PDA

View Full Version : Guerrilla Counterintelligence



Jedburgh
03-13-2009, 04:59 PM
JSOU, Jan 09: Guerrilla Counterintelligence: Insurgent Approaches to Neutralizing Adversary Intelligence Operations (https://jsoupublic.socom.mil/publications/jsou/JSOU09-1turbivilleGuerrillaCI_final.pdf)

....A key issue underpinning this current volume is the complex relationship between state and nonstate actors. The nonstate actors are organizations with structures and personnel; albeit that these structures vary considerably in complexity from group to group. Insurgent groups have goals that require a strategy and operational planning to achieve. Consequently, the groups need to secure their operations to ensure effectiveness; they also need to provide security because the operations entail securing the organization and its personnel from government counterinsurgency operations. Ultimately, this leads groups to develop some form of counterintelligence rules and structure to provide security. In small groups this may be limited to security-focused rules of conduct and operational security, but as groups grow in size and complexity, the need for a more formal type of organizational structure increases and a more robust security organization will be needed.

Dr. Turbiville does an excellent job of highlighting the critical element of security and how insurgent groups ignore it at their peril. Another effective analysis is his discussion of trends and similarities that can be observed across geographical, historical, and cultural boundaries. In other words, all insurgent groups must provide for some form of security and understanding; this provides a useful prism with which to analyze various groups. Piercing a group’s intelligence capabilities can be critical in undermining its operations. As a word of caution, insurgents can do the same thing to governments. Dr. Turbiville persuasively argues Michael Collins’ targeting of British intelligence organizations seriously undermined British security force’s resolve in Irish counterinsurgency operations in the early 20th century.

This ###-for-tat threat and counterthreat also applies to the concept of infiltration, the greatest threat to an insurgent group. Shielding itself from government infiltration or penetration is a critical element in ensuring an insurgent group’s freedom of operation. Ultimately, this requires the population to either actively support or passively tolerate the insurgents. Consequently, the population’s loyalty, a fundamental tenet of irregular warfare, is the objective of both sides fighting in an insurgency....
Complete 92-page study available at the link.

jmm99
03-16-2009, 12:58 AM
Our CI efforts in the past (e.g., Cold War) were primarily directed against the intelligence and counter-intelligence efforts of State Actor agencies.

Now we are more into VNSAs (Violent Non-State Actors) and their intelligence and counter-intelligence efforts - but, the State Actor agencies are still out there as exemplified by the Simm case.

My question is whether it would be better or worse to compartmentalize our efforts vs. State Actor services from our efforts vs. VNSA "services". Seems to me there are similarities, but also differences.

Any thoughts ?

Ron Humphrey
03-16-2009, 04:13 AM
Our CI efforts in the past (e.g., Cold War) were primarily directed against the intelligence and counter-intelligence efforts of State Actor agencies.

Now we are more into VNSAs (Violent Non-State Actors) and their intelligence and counter-intelligence efforts - but, the State Actor agencies are still out there as exemplified by the Simm case.

My question is whether it would be better or worse to compartmentalize our efforts vs. State Actor services from our efforts vs. VNSA "services". Seems to me there are similarities, but also differences.

Any thoughts ?

that such a compartmentalization were to take place. Exactly how long would it be before many if not all of those studied networks developed information linking them to State sponsorship of some sort.

And should that happen who's supposed to coordinate information sharing between those departments. Also who acts on what?

That would seem to be a perfect way to find ourselves in disconnect mode all over again

jmm99
03-17-2009, 07:40 PM
is really one of what is the best way to organize our efforts to handle three functions (counter-intelligence, counter-espionage and counter-"terrorism" ), which are related but have distinct practical and legal differences.

We can start with the Wikis for Counter-intelligence (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Counter-intelligence), Counter-Terrorism (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Counter-terrorism) and Counter-intelligence and counter-terrorism organizations (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Counter-intelligence_and_counter-terrorism_organizations), as basic background. What is the best organizational framework for us (US) ?

Also in the mix of basics: The 10 Commandments of Counterintelligence (http://www.ncix.gov/archives/docs/10CommandmentsofCI_cind-2002-01-05.pdf).


--------------------

counter-VNSA (Violent Non-State Actors) might be a better term since it would include both transnational "terrorists" and transnational criminal gangs.