Ralph Peter's Best to Worst COAs for Afghanistan

[Rob Thornton]

DOn't know how many have read this yet. Ralph Peter's has an interesting piece in the USA Today on COAs in Afghanistan. Peter's as almost always is candid.

His opener tells you exactly where he stands -


The conflict in Afghanistan is the wrong war in the wrong place at the wrong time. Instead of concentrating on the critical mission of keeping Islamist terrorists on the defensive, we've mired ourselves by attempting to modernize a society that doesn't want to be — and cannot be — transformed.


and why:


Even if we achieved the impossible dream of creating a functioning, unified state in Afghanistan, it would have little effect on the layered crises in the Muslim world. Backward and isolated, Afghanistan is sui generis (only example of its kind). Political polarization in the U.S. precludes an honest assessment, but Iraq's the prize from which positive change might flow, while Afghanistan could never inspire neighbors who despise its backwardness

He goes on to lay out his view of best and worst COAs



Best. Instead of increasing the U.S. military "footprint," reduce our forces and those of NATO by two-thirds, maintaining a "mother ship" at Bagram Air Base and a few satellite bases from which special operations troops, aircraft and drones, and lean conventional forces would strike terrorists and support Afghan factions with whom we share common enemies. All resupply for our military could be done by air, if necessary.

Stop pretending Afghanistan's a real state. Freeze development efforts. Ignore the opium. Kill the fanatics.


Good. Leave entirely. Strike terrorist targets from over the horizon and launch punitive raids when necessary. Instead of facing another Vietnam ourselves, let Afghanistan become a Vietnam for Iran and Pakistan. Rebuild our military at home, renewing our strategic capabilities.


Poor. Continue to muddle through as is, accepting that achieving any meaningful change in Afghanistan is a generational commitment. Surge troops for specific missions, but not permanently.


Worst. Augment our forces endlessly and increase aid in the absence of a strategy. Lie to ourselves that good things might just happen. Let U.S. troops and Afghans continue to die for empty rhetoric, while Pakistan decays into a vast terrorist refuge.


My questions - did he leave anything out? Is his view to narrow, too broad or just right?

Best, Rob

[gh_uk]

Without forming a judgment as to whether he is right or wrong, the Best/Good options do not sound too dissimilar to the approach advocated by Rupert Smith in the Utility of Force, who said...


The supporting arms and services must be kept to minimum so as to present the fewest targets...I think we must conceive of the application of force, in contrast to the intelligence and information operation, as a raid at theatre or strategic level rather than a sustained operation

Smith, R. The Utility of Force, Penguin, London, 2006, p401

[Bob's World]

We would probably differ on rationale somewhat, but I think he's essentially right.

The decisive point for the US is our relationship with Saudi Arabia. Until we are willing to begin adjusting our foreign policy from that point, working outward, we will simply be gnawing on the edges of the problem. (Note, I am in no way suggesting a military solution to the policy problem we have with the Saudis).

Establishing a Shia dominated democracy of some sort between Iran and Saudi Arabia is certainly the long hard road toward adjusting our policy in the region, but it will have more effect than increased efforts in Afghanistan to try to turn it into a "little America."

Biggest problem is that the politicians are so focused on the "two wars" in the region, that they ignore the giant policy disaster that those two wars are sitting in the middle of. My vote is to get a new comprehensive policy for the region that focuses on populaces over threats worked out first, and then decide where the "M" in DIME needs to be adjusted.

[Ron Humphrey]

My questions - did he leave anything out? Is his view to narrow, too broad or just right?

Best, Rob

That said I do wish he would have given more weight to the fact that despite many of the considerations he brought forth, in the end there is very much a certain level of requirement to do something.

The fact that so much is out of wack and could be approached differently doesn't change the reality of a need to do something. We are stuck looking for the best of bad solutions because at least for now that seems to be all thats available.

To do what needs to be done right will take a lot more time, and dedication of govt resources then we are likely to see anytime soon. It also doesn't help that so many of the "things" going on here contribute greatly to the perception of our ability to accomplish things over there.

Perhaps that would be something to really focus on. Third, fourth order effects of words and actions here on our ability to speak and act on the international front.

[Old Eagle]

I love Ralph like a brother.

BUT a coupla points --

Ralph's rant on killing all the Sunnis in Iraq, while thought provoking didn't bring much to the fight.

What British experience is he talking about? 19th Century?

During my tour, I met too many Afghans who really want a chance to break out of the cycle of war, poverty and exploitation. I remain convinced that they can make a difference if we give them even a modicum of support. At the same time we do need to help them keep from making the same mistakes our erstwhile Vietnamese allies made -- trying to maintain a thugacracy/kleptocracy when, in fact, real change was needed.

As usual Brother Peters presents us with a great point of departure for a meaningful discussion.

[Ken White]

Looking at Ralph's option, I think:

- Best: Agree but would continue development

- Good: In the first place 'we' told them we would not do that * and in the second the OTH bit won't work.

- Poor: Agreed.

- Worst: Agreed.

Strongly agree with gh_uk

Also agree with Bob's World -- we're getting wrapped up in the minutia as we are entirely too prone to do...

* Thus I also agree with Ron Humphrey:
"...in the end there is very much a certain level of requirement to do something...Third, fourth order effects of words and actions here on our ability to speak and act on the international front.

Add to that Old Eagle's comment re: what many Afghans want and consider the facts that we said we'd not abandon them and we need to restore the credibility of our words internationally -- that IMO, is a bigger hit on us with many than all the media rhetoric stuff -- and that the Afghans are just like anyone in else in that they will take every handout they can get and ask for more; that they will fix things in their interest when it can be shown that it is indeed going to be a benefit. They respect honor, pride and strength -- and we must show them that taking all you can get is ultimately counterproductive. They are not likely to come up with a strong central government but I believe they'll come up with something that works for them. We have opened a window for them to improve their situation. It is up to them and not up to us what they do with that opening. We should not try to sort it for them , we simply should continue to hold that window open for a bit and encourage but not push them to get it sorted.

I'm bothered that we are dispatching 17K more troops and as yet have no announced goal. That's why I believe Ralph's "Best" option is an excellent idea until we sort out what we're trying to do.

[davidbfpo]

Here is a link to the article, which took awhile to locate on USA Today:
http://blogs.usatoday.com/oped/2009/02/the-mendacity-o.html#more

(Added later) This article, far longer, is more helpful, but no options given: http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/08winter/devillafranca.pdf

Old Eagle: the comment on the UK's experience is: 'As the British learned the hard way, Afghanistan can be disciplined, but it can't be profitably occupied or liberalized'. IIRC on SWJ there is a comment akin to "You only rent Afghan loyalty". Don't overlook there was a substantial minority, in the cities, that supported reforms before the Soviet intervention; some of whom fought with the Soviets and many emigrated - I suspect far more stayed put.

IMHO the British / Imperial history is as relevant today as then; why? Simply Afghanistan appears to have changed so little and has a strong conservative culture.

The current approach IMHO is dangerous and vulnerable to sudden changes in public opinion. I cite the tiredness of the Canadian and Dutch in support i.e. time to go.

davidbfpo

[slapout9]

The decisive point for the US is our relationship with Saudi Arabia. Until we are willing to begin adjusting our foreign policy from that point, working outward, we will simply be gnawing on the edges of the problem. (Note, I am in no way suggesting a military solution to the policy problem we have with the Saudis).


I have always believed this from the start, as in 911. Especially if you look at it from a crime satnd point. Almost all the suspects were from Saudi, we call that a clue in Law Enforcement. I don't think military action is appropriate now, but I would not have ruled it out following 911. If you really want to get Bin Laden start going after the Bin Laden family dynasty and the massive wealth they have acquired. Go ahead with the Flame Thrower attacks now:wry:

[John T. Fishel]

about Afghanistan to know what I do not know. I do not know if there is a critical mass of modernizers among the Afghans. I do not know if the Taliban is sufficiently unified to be perceived as a threat in in itself. I do not know if the Taliban are owned/rented by AQ. I do not know if there is an effective alternative to the opium crop. I do not know the tribal relationships in Afghanistan and how those really break out linguistically, religiously, and politically, etc. I do not know what constitutes corruption in Afghan culture - presuming, of course, there is such an animal.

OTOH I do know that our C2 structure is screwed up. I do know we have not paid more than lip service to the obligations we incurred in 01 and 02. And, I do know that we have yet to develop a strategy either military or whole of govt - combined. I do agree that the British 19th century experience there is relevant as is the Soviet. I just don't know how relevant they are or in what way.

The problem, then, is to get the information quickly, do the analysis, develop the strategy to include a unified C2, and execute it in short order - which, of course, will be longer than we would wish.

Cheers

JohnT

[Ken White]

The problem, then, is to get the information quickly, do the analysis, develop the strategy to include a unified C2, and execute it in short order - which, of course, will be longer than we would wish.Whoops. We missed that suspense date. My, how time flies... :o

Very good post, John.

[Bill Moore]

Ralph Peters is all about thumping the bad guys hard, then going home with our heads held high, while ready and willing to return to do the same as required. Bob's World is more focused on influencing the population to solve the problem, but amazingly both Bob and Peters are at least in partial agreement on Afghanistan, and it sounds like many SWJ members (to include myself) find ourselves generally in agreement with Peters, which is many ways is telling. One can only hope that those proposing these seemingly pie in the sky policies are seeing a reality that many of us have simply not seen yet.

I argued in previous posts that a viable alternative strategy was to go into Afghanistan (as one example) as we did initially, but with more force and hammer Al Qaeda, and yes pursue them into Pakistan while we had the political will to do so immediately after 9/11. Then hand over the reigns to whomever with a stiff warning that if AQ resettles in Afghanistan (or anywhere else in the world) we'll pay another visit. Unfortunately we can't re-write history, and the coercion course of action is no longer a feasible option now.

While only an opinion, from what I'm seeing, I agree with Peters' that it isn't worth the cost to convert Afghanistan into a functional state (assuming it is possible). We have other national interests that we can't pursue because too many of our force has been tied down in OIF and OEF-A, but Peters doesn't really explain how we and our NATO allies would leave Afghanistan with honor at this point. We seem to be a catch 22 position, we know staying isn't practical, but leaving sends the wrong message to the world, and that wrong message will significantly impact our ability to garner support for future military adventures. However, we do have a new administration, so that does allow some room for significant change.

Peters' pointed out the obvious, in South Asia the main threat is in Pakistan, and sadly Pakistan is in a precarious situation. They desparately need our help, but that help must be provided in a careful manner to avoid further polarizing the people from their government. We don't see much reporting on the food riots, looting, etc. tied to the severe economic crisis in Pakistan, one that rapidly getting worse. The Taliban imposing Sharia in Swat is big news as it should be, but that is only a small part of the overall tragic story unfolding in Pakistan.

Back to Afghanistan, lets assume we Afghanistan to function as a weak state in the future, what is the so what factor of that for our security interests? The AQ training camps are elsewhere now. The money still flows to the global Jihadists from the Middle East, and while very one likes to point to Saudi, that is not the only "friendly" Middle Eastern nation sending millions of dollars to these Jihad wackos. As Peters' stated, Afghanistan is the wrong war, wrong place, wrong time (it wasn't in 2001/2002). Afghanistan was the geographical center of gravity for Al Qaeda at one time, that is no longer true, and the problem has morphed into a problem set much larger than Al Qaeda, and much larger than Afghanistan and Pakistan, so maybe we should take Peters' advice about the audacity of realism one step further and review our entire strategy to counter Islamist extremism.

[Entropy]

Frankly, I find his analysis rather shallow - something that seems to afflict a lot of strategic thinking in our country today. He complains about substituting means for ends and then turns around and spends the rest of the article doing exactly that - writing about means, not ends, and making dubious comparisons to Vietnam. What is his end? What is his strategy? We don't really know. What interests do his preferred COA's serve? We don't really know that either. I'm not sure he's doing much of anything to further the debate here.

Rather than offer a strategy of his own on which to base coherent COA's, his solution is simply to reduce troops as much as possible - IOW reducing troops IS the strategy. To me that is not a very convincing argument. I think a reasonable argument can be made that one can do more with less in Afghanistan, but Peters doesn't make that argument. If the lack of a coherent and especially unified strategy is the problem, then I fail to see what his options do to solve that problem. Without that kind of basic analysis, what Peters advocates could turn out to be much worse than the present course. Every COA has downsides and risks - to Peters, and many others who've made pretty much the same arguments he makes here in reference to Iraq and Afghanistan, the downsides of their preferred positions are irrelevant or ignored. I read a lot of the same kind of arguments when Iraq was at its worst where people could seemingly see no viable solutions. In such cases those views become self-fulfilling because almost all options are eliminated but a few. Absent a more comprehensive examination or at least some minimal cost-benefit analysis, his four options are, to put it bluntly, wishful thinking.

I also have problems with the assumptions behind several statements in the piece:


Expending blood and treasure blindly in Afghanistan, we do our best to shut our eyes to the worsening crisis next door in Pakistan, a radicalizing Muslim state with more than five times the population and a nuclear arsenal. We've turned the hose on the doghouse while letting the mansion burn.

Who is shutting their eyes? The problems in Pakistan have not been ignored, it's just that there isn't much the US can do about them. Furthermore, the implication of the final sentence is that the US is responsible for Pakistani radicalization. There may be some truth to that, but the unintended irony here is that the radicalization is not rooted in the nation-building Peters dislikes, but on punitive measures he does. There's a reason US operations inside Pakistan were secrets (until they were recently and stupidly disclosed).


Even if we achieved the impossible dream of creating a functioning, unified state in Afghanistan, it would have little effect on the layered crises in the Muslim world.

Limiting our options to punitive ones is probably not going to ease these crises in the Muslim world Peters is worried about - probably the opposite. Again, every COA has costs and unless and until one examines the downsides of those costs, then they simply wishful thinking.

There is much more to criticize along similar lines in this piece and I could go on, but I'd like to get back to Rob's question:


My questions - did he leave anything out? Is his view to narrow, too broad or just right?

Leaving aside his own lack of any strategy, I think his view is much too narrow and simplistic. As one example, he states we should, "Kill the fanatics." Who would those be? "Fanatics" is a meaningless term given the complexities in Afghanistan. Besides, we've been killing people for almost eight years now, how is that working out?

But let's look for a minute at other possible COA's. Operating under the assumption that our goal is primarily a negative one - deny AQ and its affiliates an Afghan-based safe haven - there is a continuum of possibilities where the extremes are probably the least tenable. In this case, I do agree with him that we (the US and NATO) cannot create a modern, unified, stable nation inside the territory that we call Afghanistan (something I've commented on here a few times), but that doesn't mean that attempts to create some unity and stability in A-stan are pointless. In other words, it's not an either-or choice - there is a LOT of room between his minimalist "best" and "good" COA's and the unrealistic ideal of Afghanistan as the next South Korea.

As I've said before in other threads, look next door at Pakistan to see an example of a nation where most of its territory is, in reality, not controlled by the central government. The central government is, to steal a book title, "The strongest tribe" in Pakistan which administers, to a greater or lesser extent, most of the country as colonial possessions. That is, IMO, the best we could hope to achieve in Afghanistan in terms of nation-building, but I don't consider even that an achievable goal within any reasonable time frame.

Even with that lesser alternative set as the upper limit there are still many options down the line before coming to complete disengagement. Even a weak central government, nominally loyal and dependent upon the US, could act as our long-term reliable-when-we-really-need-them-to-be proxy and keep the conglomeration called the "Taliban" in check.

Another alternative is greater decentralization where regions are largely autonomous (think Kurdistan). There is the strategy I've mentioned elsewhere of rebuilding and buttressing the old tribal power structures. There are others and they need to be considered as well.

Regardless of which COA(s) we choose, we cannot limit our options to the punitive expeditions Peters' advocates - ideally those would be rare. Various forms of aid (economic, development) as well as non-punitive military missions (security, training, etc.) are all tools we can use and it doesn't make much sense put most of them back in the shed without good reason, which is exactly what Peters would have us do.

Finally, this really annoyed me:


If the impending surge fails to pacify the country, will we send another increment of troops, then another, as we did in Southeast Asia?

Surely Ralph Peters must know two things: 1. This isn't Vietnam, there is no draft and therefore the amount of escalating we can do is very limited 2. It's even more limited when one considers the logistical realities of operating in Afghanistan. The fear he gins up here and earlier in the piece is unfounded, IMO.

To close, I agree we need an "audacity of realism," but I think Mr. Peters' op-ed is as mired in the wishful thinking he opposes.

[jmm99]

from Ken
- Best: Agree but would continue development

- Good: In the first place 'we' told them we would not do that *....

If we (per Peters) are going to "support Afghan factions with whom we share common enemies", development for them would be a carrot. Or by "development" do you mean for all of Astan ? I assumed the former, but you have learnt me not to ass u me. :D

The other question goes to my ignorance of "In the first place 'we' told them we would not do that" - ignorance being my mind blank of any particular document that would create either (1) a legal commitment to stay; or (2) a moral or ethical commitment to stay. With all that's been written or said in the last 7 years, we might have committed to rebuild the entire country. :(

Anyway, links to any specific on what "we" told them ?

[George L. Singleton]

The ignore the opium, kill the terrorists statement.

I agree with killing the terrorists, but do not agree with ignoring the opium. That would be a huge mistake.

[Ken White]

Who's on first? :D

Development for most of Afghanistan with special emphasis on the carotene. It's good for you!

"We" have said, IIRC, that "...we erred in the 1980s and just left, we will not do that again, we will not leave you alone..." and dozens of other similar statements over the years as you point out. There is no legal requirement to stay but to me we inherited an ethical requirement to do so by our words. As I've said before, I do not think we should've said we we would stay and fix it (whatever that means) -- but we did say it. Repeatedly. Since we said we would, in public, we really need to do that. One cannot be made to say anything but anything one does say becomes a commitment.

That's probably why Creighton Abrams said "Generals should be noted for their silences." :cool:

We have abandoned others before and it hurt us -- our abandonment of Viet Nam (another place where we should not have said "we will..."), of the Kurds, earlier (ditto...) and of the Shia in southern Iraq after Desert Storm (ditto again) among others hurt us more internationally than did invading Iraq. The message was you cannot rely on the Americans. That needs to be fixed

The "we'll stay" comments came early on. Here's a recent one:
...And we could have replaced one power person with another. That would have been, I guess, the easy route, and then just left it behind, say we've done our duty and we've upheld the doctrine -- and said, okay, we're now going to take this group, replace them with this group -- and just got out of the way. But that's not -- that, one, didn't learn the lessons of the '80s and the '90s. And secondly, the interest is to build a flourishing democracy as an alternative to a hateful ideology. And it's not easy work. Afghanistan is a huge country. The road system is not nearly as well developed as a lot of other countries. You're just beginning to develop your resource base in a way that I hope benefits the people of Afghanistan -- after all, it's their resources.
...
told the President that you can count on the United States -- just like you've been able to count on this administration, you'll be able to count on the next administration, as well. It's in our interest that Afghanistan's democracy flourish. It's in America's interest that we forever deny safe haven to people who still want to kill our citizens.

LINK. (http://www.america.gov/st/texttrans-english/2008/December/20081215154847xjsnommis0.379162.html)

P.S.

Here's an early one: LINK (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/1381782/Powell-promises-support-for-Afghanistan.html)

[jmm99]

the 2008 link was exactly what I was looking for.

That is about as close to an executive agreement as you can get, without committing it to writing. I shudder at what might have been said and done in private.

That is one reason why Silent Cal ranks high on my POTUS list - and the goats or sheep (and other fauna) on the WH lawn were also a nice touch.

[John T. Fishel]

international obligations incurred de facto by public statements that are not explicitly written out. Ken's right about the cost of not living up to a verbal committment.

I recall Pres Bush 41 saying publicly to Panama in the wake of Just Cause that the US would provide $1b to rebuild. Pres Endara, VPs Arias Calderon and Billy Ford and the people of Panama believed him. But when it was all done, the Administration had provided only about half that amount and then sought to show it had met its obligation through an AID report that was all smoke and mirrors. As I said in my SSI monograph in 1992 (also published by Praeger as part of Civil Military Operations in the New World - 1997), "Most Panamanians don't count that way." That incident may - or may not - have contributed to the outcome of negotiations over post 1999 basing rights in Panama where we gave up Howard AFB.

It all points to the classic lesson that people who work in development learned long ago: Never promise something you can't deliver. It wil always come back to haunt you. (Solid lesson for COIN, SFA, and SASO too.)

Cheers

JohnT

[J Wolfsberger]

1. Afghanistan is neither a state nor a nation. It is a geographic expression for a region wherein live a number of tribal groupings. There are a few neutral areas, e.g. Kabul, but they are not representative of either the region or the people living there. Confusing the educated minority living in Kabul, for example, as being representative of the entire region in terms of education, hopes, aspirations, modernity, etc. is a guaranteed route to failure. One of the first steps on the route is any notion of establishing any sort of Western model of a representative government in A'stan. Am I missing something?

2. The surge in troops didn't turn anything around in Iraq. The new strategy did. Successfully executing that strategy in the allocated time required more troops. A simple surge in troops into A'stan without a substantially revised strategy recognizing the points I made above, and establishing clear, achievable military and political goals is the worst kind of eyewash: the kind that gets good people killed to no useful effect. Again, am I missing something?

3. A lesson from an old course in International Relations: The best equipped and trained military in the world does not deter war. Prestige, the reputation for being able to effect one's will, does. In the case of A'stan, walking away is not an option: the message received will be that the US can be defeated by chipping away until it loses resolve, tucks tail and slinks home. (Anyone who doubts that is the message that will be received, PM me about terms for the bet. :D) I agree with Peters that we should "stop pretending Afghanistan's a real state." But I also think every one of his options damages US prestige to one degree or another. That loss of prestige will embolden the jihadis, and ultimately lead to a worse problem, broader based, than we face today. I think we can do better. Again, am I missing something?

[Ken White]

Works for me. We need to quit screwing around like a bunch of idiots...

[J Wolfsberger]

As an alternative to Ralph Peters' five options, see Tell Me Why We’re There? Enduring Interests in Afghanistan (and Pakistan) (http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS%20Policy%20Brief%20-%20Enduring%20Interests%20in%20Afghanistan%20and%2 0Pakistan.pdf), by Nathaniel C. Fick, David Kilcullen, John A. Nagl, Vikram J. Singh.

Maybe it will spark a discussion of what our strategy should be.

[Ron Humphrey]

As an alternative to Ralph Peters' five options, see Tell Me Why We’re There? Enduring Interests in Afghanistan (and Pakistan) (http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS%20Policy%20Brief%20-%20Enduring%20Interests%20in%20Afghanistan%20and%2 0Pakistan.pdf), by Nathaniel C. Fick, David Kilcullen, John A. Nagl, Vikram J. Singh.

Maybe it will spark a discussion of what our strategy should be.

I'll start it out since i so enjoy over-simplifying anything:o

Move to largest cities with sufficient training forces for pol,army,NP,etc and sufficient security to let you focus on that training(add development,ed,etc)

Establish larger FOB-like bases in or around villages along the border where you have been able to find those who really want change and are going to work with you.

ISR up like crazy and focus on agro development, security, and training.
Find those who can influence change in those areas and enable away/ keep them safe. Wack a mole when or if you have to but make sure you know which mole your wackin Find out who got screwed in the past (a result of our lack of followthrough after helping them kick out the Russians, and do whatever you can to "make it right" within the context of societal norm / acceptable to our norms.

pay them more to grow something else than T pay them for opium , set it up for future dependance on the new product so that in the future the overall prices can and will revert to norm.

Look for any area where you can coop passive support for enemy movements but don't waste time trying to coop active support. Instead the aforementioned actions should help to either move them towards passive or put them sites either way works just one more permanent and painful than the other.

For God's sake get your leadership both military and political on a common theme (whether they all agree or not) it'll at least cut back on consistant bickering in the public forum and allow for more meaningful actions in the private communications.

Say what you mean, mean what you say, and make sure theres sufficient reason for them to believe you.

Let the enemy have to move and plan, watch their back and always be looking over their shoulders. Let them know where your at but make sure their visit won't be a pleasant one.

And most of all don't grow so big that those who need to grow can't because there's

1- no need
2- no incentive

[Ken White]

Plan A.

It is better to destroy submarines in port. That is much easier than trying to find them when they're in the sea...

Plan B.

Ya always have to have a plan B at a minimum. If major strategic raids are deemed not acceptable and / or if Pakistan does not move more rapidly, then:

Do not go to the cities; Afghans are essentially and psychologically a rural people.

Do not try to force a 'nation.' Let the Afghans sort it out but give them a sensible time limit -- say three years -- to come up with what they want to do and who is included in the governmental entities. That entails accepting their solution and not trying to get what we want (and quite probably do not need).

Continue to equip (sensibly but more rapidly) Afghan forces, continue the training regimen about as it is.

Decrease wheeled traffic by using deploying, contracting * and using more aircraft (including armed helicopters and A-10s).

Do not deploy more troops, remove some that are there. Train and equip those that are to stay to operate in platoon and even squad ** packets with nearby and rapidly available CAS plus rapid reinforcing Co size elements on strip alert. There must be interoperation with Afghan forces for several reasons to include their lead frequently but it will also be desirable in certain areas for us to have the sole responsibility for the AOR due to demographic / tribal constraints on the Afghan forces.

Lastly and more importantly -- pay more for development workers and Afghan national forces (and tribal or other 'militias') than the opposition is paying. For over seven years only SF and the CIA have had enough sense to do that.

If we're serious about fixing it, we can train up a force, Army GPF, Marines, SOCOM immaterial or combined (with a single chain of command). The air effort can rotate, it does not need the continuity and local knowledge required for the ground effort. Tell the ground force they'll train hard for almost a year then serve three years in Afghanistan or until we leave sensibly whichever is first -- and they'll not deploy again for a minimum of five years. You wouldn't get a whole lot of volunteers but you'd get enough. You'd have to pay them well but that would be cheaper than what we're now doing. Yeah, I know... :wry:

The personnel pogues and TJAG said what? :D

* developing and using local capability in the process.

** Yes, that can be done IF the troops are well trained and carry sensible loads. Yes, that means no Armor. Yes. I know we won't do that -- but he asked... ;)

Being prudent, I also have a Plan C -- whatever the Think Tank crowd du jour gens up.

All the foregoing, BTW and smileys not withstanding is a totally serious and considered answer to the question.

Any option selected must consider that 'clear and hold' is the best operational technique (it is not a strategy) but that neither NATO nor we can provide enough troops to do that; that Afghanistan cannot afford an Army large enough to do that and that the time to even approach getting the numbers to apply that technique is probably in excess of ten years; that even if Afghanistan could train and deploy an adequate number of troops to use that technique they would merely be training future insurgents as they had to release large numbers of said troops due to an inability to pay them.

That's a big sentence. It's a big problem. Realism bites...

[J Wolfsberger]

MarcT could address this better than me, but here's something to add into the mix. The critics of McMasters' approach of paying the sheiks in Anbar missed the point. (I think this was his.) What they referred to as "payoffs" or "bribes" were, in a tribal society, the disbursement of patronage. Hence the observation that the US is the biggest tribe - I think that statement referred to more than firepower.

Would it not be a good starting point to plan on deliberately building a "representative" government around the existing tribal structure?


Approach the idea of the central government in Kabul as a permanently constituted National Jirga.
Maybe introduce the ideas of an "Elders Jirga" with two or three members (not representatives) from each tribe, and a "Clans' Jirga," where each clan within the tribe elects/selects/has selected (by the elders) members (not representatives) based on size. The few truly non tribal areas, such as Kabul, could be treated as tribes for the purpose of Jirga membership.
The chief elder/leader of the National Jirga (i.e. chief executive of the country) could be selected by a joint vote (or argued out consensus) of both Jirgas.
The National Jirga (i.e. central government) disburses patronage in return for loyalty.
The tribes, in turn, accept the obligation to provide support, as requested, to the Jirga. The "support" ranges from contracting for provision of water, sewage, etc. to whacking any Taliban that show up.
As part of a general amnesty, make the support a shut down of the opium trade, with payments disbursed through the tribal structure to subsidize payment for other crops, or development of other economic activity.

I realize these are pretty rough ideas. But at least they would get us into the realm of thinking about a central government that the majority of Afghanis would feel was theirs, and thus they could buy into.

[George L. Singleton]

1. There appears rationally to be no cash value substitue for the opium crops.

2. Centralized government as known to us in he West is totally alien to the grassroots in Afghanistan.

[Ron Humphrey]

1. There appears rationally to be no cash value substitue for the opium crops.

2. Centralized government as known to us in he West is totally alien to the grassroots in Afghanistan.

1- Luckily there are things in life besides cash which can be seen as "valuable" enough to bring the value of a given action (growing something besides opium) at least on par with growing it. The trick would seem to be finding what those are. Outside the box :D

2- Was it any less alien to many of the so-called "western" nations before they adopted it. Not sayin it would work just always think of the old adage
NEVER say NEVER

[ODB]

The final two options.

1. Level it with nukes and make it one huge parking lot.

2. Breed it out of them.

Just humor :D

Actually wanted to address the "cash crop" issue. I think we did well not touching the opium the first 5 years, although the Brits had another agenda in those regards. Unfortunately we did not have an economic plan to replace the opium. Have read other threads covering cloud seeding to getting Universities involved agriculturally. I have to wonder if they can sustain economically on agriculture in todays world. Maybe we should move all American car manufacturers to Afghanistan and kill two birds with one stone.

Aghanistan is a hard nut to crack don't know if it can be done with our political views today vs those of 60 years ago. Too much let's make everyone happy involved, it is not going to happen, some will be pissed off, but overall what is best for the country?

[Bill Moore]

We're in Afghanistan, so even if we share Peters' frustrations, we have to get to an acceptable state where we can transition the state of Afghanistan, or the various tribal regions to local authorities. I don't think we know what the so called end state in Afghanistan will be, nor should we make public statements saying that we do (which can lead to a loss of credibility), eventually we'll recognize what the acceptable transition point is and it will be based on what our finest minds think is feasible and ultimately what the Afghan people really want. That is sometimes a hard reality for our idealistic policy makers to come to grips with.

One of my main concerns is indirectly related to the conflicts we're currently involved in, but rather how they are shaping the transformation of our military and other government agencies. We have security concerns equal to (or greater than in my opinion) Al Qaeda, but I'll focus my argument on the Al Qaeda Network threat. Afghanistan was not important to us after the USSR departed, and it didn't become important until the attacks on our Embassies in East Africa and the attack on the USS Cole, yet the threat was resident there prior to the attacks alerting the majority to the threat. How many other countries right now are a future Afghanistan (next host to the preparaton of a major terrorist attack on a modern country)? Are we then going to swarm to that country, and then after we hammer the known terrrorist elements there are we going to stay and try to convert that country into a functional democracy with modern market models?

Arguments can be made that in select strategic locations (Iraq being one of them) this is worth the investment in time, blood and treasure, but is it the answer for every failed state. And for those where we agree it is not in our interest to make that commitment, what other options do we have to address the threats there? I for one would argue that Peters' coercion strategy is still viable for many foreseeable threats.

[Ken White]

Arguments can be made that in select strategic locations (Iraq being one of them) this is worth the investment in time, blood and treasure, but is it the answer for every failed state. And for those where we agree it is not in our interest to make that commitment, what other options do we have to address the threats there? I for one would argue that Peters' coercion strategy is still viable for many foreseeable threats.Totally agree and would opt for launch of strategic raids before major troop commitment in almost all cases.

However, there are a few nations -- Afghanistan is one -- where I don't think there's enough "there there" to justify a launch ...

[ODB]

What will be our final "debt" or IOU (not monetary) to Pakistan after this is all said and done? Or will we cut ties and run ala 1980s Afghanistan?


Originally Posted by Bill Moore
How many other countries right now are a future Afghanistan (next host to the preparaton of a major terrorist attack on a modern country)? Are we then going to swarm to that country, and then after we hammer the known terrrorist elements there are we going to stay and try to convert that country into a functional democracy with modern market models?

Unfortunately some are much, much closer to home, there is no ocean to cross this time.

[120mm]

WWGMD? That is, What Would Greg Mortensen Do? I've become an instant fan of "Three Cups of Tea" and think there might be some lessons in that example.

I think engaging the smaller tribes/communities directly might have some good outcomes with minimum investment. Heck, we could even sell it to the Muslim world as I/O showing that we care. Despite the unique nature of Afghanistan/Pakistan and it's apparent irrelevance.

Hiding behind our borders, and lashing out blindly at perceived slights to America, ala Ralph Peters, will eventually brand us the rogue elephant, that needs to be put down by the rest of the world. Maybe not today, or tomorrow, but sooner or later.

Not a big fan of grand modernization/aid projects, either, as we repeatedly batter ourselves bloody against the USAID constructed canals of Nad-e Ali district in Helmand Province and the warlords who inhabit them. Unintended consequences, and all that....

[Ken White]

Hiding behind our borders, and lashing out blindly at perceived slights to America, ala Ralph Peters, will eventually brand us the rogue elephant, that needs to be put down by the rest of the world. Maybe not today, or tomorrow, but sooner or later.But I haven't seen anyone who advocates hiding behind our borders and hopefully, if we lashed out, it would not be blindly. We've been pretty good about ignoring perceived and even real slights, no reason not to expect that to continue.

Certainly real problems versus perceived slights should be addressed in some manner; the question is merely how. I know of no one who would advocate what you write. Why would you suggest that they have?

I'm sure you're aware that some in the world have already labeled us as Rogues or worse but that most don't agree -- they don't like us because we're rich and arrogant but they don't think we're rogues. No particular need for us to react in ways that cause them to think that.

Acknowledging that some tend to react that way.

[120mm]

But I haven't seen anyone who advocates hiding behind our borders and hopefully, if we lashed out, it would not be blindly. We've been pretty good about ignoring perceived and even real slights, no reason not to expect that to continue.

First, we have always lashed out blindly, as a nation. I see no reason why this would change.

Second, we ignore perceived and even real slights... until we don't. I don't care what we advocate, I only care what we DO.

What we, as a nation, appear incapable of doing is long-term engagement in a politically patient manner. Perhaps it's the nature of the representative republican democratic beast.

I think the rest of the world does not appreciate our inconsistency, as much as our wealth.

[Ken White]

First, we have always lashed out blindly, as a nation. I see no reason why this would change.Not always by a long shot, we really tend to not lash out and then we get pushed a bit further (as you point out below) -- then we lash out. Almost every war we've been in resulted from that effect.

If you look deep, a lot of that lashing is not nearly as as blind as it seems to be. We tend to disrupt rather than to conquer; WW II was an exception. Disrupting is generally chaotic and less orderly than many like.
Second, we ignore perceived and even real slights... until we don't. I don't care what we advocate, I only care what we DO.Agree with that. It is a problem, induced mostly by the governmental system but also by our impatience and rather naive approach to the world. Plus our ignorance -- due to a screwed up educational system (itself partially caused by a screwed up legal system). We've done some dumb stuff -- a lot of it by getting OVER involved with other nations but on balance over the years we've done more good than harm. By a broad measure.
What we, as a nation, appear incapable of doing is long-term engagement in a politically patient manner. Perhaps it's the nature of the representative republican democratic beast.Agree and I think that's the largest factor but all things considered, looking at a lot of folks in the world who 'do it better' (in the eyes of themselves and some in the US), I can put with those downsides for the positives.
I think the rest of the world does not appreciate our inconsistency, as much as our wealth.True. They also distrust us because we say we're going to do things and then quit. Never a way to keep friends. That concerns me more than does our inconsistency and the occasional dumb stuff; everyone screws up on occasion. Regardless, the big guy is always everyone's favorite target.

Stay alert over there... ;)

[120mm]

What I would like to see out of American policy is a wide range of diversified and fundamentally cheap small projects that quietly, and inobtrusively address education, health and welfare issues, without demanding quid pro quo.

Mortensen's Central Asia Institute might offer a prototype.

[Ken White]

...Mortensen's Central Asia Institute might offer a prototype.and we started on the other in the 50s -- then Congress demanded the QPQ. They are a big part of the problem...

Since then it's been in fits and starts as people change in the jobs. No question but that we need a relook -- and it would be nice if we could do it so Congress can't tamper with it but they'll never buy that. Sigh... :o

Watch 'em rockets. ;)