When to Bring the Love, When to Bring the Hate

[Ian K]

Captain Few's article hit on some points that have been running around in the back of my mind for some time. Namely, what do you do when the civilian population hates you?

It is expected that in COIN operations, we will often be looked on unfavorably. We try to win over the population by being the good guys, protecting them from insurgent atrocities and helping develop the economy and basic services to improve life.

But what if the large majority of the population hates you with an ideological fervor? What if they are willing to take our goodwill and throw it back in our faces, ignoring what benefits we may bring them? We want their cooperation, but sometimes just giving benefits won't bring it, and will in fact be seen as weakness (just as troops don't want to be coddled . . ).

Perhaps the ideal way to handle such a situation is to undermine the society economically, developing trading relations (through second or third parties most likely) that corrode the ideological base and make them dependent on products or services we provide (or can control). This is a long term solution, though, and the grunts on the ground will need something more immediate.

So (in my roundabout way) what I'm asking is, are there times when you have to 'get tough' with the civilian population? If so, how tough do you - can you - get?

[SWJED]

Love and Hate
by Captain Michael Few, Small Wars Journal

Love and Hate (Full PDF Article) (http://smallwarsjournal.com/mag/docs-temp/178-few.pdf)


One of my best commanders preached a very simple command philosophy. “Mike,” he would proclaim, “sometimes you got to give the love, and sometimes you got to give them the hate.”

To emphasize his point, he would clench both fists and extend mock punches: one representing the love and one representing the hate. This philosophy served our squadron well both in leading his airborne reconnaissance squadron and clearing Al Qaeda held safe-havens in Northern Iraq.

The premise behind this philosophy reflected many years studying the art of leadership and his straightforward assessment coupled a deep understanding in discretion and discernment tempered in the pragmatism of the complicated realities of real life mutually exclusive to the black and white moral world view preached at the academy.

In 1879, MG John Schofield declared that “the discipline which makes the soldier of a free country reliable in battle is not to be gained by harsh nor tyrannical treatment. On the contrary, such treatment is far more likely to destroy than to make an army.” Conversely, the leadership of coddling and friendship is marked with disrespect and irreverence from one’s subordinates.

Simply put, soldiers desire neither a dictator nor buddy in a commander. They demand leadership...

[Cavguy]

Captain Few's article hit on some points that have been running around in the back of my mind for some time. Namely, what do you do when the civilian population hates you?

It is expected that in COIN operations, we will often be looked on unfavorably. We try to win over the population by being the good guys, protecting them from insurgent atrocities and helping develop the economy and basic services to improve life.

But what if the large majority of the population hates you with an ideological fervor? What if they are willing to take our goodwill and throw it back in our faces, ignoring what benefits we may bring them? We want their cooperation, but sometimes just giving benefits won't bring it, and will in fact be seen as weakness (just as troops don't want to be coddled . . ).

Perhaps the ideal way to handle such a situation is to undermine the society economically, developing trading relations (through second or third parties most likely) that corrode the ideological base and make them dependent on products or services we provide (or can control). This is a long term solution, though, and the grunts on the ground will need something more immediate.

So (in my roundabout way) what I'm asking is, are there times when you have to 'get tough' with the civilian population? If so, how tough do you - can you - get?

Not feeling verbose tonight but ...

The bottom line is you have to "control" the population, esp. hostile ones. Looking back for examples, you do this through census, gated communities, curfews, food control, registration, etc. COIN in many aspects is about denying insurgent freedom of movement.

Sometimes that means you have to be the "strongest tribe". The long term solution is to establish political organizations/authority in the town and counter-mobilize the population, which takes time.

And it may not work. But if you do effective population control, you can systemically target the insurgents or force them to displace elsewhere - but be prepared for that.

[MikeF]

I think I finally beat Ken White to the punch for once.

How do you gain the situational awareness for it? As almost every thread ends up- training, training, training...

I wrote this article to specifically highlight one of my worst days out of many other successes. Keep in mind, it is only one story out of many others in Iraq. Neil Smith "Cav Guy" has written extensively on this aspect (see here (http://usacac.army.mil/CAC/milreview/English/MarApr08/Smith_AnbarEngMarApr08.pdf) for one case co-authored with COL McFarland on Ramadi). Rob Thorton, Dr. Fishel, and Dr. Marc Tyrell published an entire SFA Case Study on Mosul. (http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/sfacasestudy.pdf).

That's all I can muster tonight...Brain power is running low and The Daily Show is on....MTF

v/r

Mike

[Cavguy]

Mike,

Thanks for the props.

Now that I am a little more refreshed (stayed up last night finishing The Gamble), it was full of stories like you describe.

"Hearts and Minds" (which I really hate now), doesn't mean making people like you. It means enticing or forcing them to make an irrevocable choice to pick a side.

I can't give you an answer that will work every time. But here is a framework that is generally successful :

Deny insurgent sanctuary
Deny insurgent mobility
Deny insurgent access to resources
Separate the population from insurgents

There's a bunch of resources/case examples of how to do this at the tactical level, some are located at my organization's website (http://coin.army.mil)in the knowledge center - and a few rise to the top.

Any COIN campaign in a given area must be preceeded with a detailed mission analysis to understand the problem. Do not ask "where is the enemy", but rather ask first "where am I?" and then, "why is he able to operate there?" Do this and your COA will fall into place.

As I stated last night, sometimes it just means you have to be the biggest guy on the block, 24/7.

[Bob's World]

But what if the large majority of the population hates you with an ideological fervor? What if they are willing to take our goodwill and throw it back in our faces, ignoring what benefits we may bring them? We want their cooperation, but sometimes just giving benefits won't bring it, and will in fact be seen as weakness (just as troops don't want to be coddled . . ).




Half of America hated the Clinton Administration. Roughly the opposite half of America hated the Bush Administration with even more ardent fervor. I would contend though, that if China had graciously inserted itself into that mix in an effort to "liberate" either half from that offensive governmental leadership, both halves would have joined as one immediately to fight them in the streets, to "take their goodwill and throw it back in their faces, ignoring the benefits they bring..."

Dealing with ones own insurgent populace is hard enough, being an embroiled third party, either by invite as is S. Vietnam, or by invasion, like in Iraq, is an entirely different situation altogether. The HN is conducting COIN; it really helps to avoid confusion of roles when you clearly keep your foreign engagement in a separate classification. We have a mission for this, and it is FID, and by staying in that lane it also helps clarify your engagement with the HN's populace as well.

The ultimate goal is to assist in healing the perception of the populace that they are both experiencing poor governance, and that their only effective recourse to the same is through illegal acts of violence. As a guest, ones best course is to remain as neutral as possible, only taking sides when required to stabilize specific situations that have gotten out of control in ways that will escalate and exacerbate the problem.

When a foreign country aids a HN government's COIN efforts through FID, everyone knows that it is to support its own national interests in that particular state, and that they believe those interests are best served by sustaining the current government. So right off the bat your "neutrality" in this fight between the government and the governed is justifiably questioned.

When a foreign country aids a populaces insurgent efforts against their government through UW, everyone knows that it is to support its own national interests in that particular state, and that they believe those interests are best served by removing the current government. So again, right off the bat, your "neutrality" in this fight between the government and the governed is justifiably questioned.

The one constant in every equation is the populace, and so long as the efforts of the meddling foreign entity remain in word and deed focused as much as possible, not on sustaining any particular government, but instead on enabling the establishment of good governance (the form of governance desired by the populace, independent of any metrics of how effective it might be), and then to help make that governance as effective as possible, is best for the foreign intervening party.

Remember, insurgencies fall into three broad categories:
Revolutionary to change the governance
Separatist to create new state out of a larger old state, and
Resistance to drive off an unwanted foreign entity.

All three exist in Iraq; and only the third category is specifically motivated to the removal of the U.S. influence there.

A fourth category is dedicated to removing the U.S. influence there due to the U.S. being logically perceived as the protector of the existing government of Iraq, and that is those states (Iran) and non-states (AQ) waging UW in Iraq to destabilize that US backed government. (A separate disertation in of itself on why striking the mission "CT" from the roles and incorporating "counter unconventional warfare" in its stead is probably something I need to write up for larger discussion)


So, to understand how to engage the populace you really have to first understand what type of operation you have inserted yourself into the middle of, what your objectives there are, and then how to best engage with all of the various actors to best achieve those objectives. But if I was pressed for a one-word description of how to treat the populace it would be: "Respect" You can neither buy nor beat respect out of someone. You have to earn it.

[MikeF]

Captain Few's article hit on some points that have been running around in the back of my mind for some time. Namely, what do you do when the civilian population hates you?

It is expected that in COIN operations, we will often be looked on unfavorably. We try to win over the population by being the good guys, protecting them from insurgent atrocities and helping develop the economy and basic services to improve life.

But what if the large majority of the population hates you with an ideological fervor? What if they are willing to take our goodwill and throw it back in our faces, ignoring what benefits we may bring them? We want their cooperation, but sometimes just giving benefits won't bring it, and will in fact be seen as weakness (just as troops don't want to be coddled . . ).

I'll start with this part. I think Neil and I are sharing a brain today because I wanted to talk about the whole hearts and minds thing. (BTW Neil, no worries, I've learned a lot throught your work).

Anyways, Ken White and Wilf (William Owen) have drilled into to my head time and time again the irrelevancy of "winning" the hearts and minds. That goes back to your original post on the populace "liking" or "hating" you. It's not about us. We're a third party arbitrator in the conflict.


COIN is "Those military, paramilitary, political, economic, phschological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency" (JP 1-02).

The definition says nothing about making people like or hate you.

A while back, Wilf sent me this quote that I found extremely useful:


"The reason I stress this is that you cannot win these sort(s) of wars with bullets. You can only win the people over in my opinion- to use that nauseating phrase I think I invented- by capturing their hearts and minds."
-Field Marshall Sir Gerald Templer on Vietnam

Templer specifically uses the term capture, not win to describe "hearts and minds."

For my thesis, I'm actually trying to model the arbitration of hearts (emotions) with minds (utility) in an adapted version of Nash's Arbitration to show qualitatively how one goes about trying to transition from COIN to SSTR.

I summed up the following in my introductory chapter:


The purpose of this thesis is to introduce a simple game theory model that explains qualitatively the collective struggle of the Iraqi hearts (emotions) and minds (utility). This thesis reflects my findings based on my personal experience in Zaganiyah.
This thesis explores the possibility of modeling the conflict in Iraq by introducing a simple two-person game using an adapted version of Maynard Smith’s Evolutionary Stable Strategy and John Nash’s Arbitration Point to model the arbitration of hearts and minds necessary for transition from protracted counter-insurgency operations towards reconstruction and stability operations.
This model is not an approach on how to win the hearts and minds of a populace as I believe this concept to be misguided and irrelevant. From personal experiences in combat operations, one can control the minds of a population for a discrete amount of time; however, one can never control the hearts. Instead, this model is intended to describe the concept mathematically and qualitatively to provide a common understanding for planners and decision makers on the tactical, operational, and strategic levels in order to determine solutions, policies, and strategies that are less bad rather than right or wrong.
I realize this post was long-winded, but I hope it was helpful.

v/r

Mike

[Ken White]

""Hearts and Minds" (which I really hate now), doesn't mean making people like you. It means enticing or forcing them to make an irrevocable choice to pick a side."


"Any COIN campaign in a given area must be preceeded with a detailed mission analysis to understand the problem. Do not ask "where is the enemy", but rather ask first "where am I?" and then, "why is he able to operate there?" Do this and your COA will fall into place."


"...This model is not an approach on how to win the hearts and minds of a populace as I believe this concept to be misguided and irrelevant. From personal experiences in combat operations, one can control the minds of a population for a discrete amount of time; however, one can never control the hearts..."

Such is the path of true righteousness. So let it be written, so let it be said...:cool:

[MikeF]

So (in my roundabout way) what I'm asking is, are there times when you have to 'get tough' with the civilian population? If so, how tough do you - can you - get?

In Pre-OIF/Pre-COIN times, long/long ago, army guys used terms like recointer, area reconnaissance, zone reconnaissance, IPB, and OODA loops.

Before the Break Point, before the Surge, the FIRST thing we did in country was an aerial reconnaissance followed with an area reconnaissance followed with route reconnaissance for my boy's to understand the PHYSICAL TERRAIN of the Diyala River Valley from Baqubah to Abu Sayda (at that time a troop AO not squadron). Second, we conducted leader engagements throughout EVERY town with political, security, and economic leaders AND Adbul Average "Six Pack" so my boy's would understand the HUMAN TERRAIN.

This situational awareness allowed us to conduct Step One: Describe the environment. From there, we could start identfying Avenues of Appoach, key terrain, tribes, sects, factions, families, so forth and so on. All simple stuff derived from the scout platoon manual, FM 7-8, and the Ranger Handbook. Sometimes in combat people forget to do the basics.

If we didn't receive human intelligence b/c the people were scared, then we cheated and snuck in at night to observe.

Eventually, I'll publish the events in chronological order.

One of the culminating operations (derived from 3 weeks of tactial reconnaissance) is described below in the first part of my next paper. The result was 17 EKIA, 1 US WIA, no civilian casualties, and temporary security in light of the civil war. It was a good three weeks.


Disrupting the Information Advantage

In counterinsurgency, killing the enemy is easy. Finding him is nearly impossible.
-David Kilcullen, Twenty-Eight Articles

“Sir, trade weapons with me,” Bernie whispered from the protection of our hide site. We were hidden deep within the grape vineyards. We snuck in under the cover of darkness, found the enemy, and now it was time to kill. We had been tracking our prey for weeks. We were finally given the go. As the women and children scattered, the sniper quickly began to recede back into the safety and anonymity of the town. For a moment, he was in range- two hundred meters away. Staff Sergeant Bernthall focused. We traded weapons- his sights were conditioned for room clearing, mine for long-range observation. He calmed his body, breathed deep, and squeezed the trigger. With the first round, he zeroed my weapon to his specifications. With the second squeeze, in one fell swoop, the bullet traveled out of the palm groves, across the Diyala River, down the crowded street, and the sniper fell- one round to the head-perfection. Operation Shaku Maku had begun. Thankfully, there would be no civilian casualties today.
-Zaganiyah, October 31, 2006

Sometimes you get it right. Two weeks after al Qaeda declared Baqubah its new Caliphate and ten days prior to the Break Point of Zaganiyah, we tried a new tactic we dubbed terrorize the terrorist.



Hope this helps.

v/r

Mike

[Rex Brynen]

It means enticing or forcing them to make an irrevocable choice to pick a side.

Perhaps I've been working in Lebanon for too long, but I've never seen such a thing as an "irrevocable choice." I have a sneaking hunch Stan and Tom would say the same about Zaire/DRC... :D

[Ron Humphrey]

Perhaps I've been working in Lebanon for too long, but I've never seen such a thing as an "irrevocable choice." I have a sneaking hunch Stan and Tom would say the same about Zaire/DRC... :D

All or nothing might be slighty closer to reality??

[Ken White]

Perhaps I've been working in Lebanon for too long, but I've never seen such a thing as an "irrevocable choice." I have a sneaking hunch Stan and Tom would say the same about Zaire/DRC... :DThe good news is that most people are pragmatic and are willing to make choices that are sensible and fairly durable if not irrevocable. Ron has it right; the key is to make that choice less hazardous or more hazardous -- METT-TC dependent; sometimes you need one, sometimes the other -- than alternatives; irrevocability is always negotiable. Ask any politician in any nation... ;)

[Ian K]

Thank you all for your replies. Especially, MikeF, thank you for sharing your experiences so freely.

I realize a lot of what I've written is, compared to the rest of the community, at pretty elementary level. I picked up a copy of Galula's Counterinsurgency Warfare, and starting this weekend I plan to start boning up on the basics, so hopefully in the future I'll be able to contribute in a more informed manner.:cool:


Anyways, Ken White and Wilf (William Owen) have drilled into to my head time and time again the irrelevancy of "winning" the hearts and minds. That goes back to your original post on the populace "liking" or "hating" you.

I understand that, but our objective is, as I understand it, to appeal to their rational sides and show them that cooperating with us gets them more things that they want (perhaps security, jobs, economic development, freedom, etc.) than if they continue to support the enemy. (While also making use of information warfare to erode the enemy's ideolgical position).


It means enticing or forcing them to make an irrevocable choice to pick a side.


All or nothing might be slighty closer to reality??

So in the terms of the original question, we use population control measures (as brushed upon by Cavguy) to make life inconvenient enough for troublesome populations that they will want to cooperate with us in order to have those measures rescinded (sort of carrot and stick approach)?

And is it realistic to suppose that there may be situations where the population will, presumably for ideological reasons, resist these efforts for long periods of time (years/decades) no matter how well the troops "get it"?

[Ron Humphrey]

And is it realistic to suppose that there may be situations where the population will, presumably for ideological reasons, resist these efforts for long periods of time (years/decades) no matter how well the troops "get it"?

Looks like you just uncovered one of the many reasons they say it take 10-30 years:wry:

In the long run no matter what the Counter Insurgent does or doesn't do it's the population who'll decide what right looks like for them. Sometimes you might be lucky enough to end up with it looking something like what you'd hope for, more often than not unfortunately not:(.

Thus the statement that Hope is not a plan, it may be an influencer in how you approach it but in the end,(as Ken is so good at saying)--- METT-TC

[Cavguy]

So in the terms of the original question, we use population control measures (as brushed upon by Cavguy) to make life inconvenient enough for troublesome populations that they will want to cooperate with us in order to have those measures rescinded (sort of carrot and stick approach)?

And is it realistic to suppose that there may be situations where the population will, presumably for ideological reasons, resist these efforts for long periods of time (years/decades) no matter how well the troops "get it"?

Answer to Q1: Not really. The point isn't to make life miserable, but to deprive the insurgents of the ability to act, and provide room for establishment of effective host nation government control. Essentially isolating the insurgents from the population. Insurgents require mobility. To borrow from Trinquier:


“We have seen how indispensable the support of the population is to the guerrilla. It is possible for [the guerrilla] to exist only where the people give him their unqualified support. It is the inhabitant who supplies the guerrilla with his food supplies … ammunition … information … warning … [and] refuge”
- Roger Trinquier, Modern Warfare, Ch 9, 1964


Bottom line - deprive the insurgent of access to the population, and he can't effectively fight. The population is his support base. Deny him support, and he can't operate. NOTE: I think Trinquier erred here by using "unqualified", I think many times insurgents receive support that is qualified until the government (or another force) provdies a better alternative.

Best case you deny him that support by turning the populace against him. In the case discussed on this thread - you prevent the population from supporting him while you develop institutions capable of preventing his return. He will usually flee elsewhere when pressed in a given area, and return when conditions permit - a good example is when Mosul flared up in 2004 as soon as the pressure was on in Fallujah. So you have to plan for that or you wind up in "whack-a-mole". He is also more vulnerable when he is forced to move, and thus is easier to target if you think through your "clear/hold/build" plan effectively.

Niel

[Cavguy]

Perhaps I've been working in Lebanon for too long, but I've never seen such a thing as an "irrevocable choice." I have a sneaking hunch Stan and Tom would say the same about Zaire/DRC... :D

That phrase was borrowed from Kilcullen. You are probably right, but you want the population to "get off the fence" and side with you in such a way that it becomes difficult to switch back. Anything can switch back, but we want it to be painful to do so.

[Stan]

He will usually flee elsewhere when pressed in a given area, and return when conditions permit - a good example is when Mosul flared up in 2004 as soon as the pressure was on in Fallujah. So you have to plan for that or you wind up in "whack-a-mole". He is also more vulnerable when he is forced to move, and thus is easier to target if you think through your "clear/hold/build" plan effectively.

Niel

Niel has a solid point that has proven to work even in Sub-Sahara during political and social upheavals. By strengthening the security (per se) in one area didn't necessarily get rid of the problem, but it significantly weakened it and subsequently moved it. We were for a short period able to predict the outcome and were better prepared.

Gaining and keeping population or local support is a hard one to get a grasp on. When insurgents threatened them with death, it was fairly clear. Regardless of what we did to better the locals' existence, they knew we (Belg, French and US) were unlikely to ever beat or kill them for cooperating.


Perhaps I've been working in Lebanon for too long, but I've never seen such a thing as an "irrevocable choice." I have a sneaking hunch Stan and Tom would say the same about Zaire/DRC... :D

Tom actually invented and perfected "Irrevocable Choice", and I figured out how to stay low ;)

[Bob's World]

Gaining and keeping population or local support is a hard one to get a grasp on. When insurgents threatened them with death, it was fairly clear. Regardless of what we did to better the locals' existence, they knew we (Belg, French and US) were unlikely to ever beat or kill them for cooperating.


"The Population" "The Insurgent" "The Government" "The Counterinsurgent" all get thrown about fairly regular as if they were not all of the same cloth.

The Population is of course the one fabric from which all are cut, with The Government and The Counterinsurgent being one and the same, and also a subset of the populace. The insurgent is also a subset of the populace.

If someone is not of "The Populace," then I would offer they are neither an insurgent nor a counterinsurgent, but are something else altogether.

When we get careless in our language it leads to carelessness of thought, which then results in carelessness of action.

I contend that current U.S. military doctrine on COIN has fallen into this trap, casting ourselves into the role of counterinsurgent in many cases where we are not; and that this line of thinking has been heavily reinforced by our recent operations in Iraq. The US Army is to be commended for the amazing transition of both thought and deed in dealing with the situation that it was launched into the middle of in Iraq. But what we are doing there, while absolutely taking place in the middle of an Iraqi Insurgency, is not COIN. COIN is what the Iraqi government is conducting, and it is as much about improving their own governance of the populace as it is about containing any manifestations of those that challenge that governance.

If anything the role of the intervening party is the most complex of all, because it is the intervener who in fact must make what often is treated as an "irrevocable choice" about which aspect of the populace he will support in this complex dance among "The Populace."

[MikeF]

"The Population" "The Insurgent" "The Government" "The Counterinsurgent" all get thrown about fairly regular as if they were not all of the same cloth.

The Population is of course the one fabric from which all are cut, with The Government and The Counterinsurgent being one and the same, and also a subset of the populace. The insurgent is also a subset of the populace.

If someone is not of "The Populace," then I would offer they are neither an insurgent nor a counterinsurgent, but are something else altogether.

When we get careless in our language it leads to carelessness of thought, which then results in carelessness of action.

I contend that current U.S. military doctrine on COIN has fallen into this trap, casting ourselves into the role of counterinsurgent in many cases where we are not; and that this line of thinking has been heavily reinforced by our recent operations in Iraq. The US Army is to be commended for the amazing transition of both thought and deed in dealing with the situation that it was launched into the middle of in Iraq. But what we are doing there, while absolutely taking place in the middle of an Iraqi Insurgency, is not COIN. COIN is what the Iraqi government is conducting, and it is as much about improving their own governance of the populace as it is about containing any manifestations of those that challenge that governance.

If anything the role of the intervening party is the most complex of all, because it is the intervener who in fact must make what often is treated as an "irrevocable choice" about which aspect of the populace he will support in this complex dance among "The Populace."

I've been struggling with this one for some time, and COL Jones nailed it.

To add a couple thoughts:

1. A person, group, actor that is external or foreign (i.e. AQI, NVA) is a partisan force. This force is attempting to arbitrate in the state's affairs.

2. The state is the one that conducts COIN. As an outside force (i.e. in Iraq) we can assist through FID, SFA, etc...)

3. Our actions in Iraq thus far should be charaterized as an occupation using COIN principles or tactics.

Are we on track or off-base?


v/r

Mike

[Stan]

I appreciate where you're coming from and your experience. I will not begin to generalize what a tour in Sub-Sahara is and what a tour in Iraq is. They are like night and day.

Rest assured, I do not carelessly throw around words with my comments; They come from experience.

I regret you failed to see the joke regarding "irrevocable choices" which was more or less pitched to me the very same way.

Regards, Stan


"The Population" "The Insurgent" "The Government" "The Counterinsurgent" all get thrown about fairly regular as if they were not all of the same cloth.

[Ken White]

an issue:
"...But what we are doing there, while absolutely taking place in the middle of an Iraqi Insurgency, is not COIN. COIN is what the Iraqi government is conducting, and it is as much about improving their own governance of the populace as it is about containing any manifestations of those that challenge that governance.

If anything the role of the intervening party is the most complex of all, because it is the intervener who in fact must make what often is treated as an "irrevocable choice" about which aspect of the populace he will support in this complex dance among "The Populace.""as Bob's World said...

Only thing I'd add to that is that the intervenor's 'irrevocable choice' reverts to CavGuy's assertion with regard to the population:
That phrase was borrowed from Kilcullen. You are probably right, but you want the population to "get off the fence" and side with you in such a way that it becomes difficult to switch back. Anything can switch back, but we want it to be painful to do so.The intervenor has made a choice when he enters the fray, it can be irrevocable -- or not... :wry:

As Mike F summarizes:
1. A person, group, actor that is external or foreign (i.e. AQI, NVA) is a partisan force. This force is attempting to arbitrate in the state's affairs.

2. The state is the one that conducts COIN. As an outside force (i.e. in Iraq) we can assist through FID, SFA, etc...)

3. Our actions in Iraq thus far should be charaterized as an occupation using COIN principles or tactics."Other than preferring Bob's 'intervene' to Mike's 'arbitrate, I thought -- and think -- most were thinking that and that it is correct. Though I see no problem with saying that we were or are conducting COIN operations (with the implied 'in conjunction with HN forces.').

[MikeF]

an issue:as Bob's World Other than preferring Bob's 'intervene' to Mike's 'arbitrate, I thought -- and think -- most were thinking that and that it is correct. Though I see no problem with saying that we were or are conducting COIN operations (with the implied 'in conjunction with HN forces.').

I'm spending too much time in the library right now reading old books on game theory. :( Arbitrate is the economic term.

Every now and then, I look out the window and remember I'm still in Monterey for a bit. :cool:

v/r

Mike

[Bob's World]

summarizes:Other than preferring Bob's 'intervene' to Mike's 'arbitrate, I thought -- and think -- most were thinking that and that it is correct. Though I see no problem with saying that we were or are conducting COIN operations (with the implied 'in conjunction with HN forces.').


If I were a shrink, I'd probably see this as a "breakthrough moment." :)

My big issue with this, is that small things matter. If you say you are doing COIN, you begin to think you are doing COIN. Soon you forget or minimize the "in support of" or "in conjunction with" HN forces part of it.

Plus, Americans are not the most patient people in the world. No, really, this is true. We also sometimes think we have the corner on good ideas. Again, I kid you not.

So what happens is that American unit that thinks its doing the same mission as the HN unit soon moves from behind, to beside, to out in front because the HN is too (pick your excuse) to do it on our timeline to our standard. Soon the HN takes a knee. If you aren't listening to what he says, and if you are willing to do it yourself, he often is willing to let you. Before you know it that handful of "US Advisors" has ballooned to a major US operation; and we're trying to figure out how it ever got out of hand in the first place, and how we can extricate ourselves with our honor intact.

So, yeah, I really do think that clearly distinguishing and defining what you are doing up front as distinct from what the HN is doing is very very important indeed.

Usually where we avoided this problem and achieved great results it has been some place where political sensitivities drove extremely constrained parameters for any military involvement (El Salvador, Columbia, the Philippines). Where we have not constrained our actions, we have acted unconstrained, and that has often as not gotten messy.

[Cavguy]

Usually where we avoided this problem and achieved great results it has been some place where political sensitivities drove extremely constrained parameters for any military involvement (El Salvador, Columbia, the Philippines). Where we have not constrained our actions, we have acted unconstrained, and that has often as not gotten messy.

I don't necessairly disagree, except our two current problems, IZ and AFG, had no functioning military to advise in the first place when we started. I do agree the conventional force has made a slow transition from COIN to "by, with, and through".

I get kind of disturbed with the "We did El Salvador, Colombia, and Philippines with a few SF" drum mainly because they had longstanding, functional governments and militaries that were suited for advisory efforts. None of the three cases featured significant external sanctuary or external support.

I don't think this is what you meant, but I just want to compare apples to apples.

[MikeF]

I don't necessairly disagree, except our two current problems, IZ and AFG, had no functioning military to advise in the first place when we started. I do agree the conventional force has made a slow transition from COIN to "by, with, and through".

I get kind of disturbed with the "We did El Salvador, Colombia, and Philippines with a few SF" drum mainly because they had longstanding, functional governments and militaries that were suited for advisory efforts. None of the three cases featured significant external sanctuary or external support.

I don't think this is what you meant, but I just want to compare apples to apples.


I think the distinction is relevant, but, I also believe that when the dust is settled, the Iraq experience will redefine our thought on COIN and small wars in general due to the tremendous scope, the complexity, and the extent of the USG involvement. I cannot even define off the top of my head how many different insurgencies or partisan actors there are in Iraq.

My assessment may cause dispute, but we'll see.

Also, the SF work in the Phillipines, El Salvador, and Plan Colombia were superbly executed. I've spent some serious time trying to learn from the precision, accuracy, and surgeon's touch displayed by our counterparts. In some ways, Iraq and Afghanistan are simply different. In other ways, there are some similarities.

v/r

Mike

[Bob's World]

Come on Cav Guy...you know I didn't say "with a few SF." You added that part. I don't know if your Freudian slip is showing, but hey, sometimes a cigar is just a cigar, right?

Seriously though, you are right on about Iraq and Afghanistan being very different indeed.

Amazing how when one kicks the neighbor's door in and barges in and acts like he owns the place, it puts a whole different spin on the visit than if one rings the bell, comes in when asked, and defers to his host while there, and leaves at a reasonable hour...

[Ken White]

I definitely agree that words are important and that there is a tendency to say "WE are doing COIN" and that does indeed give those on the ground a sometimes improper mindset -- but I also believe that lack of COIN operations and /or HN FID support TTP knowledge on the part of senior leaders is now pretty well eliminated (he said, hopefully, after going on eight years... :o ) and that failure to act accordingly is thus a leadership issue.

I also suggest that while technically correct that the precision desired is perhaps a step too far for the US military... :wry:

Iraq and Afghanistan are both very different from other operations and conflating them with any others is ill advised.

[Cavguy]

I think the distinction is relevant, but, I also believe that when the dust is settled, the Iraq experience will redefine our thought on COIN and small wars in general due to the tremendous scope, the complexity, and the extent of the USG involvement. I cannot even define off the top of my head how many different insurgencies or partisan actors there are in Iraq.

My assessment may cause dispute, but we'll see.

Also, the SF work in the Phillipines, El Salvador, and Plan Colombia were superbly executed. I've spent some serious time trying to learn from the precision, accuracy, and surgeon's touch displayed by our counterparts. In some ways, Iraq and Afghanistan are simply different. In other ways, there are some similarities.

v/r

Mike

Agreed, at the risk of sounding like a curmudgeon, I just want to ensure we separate the enduring lessons from the operational environment context, which is significantly different. Could a more by, with, through approach been attempted earlier in Iraq? I'm not sure. The risk would have been regime collapse, which was unacceptable.

By all accounts, the ANA and ANP is not prepared to execute effective COIN yet. This could be sped up by ensuring all ISAF units embed/partner with the ANA, if not already done.

I am actually a huge proponent of embedding a US company into weak HN BNs, and the BN HQ embedded with a HN BCT.

The army will be doing a version of this next year, with two BCT's deploying as advisors, rather than combat forces in a pilot of an emerging concept.

[MikeF]

Agreed, at the risk of sounding like a curmudgeon, I just want to ensure we separate the enduring lessons from the operational environment context, which is significantly different. Could a more by, with, through approach been attempted earlier in Iraq? I'm not sure. The risk would have been regime collapse, which was unacceptable.

By all accounts, the ANA and ANP is not prepared to execute effective COIN yet. This could be sped up by ensuring all ISAF units embed/partner with the ANA, if not already done.

I am actually a huge proponent of embedding a US company into weak HN BNs, and the BN HQ embedded with a HN BCT.

The army will be doing a version of this next year, with two BCT's deploying as advisors, rather than combat forces in a pilot of an emerging concept.

Agreed. I refuse to jump into the frivolous SF v/s GPA debate. I owe my succesful command to the undergrad instruction I received from 10 SFG group while assigned to them in Iraq back in 2005. Now, I'm fortunate enough to attend their master's program at NPS. They're good in my book. Regardless, I chose to stay Regular. I like leading young soldiers.

As others have observed, one of the unusual shifts in Iraq from previous wars is SF taking on an increased DA role (with great exception to their Iraq Special Forces Units and Hillah Swat) AND GPF taking on advising roles.

As our advising has evolved, I try to sum up three different approaches:

1. Ignoring the ISF/IP. The do it yourself approach.
2. Partnering. Co-locating with them in patrol bases as Neil and I did.
3. Combat Advising. What the MTTs are doing more attuned to traditional FID on the BN HQ and above level.

The next step for GPF to look at is what works and what doesn't with Regular soldiers. Additionally, we must describe the unique qualifications and characteristics needed to execute. Some will do better than others.

I think Rob is trying to expand on this in his latest thread. (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=6698)

v/r

Mike

[Ian K]

Cavguy, thanks for the clarification.

I'd normally try to think of something witty here, but it's been a long week.

[MikeF]

I realize a lot of what I've written is, compared to the rest of the community, at pretty elementary level. I picked up a copy of Galula's Counterinsurgency Warfare, and starting this weekend I plan to start boning up on the basics, so hopefully in the future I'll be able to contribute in a more informed manner.:cool:

Ian, I meant to respond to this earlier. Don't be afraid to ask questions. I wish SWJ was available when I was in school and a young junior officer. Instead, I learned the theory by actual practice.

One of the reasons I decided to publish and continually write on this blog during my "vacation" in grad school is that I wish someone had done the same for me. If I can help young officers and NCOs become better combat leaders, then I feel like a success. I used to drill into my PLs head that they would be much better company commanders than me b/c they were learning COIN at the LT level.

Anyways, while you might be on the elementary level, Neil and I are only in middle school. Prof Ken White and many others on here have been fighting these fights way before your parents had their first date. :eek: We have much to learn from their experiences.

v/r

Mike

[William F. Owen]

I understand that, but our objective is, as I understand it, to appeal to their rational sides and show them that cooperating with us gets them more things that they want (perhaps security, jobs, economic development, freedom, etc.) than if they continue to support the enemy. (While also making use of information warfare to erode the enemy's ideolgical position).



Human beings may be RATIONAL, but they are very likely to be UNREASONABLE, and that is where appealing to anything other than their most base instincts. I can show you folk who will starve to death, rather than "degrade" themselves by asking for help.
Try and define co-operations in a way that they can't re-frame as "surrender."

[MikeF]

Human beings may be RATIONAL, but they are very likely to be UNREASONABLE, and that is where appealing to anything other than their most base instincts. I can show you folk who will starve to death, rather than "degrade" themselves by asking for help.
Try and define co-operations in a way that they can't re-frame as "surrender."

What I struggled most with after the Surge was the reaction of the Sunnis in Zaganiyah. Literally, my friends and neighbors (consisting of doctors, lawyers, and engineers) entered a Hobbesian state after AQI took over the village. After AQ killed or displaced half the town, the remaining civilians took over their neighbor's homes, stole their property and belongings, and even participated in beheadings.

There actions were quite unreasonable.

I continue to struggle with how people can treat each other in such a manner. As I read through the Old Testament and the works of Hobbes, Machiavelli, and John Locke, I have a much more mature understanding of what the authors refered as they describe the state of man. We can be truly ugly in our darkest moments.

v/r

Mike

[marct]

Human beings may be RATIONAL, but they are very likely to be UNREASONABLE, and that is where appealing to anything other than their most base instincts. I can show you folk who will starve to death, rather than "degrade" themselves by asking for help.
Try and define co-operations in a way that they can't re-frame as "surrender."

Rationality is really only applicable within rather limited frames of reference and is totally limited by how people perceive "reality". Wilf, your point about definition is really crucial here. In some cases, it may be best to define cooperation as a "Win" for them coming from a long and intense bargaining session.


I continue to struggle with how people can treat each other in such a manner. As I read through the Old Testament and the works of Hobbes, Machiavelli, and John Locke, I have a much more mature understanding of what the authors refered as they describe the state of man. We can be truly ugly in our darkest moments.

Always good to keep in mind, Mike. At the same time, it is probably also a good thing to remember the flip side - we can produce incredible beauty in our best moments :wry:. Anyone who thinks that we are a rational species needs their head examined :D.

[MikeF]

Rationality is really only applicable within rather limited frames of reference and is totally limited by how people perceive "reality". Wilf, your point about definition is really crucial here. In some cases, it may be best to define cooperation as a "Win" for them coming from a long and intense bargaining session.

Always good to keep in mind, Mike. At the same time, it is probably also a good thing to remember the flip side - we can produce incredible beauty in our best moments :wry:. Anyone who thinks that we are a rational species needs their head examined :D.

One of the most remarkable moments is the democratic experiment that we are fortunate enough to live in. I tend to be a pragmatic optimist as I get older.

To see true beauty, I sit at the beach and watch my daughter collect seashells and play in the sand. The bliss, purity, and innocence of children is remarkable in itself.

v/r

Mike