Air Force Motorized Jaeger Regiment?

[Distiller]

So the Navy has Naval Air and the Marine Corps to reach out beyond its core realm, and carry the fight onto the land and through the air, some elements are even land-based to reach towards the sea (e.g. airborne ASW and patrol).

And the Army has a certain aerial capability to reach ahead, and they should kill West Point and have an Army Air Corps with all the A-10 and intra-threatre aerial transports and all the UAVs they need. They even play a role in the war against the air through their Patriot batteries. And they have a certain limited riverine capability.

In short, with some adjustments those two forces would rule their respective realms AND be able to touch their surroundings.

But the Air Force as an own branch is a problem child since the demise of SAC. CAS would be better at home with the Army (the Marines do their own CAS in any case), strategic airlift is in the hands of TRANSCOM, SOCOM is about to start their own aerial force, STRATCOM has its hands on the nuclear bombing mission and strategic ISR and all things orbital, and everybody is trying to take away the UAV mission. With interdiction alone the day is not filled. No wonder they want to venture into cyber!

But what about an approach similar to the other branches? To reach beyond the core realm? For example into ground combat. With the Air Force Motorized Jaeger Regiment.

In contrast to the Army's air cavalry helicopter force, which is short ranged and limited in scope, and the Army's airborne formations, which besides depending on assets they don't control, are far too heavy, and are basically only capable of waiting for road/rail/river-bound supply once they are inserted (faszinating that the Army still puts "airborne" on whole divisions and even corps), the AF MotYeagReg could be really made light enough for airmobile operations.

In contrast to the other airmobile/airborne formations it could be 100% owned by the Air Force and could be inserted, supported, sustained and extracted by Air Force assets - basically the C-130. The ops area could actually be quite far behind enemy lines, since the units would be light enough to be sustained through the air - General Student's dream, I guess.

UAVs could provide constant ISR ahead and guard the flanks, as well as provide ESM and ECM, Fighterbombers and UAVs could provide support and break heavy restistance, C-130 could continously provide supply and at the end extract the unit again, and fighters could provide air cover. As vehicle to make it "motorized" and give it speed and reach the BvS10 would be an option, plus DPVs and motorbikes (or BMP-3 :D). Speed and mobility would be the main weapon - besides 50cal MGs, AGLs, ATGMs, Stingers, 120mm mortars ... (the rear car of the BvS10 is pretty versatile).

Of course such a regiment would have to be very careful around dug-in or armored enemy formations, since it would almost completely rely on fighterbomber air support to clear such obstacles.

Standing up Motorized Jaeger Regiments would give the Air Force a new mission that reaches beyond its core realm, thus balancing it in a sense, like the other branches. It would also give a 3D medium-range opposed forced entry capability to the armed forces that is missing now, since neither AirCav, nor the 3D elements of the MEUs have a very deep reach (MV-22 does not have any meaningful fighting power for conventional forces).

[Majormarginal]

When I spoke to an Air Force recruiter during high school his opening line was, "We're not Infantry." That was his closing line also.

[J Wolfsberger]

Distiller, I think you've unintentionally hit on the Air Force's biggest problem: they don't want to understand their role within the full spectrum of warfare, nor do they want to perform the activities that role requires.

Unfortunately, there is a belief in the AF, never clearly articulated unless you can get some of their officers outside enough adult beverages, that the way to win a war is "bomb 'em till the rubble bounces," then send in the infantry to occupy the ruins. Your idea plays right into that viewpoint.

With respect to the Army entering the AF "realm," the AF made it necessary. I won't go through all the history - it's easy enough to find. I'll summarize it by saying that the reason there is so much Army (rotary wing) aviation is because the AF refused to support emerging Army doctrine and the associated required capabilities. In fact, there was almost an Army fixed wing aviation component: when the AF wanted to get rid of the A-10s in the 1980s, the Army said "Fine, we'll take them." At which point the AF "rediscovered" it's CAS mission.

Unfortunately, the AF idea of CAS is to buy fighters that are "dual capable." In practice, that means buying fighters. The Navy and Marines have a justifiable need for dual capable aircraft. The AF doesn't. Their practice of flying over Iraq in F-16s carrying 500 lb. bombs, then landing heavy, adding wear to the airframes that dramatically decreases service life, and whining that they weren't being given their proper role in COIN, all adds up to a group of people without a clue. Your idea would only affirm their cluelessness.

[BayonetBrant]

What Wolf said....

[Steve Blair]

Concur with JW as well. This proposal also ignores the vulnerability of airlift assets as well as any light air-deployed force once it's on the ground.

[William F. Owen]

Concur with JW as well. This proposal also ignores the vulnerability of airlift assets as well as any light air-deployed force once it's on the ground.

You could call it AIR-MECH STRIKE.....

[wm]

You could call it AIR-MECH STRIKE.....

You could also call it DUMB (Doubtlessly Useless Misuse of Bodies)

[J Wolfsberger]

You could also call it DUMB (Doubtlessly Useless Misuse of Bodies)

You win. :D

[Entropy]

Well, I was kind of hoping this thread would die a quiet death, but I guess it's not to be.

The bottom line is the Air Force doesn't have any interest in developing a ground force, nor should it have any interest (beyond, of course, small specialized units and SoF) in doing so. The closest you will get is forces for air base or air field defense.


Distiller, I think you've unintentionally hit on the Air Force's biggest problem: they don't want to understand their role within the full spectrum of warfare, nor do they want to perform the activities that role requires.

That's a bunch of hooey. The reality is that the Air Force doesn't perfectly conform to what some think the Air Force's role should be within the "full spectrum of warfare." That's a difference of opinion and perception, not fact. The Air Force isn't a subordinate arm of the Army, no matter how much some may wish for it. It therefore has a legitimate say in how best to use air forces in joint operations. It's fine if you disagree with the AF's official view (as many in the AF do), but the sweeping unsubstantiated hyperbole ("whining," "group of people without a clue") gets a little old as do statements of opinion presented as statements of fact.

That the evidence for your point of view is apparently only obtainable from the mouths of a few drunk airmen doesn't help your argument much. Nor does using events that occurred two decades ago. Nor does your completely wrong statements about F-16's landing heavy - that's a serious problem for Marine/Navy aircraft returning to carriers (who often have to jettison ordnance in order to land), not so much for those using airfields.

[Distiller]

The idea is not mine, and certainly not new. Just tried to put it into context with the capabilities of the other branches.

The Russians (Soviet's, that is) had/have a whole bunch of their "VDV" formations designed for just exactly that concept, that's what the BMP vehicle series was/is for. And the fact that they lost the Cold War doesn't change their quite sharp minds in military matters and their tendentially clearer conceptual thinking. And if you look into the late years of the German Wehrmacht, they were also thinking into that direction, with Ar232 and Me323.

[Rifleman]

It there's a second ground army isn't one of them redundant?

Come to think of it, the USMC might want to pay attention to that idea as well. They started life as the Navy's infantry and have more or less morphed into a defacto second ground army. Case in point: SEAL snipers taking out pirates when one of the USMC's historic missions was.....sharpshooters in the rigging.

[Rifleman]

You could call it AIR-MECH STRIKE.....

I was waiting for that little bit of sarcasm. ;)

And with the M113A whatever model number it's up to now as the striking vehicle of choice, right? :wry:

[J Wolfsberger]

That's a bunch of hooey. The reality is that the Air Force doesn't perfectly conform to what some think the Air Force's role should be within the "full spectrum of warfare." That's a difference of opinion and perception, not fact. The Air Force isn't a subordinate arm of the Army, no matter how much some may wish for it. It therefore has a legitimate say in how best to use air forces in joint operations. It's fine if you disagree with the AF's official view (as many in the AF do), but the sweeping unsubstantiated hyperbole ("whining," "group of people without a clue") gets a little old as do statements of opinion presented as statements of fact.

That the evidence for your point of view is apparently only obtainable from the mouths of a few drunk airmen doesn't help your argument much. Nor does using events that occurred two decades ago. Nor does your completely wrong statements about F-16's landing heavy - that's a serious problem for Marine/Navy aircraft returning to carriers (who often have to jettison ordnance in order to land), not so much for those using airfields.

I'll take the well aimed (and deserved) hit for being blunt and heavy handed in my characterization. :o

But I'll stand by the substance of my criticism (restated in a more professional manner):

1. AF commitment to CAS is less than whole hearted.
2. The prevailing attitude within the AF is that air power alone can win wars.
3. There was (and I think, still is) an attitude that the AF was not being allowed to bring its full capability to bear in the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts.
3.a. There was (and I think, still is) an attitude that civilian casualties aren't a negative factor, and may be a positive factor, in COIN.
4. There was (and I think, still is) an attitude that the conflict in Iraq would have ended sooner if the AF had been allowed to inflict more damage and casualties.

I may be wrong in my understanding - would certainly not be the first time. At present, I have a poor opinion of their doctrine and attitude. If you can point me to publications or articles that prove me wrong, I'd like to follow up. Regardless of my opinion of doctrine and attitude, the men and women wearing the AF uniform are still our comrades.

[slapout9]

It there's a second ground army isn't one of them redundant?

Come to think of it, the USMC might want to pay attention to that idea as well. They started life as the Navy's infantry and have more or less morphed into a defacto second ground army. Case in point: SEAL snipers taking out pirates when one of the USMC's historic missions was.....sharpshooters in the rigging.

That is a very good point Rifleman.

[ODB]

my own aerial platform that fly in, jump out of and just let it crash where ever it stops. Throw away disposal air platforms for the Army. Oh wait, we tried that once, Gliders. Mine will be better though, they will be self powered and we would actually jump from them, not wait for them to crash.

[Cliff]

this subject returns every 6 months or so.


But I'll stand by the substance of my criticism (restated in a more professional manner):

1. AF commitment to CAS is less than whole hearted.

What do you base this assertation on? The AF developed the JDAM and GPS, both of which have arguably been the biggest revolution in fire support for troops in the field since the airplane. Currently CAS is probably the highest priority mission in the AF, with numerous squadrons training at CAS over their supposed primary missions. Red Flags train extensively on CAS, SCAR, and BAI. The AF is trying to increase the number of JTACs. I am sure there will be a Desert Storm/eliminating the A-10 example given... Much has been made of this. Regardless, the focus of TAC and the tactical AF in the '80s was AirLand Battle... which was the Army's idea. AF doctrine was written with TRADOC... for both services. If TAC had had its way, Desert Storm would have had almost 0 strategic attack and just attempted to pound the Iraqi Army into dust. Didn't happen due to Gen Schwarzkopf choosing a different plan... kinda hard to blame the AF for that and say that CAS isn't a focus. This notion is 20 years behind the times.


2. The prevailing attitude within the AF is that air power alone can win wars.
The AF attitude is that Airpower is an essential part of the joint force. Air power is a key enabler... without Air Superiority, the Joint Force would have a very difficult time winning any war. You wouldn't be able to get to the fight, you wouldn't be able to use your helos, no CAS, no medevac, no resupply by air. No UAVs... Oh by the way all your lightly armored vehicles would be toast vs. a real air threat...

This doesn't mean airpower can't win a war... some wars it can. Just as Land Power and Sea Power can win some wars. Guess what... we usually do best when we all work together - usually that will mean air power gaining air superiority first, then supporting the other components.

Why folks insist that we shouldn't be allowed to protect them from enemy air is completely beyond me - sometimes it seems like maybe we should go ahead and just do what folks think we do and go play golf rather than trying to keep everyone on the ground safe. I would be curious to see an NTC rotation with realistic red air and no air superiority... once you run out of Patriots, good luck!


3. There was (and I think, still is) an attitude that the AF was not being allowed to bring its full capability to bear in the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts.

What are you basing this on? Arguably the AF didn't bring everything to bear in Iraq... during OIF, due to the FSCL being moved too far. But that wasn't a huge issue... since then I haven't heard anyone arguing we're not being allowed to bring capability to bear. Maybe that some UAV/ISR capability is being wasted by being diluted... but never that we are holding back.


3.a. There was (and I think, still is) an attitude that civilian casualties aren't a negative factor, and may be a positive factor, in COIN.

What do you mean by this? Are you really accusing the AF of thinking that civilian casualties are OK? If so this is absolutely ludicrous... The AF arguably goes to greater lengths than any other service to avoid civilian casualties. Do Army folks have to use a computer model of their ordnance effects and consult a JAG before using artillery, mortars, or rockets? The AF does... before EVERY use of kinetic weapons.


4. There was (and I think, still is) an attitude that the conflict in Iraq would have ended sooner if the AF had been allowed to inflict more damage and casualties.

This is also ridiculous. No one I know of in the AF thinks this. OIF is a great example of how to MINIMIZE the damage and casualties to make postwar reconstruction better... show me any other armed service in history that went to the lengths the AF did in OIF to minimize unneccessary damage.


I may be wrong in my understanding - would certainly not be the first time. At present, I have a poor opinion of their doctrine and attitude. If you can point me to publications or articles that prove me wrong, I'd like to follow up. Regardless of my opinion of doctrine and attitude, the men and women wearing the AF uniform are still our comrades.

From AF Doctrine Document 2-3, Irregular Warfare:

"Large applications of US military force in COIN operations should be limited when possible and forces should perform such roles as restoring order orseizing the initiative."

http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/service_pubs/afdd2_3.pdf

I'm not sure where your sour opinion of AF attitudes and doctrine comes from. The AF is fully comitted to being a part of the joint team across the spectrum of warfare. In addition, the AF is is still trying to maintain some small shred of deterrence against a high-intensity war along with the USN. This allows the USMC and USA to focus a little more on the low intensity conflicts currrently going on while keeping risk low.

I know this forum is fairly ground-centric due to the subject matter, but it seems like there is a sort of group-think when it comes to the Air Force in particular. Every time this topic comes up the same mantra of "the Air Force doesn't care" comes up...

I'd be curious to hear what folks in/recently returned from OIF and OEF think of the current AF attitudes mentioned above.

V/R,

Cliff

[BayonetBrant]

This doesn't mean airpower can't win a war... some wars it can.

Didn't we disprove this in Kosovo? Grandiose claims of vast swaths of dead enemy vehicles, shown to be tractors and outhouses once the ground forces arrived?

[Ken White]

this subject returns every 6 months or so.
...
I know this forum is fairly ground-centric due to the subject matter, but it seems like there is a sort of group-think when it comes to the Air Force in particular. Every time this topic comes up the same mantra of "the Air Force doesn't care" comes up...

I'd be curious to hear what folks in/recently returned from OIF and OEF think of the current AF attitudes mentioned above.I didn't just return from either OIF or OEF but a lot of those guys and I have defended the AF on these 'every 6 months or so' soirees -- you're right, they do seem to come back to haunt us all...

So I'll again defend the USAF and say all your points are valid. In fairness though, I'll also have to say that J. Wolfsbereger's points are valid based on the perceptions that some in the AF have planted. Every thing he says has some validity and that validity is due, I think to the fact that some in the AF have been unduly parochial or community centric in the face of logic and thereby left a bad taste in many mouths.

Strategic bombing has been defended in the past in spite of pretty conclusive proof that it does not work; the USAF did want to avoid the CAS mission and did several times try to dismiss the A-10; USAF aircraft flying CAS in earlier times did fly higher and faster than did some Navy and Marine aircraft doing the job -- that was because of aircraft type and capabilities as much as anything else but it is also a fact that lead to denigration of the AF and which the AF clumsily handled. That is a part of the problem; the AF gets a knock, gets defensive and handles said knock clumsily. Add to that the many procurement problems and an undeserved belief that the AF has an undeserved sense of superiority gets planted.

Thus even though that was then and this is now, you, Entropy and a few others have to come 'round every few months and rise to the defense of that AF as it gets slammed for past transgressions, bad purchasing and equipping decisions and poor PR skills. *

Why can't we all just get along... :wry:

* NOTE: ALL the services have, have had and will have similar problems; the Navy's smart enough to ignore the socially lesser mortals, the Marines are astute and energetic enough to counter it, the Army's big enough to ignore it and that leaves the poor AF to have to get defensive. Except you really don't. You guys do okay, just shut Dunlap down... ;) ADDED: He's a smart guy but his excessive parochialism and statements have IMO not done the AF any favors, quite the contrary in fact...

[J Wolfsberger]

Cliff,

Thanks for the pointer to AFDD 2-3. These stood out:

"In irregular operations, commanders should understand that the application of military force is in support of other instruments of national power ..."

"In addition, operations conducted in such close proximity to the civilian population also present LOAC and ROE challenges."

So you'll understand the source of (at least) my attitude, it's in response to an article by MG Dunlap (that I can't find a link to right now), and the historical attitude of "COIN from the air." 2-3 addresses the latter issue very well.

The issue of AF reluctance in the area of CAS remains.

[Entropy]

John,

MG Dunlap speaks for himself and not the USAF. Do some in the USAF share his views? Yes, but many do not, particularly those who've done sandbox rotations in the last decade. Some of those people have written on how the Air Force can better support joint operations, but they don't seem to get the notice that MG Dunlap does. As Ken notes, MG Dunlap makes some valid points in his articles, but they are largely ignored in favor of his more controversial positions.


1. AF commitment to CAS is less than whole hearted.
There is some legitimate historical truth to that, but I don't think it applies at all today. Part of the conflict comes from differing viewpoints of how CAS is best provided. I think the Army has come around to the Air Force's view more than the reverse. I think the Air Force has proven that a low-slow aircraft using the Mk1 eyeball for targeting is not necessarily the best way to deliver CAS. One reason for the A-10C upgrade was that it was an inferior CAS platform in many situations because it lacked the capability to guide, deliver and integrate modern precision weaponry. It seems to me many critics of AF CAS don't understand that technology significantly changed CAS and the result is that platform matters a lot less than it used to.

I think we also need to consider training. Bad blood prevented the Air Force and Army from working together on CAS doctrine and training which resulted in poor operations in OEF and OIF. By contrast, the SoF forces, with embedded combat controllers who did a lot of training, performed CAS very well using bombers in the opening stages of OEF.

The fact is that despite what some detractors continue to claim, most USAF aircraft are capable CAS platforms. If we didn't have the A-10, we'd still be providing pretty decent CAS (note: I love the A-10 and don't want to see it go away - it serves important niches). So I think a lot of CAS detractors continue to live in an idealized past where CAS is platform dependent and I think they needlessly point to real or perceived wrongs by the USAF that occurred 20, 30, 40, 50 years ago that don't automatically apply today.

So, I don't think CAS is an issue today at all, based on the AAR's I've read over the past few years. I think most of the Army understands that the AF way of doing CAS, with precision weapons and sensors, is equally good if not better than the idealized vision of a CAS-only platform. In most cases, CAS is not a platform-dependent activity.

Who knows what will happen in the future and it's possible the Air Force will take a wrong turn with CAS, but I doubt it. Either way, we will find out and I, for one, will defend it as an important AF mission. I think the biggest factor will be training. Air-ground coordination is difficult and both services need to put the effort in to maintain, if not increase, the level of proficiency we have now.


2. The prevailing attitude within the AF is that air power alone can win wars.
Again, I think this is an historical anachronism. Undoubtedly there are some who believe that, but I think they are a minority. The AF does see it's role as very important, indeed critically important. A lot of ink is spilled debating what element of power is "decisive" or the most important in a particular campaign. I find most of those arguments silly. The fact is that the air, land and naval components are interdependent.


3. There was (and I think, still is) an attitude that the AF was not being allowed to bring its full capability to bear in the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts.
You'll have to explain what you mean here and provide some evidence. "Full capability?" What does that mean?


3.a. There was (and I think, still is) an attitude that civilian casualties aren't a negative factor, and may be a positive factor, in COIN.
Totally untrue. There is some hand wringing due to the fact that it's the Air Force that usually takes the blame when civilians are killed despite the fact that 99% of the time it's the land forces that ordered and authorized the strike. There have actually been times when the CAOC overruled the ground commander for fear of civilian casualties. As Cliff says, the AF takes "collateral" damage very seriously, probably too seriously in some cases. The Air Force understands that civilian casualties have a negative strategic effect and try to limit it as much as possible. His comment about lawyers is accurate.


4. There was (and I think, still is) an attitude that the conflict in Iraq would have ended sooner if the AF had been allowed to inflict more damage and casualties.

This is something else you'll have to explain and provide some justification. First of all, which conflict? The MCO portion of OIF, or something later?

Ken,


Thus even though that was then and this is now, you, Entropy and a few others have to come 'round every few months and rise to the defense of that AF as it gets slammed for past transgressions, bad purchasing and equipping decisions and poor PR skills.

I defend the Air Force against attacks that I think are unwarranted. I think I've said a few times now how completely incompetent AF purchasing/procurement is, and we've both discussed and criticized the Air Force's defensiveness, lousy PR and inability to competently put forth its viewpoint on various matters. There are a lot of cultural and other problems in the Air Force that don't get discussed much because the same sheet of music gets played over and over. I'm not defending any of that, but what I believe are common misperceptions about the Air Force, particularly among Army personnel. Note John's bullet points above. They are all about perception and attitude. If I think the perception and attitude are wrong I'm going to speak up about it.

Let me give you another recent example about perceptions:

A couple of months ago on the INTELST forum a topic came up about this aircraft program (http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/blogs/defense/index.jsp?plckController=Blog&plckScript=blogScript&plckElementId=blogDest&plckBlogPage=BlogViewPost&plckPostId=Blog:27ec4a53-dcc8-42d0-bd3a-01329aef79a7Post:084afde5-e2e7-448e-a9f8-d6b0c64fe707). The immediate reaction was quite predictable - shock and anger about the Air Force trying to muscle in on the Army's territory by developing a manned tactical ISR system, one that can't even plug into the AF's big, expensive PED architecture! Everyone bought into their own preconceived notions about the Air Force and it's hidden agenda and thought it was a blatant ploy to grab airborne ISR away from the Army. After a day or two of this, the moderator comes on and tells the rest of the story, which I paraphrase here: This project was forced on the Air Force because the Army couldn't execute it on the SECDEF's timeline.

This is the kind of thing I see all the time Ken - a lot of assumption and jumping to conclusions based on bias and not evidence. The underlying subtext is that there is a hidden agenda at work. I don't think there's anything wrong in challenging those assumptions and what I see as false perceptions and I will continue to do so.

[Ken White]

Ken ... If I think the perception and attitude are wrong I'm going to speak up about it ... a lot of assumption and jumping to conclusions based on bias and not evidence. The underlying subtext is that there is a hidden agenda at work. I don't think there's anything wrong in challenging those assumptions and what I see as false perceptions and I will continue to do so.I was expressing regret that you had to do it due to what I can only presume to be on the part of some posters sheer parochiality, ignorance or a desire to yank chains to see what happens.

P.S.

Didn't you advise me once not to read the comments following newspaper columns? Allow me to reciprocate -- I suggest not reading the comments on so-called 'Defense Blogs' (present Company excepted) -- they're all as bad as the newspapers. The articles to which those comments are appended seem to quite often be full of ignorance and inaccuracies also. :eek: :D

[Ken White]

Deleted, double post. ???

[Entropy]

Didn't you advise me once not to read the comments following newspaper columns? Allow me to reciprocate -- I suggest not reading the comments on so-called 'Defense Blogs' (present Company excepted) -- they're all as bad as the newspapers. The articles to which those comments are appended seem to quite often be full of ignorance and inaccuracies also. :eek: :D

Good advice, thanks! :D

[Umar Al-Mokhtār]

the Luftwaffe had it's own paratroop panzer division (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Herman_Goering_division)! :D

[J Wolfsberger]

Entropy,

For the record, I do support the AF. In particular, I seem to be in a minority that wants the F-22 bought in its original planned number so it can accomplish the mission of air supremacy. I also would like to see C-17 purchased to replace C-130s one for one.

Thanks for your comments. I'll mull over them before spouting off about the AF again. :wry:

[Culpeper]

I served in the USAF as a ROMAD. Something directly related to CAS. I grew out of my blue uniform within a year and never wore it outside of basic training. Attached to the 82nd my squadron and my sister squadron spent 60% of our enlistment in the field with the grunts. Both squadrons completed at the very least Jump School at Ft. Benning and some went on to Air Assault School as well. It was not a pleasant 8 to 5 Air Force job.

The reason the Air Force doesn't completely let go of CAS and give it all to the Army is that the Air Force wants her assets on the ground as well. It's part of the whole SO scenerio. Cannon AFB is now entirely a SO air base and has a rather complex set of missions to perform. As intimated, all sister services have assets on the ground trained to coordinate CAS, whether the aircraft are Marine, Navy, Army, or Air Force. It doesn't matter. Maximum use of all assets available. The "S" in CAS stands for "support". The Air Force has no business reaching out beyond that with the Army's MLR, FEBA, or whatever you want to call it for CAS. The Air Force has her "Airplanes" to reach out and touch someone as far as she wants to reach for a variety of reasons to include paving a path for ground forces. This whole topic is a moot point. Sorry about that. Just how I feel about it. Some things never just go away.

[Distiller]

Not exactly sure how this here ended up as "Air Force doesn't want to do CAS" thread ...

Moot the point is not. The Forces lack that 3D forced entry capability that the Russians never dropped. The Hermann Goring Division was mentioned - the Germans also never dropped that idea, see Wiesel airportable tank with TOWs and 20mm machine canon. And if I remember correctly, the JHL/HLVTOL part of the Objective Force Mobility concept also talks about lifting a FCS out a 1000 nm (which is a little too far, I guess one fighterbomber flight hour would be a good distance, or around 300nm behind the major ground combat line).

The Army AirMech Strike idea, at least as far as I understand it, was/is basically loading a M113 onto a CH-53 and flying it out a 150km. Nice, but in real life 150km doesn't even get you out of SMERCH range. And against counter-air and air defense such a force wouldn't have a chance.

No, what I was asking was, if it would make sense to give such a forced entry unit to the Air Force, like the Marines are the forced entry component of the Navy (well, should be). I mean, the Wehrmacht Fallschirmjager were also part of the Luftwaffe, and not of the Heer. As I described, the Air Force would have all the ressources needed to enable and sustain such a ground element.

Folks here might reject the notion, but the U.S. ground combat doctrine is still dominated by a slow linear development out of a long static buildup - in short they are not capable of Blitzkrieg and Bewegungskrieg, and are doctrinally less advanced and less capable than the German Wehrmacht in its time. That's why such a MotJaegReg might give new impulses and force a little competition.

And don't get me started about how in times of "jointness" it doesn't matter who "owns" what. That's probably why we have Army air assault units on amphib carriers and Marines jumping out of UH-60 as part of a mountain division operation. Jointness was invented to make sure nothing is "joint", but technological progress made it natural (optimistic angle) and pure neccessity forced it in a couple of areas.

[CR6]

And don't get me started about how in times of "jointness" it doesn't matter who "owns" what. That's probably why we have Army air assault units on amphib carriers and Marines jumping out of UH-60 as part of a mountain division operation. Jointness was invented to make sure nothing is "joint", but technological progress made it natural (optimistic angle) and pure neccessity forced it in a couple of areas.

I guess I don't understand the problem of having army air assaults launched off of amphibs, if that combination of resources best meets the combatant commanders needs. Why DOES it matter who owns what if all services are working together? Redundancies between servicies mean someone's not necessary.

[William F. Owen]

The Army AirMech Strike idea, at least as far as I understand it, was/is basically loading a M113 onto a CH-53 and flying it out a 150km. Nice, but in real life 150km doesn't even get you out of SMERCH range. And against counter-air and air defense such a force wouldn't have a chance.


It was a lot more complicated than that and basically an idea of which I remain very un-convinced.

Air Mobile is best for Special Ops /Small Unit special mobility, (including CSAR) and after that Helos should concentrate on CASEVAC, and Re-Supply/Sustain/Relief in Place. "Soft skin Truck that jumps woods"

Can't see a need for much else in the real world

[Distiller]

It was a lot more complicated than that and basically an idea of which I remain very un-convinced.

Air Mobile is best for Special Ops /Small Unit special mobility, (including CSAR) and after that Helos should concentrate on CASEVAC, and Re-Supply/Sustain/Relief in Place. "Soft skin Truck that jumps woods"

Can't see a need for much else in the real world

How do you see the Russian VDV troops? The Russians still believe in that concept; their main task would have been/is to capture rear HQs, blow up supplies, cut com lines, and take out enemy air defense. Though I have to admit that those guys I talked to were somewhat pessimistic about the prospect of being picked up again at the end of the mission (they also said the plan was to extract just the personnel, and leave the vehicles behind).

[Culpeper]

No, what I was asking was, if it would make sense to give such a forced entry unit to the Air Force, like the Marines are the forced entry component of the Navy (well, should be).

I understood your question. It's beyond the scope of the Air Force. That is why the Army Air Corps became the United States Air Force. The Army has its own capabilities and the Air Force. The Marines has its own capabilities and the Navy. What's the problem?

[Ken White]

How do you see the Russian VDV troops? The Russians still believe in that concept; their main task would have been/is to capture rear HQs, blow up supplies, cut com lines, and take out enemy air defense. Though I have to admit that those guys I talked to were somewhat pessimistic about the prospect of being picked up again at the end of the mission (they also said the plan was to extract just the personnel, and leave the vehicles behind).and their BMDs not (BMPs as you said and repeated) my only concern was whether I'd have enough Ammo or not. I suggest those who told you that just personnel and not vehicles would be extracted were correct -- IF the USSR had actually decided to bother picking up anything or anyone -- and that the number retrieved would be significantly smaller than the number dropped.

That from an old Parachute troopie and Armored Cavalry guy who knows the concept of parachuting troops and attacking the enemy in the rear is still valid regardless of the SAMS take on it -- but you do have to use some sense about what you do and where you do it and there are limitations on what parachute troops can do. They can do more without the impediment of tracked vehicles. Tracks have their place, air landing has its place, parachuting has its place. the first does not go with the latter two for all sorts of reasons -- not least simple logistics. Fuel is heavy.

[slapout9]

I will say the capability to Strike and Hold vital targets (from long ranges)or more correctly to "capture in tact" should become a vital capability of the military. It will only become more valuable as move into the future.

[William F. Owen]

I will say the capability to Strike and Hold vital targets (from long ranges)or more correctly to "capture in tact" should become a vital capability of the military. It will only become more valuable as move into the future.

Agreed, especially as armies become smaller and the earth does not. Doug Macgregors notes on dispersed mobile warfare are worth reading.

However... that does not mean there is a need for large scale airborne or airmobile operations, in the way WW2 played them out and the Cold War forecast.

If you drop anyone anywhere and they get into a fight, they have to be able to win, and break contact to be recovered. Very, very rarely does the risk match the reward.

[slapout9]

However... that does not mean there is a need for large scale airborne or airmobile operations, in the way WW2 played them out and the Cold War forecast.



General Gavin himself believed and wrote that large scale Airborne Ops were no longer feasible.

[William F. Owen]

General Gavin himself believed and wrote that large scale Airborne Ops were no longer feasible.

I believed that, but I've never had someone be explicit about it. I don't have his books, so thanks. That's interesting.

Airborne and airmobile operations are extremely high risk and this is born out by the historical record.

Actually they seem most relevant and have the greatest sustained success in COIN or small wars. In "big wars" they always seem to turn into a shambles.

[slapout9]

Actually they seem most relevant and have the greatest sustained success in COIN or small wars. In "big wars" they always seem to turn into a shambles.

Exactly. Or use in GWOT or what ever it is called know:eek: had a lot of first hand experience with this when I was in. It is nothing but a Longe Range Raiding Force. It does no have to be extracted, it could be relieved in place, but they were never meant to survive long term high intensity combat.

[Ken White]

...It is nothing but a Longe Range Raiding Force. It does no have to be extracted, it could be relieved in place, but they were never meant to survive long term high intensity combat.That should never be forgotten by planners and those either pro- or anti- airborne. Still, that limited utility can have great merit if used correctly. Nothing else can move a body of troops 10,000 miles and get them on the ground able to fight near but not necessarily on a military objective. Air landing is an option but airfields aren't always located conveniently and are rarely unguarded.

Of course, we could have developed long range stealthy transport with significant rough field and STOL capability in order to do a far better job of getting combat ready troops on the ground in better shape at great distance -- but that might have led the Politicians into trying some risky adventures... :rolleyes:

[COMMAR]

It there's a second ground army isn't one of them redundant?

Come to think of it, the USMC might want to pay attention to that idea as well. They started life as the Navy's infantry and have more or less morphed into a defacto second ground army. Case in point: SEAL snipers taking out pirates when one of the USMC's historic missions was.....sharpshooters in the rigging.


No, Rifleman does not have a good pt, he uses that to point out role & mission when those are the 2 things he leap frogged over to try & make his point.

If it was simply a matter of surgical shooting, there were 9 Marine Scout-Snipers on the Boxer who could've easily taken those shots but that would over look the fact that dedicated Hostage Rescue is not a Marine Corps Role or Mission.

Not to mention disregarding the long & difficult song & dance of setting up those 3 shots. Something only a Dedictated HR team could've done.

Dedicated HR is not a mission the USMC is interested in.

So what you saw was a Dedicated HR Unit, using the sound HR tactics of time, deception, & irritation to make something very difficult look easy. Not 3 SEALs who were "secretly" airdropped in to encroach Marine sharpshooting territory.

[Culpeper]

If it was simply a matter of surgical shooting, there were 9 Marine Scout-Snipers on the Boxer who could've easily taken those shots but that would over look the fact that dedicated Hostage Rescue is not a Marine Corps Role or Mission.

I had no idea there were already snipers on the destroyers. If so, you're correct the USMC snipers could have completed this mission, considering the final action that was needed to end the situation. Monday morning quarterbacking on my part. The SEALs were brought in for HR, which is one of their jobs. Nobody knew at the time, I'm sure, that it would boil down to 30 yard single shots to end the standoff. I concur with your statement. Apples and oranges.

[COMMAR]

I had no idea there were already snipers on the destroyers. If so, you're correct the USMC snipers could have completed this mission, considering the final action that was needed to end the situation. Monday morning quarterbacking on my part. The SEALs were brought in for HR, which is one of their jobs. Nobody knew at the time, I'm sure, that it would boil down to 30 yard single shots to end the standoff. I concur with your statement. Apples and oranges.


Not on the Destroyers but on the Boxer, an Amphib that showed up about 12hrs after the Halyburton.

They are part of the MEU's STA Plt. But 9 Snipers, 8 Scout-Snipers and their SS Qual'd Plt Sgt, a Gunny, have been assigned to support the Anti-Piracy Ops throughout the AO & were on scene at the time.

Taking the shots, sure they could've easily taken the shots.

But to manage & manipulate the Hostiles like that to make the shots so easy, no.

There are only 2 other units in the US who could've handled the entire Op w/that much skill and they are both dedicated to HR.

[Distiller]

Of course the mission would be high risk. Just find something that's worth it. And the regular size of an insertion would probably be limited to a battalion, with multiple insertions in multiple locations a possibility.

I would see it primarily as "deep dash" capability, perfect for non-linear operations. Cavalry style. It would bring its own unique capabilities, as do the paras, the air assault units, &c.

Using them for dash-grab-hold operations might also be possible but the basic idea behind picking them up again is to be out before the enemy can concentrate anything meaningful against you.
Just him knowing that the capability exists might influence his planning and actions.

Re the comment on Gavin. Times may have changed. UAVs make persistent regional ISR possible, stand-off ISR gives the bigger picture over longer periods. Landings are not made into the darkest fog of war any more, decreasing the risk. This idea is not for division sized formations, though. This is "small wars" council.

(PS: I apologize for writing BMP instead of BMD.)

[Ken White]

There are only 2 other units in the US who could've handled the entire Op w/that much skill and they are both dedicated to HR."That much skill," perhaps. Adequate skill, OTOH, is very different thing.

This tendency to make war too complex unless one is especially trained as opposed to well trained is not wise.

There's a point where the situational and discrete location need for specific combat capability outstrips the ability of even the US to provide special purpose units or people in adequate quantities to fulfill the potential requirements.

Creating SMUs as a patch to cover poor individual and unit training is potentially dangerous.

[COMMAR]

"That much skill," perhaps. Adequate skill, OTOH, is very different thing.

This tendency to make war too complex unless one is especially trained as opposed to well trained is not wise.

There's a point where the situational and discrete location need for specific combat capability outstrips the ability of even the US to provide special purpose units or people in adequate quantities to fulfill the potential requirements.

Creating SMUs as a patch to cover poor individual and unit training is potentially dangerous.


Right I totally I agree, which is why the Corps never bought into so narrowly focused Units. I was acknowledging the Professionalism in how it was handled.

But, switching back, that is what made the Force Recon DAPs so effective. In taking the IHR Mission, they maintained the Shooting & Assault Techniques & Standards of the SMU's. But they did this w/out being so narrowly focused that they could not still support the mission of the MAGTF Cmdr, like a Dedicated HR Unit.

They took the necessary elements to remain Proficient in IHR and used those standards to elevate their other missions. This was something noted in the JSOU's report.

It noted that the Reconnaissance Element of the DET had a Direct Action & Reconnaissance capability on par with any Tier I SMU. But it could seemlessly blend w/any Conventional Unit that it supported.

Also K.I.M. you probably know this but others may not, they maintained these high standards while rotating most Marines in & out of Force Recon to the Recon & Infantry BNs every 4-5yrs.

[Distiller]

The Russians take good care of their air/mech formations and add capabilities, and as they have a clear mind in these things I again say the U.S. should look into such a capability.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q1EJjxD0XTc
5:30 till 5:50.

[kaur]

Just 1 comment about BMP-2. Author of this article considers that BMP concept is failure. On the upper photo there is Mad Max armored BMP in Afganistan.

http://img242.imageshack.us/img242/687/bmp2.jpg (http://www.imagehosting.com/)

Article is from this journal http://www.zeughaus.ru/product/dajdzhest-bronja-2009/

[William F. Owen]

Just 1 comment about BMP-2. Author of this article considers that BMP concept is failure.

Why? Any chance of some bullet point explanations. Personally, I agree with him, and I blame the Germans for getting sucked in with the Marder and the US jumping on the band Wagon with the IFV and the UK - as always - followed suit!!

Light tank carrying troops. Not a good light tank. Not a good troop carrier. This is a really good example of where what sounds good at the Concept stage begins to fall apart in reality.

[kaur]

Author says that skin is just too thin and effective upgradeing it is not possible due to BMP's technical limitations. In Afganistan the skin was penetrated even with Lee-Enfield rifles. After turret modification Lee-Enfield couldn't penetrate it, but BMP lost ability to swim. Units prefer for transportation MT'LB's. Lester Grau covers the problems of BMP in his article - http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/documents/Preserving%20Shock%20action.pdf

PS IED and RPG threat was not covered in detail. It was just mentioned that troops prefer to ride on top of the vechicle (beside the photo from Grozny). Here is video of Chechen ambush against Russian column - http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=3ac_1181603079

[kaur]

I spoil this thread last time and add picture of Russian BMPT. Article says that this model is already in serial production. At present time the problem is organisational - should 1 platoon of BMPT's added to tank comapny or 1 company of BMPT's to tank battalion. Those solutions (numbers of additional armoured equipment) will destroy the equipment tables of those organisations. Nobody wants to change those. The other idea is to change in the future brigades (the army reform!) AT batteries to BMPT companies.

http://h.imagehost.org/t/0384/VF_BMPT.jpg (http://h.imagehost.org/view/0384/VF_BMPT)

[Cavguy]

Why? Any chance of some bullet point explanations. Personally, I agree with him, and I blame the Germans for getting sucked in with the Marder and the US jumping on the band Wagon with the IFV and the UK - as always - followed suit!!

Light tank carrying troops. Not a good light tank. Not a good troop carrier. This is a really good example of where what sounds good at the Concept stage begins to fall apart in reality.

FYI. I had excellent results employing the M2 Bradley in Urban COIN ops. Very flexible, right mix of firepower/armor. Was my preferred vehicle when paired with tanks and/or HMMWV's to round out the options.

[William F. Owen]

FYI. I had excellent results employing the M2 Bradley in Urban COIN ops. Very flexible, right mix of firepower/armor. Was my preferred vehicle when paired with tanks and/or HMMWV's to round out the options.

Sure. UK all swear by the Warrior ICV, but you had good results compared to what? Given what we actually now know about conflict in 21st century, would we still design ICV's today?

The same issue goes for right mix of Firepower/Armour.
M2 Bradleys and Warriors would have melted like butter if they had been subject to the hits that IDF Merkava, Puma and Achzarit were subject too - which is why the IDF now considers Namer to be the minimum level of protection.

[Clinkerbuilt]

I want to make two points: the first on the HR sub-thread, the second on the core article that started it all.

First, simply sniping pirates from a destroyer deck, while difficult, is a perfectly plausible deployment strategy for Marine snipers/scout-snipers. That, however, is not HR. It's not a question of "adequate" training, but one of "training to a level of ability necessary to accomplish the mission".

Just like sending Regular Infantry to try and conduct HR is not a good idea if you want live hostages later, sending "regular" snipers in to attempt an HR mission is a very bad idea: their job is to drill targets. Period. That's eminently acceptable for the conventional, as well as most COIN, environments but is a recipe for a PR disaster of "Heroic Merchant Captain Killed In Botched Rescue Attempt - Pundits Compare To Iran Rescue Mission" proportions.

The Marine Corps does not train for the HR mission, as it regards it as an unneeded and unwanted diversion of scarce resources and money - it's more important to train for the more-likely missions, and leave highly specialized missions to highly-specialized troops.

Can "regular" snipers (from any/all services) execute an HR mission? Probably...Maybe...Not words I would want to hear in an NSC/NCA-level meeting, with the Press Corps camping in the Press Room, and with 15 minutes to go to camera...


*~*~*~*
*~*~*~*

On to the MotJagRegt concept:

In OIF, the 82nd ABN could have been inserted deep, to cut the roads to Syria. They might have even been able to withstand attacks from all directions long enough to be relived via the ground attack, with minimal air support in the meanwhile: the IRGC and "Saddam Fedayeen" were certainly not the Waffen SS, whatever the History Channel would like us to think.

The extraordinarily-good reasons for not doing that were touched on previously, namely that large-scale, airborne/airmobile deep insertion died at Arnhem -- and for those not paying attention the first time around, the French were kind enough to provide a refresher at Dien Bien Phu.

There was a lot of innovation in the 30's, but that was because there was so much new technology out there, no one knew what it was capable of. "War-game" theory was not well-developed at the time, more closely resembling "Strategos" than actual "combat simulation", so no one could substantively estimate what would happen when you threw "X"-unit into "Y"-mission against "Z"-force[s].

A whole slew of good people on all sides got very, very dead to figure out what those limits were.

Basically, the concept just doesn't work: either the force is heavy enough to survive on its own - meaning that it will be extremely hard to transport it to the target by air - or it will be too light to accomplish anything of substance on the ground, should it run into real opposition.

After WW2, the Army took a good, long look at the Airborne, and concluded - as someone else pointed out, via elocution by The Gavin - that deep strike by Airborne was well and truly dead -- the Army then re-focused Airborne on short-range missions, either reinforcing ground troops, acting as "first-in" attackers to meet in-coming ground troops in short order, or as "air-landed infantry", which seems to have worked fairly well, so far http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/airborne2.htm

On the Fallschirmjaegers: Certainly, they were some tough cookies, but all airborne forces of WW2 were a cut above conventional "mudders", at least in the early days. In the end, however, they were simply "elite infantry": you can't keep getting the drop on the other guy forever, a vital component to airborne ops, and the Germans had to learn that the hard way.

On the VDV: Take another look at those units, and the concepts behind them -- they're suicide troops. Their mission is to function as human cruise missiles, rather disturbingly like modern suicide-bombers: go deep into the enemy's underbelly, and do as much damage as possible. If they survive long enough for a ground offensive to get to them, they get 20 acres and a mule -- more than likely, they will die gloriously for the Rodina, sacrificing themselves to bog the enemy down.

Goes right back to wargaming: the VDV only survives if the air umbrella and air-bridge is maintained against an aggressive and highly PO'd enemy. Just look at how fragile the regular Russian ground-pounders in Afghanistan became after their CAS retreated before the Stinger - the muj didn't even have a single Cessna 172, but once they got ANY effective weapon to counter Russian Air - and the Russians couldn't counter that threat - the Russian war effort evaporated....the VDV are considerably lighter than the Regular Army, and don't have the communications architecture that the US SOCOM has behind it.

[kaur]

1 photo set from last Pskov division exercise.

http://pilot.strizhi.info/photos/v/Pskov_2010/

PS can you find foreign equipment :)

[William F. Owen]

PS can you find foreign equipment :)
The Iveco 4 x 4? - and there was another vehicle I didn't recognise, plus a small UAV. How am I doing???

[kaur]

Wilf, you are right! There was Italian Iveco.

UAV is Russian made, but I do understand that Russians have failed seriously in UAV business and intend to start production in joint stock company with Israelis.

Text under the picture says, that Pskov unit has only one buggy.

Text under the picture with ATV's says that those are trophys. If they are trophys, this means that those are Georgian ATV's that Pskov unit brought back from 2008. year war. Maybe text means that those ATV's are hijacked by scouts from OPFOR according to exercise scenario :)

[kaur]

I said:


Text under the picture with ATV's says that those are trophys. If they are trophys, this means that those are Georgian ATV's that Pskov unit brought back from 2008. year war. Maybe text means that those ATV's are hijacked by scouts from OPFOR according to exercise scenario

According to exercise scenario VDV recce unit ambushed OPFOR unit and continued their mission with hijacked equipment.

[kaur]

Video from Pskov exercise.

http://strizhi.org/pilot-videos/smotr/VDV_BMD2_part1.wmv

[kaur]

Part II

http://strizhi.org/pilot-videos/smotr/VDV_BMD2_part2.wmv