS funding will increase soon, either directly or through the stimulus, to bridge the gap between the mission and our current capabilities?

uh, no. Secretary Gates made the case. Secretary Rice argued in front of Congress with Gates by her side. Secretary Clinton is taking up the case. At the end of the day, resource levels are roughly the same for FY 10.

My two cents on this is that entrenched DoD contractors and their enablers in Congress are barriers to significant shifts. Obama achieved a token victory by capping production of the F-22. But appropriations to DoS have not increased.

For example, Congress still funds State's new S/CRS through appropriations to DoD with the understanding that they will transfer the money to State so that DoS can fulfill one of their new core missions, reconstruction and stabilization.

Maybe we will see some change in FY 11 for spending in calendar 2012.