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View Full Version : Network Centric Operation authors that are pro its use in 'small wars' (OOTW)



xander day
04-18-2009, 11:50 AM
Hey guys, i am looking for a counter-argument for an essay. what i am looking for is an advocate of NCO who believes that it is effective for use in small wars- ie, the use of decisive (conventional) force can fully defeat an insurgency.
all that i can find at the moment are either 4GW advocates or kaldorian nay-sayers.
any help will be useful!
thanks.
Xander Day.

William F. Owen
04-18-2009, 12:16 PM
Hey guys, i am looking for a counter-argument for an essay. what i am looking for is an advocate of NCO who believes that it is effective for use in small wars- ie, the use of decisive (conventional) force can fully defeat an insurgency.
all that i can find at the moment are either 4GW advocates or kaldorian nay-sayers.
any help will be useful!
thanks.
Xander Day.

Seems to me that the language here might trip us all up. Military Force does defeat insurgencies, because insurgencies are the use of military force themselves. - but I am not sure about the use of "conventional" or "decisive" as either useful or accurate descriptions.

...and one of the problems with NCW/NCO is that it is a "thing." At best it's equipment. How successful it is, is all in the application. Suggesting NCO/NCW as being applicable to COIN is akin to suggesting Tanks are useful in COIN, which is dependant on context, context and context.

For what it's worth, it has been mooted that the UK's technological edge was consistently effective in wearing down the (P)IRA.

Does this help?

xander day
04-18-2009, 12:30 PM
not really sadly. what i was asking is if there is an advocate of the NCO strategy that believes (essentially) that bombing an insurgency would be more effective (faster, better results etc) than a mainly political effort.
the authors that i have at the moment are all emphasising a political approach over a gulf war (either) campaign one.

if that makes sense...

John T. Fishel
04-18-2009, 12:57 PM
an insurgency was in its very early stage, with very few adherents, and you could target them precisely (and they were all bunched up), and it was a foco type insurgency, then on well placed bomb might take them all out - providing, of course, that the eyes on target got the coordinates right,:eek:

Otherwise, not!:rolleyes:

Cheers

JohnT

xander day
04-18-2009, 01:16 PM
yep! haha, but a one sided argument a good essay does not make. so yeah i gotta get other authors in. at the moment, one of the only authors remotely near this outlook is Thomas P.M. Barnett who argues for a leviathan (conventional) force and a sys admin (essentially policing and pascification) force to follow it. and this is obviously not a glaring support of conventionalism in COIN or he wouldnt have bothered writing about the sys admin force. on the other extreme i have Mary Kaldor who believes that any conventional warfighting negitively effects the overall effectiveness of the mission. i just need the modern author who believes that bombs solve everything! :mad:

William F. Owen
04-18-2009, 01:42 PM
not really sadly. what i was asking is if there is an advocate of the NCO strategy that believes (essentially) that bombing an insurgency would be more effective (faster, better results etc) than a mainly political effort.
the authors that i have at the moment are all emphasising a political approach over a gulf war (either) campaign one.

if that makes sense...

It does not make sense. It flies in the face of logic and reason. ALL War, COIN or Warfighting, is political. All Wars require campaigns and operations.

As John T. Fishel points out, if the insurgents comply with your targeting criteria, you may have a starting point. - which means if your insurgents set up in desert, devoid of civilian population, and made themselves easy to find.

Any competent Insurgent will attempt to inoculate himself against air power.

xander day
04-18-2009, 02:01 PM
Wilf, i know all of this; i have read clausewitz. what i am looking for is just an author that believes in NCO to the extent that they believe that bombing an insurgency will end the war faster than a 'hearts and minds' campaign.
i know many of the arguments, i know how insurgencys fail, all that i need is ballance for my essay. the distinction that i, albiet lazily, drew between bombing and a more political effort was essentially the distinction between bombing/heavy forces and hearts and minds/light forces. i have read enough to know that there are those on both sides of the camp, but at the moment all that i have actually been able to find are those on the lighter force side.

what i meant by 'emphasising a political approach over a gulf war campaign one' was the often repeated instance that iraq was such a mess-up because the political nature of ALL WAR was not adequately taken into consideration and instead preference was given to simply destroying enemy forces (... and infrastructure). i know that this flies in the face of all logic and reason, that is one of the points in my essay oddly enough.

William F. Owen
04-18-2009, 02:33 PM
the distinction that i, albiet lazily, drew between bombing and a more political effort was essentially the distinction between bombing/heavy forces and hearts and minds/light forces. i have read enough to know that there are those on both sides of the camp, but at the moment all that i have actually been able to find are those on the lighter force side.


Well there in may lie the problem. The distinction you draw is not one I recognise, and I suspect I may not be alone in that.

COIN is primarily about Security Operations, rather than Combat Operations, though Combat Operations are still required, and very necessary.

I for one, reject the use of the words "hearts and minds." It is not useful, misleading and misused, and even the man who originally said it, gave up using it.

xander day
04-18-2009, 02:43 PM
I for one, reject the use of the words "hearts and minds." It is not useful, misleading and misused, and even the man who originally said it, gave up using it.

i agree, but think that it is quite a useful cliché in that it is broadly understandible, even if i do still cringe whenever i hear it on the news.

as it is, i know that the distinction that i outlined exists. in simple terms it has been outlined as the division between proponants of NCO and 4th generation warfare (4GW) while there are those like Barnett who step over the divide and incorperate both outlooks into a combined strategy to combat insurgencys. as i have said previously: i have the 4GW side, i need the NCO side. as someone who seemingly knows alot about the subject, do you have any ideas?

LawVol
04-18-2009, 03:53 PM
not really sadly. what i was asking is if there is an advocate of the NCO strategy that believes (essentially) that bombing an insurgency would be more effective (faster, better results etc) than a mainly political effort.
the authors that i have at the moment are all emphasising a political approach over a gulf war (either) campaign one.

if that makes sense...

Probably not exactly what you're looking for, but maybe it'll help?

https://www.afresearch.org/skins/rims/q_mod_be0e99f3-fc56-4ccb-8dfe-670c0822a153/q_act_downloadpaper/q_obj_4f4b3453-b50d-42bf-adf0-6a5092d5ae5b/display.aspx?rs=enginespage
http://airpower.airforce.gov.au/admin/ProductFiles/Publication/Materials/310/PF61_Feb07.pdf

Bill Moore
04-18-2009, 05:57 PM
xander day, I thnk I'm tracking what you're attempting to do, but unfortunately I have seen very little written by air power advocates on how to "defeat" an insurgency using air power. I have seen papers that argued that air power was under utilized (didn't agree, but that is a personal opinion).

Maybe another angle to take is to look at what types of coercive strategies other nations have employed in the past to defeat or suppress insurgencies, such as the Nazi's, the Sovietsin Afghanistan, Syria, Saddam against the Kurds and Shi'as, and others who have used what many would consider brutal tactics to defeat an insurgency. I'll leave it up to you to determine if they were effective or not. Perhaps with the exception of the Soviets in Afghanistan, very few of these approaches were air centric, but they did use tactics that focused on the offense to suppress (or attempt to suppress) the insurgents, but unlike NCO, they attacked the social entity as a whole to cow them, not specific insurgent targets (which in a conventional sense doesn't exist in an insurgency). Thus the counterinsurgents added a severe costs/benefits ratio into the calculus of the insurgents.

I'm in agreement with the others here, the argument for using NCO to defeat an insurgency is illogical to me, so I "think" it is going to be hard to find that balance you're looking for, but good luck to you. Obviously NCO can support a more comprehensive approach, but I don't think that is what you're asking for?

John T. Fishel
04-18-2009, 08:51 PM
a USAF study from CADRE in the 1980s about the RAF in Iraq in the 1920s. There is also an official British report on the subject. This might give you some of what you are looking for.

You should also consider looking at what Kilcullen calls the Enemy Centric approach to COIN. It is rather more sophisticated than just bombing the insurgents into oblivion but still something of the same idea.

Good luck

JohnT

Spud
04-19-2009, 01:11 AM
http://www.airforce-magazine.com/MagazineArchive/Pages/2008/July%202008/0708COIN.aspx


Here is the biggest legend of all, so big that it qualifies as a full-fledged myth: Success in COIN requires boots on the ground and occupation of territory. Use of conventional ground troops is very expensive despite limited effectiveness. Last year, the Congressional Budget Office stated that the cost thus far in Iraq was $604 billion and the cost will eventually surpass a trillion dollars. Compare that to the air campaigns of Northern and Southern Watch, which were amazingly successful but cost less than $1 billion annually.

selil
04-19-2009, 01:47 AM
not really sadly. what i was asking is if there is an advocate of the NCO strategy that believes (essentially) that bombing an insurgency would be more effective (faster, better results etc) than a mainly political effort.
the authors that i have at the moment are all emphasising a political approach over a gulf war (either) campaign one.

if that makes sense...

Look up Maj. Gen. Charles Dunlap's work on Airpower and COIN. Gen. Dunlap is a really great guy even if he and I disagree on so many things. His principles on the use of the Air Force for LIC are down this direction. For USAF Sec. Wynn would be another good author to read. There have been several proponents of NCW and Air Power from the 80s till today. It isn't all NCW though.

Ron Humphrey
04-19-2009, 02:12 AM
but how exactly would one describe the approach China takes to what might be seen as insurgencies in Tibet or Taiwan at least by them.

Mike in Hilo
04-19-2009, 02:20 AM
Xander---Perhaps along the lines of Bill Moore's interpretation above: You may wish to take a look at Sir Robert Thompson, No Exit from Viet Nam, 2nd Edition--I don't have this book and it's been a long time since I've read it (1970 at the CORDS VN Training Center). I was somewhat taken aback by Thompson's defense in this book of US bombing of "V" hamlets--I mean, you'd expect him, instead, to argue strongly and uniformly against the sledgehammer approach as opposed to careful targeting--But Thompson was an advocate of placing the villager in a position where he would be physically unable to assist the insurgents, and by displacing the population into GVN controlled locations, the bombing had this effect....Thompson's point is made by quoting interviews with displaced villagers who, exhibiting a notable lack of resentment [If the author weren't the credible Thompson, I'd have questioned the veracity!], credited the bombing with having released them from an onerous, VC-controlled existence....

Cheers,
Mike.

slapout9
04-19-2009, 02:31 AM
Xander, below is the modern version of what the Air Force might do.
http://www.au.af.mil/au/aul/aupress/SAAS_Theses/Tolbert/Tolbert.pdf


Do a search, I have posted all the AWC college papers that John T. Fiishel talks about. One in particular that talks about Iraq in the 1920's goes into detail about how the Air Force went to great lengths to avoid collateral damage. Up to inventing 5 pound bomblets to use instead of large bombs. The interesting part is they (AF) first assigned an Intell officer to do detailed analysis of each area to be controlled. They then selected targets that had the best chance to influence village leadership.


An finally anything written by Colonel John Warden...who did and does believe they(small wars) can be fought primarily by Air Power.....but not completely. The ground portion should be handled by Special Force and the local inhabitants.


Hope this helps. If you can not locate the papers I mentioned let me know and I will find the links for you.

xander day
04-19-2009, 12:26 PM
Maybe another angle to take is to look at what types of coercive strategies other nations have employed in the past to defeat or suppress insurgencies, such as the Nazi's, the Sovietsin Afghanistan, Syria, Saddam against the Kurds and Shi'as, and others who have used what many would consider brutal tactics to defeat an insurgency. I'll leave it up to you to determine if they were effective or not. Perhaps with the exception of the Soviets in Afghanistan, very few of these approaches were air centric, but they did use tactics that focused on the offense to suppress (or attempt to suppress) the insurgents, but unlike NCO, they attacked the social entity as a whole to cow them, not specific insurgent targets (which in a conventional sense doesn't exist in an insurgency). Thus the counterinsurgents added a severe costs/benefits ratio into the calculus of the insurgents.

I'm in agreement with the others here, the argument for using NCO to defeat an insurgency is illogical to me, so I "think" it is going to be hard to find that balance you're looking for, but good luck to you. Obviously NCO can support a more comprehensive approach, but I don't think that is what you're asking for?

for some reason i had overlooked the idea of using Soviet/Russian experience in Afghanistan/Chechnia to illustrate the same point that i was searching for. i had looked at it, made notes on it, and was including it in my essay, but hadnt granted it the prominance that it deserved. thanks for the comment, i may have just found what i was looking for! :D

and yeah, the use of NCO to win against insurgency is illogical to me too, which is why I was trying to find an argument for it, as a kind of straw man i suppose... I realise now that the reason why i cant find anything remotely modern that argues this is because everyone finds it illogical too :D

Slapout, thanks for the Tolbert link, very useful.

Mike, i really really wish that i could find that book anywhere near me, sadly i think that my timescale will prevent me from accessing it! shame because it sounds amazingly useful (bombing to achieve the same goals as the protected hamlets initiative!!! wouldnt have thought that anyone would have had the guts(?) to argue that...)

also, Maj. Gen. Charles Dunlap's work on Airpower and COIN is pretty much exactly what i was looking for!
thanks for all of your help so far guys!
Xander