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Uboat509
03-09-2009, 08:39 PM
Interesting article here (http://www.militarytimes.com/news/2009/03/army_sfhearing_030509w/). I can't say that I like the idea personally. I don't see this ending well.


Special Forces soldiers and Central Intelligence Agency operatives could soon be moving seamlessly between the military and intelligence realms if Congress follows advice it received Tuesday.

The special operations community and the CIA each would benefit from a much closer integration of their personnel, Roger Carstens, a recently retired Special Forces lieutenant colonel who is a non-resident fellow at the Center for a New American Security, and Robert Martinage, senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, told a hearing of the House Armed Services Committee’s terrorism, unconventional threats and capabilities subcommittee.

Martinage, who authored an 82-page report titled “Special Operations Forces — Future Challenges and Opportunities” that was published in November, argued for “increased institutionalized cooperation between the CIA and SOCOM [i.e. U.S. Special Operations Command], including hybrid career paths, so people could go back and forth between the two.”

“Ideally, personnel should not only be able to move back and forth from CIA stations and SOF ground units, but also to compete for selected mid- and senior-level leadership positions in either organization,” Martinage said.

SFC W

Ken White
03-09-2009, 09:07 PM
who left a Group to go to the Agency. Different jobs...

ODB
03-09-2009, 10:08 PM
Any ODA's beating down the door to get an Agency guy on the team? IMO looks like another one of those survival tactics. HUMIT, well you guys can fill in the rest, will not go into details.

I got a thought, why not utilize SF as the Agency's Ground Branch?

I do believe I read/heard somewhere that McCain wanted to transform the 2 into some kind of hybrid organization, going back to the OSS days.

I will stay with my initial assessment, survival.

Lastly, why does everyone want someone else's piece of the pie? Everyone wants to be shooter nowadays.

Ken White
03-09-2009, 11:33 PM
to violence.... :D

ODB
03-10-2009, 12:13 AM
others on here make reference to your wisdom through years alive, but will spare you any further remarks. :eek:

For anyone who has a lot of time on their hands the entire report can be found here LINK (http://www.csbaonline.org/4Publications/PubLibrary/R.20081117.Special_Operation_/R.20081117.Special_Operation_.pdf)

And for those PowerPoint Rangers out there LINK (http://www.csbaonline.org/4Publications/PubLibrary/S.20081118.Special_Operations/S.20081118.Special_Operations.pdf)

Ken White
03-10-2009, 12:38 AM
Shooter oriented from the word go...

He advocate more SF oriented to the Arab World and the ME/South Asia. he also notes that it takes time to build SOF people -- one presumes he's given some though to the facts that by the time his reorganization is complete, it may no longer be needed and that his total focus on the Islamic issue -- which is not our only problem -- may lead us into not being ready elsewhere.

That's a shortsighted and wrong headed approach.

I did get a laugh out of this quote:
"Additionally, the 75th Ranger Regiment and 160th SOAR frequently operate under the control of JSOC."

ODB
03-10-2009, 01:10 AM
he also notes that it takes time to build SOF people

He does but I took it to be tinged with sarcasm:


What makes SOF special? The short answer to this question
is: carefully selected, highly trained personnel that can conduct
challenging missions that often exceed the capabilities of
general purpose forces. However, the rigorous and lengthy
selection, assessment and training required to create SOF has
a downside: small force size. A truism within the SOF community is that special operators cannot be mass-produced. (Bold for my emphasis)

I did get a laugh out of this quote:
Quote:
"Additionally, the 75th Ranger Regiment and 160th SOAR frequently operate under the control of JSOC."

Oh, if only most knew what was truly happening within JSOC these days, goes back to my previous statement: Lastly, why does everyone want someone else's piece of the pie? Everyone wants to be shooter nowadays.

I cannot agree with the shifting of forces focus as well. When one looks globally, Russia is awakening, Central/South America are running right up there with ME, so I personally do not see reorganizing focus as a good thing.

Finally, many know my thoughts on MARSOC, and my belief that it was a money grab........still wondering about this....maybe someone can enlighten me.


Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command (MARSOC)
• MARSOC is a recent addition to SOCOM
• Still not fully stood up
– Currently at around 1500 personnel
– Building to 2600
• Will eventually consist of three primary elements
– Marine Special Operations Advisory Groups (MSOAGs)
• Formerly know as Foreign Military Training Units (FMTUs)
• Focus on FID
– Marine Special Operations Battalions (MSOBs)
• Organized into deployable companies that focus on DA and CT
– Marine Special Operations Support Group (MSOSG)

Looks a lot like organizations already in existence.

Uboat509
03-10-2009, 02:10 AM
Oh, if only most knew what was truly happening within JSOC these days, goes back to my previous statement: Lastly, why does everyone want someone else's piece of the pie? Everyone wants to be shooter nowadays.

Nowadays? This is hardly a recent phenomenon. Everybody wants to be John Rambo when they join SF. Most adjust to the reality of what we do. Some don't. Some don't have to.

SFC W

ODB
03-10-2009, 03:21 AM
Nowadays? This is hardly a recent phenomenon. Everybody wants to be John Rambo when they join SF. Most adjust to the reality of what we do. Some don't. Some don't have to.

SFC W

Find it funny when I ask a guy after his 4-5 years in the Army, why he is getting out and they reply "SF isn't what it use to be"......... We are our own worst enemy.

What I was referencing in my previous post are those "color" guys.;)

George L. Singleton
03-10-2009, 12:22 PM
..who is Air Force but enjoyed the purple suit world, I think the SOCOM/CIA interoperability is already there and works just fine.

In days of yore (mid-1960s) the US Embassy in Karachi, Pakistan CIA In-coountry team was headed by a CIA pureist or careerist, but his Deputy was a retired Navy Commander (05) who had been a pilot.

As the then USAF Liaison Officer for the US Base at Badabur, Peshawar, in the NWFP part of Pakistan (then West Pakistan) the National Secuity Council was our uppermost command structure. We had CIA involvement with our U-2 survelliance site associated with our base, as well as Army Security Agency involvement with our USAF Security Service communications (over the horizon communications intercept intel)... across the Arabian Sea in several North Africa nations we had related Naval Intel field sites (small, communications related) as well.

History repeats itself, people are forever trying to feather and refeather their career and economic nests by various forms of mixing and matching. Nothing new here, really.

I do like the role and good work which the Navy SEALS have as a key part of USSOCOM, but the Army and Air Force Special Forces play equally important integrated and inter-related roles also.

You youngsters know today's structure and world of SF, etc. much better than us old coot retirees so I will shut down. But, history repeats itself, we hope for the good, but not always is that the outcome.

William F. Owen
03-10-2009, 03:12 PM
..who is Air Force but enjoyed the purple suit world, I think the SOCOM/CIA interoperability is already there and works just fine.


I concur from the stand point it seemed to work just fine back in the 1960's and with the NSA as well. I know at least 3 old SOG guys who went to work for "civilian SF" and then went back on the Teams. Of course everyone knows the sad story of George Bacon!

Boot
03-11-2009, 02:52 AM
He does but I took it to be tinged with sarcasm:



I did get a laugh out of this quote:
Quote:
"Additionally, the 75th Ranger Regiment and 160th SOAR frequently operate under the control of JSOC."

Oh, if only most knew what was truly happening within JSOC these days, goes back to my previous statement: Lastly, why does everyone want someone else's piece of the pie? Everyone wants to be shooter nowadays.

I cannot agree with the shifting of forces focus as well. When one looks globally, Russia is awakening, Central/South America are running right up there with ME, so I personally do not see reorganizing focus as a good thing.

Finally, many know my thoughts on MARSOC, and my belief that it was a money grab........still wondering about this....maybe someone can enlighten me.



Looks a lot like organizations already in existence.

I'm not a MARSOC apologist or even part of them. I did serve in Force Recon back in the 90's. From what I was told by some, one reason for MARSOC was to get the DA and more importantly Deep/Distant Reconnaissance specialty of Marine Recon. Also remember the Marine Corps back in the eighties opted not to send anyone to USSOCOM as it feared it would lose those assets to USSOCOM. Fast forward to the 2000's, Det 1 was tested under NSWG and was very successful however was DA not FID or the such. The Marine Corps had the opportunity to become part of USSOCOM and opted for it, so now you have MARSOC. We now have our SOF, which wasn't the case with Marine Recon as it wasn't a USSOCOM asset, even though Force Recon was pretty comparable to other SOF type organizations. I know from speaking to some there, they are constantly evolving and I don't think the final version of MARSOC has shown itself. Hope this helps.

Boot

ODB
03-11-2009, 05:27 AM
My initial thought was what are we trying to do now. But after thinking about this off and on all day, I started to come around. I can see the benefits on both sides, if (and that's a big if) both sides played together right. As I looked from a historical perspective, IMO the two have complimented each other quite well in the past and to some degree the not so distant past. May be more of the same issues all organizations are currently going through. Seems many think they are inventing some new great thing, only to realize it has exsisted before, but was forgotten. I'm still digesting the full report and may think differently afterwards.

Additional thought is that maybe we aren't thinking a big enough change. Bring all of the services SOF and the National Level Assets into one organization. Part of the problem with multiple entities is the inner fighting and trying to prove their worth over the next, what if we did away with this issue? Might be too bold of a move and rub quite a few people wrong along the way, but would the endstate ultimately be more effective Intel/Operations?

Boot, thank you for the historical perspective, sheds some of that light I was looking for.

Uboat509
03-11-2009, 07:12 AM
This whole thing is a symptom of the idea that if one is good then two must be better. If closer cooperation between SF and all the various Intel agencies is good (and it is) then actually assigning ODAs to one or more of those organizations must be better (it is not).

There is some discussion of this over at PS.com (http://www.professionalsoldiers.com/forums/showthread.php?t=22164). BLUF while there is certainly overlap between what SF does and what the civilian Intel agencies do, they are not interchangeable. They have very different missions, very different cultures and very different pools of manpower that they draw from.

SFC W

John T. Fishel
03-11-2009, 02:19 PM
on original sin. "Once upon a time" :), COL William O. Donovan, Coordinator of War Information was granted license by Pres FDR to create a full blown intel agency. Donovan borrowed a great deal from the British but concluded that having a separate intel collection/analysis agency (MI6/SIS) and covert action/paramilitary agency (SOE) was inefficient so he combined the capabilities in the OSS. This "original sin" was incorporated in the National Security Act of 1947 when the CIA was created. It has been, IMO, responsible for all sorts of mischief such as the Bay of Pigs, among other dumb ops.

Fast forward: The Intel Reform Act of 2004 did not rectify the original sin. So, combining military SOF with CIA will likely compound the error. What needs to be done, IMO, is to separate CIA's paramilitary capability from the intel collection and analysis functions, preferably in a new organization that is civilian run, similar in function to SOE. I would also keep it separate from SOCOM although there could be much work done together under an OPCON authority.

Cheers

JohnT

Tom Odom
03-11-2009, 02:42 PM
on original sin. "Once upon a time" :), COL William O. Donovan, Coordinator of War Information was granted license by Pres FDR to create a full blown intel agency. Donovan borrowed a great deal from the British but concluded that having a separate intel collection/analysis agency (MI6/SIS) and covert action/paramilitary agency (SOE) was inefficient so he combined the capabilities in the OSS. This "original sin" was incorporated in the National Security Act of 1947 when the CIA was created. It has been, IMO, responsible for all sorts of mischief such as the Bay of Pigs, among other dumb ops.

Fast forward: The Intel Reform Act of 2004 did not rectify the original sin. So, combining military SOF with CIA will likely compound the error. What needs to be done, IMO, is to separate CIA's paramilitary capability from the intel collection and analysis functions, preferably in a new organization that is civilian run, similar in function to SOE. I would also keep it separate from SOCOM although there could be much work done together under an OPCON authority.

Cheers

JohnT

Agreed, John T. We went through an episode of this in the 1980s. I researched and wrote about some of it in the 60s and again in the 70s in the Congo/Zaire. It also tends to give CIA its bifurcated personality although completely as part of that comes froom the clan side.

Best
Tom

zenpundit
03-11-2009, 07:40 PM
"What needs to be done, IMO, is to separate CIA's paramilitary capability from the intel collection and analysis functions, preferably in a new organization that is civilian run, similar in function to SOE"

Not all paramilitary covert ops should look like a raid by Delta Force. Sometimes- maybe often -the government might want a very quiet and unobtrusive operation that while requiring a limited use of paramilitary skills to be done quietly by people who have plausibly blended into the environment. That blending requires the sort of cultural/in-country familiarity of experienced collections personnel or diplomats.

For that reason I'm not sure that rigid organizational separation is a great idea unless you intend to also slide ppl with the right experience into place.

Sort of like they are talking about in the news article. :wry:

George L. Singleton
03-12-2009, 12:42 AM
Trial and error, whatever works, use it and do it.

Ken White
03-12-2009, 01:04 AM
doing just that.

That's why Winston noted "You can always trust the Americans to do the right thing -- after they have tried every conceivable alternative."

OTOH, whenever we try to organize things, we generally screw it up -- ad hocery is what we do best.

ODB
03-12-2009, 02:11 AM
the experiences and knowledge here on SWJ.

What would be the advantages to doing this and why?

What would be the disadvantages to doing this and why?

Lastly if you had complete control what would you do to reorganize our current system?

Understand the limitations of open source, so may not be able to be to detailed, but looking to see different perspectives and experiences.

Ken White
03-12-2009, 04:43 AM
What would be the advantages to doing this and why?None that I can discern
What would be the disadvantages to doing this and why?Hard to work for two masters. Army folks working for another agency would essentially become throwaways; there would be no agency loyalty to them. The agency would have different rules and playing by theirs might be a bad lick for those so seconded.

That's just off the top of my head. There's more not openly discussable.
Lastly if you had complete control what would you do to reorganize our current system?[I'm with John T. and Tom Odom, a civilian Humint intel organ; a new separate civilian DA organ; DNI; USoD Intel; Army, Navy, USMC, USAF, USCG Intelligence; DIA; DoE; DHS; DoS INR; Treasury; DEA; FBI; NGIA; NSA; NRO; A uniformed DA crew and SF (Not involved with any of the foregoing except on an as required, mission basis).

Competition keeps everyone honest. Consolidation is turf protection

jmm99
03-12-2009, 05:24 PM
from Ken
... a new separate civilian DA organ ....

Thoughts about what it would look like ? Mission ? Command and control ?

How different from the "... uniformed DA crew ..." ?

Ken White
03-12-2009, 07:20 PM
Thoughts about what it would look like ? Mission ? Command and control ?Well, not like Tom Cruise and the MI crew... :wry:

Mission: Direct Action -- and all that implies; obviously as a National Asset, it would be on a strategic (in the finer sense of the word) level.

C2: by the Prez / NSC w/ oversight by Congress pretty much as the current system works for special Intel projects.
How different from the "... uniformed DA crew ..." ?Deniable (even if not with a straight face; well, legally deniable in any event) -- which the uniformed crew should never be.

Why? Because you can hire better if expensive talent for the SMALL flexible civilian organization and can more easily expand and contract it (pun intended) than you can adapt the various military organizations and operations.

Not to mention that there are rules in the intel game and the DA crowd, if publicly known as a totally separate operation, does not have to abide by those rules. Better for Spooks, better for DA. Better for the country -- not that such a concern seems to drive too many trains nowadays...

Where does it fit? -- as placed. That's why I put it directly behind the national Humint crew (A CIA replacement) and before all the others to include the DNI who, IMO, should be the Chief analyst and little more (since the slot is probably not going away). I did leave out before the DNI and DIA (who should also do Humint as should the services and the various LE folks; competition again...) another national level organization -- a Counterintel / Counter terror organization that is emphatically not a LE agency and thus not the FBI. The FBI is ill suited for that role.

jmm99
03-12-2009, 07:50 PM
but I have to think about this a bit - from the viewpoint of the poor SOB who has the legal advisor's role to the civilian DA and CI branches.

I assume that the military DA wants to keep its combatant immunity status, as much as possible - so a mix with civilian DA would flunk that test.

Also, civilian Disinformation and other softer forms of direct political action would have to fit in somewhere - at the national C2 level ?

John T. Fishel
03-12-2009, 09:38 PM
A couple of comments.
1. Not just DA but other covert political actions.
2. DA and other covert political actions are NOT intelligence. Intel is the direction, collection, analysis, production, and dissemination of information - intel cycle. I do see DNI overseeing the cycle for all intel agencies but not for my proposed US SOE (by whatever name). The analogous position to DNI is, IMO, the CJCS.

Cheers

JohnT

Ken White
03-12-2009, 10:21 PM
A couple of comments.
1. Not just DA but other covert political actions.True -- actually, more but didn't want to get into that. ;)
2. DA and other covert political actions are NOT intelligence.Emphatically not!
Intel is the direction, collection, analysis, production, and dissemination of information - intel cycle. I do see DNI overseeing the cycle for all intel agencies but not for my proposed US SOE (by whatever name). The analogous position to DNI is, IMO, the CJCS.I was not and am not a fan of the creation of the DNI (I didn't agree with DHS either but they keep forgetting my opinion counts... :rolleyes: ) but I could buy that. I do believe his ability to influence DoD intel agencies should be limited as should DoD's be limited w/r to the services. I always have some reservations about excessive centralization which IMO always causes bureaucratic expansion and thus impedes flexibility and innovation while producing excessively focused (read: what the boss wants) products.

Competition OTOH produces products that can vary widely in quality -- and accuracy. Not a bad thing... :cool:

Ken White
03-12-2009, 10:38 PM
I assume that the military DA wants to keep its combatant immunity status, as much as possible - so a mix with civilian DA would flunk that test.be silly not to try to keep it...
Also, civilian Disinformation and other softer forms of direct political action would have to fit in somewhere - at the national C2 level ?Agree and some, many, of those forms of action should be done by the crew I tabbed for DA; they should do the other, non-intel things for the national level. Agree an information (or disinformation) mob is necessary but do not think it should be with either intel or the action crew; thus you'd have a triumvirate under the Prez/NSC -- the DNI (and the Humint crowd); the DA crew (DQI? Director of Quasi-legal Initiatives?); and the DFI (Director of Federal Flatly Fraudulent Information -- with the second and third 'Fs' suppressed, of course... :cool:).

All could routinely meet or convene in part for emergencies as does the UK Cobra Team LINK (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/4663369.stm). Not to be copycats, we could call ours Sidewinder (for Selected Intelligence, Domestic Emergencies, Wars, Information, Disinformation, Extractions, Raids). ;)

John T. Fishel
03-13-2009, 10:38 AM
you were such a creative acronymer!:cool:

Tom Odom
03-13-2009, 12:46 PM
you were such a creative acronymer!:cool:

Sounds like a Stallone movie...:wry:

George L. Singleton
03-13-2009, 02:44 PM
doing just that.

That's why Winston noted "You can always trust the Americans to do the right thing -- after they have tried every conceivable alternative."

OTOH, whenever we try to organize things, we generally screw it up -- ad hocery is what we do best.

Not to digress but Churchill is my favor historic figure from my youth, followed by Teddy Roosevelt and Ike.

And of course Churchill himself epitomized trial and error in his repeated moves "across the floor" of Parliament from one party, back to the other, back again, it makes historians dizzy. His failed Dardinelles campaign was another example of his "under belly" attack theories which didn't work.

Churchill was originally opposed to the coast of France landings, wanted to go in from the south, as best I can recall, Vichy France.

Have a good weekend. Correct me if my history recall is flawed.

Steve Blair
03-13-2009, 03:19 PM
Not to digress but Churchill is my favor historic figure from my youth, followed by Teddy Roosevelt and Ike.

And of course Churchill himself epitomized trial and error in his repeated moves "across the floor" of Parliament from one party, back to the other, back again, it makes historians dizzy. His failed Dardinelles campaign was another example of his "under belly" attack theories which didn't work.

Churchill was originally opposed to the coast of France landings, wanted to go in from the south, as best I can recall, Vichy France.

Have a good weekend. Correct me if my history recall is flawed.

Churchill was obsessed with Italy and the Balkans, actually. He accepted Vichy as something of a compromise.

Tom Odom
03-13-2009, 04:24 PM
Churchill was obsessed with Italy and the Balkans, actually. He accepted Vichy as something of a compromise.

And Sicily and the Anzio operation in Italy...:eek:

But he did have character :D

JRoberts
03-21-2009, 04:34 PM
DA and other covert political actions are NOT intelligence. Intel is the direction, collection, analysis, production, and dissemination of information - intel cycle.

I'd generally agree with that assertion. But covert action covers a range of activities--political subversion, economic subversion, propaganda, etc.--and while we might want to spin off paramilitary operations into a separate category, if intelligence agencies aren't going to conduct the 'less-kinetic' covert actions, who will? You don't want military officers doing that kind of thing, at least, not if you care about plausible deniability and the Geneva Conventions. Having a separate civilian agency is an interesting idea, but if you place it outside of the HUMINT production loop...knowing how tightly-controlled information can be within the IC...you're basically shutting off access to knowledge about the political context/local environment/etc. in whichever area you want to conduct a covert action in. I.e., the stuff that HUMINT is best at producing.

And then who will you find to staff this agency? Unless that agency were to be totally blind to political developments, you would probably want to have a number of analysts and CIA collection management officers, probably seconded on an ad-hoc basis, who were already familiar with the proposed operational environment.

It's not at all satisfactory, for reasons that have already been well articulated, but the present system is probably the least bad option. Placing it under CIA at least theoretically ensures that covert actions can be conducted in a political context about which there is already some level of institutional understanding (not necessarily much, but some). You don't have to worry about staffing or secondment problems, and you can conduct covert actions through the networks that are already in place, rather than bringing in outside resources to do the job.

In the long run, I guess I don't see how a separate covert action agency could function without to some degree replicating the analytical and management functions that CIA already has in place.

John T. Fishel
03-21-2009, 05:05 PM
covert action from intel is to avoind contaminating the intelligence and policy to the maximum extent possible. The classic case (in the public domain) of such contamination is the Bay of Pigs fiasco (17 Apr 61). CIA's DDP was responsible for intel collection, analysis, operational planning, and execution. No analyst from DDI ever saw the intel collected, the analysis, or the plan. Had they seen any of this they would have waved the red flag of:eek:!!!!!
All the evidence was that the operation had no possibility of strategic or political success but because it was so tightly controlled there was no independent check on stupidity.

I am not suggesting that seconding personnel with appropriate expertise to my covert action agency would be wrong - in fact, seconded personnel often develop a loyalty to their new organization. (Example is Army, Navy Air force, and Marines assigned to a joint shop tend to think "purple" while they are there reverting to their service colors when they return to the service environment.)

Bottom line is that I think we can do much better than the current arrangement. Intel consumers should not be their own analysts.

Cheers

JohnT

jmm99
03-21-2009, 08:07 PM
I'm seeing three different functions here:

1. Intel is the direction, collection, analysis, production, and dissemination of information - intel cycle. Intel consumers should not be their own analysts.

2. Political subversion, economic subversion, propaganda (I'd use "disinformation" here, since propaganda which is white on white should be totally separate from disinformation operations), and the "etc." of this softer side of covert ops.

3. Paramilitary operations (e.g., Bay of Pigs, which was neither clandestine nor covert in its execution; but very compartmentalized in its preparation); but more so in the present context, DAs which should not be handled by the military (Gary Berntsen's pitch).

In any given situation, two or more of these functions can and probably need to be linked. So, one agency fits all; or separate agencies ?

If the latter, there are at least two problems:

1. Co-ordination of efforts (joint task forces ?);

2. How to hide the appropriations for their efforts (dumping all the $ into one agency makes that easier) ?

Is this roughly where this discussion is at ?

John T. Fishel
03-21-2009, 11:50 PM
Obviously, I agree completely with your #1.

#2 - first, we designate propaganda as white = source acknowledged, gray = source not acknowledged, and black = source disguised. For both the US military and DOS, the information in all propaganda messages is truthful (although it need not be the whole truth). Disinformation (deception) is, in the US, not psychological operations but rather an intelligence operation but one that may use PSYOP assets.

#3 - I see no reason why DA should not be carried out by military SOF (SEALS, DELTA, and SF C companies and the like). Even if they are clandestine, the US military has a history of this kind of activity and as far back as Nathan Hale, if caught, being executed as spies. As a practical matter, it may be useful to have a civilian agency that can carry out DA. But, I would note that the Bay of Pigs (and other clandestine and covert ops[intended]) have had uniformed members on the team. (A USMC COL was responsible for training the Brigada.)

Regarding your "problems": Coordination always is - we have discussed unity of effort on many threads. Hiding appropriations has usually been done by scattering the funds around the defense budget - works pretty well. So, I don't see these problems as peculiar to the creation of a US civilian SOE but rather inherent in bureaucracies in general, and especially those that deal in secrets. What my SOE would achieve, I think, is separation of intel from covert ops thereby avoiding certain typse of screw ups, if the system is used as intended. But, as stated in one of my favorite episodes of one of my favorite TV shows, Babylon 5, "Always bet on stupidity/"

Cheers

JohnT

jmm99
03-22-2009, 01:30 AM
from JTF
#2 - first, we designate propaganda as white = source acknowledged, gray = source not acknowledged, and black = source disguised. For both the US military and DOS, the information in all propaganda messages is truthful (although it need not be the whole truth). Disinformation (deception) is, in the US, not psychological operations but rather an intelligence operation but one that may use PSYOP assets.

I was limiting #2 to disinformation (not from US military, DoS), which in my twisted mind is a part of a two-level (outlet and message) black to white disinformation and information construct:

1. outlet spectrum - outlet is black when outlet is 180 degrees from originating agency which remains clandestine and covert (e.g., info, regardless of its color, comes from CIA and is published by the KGB). Outlet is white when outlet is in phase with originating agency (e.g., info comes from CIA and is published by VOA). A gray outlet would be the perfect neutral (90 degrees out of phase with the main adversaries). Obviously, a broad spectrum of gray outlets is possible.

2. message spectrum - message is black when it is false in main focus part; message is white when it is true in main focus part. Again, many shades of gray can lie along the spectrum.

Can you have a white on white, covert and clandestine, disinformation operation ? Sure - Czech Intel's planted WWII German docs (which were mostly real) in the lake - discovered by TV documentary types, given to Czech government and eventually released through Czech government agencies, to some consternation in German Intel circles.

------------------------------

from JTF
#3 - I see no reason why DA should not be carried out by military SOF (SEALS, DELTA, and SF C companies and the like).

Neither do I - and this should be the default (IMO).

I am no big proponent of civilian DAs; but there are situations where they are needed - primarily because of legal reasons. In those situations, the actions "should not be" carried out by military SOFs - which is what I meant by "DAs which should not be handled" (not all DAs, but a limited class of them).

--------------------------------
As to the "problems", I don't see them as insurmountable hurdles - just possible hurdles that can be overcome. As to co-ordination, I should have cited Ken's post:


All could routinely meet or convene in part for emergencies as does the UK Cobra Team LINK (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/4663369.stm). Not to be copycats, we could call ours Sidewinder (for Selected Intelligence, Domestic Emergencies, Wars, Information, Disinformation, Extractions, Raids).

Love that Sidewinder :)

John T. Fishel
03-22-2009, 11:53 AM
I feel quite anal about the terminology I learned in the PSYOP course and as a practitioner in both the 13th PSYOP Bn and in Southcom. :wry: While I understand where you are coming from, JMM, we in the business simply don't use that terminology and get a bit agitated when the white, gray, balck spectrum is used to refer to message content, ie message spectrum. The reason we don't use it is both that our messages are truthful and it serves no useful purpose. To the best of my knowledge, even CIA covert PSYOP only uses it to refer to sources - at least according to my buddy who served in DDO for 5 years and was involved in a classic Black PSYOP (that I believe I related on another thread).

Regarding DA, we are generally in agreement although I would add that another reason for a civilian sOE type organization is its potential agility in mounting an operation, eg JAWBREAKER 1 in Afghanistan (Gary Schoen).

Cheers

JohnT

Ken White
03-22-2009, 12:47 PM
I recall and understand the doctrine -- as well as what you are saying about -- black, gray and white propaganda. However, I also recall from a few classes at Holabird long ago (howzat for dating ones self... :o) that the colors can and do also identify purpose; i.e. Black written by Black says White is ba-a-ad (though I'm actually an angel... :cool:); Gray written by Black says White is good but well, he's not really all that angelic and Blue, after all does not trust him. It plants seeds for further tilling...

White written by Black says Black is the good guy.

While I understand we are always truthful (... ;)), adhering strictly to your and the doctrinal definitions would seem to raise a couple of questions. Why have / do Black and Gray? For what reason would we not want to reveal the source? Or disguise it?

I'd submit, for example that "Bright, Shining Lie" is gray. It purports to tell some of the story of the US Army and Viet Nam but it is, in my opinion, a well written polemic that attempts to justify the less than stellar way the media covered that war by pointing out enough Army and Viet Namese (as well as the John Paul Vann speculatory denigration; 'even the good guys had issues...') warts (and I certainly know and acknowledge there were plenty...) to make the media look like the real good guys -- when in fact, they were no better at doing their job or being truthful, all things considered, than was the Army.

John T. Fishel
03-22-2009, 11:08 PM
didn't go there because I didn't transfer to MI or take the Advanced Course until it was at Hoochie Cooch.:D

I suspect you are right that at one time colors could refer to content but it became obvious that separating PSYOP from deception and disinformation was more useful than maintaining the color scheme for content.

Regarding your specific question: I guess telling the story again is worthwhile. My friend worked sub-Saharan Africa. They were looking for ways to discredit the Soviets in the region. Someone came across Soviet anti-Islam propaganda designed for use in Central Asia. Still, it was real Soviet stuff. The op took this stuff and ran it in the Muslim countries of sub-Saharan Africa claiming it originated from the Soviets (true) and passing it off as targeting the Muslim population of the region by the Soviet govt and embassies in the region. Hence, this was a classic case of a Black Propaganda op with great results. To use the content and source scheme you would have to call this Black source and white content. too confusing for my littel brain.

Cheers

JohnT

COMMAR
03-24-2009, 06:30 AM
Finally, many know my thoughts on MARSOC, and my belief that it was a money grab........still wondering about this....maybe someone can enlighten me.



Looks a lot like organizations already in existence.


MarSoc wasn't about money but a much more Powerful Motivator, Policy.

Its Policy that sets what is a Conventional Force, what is a Special Operations Force, what is a General Purpose Force... Its Policy thats says XYZ conventional units are Rapid Deployment Forces & can deploy immediately on the word of the President.

...It was Policy that the Marine Corps successfully used to argue to keep its SOF capable Forces fr/ being chopped to SoCom in the '80s. Arguing that unlike the other services the Marine Corps as a whole is listed as a GPF who's missions can border whats defined as S-O. Also unlike the other services, its SOF capable units are Totally integrated in the day-day Operations of the MAGTF on all levels.

At the time, a successful argument on the Grounds of Policy.



It was The USMC that found itself on the wrong side of Policy in the yrs leading up to MarSoc w/ a SecDef (Rumsfeld) set to write New Policy regarding SOF & their usage in the future of the GWOT.

W/out getting into the details, as some of you already know, that SecDef changed Policy & said that in Matters of the Pursuance of Terrorism the T-SOCs in each Theater Command would be the Lead Commander. ALL other Theater Deputy Commanders including the Theater Commander Himself were to be in a Supporting Role.

This was a major Policy shift for the Marines. Prior to this it was standard practice for the Theater Commander to use Marines, usually already on scene Forward Deployed on a MEU(SOC), as an In-Extremis(time sensitive) SOF until a SoCom/JSOC sponsored force, usually CONUS, could be assembled.

This POLICY changed w/ Rumsfeld who made all things Terror related strictly the Purview of SoCom's T-SOCs.

But for the Marine Corps the writing was already on the wall. This was already known to them since the opening days of A'stan when their MSPF's were constantly denied High Priority Missions & their highly trained Raiding Companies on the MEU(SOC)'s were often relegated to guard duty by the T-SOC who was mostly running & assigning the early missions.

Rumsfeld's Policy change, in I believe '06, would make that kind of tasking in the long run in Terrorism Assignments... OFFICIAL.

To add INSULT to INJURY after using the MEU ships & an empty Carrier as a Launch Pad & early Base of Operations, SoCom began looking into developing a FwdDep'd Composite SOF Strike Force that they hoped could be based on the MEU's ARG ships, much like the old SEAL Strike Plt.



SO the MARINES went Proactive. In '02 they signed the MOA that established Joint Ops w/ SoCom & re-established the by then defunked USMC-SoCom Board which was supposed to meet every 6mths since SoCom's inception.

In '03 the Marines tried to get ahead of the proposed Composite Strike Force by Proposing another MOA that was a Proof of Concept for a Test Unit that would prove its MSPF Concept as capable of filling this role, which became DET-1.

HQMC was not however originally looking to begin a New Command under SoCom or turn over any forces, but just establish that its MSPF was as or more capable of running various Spec Ops as any Tier II Force and therefore should be competitive for all High Priority T-II Missions.

This was constantly repeated by the Commandant when asked if the Corps was trying to create a new SOF & his answer was, "The Marine Corps does not like Headquarters on top of Headquarters." & that "Present relationships were fine". This was echoed by Rumsfeld who repeatedly stated he had to literally force the Marines hand.



You see the Marine Corps as a whole faced being BLANKED out of the whole Global Fight against Terrorism in any Proactive & Meaningful way. So It provided MOA's to Prove it could provide units that could play on SoCom's level & Rumsfeld forced the Merger b/c it was a good fit.

SoCom was not going to sign off some of its future Global Hi-Pri Missions to Marine units they don't control & disbands every 18mths & is not totally dedicated to S-O; they won their arguement.

The Corps was determined not to permanently lose its Marines & have an Operational Structure that put other(Traditional) Marine Units in a position to play a part in future SOF Missions; they won theirs.

There's more detail to it but that about sums it up.


I could go on & on from here but would rather just go back & forth.



Also___ The Idea that the Corps was after SoCom's money is baseless, its really something that gets batted around on Discussion Boards then PARROTED until it becomes GOSPEL.

The USMC is asked by Congress every yr to greatly expand its budget but it declines. Could they use more money, sure, but that ignores the long history of fiscal discipline the Corps is known for. There've been some exceptions for some must have big ticket items, but even that was few & frugal compared to the other services.

This move was about Policy, plain & simple.

George L. Singleton
03-24-2009, 10:03 AM
Simplistically said the Marines were a very important, hinge component if you will, of all the war gamming plans and exercises I helped develp and run for old USREDCOM...and our field exercises coupled with computerized table tops run as one total process for any single classified exercise worked well with the Marine Corp.

Can you imagine a non-rated USAF Reserve Colonel giving a Marine Corp Artillery Major training and guidance on battle field resupply of various types of artillery shells to keep all his tubes of various caliburs in action in a heavy exercise? I did, and somehow, it worked. That was the kind of interservice, active and reserve (I was an Individual Reservist with REDCOM/SOCOM to be clear once more) we had then.

ODB
03-25-2009, 02:58 AM
[MarSoc wasn't about money but a much more Powerful Motivator, Policy.

But later you argue:

You see the Marine Corps as a whole faced being BLANKED out of the whole Global Fight against Terrorism in any Proactive & Meaningful way. So It provided MOA's to Prove it could provide units that could play on SoCom's level & Rumsfeld forced the Merger b/c it was a good fit.

Got it they want in the fight and the GWOT funds.......


Its Policy that sets what is a Conventional Force, what is a Special Operations Force, what is a General Purpose Force... Its Policy thats says XYZ conventional units are Rapid Deployment Forces & can deploy immediately on the word of the President.

...It was Policy that the Marine Corps successfully used to argue to keep its SOF capable Forces fr/ being chopped to SoCom in the '80s. Arguing that unlike the other services the Marine Corps as a whole is listed as a GPF who's missions can border whats defined as S-O. Also unlike the other services, its SOF capable units are Totally integrated in the day-day Operations of the MAGTF on all levels.

At the time, a successful argument on the Grounds of Policy.

It was The USMC that found itself on the wrong side of Policy in the yrs leading up to MarSoc w/ a SecDef (Rumsfeld) set to write New Policy regarding SOF & their usage in the future of the GWOT.

W/out getting into the details, as some of you already know, that SecDef changed Policy & said that in Matters of the Pursuance of Terrorism the T-SOCs in each Theater Command would be the Lead Commander. ALL other Theater Deputy Commanders including the Theater Commander Himself were to be in a Supporting Role.

This was a major Policy shift for the Marines. Prior to this it was standard practice for the Theater Commander to use Marines, usually already on scene Forward Deployed on a MEU(SOC), as an In-Extremis(time sensitive) SOF until a SoCom/JSOC sponsored force, usually CONUS, could be assembled.

This POLICY changed w/ Rumsfeld who made all things Terror related strictly the Purview of SoCom's T-SOCs.

But for the Marine Corps the writing was already on the wall. This was already known to them since the opening days of A'stan when their MSPF's were constantly denied High Priority Missions & their highly trained Raiding Companies on the MEU(SOC)'s were often relegated to guard duty by the T-SOC who was mostly running & assigning the early missions.

Rumsfeld's Policy change, in I believe '06, would make that kind of tasking in the long run in Terrorism Assignments... OFFICIAL.

To add INSULT to INJURY after using the MEU ships & an empty Carrier as a Launch Pad & early Base of Operations, SoCom began looking into developing a FwdDep'd Composite SOF Strike Force that they hoped could be based on the MEU's ARG ships, much like the old SEAL Strike Plt.

This is where my heartache lies. Instead of developing a unit that would meet the needs that where identified above, a unit was created that would take the same role of units already in existence. Don't get me wrong, I scream daily where I am at, that we are not being utilized properly. This does not suprise me. We all have a role to play, unfortunately we do not play that role and think we need to play somebody elses role. We create units to have the same capabilities and tasks as units already in existence. We add other unit capabilities to units and mix match across the spectrum until no one knows who does what. I have no issue in the creation of capabilities that address shortcomings, but not to simply meet the changes in policy, money, whatever one wants to call it.

George L. Singleton
03-25-2009, 04:49 AM
From only an arm chair nowadays I agree with your general observations about creating what we already have and could use in our forces structure.

It pained me to see the US Marine Reserve Artillery unit at the Bessemer, Alabama armory converted into what amounts to an MP unit for use in Iraq several years ago.

There was and still is a mission and need for Marine Corp field artillery. If the DoD wanted and wants MPs then use MPs or ask for volunteers to cross train to be MPs from all branches of the service, regular, reserve, and guard.

ilots
03-30-2009, 05:17 AM
.....The reason we don't use it is both that our messages are truthful and it serves no useful purpose. .....
As another PSYOP'er I would respectfully, yet strongly, disagree. MSGS & PSYACTS are not always truthful - not even on the strat-side. Unfortunately, this idea has been further propogated by IO in recent years. PSYOP must not always be truthful, BUT it must always be credible. There is a distinct difference. Deception operations are difficult to conduct when you are only able to be truthful... however, they are fairly easy to conduct after you have used truth to establish credibility. That said - unfortunately, credibility is a rare currency; once spent it may or may not ever be earned back.


On a side & pet-peeve note, this is just one more reason that PSYOP day-to-day should be as far away from PA, Command Info, & (dare I say it) even IO as possible - but that is another topic.

COMMAR
03-30-2009, 09:13 AM
But later you argue:


Got it they want in the fight and the GWOT funds.......



No... nothing I explained above had anything to do w/funds, but had to do w/the USMC(as a whole, not MSOF) positioning itself, due to DOD policy shift, to remain the In-Extremis Force of Choice in lew of a SOF TF.

A very complex relationship, expecting no direct MAGTF relationship to the T-SOC's CT goals, but indirect in involvement thru 1) MSOC association & 2) improved relations due to the renewed USMC-SoCom Boards including planned institutionalization of USMC-SoCom/GPF-SOF Joint Training Excercises.




This is where my heartache lies. Instead of developing a unit that would meet the needs that where identified above, a unit was created that would take the same role of units already in existence. Don't get me wrong, I scream daily where I am at, that we are not being utilized properly. This does not suprise me. We all have a role to play, unfortunately we do not play that role and think we need to play somebody elses role. We create units to have the same capabilities and tasks as units already in existence. We add other unit capabilities to units and mix match across the spectrum until no one knows who does what. I have no issue in the creation of capabilities that address shortcomings, but not to simply meet the changes in policy, money, whatever one wants to call it.



Well thats the thing, they didn't re-create anything, b/c MarSoc as a whole & the MSOC's in particular (when complete) will provide an Fwd Dep'd Expeditionary capability unseen in Tier II SOF.

Which is something mentioned in SoCom's Official Report done on DET-1 by the JSOU & authored by SEAL LtCmdr Mark Divine.

This was the whole purpose of providing the DET in the Proof MOA. To pre-empt development of a composite SOF unit fr/being Fwd Deployed at sea, inwhich SoCom would've been Recreating the wheel.

The Corps was saying, "Hey, we already do that. If you need to see it, here's what we can do." Hence MOA Proof of Concept... DET-1.

The DET, which I mentioned before, was based off a MEU(SOC)'s MSPF a Mini Self-Sufficient/Contained Expeditionary Task Force comprised of DA/SR, Intel(HumInt & Sig) including a Deep Battlespace Strategic Ground SigInt capabilty (RRT), C2, Fires & Air Deconfliction, Support, etc.

The report stated the DET demonstrated a Direct Action & Reconnaissance capability on par w/ Tier 1 SMU's and that the MSPF regularly deploys w/ support only seen in SMU TF's.

Singled out was the Intel units, who while only comprising 3% of the Intel assets slated for the CJSOTF in Iraq during that 6mth time period provided over 29% of the CJSOTF's Actionable Intelligence.

etc, etc, etc...


But thats off subject...

SoCom liked what they saw, & the USMC saw an opportunity to dig into SoCom's MISSION pie(MAGTFs by assoc. w/MarSoc), NOT their MONETARY pie; & positioned themselves accordingly.







In other News:
This is a very complex issue that can't be viewed by down talking unit contribution as simply copying or not copying.


MarSoc's overall planned capabilities can't be gauged by missions run in A'stan to date...

B/C without its planned TF Enabler Structure in place(still growing) & w/its Global Transpo (ARG/MEU Ships), doing squares off the Kuwait coast b/c the MEU is dry docked as the Iraq Theater Resr'v; MarSoc's not in a position to take up its planned role as an Fwd Dep Expeditionary strike force & therefore seperate itself in your eyes.

It is however gaining valuable time learning its new command's(SoCom) Op Structure & TTPs before operating Independently in the near future.





W/that said, I'd say it'd be about another 1-2yrs before you see MSOC's doing what they were actually designed to do.

Schmedlap
03-30-2009, 11:33 AM
The reason to separate covert action from intel is to avoid contaminating the intelligence and policy to the maximum extent possible...
I am not suggesting that seconding personnel with appropriate expertise to my covert action agency would be wrong... seconded personnel often develop a loyalty to their new organization...
Bottom line is that I think we can do much better than the current arrangement. Intel consumers should not be their own analysts.
Regarding the hybrid career paths for SOF/CIA mentioned earlier in the thread, it seems to me that allowing 18F's and certain WO's to run the hybrid path would help to bring out the positive aspects of the "seconded personnel" dynamic while familiarizing the military and CIA with one another. Maybe they worked together better than I got the impression they did, but I sensed a fair amount of friction between the SOF and CIA (and other) organizations in Iraq. My impression was that it was the result of a clash of organizational cultures. Some hybrid career paths could smooth this out, imo.

If limited to 18F's and WO's, I'd think that this could also avoid the danger of intel consumers being their own analysts. To the extent that an 18F is already an intel analyst consuming his own analysis, it doesn't seem that the hybrid career path would exacerbate this.

John T. Fishel
03-30-2009, 12:39 PM
policy and doctrine were clear: PSYOP was not deception - that was an intel op - and our messages were always to be truthful (although, as I said before, not always the whole truth). My former CIA buddy confirmed that in his day, they followed the same doctrine and policy differentiating between a psyop and deception op. Things may well have changed since I left even the periphery of the PSYOP community in 1992. If they have, I am greatly saddened:( Otherwise, I generally agree with your point on separation but with the following caveat: At the command level, there needs to be coordination so that the right had knows what the left is doing and doesn't undercut the other.

Cheers

JohnT

John T. Fishel
03-30-2009, 12:43 PM
I agree with you. I do think that the separation of function is required at the strategic level and to only a slightly lesser extent at the operational level. At the tactical level - which I think you are really talking about - there really can be no such separation. Nor is there in the tactical military world.

Cheers

JohnT

ODB
03-31-2009, 04:08 AM
Think I'm getting COMMAR. The gist of things is that they will some day fill that void, but like most of us today, are not being utilized properly. This is the first time I've heard of them being a forward deployed strikeforce, then that may lead into another conversation to have elsewhere. Only time will tell how they end up being utilized. Thanks for putting things into perspective.

ODB
03-31-2009, 04:19 AM
Regarding the hybrid career paths for SOF/CIA mentioned earlier in the thread, it seems to me that allowing 18F's and certain WO's to run the hybrid path would help to bring out the positive aspects of the "seconded personnel" dynamic while familiarizing the military and CIA with one another. Maybe they worked together better than I got the impression they did, but I sensed a fair amount of friction between the SOF and CIA (and other) organizations in Iraq. My impression was that it was the result of a clash of organizational cultures. Some hybrid career paths could smooth this out, imo.

If limited to 18F's and WO's, I'd think that this could also avoid the danger of intel consumers being their own analysts. To the extent that an 18F is already an intel analyst consuming his own analysis, it doesn't seem that the hybrid career path would exacerbate this.


What about that agency guy who wants his time on an ODA? We know how these games are played, we are letting some of your guys do this, so now some of our guys get to do that. If that happens, everytime you go into some country, that country will be playing "Let's see if we can guess which one is the CIA guy."

A lot of that friction is caused by trust or lack there of. Creditability is a huge one as well. Matter of fact this is how a buddy of mine got blown up. They get told to go clear an area that the CIA swears is full of Taliban. My buddy and his team were just there 3-4 days prior. They go out, stand on the exact grid, CIA tells them they can't be in the right spot. On the way back out they hit an IED, kills everyone in truck except my buddy. Now let's look at that:

1. The ODA had already been there recently, the CIA didn't take the ODA's intel on the location.
2. The ODA goes to the exact spot and because there is nothing there, CIA tells them they can't be in the right location.

Yes, trust and crediability! There are a number of reasons for the friction, and we'll leave it at that.

Ken White
03-31-2009, 03:49 PM
1. The ODA had already been there recently, the CIA didn't take the ODA's intel on the location.
2. The ODA goes to the exact spot and because there is nothing there, CIA tells them they can't be in the right location.

Yes, trust and crediability! There are a number of reasons for the friction, and we'll leave it at that.to relationships between Army units, between SF units, between Army and SF units -- and, most damaging, it particularly applies to the intelligence and reconnaissance business and reports by almost everyone involved in those efforts...

That is not only unfortunate, it also too often gets forgotten by too many who are unwilling to trust others. Caused by a bad combination of too much ego and too little self confidence, usually.

Schmedlap
03-31-2009, 04:44 PM
What about that agency guy who wants his time on an ODA?
I was thinking more along the lines of him working at the JSOTF, as a member of the JSOTF, rather than what I saw before - CIA working in coordination with, but not as a member of, the CJSOTF.


A lot of that friction is caused by trust or lack there of. Creditability is a huge one as well.
I think this can be addressed with greater hybridization, not with less, especially in light of the experience you recounted. That's not to say that hybridization is the final or only answer. It seems to be "a" way.

ODB
04-01-2009, 04:41 AM
my best to articulate here where a lot of that friction is generated. By nature type-A personalities clash. Pride and egos run rampant among these two entities. Agree Ken, it is among all. In the case between SOF and CIA a lot of that is home grown. Guys leave the SOF community after a few years and go to the agencies (won't limit it to one 3 letter agency). They then end up back in country with an even bigger head, the ground branch ones are usually the worse. What you don't see is that 35-50 year old prior SOF guy, you see that mid 20's guy with an over inflated ego. On the flip side you may get that book geek who hasn't experienced much outside his office until that point. Yes you get the overinflated SOF guy ego as well. I don't think hybridization is the answer, I think it lies in training. Knowing who you may be working with, building those relationship. Don't get me wrong like everything there are good and bad, some I'm still in contact with today after years. Honestly from my stand point my business is about building personal relationships, if I can't do that among my own how can I with local nation people. It's a people business.

The one thing out of all this that I'm still debating in my mind about the two blending into one is the utilization of SF as the ground branch. Would like others thoughts and insights on that.

I have had multiple thoughts, discussions and the like on this whole report, haven't made up my mind yet, but becoming more territorial by the day.:rolleyes:

ODB
04-01-2009, 04:42 AM
Doing a helluva lot of Googling these days, will get back with more questions in a few days. Some bold statements but researching.

George L. Singleton
04-01-2009, 12:55 PM
As this discussion has gone on longer than I would have expected I guess I am going to have to file my claim for CIA equivlaent grade pay for the rank of First Lieutenanat I held during my tour of duty with the old US Embassy in Karachi...where I worked with...you might say on detail...the CIA Team Chief and his Deputy the last half of my 18 month tour of duty as the 1964/1965 India-Paksitan War with preamble... then conflict came on us...resulting in part of my work...the 6937th Evacuation Plan being used by mid to late 1965 when all hell broke loose impacting our base at Badabur, suburban Peshawar.

Let me see, GS-9 or GS-11 pay, with retroactive compound interest....just might help repay me the cost recently of putting our three now in their mid-20s children through two college degrees each!

jmm99
04-01-2009, 07:40 PM
George brings up a practical point about lateral transfers and pecking order.

For example, at DoS Legal Advisor's Office (http://www.state.gov/s/l/3190.htm#emp), quite a bit of flexibility exists on lateral transfers:


Attorneys are paid according to the General Schedule for Federal employees. For recent law school graduates with less than 1 year of relevant legal experience, the standard appointment is at GS-11, step one. Candidates with at least one year of experience, such as judicial clerks, will be appointed at GS-12, step one. Non-government laterals are appointed at the grade level (up to GS-15) and step that they would have earned had they joined the Office directly from law school. On a case-by-case basis, we may be authorized to compensate a newly appointed attorney with “superior qualifications” at a higher step level. Attorneys at the GS-11 level may be appointed at up to step 10 in their salary grade. The possible step increase varies for the higher grades. Salary levels for laterals from other Federal agencies are based on their current grade and step.

This policy hasn't changed in 40 years - DoS LA was simply the best USG hire because it had to compete with the I Law firms.

If you were making a lateral move to LA from the "right place", you would take a $ hit, but not a hit in level of responsibility. In fact, LA probably would provide a higher level of responsibility than at the firm. Then, if later you made a lateral move back to the "right place", you would not be penalized for your stay at LA. In fact, time spent at LA in effect counted as time served in the firm - with no future promotion issues in the firm caused by that (in fact, it could be a plus).

So, while I am not necessarily a fan of what seems to be proposed, the issues of pecking order status, preservation of seniority and pay (probably the least issue in the short run) seem to loom large.

Is there a brave soul out there who can give us a chart comparing military grades with the GS grades ?

-------------------------------
For one man's view of how the CIA and SOF cultures co-operated - and clashed - in norther Iraq, Sam Faddis' book, Operation Hotel California (http://www.amazon.com/Operation-Hotel-California-Clandestine-Inside/dp/product-description/B001I4607O), is interesting.

Ken White
04-01-2009, 08:43 PM
Here are the substantive rank equivalents (scroll down to Paragraph 4):

LINK. (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/General_Schedule)

Basically, a GS 11 equates to a Captain, a GS 12 to a Major, a GS 13 to a LTC and a GS 14 or 15 to a COL, only in the SES to you get to FlagO equivalents. Note there can be and often are local variations due to position. I personally do not believe Civilians should rate Military personnel but they do and I had to rate a slew of LTC and even two COLs. No problems in spite of my reservations. Even got a Senior Rater profile on Captains and Majors...:wry:

For pay equivalents, Google the Military and Civil Service pay charts though they don't tell the whole story. You can pretty well figure pay comparability by the substantive rank. We're too material a society not to do it that way. ;)

jmm99
04-01-2009, 08:53 PM
Thanks for the link and its chart. Also helps on the reverse match-up between FS and GS grades.

COMMAR
04-09-2009, 10:21 PM
Think I'm getting COMMAR. The gist of things is that they will some day fill that void, but like most of us today, are not being utilized properly.



Yeah something like that.

Here's what I know from talking to some guys fr/ my old unit Small Craft Co who are now in MARSOC & general reading. Nothing OPSEC Sensitive just basic info thats already been released in various papers & articles.

When MARSOC was first signed into existence it was considered a 5yr build to duplicate DET-1 plus some. They said they can do it in 3 which would put them at the start of FY 10 this October '09.

This was considered a multi-year build & not a straight turnover b/c it had to grow the type of personnel needed on the support side.

Reconnaissance Men & Grunts for the DA/SR & FID missions the Corps had out the wazoo to transfer, but they needed to grow the "Special Operations Mission Enablers", not just transfer over some maintenance guys to support Spec Ops.

Thats what one of things that set DET-1 apart, every member fr/ the Admin Clerks to the Topographic Intel guy was cross-trained in Direct Action & Special Reconnaissance.

You had 30 Reconnaissance Men plus another 70 SR/DA trained Enablers who could individually attach to the 5 man DASR tms & enhance any mission by allowing the DET to Task Organize to the specifics of whatever mission came their way.

Fast Foward, since the new MARSOC had Recon guys and the guys fr/the FMTU(MSOAG) readily available, you don't sit them out until everything else is ready, you use them.




Dec. 2008 (FY 09) MarSOC's Training Pipeline, starting w/the 7mth ITC, opened to All MOS's. The Individual Training Course teaches DA/SR, Operational FID, Light Infantry Tactics, Advanced Medical & Fire Support, among other skill sets.

This is the move that will allow the MSOC's to transition into the planned Expeditionary role.

It is Baseline training for all deployable MarSOC Marines before moving into MOS specific training; but for the most part, unlike other SOF, your previous MOS will determine your parent unit:

-Meaning if you were Recon B4 MarSOC your headed to the MSOBs.
-If you were a Combat Engineer, Intel, Comm, ANGLICO, etc. your headed to the MSOSG.
-An Infantryman your headed to the MSOAG.

The MSOAG & MSOC's will break into 14 man deployable MSOTs accompanied by Enabler Detachments.

Tactically the pipeline is nothing the Recon guys haven't seen before, but much like the SFQC that it closely resembles, its very Operationally & judgement focused-- March '07.



To illustrate how this will eventually look w/the MSOC's are two excerpts fr/ an article showing how it looked in the DET.





Lost in the shuffle
Det 1’s combat record showed it could stand out among spec ops, but the Corps cut short this unit’s stellar story

By Gidget Fuentes
May 01, 2006

...Tensions were flaring in the Iraqi town of Kut as insurgents took over key buildings in the city along the Tigris River south of Baghdad.

An Army Special Forces “A” team, supported by a small detachment of Marine Air-Naval Gunfire Liaisons (ANGLICO), had been working with the Ukrainian military, which was holed up in its base when insurgents overran the local police station.

Over five days in August 2004, the “A” team fought from its safe house, taking casualties before it requested support from headquarters.


That call for help went to a highly trained team of leathernecks who, at the time, represented an experimental unit that marked the Marine Corps’ official foray into the world of special operations forces.

Enemy fighters had taken over key parts of the city, “and we had to get it back. So we just helped the SF guys out doing that,” said Master Gunnery Sgt. Charles Padilla, the senior man and recon team leader.

“We got there just in the right time.”

Within hours and under cover of night, a 16-member team from Marine Corps Special Operations Command Detachment 1 — including reconnaissance scouts, snipers, fire-support coordinators, communicators and radio recon operators — flew from its base near Baghdad to a nearby strip and worked its way into the city. The Marines arrived around 1 a.m. and linked up with Special Forces.

For one week, Det 1 and the Special Forces “A” team operated together, pulling security for local officials, taking the high ground around the city and river to provide cover and directing aircraft to strike buildings housing insurgent fighters.

When an Army Stryker brigade combat team arrived days later, Det 1 stayed to help quell the insurgents and plan the eventual retaking of the city before heading to Najaf, which was teeming with insurgents.

The men said it was a seamless blend of skills and high-tech capabilities that the Army units, including one battalion commanded by a Ranger-trained officer, welcomed with open arms.

“They just used us as if we were another one of their teams,” Padilla said, adding that without the Det’s capability to control and synchronize fires, and do command and control, “the Stryker battalions would have went in blind.”

The Det team’s accomplishment, repeated in similar fashion during the intense battle for Najaf later that month, is among the highlights of a combat deployment by an experimental unit that has stayed off the public’s radar.

Det 1 broke ground June 20, 2003, as a “proof of concept” designed to see whether Marines should become part of U.S. Special Operations Command. The Marines, who numbered 102 when they deployed, jumped into intense training before leaving on schedule in April 2004 for Iraq to a six-month deployment that, by most accounts, was successful in proving the Corps should have a seat at SOCom’s table of Army, Navy and Air Force commandos.



...Det 1’s strength, said its commander, came from the unique way the group organized itself around battlefield functions: maneuver, communications and control, fires, force protection, intelligence and logistics.

Along with the headquarters element, the Det comprised of a reconnaissance element, which included four five-man recon teams; a fires liaison element, which included two fire liaison teams and air controllers; and a 30-member intelligence element, which included radio reconnaissance, human exploitation teams and fusion cells.

“All functions can be executed in one grid square. We can do everything — all the intel process, high-end communications and everything,” said Col. Robert Coates, the Det’s commander. “We were fielded with emerging technologies that allowed us to do that. And you combine that with hard feet and strong backs, which made us very versatile and a force of choice on the battlefield.”



...In August 2004, the Det got a tasking order to support conventional forces fighting in Najaf. It would use its enabling capabilities to support the Army battalions, Marines and Navy SEALs poised to fight in the holy city.

“What they got was a full spectrum of battle-space capabilities,” Coates said.

Army and Marine forces battled militia forces loyal to radical cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, fighting amid the tight urban confines of the Old City and through expansive cemeteries.

U.S. forces fought their way in to encircle the gold-domed Imam Ali Mosque, a sacred Shiite shrine. It was the first major battle for the then-fledgling Iraqi government, which had assumed control two months earlier.

Padilla and the Det’s sniper team coordinated fire support, which included AC-130 and helicopter gunships, working closely with 2nd Battalion, 7th Regiment, of the Army’s 1st Calvary Division. Organized teams with snipers went several blocks forward of the friendly lines for observation, and the team integrated fires, air support and strikes and communications while heavily engaged, supporting the conventional forces.

“The snipers kept them down in the day, and fires kept them down at night,” Coates said. Some logged “kills” as far as 1,300 to 1,400 meters away.

With a communications architecture that provided “unheard of” amounts of bandwidth, the Det was able to reach back to its intelligence cell, which provided advanced imagery, data, signals intelligence and other products that the Marines were able to hand to the conventional forces to fight the fight.

“They got intelligence products ... that they had never, ever seen before,” Coates said.

“When we showed up, the maps they had were like the maps you buy at a gas station,” said Master Sgt. Ryan Keeler, the communications chief. “We sent back requests, and a day later ... we were able to print them off and take them to the field and also take them to the conventional units we were supporting.

“They couldn’t believe the photo imagery that we were able to get, one block over.”

For more than a week, “Kilo,” Keeler’s radio call sign, became a known voice among the air controllers and pilots hanging over the besieged city.

Keeler recalled that one day, as he caught a few precious hours of sleep after an intense night directing fires, an Army colonel he didn’t know went up to him and kicked him awake.

“So you’re Kilo,” the colonel said to him.

It seemed the colonel just wanted to pass along his thanks. “We put a lot of rounds downrange and put a lot of people out,” he recalled.

The Det left the city several days after a cease-fire was called. It was surreal, seeing insurgents they had been fighting now walking the streets. “It was like the rats coming out,” Padilla said.


I'll have to go thru my old papers to give you the titles of alot of the papers and articles dealing w/ the overall concept of usage for the deployable units.

The personnel will be very interchangeable not so much of a static difference like SEALs to SWCC or SF & Rangers, they plan to have the ability to be very mix & match across MarSOC units to build Task Specific tms when in theater along MOS lines.

Distiller
04-11-2009, 06:15 PM
SOCOM has 50.000 men! That's almost 3 divisions. What can be "special" about that?

After the persistant Marines ego trip, trying to replicate everything and becoming an army within the army, SOCOM is now trying the same, putting "special" on everything and trying to create the fifth or six component force, all complete with naval and aerial section.

If anything SOCOM shouldn't be expanded, it should be *drastically* cut (like the Marines). Is it just because regular units are full of guys and gals in it for the education they'll get afterwards, or is because "special" is cool, or because there is so much pork in the system that the power & money games inflate SOCOM? In any case a lot of "special" seems Ranger work - max.

In so far a (near-)merger with CIA assets would be a good thing, but only if "special" really becomes special again. Not more than 10.000 men I'd say. Like the immortals of the old Persian kings.