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Cavguy
04-06-2009, 07:13 PM
All,

Fascinating press conference. In summary:


Recommended Termination:

F-22 (stopped @ 187)
FCS vehicles (all - unsure of NLOS-C)
DDG-1000
Further C-17 Buys
Army BCT's halted @ 45 vice 48 to increase available manning, no change in endstrength increase though.
Presidential Helo
Next-Gen bomber (pending QDR)
JIEDDO and other ad-hoc organizations
TSAT cancelled


Winners:

F-35 increase
F-18 increase
UAV Increase
TF Odin-like increase
More $$ for helos - crews and airframes (?)
More SF support
DDG-51 restart
LCS increase


No change/limited info:

JTLV
EFV
Carriers (10)
FCS "Spinouts"


Gates told Congress basically to "do the right thing". That I will be interested to see.

Can't wait for Congress' and the defense lobby's reaction ....

Entropy
04-06-2009, 07:20 PM
Well, good luck to him, I don't think Congress is going to play ball, but we can always hope.

Did he give any estimates on how much this would reduce the defense budget? Also, what about a reset for the Army and Marines?

MikeF
04-06-2009, 07:31 PM
Gates Fights Last War

Kori Schake
Foreign Policy

http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/04/04/gates_fight_the_last_war


Gates is setting a course to focus on counterinsurgency that will likely come at the expense of other military capabilities when budget trade-offs need to be made. The wars we are fighting do not refute transformation. Much of what Rumsfeld identified as the central advantages and central weaknesses of our military actually have been validated: our space infrastructure is too weak for the increasing demands we place on it; integrating battlefield information with long-distance precision strike allows U.S. forces to react with a dominating speed; and persistent surveillance is revolutionizing our operations.

Gates's emphasis on institutionalizing counterinsurgency sounds remarkably like fighting the last war, and too little effort has been directed toward redressing those vulnerabilities in U.S. military power most likely to produce losses in future wars. The United States is already reasonably good at counterinsurgency, as a result of the Iraq war, and the equipment has adapted relatively quickly despite a balky Pentagon bureaucracy. Gates is adopting a conservative approach that will make other, harder adaptations -- like handling cyber attacks -- more difficult in the future.

And so it begins...

v/r

Mike

Ski
04-06-2009, 08:49 PM
Two major surprises. Halting growth of BCT's at 45 in order for the manning levels to catch up is one of them, but in reality it's only two less (minus the EBCT at Bliss and since FCS is on the way out, there's no reason for this BCT to stick around). The other is the JIEDDO and organizations like that (ad-hoc). I wonder what the other organizations are - AWG?

Entropy
04-06-2009, 09:05 PM
This makes me cry inside:


Second, we will terminate the Air Force Combat Search and Rescue X (CSAR-X) helicopter program. This program has a troubled acquisition history and raises the fundamental question of whether this important mission can only be accomplished by yet another single-service solution with single-purpose aircraft. We will take a fresh look at the requirement behind this program and develop a more sustainable approach.

Say goodbye to Air Force rotary wing aviation and the only dedicated personnel recovery force in DoD.

Danny
04-06-2009, 09:11 PM
That the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle survived. I'm rather surprised, actually. So be it. They'd better get it right, and soon, without the cost overruns and system failures that have plagued it.

selil
04-06-2009, 10:18 PM
Gates is adopting a conservative approach that will make other, harder adaptations -- like handling cyber attacks -- more difficult in the future.
Kori Schake
Foreign Policy


Let me just express in a few words my thoughts that a conservative approach based on fighting insurgencies will impact handling cyber attacks. Since cyber attacks most closely align with low intensity conflict. Since never has a cyber attack manifested as a high intensity conflict. While large militaries may be capable of fighting on multiple fronts they have little in the way of capability of fighting cyber. Large unwieldily forces with strict hierarchies have absolutely no place in cyber. Boo hisss. Throwing cyber out as a lost capability is not only wrong it impeaches the writer.

Ron Humphrey
04-06-2009, 11:35 PM
Let me just express in a few words my thoughts that a conservative approach based on fighting insurgencies will impact handling cyber attacks. Since cyber attacks most closely align with low intensity conflict. Since never has a cyber attack manifested as a high intensity conflict. While large militaries may be capable of fighting on multiple fronts they have little in the way of capability of fighting cyber. Large unwieldy forces with strict hierarchies have absolutely no place in cyber. Boo hisss. Throwing cyber out as a lost capability is not only wrong it impeaches the writer.

What I heard was intelligence and related fields tool sets expanded and a push upward in the number of those who are training to be cyber focused with the overall impression of agility in thought action and aquisition related to such.

May be wrong but I think it may be more of what your looking for and less behemoth then many might have expected.

Stevely
04-07-2009, 01:07 AM
Did he give any estimates on how much this would reduce the defense budget? Also, what about a reset for the Army and Marines?

That is what I am curious about - at some point in the not too distant future, the ground combat vehicle fleet is going to need to be recapitalized. Is there any provision for this? Most of what we have is 80s vintage and has been at war for years now. How much life can reset eke out of the existing fleet and will it continue to be funded?

82redleg
04-07-2009, 09:26 AM
Two major surprises. Halting growth of BCT's at 45 in order for the manning levels to catch up is one of them, but in reality it's only two less (minus the EBCT at Bliss and since FCS is on the way out, there's no reason for this BCT to stick around). The other is the JIEDDO and organizations like that (ad-hoc). I wonder what the other organizations are - AWG?

Actually, the EBCT made 49 BCTs- the goal was 48 deployable BCTs- 10 DIVs x 4 BCTs, plus 5 separates (173, 2 ACR, 3 ACR, 170 HBCT, 172 HBCT) and 5/3 ID, 5/4 ID and 6/1AD (the EBCT is 5/1AD).

William F. Owen
04-07-2009, 11:03 AM
Say goodbye to Air Force rotary wing aviation and the only dedicated personnel recovery force in DoD.

I don't know how closely you've followed this fiasco, but if they hadn't scrapped it, it would probably have resulted in folks getting sacked, or worse. It's a very sorry story when studied in detail.

Ski
04-07-2009, 12:16 PM
No real loss in my opinion anyway it's sliced. I was never a big fan of the FCS concept, even more so after the costs ballooned by 200%.



Actually, the EBCT made 49 BCTs- the goal was 48 deployable BCTs- 10 DIVs x 4 BCTs, plus 5 separates (173, 2 ACR, 3 ACR, 170 HBCT, 172 HBCT) and 5/3 ID, 5/4 ID and 6/1AD (the EBCT is 5/1AD).

Hacksaw
04-07-2009, 01:08 PM
As for cost savings... they declined to comment based on the fact that they didn't discuss classified programs... Although Mr Gates made a distinct effort to clarify that the program recommendations were NOT based on a real or perceived budget top line... In his words (paraphrased) this was about doing the right thing...

As for FCS, and Army vehicle recapitalization, Mr Gates was specific in discussing the need to recapitalize the Army fleet, and that there was a cost in $ and time by cutting FCS vehicles, but that it was in his mind the right thing to do... so I think they have probably placed a wedge in for recapitalizing the fleet without really knowing what shape that recapitalization will take...

Live well and row

J Wolfsberger
04-07-2009, 01:40 PM
Hoover Research Fellow

"Expertise: national security strategy, the effective use of military force, European politics"

If the quality of thought in her article is representative of a Hoover Institute expert, they've fallen on hard times.

selil
04-07-2009, 01:57 PM
What I heard was intelligence and related fields tool sets expanded and a push upward in the number of those who are training to be cyber focused with the overall impression of agility in thought action and aquisition related to such.

May be wrong but I think it may be more of what your looking for and less behemoth then many might have expected.

I think you're responding to the secdef comments and I'm responding to the catch all at the end of the article written by Kori Schake. Please correct me if I'm wrong.

Shake closed her article with


Gates is adopting a conservative approach that will make other, harder adaptations -- like handling cyber attacks -- more difficult in the future.

I can't agree with that sentiment. Though I'm always willing to listen it just seems way off base.

William F. Owen
04-07-2009, 01:58 PM
Hoover Research Fellow

"Expertise: national security strategy, the effective use of military force, European politics"

If the quality of thought in her article is representative of a Hoover Institute expert, they've fallen on hard times.

Wow... I was just musing posting on just this topic but considered it a little bit "bad form," ... but since you say it, I must concur.

I was underwhelmed as to both the assertions and the evidence or even reasons to support them. May be a smart chap, but it did not shine through in the article.

MikeF
04-07-2009, 02:03 PM
Wow... I was just musing posting on just this topic but considered it a little bit "bad form," ... but since you say it, I must concur.

I was underwhelmed as to both the assertions and the evidence or even reasons to support them. May be a smart chap, but it did not shine through in the article.

I watched the NCAA championship last night. I'm a huge Carolina fan. Does that make me an expert on basketball? I can hardly make a free throw.

v/r

Mike

J Wolfsberger
04-07-2009, 02:45 PM
That is what I am curious about - at some point in the not too distant future, the ground combat vehicle fleet is going to need to be recapitalized. Is there any provision for this? Most of what we have is 80s vintage and has been at war for years now. How much life can reset eke out of the existing fleet and will it continue to be funded?

Gates said: "But it is important to remember that every Defense dollar spent to overinsure against a remote or diminishing risk or, in effect, to run up the score in capability where the United States is already dominant is a dollar not available to take care of our people, reset the force, win the wars we are in, and improve capabilities in areas where we are underinvested and potentially vulnerable." (Emphasis added.) I assume (yes, I know :D) that he's referring to recapitalizing the current ground force vehicle fleet.

Courtney Massengale
04-07-2009, 02:46 PM
Just from my foxhole, it looks like a lot of this is targeted at incorporating things that were born in supplemental into the "regular" budget.

Obviously the writing is on the wall – we can't continue to fund transformation, expansions of Special Operations and good ideas for GWOT one supplement at a time.

Entropy
04-07-2009, 02:50 PM
I don't know how closely you've followed this fiasco, but if they hadn't scrapped it, it would probably have resulted in folks getting sacked, or worse. It's a very sorry story when studied in detail.

Yeah I have. There's no question the Air Force completely screwed up the competition for the HH-60 replacement - I just hope this isn't throwing the baby out with the bathwater.

Cavguy
04-07-2009, 03:23 PM
Gates said: "But it is important to remember that every Defense dollar spent to overinsure against a remote or diminishing risk or, in effect, to run up the score in capability where the United States is already dominant is a dollar not available to take care of our people, reset the force, win the wars we are in, and improve capabilities in areas where we are underinvested and potentially vulnerable." (Emphasis added.) I assume (yes, I know :D) that he's referring to recapitalizing the current ground force vehicle fleet.

As an Armor guy, I'm not shedding any tears for the demise of FCS. Its fundamental assumptions were invalid - namely - that "information=force protection", and risk could be assumed with armor in favor of deployability. If "information dominance" would protect us, we wouldn't be losing soldiers to IED's. Like EBO, FCS tried to eliminate fog and friction from war, instead of embracing it and developing systems to compensate.

Combat experience in Iraq, Afghanistan (CDN), and Israel have all demonstrated the necessity of heavy armor in urban combat. I am all for a recapitalized fleet and new vehicles with less maintenance/logistics requirements, but not at the expense of combat effectiveness. One size fits all approaches rarely work well, we need a mix of high/low capabilities.

MikeF
04-07-2009, 03:28 PM
Combat experience in Iraq, Afghanistan (CDN), and Israel have all demonstrated the necessity of heavy armor in urban combat. I am all for a recapitalized fleet and new vehicles with less maintenance/logistics requirements, but not at the expense of combat effectiveness. One size fits all approaches rarely work well, we need a mix of high/low capabilities.

Neil, you got me thinking again. Should we forecast the following?

Heavy in urban, Light in the village?

v/r

Mike

wm
04-07-2009, 03:32 PM
Just from my foxhole, it looks like a lot of this is targeted at incorporating things that were born in supplemental into the "regular" budget.

Obviously the writing is on the wall – we can't continue to fund transformation, expansions of Special Operations and good ideas for GWOT one supplement at a time.

I suspect that when one ties this in with the earlier fracas over the OMB position about calling what is happening in IZ/AF a species of overseas contingency operations, then the overall position becomes more clear. GWOT and supplemental budgets have been a license to steal for the operational forces, buying a lot of non-sustainable capability at tremendously inflated prices. Actually, the GWOT-funded COTS capability is sustainable, but the maintenance fee will also be grossly overpriced.

What the budget announcement from the SecDef seems to be saying is that we have to wean ourselves from the GWOT funding fix and get back to a realistically sustainable force that has a balance between the current fight and likely future contingencies. I'd love to be able to build Battlestar Galactica, but I don't think we really have to worry about Cylons attacking Earth any time in the next 50 years or so. A loose ICBM/MRBM from some of the more screwy leaders of middling (maybe that ought to be muddling or meddling?) nations in North and SW Asia or a conventional intervention in support of some treaty obligations seem much more likely (and closer to the small war type efforts in which we currently engage) as targets for our future force structure.

By the way, bringing more discipline to what is currently a "grab-and-go" approach to acquiring technology seems more likely to make our cyber problems a little easier to manage. At least we might all be using the same or very similar technology across the force so we won't have to devise as many different defenses for the smorgasbord of systems currently in use

selil
04-07-2009, 03:38 PM
Heavy in urban, Light in the village?


That right there is I believe a spark of genius. It is also population centric.

Ken White
04-07-2009, 03:41 PM
Like the new choppers for the WH, Entropy. Both requirements exist now and will only get worse with age. Both will die temporarily only to resurface later and be more expensive. Hopefully each with a decent bird not over equipped; though we do seem to have to try to gold plate everything...

Cavguy
04-07-2009, 03:48 PM
Neil, you got me thinking again. Should we forecast the following?

Heavy in urban, Light in the village?

v/r

Mike

Not necessairly, as you need both capabilities. What matters is how we organize. Do we need large armored formations for COIN? No. Do we need heavy armor to support troops in COIN? Absolutely.

I wrote a post awhile back (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=38096&postcount=6) on how I tasked organized a heavy company team for COIN - and thought it was pretty successful and flexible. It provided dismounted ability to engage the population with the firepower needed to support those dismounted troops when the sh*t hit the fan (and potentially discourage those who saw an easy and exposed target.

My flexible MTOE with the ability to customize forces to the mission was the key ingredient. My tankers sometimes used the tanks and sometimes acted as infantry. My mech guys did all kinds of varied tasks, as did the combat engineers. The mission/environment dictated our equipment set, not the other way around.

MikeF
04-07-2009, 03:58 PM
Saying the same thing.


Not necessairly, as you need both capabilities. What matters is how we organize. Do we need large armored formations for COIN? No. Do we need heavy armor to support troops in COIN? Absolutely.

I was trying to summarize a planning factor not suggest a law. :D

v/r

Mike

Courtney Massengale
04-07-2009, 04:11 PM
What the budget announcement from the SecDef seems to be saying is that we have to wean ourselves from the GWOT funding fix and get back to a realistically sustainable force that has a balance between the current fight and likely future contingencies.

A loose ICBM/MRBM from some of the more screwy leaders of middling (maybe that ought to be muddling or meddling?) nations in North and SW Asia or a conventional intervention in support of some treaty obligations seem much more likely (and closer to the small war type efforts in which we currently engage) as targets for our future force structure.

To go along with that, I think it sends the message that The Pentagon wants out of the Strategic level of diplomacy.

If the United States wants to continue with missle defense, power projection, etc on the scale that it has over the past few years, then Congress will have to legislate it as a seperate and unique issue; not bury it in funding for other more pressing needs.

Whats going to be really interesting is how the folks on the hill scramble to keep funding for unpopular projects that have domestic and international political value.

wm
04-07-2009, 04:26 PM
Neil, you got me thinking again. Should we forecast the following?

Heavy in urban, Light in the village?



Sounds like a "silver bullet, one-size fits all" (actually two sizes) approach to a problem set that requires a little bit of everything used flexibly as the situation requires. Seems to me a force based around a collection of H or J-series TOE Cav squadrons would be a pretty good fit for most stuff, with suitable equipment modernizations of course.

J Wolfsberger
04-07-2009, 04:34 PM
As an Armor guy, I'm not shedding any tears for the demise of FCS. Its fundamental assumptions were invalid - namely - that "information=force protection", and risk could be assumed with armor in favor of deployability. If "information dominance" would protect us, we wouldn't be losing soldiers to IED's. Like EBO, FCS tried to eliminate fog and friction from war, instead of embracing it and developing systems to compensate.

Combat experience in Iraq, Afghanistan (CDN), and Israel have all demonstrated the necessity of heavy armor in urban combat. I am all for a recapitalized fleet and new vehicles with less maintenance/logistics requirements, but not at the expense of combat effectiveness. One size fits all approaches rarely work well, we need a mix of high/low capabilities.

Agree totally and completely. A key phrase used by Gates, that I doubt any of the media picked up on, was "full spectrum." Based on the new FM 3-0, that has a very specific meaning - and I hope he was revealing his intent when he used it.


Not necessairly, as you need both capabilities. What matters is how we organize. Do we need large armored formations for COIN? No. Do we need heavy armor to support troops in COIN? Absolutely.

I wrote a post awhile back (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=38096&postcount=6) on how I tasked organized a heavy company team for COIN - and thought it was pretty successful and flexible. It provided dismounted ability to engage the population with the firepower needed to support those dismounted troops when the sh*t hit the fan (and potentially discourage those who saw an easy and exposed target.

My flexible MTOE with the ability to customize forces to the mission was the key ingredient. My tankers sometimes used the tanks and sometimes acted as infantry. My mech guys did all kinds of varied tasks, as did the combat engineers. The mission/environment dictated our equipment set, not the other way around.


One of my big pushes is doing a better job at executing up front system analysis to translate desired capabilities into system functions that support the intended doctrine. That means evaluating effectiveness across the entire spectrum, a wide variety of missions, and working with the user community to provide systems that have the kind of flexibility to let you do that.

tankersteve
04-07-2009, 04:53 PM
While good in a mechanized fight, most heavy cavalry organizations don't have enough dismounts for IW/COIN. Even when shutting down a pair of Bradleys to up the total number of dismounts, it is still significantly less than what a mech platoon brings to the fight.

Our present Combined Arms Battalion, with 2 tank and 2 mech companies is a great base to start from. Many of the battalions have companies create semi-permanent task organizations which works well. These companies share the same company TACSOP and consider each other their wingman. The great weakness is the continued small size of the tank platoon and its lack of capability when not mounted.

It would be nice to have more mortars but this organization has more dedicated dismounts than the cav organizations and they have the greatest utility in any war.

I have noticed an infatuation (sorry for the potentially inflammatory word) with the cav construct. We have really screwed up the current BCT with an entire 'squadron' and only 2 maneuver battalions. It seems that people forget that reconnaissance is a mission, not an organization. I think that a maneuver battalion could conduct effective reconnaissance, but these horribly undersized/undermanned squadrons, designed for reconnaissance, do not perform well as additional maneuver formations.

Hopefully, with the move to stop the BCT growth, we can focus on properly manning the BCTs we have. Maybe, as retired COL Mansoor wants, we can get a 3d maneuver battalion back into the BCT, perhaps by cutting down the size of the RSTA squadron to a robust troop (it would help).

Tankersteve

Cavguy
04-07-2009, 04:58 PM
Steve,

Agree all.

More dismounts needed in HBCT - desperately. What I enjoyed when we were in Tal Afar was the ability to customize the vehicles of a given unit to a mission - a high/low mix.

I think people like the Cav construct because it is a mix - of tanks, scouts, and aviation, which grants flexibility to the commander.. You are right - way too low on dismounts. Fix that though .... :D

MikeF
04-07-2009, 05:01 PM
Steve,

Agree all.

More dismounts needed in HBCT - desperately. What I enjoyed when we were in Tal Afar was the ability to customize the vehicles of a given unit to a mission - a high/low mix.

I think people like the Cav construct because it is a mix - of tanks, scouts, and aviation, which grants flexibility to the commander.. You are right - way too low on dismounts. Fix that though .... :D

Stetsons, Class A's, and Jump boots are simply weird:confused:

Ken White
04-07-2009, 06:06 PM
I have noticed an infatuation (sorry for the potentially inflammatory word) with the cav construct...It seems that people forget that reconnaissance is a mission, not an organization. I think that a maneuver battalion could conduct effective reconnaissance, but these horribly undersized/undermanned squadrons, designed for reconnaissance, do not perform well as additional maneuver formations...we can get a 3d maneuver battalion back into the BCT, perhaps by cutting down the size of the RSTA squadron to a robust troop (it would help).Totally agree on the three maneuver Battalions and only a Cav Troop per light or heavy Bde -- plus a RSTA company with UAV /UGV (the Cav Troop should not be encumbered with that very necessary stuff).

Understand the current design was, rightly or wrongly,selected as 'the best we can do with what we have' but it really needs a relook as we head into the future.

I also believe we not only forget reconnaissance is a mission, we don't even generally do reconnaissance. :mad: With the caveat that there are a few exceptions, the Infantry commanders, mostly, do not understand the concept of mounted reconnaissance and misuse their forces badly all too often. Armor units tend to believe in flash and dash rather than painstaking recon; there's a reason for the old "bypass, re-gas and haula$$" cliché. That also with only rare exceptions -- as is the generalization that entirely too many senior people in all branches do not have the patience to wait for the length of time required for effective and competent Recon so their alternative is to send an overly heavy, unstealthy, high speed and undermanned force out to hurry up and draw fire.

That's why current Cav units are too small, they're not scouts (or dragoons) nowadays, they're sacrificial lambs.

MikeF
04-07-2009, 08:24 PM
I also believe we not only forget reconnaissance is a mission, we don't even generally do reconnaissance. :mad: With the caveat that there are a few exceptions, the Infantry commanders, mostly, do not understand the concept of mounted reconnaissance and misuse their forces badly all too often. Armor units tend to believe in flash and dash rather than painstaking recon; there's a reason for the old "bypass, re-gas and haula$$" cliché. That also with only rare exceptions -- as is the generalization that entirely too many senior people in all branches do not have the patience to wait for the length of time required for effective and competent Recon so their alternative is to send an overly heavy, unstealthy, high speed and undermanned force out to hurry up and draw fire.

That's why current Cav units are too small, they're not scouts (or dragoons) nowadays, they're sacrificial lambs.

Not only is reconnaissance a mission, but I believe it is an art. Ken's points are spot on; I'll try to add a bit. Now (quite possibly before), we have to conduct reconnaissance of the physical AND human terrain. An indigenous guerilla has a comparative advantage in information- he can see us, we cannot see him. Moreover, he is the master of his terrain.

For the villages, particularly restricted areas, I believe a light approach is best. In my light RSTA, we tried to incorporate lessons learned from the LRRPs of Vietnam to employ. It worked. One distinction we made was empowering our junior leaders. My SCO sent the majority of scouts to RSLC, Ranger, Sniper, etc... to add to our human capital. In my troop, we had E4 fire supports studs talking directly to Apaches (with supervision :o). That E4 is worth more than 10 Predator UAVs.

As for urban areas, I was taking an educated guess. The last time I owned major real estate in an urban area Sadr City was still Saddam City and BIAP was Saddam International Airport.

Ken- what's with this we stuff?

v/r

Mike

Ken White
04-07-2009, 10:36 PM
and that Speculist coulda talked to that Apache just as well w/o any supervision... ;)

Boot
04-08-2009, 12:57 AM
Being a Comm. guy by trade, and not knowing the details of TSAT, I will only say that the demand from the force (all services, Interagency etc...) for these type services coupled with the bandwidth intensive applications, necessitates a robust capability. I am not sure the TSAT is the answer, but there needs to be an answer.

699guy
04-08-2009, 04:49 AM
out of this. We've seen the medevac variant fielded to non-stryker BCTs. The SBCT does have 3 maneuver battalions and a Cav SQDN giving it a bit more flexibility than a HBCT. I'd be the first to say this would not be the preferred formation to go against T-80s in open terrain. But its done a darn good job throughout Iraq. With the fielding of the MGS variant a company commander had the the ability to move thru a spectrum of PSYOP with the mounted speakers to .50 cal or MK-19; up to 105mm HE cannon direct or 120mm indirect all organic.
Cavguy would have loved the flexible T/O, and the ability to put 108 11Bs on the ground with trucks in support, more if you are not employing your mtrs or bringing all the trucks.

With the plug pulled on FCS will the Stryker variants, meant to bridge the gap become the endstate?

MikeF
04-08-2009, 04:55 AM
Village Light, Urban Heavy? Strkyers medium fill the void?

Yeah, I know. I've been reading too much poetry.

About time you voiced 699- much better than grumpy old NCOs grumbling over lambs and rice, of mice and men. :)

v/r

Mike

Entropy
04-08-2009, 05:00 AM
A bit off topic, but a question for you armor guys: Is the Abrams still competitive today against the latest from the Russians and others?

Cliff
04-08-2009, 06:51 AM
was the most interesting part, especially when compared to previous reporting.

http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4396

One good exchange:


GATES: For me, it was not a close call. And the basic conclusion was that, first of all, we have fulfilled the program. I mean, it's not like we're killing the F-22. We will have 187 of them. That has -- the 183 of that has been the program of record, as I recall, since 2005. So we are completing the F-22 program. And the military advice that I got was that there is no military requirement for numbers of F-22s beyond the 187.

Q: What about the Air Force advice? They've been (allegedly ?) badgering you with all sorts of analysis that they need 60 more.

GATES: That was their advice as well.

Q: Excuse me. It was their advice as well that --

GATES: Yes.

Q: -- that you didn't need more than 187?

GATES: Yes.

Which is even more interesting when you compare it to this interview by the CSAF (by law responsible for military advice to SECDEF):

http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story_channel.jsp?channel=defense&id=news/F22s021709.xml


“We looked at this in a dispassionate and analytical way” and produced a number that “I feel is credible,” Schwartz said during a Defense Writers’ Group breakfast this morning in Washington. The general said he would not release his new number until presenting it to Defense Secretary Robert Gates - but he noted he would not disagree with statements from Navy Adm. Michael Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who told Congress 60 more F-22s were needed.

Hmmm... it seems like there is a disconnect somewhere. I will be curious to see what the congressional testimony by the uniformed folks ends up being.

Also interesting to look at the National Military Strategy and its requirements vs. the air superiority assets we will have with 187 F-22s and 250 less F-15Cs/F-16s...

I fully agree on the need to re-orient and have a "full spectrum" force... but if your strategy results in you needing X aircraft, X-310 = strategy-capabilities mismatch. A lot of risk is going to be accepted if this goes through.

Anyone out there involved in QDR/know when a new NMS might be out?

V/R,

Cliff

Entropy
04-08-2009, 11:10 AM
187 (now 186 with the recent crash) F-22's are enough, I think, for the next ten years or so. Beyond that, no one can say with any certainty, but that is true for pretty much system. That's the funny thing about the future - it's hard to predict! ;)

What I think the most zealous opponents of the F-22 fail to consider, however, is that a modest number of aircraft means the follow-on to the F-22 could come a lot sooner than it otherwise would have.

The real risk with this plan is that the DoD is betting on the F-35, which is still a program in development. It seems to assume there will be no more problems and the aircraft will reach IOC on time, with all the advertised capabilities at the advertised cost (which keeps rising).

Ski
04-08-2009, 12:40 PM
Yes. The only two tanks that the Abrams would have difficulty against are the Leopard 2A6 and the Challenger2.





A bit off topic, but a question for you armor guys: Is the Abrams still competitive today against the latest from the Russians and others?

Ken White
04-08-2009, 04:18 PM
What I think the most zealous opponents of the F-22 fail to consider, however, is that a modest number of aircraft means the follow-on to the F-22 could come a lot sooner than it otherwise would have.said zealous opponents -- not to mention the SecDef, his minions and the Chief of staff of the whole USAF who allegedly acceded to the new lower number...
The real risk with this plan is that the DoD is betting on the F-35, which is still a program in development. It seems to assume there will be no more problems and the aircraft will reach IOC on time, with all the advertised capabilities at the advertised cost (which keeps rising).I really doubt anyone has other than the expectation of teething problems. All new equipment has them. All. If that equipment pushes the state of the art, and the F-35 does, then it's beyond certain such problems will appear. We really know that and long time watchers know that by far the best way to get those problems fixed is to get the equipment in service. Long time watchers know that -- even if the GAO and the ignorant media and most in Congress do not.

On another note, the CSAR and WH bird decisions are most likely simply a time out to await the S-92 fixing the bugs in the CH 148 program. Buying American always sells; the Hook is good but dated and BIG and that other bird has mek-a-nickel probs out the wazoo...

Strategy is as necessary inside the beltway as in the broader world.

Only thing I disagree with is stopping C-17 buys. Now let's see what Obama and his and our 535 (elected) thieves do...

On another note. Okay, Steinbeck -- enjoy watching the Sea Otters off the pier after your Abalone steak...:D

MikeF
04-08-2009, 04:26 PM
On another note. Okay, Steinbeck -- enjoy watching the Sea Otters off the pier after your Abalone steak...:D

Dude just remember you started it....as we descend into childish games....

Damn NCO academy, aren't you supposed to be cutting your grass as a hallmark of discipline?:cool:

v/r

Mike

Ken White
04-08-2009, 04:59 PM
Damn NCO academy...Never attended one nor that SGM academy that's lost its way (Thank all the gods!!! :D Thanks for my non-attendance, not that the Academy has lost its way... :mad:).
...aren't you supposed to be cutting your grass as a hallmark of discipline?:cool:That was always something Co / Trp Cdrs and Team Leaders worried about back in my day; not my yob -- that yob was training. Grass cutting or police call were not included in my little list of things to train or do.

Nowadays my Wife does that. Worry about the grass, that is. Been known to cut it as well. Whenever she gets tired of doing it, we just screw some barb wire pickets in the ground, fence the area with engineer tape and hang signs that say "Seeded: Keep Off" around the perimeter. Stops the neighbors muttering and backs off the Neighborhood Watch.

Whatever works... ;)

Schmedlap
04-08-2009, 05:12 PM
I watched the NCAA championship last night. I'm a huge Carolina fan. Does that make me an expert on basketball?
No. But if you had played a basketball game on an XBox or Playstation, then that would make you an expert basketball player. At least, that is what I infer from claims that violent military-like video games are a conspiracy to turn kids into killing machines for the military.

MikeF
04-08-2009, 05:12 PM
Nowadays my Wife does that. Worry about the grass, that is. Been known to cut it as well. Whenever she gets tired of doing it, we just screw some barb wire pickets in the ground, fence the area with engineer tape and hang signs that say "Seeded: Keep Off" around the perimeter. Stops the neighbors muttering and backs off the Neighborhood Watch. Whatever works... ;)

I suppose love is simply finding someone to endure one's endless transgressions and faults. :eek:

Back to reality, it is refreshing to have a SECDEF that actually listened to Ike's musings on the military industrial complex...Rather right in choice, at least he listened.

v/r

Mike

tankersteve
04-08-2009, 05:18 PM
Entropy, PM sent on tank question.

Schmedlap
04-11-2009, 01:11 PM
From The Economist (http://www.economist.com/world/unitedstates/displayStory.cfm?story_id=13446682&source=hptextfeature), A Daring Punt: Robert Gates Changes the Pentagon's Priorities


MORE men at the expense of machines; more drones rather than top-end fighter jets and future bombers; more helicopters for combat troops rather than a replacement for the presidential chopper; more coastal vessels and fewer aircraft-carriers; better cyberdefences, but scaled-back missile defences and laser weapons. In short, the new American defence budget would spend more on today’s wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and less to stave off future threats from China or Russia.

The proposals have delighted those who think America will fight irregular “small wars” for the foreseeable future, and horrified those who believe it must be ready to fight big conventional ones. (emphasis mine)I still don't understand the fear over the conventional capability. While I understand, but do not share, the concern that we do not train enough on conventional, BDE/DIV warfighting, I think it takes irrationality to a new level in worrying that this budget, too, will somehow diminish our conventional capability. The real or imagined diminishing of that capability is due to allocation of training time, not material resources.

NOTE: The comment sections of a news outlet's website are generally not the place to find intelligent discussion, but this story in the Economist bucked the trend. Check out the first 10 or so comments (http://www.economist.com/world/unitedstates/displayStory.cfm?story_id=13446682&mode=comment&sort=asc#commentStartPosition) (click this link instead of the one at the story, to see the oldest comments first). This is one of those rare instances where reader comments actually add worthwhile commentary to the story.

In particular, see the comment by System Planner (4th comment from the top):

Mr. Gates has started a resource reallocation process without really affecting the top-line. There will be no net jobs impact. He has cleared the deck and seized the moral high ground prior to the QDR and the PR 2011 budget. In POM 2012, expect to see major surgery. His most important change is remanning the DOD civil service to provide competent acquisition oversight and a substantial in-house R&D capability. That move make DOD the master of its own fate. The day of the huge system integration contractor is rapidly passing. It really has failed miserably.
Can anyone vouch for the accuracy of that comment?

RTK
04-11-2009, 02:01 PM
I also believe we not only forget reconnaissance is a mission, we don't even generally do reconnaissance. :mad:
...
That's why current Cav units are too small, they're not scouts (or dragoons) nowadays, they're sacrificial lambs.

I genuinely miss being on here everyday. It's statements like these that warm my heart and make me feel not so alone.

We have abdicated our moral authority in the realm of reconnaissance in the hopes that technology, sensors, and gizmos will provide us with what we need to win the battle. We've become obsessed with technologies replicating or replacing the senses of the Soldier. We've hosed ourselves in that arena. Thankfully Secretary Gates maybe saving us from ourselves.

We're bad enough with reconnaissance. We're even worse with security operations. We did this to ourselves when we neglected to remember that R&S is recon and security, not recon and surveillance.

Stevely
04-11-2009, 06:38 PM
In particular, see the comment by System Planner (4th comment from the top):

Can anyone vouch for the accuracy of that comment?

I have read in several places that the official word now is that the contractor workforce is too large in comparison to the rest of DOD, and that it will be reduced, and the ranks of the civil service will increase. I believe that the acquisition workforce will be entirely civil service.

Where I work (JFCOM), we have started hiring more GS (well, NSPS) and have been slowly cutting down on contractor work force via consolidating contracts, so far. So maybe it is a trend. There is certainly plenty of rumors that this will gear up in a big way.

Also, there is a big push to get anybody having anything to do with acquisition DAWIA certified, including yours truly.

Umar Al-Mokhtār
04-12-2009, 02:22 PM
Entropy: Not so much a reduction to the budget. It's being couched as a “re-balancing” and I would be surprised if there wasn't a net increase in the Defense budget for POM-10. As to CSAR-X, I wouldn't necessarily say goodbye to it. Together with the cut to the Presidential helos I believe what the SecDef is getting at is we have to stop reinventing the wheel (or helicopter) every time we want to make a system better. IMO he feels we should leverage on the existing airframes to fill the requirement, i.e. build more of X rather than create a whole new Y. As it says he doesn't want to buy “another single-service solution with a single purpose aircraft.” The C-130 is a prime example of one airframe that is built with an eye towards fulfilling a plethora of roles. Ken's belief that both program will rise phoenix like from the ashes in much more expensive mode should also be of concern to the SecDef. Better to get both programs realigned with existing airframe designs as soon as possible.

Stevely – The contractor reductions are initially targeted at those who work in the Building. I agree that the contractor force in acquisitions should completely be GS. Can you say conflict of interest. As to the others, and those outside of the P'gon, it is a tough call reducing them until the government personnel system is revamped and the union rules change.

Two issues IMO drive the government's appetite for on-site contractors. First is speed. Most contractors can reply to an RFP in a week or two, a contract can be let, and people in place (if they aren't already) in a much shorter time than the existing personnel system. Sometimes it is just a matter of adjusting an existing contract, then folks are on site with an even quicker turn. Second is divestiture. Once a contract requirement is fulfilled, or even before, the contractors can be let go, since most fee for service contracts are written with the Government as an “at will” employer. Try getting rid of a GS in a day, a week, a month. Some who have nearly criminal conduct can take years to get rid of (ask almost any lawyer in the DoD GC).

The fear mongering has already begun: Heritage Foundation fired a nice propaganda salvo and it's posted over at Abu Muqawama (http://abumuqawama.blogspot.com/2009/04/noo-ku-lar-combat-toe-to-toe-with.html). Can't wait to see who's next. :D

Entropy
04-12-2009, 07:02 PM
As it says he doesn't want to buy “another single-service solution with a single purpose aircraft.” The C-130 is a prime example of one airframe that is built with an eye towards fulfilling a plethora of roles.

If CSAR-X/HH-60G is a single-service, single purpose aircraft, then the C-17 must be too. Since OEF began, USAF CSAR assets have rescued a handful of downed or isolated pilots and hundreds (if not thousands) of ground and SoF personnel. Doctrinally, each component is responsible for it's own personnel recovery, but many missions fall on USAF CSAR because the other components lack the capability (either in equipment or training) to make it happen. There are a lot of soldiers and marines who are alive today as a result. If the SECDEF intends to make CSAR a joint effort, then that's great, I look forward to hearing those ideas.

Boot
04-12-2009, 08:03 PM
I still don't understand the fear over the conventional capability.

I read a recent memo from JFCOM CCDR to Sec. Gates. He specifically points out that in making IW a core compentency we will not sacrifice conventional capability or nuclear forces. I believe the last sentence of the intro paragraph reads (paraphrased):
"avoid giving the impression that, if implemented, the Department was going overboard vice achieving balance with IW as a (not "the") core compontency of the Department."

Hope this sheds some light.

Boot

Umar Al-Mokhtār
04-12-2009, 08:23 PM
remember, Gates had no control over the adoption of the C-17, which does seem to be a more versatile replacement for the 141. The Bush/Rumsfeld days of profligate spending are perhaps over. CSAR is a very important capability that perhaps should be a more joint effort since all the services benefit from it. Plus there were other issues (http://www.defensetech.org/archives/004092.html)with the proposed CSAR-X.

Ken White
04-12-2009, 08:32 PM
is a single service and single purpose aircraft -- that provides service to all the Armed Forces and therefor is joint and multipurpose in that sense. I don't think he or anyone else is saying the HH-60G * is a single service single purpose aircraft -- but there is no doubt the VH71 would have been such.

Could there have been an HH 71? Sure but the USAF for whatever reason opted for an HH 47 (to achieve multi service commonality??? As a result of USSOCOM pressure to reduce aircraft types??? ** Maybe Gates is torqued at GAO for sustaining the protest and LM for protesting ;) ) so the 71 became the one-off item he was citing. I'm sure he also considered that the EH 101 from which the VH 71 was derived has multiple problems in wolrdwide service; I believe ALL operators are having mechanical problems with varying models of the a/c.

As for the CSAR assets picking up Medevacs and lost SOF troopies, why not? You've got a capable bird with trained crews as you point out and other, equally capable birds and crews are (one would hope) doing other mundane haulage things and it makes little sense to let that CSAR cape just sit. As I know you know, there are also a few pilots picked with non CSAR assets here and there. LINK (http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=28713), LINK (http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P2-838351.html). I think we're all on the same side... :wry:

Oh -- and keep your eye on the newer Sikorsky bird... :D

* Not least because the HH 60G is used by the USAF for other things and the entire 60 series is about as joint as one can get with only the Marines insisting on a less capable bird and figuring that the lower cost to buy and operate compensates for the lack of more capability (that they don't need as the CV 22 fills that requirement for them -- and for AFSOC. For future CSAR also? I've read all the arguments; we'll see...).

** If so, somebody forgot the rotor disks and fitting them on even the big decks...

P.S.

Last I thought I knew, the USAF was the DoD proponent for CSAR (and thus also responsible for some oversight) but each service was indeed responsible for its own CSAR -- anyone know if that has changed or is planned to do so?

Entropy
04-12-2009, 09:52 PM
Ken,

As I think you know, I spent several years in the CSAR community. There is a lot of speculation about the HH-47 pick because, frankly, most CSAR folks much prefer either the 92 or the 101. There are some legitimate advantages to the 47, of course, but the same can be said for the other airframes and the 47 comes with some significant CSAR-specific disadvantages. Anyway, the speculation is that the 47 was picked with the intent to simply roll the CSAR mission into AFSOC's ball of wax as simply another mission in the AFSOC set. As you probably know, CSAR WAS tranferred, briefly, from ACC to AFSOC. The AFSOC people were 100% for the 47 and most of their excitement seemed to come from all the missions those aircraft could perform that weren't CSAR. Again, that is simply the perception of a lot of people in the CSAR community. They don't want to see their CSAR skillset diluted too much with other tasks, which isn't an unreasonable fear, IMO, given the OPTEMPO of AFSOC and the other SoF components.


As for the CSAR assets picking up Medevacs and lost SOF troopies, why not? You've got a capable bird with trained crews as you point out and other, equally capable birds and crews are (one would hope) doing other mundane haulage things and it makes little sense to let that CSAR cape just sit.

I agree completely and the CSAR folks do too, for the most part - the units in theater are pretty aggressive about advertising their capabilities and very rarely turn down a potential mission. Birds were OPCON'd to the land component to assist their efforts. For the most part, the HH-60's are used on those missions that are too risky for others, which makes sense.


As I know you know, there are also a few pilots picked with non CSAR assets here and there. LINK, LINK. I think we're all on the same side...


Agree totally there too. My main point in all this is simply to suggest the DoD needs a dedicated personnel recovery capability, and currently USAF CSAR is the only force that meets that requirement. I worry that Sec. Gates and others see PR as a secondary mission that does not require a dedicated force. If true, I think that's a mistake. That has been tried before and didn't work out too well in many cases (like the Navy in Vietnam, for example).

Umar Al-Mokhtār
04-12-2009, 10:21 PM
he's just torqued at Boeing...:D

JFCOM is the DoD Executive Agent for personnel recovery although the USAF certainly has the most robust CSAR capability. But I agree with you Entropy that perhaps there is not a true appreciation for CSAR at the SecDef level. That may be due in part to the misperception that CSAR only goes after downed pilots, and since we have not had a significant amount of those type rescues in the current wars that may color their vision.

CSAR needs a stronger advocate at the DoD level but that would also require the USAF to agree. Seeing as they have seemingly lost the F-22 fight perhaps they will pitch in on behalf of CSAR. :wry:

Ken White
04-12-2009, 11:51 PM
I have little doubt that SOCOM was the driver on the HH 47 and I totally agree that CSAR is not and should not be a SOCOM mission -- though they will fight for it (and not for altruistic reasons) and have a lever in the PR and validation mission they have long had. Also agree that it will not be good for CSAR and would lead to their fragmentation and misuse. I'm with you on all three points.

He probably is torqued at Boeing -- and they deserve it -- I think he and even the Bean Counters at DoD understand the need for the CSAR mssion but just believe the current capability situation can wait a bit for improvement.

Not to mention that LM can stand the F22 hit...

I still think Buy American, the S-92 and the CSAR and Prez Flight missions are remarakbly synergistic. ;)

Distiller
04-13-2009, 05:12 AM
What I'm missing is a decisive cut of the numbers of the U.S. national security "front end". If you add the armed forces, plus the civil services and contractors, and the intel community you end up with around 3.4 million heads. That is simply enormous.

At one point in the not too far future one will have to look at the contractors, reserves, and guards structure. The three major tribes of the DoD have about 50% of their manpower *again* sourced out to contractors! And a second look has to be taken at the multitude of civil management levels and at the top heavy command structures all over the place. I see it as inevitable that the national security front end comes down 50% to around 1.7 million heads; otherwise there will never be enough money.

Lots of things out there are neither sustainable nor productive. It's a pitty that the discussion always centers on hardware, but:

I would like to have seen much more efforts in space and more in cyber.

Cutting the F-22 is a mistake, better limit the JSF and go for UCAVs. Cutting the C-17 is a mistake as well, it should continue open ended on a 12 planes per year cycle. The NGB was pointless in its published form in any case.

FCS should always have been treated as a tech-demo programme. Basically the vehicles would have been re-invented and modified CV90. The Army shouldn't shun away from a armored - cavalry - mot inf - light inf structure.

And the decision to restart the Burkes is industrial driven, which can't really be criticized, but hopefully is only a gap filler, as at the same time there has to be a deep look into the question of nuclear power carrier escorts. The existing Burkes should be remodeled as dedicated versions for AAW, for ASW, and for land attack/naval fire support. And last but not least I expect a shake-up of the opposed forced entry capability next year, especially the setup of the Marines (Gates said something about looking into that). LHA-6 should never continue, and instead LHA-8 expanded, with LPD-17 more focused on the sustainment role.

Entropy
04-13-2009, 04:34 PM
SECAF and the CSAF Op-Ed on the F-22 (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/04/12/AR2009041202268.html?hpid=opinionsbox1):


We considered whether F-22 production should be extended as insurance while the F-35 program grows to full production. Analysis showed that overlapping F-22 and F-35 production would not only be expensive but that while the F-35 may still experience some growing pains, there is little risk of a catastrophic failure in its production line.

I like it, they addressed my primary concern clearly. So far I'm quite happy with the new Air Force leadership.

Mooks
05-30-2009, 01:33 AM
Sorry to re-raise this older topic but I've recently come back to the SWJ and I've been thinking about this issue for awhile, particularly in regards to the fighter procurement. (sometimes I like to dream in the skies too.)

Looking back much of the focus on this QDR has been on Conventional vs Stabilization warfare, and rightly so. The dynamic is a critical one and carving out a strategy for where the United States will be in 10, 15 years globally is a critical part of getting procurement right.

Yet there is another dynamic that doesn't get much attention, but plays an important influence in the choices he made. Its particularly apparent concerning the F-22/F-35; neither is fighter of the future. Instead the OSD might be hedging their bets that the UAV revolution will provide a new set of capabilities in the near future. I think Distiller touched upon it a bit.

We don't know what the nature of airforces will look like in a decade or two's time. In the last 10 years we've seen a complete revolution in the use of UAVs and its not clear where that revolution might go. Why would they invest in a $150 million Dollar F-22 when in a decade a $50 million dollar UAV will appear to do its job far more effectively? So there might be significant hesitance to commit to manned aircraft, which is somewhat apparent in the following quote;

We will not pursue a development program for a follow-on Air Force bomber until we have a better understanding of the need, the requirement, and the technology.

I think a historical parallel exists with the Royal Navy at the turn of the last century, when they invested heavily in standard battleships only to have to rearm again with the dreadnaught. If this scenario rings true, then United States is avoiding investing on platforms that might become obsolete in the near future, when there is no pressing geo-strategic need for these capabilities. The F-35 program can be scaled back in the future and the F-22 is utterly expendable at this time.

Entropy
05-30-2009, 05:08 PM
Mooks,

The manned fighter is not going away anytime soon. There are real and severe technical limitations to what UAV's can do. A UAV loitering overhead is not the same thing as a fighter pulling a 9 g's while inverted. Maybe someone will figure out how to reliable maintain a satellite link under all the conditions under which fighters must operate, but it is much more difficult that most seem to assume.

The bombing mission, particularly long-range penetrators, will be going unmanned next. The Navy is already well along this road.

Ken White
05-30-2009, 06:36 PM
but of little else, see the LINK (http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123149476).

I see the fine hand of Dunlap in that... :D

Ken White
05-30-2009, 06:39 PM
There are real and severe technical limitations to what UAV's can do.direct fire limitations and such fire may not be mandatory but it can be really helpful on occasion. Air to ground and air to air...

Entropy
05-30-2009, 08:14 PM
but of little else, see the LINK (http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123149476).

I see the fine hand of Dunlap in that... :D

Please shoot me - what an embarrassment!


direct fire limitations and such fire may not be mandatory but it can be really helpful on occasion. Air to ground and air to air...

True, but the primary problem from a UAS standpoint is maintaining a reliable comm link. For aircraft that won't be expected to maneuver much, this isn't a problem, but for fighters, it's a huge problem. For similar reasons, fighters continue to use INS-GPS hybrid navigation because GPS can't update fast enough or the signal degrades under certain conditions.

And, why not add ground-to-ground to your list?

Ken White
05-30-2009, 08:36 PM
...why not add ground-to-ground to your list?direct fire are imagination and will... :cool:

(Unless you're referring to G-G Unmanned Systems, then the same problems you and I both cite plus target and environmental discrimination pertain. ;) )

Entropy
05-30-2009, 08:58 PM
(Unless you're referring to G-G Unmanned Systems, then the same problems you and I both cite plus target and environmental discrimination pertain. ;) )

Yep, though I think unmanned tanks would be cool.

Cliff
05-30-2009, 09:27 PM
We don't know what the nature of airforces will look like in a decade or two's time. In the last 10 years we've seen a complete revolution in the use of UAVs and its not clear where that revolution might go. Why would they invest in a $150 million Dollar F-22 when in a decade a $50 million dollar UAV will appear to do its job far more effectively? So there might be significant hesitance to commit to manned aircraft, which is somewhat apparent in the following quote;

I agree that UAVs will be a huge part of the ISR mission as well as helping with CAS, INT, and Strategic Attack.

Entropy has hit on a big point with C2 of the air-to-air mission, though - the links to the UAV are a huge issue.

Finally, the ID part of the air to air mission is huge. Even with a huge leap forward in processing/computing, it would still be difficult to get a UAS to work the ID as effectively as a human. It is not at all uncommon for electronic ID to be completely wrong - and the decision to shoot or not to be made based on overall Situational Awareness (SA). It's tough to program a computer to have this "6th sense" if you will and make the correct decision. Reference the Patriot shooting several friendlies in OIF, as well as the USS Vincenes shooting the Iranian Airbus... computing is not quite there yet.

It will likely be 15-20 years prior to the computing technology and links can reach this level... meaning there will be at least one more generation of manned air to air fighters after the F-22. They may be manned fighters controlling UAVs, or using lasers, or some new technology we don't know about - but they'll probably still be manned.

Just my 2 cents...

V/R,

Cliff

Umar Al-Mokhtār
05-30-2009, 10:09 PM
Wow! They failed to mention flip flops and board shorts. That's true informality!

I still get a hoot out of those in the Space AFSC wearing flight suits and leather jackets...

AlexTX ret
05-30-2009, 11:11 PM
Okay, first of all, how do UAV's, as well as most electronic communications, react to a electronics warfare rich environment? My sources say there are problems. It's not just us, who are going to experience back/gray outs but everybody will. Again if my sources are right, electronic warfare is keeping pace with everything else technical in the world's militaries. We arent the only one working heavily on this problem. We also may not be the biggest bully on the block. When we can safely say we have solved all the problems, why do I suppose that they'll come up with a question we haven't asked ourselves yet? It's the nature of warfare.

Defence overcomes offense then offense overcomes defense, it's the nature of the beast. We've been hypnotised by the burst of technology that overcame the restrictions we though were impossible to meet. But are there certain basics that have to be maintained? I'm only asking a question here, not giving an answer.

I know what Putin and the Russians(sounds like a rock group) were by my last word, before Russia pulled the Iron Curtain down, Russian scientists and engineers were working on a way of electronically defeating our ABMs. If that is so then they aren't running from our technological superiority. If anything they're increasing tensions because we can only guess what they or the Chinese or the Indians are actually up to.

Just food for thought...



The manned fighter is not going away anytime soon. There are real and severe technical limitations to what UAV's can do. A UAV loitering overhead is not the same thing as a fighter pulling a 9 g's while inverted. Maybe someone will figure out how to reliable maintain a satellite link under all the conditions under which fighters must operate, but it is much more difficult that most seem to assume.

The bombing mission, particularly long-range penetrators, will be going unmanned next. The Navy is already well along this road.

This makes a lot of sense to me. UAVs haven't shown a lot of situational awareness.

How mature is the technology that you are depending on here to make those unmanned fighters possible. UAVs are relatively simple compared to a fighter or bomber. There is always a need to consider what the future will bring but don't depend on it.

Also has anyone thought out just what truly unmanned fighters would do to warfare. Why have them? Cruise missles tecnology could be increased to give you similar advantages and there is no need for an expensive aircraft of any type. Remember the Tomohawks were all originaly nuclear tipped. Which brings us to a greater question, why not just throw rocks at each other. If we are willing to make warfare reduced to the lowest commonest denominator, then why have Navies because right now they are at great risk because of the Chinese large anti-ship rockets. Why have soldiers because while not as good as soldiers, robots would be adequate to blowup large sections of the frontline without harming a living being's life except for those that were there when the robot went off.

Anything electronic that isn't an A.I. or for that matter, self aware, has the method of its defeat already in its programing. Only humans are capable of reacting in unusual ways to events and because of this can defeat anything not as adaptable. And if the ECM is as bad it has been described to me then unmanned anything is a disaster waiting to happen.

I'm not a luddite. I think of myself as a realist. And in this country we have done too much damage by depending on technology that didn't work the way it it was supposed to.

We designed the F-22 fighter along a playbook that showed that it would be a frontline fighter till 2050 I believe. Then the Russians threw out our playbook and created a stick and rudder fighter (S 37) that took the F-22 down a peg or two. I'm just citing a study done by the military that wanted to know just how effective the F-22 was up against other fighters.

Create bigger nail and they will crete a bigger hammer.

selil
05-31-2009, 04:12 PM
Okay, first of all, how do UAV's, as well as most electronic communications, react to a electronics warfare rich environment? My sources say there are problems. It's not just us, who are going to experience back/gray outs but everybody will. Again if my sources are right, electronic warfare is keeping pace with everything else technical in the world's militaries. We arent the only one working heavily on this problem. We also may not be the biggest bully on the block. When we can safely say we have solved all the problems, why do I suppose that they'll come up with a question we haven't asked ourselves yet? It's the nature of warfare.


UAV's are tasty targets. They are on a high stakes totally secure network. Just ask anybody in the USAF. They are hardened, encrypted, restricted, and totally cut off from other networks physically so they can be secure. Why sorta just like SIPR net!! Nobody has ever hacked or exploited SIPR net right?

Take the UAV control system and the vehicle. Now tell me where ALL the parts came from originally.

UAV's would make a heck of a botnet.... zombie UAV's ... Now that is apocalyptic.

Tom Odom
05-31-2009, 04:19 PM
UAV's would make a heck of a botnet.... zombie UAV's ... Now that is apocalyptic.

SkyNet became self aware:eek:

selil
05-31-2009, 04:46 PM
SkyNet became self aware:eek:

That's my other summer project.

Entropy
05-31-2009, 09:01 PM
That's my other summer project.

I need to see the movie, even if it's getting bad reviews.

Mooks
06-01-2009, 05:41 AM
Mooks,

The manned fighter is not going away anytime soon. There are real and severe technical limitations to what UAV's can do. A UAV loitering overhead is not the same thing as a fighter pulling a 9 g's while inverted. Maybe someone will figure out how to reliable maintain a satellite link under all the conditions under which fighters must operate, but it is much more difficult that most seem to assume.

The bombing mission, particularly long-range penetrators, will be going unmanned next. The Navy is already well along this road.

I completely agree there are a number of technical issues that may never be solved. However given the recent strides that have been achieved there is questions over whether purchasing large numbers of a single type of manned fighter is prudent. Its quite possible in the next 20 years technical progress allow UCAVs to operate without the need for persistent control due to some limited form of autonomy. A2A isn't that hard actually once the decision to kill has been made. You don't need a remote pilot to maneuver the aircraft during, it can do that itself, just like an AMRAAM or a JDAM guides itself towards a target.

Given what I've seen in computer science, 20 years is not an ambitious timeline; some of the key technology needed for this already exists and are in commercial applications. Northrop-Grumman and Boeing are pouring billions into this area with the X-45, 47 and the bird of prey, which are integrating technology from various areas to create the next generation of UCAVs.

In any case, as you pointed out it doesn't have to be classic aerial combat where UCAVs become dominant, but other missions like SEAD or deep penetration to attack high value targets. They can dent the overall rationale behind buying more manned fighters like the F-35 at the volumes currently considered.

This brings me to my overall point of my last post; we don't know what the airforce of the future will look like but it is clear a technological change is occurring. I merely raise the scenario of UCAVs being very effective as one a possible scenario of how these issues may play out. I'm personally not sold either; AlexTX may well be right about the risk to UAVs and its well known that the Chinese have been looking into countermeasures in this area. I made this exact point to several government army of the future researchers a couple of years ago (and didn't get a very sympathetic reply.) Yet its difficult to deny there is much promise for this technology to the extent it might revolutionize air warfare.

Considering this and the era of strategic ambiguity the U.S. resides in as well I believe the Pentagon is somewhat hedging its bets in purchases of manned fighter aircraft at this time.

Mooks
06-01-2009, 05:46 AM
How mature is the technology that you are depending on here to make those unmanned fighters possible. UAVs are relatively simple compared to a fighter or bomber. There is always a need to consider what the future will bring but don't depend on it.

Also has anyone thought out just what truly unmanned fighters would do to warfare. Why have them? Cruise missles tecnology could be increased to give you similar advantages and there is no need for an expensive aircraft of any type. Remember the Tomohawks were all originaly nuclear tipped. Which brings us to a greater question, why not just throw rocks at each other. If we are willing to make warfare reduced to the lowest commonest denominator, then why have Navies because right now they are at great risk because of the Chinese large anti-ship rockets. Why have soldiers because while not as good as soldiers, robots would be adequate to blowup large sections of the frontline without harming a living being's life except for those that were there when the robot went off.

Anything electronic that isn't an A.I. or for that matter, self aware, has the method of its defeat already in its programing. Only humans are capable of reacting in unusual ways to events and because of this can defeat anything not as adaptable. And if the ECM is as bad it has been described to me then unmanned anything is a disaster waiting to happen.

I'm not a luddite. I think of myself as a realist. And in this country we have done too much damage by depending on technology that didn't work the way it it was supposed to.


In response to your overall query, Peter W Singer wrote an article in the Atlantis (http://www.thenewatlantis.com/publications/military-robots-and-the-laws-of-war)Science and Tech Magazine (an abridged version of his book apparently) discussing some of these issues from a policy and law standpoint. It might be worth a read.

Cliff
06-01-2009, 07:45 AM
A2A isn't that hard actually once the decision to kill has been made. You don't need a remote pilot to maneuver the aircraft during, it can do that itself, just like an AMRAAM or a JDAM guides itself towards a target.

I'd beg to differ more than a little bit... AMRAAM and JDAM simply fly themselves within a certain distance of the target... if you are talking kamikaze UAVs, then I agree... but then, that's not a UAV, that's a missile.

You make my point for me when you talk about the decision to kill... that's the key. And that's where the state of the art just isn't there quite yet.


Given what I've seen in computer science, 20 years is not an ambitious timeline; some of the key technology needed for this already exists and are in commercial applications. Northrop-Grumman and Boeing are pouring billions into this area with the X-45, 47 and the bird of prey, which are integrating technology from various areas to create the next generation of UCAVs.

I agree, 20 years is not unreasonable for autonomous A-A UCAVs.


In any case, as you pointed out it doesn't have to be classic aerial combat where UCAVs become dominant, but other missions like SEAD or deep penetration to attack high value targets. They can dent the overall rationale behind buying more manned fighters like the F-35 at the volumes currently considered.

Completely agree... the SEAD and INT/Strategic Attack make the most sense since pre-planned targetting is possible and ID is easier based on the planning.


This brings me to my overall point of my last post; we don't know what the airforce of the future will look like but it is clear a technological change is occurring. I merely raise the scenario of UCAVs being very effective as one a possible scenario of how these issues may play out. I'm personally not sold either; AlexTX may well be right about the risk to UAVs and its well known that the Chinese have been looking into countermeasures in this area. I made this exact point to several government army of the future researchers a couple of years ago (and didn't get a very sympathetic reply.) Yet its difficult to deny there is much promise for this technology to the extent it might revolutionize air warfare.

Considering this and the era of strategic ambiguity the U.S. resides in as well I believe the Pentagon is somewhat hedging its bets in purchases of manned fighter aircraft at this time.

This is why I think we should be buying some more F-22s at the expense of the F-35... the F-35 mission can be done partially by Reaper or the turbojet powered UCAVs. The F-22's mission can't... and also can't really be done by F-35. Which is why the current aircraft acquisitions plans don't seem to jibe with our stated national military strategy.

Entropy
06-01-2009, 12:57 PM
Mooks,

Cutting manned fighters now in the hope that A2A UCAV's will be viable and available 20 years from now does not seem wise in my view. Maybe someday the technology will be there - when it is, we can go that route if it makes sense to do so.

Also, I completely disagree with your assertion that A2A "isn't that hard" once a decision to kill has been made. Sometimes it is, often it isn't, particularly when you're facing a smart, thinking, well-trained enemy.

Lord_Malone
07-04-2009, 03:57 PM
Two major surprises. Halting growth of BCT's at 45 in order for the manning levels to catch up is one of them, but in reality it's only two less (minus the EBCT at Bliss and since FCS is on the way out, there's no reason for this BCT to stick around). The other is the JIEDDO and organizations like that (ad-hoc). I wonder what the other organizations are - AWG?

AWG ain't goin' nowhere.

Boot
07-04-2009, 11:35 PM
AWG ain't goin' nowhere.

I agree...from what I read and understand they are doing great work.



Boot

Ski
07-05-2009, 02:18 PM
Yeah, that's really good news. Thanks for the update.