Short 06 Stokes Debate

[William F. Owen]

I got e-mailed this (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/04/05/AR2009040502235.html?hpid=topnews) this morning.

Seriously, if this article is in anyway accurate, then you have the wrong folks in the Pentagon. I know and respect Frank Hoffman, and I have a lot of time for Stephen Biddles work, but the tone and content of this argument is woeful. I assume both men are quoted out of context.

A great many of the statements of fact in this article are just plain wrong, and intent on lionising Hezbollah in a way that is just contrary to the operational record. The IDF problem in the Lebanon War was the plan, and the lack of objectives.

Even Exum's paper concludes that one the IDF got it's act together, Hezbollah had considerable difficulties.

...and if Hezbollah are so confident, why did they not fire 1,000 or rockets during Cast Lead? If they weren't going to fire then, when were they? How many have they fired since 2006? All these facts are wonderfully absent from the debate.

If anyone in any US institution is seriously suggesting that the US Army can fight well armed insurgents in A'stan and Iraq, but couldn't face Hezbollah, then they need to removed from their post. It flies in the face of facts, and rational military analysis. Hezbollah are not a Soviet Artillery Machine Gun Brigade (even though they try to use the same tactics) and not even close in threat the a Soviet MRR!

As for the "you can't do it all" issue, how come IDF Reservists, have fought in the Lebanon, done anti-terrorist duties on the West Bank, and then fought in Gaza, - and that's based on a total of 4 months training in 3 years, as well as holding down a civilian job.

I hope this is a journalist, with little or no military knowledge trying to make a story where there simply is not one.

[Tom Odom]

If anyone in any US institution is seriously suggesting that the US Army can fight well armed insurgents in A'stan and Iraq, but couldn't face Hezbollah, then they need to removed from their post. It flies in the face of facts, and rational military analysis. Hezbollah are not a Soviet Artillery Machine Gun Brigade (even though they try to use the same tactics) and not even close in threat the a Soviet MRR!

As for the "you can't do it all" issue, how come IDF Reservists, have fought in the Lebanon, done anti-terrorist duties on the West Bank, and then fought in Gaza, - and that's based on a total of 4 months training in 3 years, as well as holding down a civilian job.

I hope this is a journalist, with little or no military knowledge trying to make a story where there simply is not one.

Wilf

This kind of "analysis" has been going on as a means to an end, notably to reniforce arguments that COIN degrades conventional. It is useful to those who use it because rightly or wrongly the IDF gets looked at as a guinea pig. I sat in a brief a year or more ago that went into all of this and at the end when they were taking questions, I raised my hand. I asked did they look at patterns/trends of IDF operations from earlier periods. I got a blank look followed by what is your point. My point was that some--not all--of the issues highlighted had occurred in IDF operations well before 2006 (as they have in ours). I renforced my point by pointing to a slide where they had a picture of southern Lebanon and saying all of that was true when I was there in 1987 watching the IDF.

My comments were not well recieved as they did not fit the intent of the brief.

Best
Tom

[William F. Owen]

My comments were not well recieved as they did not fit the intent of the brief.


...and I am become Tom Odom, slaughterer of sacred cows and crusher of pet agendas....

I can live with that!

[Hacksaw]

A couple of things...

If my memory serves me correctly, Greg Jaffe is actually quite familiar with the US Military, but...

Greg tends to take months to put together a story, quotes could very well have been taken largely out of context... its been quite sometime since I tracked what journalist were writing to determine where their agenda was heading... Mr Jaffe usually has an agenda, or at least an opinion, which he then pens articles to support...

My sense from the cheap seats, is that no one of any real significance, is looking at the IDF experience(s) in Lebanon and the West Bank and drawing conclusion... They are, however, very interested in learning from the IDF experiece... The CSI reference appears to come from an info paper written to suggest that a larger observation paper was warranted... I thought the info paper rather over-stated... an OP from CSI should be very balanced...

So I think My Jaffe's piece is much ado about nothing... well not nothing... just overstating the US response/internalization of IDF experiences...

Of course my soda straw might be pointed in the wrong direction

Live well and row

[Cavguy]

Exum has some excellent commentary (http://abumuqawama.blogspot.com/2009/04/arguing-2006-war.html) at his blog:


Here's the problem with that, though. As Jaffe notes toward the end of the article, the 2006 war is a kind of Rorschach test that does not so much point toward obvious conclusions but rather highlights pre-existing biases on the part of those researchers looking to draw conclusions. Personally, I believe you can take any number of important lessons from the war and can use the war writ large to argue all sides of the ongoing defense debates. If you just look at the war within the 34 days of open fighting, for example, it is clear the Israelis allowed their conventional war-fighting skills to atrophy as they engaged in low-intensity operations in the Palestinian territories between 2000 and 2006. But if you look at the war from the other side of the border -- which few studies have done -- you see the way that, over a span of time beyond the 34 days of open fighting, Hizballah employed non-kinetic lines of operation (to include information operations and the provision of essential services to their population), to virtually ensure that no matter how the Israelis performed operationally, they would have a tough time winning strategically. Or, to put it another way,

"Even if the Israelis had done better operationally, I don't think they would have been victorious in the long run," said Andrew Exum, a former Army officer who has studied the battle from southern Lebanon. "For the Israelis, the war lasted for 34 days. We tend to forget that for Hezbollah, it is infinite."

So there are lessons to be found in the 2006 war for Cold Warriors and COINdinistas alike. What we should do, instead, is study the wars we are actually fighting. That will cost guys like me several thousand dollars in consulting fees each year for those war games Frank Hoffman mentions, but it makes a lot more sense to study the wars in which Americans are actually fighting and dying than it does to study a war whose lessons are only vaguely applicable to the future of American war.

Paging COL Gentile .....

[William F. Owen]

"Even if the Israelis had done better operationally, I don't think they would have been victorious in the long run," said Andrew Exum, a former Army officer who has studied the battle from southern Lebanon. "For the Israelis, the war lasted for 34 days. We tend to forget that for Hezbollah, it is infinite."

In the long run, Hezbollah did not act militarily during Cast Lead. The War did not last 34 days for Israel. That was just the fighting. It has lasted 61 years, and everyday of Israel's existence, and continues. Hezbollah are a pretty recent players in this game.

[Schmedlap]

The misconceptions that get thrown around in this endless non-debate about COIN v conventional makes me ever more concerned at the size of the divide between Pentagon deep-thinkers and the actual practitioners. I'm starting to wonder if they inhabit different worlds, rather than different sides of a canyon.

First off, the Hezbollah-IDF analogy seems to omit a few issues (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2008/05/americas-greatest-weapon-1/#comment-1700)...
- Didn't Israel commit a mistake often deemed to be one of being overly "conventional" in that it was too heavy handed in striking targets in Lebanon?
- Didn't Nasrallah publicly admit that he miscalculated the response of Israel and, in private, acknowledge that Hezbollah took unexpectedly high losses?
- Wasn't Israel's "loss" really a public diplomacy / perception management issue?

The concern about Hezbollah fighters actually showing some fighting spirit and skill seems less concerning than the fact that we were surprised by that performance and that we fear it. Not all wars are fought against an Arab army fleeing down a highway of death.

Second, I'll keep this at the level where I'm within my OPSEC comfort zone, but I didn't see one mention of anything from the 06 skirmishes or from the discussion surrounding them that we are not already doing /countering on a daily basis in Iraq. This atrophy of conventional warfighting skills is the biggest myth / non-issue to come along since War of the Worlds.

Who started this? Who put their brain under the pillow and got visited by the Bad Idea Fairy?

We're not training our artillery batteries because they're too busy firing arty in combat. (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2008/05/army-focus-on-counterinsurgenc/#comment-1592)

We have been conducting hard raids and other kinetic operations (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2009/01/think-again-counterinsurgency-1/#comment-2533), not "new" COIN "tactics" for years in Iraq.

"... keep in mind the Army adage that armies are best built from the bottom up, squad by squad, platoon by platoon." - MG Scales (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2008/04/officer-questions-petraeuss-st-1/#comment-1444)

Who can say with a straight face that our small units from the mid- to late-1990s were more ready for prime time than any of the US forces that are presently dispensing scunion in Iraq and Afghanistan? We have more lethal squads, sections, and platoons that are manned with combat veterans who are better equipped than any military in history. The pre-9/11 force went to the range twice per year to finger-drill BRM and qualification. In Iraq, our Soldiers get combat experience, they do continuous maintainance, continuous operations, continuous TLPs. We have a stronger foundation of lethal, experienced, trained small units than we've ever had.

[Eden]

Who can say with a straight face that our small units from the mid- to late-1990s were more ready for prime time than any of the US forces that are presently dispensing scunion in Iraq and Afghanistan? We have more lethal squads, sections, and platoons that are manned with combat veterans who are better equipped than any military in history. The pre-9/11 force went to the range twice per year to finger-drill BRM and qualification. In Iraq, our Soldiers get combat experience, they do continuous maintainance, continuous operations, continuous TLPs. We have a stronger foundation of lethal, experienced, trained small units than we've ever had.

Agree 100% about our small-units. What I worry about is our larger units and staffs. If we have to fight in an environment where brigade commanders have to integrate combined arms through fire and maneuver of battalions and batteries, our excellent squads, sections, and platoons will lose more people than they needed to through lack of timely support - fires, logistics, medical, etc.

Now if you don't envision us undertaking any operations at that level for twenty years, then no worries...but please don't think that expertise in small wars automatically will translate into success in a higher-tempo, higher-lethality scenario.

[Schmedlap]

If we have to fight in an environment where brigade commanders have to integrate combined arms through fire and maneuver of battalions and batteries, our excellent squads, sections, and platoons will lose more people than they needed to through lack of timely support - fires, logistics, medical, etc.
If you are merely asserting that our BDE and above are not adequately trained in combined arms warfare, then I would agree. But if you further assert that we are less well trained than prior to 9/11, I would sharply disagree. And, for that reason, I do not attribute any shortcomings in our BDE & above proficiency to current operations or current training. In my opinion, while the proficiency is inadequate, we are nonetheless far more proficient than we have been for at least the last 10 years.

Our operations today are highly sophisticated because battalions now have more types of units to employ and must simultaneously employ some in a mixture of hard and soft missions. It demands highly competent staffs that work well as a team. One company may be doing a raid while another is providing medical supplies and support to a local clinic, another is in an hour-long skirmish with a dozen gunmen in a heavily populated area, another is doing a sweeping operation on the outskirts of a city, and another is spread out across the city in team or squad-sized ambush positions.

Before we invaded Iraq, I never saw, worked with, or trained with a THT, JTAC, or PSYOP team. The only time that I ever encountered a CA team or ODA prior to OIF was in Bosnia. The only EW that I was familiar with prior to OIF was when I was an OPFOR augmentee and my company net was suddenly blasting "Thunderstruck" by AC/DC. Integration of any air assets - Apaches, Kiowas, or CAS - was almost always simulated and notional. Artillery and mortars were simulated - both the call for fire and arty simulator that was thrown by the OC. Counter battery fire? Never saw it simulated or in reality. Civilians on the battlefield, interpreters, humanitarian aid, detainee operations? Again - only saw it in Bosnia, prior to OIF, or not at all. In Iraq - leaving aside the invasion - units that I deployed with did battalion-level operations that included all of the assets mentioned above and did so in the mixed scenarios mentioned in the preceding paragraph. I think that requires a significantly higher level of coordination than a staff riding across the central corridor and feeding the front-line trace and SITREPs to the BN CDR.

The major element missing is simply the volume of personnel and vehicles being employed at once, in a particular operation. But that is not all that significant in terms of our ability to organize/integrate/C2. Integrating numerous types of units/effects is a greater challenge than coordinating a large volume of similar units/effects.

PS - I would also add that, given the insane amount of mission distractions in theater - most of them involving PowerPoint slides and awards - I am amazed that our staffs are capable of doing anything at all.

[Steve Blair]

Now if you don't envision us undertaking any operations at that level for twenty years, then no worries...but please don't think that expertise in small wars automatically will translate into success in a higher-tempo, higher-lethality scenario.

And the reverse also applies, which is why we need to fix the basic system (personnel, unit stability, etc). That's, actually, where I think the break is, and this other squabbling is distracting us from the larger problems in training and personnel administration and organization.

[Ken White]

Unfortunately. So far I see little movement to fix that and it IS critical.

[William F. Owen]

- Didn't Israel commit a mistake often deemed to be one of being overly "conventional" in that it was too heavy handed in striking targets in Lebanon?
It's not even that simple. The air strikes did massive damage to Hezbollah C&C, and logistics, but the ground forces were initially given VERY strict ROE, which is why smoke smoke and suppressive artillery fire was not used, initially at Wadi Saluki. The problem was not so much skills and drills, as the context of the plan, and the objective.

- Didn't Nasrallah publicly admit that he miscalculated the response of Israel and, in private, acknowledge that Hezbollah took unexpectedly high losses?
He did, and that is why Hezbollah didn't want to come to play in Round 2. In essence there is not much Hezbollah can ever do to Israel, which does not risk a more catastrophic multi-formation raid.

- Wasn't Israel's "loss" really a public diplomacy / perception management issue?
Well, that's all pretty subjective, but not wholly wrong either.

The concern about Hezbollah fighters actually showing some fighting spirit and skill seems less concerning than the fact that we were surprised by that performance and that we fear it. Not all wars are fought against an Arab army fleeing down a highway of death.
Correct. Additionally a lot of the early analysis of the Lebanon war was a product of Hezbollah information operations. Certain things were presented as fact, when we now know them to be wholly untrue. Unfortunately, some in the US Community continue to swallow these ideas whole. The fact that Hezbollah uses defensive concepts and ideas copied from Soviet Doctrine is simple not discussed because it does not fit fairy dust being sold.

Bottom line: Hezbollah are not a challenge, once you get the operational context and applications right.