Size of the Platoon and Company [Archive]

davidbfpo

02-17-2009, 08:50 PM

David, Thanks. I keep forgetting that British Army units were, and are, stationed in Ulster (like 1st (US) AD in WWII). From my reading it sounds like it took over 5 years for the British government to really get a system in place (including rebuilding the Police, getting rid of the B-Specials, and standing up the UDR) - and then about 3-5 more years for the "Internal Security" systems to really have an impact. Am I reading this right? Also ,what was your general impression of the UDR operations? Was that a generally successful model for internal security? I know there were problems, but my impression is that the UDR played a vital role, despite the problems. From your on line info this sounds like your area. Thanks.

"The Troubles" lasted a long time and it simply took a long time for the violence to be contained and reduced to an acceptable level. Violence came from both sides of the communal divide and sadly some collusion by local security forces. This was mainly the UDR and one UK report cited 5-15% had strong links with Protestant paramilitaries; collusion was rarely found in the RUC and to my knowledge not in the regular Army.

The intelligence effort appears to have taken longer to get right and still causes controversy e.g. Omagh bombing and whether GCHQ helped (Try: http://news.bbc.co.uk/panorama/hi/front_page/newsid_7868000/7868236.stm. )

The UDR initially had a significant Catholic minority for a few years, now often overlooked, but by its end it was 99% Protestant. Through out it was mainly a mix of full-time and part-time, locally recruited soldiers - with a cadre of regular UK Army officers and NCOs. IIRC their main role in later years was in the rural areas, the RUC handled the urban areas and rarely had UDR support. Being in the UDR could not be easily hidden in the rural areas and they paid a very high price, often even when retired or had left the UDR (264 dead).

I suspect the UDR initially was a quick fix and politically motivated - to keep loyalist support in uniform. Their existence after many years enabled the UK Army to reduce its numbers and extended "Ulsterisation" in policing to the military in the mid-1970s it was eleven battalions strong and 57,000 served in its history. I am not aware of how vital a role the UDR played, nor can I readily locate an expert comment.

My judgement or comment reflects the fact that the main focus throughout "The Troubles" was that the "hardcore" Republican areas were urban, where the UK Army handed primacy over to the RUC in the mid-1970's, so the UDR's value was not crucial IMHO.

In the rural areas the UDR had an active role long after primacy was handed to the RUC, but the regular UK Army dominated intelligence and surveillance roles.

Many other factors had a part in ending "The Troubles".

Late addition: On my bookshelf and relied upon for much of my response is this book 'Testimony to Courage - the Regimental History of the Ulster Defence Regiment 1969 - 1992', John Potter, Pen & Sword Books Ltd, 2001.

1258dave

02-17-2009, 09:58 PM

David,
Thanks for the response. I realize that building an organization like the Ulster Defense Regiment, and the Home Service Force of the Royal Irish Reg, was a stop gap during the worst part of the war ("troubles") that turned into the "least bad" solution long term.

It is easy to forget that the British Army executed Operation Motorman in 1972 for 6 months with a 28k+ pax Division- not counting the UDR or the Royal Ulster Constab. Add it all up and the Government forces were probably putting close 40k (or more?) armed personnel on the streets (police, Regular Army, UDR, HSF etc).

As an "Full Time" Army National Guardsman - I am always interested in how other "reservist" or "Home Service Force" units organize and operate.

Sabre

02-17-2009, 11:40 PM

My question: What is the optimal size of a platoon? And then, how large the company? Is there a known or preferred (I am sure) maximum? Where do effectiveness and span of control intersect and where do they diverge?

I am primarily focused on the infantry platoon and company. However, comments on other forces would certainly be of interest.

Something that has always interested me...

To answer (part of) the original question, there appears to be a some research evidence that indicates something like 150 people should be the maximum size of a "community", as a rifle company is. Studies were done on various groups by different researchers, and often came to this conclusion, whether it was military company-echelon units, religious communities, or business units within a commercial company. There may be a sort of limit in the way that human brains are "wired" in the average person. Beyond that limit, not everyone "knows" everyone else, and knows where they fit in the organization (i.e., at any given moment you could glance at someone and think "that is so-and-so, from 1st platoon). From personal experience, in a unit that was brought up to full strength at 144, I'd say that did seem to be pushing closer to the limit (this was before I read any of the studies). I also recall support and HQ companies that were massive, up to 300+ personnel, and talking to folks in those companies, the units simply didn't have the same cohesiveness.

Given that units are often notoriously under- strength, and need to be able to absorb casualties, I can't see a reason to make it much less than 150, either. In fact, I'd pack a few more in, just in case. I'd rather have too many, than have a company that melts away too quickly. I would definitely divide the company into at least four platoons (with a smaller fifth "weapons" platoon or section), just so the company commander can have more tactical options beyond "one up, two back" and "two up, one back". From what I have seen, a good company commander can handle five or six platoons just fine, and a bad one can hose things up, even if he only has two platoons to worry about.

Dividing 150, or 160, or more, personnel into four rifle platoons (+ HQ and weapons) means each platoon will have to have maybe... 30 to 36 personnel. As an aside, I don't see a convincing reason that any other company-level unit design can't stay strictly within the 150 limit. Rifle companies are special, in that they are expected (and historically do) take more casualties than other unit types.

Ken White

02-18-2009, 12:00 AM

but I'd rather be ten people short than one man overstrength. Overstrength consumes resources and effort; understrength works harder and poses fewer personnel management problems while easing the control problem.

A rifle squad exists to put at least a man or two left functional on a piece of ground, the difference between six and nine men will be one guy instead of two; got to an 11 man squad and you get maybe three. Got to any other mission and anywhere from five to nine is adequate for most things...

For mounted units, overstrength means crowded vehicles among other things... :D

tankersteve

02-18-2009, 01:29 AM

Sabre, that was the kind of info I was looking for. However, since we are so rarely up to full strength, I am interested in a company design of just (and it's close) under 200, with the four platoons being approximately 45, with their medic and FO. I wonder what things can be done to bring larger organizations to have a closer feel of community. Obviously, training hard together and having competitive sports outside of training will help bond a military organization. But would it suffice for a company that is that robust? I had a tank platoon attached to a Marine infantry battalion in Ramadi, and the weapons company was right at the 200-man mark, and seemed to have good cohesion.

I understand the desire to have more platoons, but that requires more officers and more NCOs and ends up with less Soldiers. There is a fine line out there somewhere between what the average new LT can control and what will overwhelm him. However, with fewer leaders, I see the ability to be more selective in our leaders.

Ken, you have to remember, there is always room for 'one more' in a Bradley, especially when going back to base. :D (I have personally been in the back with 10 not-so-small infantrymen, while towing a disabled Bradley) Being fat on personnel, to me, is never an issue, and I definitely disagree with you on that point. Being short of troops requires me to go to the boss, lay out my whole troop-to-task, and explain that while I CAN do his latest mission, this is what will suffer or not get done.

Note: as a tanker, I have had to deal with the 63-man company, plus attachments and maintenance and been tasked like an infantry company. I was substantially plussed up in Iraq, and didn't have major difficulties accomplishing my missions. However, it made me very partial to more robust organizations. The problem with the tank company is the size of the platoons, though. While they are effective on a tank, they don't offer much for the PL to maneuver with and do not work well off of the tank.

Tankersteve

Ken White

02-18-2009, 02:54 AM

Ken, you have to remember, there is always room for 'one more' in a Bradley, especially when going back to base. :D (I have personally been in the back with 10 not-so-small infantrymen, while towing a disabled Bradley).Believe me, I've seen that. Though primarily a light inf type by strong preference, I've been Cav and Mech -- but we're talking M75 and M113 here... :D

Though this probably isn't the place to get into 'can you top this one?' That's better done over a drink...Being fat on personnel, to me, is never an issue, and I definitely disagree with you on that point. Being short of troops requires me to go to the boss, lay out my whole troop-to-task, and explain that while I CAN do his latest mission, this is what will suffer or not get done.As I said we can disagree. However, I do have a question; serious and no disrespect of anyone or anything intended. Why would you have to go to your Boss and do that? Why have you been given a mission as if someone above is not cognizant of your PFD strength?Note: as a tanker, I have had to deal with the 63-man company, plus attachments and maintenance and been tasked like an infantry company. I was substantially plussed up in Iraq, and didn't have major difficulties accomplishing my missions. However, it made me very partial to more robust organizations. The problem with the tank company is the size of the platoons, though. While they are effective on a tank, they don't offer much for the PL to maneuver with and do not work well off of the tank.Tanks -- been there done that, too -- obviously are different on the matter of strength; a tank pretty well has to be full. I've always contended that Tank Cos ought to have the Security section in Co Hq -- four full crews -- as potential replacements; they'll be necessary in MIC or hotter. Infantry, OTOH...:cool:

William F. Owen

02-18-2009, 06:19 AM

Will,
How does the 12 man sqd work?
Is the SQD LDR part of one of the fire teams?
Is the medic organic?
What does the PLT HQ look like?
The 12 man squad works just like the USMC arrangement except, as far as I can tell, the squad leader is IN one the fireteams. Don't know about the medic. I think every platoon has one, and not sure about the PLT HQ, though based on what I have heard from the class of 67' 73' and 82, an officer carrying his own radio, IS a platoon HQ!
Why only one MMG (PICKEM DEEP, the P=pairs right?) and why not a SAW in every fire team? I'm still exploring this one. THis is my general impression, based on talking to folks. Something critical to understand is that the IDF is extremely informal and adapts to circumstance very quickly. No two platoons seem to be the same!
And the big question: what is the impact of conscription? If any?
The impact is that the infantry gets very high quality manpower, and places for the infantry are oversubscribed in some units.
Seperate question: have you seen tests with a PLT built with 6 x 5 pax Fire Teams? The UK tested 5 x 4 man fire teams and it worked extremely well, in the attack - but that was the only thing tested. The 6 x 5 man teams is merely an enhancement

Sabre

02-18-2009, 06:43 PM

Sabre, that was the kind of info I was looking for. However, since we are so rarely up to full strength, I am interested in a company design of just (and it's close) under 200, with the four platoons being approximately 45, with their medic and FO. I wonder what things can be done to bring larger organizations to have a closer feel of community. Obviously, training hard together and having competitive sports outside of training will help bond a military organization. But would it suffice for a company that is that robust? I had a tank platoon attached to a Marine infantry battalion in Ramadi, and the weapons company was right at the 200-man mark, and seemed to have good cohesion.
Tankersteve

Heh, when I design a rifle company, I end up with 180ish personnel.
USMC Rifle Co's clock in at what, just over 180?
Army Rifle Co's are (with FO's and medics) just under 150.

I don't know that 150 is a "hard" limit, but stray too far away, and at some point (perhaps past 200?) things will not go so smoothly.

Perhaps cohesiveness was a poor choice of words. I think that it is more about "knowing" everyone. In combat, that means details about them that could be very important. I catch sight of someone, and I should know their name, so I have a better chance of getting their attention, and I know where they fit in the organization (that is so-and-so, from 1st platoon - and what the heck is someone from 1st platoon doing there???), and hopefully, I know a little about them (perhaps some idea of how agressive they are, any special skills, etc). I can envision situations where these little details can make a big difference.
I'm not sure that there is too much that you can do to enhance things for a large organization - one with, say, 300 pax. How could you change the 3-to-6 span of control, for example? At battalion and above, you can have a staff to handle all of the "moving parts", but not really at company and below.

That's my understanding of it, anyway.

As a side-note, I find it interesting that the Army seems to be loath to add additional leadership at the company or below level (e.g., a company gunny), which in the current BCT designs would have "cost" 6 to 12 people in total, but will happily add 40 staffers to each BCT...

Ken White

02-18-2009, 07:14 PM

Heh, when I design a rifle company, I end up with 180ish personnel...I don't know that 150 is a "hard" limit, but stray too far away, and at some point (perhaps past 200?) things will not go so smoothly.However, lately I've been rethinking that as some comments here triggered my recall of being in a ROTAD Rifle Company in the 101st long time ago. Four Rifle Platoons, weapons Platoon and Co Hq for a net (IIRC) of 233. It was definitely unwieldy...As a side-note, I find it interesting that the Army seems to be loath to add additional leadership at the company or below level (e.g., a company gunny), which in the current BCT designs would have "cost" 6 to 12 people in total, but will happily add 40 staffers to each BCT...True. Really dumb -- but true...

Rifleman

02-19-2009, 01:04 AM

I've got two thoughts about the light rifle company:

1) Don't put Designated Marksmen/sharpshooters in platoons and squads full time. Instead, have a DM squad in the company weapons platoon led by a senior staff sergeant for training and administration. Attach a couple of teams out to each platoon for operations as needed. The platoon leader can further attach them out to squads if needed.

2) Would it be so hard for the Army to have a WO program similar to the Marine Gunners? One WO weapons specialist per rifle company? Perhaps leading the weapons platoon? Seems to me he might also temporarily take over a rifle platoon if the situation demanded; rifle platoon leader casualties, etc.

Does the Army have enough SFCs and SSGs for an Infantry WO pipeline? Is this feasable?

tankersteve

02-19-2009, 01:21 AM

Ken,

This usually is more of a garrison requirement, but frequently in OIF, a new mission would arise. Sometimes this was from the Good Idea Fairy, sometimes it supported improving the security in the populace. And it became difficult for the battalion HQ to track the things I was doing. For instance, in Tal Afar, some of my tasks in my company were:

Maintain limited visibility overwatch all night, every night along a 3.5 km stretch of the outer ring highway, the MSR for the brigade FOB. 2 tanks could do this, but we usually split the time into 2 4-5 hour periods, thus consuming a whole platoon.

Maintain random nighttime patrol presence in some of the neighborhoods - prevented the bigger booms by never giving the enemy a chance to emplace HMMWV-killing (or bigger) IEDs, such as 3ACR had previously in my sector. Now in hindsight, don't think this was the best way to do it, but my method then was through a pretty high optempo.

Each platoon partner and conduct a joint patrol with IA every single day. Later, this got turned into every U.S. patrol had IA with it.

Patrols during the day, focused on a neighborhood, looking at gathering atmospherics, looking for ways to interact with the neighborhood, etc. We were not experts in COIN but we kind of understood that talking to the locals was important. This was pre 3-24 (COIN manual) so we fumbled alot. We should have been gathering info like census and complete demographics.

Assist my Fire Support section with IP partnership, sometimes requiring a squad or platoon for patrols or training.

Maintain 24/7 COP defense - nighttime visits to local houses or random patrols, 4-man guard force.

Escort EOD in sector. I had the EOD team living with me (for good reason, unfortunately).

Maintain QRF ability at +10 minutes (usually quite less). If I had 2 platoons in sector, I could designate either to be the QRF. If only 1, then I had to have one from the COP.

Maintain liaison with IA battalion, assisting however I was able. Lots of visits, lots of chai, lots of planning, discussions, getting to know (and genuinely like) each other. Many combined operations, including everything done at a larger scale.

In addition, other things that came up were:

Some actionable intel, with night-time cordon and search.
Escort TPT or THT (I liked TPT, never found value with our THT, but that is a discussion for another thread).
Hospital liaison visits, IP station visits, Sheik visits, CMO projects (quite a bit - bn cdr wanted money spent!), Cave and ravine searches, joint training opportunities, new patrol base recon, admin movement support (meetings at bn hq, hauling generator back to the FOB, etc).

My BN CDR was pretty good about managing missions with his companies, but sometimes things came down that didn't get a lot of mental muscle from the staff. I was always taught that you didn't say you couldn't do something, you said that I can do the mission but here is what I won't be able to do or do at the same level. In Iraq, you have many directed missions, but so many that you pick up on your own, due to variances in each company AO, that the battalion doesn't always realize how busy you are.

Sorry for my long post, but I found it rather cathartic. There is the haunting that every commander lives with after his combat tour, about what he did and didn't do, and how he could have done things differently. Being at NTC, and reliving Iraq every month, can be a mixed bag for this.

Tankersteve

Ken White

02-19-2009, 02:16 AM

limited knowledge expanded.

My BN CDR was pretty good about managing missions with his companies, but sometimes things came down that didn't get a lot of mental muscle from the staff. I was always taught that you didn't say you couldn't do something, you said that I can do the mission but here is what I won't be able to do or do at the same level. In Iraq, you have many directed missions, but so many that you pick up on your own, due to variances in each company AO, that the battalion doesn't always realize how busy you are.Understand all the missions and can visualize most ( I hate Chai... :( ). Thanks. Only comment to that is that IMO your Bn doesn't need to know what you're doing in anything near total knowledge but should be enough aware that barring an urgent situation, they wouldn't task you to do things that degrade the total mission. I didn't say that well but I'm sure you know what I mean -- adding that I wasn't there so that's just a generic comment.Sorry for my long post, but I found it rather cathartic. There is the haunting that every commander lives with after his combat tour, about what he did and didn't do, and how he could have done things differently.I know. Some things 42, 58 years ago I still wonder about -- and know what I should've done in others. I appreciate the length and detail. Being at NTC, and reliving Iraq every month, can be a mixed bag for this.I can imagine but my spies tell me you guys are doing good stuff out there now. Units still try to do too much and I'm sure Joe gets as much jerk around due to that as ever but it's better than its ever been. You guys do good work.

Thanks again for the education.

02-19-2009, 07:44 PM

The big Marine Infantry Squads (13 x 3) = 39
Platoon Ldr, Platoon Sgt, Radioman x 3 = 9 = 126
Weapons platoon to reach the 180 figure is 54
personnel for MG sections and assorted items that
fly thru the air and go boom and a Plt. Ldr, Plt. Sgt and Radioman.

Ability to absorb casualties, cover more ground in defensive postions and in the assualt. Firepower volumne 1/3 higher than the 9 man US Army Squad.

Six and a half decades of proven combat power and effectivness.

This ground has been covered in the Squad thread. Especially the first four pages of that tome.

The conversation petered out because the ground had been plowed to dust.

I'm still looking forward to the 12 man Marine Squad critique based on a tour in Afganistan.

It makes the platoons only 3 men lighter and the 180 reduced to 171 at the standard Company level.

A mere pittance in power loss, but perhaps an efficency under fire drop without 9 stand alone Squad Leaders fighting their 3 - 4 man Fire Teams.

tankersteve

02-19-2009, 09:48 PM

Unfortunately, I didn't see the specific details on the company size before, so I do appreciate that. And you did answer the question on the size of the company - big companies are doable. Since the Marine squad (as you pointed out unchanged in 6 1/2 decades) may be changed, this discussion is definitely not over. Sounds like even the USMC isn't completely satisfied or sees room for improvement?

However, while I understand that other armies have the squad leader also leading one of the fire teams (all of them perhaps smaller squads, i.e., 8 men), I see the Marine squad as much more optimal, especially with a focus on more decentralized operations. As the SL starts performing duties typically identified with a platoon commander (in a COIN environment), he will have less time to directly deal with the 3 men in his fireteam. Plus, with this big a squad, it definitely seems advantageous to have the SL free to look at a larger picture. I am not sure where the benefit is, other than reducing 27 junior Marines from each battalion structure.

This seems to be nickel and diming the manpower - be careful where this leads, as the US Army went this way several decades ago, and look at where we are now!

Question: Where are the FO/ANGLICO the company uses, or is the platoon commander/platoon sergeant and squad leaders expected to do all their own call for fires? Are they in the weapons platoon or attached from a supporting artillery unit, as the Army does? Corpsmen the same way or within the battalion? When scheming my company structure, without attachments such as a commo guy for the HQ and 5 medics and the forward observer element, the total size is 184, right in line with what the Marines are at now.

Thanks.

And Ken, not trying to insult your intelligence or experience :o, just wanted to break out the whole gamut of duties/missions that tend to get lost in the sauce by higher HQs.

Tankersteve

Ken White

02-19-2009, 10:14 PM

And Ken, not trying to insult your intelligence or experience :o, just wanted to break out the whole gamut of duties/missions that tend to get lost in the sauce by higher HQs.Thanks again for the effort, I learned some specifics, some new things I hadn't thought of and got some thoughts confirmed. Good laydown for many of us, I suspect. Done similar things, yes -- but in a different place and time with different gear and rules; every war is different and thinking there's nothing new is dangerous. Since I'm violently opposed to both violence and danger, learning is where it's at. ;)

Ungrammtical but correct... :cool:

jmm99

02-20-2009, 05:07 AM

Happened to run into this old (1984) MG article (http://www.mca-marines.org/gazette/jun08_hammes_rethinking_rifle_squad.asp), which seemed interesting to me for the pros and cons raised - and the author, then CPT T X Hammes.

02-22-2009, 04:51 AM

Ken White

02-22-2009, 05:46 AM

was more like Forrest Tucker's role in Sands. The perennial Corporal, I screwed off a lot unless I really had to do sumpn... ;)

Semper Fi, yourself. Guns up...

P.S.

I'm with you; seen a lot of different organizations and the old K Series Marine Rifle Company worked as well as any and better than most. Great for training young NCOs, the Army squad with two fire teams doesn't do as well. We also agree on MG Platoons...

Rifleman

02-22-2009, 05:50 AM

I believe the 12-man squad that was being considered consisted of two fire teams and a C2 team. I can't remember the proposed make up of the C2 team. Was it SL, FO, RTO, and Corpsman?

I believe the change was intended to make the squad more of a stand alone unit for LIC, COIN, etc. I don't know if the USMC is still considering the change.

That's the best I remember from the reading I've gone; but, likely, I've gotten some details wrong. Someone in the know chime in and correct me.

Rifleman

02-22-2009, 05:52 AM

was more like Forrest Tucker's role in Sands. The perennial Corporal, I screwed off a lot unless I really had to do sumpn... ;)

But you saw the light and was born again.....as a paratrooper NCO! :p

02-22-2009, 10:33 PM

Tankersteve posted -

Question: Where are the FO/ANGLICO the company uses, or is the platoon commander/platoon sergeant and squad leaders expected to do all their own call for fires? Are they in the weapons platoon or attached from a supporting artillery unit, as the Army does? Corpsmen the same way or within the battalion? When scheming my company structure, without attachments such as a commo guy for the HQ and 5 medics and the forward observer element, the total size is 184, right in line with what the Marines are at now.

Back in the day FO's and Anglico teams were attached to the CO. HQ. Today, Squad leaders and even Fire Team leaders are trained to communicate with Artillery and FAC's. I have read about junior NCO's handling communications often enough that they could tell who the pilots were by their voices as well as their "handles" in the march up the Bagdad.

Rifleman,

The old ratio was one Corpsman for each platoon, with a Senior Corpsman atttached to the Company. 5 per company. A lot of water has passed under the bridge since Vietnam and a lot of communication gear has been introduced to the rank and file. Attaching a Corpsman to a specific Squad is how it is done. I don't think they would become a member of the squad T/O.

Tanker Steve,

One of the Marine Infantry NCO building blocks has always been the Squad Leader position. This is the first major step in developing Junior NCO to grow up to become Marine Gunnery Sargents. I don't think the ARMY has a corresponding rank that compares to Gunnery Sgt. They have the same pay grade, of course, but the responsibility and efficiency levels are much different.

Ken White posted -

"P.S.

I'm with you; seen a lot of different organizations and the old K Series Marine Rifle Company worked as well as any and better than most. Great for training young NCOs, the Army squad with two fire teams doesn't do as well. We also agree on MG Platoons... "

Thanks, Ken. I firmly believe the early responsibility for 12other Marines is the keystone of every senior Marine NCOs career. It teaches you the importance of discipline and how to think fast and outside the box when under great stress. And I believe the Big Marine Squad will remain a cornerstone in the Afghan War for applying power and absorbing punishment while coninuing the fight.

Ken White

02-22-2009, 10:49 PM

But you saw the light and was born again.....as a paratrooper NCO! :pI just grew up.

A teeny bit. :D

COMMAR

02-25-2009, 07:48 AM

Thanks for the Redux - here we are 25 years further down the Squad debate role and the United States Marine Corps is still using the Big 13 man squad and considering a 1 man reduction to a 12 man squad.

Does anyone know exactly what the set up is on the expirmental 12 man squad that is being looked at?

Was the stand alone Squad Leader over 3 Fire Teams the casualty?

Semper Fi, KW!

No, no don't worry the lone SqLdr has not been KIA.

The shift was part of what was Distributed Ops & has now shifted to Enhanced Company Operations.

The Marine Infantry Platoon remains at 44, 43 Marines & 1 Corpsman.

3x 13 man Squad, + Radio Operator, Plt Guide, Plt Sgt, & Plt Cmdr.

What changes, is the ability to shift the Plt Structure to best exploit opportunities.

At that time one boot fr/ each squad will shift to the HQ section creating 2 Plt C2's.

C2-A: Plt Cmdr, RTO, Plt Gde, & 1 of the Rifleman.
C2-B: Plt Sgt, Corpsman, 2 other Rifleman.

3x 12man Squads: The Squad now becomes a 2 team Manuever element but the SqLdr technically doesn't join the 3rd team he still moves independently directing the actions of the 2 manuever tms.

The 3rd tm however form a C2 Cell: The Fire Team Ldr now becomes the Fires Coordination Chief, 1 of the Rifleman becomes the Squad Radio Operator, & the other Rifleman is the Combat Lifesaver.

There's even talk of bringing the Loose Rifleman in the C2 back as the Squad DM to provide overwatch.

This might really freak you out.

There's even talk of splitting the squad even further into 6 man elements to Operate like 6 man Sniper teams for tracking, disruption, & sabotage bringing back the Old "Hunter/Killer Teams" fr/ the Vietnam War.

Kiwigrunt

02-25-2009, 09:47 AM

This might really freak you out.

Sure does. So if I get this right, 20 out of a total of 44 now form 5 seperate 4 man HQ elements within the platoon?!?! To lead 6 x 4 man fire teams.:confused::rolleyes:

Rifleman

02-25-2009, 07:29 PM

This might really freak you out.

There's even talk of splitting the squad even further into 6 man elements to Operate like 6 man Sniper teams for tracking, disruption, & sabotage bringing back the Old "Hunter/Killer Teams" fr/ the Vietnam War.

Wilf,

Take heart bud. If true, someone's listening. Not exactly what you propose but getting closer. They didn't day, "Patrol Base Infantry" or, "Fire Team Group" but they're getting close to your concept.

A little bit of RLI influence in there too, maybe?

02-26-2009, 12:30 AM

Commar posted - The shift was part of what was Distributed Ops & has now shifted to Enhanced Company Operations.

"The Marine Infantry Platoon remains at 44, 43 Marines & 1 Corpsman.

3x 13 man Squad, + Radio Operator, Plt Guide, Plt Sgt, & Plt Cmdr.

What changes, is the ability to shift the Plt Structure to best exploit opportunities.

At that time one boot fr/ each squad will shift to the HQ section creating 2 Plt C2's.

C2-A: Plt Cmdr, RTO, Plt Gde, & 1 of the Rifleman.
C2-B: Plt Sgt, Corpsman, 2 other Rifleman.

3x 12man Squads: The Squad now becomes a 2 team Manuever element but the SqLdr technically doesn't join the 3rd team he still moves independently directing the actions of the 2 manuever tms.

The 3rd tm however form a C2 Cell: The Fire Team Ldr now becomes the Fires Coordination Chief, 1 of the Rifleman becomes the Squad Radio Operator, & the other Rifleman is the Combat Lifesaver.

There's even talk of bringing the Loose Rifleman in the C2 back as the Squad DM to provide overwatch.

This might really freak you out.

There's even talk of splitting the squad even further into 6 man elements to Operate like 6 man Sniper teams for tracking, disruption, & sabotage bringing back the Old "Hunter/Killer Teams" fr/ the Vietnam War."

Commar - No freaking out is allowed in the Marine Infantry!

Actually your telling me, nothing has changed. We always had the ability to reconfigure the platoons for different situations.

Pulling a single rifleman from each Squad doesn't disrupt the three manuever elements (Fireteams) at all. They still function as 3 fireteams under the direction of the Squad leader. They retain 3 automatic weapons and 35 rifles including the squad leaders rifle. The Marine Big 3 FT Squad was designed to accomodate casualties expected during the Island Campaigns in the Pacific during the beach assualt phase.

Your "The 3rd tm however form a C2 Cell: The Fire Team Ldr now becomes the Fires Coordination Chief, 1 of the Rifleman becomes the Squad Radio Operator, & the other Rifleman is the Combat Lifesaver." seems to me to be whimsical and a big reduction in the force application 12 man squad can provide. Fires Coordination Chief (What is the Plt. Cmdr. going to do. Or the SL himself? )

Squad Radio Operator. I suspect todays Squad Leaders can already communicate with their fellow Squad Leaders should the need arise. (Shouting useta work for me. or sending a rifleman as a runner if electronics are jammed, and hand and arm signals worked in the line of sight mode very well)

The SL might have helmet or handheld comm gear that can specify Company, Paltoon or Squad nets in todays world.

Explain what a Combat Life Saver is????. We useta call them Corpsmen.

And while some think the (DM) Designated Marksman is a new deal, the Marine Rifle Squad Leader knew who his best shots were and utilized them for long range killing fire when the opportunity presented itself. The DM designation today lets other Marines know that the new guy who transfered in from another Regt. or Division was rated a superior shooter.

When you said the third team becomes 3rd C2 Cel?

Is that the short team from each Squad? The numbers don't work if the third team becomes C2-C The Squad has become your standard 9 man Meck and Lite Infantry Squad
not two bigger elements of 6 and 5 + the SL = 12.

C2-A: Plt Cmdr, RTO, Plt Gde, & 1 of the Rifleman.
C2-B: Plt Sgt, Corpsman, 2 other Rifleman.
C2-C: Fires Coordinator Chief, Squad Radio Operator, Combat Life Saver.

Does this mean that the Right Guide can't be the Fires
Coordinator? Or the Plootoon Sgt.

Seems to me that the message may have gotten garbled during the sorce translation.

Perhaps someone can clairfiy the juggling!

Especially this description of the squad becoming two 6 man elements, er, one 6 and one 5 men elements with an independent SL, should he not want to join one of the elements.

The Irish have a new whiskey on the shelves now. It comes from County Down. It is called "Feckin Irish Whiskey" - I kid you not! That bottle sells in PA for $23.95

I will venture to guess that someone has been tasting that particular brand because as described above the is fecked up.

Does the US Army have people in the infantry who are called Fires Coordinators, Squad Radio Operators and Combat Lifesavers?

If this has been a test and I tripped the winning lever -

I will accept a bottle of Powers Gold Lable Irish Whiskey.
It is two bucks cheaper than Feckin Irish Whiskey and it is much smoother. Dangerously smoother! :wry:

Ken White

02-26-2009, 01:49 AM

Actually your telling me, nothing has changed. We always had the ability to reconfigure the platoons for different situations.I'm too old to go memory trippin'. :D

Howsomeever, I have run a squad with two five man Fire teams (me, SL as one FTL -- short three people, no other Corporals); have run two FT, a seven man assault element with two Cpls and all three BARs in a Base of Fire Team for four with me going where I could do the least harm...

Several other variants. I recall one effort of three weeks or so where we had a Platoon with a PSgt (Acting Plat Cdr), RTO and with five or six teams with four to six people. Whatever worked.Explain what a Combat Life Saver is????. We useta call them Corpsmen.Different. Cbt Lifesaver is the 0311 with some medical training and an IV pack to give immediate first aid. varies from unit to unit, in the Army some have one per FT, some get almost everyone qualified; the Corpsman or Medic is still with the PL/PSG. It works in these FID situations, is less likely to do so in a war of movement against a peer opponent; then it'll be "get his ammo and keep moving..."And while some think the (DM) Designated Marksman is a new deal, the Marine Rifle Squad Leader knew who his best shots were and utilized them for long range killing fire when the opportunity presented itself. The DM designation today lets other Marines know that the new guy who transfered in from another Regt. or Division was rated a superior shooter.True, J. M. Hayes, Commanche from some little town outside of Lubbock comes to mind. I got him one of those '03s with a Unertl scope and he almost cried when they picked it up to send back to Quantico for re-scoping.Does the US Army have people in the infantry who are called Fires Coordinators, Squad Radio Operators and Combat Lifesavers?Yes, no (All god's chillun got radios) and yes.I will accept a bottle of Powers Gold Lable Irish Whiskey. It is two bucks cheaper than Feckin Irish Whiskey and it is much smoother. Dangerously smoother! :wry:Upgrade your game, RJ Good bourbon costs more but it's worth it... :D

Semper Fi

Or is that Semper Stimuli today...

COMMAR

02-26-2009, 04:45 AM

When you said the third team becomes 3rd C2 Cel?

Is that the short team from each Squad? The numbers don't work if the third team becomes C2-C The Squad has become your standard 9 man Meck and Lite Infantry Squad not two bigger elements of 6 and 5 + the SL = 12.

C2-A: Plt Cmdr, RTO, Plt Gde, & 1 of the Rifleman.
C2-B: Plt Sgt, Corpsman, 2 other Rifleman.
C2-C: Fires Coordinator Chief, Squad Radio Operator, Combat Life Saver.

Does this mean that the Right Guide can't be the Fires
Coordinator? Or the Plootoon Sgt.

Seems to me that the message may have gotten garbled during the sorce translation.

Perhaps someone can clairfiy the juggling!

I'll give a shot... 1st keep in mind that this is going to be at levels of Dispersion well BEYOND any previous Infantry Plt. The Plt's could be Operating at anywhere fr/ 5km-50km+ fr/ the Company or BN.

Each Squad could be patrolling at anywhere fr/ 1-10km from the PltCmdr/PltSgt. Each Fire Team at up to a km fr/ the SqLdr.

The EACH Squad becomes:
2x 4 man Fire Teams
1x 4 man C2 team made up of:
1x SL
1x Fires Chief(former 3rd tm ldr)- Draws up complex Fire Mission including Level II CAS, much like a 0861 Fire Support Specialist(lite).
1x Squad RTO- Operating at extended ranges the Sqd will need a VHF band to talk back to the Plt & SATCOM to reach back for Fires.
1x Combat Life Saver

Each Sqd when Dispersed will set up this way, to cover large swaths of land.

The Plt Cdr & Plt Sgt will each form separate Plt Command Cells:
Switching ON/OFF relieving each other they will control the overall actions in the AO 24/7. Everything fr/ Processing Intel, to assigning targets, to Handle Logistics, etc. basically operate like a CO HQ.

[/QUOTE]Especially this description of the squad becoming two 6 man elements, er, one 6 and one 5 men elements with an independent SL, should he not want to join one of the elements.[/QUOTE]

They haven't really released many details on this one yet. It was going to be utilized but is now on the shelf but is still being introduced, though not to the extent it was orignally designed to be utilized in. It is being intro'd in a package w/ the new program COMBAT HUNTER.

In the CH program Marines learn to conduct Advanced Forms of Observation & Surveillance, Camouflage & Concealment, Stalking &Tracking, & Individual Profiling of whole towns & villages. Building Profiles on suspicious individuals & activities fr/ a concealed position for capture & disruption.

The Closing event is breaking into 6man Tracking teams to track an Individual for capture or elimination.

[/QUOTE]Explain what a Combat Life Saver is????. We useta call them Corpsmen.[/QUOTE]

Combat Lifesaver is a program the Corps started in '02. 1 Marine fr/each squad is trained in CL Course which was basically a Combat Medic Course (lite).

Needles for IV, Trachea tubes for breathing etc. its a very in depth course. I believe the Army requires it now also.

Also K.I.M. this also ties into the future Concept of the "SC MAGTF" in which 1 Marine BN each would be spread across a whole Theater Command in Company sized Detachments.

These CO-DETs would be based either at sea or in friendly nations around particular regions and send out Plt sized Dets to various nations in that region to conduct various FID training missions.

These would be 6mth Deployments w/ certain Regiments Specializing in certain Regions therefore sending the same units to the same areas continuously, developing a Repoirte w/ the locals, but most importantly vital constant intel.

02-26-2009, 05:56 AM

COMMAR,

Thank you for the indepth explaination. My apologies, for being terse and a little edgy. I think I'm becoming a curmudgeon.

I really appreciate the peek at this new concept. It is an eye opener. The Afghan War will be the proving ground for this application of force by Squad sized units..

With the ability to call upon Artillery and Air will really multiply the Squads impact and in turn the wider dispersal of Squads will allow a Platoon do the work of a Company, or even a Battalion if the stars are lined up right..

The Second Marine Division is standing up a Marine Expeditionary Brigade for Afghanistan this Spring/Summer and I hope some of the units in that MEB will employ the concepts listed above.

And the US Army is sending its first Stryker Brigade there as well.

Interesting times. A lot of new "stuff" to get the wrinkles
smoothed out.

The Fires Coordinator, Combat Lifesaver and Squad radio operator now make sense.

Thanks again!

William F. Owen

02-26-2009, 11:44 AM

Wilf,

Take heart bud. If true, someone's listening. Not exactly what you propose but getting closer. They didn't day, "Patrol Base Infantry" or, "Fire Team Group" but they're getting close to your concept.

A little bit of RLI influence in there too, maybe?

Eyh! As long as the thinking gets out there, I'm happy. I'm not so much interested in the detail as the thinking that gets put behind it.

What they'll end up with is an organisation that fits the culture, and that IS important, but it's not necessarily best practice.

COMMAR

02-26-2009, 07:04 PM

With the ability to call upon Artillery and Air will really multiply the Squads impact and in turn the wider dispersal of Squads will allow a Platoon do the work of a Company, or even a Battalion if the stars are lined up right..

The Second Marine Division is standing up a Marine Expeditionary Brigade for Afghanistan this Spring/Summer and I hope some of the units in that MEB will employ the concepts listed above.

You've actually seen light flashes of it in one form or another since '04 Marines went into Anbar & started Distibuting Plt's out in COPs 60-70mi fr/the BN HQ.

It was seen & proven effective in Full Glory in a deployment of a Platoon that attached to the US Army's 10th Mtn in '06.

But its doubtful if they'll fully unleash it again for a few yrs, although Combat Hunter is standard PTP now. They want to get all the bugs worked out of the "Enhanced Company Operations", ECO Concept, before they fully expose it.

I don't see that happening until they solve Logistics & that won't be for another few yrs. They have alot of good ideas in the works but it will be 1-3yrs until they're proven effective.

Actually a few of the Log ideas are slated to be proven in A'stan next yr. One is the Ultralite J-PAD, the GPS guided parachute resupply system of about 200-700lbs of gear.

Another is the AH-6X "Little Bird" UAV slated to be able to carry 4 Marines, weapons, & over 2,000lbs of payload AUTONOMOUSLY. Now that is some serious Juice.

At about $5mil a pop, even at 10, if you could get 3-6 of them allocated per Dispersed Company it would change the game. They can be used for Log & Resupply, Manuever, CasEvac, Weapons Platform, Surveillance & Reconnaissance, the possibilities are endless..

"Future Weapons" video clip.
http://awwar.com/Military-Weapons/Aircraft/AH-6X-Little-Bird-UAV

Ken White

02-26-2009, 07:12 PM

COMMAR said:"Combat Lifesaver is a program the Corps started in '02. 1 Marine fr/each squad is trained in CL Course which was basically a Combat Medic Course (lite).

Needles for IV, Trachea tubes for breathing etc. its a very in depth course. I believe the Army requires it now also.The Army introduced the program in 1985, firmly pushed it into full execution in 1988. Troops from the 82d on an MTT to get Canada's first rotation to Kandahar were responsible for the Canadians also adopting the program.

We can all learn from each other. ;)

03-08-2009, 04:40 AM

The widely disbursed platoons and squads could be protected by this new artillery concept in Afganistan 24/7.

The Marine Corps Times posted this today about a Marine Reserve artillery battery in Helmand Provience

The reservists with Battery D, 2nd Battalion, 14th Marines, had been at Camp Barber only three weeks in February when they conducted a successful field test of their High Mobility Artillery Rocket System, a first for any Marine unit operating in Afghanistan and a sign of what’s in store for the insurgency there, officials said in a news release.

HiMARS is more advanced than a traditional howitzer, Maj. Frankie P. Delgado, battery commander, said in the release. With its three-man crew, the system cradles six 200-pound rockets. Its range can exceed 40 miles, and the rockets, guided by a Global Positioning System, are accurate to within 26 feet.

Has the US Army used HiMARS in Iraq or Afganistan?

Any pros or cons on the rockets and their accuracy would be appreciated.

Will the Squad or Platoons be the FO elements for this 40 mile radius weapon?

William F. Owen

03-08-2009, 07:44 AM

Has the US Army used HiMARS in Iraq or Afganistan?

Any pros or cons on the rockets and their accuracy would be appreciated.

Will the Squad or Platoons be the FO elements for this 40 mile radius weapon?

Dunno, but the UK has been using GMLRS for the last 2 years. Last I heard, airspace de-confliction meant that missions took about 12 mins from request to attack.

Remember rockets attack in the low trajectory, so there are issues there, but in this day an age, it's not much of a step forward.

jcustis

03-08-2009, 11:42 AM

Dunno, but the UK has been using GMLRS for the last 2 years. Last I heard, airspace de-confliction meant that missions took about 12 mins from request to attack.

Remember rockets attack in the low trajectory, so there are issues there, but in this day an age, it's not much of a step forward.

Accuracy differences between the systems are indeed significant steps forward.

03-08-2009, 01:23 PM

What is the re-load time for the 3 man crew handling 6 200 pound rockets?

Can the individual six pack's handle multiple targets?

What's the TOT at maximum range of a rocket?

How fast can a battery shoot and scoot?

Can the rounds (rockets) be lazered to the target?

Can the launchers be sling hauled by helo and what is the smallest helo in the inventory capable of lifting them?

William F. Owen

03-08-2009, 02:01 PM

Accuracy differences between the systems are indeed significant steps forward.

For MLRS it's a step forward but for we've had <8m accuracy for some time. I think Copperhead, was around during GW1 and there has been a similar Russian systems in service for the last 5 years.

I fully accept it's an improvement, but it's not a game changer. Go back 30 years and 207mm artillery could hit bridges and individual vehicles, in the low trajectory, though it required some adjustment of fire.

William F. Owen

03-08-2009, 02:06 PM

What is the re-load time for the 3 man crew handling 6 200 pound rockets?
Doesn't MLRS have an auto-loader?
Can the individual six pack's handle multiple targets? Yes
What's the TOT at maximum range of a rocket? Well over 1 minute according to someone I know.
How fast can a battery shoot and scoot? I think the "battery" is now one vehicle.
Can the rounds (rockets) be lazered to the target? The Israelis have had a laser guided MLRS round for some time.
Can the launchers be sling hauled by helo and what is the smallest helo in the inventory capable of lifting them? I think CH-47 can sling lift HiMARS.
You may want to look at this (http://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/15schreyach.pdf)

jcustis

03-08-2009, 03:48 PM

For MLRS it's a step forward but for we've had <8m accuracy for some time. I think Copperhead, was around during GW1 and there has been a similar Russian systems in service for the last 5 years.

I fully accept it's an improvement, but it's not a game changer. Go back 30 years and 207mm artillery could hit bridges and individual vehicles, in the low trajectory, though it required some adjustment of fire.

Wilf,

I totally disagree on the terms of the game changing or not, and here is why:

In this day and age, low CEP delivery systems have everything to do with the decision to employ those fires in the midst of a collateral damage calculus. I don't think Copperhead is really a player when you look at the comparative ranges involved, and the target designation requirement. You don't need to designate with the rocket systems.

HIMARS and the GMLRS rockets it employs are like night and day when compared to a Copperhead round, when you take into account the GPS guidance package.

In this day and age...in our small wars...we are frequently presented with a tactical problem that doesn't allow for adjusted fires. Pin-point accuracy (yes, a relative term) is required.

And as for airspace deconfliction, I'm not so sure that the rocket systems present a different problem than standard tube artillery. The three forms of deconfliction remain the same whether the round is dumb or not - lateral separation, separation by time, and separation by altitude. Determining the rocket path and telling aircraft to stay above or to the side of that path is an easy proposition, even if the rocket is going to alter it's course enroute; the stay-above has to be easy to plot and account for. Clearance delays are likely imposed due to the nature of the C2 system employed, not the calculations involved. Tighten up the procedures and all you have to deal with is flight time.

Am I a rocket fanatic? No...but if I can be ranged by rocket artillery where tubes cannot play, I''m not going to look down my nose at the support. :D

William F. Owen

03-08-2009, 09:05 PM

Wilf,

I totally disagree on the terms of the game changing or not, and here is why:

So what we might be "disagreeing" over is the expression "game change?"

GMLRS is a good thing, but it's just one stick in the golf bag, and it's advantages are all relative - that is my point. GMLRS is not, in and of itself going to alter how the infantry work. I base this purely on an historical perspective.

There are numerous precision fires technologies, such as Loitering Munitions, GPS and laser guided weapons and even armed UAVs which will all bring highly reactive accurate supporting fires to the combined arms battle, but as you yourself have alluded, the challenge remains the C2/C3I.

tankersteve

03-09-2009, 03:01 AM

Cavguy

03-09-2009, 05:27 AM

Gents,

Army used GMLRS, from tracked MRLS launchers, extensively in Iraq. I am not sure if it is used in Afghanistan yet although I am pretty sure that either the 82d or 18th Airborne artillery were to get the HIMARS.

In Ramadi, the GMLRS allowed one to drop an entire building with very little damage to adjacent buildings. I have a great video feed of a GMLRS destroying a car being used by an IED emplacement team. So if you want to talk about accuracy, it can take out a stationary car on a city street.

Tube artillery is right in the game. Copperhead is pretty much forgotten as designating with a laser and getting the correct reflection angle was apparently more work than it was worth. Now we have Excalibur with the same capabilities as GMLRS but with less range and a greatly reduced warhead size.

All this does is give the commander multiple options, with different warheads providing different collateral damage radii. And yes, there really is an upper airspace deconfliction piece when shooting GMLRS.

Tankersteve

Steve,

I coordinated in that GMLRS you mention on the Racetrack (http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=f61_1190294791). A week prior 1/6 MAR lost 4 marines to an IED which annihlated a HMMWV at that very location. It was some sweet payback. The leaked video doesn't show nearly the detail we had. (which is a good thing) If the Marines hadn't had called in the strafing run, I'm sure the locals would have thought the IED exploded on the emplacement team. It was perfect.

(BTW, that video was leaked by someone, and shouldn't have been, but it's out there now)

In Ramadi, I held the record (at the time) in theater with 22 GMLRS missions shot through the RFCT TOC. We liked it for all the reasons you mention. I think this was covered in another thread awhile back (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=4174&highlight=gmlrs+ramadi), but I mentioned that commanders liked the option of destroying rooms without destroying the building, among other things.

Niel

AlexTX ret

05-16-2009, 07:41 PM

Well, this is my first post on a forum. Cut me some slack, please!

I'm a strong believer in using all assets at my disposal. If HiMARS is one of them then I must learn to use it at its fullest. However with a 40 mile range, who has control of them. If it's a Battalion or higher FO then I can see it's usefulness. However, what if it is some scared 2lt who feels he's in over his head trying to manage the additional assets of his platoon and he has found out that the proverbial stuff hit the fan? How does it help him and his platoon when it adds orders of magnitude of difficulty to his job?

Wilf,

In this day and age...in our small wars...we are frequently presented with a tactical problem that doesn't allow for adjusted fires. Pin-point accuracy (yes, a relative term) is required.

This is the problem that Israelis have had recently everytime that they have tried to use their well reguarded prowess. They have the ways and the means to defeat any Mideast power and the HAMAS should be no match for them. However, Hamas hides its assets within centers of civilian populations. The Israelis are hamstrung because they are sensitive to world opinion and one rocket that goes out of its chosen path can ruin their whole day. :eek:

Ever since Stalin's Organs and Nebelwerfers, the idea of artillery rockets have had a certain appeal. The Newer versions such as HiMars are unbelievable accurate and have longer ranges than anything before them. However, are they only to be used in Fulda Gap senearios or Afganistan type battles where a little colateral damage isn't a great game breaker? And again it comes down to the skills of the soldier that calls in the mission order. If a unit is that seperated from its parent group, wouldn't a airstrike be a better action? The HiMars rocket system maybe accurate but it's still dumb. It can only react to the coordinates that are given it by who's ever on the ground.

Sorry for the long post. I'm not trying to demean 2lts. God knows, I was there once. However, it is in light of my experiences that I learned to ask questions. Because it is your butt on the line, not the tactical genius that came up with system. :wry:

William F. Owen

05-17-2009, 08:05 AM

I'm a strong believer in using all assets at my disposal. If HiMARS is one of them then I must learn to use it at its fullest. However with a 40 mile range, who has control of them. If it's a Battalion or higher FO then I can see it's usefulness. However, what if it is some scared 2lt who feels he's in over his head trying to manage the additional assets of his platoon and he has found out that the proverbial stuff hit the fan? How does it help him and his platoon when it adds orders of magnitude of difficulty to his job?

I think it's a mistake to assume that the design, capabilities, and application of any modern weapon system is based primarily on logic, because the evidence suggests it is not.

However, how to apply weapons capability in support of a platoon, should not be something that worries the 2nd Lt. If it does, then something about the training, organisation and communications is very wrong.

05-18-2009, 12:36 AM

Originally Posted by AlexTX ret

I'm a strong believer in using all assets at my disposal. If HiMARS is one of them then I must learn to use it at its fullest. However with a 40 mile range, who has control of them. If it's a Battalion or higher FO then I can see it's usefulness. However, what if it is some scared 2lt who feels he's in over his head trying to manage the additional assets of his platoon and he has found out that the proverbial stuff hit the fan? How does it help him and his platoon when it adds orders of magnitude of difficulty to his job?

Responce by William F. Owen.

I think it's a mistake to assume that the design, capabilities, and application of any modern weapon system is based primarily on logic, because the evidence suggests it is not.

However, how to apply weapons capability in support of a platoon, should not be something that worries the 2nd Lt. If it does, then something about the training, organisation and communications is very wrong.

Gentlemen,

After 7 years of war, I suspect that any well trained Marine Coproral could be capable of handling the details of a fire mission describe above.

And in the Hindu Kush, I do not believe that the ability to surround yourself with innocent populations, whilst attacking a small Platoon outpost, or combat patrol would be an option.

I have a sense the young men in the fight are a lot more capable of any group we may have belonged to or worked with, if we have been retired or seperated from the Armed Forces for more than 10 years.

If the Marines are comfortable with Reserve artillery units firing support missions for their infantry units, I doubt they would allow them the responsibility they have given them with this new to the Marine Corps weapons system.

05-18-2009, 04:53 AM

Gentlemen, pardon the missed "un" in uncomfortable

If the Marines are uncomfortable with Reserve artillery units firing support missions for their infantry units, I doubt they would allow them the responsibility they have given them with this new to the Marine Corps weapons system.

AlexTX ret

05-18-2009, 03:35 PM

Originally Posted by AlexTX ret

Responce by William F. Owen.

However, how to apply weapons capability in support of a platoon, should not be something that worries the 2nd Lt. If it does, then something about the training, organisation and communications is very wrong.

From RJ

After 7 years of war, I suspect that any well trained Marine Coproral could be capable of handling the details of a fire mission describe above.

(snip)

I have a sense the young men in the fight are a lot more capable of any group we may have belonged to or worked with, if we have been retired or seperated from the Armed Forces for more than 10 years.

If the Marines are comfortable with Reserve artillery units firing support missions for their infantry units, I doubt they would allow them the responsibility they have given them with this new to the Marine Corps weapons system. (I assumed the "un" in uncomfortable already ;)

I added both quotes because both bring up good points.

I bow to people who are invoved in military operations in the here and now because the last conflict I was in was Gulf War 1. I retired soon after that.

However, I have reservations about the fundamentals from listening to present day veterans.

After observing my boy's training, I feel it is much more situation oriented. The training I recieved was better suited to WW2, Korea and the plains and forests of Europe. Not exactly the thing I needed leading a Airmobile rifle platoon in the Vietnam.

But no matter how long I've been out, the fundamentals haven't changed. A unit leader is about leading soldiers into combat. If you have a good noncom supporting you, the better you're able to accomplish your mission. However,
your whole reason for being is to lead. It's your butt that will end up in a sling if something goes bad. Of course "fragging" is not an option lower ranks have to voice their opinion of your abilities. :eek:

The more a unit leader is straddled with optional assets that have to be dealt in "real time", the more he is distracted form his primary mission which is to lead.

The modern day soldier is much more motivated and mission focused than any that I saw in my time in service outside of such groups the airborne, rangers or their earlier bretheren, LRRPS. This can only be a good thing though I have heard of failures do to leaders overreaching their mission parameters or simply getting over their heads. This is where experience becomes more important than ever.

However, I've observed an exercise or 2, and the walk through that I witnessed was impressive. Nevertheless, I saw experienced officers abducating a lot of their responsibilities to lower leaders as they managed the extra tasks their positions required them to attend to. The one thing that I learned as I rose through the ranks was to simplify my job as much as possible. Not run away from responsibilities, just attach priorities to what must be done and then do it. The more missions we give our leaders to do (a leader has a finite amount of attention span to acomplish the tasks he needs to fulfill) the less he's there to accomplish is primary mission which is fighting his unit.

As far as calling in a fire mission, present day protocals have made it so simple that possibly a girl scout with a bit of brains could do it. Also, be it tube or rocket batteries, the Fire Control Officer position, while more and more important, has been stream lined so that he can more easily deal with multiple fire missions. I personally wouldn't be afraid that my artillery assets were reservist. I think that RA and NG/Reservist get basically the same training, so a reservist battery ability lies less with training and more to do with experience. However, the major component is the soldier who called in plotted the target position and called in the mission.

Also, I can accept that as I rose in rank, my focus changed as to priorities I used to evaluate my unit. In my opinion, unfortunately, it wasn't the better leaders that got my attention, it was the leaders that failed to live up to the Armies expectation of what their job performance should be. For in the end, I couldn't get rid of them so I had to find was to make them as competent as possible. And anything that weakened their already weak situlational awareness was something to be worked around not welcomed.

I'm sorry for such a long post. I've probably shown my age as many younger officers thnk of me as some sort of dinosaur. (However, "Barney" I am not) Also, I realized as a young officer, I had a great failiing, I couldn't keep my mouth shut. Why it didn't affect my performance reports I'll never know.

Infanteer

07-21-2009, 04:41 AM

Interesting. I used to love to debate the finer points of Platoon and Company TO&Es, wondering if adding/subtracting one or two soldiers here or there would make a difference. Then I actually commanded a platoon and found that:
1. Our doctrine is extremely disjointed - I can look in 3 different manuals (Bn/Coy/Pl) and find 3 different line diagrams for what a Platoon and/or Company should look like;
2. You never get a TO&E Platoon in garrison - vacant spots, courses, or other events mean your platoon is always different than the prescribed version;
3. You never get a TO&E Platoon in the field - casualties, leave (Canada pulls guys out of theater for a few weeks of leave on each tour), atts/dets, vehicles going down - you name it; it turns your 40-man organization into a 28-man or a 44-man in a flash. You work with what you got, not with what sounded good over beers in the Mess; and
4. Mission will always dictate - Getting tied to TO&E could take away from this. "Well, I have 3 Sections (are term for "Squads"), so I have 3 Tasks for this Mission". The mission may best be handled with 5 elements (busting up sections) or 2 (putting 2 together).

....This has led me to the belief that a TO&E's main purpose is twofold - administration and affiliation. Not tactics. The administrative part fills the legal requirements of "who is responsible for this guy" and "who manages his career, etc, etc".

The affiliation function is more interesting. I've found that each level fills a certain sociological function. A Platoon is "the family" - everyone knows everyone else. The Platoon Commander knows all his soldiers (or at least he should) and their specifics. All the troops know eachother and what is going on. The Company is "the clan" - companies have real personalities - platoons have personalities too, but these are often really shaped by the Company; you have a general idea who everyone is and recognize them. Experience is usually defined at the company level (Remember when we were in A Coy and we did that raid?). Battalions are "the neighbourhood" - you work in the same building but, for the large part, you don't know everyone. However, it is your neighbourhood, it is better than anyone elses, and it defines "where you were in the Big Army" at any point in time. Anything else is "Big Army" and really doesn't have a factor on day to day soldiering (aside from the more esoteric things like Regimental/Division identity).

I guess this is where the "So What?" comes into play. The So What? is that a TO&E is merely a start point - how you manage soldiers not actually fighting and what you (try) to launch to the fight with. Once you launch, princples, more than line diagrams, become the important thing.

1. Span of Control - Platoons are probably the size they are (and have been since their inception at the beginning of the 20th century) for a reason. I'm not talking about 8 or 9 or 12 man squads. I'm talking about roughly 40 dudes against 60 dudes/80 dudes/100 dudes. As a Platoon Commander, I've commanded, with atts, 7 other organizations that more than tripled the size of my Platoon. I never really "commanded" these guys (although there was a legal command relationship involved), but rather gave them my intent and some guidance (after questioning them on what they brought) and sent them on their way. I did this because it was not physically possible to command that many guys. I can command 3-5 NCOs who can command 3-5 dudes (or a Section with their 2IC). I can, through command, exhibit a degree of control over the other odds and sods that came out, but I really focussed my "command" on those 3-5 dudes. Otherwise, span of control would break down. So, in designing a TO&E for a Platoon, keeping it from 35-45 personnel is prudent.

2. Flexibility - Different missions require different tools for the job. In our Rifle Platoons, the commanders have (or at least should) 2 GPMGs, a 84mm Recoiless Rifle, a 60mm mortar and, these days, a DM Rifle. Depending on the mission, I can pick which 1 or 2 systems I need. I've seen this described as the "tool-box" or the "golf-bag" approach and it is really good. Give me a host of tools and I'll pick which one best suites the specific tactical problem. TO&Es should apply this approach to skillsets as well. I'm lucky enough to have a wide variety of skillsets in my NCOs. One guy is Urban Ops Instructor and knows all about angles, stacking, searching and breaching. Another guy is Gunnery Instructor which means he is a SME in vehicle gunnery. Another guy was Advanced Recce/Mountain Ops which meant he was the "Light Fighter". Having this variety of skillsets enabled the platoon to have the "toolbox" for different tactical problems. So, in designing a Rifle Platoon TO&E, the primary organizing principle after Span of Control should be Effects and the equipment and personnel required to employ those effect. A TO&E should prescribe the weapons and skillsets that are allocated to the Platoon "Golf Bag" so as to ensure effectiveness in any tactical scenario.

3. Fire and Movement - As long as your organization can do this and do it well, it will fight and it will win. It doesn't matter if an Section has 8 or 9 or 12 men. If it can do this, it should be good to go. If all that other stuff above comes into play and your using 7-man sections (as Canadian Dismounted sections are, ideally) you still see success. Heck, I've heard of 4 guys with a LAV III shooting them in being an effective tactical grouping. Therefore, in designing a rifle platoon TO&E, having enough leadership to be able to effect this (2-3 guys per section) is vital - it doesn't matter if they have 5 bayonets or 11.

4. Rule of Fours - For some reason I've found that conducting a mission usually forces you to adapt a "Rule of Four" even if your organization is built around a "Rule of Three" or a "Rule of Five". It could be "Assault, Support, Depth, Reserve" or "Assault, Firebase, Specialist, Security" or "Forward Security, Main Body, Close Security, and Rear Security". None of these elements are permanent nor are they the same size. This "rule" isn't a hard and fast rule, and there are always exceptions and variations, but I found that four offered the most flexibility in return for effort. So, in designing a TO&E, encouraging a "Rule of Four" for a Platoon is good - this means four Sections that can be grown/shrunk as the situation dictates.

Therefore the ideal Platoon is 35-45 guys, has about 8-12 NCOs with a "golf bag" of weapons and skillsets and can apply a "Rule of Four". Anything beyond that doesn't really affect the effectiveness of such an organization.

I believe these principles apply across the spectrum of conflict (ie: there is no such thing as a "COIN Platoon") and at the Company Level as well (just up the numbers).

Well, I'm rambling. There it is for y'all to take apart.

Cheers,
Infanteer

Ken White

07-21-2009, 05:22 AM

So no pick apart from here. I also have always found that fours make more sense than the triangular bit. There may be some who come along to debate esoterics but basically, you've figured it out -- what ever works for you is okay.

William F. Owen

07-21-2009, 06:49 AM

....This has led me to the belief that a TO&E's main purpose is twofold - administration and affiliation. Not tactics. The administrative part fills the legal requirements of "who is responsible for this guy" and "who manages his career, etc, etc".
That is largely correct, yet the tactical employment of the platoon is nearly always used to justify it's structure.

1. So, in designing a TO&E for a Platoon, keeping it from 35-45 personnel is prudent.
Really? I think that is a very general statement, and I'm not sure it gets us further down the road, but let's run with it.

2. A TO&E should prescribe the weapons and skillsets that are allocated to the Platoon "Golf Bag" so as to ensure effectiveness in any tactical scenario.
The Golf Bag sounds good, but it's usually a cop out for "we don't really knows what we do." See my article here (http://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/Alice_In_Warminster_RDS_Summer_09.pdf). The Golf Bag has to have set limits, or else it degenerates into outfitting GI-Joe for the next game.

3. . Therefore, in designing a rifle platoon TO&E, having enough leadership to be able to effect this (2-3 guys per section) is vital - it doesn't matter if they have 5 bayonets or 11.
OK, that makes sense.

4. So, in designing a TO&E, encouraging a "Rule of Four" for a Platoon is good - this means four Sections that can be grown/shrunk as the situation dictates.
DGD&D in the UK commissioned a DERA report to support the "Rule of 4" in doctrine and found there is no Rule of 4. It's an opinion based on opinion. It simply does not exist, and there is no evidence it works.

Therefore the ideal Platoon is 35-45 guys, has about 8-12 NCOs with a "golf bag" of weapons and skillsets and can apply a "Rule of Four". Anything beyond that doesn't really affect the effectiveness of such an organization.
Ideal Platoon? You've got some huge margins in there, for something "ideal."
I'd say 24-30, with 6-8 Officers/NCOs and a very basic weapons set.
I think the "ideal" will remain elusive, and alter given context.

However, I largely agree with your approach, especially focussing on the platoon and "some assembly required". There is some good indications that this does work, but it does require some pretty deep education at all levels to get people to be able to apply it in a large number of very different conditions.

Infanteer

07-21-2009, 04:41 PM

Really? I think that is a very general statement, and I'm not sure it gets us further down the road, but let's run with it.

I guess that is as specific as I cared to get - I've worked with 7, 8, 9 and 11 man sections on the ground to some extent and have found that it really doesn't make a huge tactical difference.

The Golf Bag sounds good, but it's usually a cop out for "we don't really knows what we do." See my article here (http://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/Alice_In_Warminster_RDS_Summer_09.pdf). The Golf Bag has to have set limits, or else it degenerates into outfitting GI-Joe for the next game.

Interesting article - Canada has, at least since the adoption of the AR series/Minimi and GPMG in the 80's, maintained alot of those systems (M-72, 60mm mortar). However, we are experiencing some foolishness as a simple, lightweight mortar is being replaced by a heavy, computerized AGL with electronic ammunition (just begging for Murphy to intervene there).

The "Golf Bag" approach is, in my opinion, a sound one. My "HQ Section" has - at any time - 3 to 5 soldiers. In the carrier we keep a mortar, a GPMG (with more in the other cars), a recoilless rifle and - now - a DM rifle.

The sections are pretty much equipped with what they have, but the Platoon has some options. With those soldiers, I can decide if I need indirect or direct suppression, precision fire, or a big-boom at, more or less, 600-800 meters, to support the sections. I guess the strength of the "Golf Bag" is that I have more capabilities than simply "1 x GPMG Team" dictated by a line diagram or having a debate between whether a Platoon Weapons Det should have a 60mm mortar or a second GPMG. It allows the commander to decide.

DGD&D in the UK commissioned a DERA report to support the "Rule of 4" in doctrine and found there is no Rule of 4. It's an opinion based on opinion. It simply does not exist, and there is no evidence it works.

I guess I stuck that one in on the end to plug my view - but I think it works as a general principle. I found that when, for whatever reason, a platoon or company was denuded of that 4th maneuver element that it made things alot harder.

Ideal Platoon? You've got some huge margins in there, for something "ideal."
I'd say 24-30, with 6-8 Officers/NCOs and a very basic weapons set.
I think the "ideal" will remain elusive, and alter given context.

I've found it harder to sustain operations with less than 30 guys as you can't rotate troops off of task to rest. Keep in mind that I also account for our vehicles, which chew up 12 guys in change for a phenomenal capability set.

I guess the thrust of my post was that the ideal isn't something we can pin down to exact numbers. Your ideal platoon has just as wide of arcs as mine (which I am assuming is your purpose). What I was really getting at is I don't think a Platoon with 36 guys is going to be more or less effective than one with 44 guys (same with a Sect of 8 vs a Sect of 12). A well trained and equipped Sect of 8 will kill a Sect of 12 guys lacking in those departments. So I guess if we wanted to discuss the "ideal" Sect, Platoon and Coy we should look at capabilities and how to most effectively set a unit up to manage those capabilities.

Cheers,
Infanteer

William F. Owen

07-21-2009, 04:48 PM

The "Golf Bag" approach is, in my opinion, a sound one. My "HQ Section" has - at any time - 3 to 5 soldiers. In the carrier we keep a mortar, a GPMG (with more in the other cars), a recoilless rifle and - now - a DM rifle.
It is sound, if you don't end up taking a knife to a gun fight. We used to keep an 84mm and a GPMG in the 432s, but we could always de-buss carrying all weapons. When weapons are getting left behind, there is the top of a slippery slope.
I've found it harder to sustain operations with less than 30 guys as you can't rotate troops off of task to rest. Keep in mind that I also account for our vehicles, which chew up 12 guys in change for a phenomenal capability set.
Yep. Good point. Other ways to skin that cat, but can't argue with your logic.

I guess the thrust of my post was that the ideal isn't something we can pin down to exact numbers. Your ideal platoon has just as wide of arcs as mine (which I am assuming is your purpose).

Concur. We have to compare like with like.

Ken White

07-21-2009, 05:27 PM

...and have found that it really doesn't make a huge tactical difference.Only when you take 30 to 50% casualties does it become significant. That makes the USMC Squad of 13 with three ARs / SAWs a good one due to that depth (weapons become casualties also). Other than that, size and employment are highly situation dependent and there's no 'best.'I guess I stuck that one in on the end to plug my view - but I think it works as a general principle. I found that when, for whatever reason, a platoon or company was denuded of that 4th maneuver element that it made things alot harder.The triangular design was developed to prevent inexperienced or poorly trained Armies from being too predictable by forcing an unbalanced approach. With smaller, professional forces (pending the next major war), that need not be a concern. Organizing in fours facilitates rotations, lessen overhead and gives more flexibility and depth. It also offers a 25% increase in junior leader training slots....which chew up 12 guys in change for a phenomenal capability set.Can also impact your training level if you aren't careful to rotate those vehicle minders on a regular basis. Everyone needs some dismount time... :wry:...So I guess if we wanted to discuss the "ideal" Sect, Platoon and Coy we should look at capabilities and how to most effectively set a unit up to manage those capabilities.All TOE are, as you mentioned, an administrative device. Organization for combat is a totally different creature and is or should be totally METT-TC dependent. There is no one size fits all, no 'ideal' as every war, every operation will present peculiar demands and the error will lie with he who's a slave to the prescribed organization -- or doctrine.

The advantage to large platoons and companies is combat depth; you can sustain losses and still function. The disadvantage is bulk and clumsiness leading to lack of stealth and diluted training -- the more people you have, the more that will not be present for some reason. The key is to take what you're given, do the best you can with it and never stop studying and thinking.

Infanteer

07-22-2009, 07:31 AM

I just finished reading through that 19 page monster which, on a lot of points, mirrors this one. I think it comes down to this:

My thinking for platoons focusses on generating patrol multiples. That is relevant, regardless of the conflict, terrain, or threat. Supporting and sustaining dismounted operation, regardless of numbers or weapons types, is something that has to focus thinking on the platoon level.

The fixation on squad size has proven worthless. We need to move beyond it.

I guess a TO&E sets, as discussed above, the admin foundation for a Platoon to launch. The Aussie 2012 Rifle Platoon seems to have the right idea because it appeared (at least to me) to be the most general in concept. A platoon is composed of 10 groups of 4 guys. There is a "weapons locker" - quite simple in its loadout - in weapons that they can access. The 4 man teams can be stacked to any degree and each one supplied with an addional weapon from the locker based upon the mission. The Platoon is not vehicle specific - managed readiness helps decide what platform a Platoon should focus developing skillsets on ahead of time.

Need 3 groups of 12 each with a GPMG? Go with it. How about an assault group of 16, a support element of 16 (with 2 mortars an 84mm and a GPMG) and a security element of 8 (with 2 GPMGs)? Why not? How about busting your guys up into groups of 10 to mount in IFVs (involves splitting a group of 4 - oh well) or 20 to ride in helos? Sure. Smart, adaptable NCOs will make it work.

The key for a Platoon isn't to figure out if 3 or 4 Sections of 8 or 12 men will do better in a "2 Up, 1 Back" or "1 Up, 2 Back" formation. It is about figuring out a "Playbook" - something like an American football team which has multiple plays for offensive and defensive lines (and if it keeps setting up on the line with the same play it gets hammered). I've been trying to do this with my Platoon - devise 4-6 "configurations" to dominate a certain sized area through aggresive patrolling while still maintaining a footprint (mostly around our vehicles) and allowing a certain level of rest in order to sustain operations. It is important to have a variety of configurations so the bad guy - who in this war seems to always have better SA - does not really get a grasp on what you're doing.

Anyhow, just some random thoughts.
Cheers,
Infanteer

William F. Owen

07-22-2009, 08:36 AM

The Aussie 2012 Rifle Platoon seems to have the right idea because it appeared (at least to me) to be the most general in concept. A platoon is composed of 10 groups of 4 guys. There is a "weapons locker" - quite simple in its loadout - in weapons that they can access. The 4 man teams can be stacked to any degree and each one supplied with an addional weapon from the locker based upon the mission. The Platoon is not vehicle specific - managed readiness helps decide what platform a Platoon should focus developing skillsets on ahead of time.

Concur. It does tick most of the important boxes, and the ADF is close to being on the money with this one. I know the two guys who came up with it, and they briefed me a couple of years ago.
Strangely this was thanks to an intro by one lowly Lt Col, called Dave Kilcullen!.

Infanteer

07-22-2009, 02:18 PM

Strangely this was thanks to an intro by one lowly Lt Col, called Dave Kilcullen!.

Never heard of him - should I know who that is?

:)

William F. Owen

07-22-2009, 04:16 PM

Never heard of him - should I know who that is?
:)

You missed nothing! Stag on! :wry:

Rifleman

07-23-2009, 06:48 AM

The Aussie 2012 Rifle Platoon seems to have the right idea because it appeared (at least to me) to be the most general in concept. A platoon is composed of 10 groups of 4 guys.

We know organizing the platoon into fire teams instead of fixed squads will work - the Rhodesian Light Infantry did it that way. It's not a matter of if it will work, it's a matter of if it's he best way.

I don't know the answer but it's an interesting concept.

But if it's done that way do the fire teams need to be more robust? For example: we usually hear that four men is the ideal fire team but in order to have a good chance of having four present for duty should we ask for six?

We know that six men can operate under one leader and an assistant without any internal team subdivision. Recon teams commonly did just that in Vietnam and that was in heavy cover.

Is this worth considering? Or if you're going that route is it just as well to stick with traditional squads/sections?

William F. Owen

07-23-2009, 08:35 AM

We know organizing the platoon into fire teams instead of fixed squads will work - the Rhodesian Light Infantry did it that way. It's not a matter of if it will work, it's a matter of if it's he best way.

I don't know the answer but it's an interesting concept.
Got any source material on the RLI Platoon Organisation? I think the C-47 was limited to dropping 16-men so 4 x 4-man teams?

We know that six men can operate under one leader and an assistant without any internal team subdivision. Recon teams commonly did just that in Vietnam and that was in heavy cover.
True, but you have to have pretty well trained NCOs to make it work well. I've always come down on the 3-5 man fireteams.

Is this worth considering? Or if you're going that route is it just as well to stick with traditional squads/sections?
Yes it is. Removing the Squad/Section level speeds everything up and makes everything a lot easier. This is the trick the Aussie 2012 structure misses. Fireteam groups can really only be about 24-30 men strong, but 4 x 30 man platoons is the same total as 3 x 40 man platoons. The 30 man platoons also need far fewer NCOs!

3 x 40 man 2012 platoons = 30 4-man fireteams
4 x 30 man FTGs = 24 5-man fireteams

Rifleman

07-23-2009, 03:24 PM

Wilf,

My only reference is Chris Cocks' book Fireforce. I no longer have the book but I know he said the platoon was broken down into four-man "sticks." I don't recall if he mentioned how many per platoon.

I was just thinking that 30 men can also be 5x6. Or, 4x6 plus a couple of 3-man command cells if necessary. Just wondering if that would be worthwhile since the fireteams could take 50% casualties before having to be combined.

Ken White

07-23-2009, 06:04 PM

The 30 man platoons also need far fewer NCOs!specifically costs and a flattened structure. It does however remove an intermediate leader training structure of some relevance and value. Thus it would seem to me to be an option to be weighed dependent upon ones total force design and doctrine. Degree of professionalism would also be an issue. High turnover forces (the pre 2001 US army; post 2010 TBD :D) would benefit from a Squad Leader, services having long term Privates (i.e. no 'up or out') would be okay without them.

As an aside, the US number of combat loaded jumpers for a C-47 was 22 with a door bundle or two, 24 without -- but it was crowded. A comfortable load would've been 16 but IIRC (always a danger with us ORF curmudgeons...), the RLI used 32 for the Fire Force; three x 4 for the three Alouettes, five x 4 for the C-47. Each stick had a leader, the senior being the Platoon Ldr or acting PL if the PL decided to remain aloft; next being his 2ic, location dependent upon the METT-TC and overall command being frequently being in a fourth helicopter which could and did play gunship. Sometimes the command was on the ground, sometimes in the bird. They were flexible and didn't mind risks -- which is why they were much better than most.

And they still lost...

William F. Owen

07-24-2009, 09:47 AM

I was just thinking that 30 men can also be 5x6. Or, 4x6 plus a couple of 3-man command cells if necessary. Just wondering if that would be worthwhile since the fireteams could take 50% casualties before having to be combined.
They could also be 10 X 3. As Ken White always points out, you're going to have to alter based on METT-C. "Some assembly required" seems a pretty good basis to start!

Rifleman

07-24-2009, 07:02 PM

Wilf,

Understood, "Some assembly required" for your proposed 30 man platoon. I was just asking about the base element to be used for assembly. I think everyone agrees that there has to be a base element to combine or break apart for task organization. You advocate that the base element be the fire team instead of the squad at platoon level. And while 3-5 has proven effective size for fire teams I was just wondering if that would lead to having to combine the remnants of attrited fire teams sooner.

In other words I was asking about "gaming" the system by planning for a 30 man platoon divided into six-man fire teams in order to insure that about four men per team are always present for duty - the same way the USMC squad does that by being extra big (by most army's standards) to start with.

07-25-2009, 03:31 AM

Ken,

Are their C-47's dropping troops inthe 21st Century? What was the combat load for a C-130 a venerable air craft still being flown and utilized as a troop carrier and airborne delivery system.

The never ending story of the platoon and squad make up continues unabated. History repeats its self. Successful history has a thread.

For the record - with pride and tradition

The Marine Rifle Platoon has three 13 man squads and a 4 man Leadership component. Platoon Cmdr., Platoon Sgt., Right Guide and Communicator.

The Big Marne Squad - Squad Leader (Sgt or Cpl.) three 4 man fireteams.
Fireteam Leader L/Cpl, PFC Rifleman, PFC SAW or AR gunner, PVT or PFC Assitant SAW or AR gunner.

1943 to 2009 - 66 years

Is there any current western or eastern infantry organization that can boast of the proven effectiveness without change since 1943?

Instead of attempting to redress the size of the platoon to fit in an accounting summary, I suggest you adjust the basic units to fit the most successful and deadly unit configeration and get on with winning fights.

Add a two machine gun section, to the Marine Platoon and the unit grows to 52 Marines. Section leader CPL, L/Cpl Gunner, PFC assistant Gunner w/rifle, 2 Pfc or Pvt Ammo humpers w/ rifles.

US Army Platoon - With a 4 man Leadership unit and three 9 man Squads comes to 31. It is short 12 fighting men with the same number of leadership unit.

Any efficiency experts out there? The ARMY seems a bit top heavy in the management component.

When applying force to obtain an objective or to hold a strongpoint

Big is BAD and Big is BEST

66 years without a rest.

Any questions? The Marines attract the poet warriors among us! :wry:

And Ken is absolutely right about the ability to train up leaders to continue the fight.

Ken White

07-25-2009, 04:07 AM

Are their C-47's dropping troops inthe 21st Century? What was the combat load for a C-130 a venerable air craft still being flown and utilized as a troop carrier and airborne delivery system.Somebody somewhere is almost certainly dropping people from one of Donald's masterpieces. Last time I noticed, Colombia still had a few. Nothing gooney about that bird... :wry:

The H model 130, the largest production run, ACL is ~35,000 pounds, range dependent. 90 pax or 62 jumpers for the base model. In combat, take the seats out, stretch nylon tiedowns across the bird at about five foot intervals and let people sit on the floor and you can load over 150 combat equipped troops on one -- and plop 'em into a ± 1,000 meter strip. Great bird. :cool:

07-25-2009, 04:43 AM

Thanks Ken.

I have a fishing buddy who flies the H model for the RIANG and has been deployed annually to Iraq, Afganistan and all the points in between since 2003. He loves that bird and just requalified with it to drop troops.

He's one of those airmen who was USAF who decided to skip the desk jobs and continue to fly whenever and wherever he and his aircraft is needed. A Lt Col. of vast experience and sagnacity. A happy warrior! And a officer who admires Marine Gunnery Sgts. and their ability to deliver parts, and fuel to him and his crew in dusty and dangerous places, with no questions asked.

You'd like him! He is a solid family man and a guy who delivers the goods.

William F. Owen

07-25-2009, 07:36 AM

In other words I was asking about "gaming" the system by planning for a 30 man platoon divided into six-man fire teams in order to insure that about four men per team are always present for duty - the same way the USMC squad does that by being extra big (by most army's standards) to start with.

That's probably eminently sensible. Keeping teams together is considered important and seem to have considerable merit. I'd go for 5-man teams, but that's just because of the training I associate with the organisation. 6 -man teams may be just as good if you are starting a bunch of newly trained 2010 Marines.

Clinkerbuilt

07-25-2009, 02:16 PM

I have some links:

HiMARS (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/High_Mobility_Artillery_Rocket_System)

...although I prefer the LAR-160 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:091_010_Expomil_2K05_-_01_-_Aerostar_-_LAROM_-_01--A.jpg), for it's flexibility and speed of reload.

Saw a lot of questions on the RLI/Fireforce concept. I have Cocks' book, and love it - the TOE/ECOI for Chimurenga was worth the cost alone - but here is JRT Wood's articles on the Fireforce (http://www.rhodesia.nl/firefor1.htm) concept. http://www.rhodesia.nl/firefor1.htm

(Main page at: Rhodesian and South African Military History (http://www.rhodesia.nl/rhomil.htm))

Clinkerbuilt

07-25-2009, 02:47 PM

What follows is based on this article (HTML (http://web.archive.org/web/20060620224229/2ndbn5thmar.com/train/suppression.html) and PDF (http://www.2ndbn5thmar.com/CoTTP/Suppression%20McBreen%202001.pdf)), lots of research and more time than I like to think about wandering around in the boonies, wondering where the heck I was.

I am a firm believer in the notion of integration to a 'total force' up to the battalion level. As a result, what I'm trying to do below is enhance to good while avoiding the bad.

Here, I'm trying to keep sizes manageable, while keeping the battalion level to c.1,000 troops.

Here goes:

1. "Squad Leader" needs to have its own MOS designation - do they do that, yet?

2. A squad of 20 men, or 5 x 4-man teams: an assault team, an exploitation team, two suppression-fire teams, and a support team armed with a two-man RPG-type weapon or a sniper rifle team, an RTO and a Corpsman/"Combat Life Saver+". The squad leader is in direct control of the suppression-fire element.

A group this size is capable of maneuver, suppression and assault, while being able to communicate and lay down relatively heavy fire support in the short term, pending a call for proper artillery.

At the same time, this squad is able to absorb casualties and still function effectively, since it would have to take c.60% casualties to seriously cut into its ability.

The size also adds to the security and policing mission, by having more "boots on the ground" for presence.

3. Three of these squads to a company, plus a full sniper platoon of 20 (8x2-man teams, plus PltLdr, PltSgt, 2xRTO), and a 20-man HQ Platoon (including a 10-man mortar section).

4. Seven of these companies to a battalion, plus HQ, Support (MT/Maint/Supply) and Weapons companies of 100 each.

This battalion organization puts seven maneuver elements in the field, vs the three we typically have, now.

ALTERNATE: Two squads to a Platoon, plus a 10-man platoon HQ: 1LT, PltSgt, 4 x Corpsmen, 4 x RTO = 50 men. This, however, digs into the flexibility angle, as companies go from 100 to 190, but it can still work if an overall increase to battalion size can be handled.

That's what I have -- flame-retardant suit ready! :D

Infanteer

07-25-2009, 05:52 PM

I just finished up reading another 2 threads, including a 19-page monster, on this in the forum. I should have read more before posting because I've retread covered ground. Perhaps these 2-3 threads could be merged or split into their respective parts (Squad/Section TOE, Platoon TOE, Company TOE, etc)?

Anyways, I've noticed discussion has touched on vehicles a few times. I'll just chime in from the Canadian perspective from the last few years in the green zones and arid badlands of Kandahar. We've developed a very keen appreciation for the LAV III, which is the Stryker chassis with a 25mm Bushmaster turret. The vehicle holds 10 pers (3 crew + 7 passengers). The vehicle is a superb tool. Its optics provide STANO excellent capability, the cannon is real slick and kills lots of badguys, the armour has saved lives and the vehicle itself is a shelter and a packmule for the troops and their gear.

Canada has been in the middle of a debate the last few years over "Mech Infantry" (6 battalions) and "Light Infantry" (3 Battalions) who maintain a parachute capability (with the current Army chief wanting to essentially do away with the Light Battalions). I find this to be a false dichotomy - at least for line infantry battalions. There is just "Infantry" - their method of delivery can be programmed ahead of time through proper managed readiness. The vehicle is simply too great of a "force multiplier" to be discounted as something only mech guys do. The "death before dismount" mentality that so many fear (that infantry with vehicles can't operate away from them) is really a function of leadership - Unimaginative or close-minded leadership is what allows an infantryman's skills to become so atrophied that he can't operate without his vehicle. I've done a good chunk of training away from the vehicles and we can leave them behind to go airmobile or footborne if need be.

This is why a high-end number (40) is better, in my opinion, than the lower end 28-32 I've seen. If you are operating with vehicles, they exist to crew vehicles. These guys aren't permanent crewman - my Platoon has spares and we rotate guys out for a break and to get bayonet time. This leaves 28 to 32 guys on the ground (depending on crew requirements of your platform) to operate but also gives you an extra "section" of your Zulu vehicles. If they are dismounted, those extra guys can become an extra section - or can be used as an "echelon" to help pack the ammo for the crew-served weapons that need to be manpacked now that you're out vehicles - or perhaps run the mule train?

William F. Owen

07-25-2009, 07:17 PM

I find this to be a false dichotomy - at least for line infantry battalions. There is just "Infantry" - their method of delivery can be programmed ahead of time through proper managed readiness. The vehicle is simply too great of a "force multiplier" to be discounted as something only mech guys do. The "death before dismount" mentality that so many fear (that infantry with vehicles can't operate away from them) is really a function of leadership - Unimaginative or close-minded leadership is what allows an infantryman's skills to become so atrophied that he can't operate without his vehicle. I've done a good chunk of training away from the vehicles and we can leave them behind to go airmobile or footborne if need be.

Ahhh... a subject very dear to my heart (http://www.iqpc.com/Event.aspx?id=208168)

I strongly disagree with tying infantry to a vehicle type, but I strongly agree that vehicles are essential for most infantry operations.
Loosing trained infantry to crew vehicles makes no financial or military sense, unless they are specialist crews. IMO, the best way of maintaining the skills without the vehicles is to have vehicles organised separately from the dismounts. Something like:

Vehicle Platoon = 4 Vehicles + 12 Crew
Infantry Platoon = 28 infantry

90% of the training can be done separately, providing you are doing the right training.

Infanteer

07-25-2009, 09:10 PM

I strongly disagree with tying infantry to a vehicle type, but I strongly agree that vehicles are essential for most infantry operations.

Agree. It could be a pretty substantial list of benefits, from area of ground that can be dominated to the security provided to soldiers for a bit of rest to the sustainability afar.

The balance comes from higher level managed readiness and a good grip on the troops:task ratio. If I know we are going to a jungle, I probably want to focus a chunk of my force on airmobility and living dismounted (or light). I use the appropriate work-up time to focus on these, while still tucking those mounted skills to the back should a more suitable venue come up in the future.

Loosing trained infantry to crew vehicles makes no financial or military sense, unless they are specialist crews. IMO, the best way of maintaining the skills without the vehicles is to have vehicles organized separately from the dismounts. Something like:

Vehicle Platoon = 4 Vehicles + 12 Crew
Infantry Platoon = 28 infantry

90% of the training can be done separately, providing you are doing the right training.

This is something I used to believe, but don't anymore after commanding a platoon armed with the LAV III. You don't lose bayonets to the crew anymore than you lose bayonets to be a number 2 on a GPMG or a mortar. The vehicle is a tool and nothing else. We have no qualms training infantryman to drive trucks or shoot crew-served weapons, so why is it all of the sudden an issue when we package those capabilities into a good fighting vehicle. It takes no longer to train these skills than any other PCF (Primary Combat Function - as we call them up here) skills such as recce patrolman, assault pioneer (now gone), mortarman (now gone), etc, etc.

We've discussed the idea of splitting the vehicles from the infantry and brigading them at the Company or Battalion level or going with a "Taxi" battalion of vehicles for a Brigade and the possibility of having armoured crewman crew the vehicles at another place I haunt (army.ca). None of these get around the difficulties associated with this (what happens if your driver goes down as I've had?) and quite lives up to the advantages of having integral crews. Owning the vehicle and its crew at the section and platoon level seems, to me, the easiest and most effective way of doing business. You crew your vehicle and you can provide backups or rotate for rest if your spending a long time mounted (something I've also done).

What needs to be systematized, or at least more properly thought out, is the proper ratio of training with vehicles to training without vehicles and how driving-gunning-crew commanding fits into the development of an infantry soldier (in conjunction with patrolling, helo ops, crew-served weapons, urban ops and all those other good skillsets) and how we balance rifleman's duties in a vehicle (when the unit is using one) and outside of one.

jcustis

07-26-2009, 12:52 AM

What follows is based on this article (HTML and PDF), lots of research and more time than I like to think about wandering around in the boonies, wondering where the heck I was.

Kilcullen has a similar article posted around these parts that addresses the phenomena of smaller assault units and larger suppressive elements in an attack, especially urban.

A group this size is capable of maneuver, suppression and assault, while being able to communicate and lay down relatively heavy fire support in the short term, pending a call for proper artillery.

At the same time, this squad is able to absorb casualties and still function effectively, since it would have to take c.60% casualties to seriously cut into its ability.

It's interesting that you say that, because I'd betcha that once you build to a certain size and decide that it is appropriate for a set task, it won't be able to operate at that level of efficiency once you start taking casualties...because you have all of those 20 men tasked out. This is just another way of saying that a 13-man squad could have performed the same task, IMO.

The size also adds to the security and policing mission, by having more "boots on the ground" for presence.

This is another interesting statement. I understand where you are trying to go with this, but "presence patrolling" is not a tactical task. If you need a factor of twenty-something infantrymen, just employ two 13-man squads and retain a third in QRF role, for rearm-refit, etc.

3. Three of these squads to a company, plus a full sniper platoon of 20 (8x2-man teams, plus PltLdr, PltSgt, 2xRTO), and a 20-man HQ Platoon (including a 10-man mortar section).

4. Seven of these companies to a battalion, plus HQ, Support (MT/Maint/Supply) and Weapons companies of 100 each.

This battalion organization puts seven maneuver elements in the field, vs the three we typically have, now.

Why get stuck on companies as the lowest unit capable of maneuver? The tripod of maneuver elements exists because time and studies have proven that the number three is at the upper limit of what a leader can exercise command and control over. Sure, the study needs to be updated with consideration to the tools we currently use for command and control, but we'd still be pretty hard pressed to find that the planning factor has become irrelevant.

And snipers organzied at the company-level. Ugh...No way jose, methinks. We have a hard enough time effectively employing them at the battalion level as it is.

Ken White

07-26-2009, 02:47 AM

This is another interesting statement. I understand where you are trying to go with this, but "presence patrolling" is not a tactical task...It's also indicative of a potential danger -- organizing a multi purpose force while focusing on one type of warfare rather than on generic war.One has to organize for MCO because that's the hard nut; then one has to adapt -- but not permanently or in mindset -- for other missions.The tripod of maneuver elements exists because time and studies have proven that the number three is at the upper limit of what a leader can exercise command and control over.That's true but it also -- possibly even more likely -- exists because Frederick the Great organized the Prussian Army that way to force his commanders to use unbalanced and therefor less predictable tactical moves. There are studies IIRC, that posit six to eight as the ideal span of control and ten as the upper limit but that's not in combat. I agree that it could and probably be looked at but not changed without some experimentation.And snipers organzied at the company-level. Ugh...No way jose, methinks. We have a hard enough time effectively employing them at the battalion level as it is.Hmm. Without getting into TTP, I fully understand the peacetime problems (though I don't think they're significant) but you say "employment." I guess I can't understand why the Battalion is doing that or what the problem happens to be. Back in the Pleistocene, we had snipers in Rifle companies in 1 MarDiv in Korea with no problems so unless it's a control or turf issue, I'm not sure I understand the concern... :confused:

jcustis

07-26-2009, 04:38 AM

Ken, it is both a control and a turf issue. More on the turf side sometimes, from what I have seen firsthand.

That's not to say that snipers haven't been integrated into ops down to platoon-level. It just takes the perfect balance of professional competence on everyone's part to do the job right without a lot of slop.

And a lot olf the complaints I have picked up on come from the snipers themselves, who decry many (if not most) commanders as not being knowledgeable enough to employ them correctly.

Ken White

07-26-2009, 05:17 AM

More on the turf side sometimes, from what I have seen firsthand.You do know that a Bn Sgt Major is a bona fide turf umpire, right? I got so tired of massaging hurt feelings it drove me to drink (Hey, any excuse... :D). Good news is I still have my striped shirt....It just takes the perfect balance of professional competence on everyone's part to do the job right without a lot of slop.Yeah, that is too often true...And a lot olf the complaints I have picked up on come from the snipers themselves, who decry many (if not most) commanders as not being knowledgeable enough to employ them correctly.I will not say the 'T' word but, yep, I can identify with that, totally. The key, of course is to just let the sniper do his job but I know that's asking too much in most cases. Control freaks are a monumental tactical problem and the system builds 'em. I don't know how we develop the self confidence so some can just let people do their jobs.

That was probably our big advantage in Korea; most of the Co Cdrs had been in WW II and were on their third or fourth Company, very few of 'em interfered in things unless it was necessary. Snipers were pretty much allowed to do what they wanted -- in the later stage, mid '52 on, the Co Cdrs would only get huffy about the Wpn Co 75mm Recoilless Rifles -- they'd sneak up on a ridge and pop a round or two across the valley and that backblast would bring down a hail of 122 and 152 fire; hacked off every body. :wry:

William F. Owen

07-26-2009, 05:27 AM

The balance comes from higher level managed readiness and a good grip on the troops:task ratio. If I know we are going to a jungle, I probably want to focus a chunk of my force on airmobility and living dismounted (or light). I use the appropriate work-up time to focus on these, while still tucking those mounted skills to the back should a more suitable venue come up in the future.
Well OK, but that assumes good warning time. What about the "2-weeks and we were there" scenario. If you have work up time, then OK.
What needs to be systematized, or at least more properly thought out, is the proper ratio of training with vehicles to training without vehicles and how driving-gunning-crew commanding fits into the development of an infantry soldier (in conjunction with patrolling, helo ops, crew-served weapons, urban ops and all those other good skillsets) and how we balance rifleman's duties in a vehicle (when the unit is using one) and outside of one.
Concur, and that would great if you only had one type of vehicle, and money and time were not constrained - which they are.
That everyone must know to drive and operate the main armament was one of the lessons that came out of UK operations in Basra. How to make that the default setting, when not deployed is problematic.
How many rounds per year should each soldier in the platoon use to qualify with the main armament?
How much does it cost to get all the soldiers qualified to drive on public roads?
Does he need to qualify?
What about training and vehicle maintenance?
What this means in practice is Infantry BNs becoming more specialised, not more general - and there are specialist problems associated with turret crew vehicles, as opposed to pure APCs.

William F. Owen

07-26-2009, 05:38 AM

And snipers organzied at the company-level. Ugh...No way jose, methinks. We have a hard enough time effectively employing them at the battalion level as it is.
Seriously? What's the problem? BN Sniper platoon trains up X-number of Snipers. Snipers are attached to Platoons and companies on operations. How hard is that?

Sniping is not a dark art and snipers are not masters of a dark art. At best they are a guy with a rifle and some training. Yes, they are very skilled, but so what? They are cheap to train and cheap to equip, compared to all other fire support assets. - and they are fire support.

Half the problem with UK/US Sniper myth is that they are still stuck in 1917 being the Battalion ISTAR asset, with a unique skills set. This has not been true for a very long time.
It should be no more difficult to task or employ a sniper than it is a mortar or a GPMG.

jcustis

07-26-2009, 07:08 AM

Seriously? What's the problem? BN Sniper platoon trains up X-number of Snipers. Snipers are attached to Platoons and companies on operations. How hard is that?

Sniping is not a dark art and snipers are not masters of a dark art. At best they are a guy with a rifle and some training. Yes, they are very skilled, but so what? They are cheap to train and cheap to equip, compared to all other fire support assets. - and they are fire support.

Half the problem with UK/US Sniper myth is that they are still stuck in 1917 being the Battalion ISTAR asset, with a unique skills set. This has not been true for a very long time.
It should be no more difficult to task or employ a sniper than it is a mortar or a GPMG.

Yes, I'm absolutely serious. Although I'll argue beside you 'till the cows come home that sniping isn't a dark art, I don't agree that it involves just "some training." Understanding scope theory is not particularly easy, and I say this as a former LCpl who was trained as a DM and had the chance to fire the M40 and Chandler rifles from the 1,000 yd line at Stone Bay, Camp Lejeune, a while back...

And that is why I had an issue with clinkerbuilt's proposal to organize them down at the company-level. I look around at my Corps and I realize that yes, there remains a great deal of myth and self-fulfilling prophecy that comes with sniping, and right now that's part of why they do not need to be permanent fixtures and a captain's full-time responsibility in garrison, and then in any combat environment. Infantry officers are not trained in sniper employment. Intelligence officers were/are, trained in their employment, but I don't see anything to be gained by changing the paradigm and introducing more instruction at our infantry officer's course.

We'd be better off, IMO, removing snipers from the T/O altogether, and take that structure to build DMs who could remain organic to squads with suppressed MK-12s and nothing more. Just because sniping is not a dark art, doesn't mean that snipers necessarily belong within an infantry company. I suppose I should have stated as much, as opposed to simply saying that we struggle with their effective employment at higher echelons.

We do not fight the way we did in Korea, Vietnam, or even Desert Storm. It's a good thing that that we don't in some ways, and a shame in others. The point to it though is that although employing snipers should be an easy task, we have had our share of problems and the risk calculation inevitably gets skewed as a result when snipers die en masse.

I like snipers in static area security roles, but with the state of optics being what it is, snipers will not hold a hegemony over magnified observation in any future battelfield. Give some experienced expert riflemen a harder hitting :wry: rifle and just call it a day, but don't heap shooter/observer training on them.

Ken White

07-26-2009, 07:58 AM

to flog this horse. Once more, into the breech (lousy pun, I know :rolleyes:)...there remains a great deal of myth and self-fulfilling prophecy that comes with sniping, and right now that's part of why they do not need to be permanent fixtures and a captain's full-time responsibility in garrison,I know of a number of garrison training problems with Snipers and all the reasons it's difficult -- that's why sniping always dies in peacetime only to be brought back when there's a war. I'm just not sure that's a good reason to dispense with them...and then in any combat environment. Infantry officers are not trained in sniper employment. Intelligence officers were/are, trained in their employment, but I don't see anything to be gained by changing the paradigm and introducing more instruction at our infantry officer's course.If the sniper is trained in his employment, that should be adequate unless one believes the myth that a commander has to be able to do everything all his people can do. I say myth because I've seen a lot of Commanders and not one of them ever hit that goal. Given the fact that the Corps has had Snipers back for many years, that they are / were bound to operate in a Company's AO on occasion, that lack of some rudimentary education on what a Sniper is and does is surprising -- but even lacking that, if the Sniper is trained right and has been sprinkled with Holy Water as being qualified......I suppose I should have stated as much, as opposed to simply saying that we struggle with their effective employment at higher echelons.I would never suggest that situations that cause hair pulling are generally a result of a higher echelon than needed being involved in a simple, everyday task. Never.We do not fight the way we did in Korea, Vietnam, or even Desert Storm.True and also no clue what the next fight will be like...:wry:Give some experienced expert riflemen a harder hitting rifle and just call it a day, but don't heap shooter/observer training on them.I buy that. I'd go for a better weapon and better training for all...

Snipers are handy in wars of movement, too. I picked up an '03 in Korea in 50 and carried it for a city fight and several long opposed moves. Was having good times with my bruised shoulder until they decided to pick up all the '03s and send 'em back to Quantico to be re-scoped. :(

jcustis

07-26-2009, 08:18 AM

Given the fact that the Corps has had Snipers back for many years, that they are / were bound to operate in a Company's AO on occasion, that lack of some rudimentary education on what a Sniper is and does is surprising -- but even lacking that, if the Sniper is trained right and has been sprinkled with Holy Water as being qualified...

In my weeks of training at IOC, the topic never came up, from what I can recall. Not sure if the reasoning behind that was even addressed.

William F. Owen

07-26-2009, 08:36 AM

We'd be better off, IMO, removing snipers from the T/O altogether, and take that structure to build DMs who could remain organic to squads with suppressed MK-12s and nothing more. Just because sniping is not a dark art, doesn't mean that snipers necessarily belong within an infantry company. I suppose I should have stated as much, as opposed to simply saying that we struggle with their effective employment at higher echelons.

Sniper seems a very emotive term. Back in the day, when I used to hang with John Plaster, (yeah, talking like my niece - :) ) I really marvelled at this level of knowledge, (and skill) but I always came back to, "shouldn't most soldiers be able to do this?"

I don't care where "Snipers" come from or are trained, but the end-state, not the process, should, IMO, give Company and Platoon commanders, access to Sniper capabilities as and when required.

Also,there is a pretty counter productive "creeping excellence" tendency amongst some snipers. 7.62mm is good out to 800m, with not too much problem = we need 8.59mm = even easier to hit at 800m, so we'll notch up the training to 1,200m. Flatter trajectory, thus making it easier to hit, should have equalled more snipers, not fewer even better ones!

jcustis

07-26-2009, 08:52 AM

I don't care where "Snipers" come from or are trained, but the end-state, not the process, should, IMO, give Company and Platoon commanders, access to Sniper capabilities as and when required.

I guess the matter of what comprises "sniper capabilities" has to be laid out before much deliberation goes further.

Are we talking precision direct fires? Call-for-fire capability? Long-duration and long-range observation capabilities?

We have the ability to perform most anything a sniper can do, already. The best thing he adds is a heightened ability to engage a man-sized target in a variety of conditions (low light poses challenges) affecting the target and the shooter.

Kiwigrunt

07-26-2009, 10:23 AM

Wilf:
Also,there is a pretty counter productive "creeping excellence" tendency amongst some snipers. 7.62mm is good out to 800m, with not too much problem = we need 8.59mm = even easier to hit at 800m, so we'll notch up the training to 1,200m. Flatter trajectory, thus making it easier to hit, should have equalled more snipers, not fewer even better ones!

Have the Brits not partially overcome the ‘fewer’ snipers by adding an 8.59 DM at platoon level?

Which would indeed go a long way towards:

Jcustis:
The best thing he adds is a heightened ability to engage a man-sized target in a variety of conditions (low light poses challenges) affecting the target and the shooter.

That said, I can still see the traditional role for snipers at battalion level, along with recon, and answering to battalion/S2.

Kiwigrunt

07-26-2009, 10:49 AM

This is why a high-end number (40) is better, in my opinion, than the lower end 28-32 I've seen. If you are operating with vehicles, they exist to crew vehicles. These guys aren't permanent crewman - my Platoon has spares and we rotate guys out for a break and to get bayonet time. This leaves 28 to 32 guys on the ground (depending on crew requirements of your platform) to operate but also gives you an extra "section" of your Zulu vehicles. If they are dismounted, those extra guys can become an extra section - or can be used as an "echelon" to help pack the ammo for the crew-served weapons that need to be manpacked now that you're out vehicles - or perhaps run the mule train?

So if I understand this correctly, your crews form a section, and then there are three dismount sections of 7? So per vehicle the 3 + 7 do not form one section? Just interested in how exactly this platoon works/looks.

William F. Owen

07-26-2009, 02:07 PM

Have the Brits not partially overcome the ‘fewer’ snipers by adding an 8.59 DM at platoon level?
Last I checked, there were going to be L-115A3 8.59mm at the unit level Sniper Platoons and Platoon DMs where going to be the old L96. The original L-115A1, were purchased for the platoons in 16 Air Assault and 3 Commando Brigades, but they apparently got "lifted up," to unit level snipers.

That said, I can still see the traditional role for snipers at battalion level, along with recon, and answering to battalion/S2.
Just like 1916? There's a whole basket full of very context specific discussion in that one sentence alone. My current feeling is that ideas in this area really need to be held to rigour, because some things just don't make sense, given modern equipment capabilities and the nature of contemporary operations. Having said all that, you may be right.

Infanteer

07-26-2009, 03:11 PM

So if I understand this correctly, your crews form a section, and then there are three dismount sections of 7? So per vehicle the 3 + 7 do not form one section? Just interested in how exactly this platoon works/looks.

No, it's a 10 man section with 3 for the crew. However, if I dismount, I take the 28 guys with me and the vehicles (Zulu callsigns) fall under the command of my HQ Sect Commander (the LAV Sgt). I can control those C/S like another section, however, if we are doing a Company-level operation, the LAV Capt will take control of all Zulu C/S while I work with the Coy Comd.

Having an extra officer (the LAV Capt) at the Coy level is good to; he's like the HQ Platoon/Ops guy.

William F. Owen

07-26-2009, 03:48 PM

No, it's a 10 man section with 3 for the crew. However, if I dismount, I take the 28 guys with me and the vehicles (Zulu callsigns) fall under the command of my HQ Sect Commander (the LAV Sgt). I can control those C/S like another section, however, if we are doing a Company-level operation, the LAV Capt will take control of all Zulu C/S while I work with the Coy Comd.

Having an extra officer (the LAV Capt) at the Coy level is good to; he's like the HQ Platoon/Ops guy.

That's exactly how a UK Mech Platoon operated for nearly 30 years.
...but your LAVs have stabilised cannon? So why are they operating under a Zulu-type call sign?

We used to send the 432's off to a Zulu muster or just hold them short of the objective, which was pretty silly mostly, but we only had Pig-turreted GPMG. You've got a 25mm cannon! Surely your LAVs are acting in intimate support? Just like an MICV should (IMO, actually should not!)

jcustis

07-26-2009, 11:04 PM

No, it's a 10 man section with 3 for the crew. However, if I dismount, I take the 28 guys with me and the vehicles (Zulu callsigns) fall under the command of my HQ Sect Commander (the LAV Sgt). I can control those C/S like another section, however, if we are doing a Company-level operation, the LAV Capt will take control of all Zulu C/S while I work with the Coy Comd.

Having an extra officer (the LAV Capt) at the Coy level is good to; he's like the HQ Platoon/Ops guy.

Infanteer,

I'm very interested in what your T/O looks like. We utilize LAV Gen IIs, and keep the scout capacity down from its design size to a level that helps with crew comfort, but besides having an executive officer in his own vehicle (typically the C2 variant), we do not have anything approximating a LAV Captain.

In terms of being the HQ Plt/Ops guy, what do his billet duties entail, and what vehicle does he command?

Infanteer

07-27-2009, 05:41 AM

That's exactly how a UK Mech Platoon operated for nearly 30 years.
...but your LAVs have stabilized cannon? So why are they operating under a Zulu-type call sign?

We used to send the 432's off to a Zulu muster or just hold them short of the objective, which was pretty silly mostly, but we only had Pig-turreted GPMG. You've got a 25mm cannon! Surely your LAVs are acting in intimate support? Just like an MICV should (IMO, actually should not!)

I wouldn't doubt it, as our mech tactics were most likely (like everything else) copied from the Brits. The LAV III indeed has a 25mm Bushmaster in a stabilized turret, which is a spectacular system.

I am unsure of how familiar you are with our system, so I'll go to the basics for everyone's benefit. The Zulu callsigns are a carry over from the M113 days when the taxis went off to a harbour. However the Platoon Commander, when dismounted with his sections, still controls the potent LAVs unless the OC takes them. Instead of moving LAVs around while he's busy fighting the ground fight, he just maintains comms with his HQ Sect Comd (the LAV Sgt) and tells him what needs to happen (ie: punch, cut-off, get guns on that building); the LAV Sgt, as the mounted guy, can issue direction to the individual vehicles better than the Pl Comd on the ground can.

When not mounted, the LAV Sgt is the fourth (HQ) Sect Comd.

Infanteer,

I'm very interested in what your T/O looks like. We utilize LAV Gen IIs, and keep the scout capacity down from its design size to a level that helps with crew comfort, but besides having an executive officer in his own vehicle (typically the C2 variant), we do not have anything approximating a LAV Captain.

In terms of being the HQ Plt/Ops guy, what do his billet duties entail, and what vehicle does he command?

When the Infantry moved from an APC to an IFV, we brought along the idea of the LAV Captain from the Armoured Corps' Battle Captain who filled an important role in our big (19 Tank) Armoured Squadrons (Company or Troop down in the US) which featured a Sqdn 2IC back in the echelon pushing supplies up.

In the infantry, he basically helps the OC run the fight up front while the 2IC (like you said, in a C2 variant) hangs back and acts as a CP. If the Coy dismounts, the LAV Captain takes control of all the LAVs (15 in a Rifle Coy according to doctrine - this is open source).

As there is no real doctrine for "out of battle employment", different Coy Comds will treat the postion differently - such as breaking off A+Q (S1/S4) and Ops (S2/S3) duties between the 2IC and the LAV Capt. I've also seen him employed as HQ Platoon Comd, Media Guy, LO, etc, etc. Either way, he has his own vehicle (LAV III) and brings alot of flexibility to C2 in a rifle company, mounted or dismounted.

jcustis

07-27-2009, 07:23 AM

That's an interedting way of utilizing him. Does he serve as the OC's wingman?

In our community, we have scouts rather than infantry squads, so the platoon commander does not likely dismount as much. He has a sergeant in charge of the scout section. For years there has been a muddled debate on whether the LAV-25s support the scouts, or vice versa. The focus was fairly clear when they were LAI (light armored infantry) battalions, but the LAR (reconnaissance) battalions operate off an almost bastardized version of Army cavalry doctrine, mixed in with an almost unhealthy belief that we can take on anything due to the nature of the 25mm chain gun.:D

The Aussies have an equally unique means of employment, since scouts norinfantry are carried in the back of -25s, but in LAV-PC variants that are fairly roomy compared to our biggest variant, the LAV-L (logistics). They were running 2 PCs with 4 -25s to form platoons when I was a part oc Talisman Sabre.

Firn

09-15-2009, 01:06 PM

This is a rather interesting topic with a lot of great input by experienced members. I will toss in a not so well known view on it. I bolded the perhaps most relevant points.

THE order of battle is that division and formation of the different arms into separate parts or sections of the whole Army, and that form of general position or disposition of those parts which is to be the norm throughout the whole campaign or war.

........

The greater armies become, the more they are distributed over wide spaces and the more diversified the action and reaction of the different parts amongst themselves, the wider becomes the field of strategy, and, therefore, then the order of battle, in the sense of our definition, must also come into a kind of reciprocal action with strategy, which manifests itself chiefly at the extreme points where tactics and strategy meet, that is, at those moments when the general distribution of the combatant forces passes into the special dispositions for the combat.

We now turn to those three points, the division, combination of arms, and order of battle (disposition) in a strategic point of view.

1.—Division.

In strategy we must never ask what is to be the strength of a division or a corps, but how many corps or division an army should have (or how many sections or teams a platoon should have.) There is nothing more unmanageable than an army divided into three parts, except it be one divided into only two, in which case the chief command must be almost neutralised.

To fix the strength of great and small corps, either on the grounds of elementary tactics or on higher grounds, leaves an incredibly wide field for arbitrary judgment, and heaven knows what strange modes of reasoning have sported in this wide field. On the other hand, the necessity of forming an independent whole (army) into a certain number of parts is a thing as obvious as it is positive, and this idea furnishes real strategic motives for determining the number of the greater divisions of an army, consequently their strength, whilst the strength of the smaller divisions, such as companies, battalions, etc., is left to be determined by tactics.

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Certainly it seems that the supreme direction of an army (and the direction of every whole) must be greatly facilitated if there are only three or four subordinates to command, but the commander-in-chief must pay dearly for this convenience in a twofold manner. In the first place, an order loses in rapidity, force, and exactness if the gradation ladder down which it has to descend is long, and this must be the case if there are corps-commanders between the division leaders and the chief; secondly, the chief loses generally in his own proper power and efficiency the wider the spheres of action of his immediate subordinates become.

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But on the other hand the number of divisions must not be too great, otherwise disorder will ensue. It is difficult enough to manage eight divisions from one head quarter, and the number should never be allowed to exceed ten. But in a division in which the means of circulating orders are much less, the smaller normal number four, or at most five, may be regarded as the more suitable.

If these factors, five and ten, will not answer, that is, if the brigades are too strong, then corps d'armée must be introduced; but we must remember that by so doing, a new power is created, which at once very much lowers all other factors.

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This is the abstract view of the case. The particular case may present good reasons for deciding otherwise. Likewise, we must admit that, although eight or ten divisions may be directed when united in a level country, in widely extended mountain positions the thing might perhaps be impossible. A great river which divides an army into halves, makes a commander for each half indispensable; in short, there are a hundred local and particular objects of the most decisive character, before which all rules must give way.

But still, experience teaches us, that these abstract grounds come most frequently into use and are seldomer overruled by others than we should perhaps suppose.

We wish further to explain clearly the scope of the foregoing considerations by a simple outline, for which purpose we now place the different points of most importance next to each other.

As we mean by the term numbers, or parts of a whole, only those which are made by the primary, therefore the immediate division, we say.

1. If a whole has too few members it is unwieldy.

2. If the parts of a whole body are too large, the power of the superior will is thereby weakened.

3. With every additional step through which an order has to pass, it is weakened in two ways: in one way by the loss of force, which it suffers in its passage through an additional step; in another way by the longer time in its transmission.

The tendency of all this is to show that the number of co-ordinate divisions should be as great, and the gradational steps as few as possible; and the only limitation to this conclusion is, that in armies no more than from eight to ten, and in subordinate corps no more than from four or at most six, subdivisions can be conveniently directed.
(When thinking about platoons and their divisions/teams one can see that this points seems to be still of value

2.—Combination of Arms.

For strategy the combination of the three arms in the order of battle is only important in regard to those parts of the army which, according to the usual order of things, are likely to be frequently employed in a detached position, where they may be obliged to engage in an independent combat. Now it is in the nature of things, that the members of the first class, and for the most part only these, are destined for detached positions, because, as we shall see elsewhere, detached positions are most generally adopted upon the supposition and the necessity of a body independent in itself.

In a strict sense strategy would therefore only require a permanent combination of arms in army corps, or where these do not exist, in divisions, leaving it to circumstances to determine when a provisional combination of the three arms shall be made in subdivisions of an inferior order.

But it is easy to see that, when corps are of considerable size, such as 30,000 or 40,000 men, they can seldom find themselves in a situation to take up a completely connected position in mass. With corps of such strength, a combination of the arms in the divisions is therefore necessary. No one who has had any experience in war, will treat lightly the delay which occurs when pressing messages have to be sent to some other perhaps distant point before cavalry can be brought to the support of infantry—to say nothing of the confusion which takes place. (the friction at work, and a case for organic combination of arms

The details of the combination of the three arms, how far it should extend, how low down it should be carried, what proportions should be observed, the strength of the reserves of each to be set apart—these are all purely tactical considerations.

3.—The Disposition.

The determination as to the relations in space, according to which the parts of an army amongst themselves are to be drawn up in order of battle, is likewise completely a tactical subject, referring solely to the battle. No doubt there is also a strategic disposition of the parts; but it depends almost entirely on determinations and requirements of the moment, and what there is in it of the rational, does not come within the meaning of the term "order of battle." We shall therefore treat of it in the following chapter under the head of Disposition of an Army.

The order of battle of an army is therefore the organisation and disposition of it in mass ready prepared for battle. Its parts are united in such a manner that both the tactical and strategical requirements of the moment can be easily satisfied by the employment of single parts drawn from the general mass. When such momentary exigency has passed over, these parts resume their original place, and thus the order of battle becomes the first step to, and principal foundation of, that wholesome methodicism which, like the beat of a pendulum, regulates the work in war, and of which we have already spoken in the fourth chapter of the Second Book.

A lot of food for thought, supporting a flexible and thoughtful use of the forces facilitated by the wholesome and common methodicism (drills, procedures, training, doctrine). The LINK (http://www.clausewitz.com/readings/OnWar1873/Bk5ch05.html) to the whole chapter.