Winning the War in Afghanistan [Archive] - Page 2

jmm99

09-12-2009, 03:43 AM

Primarily to BW & Ken, but to all others also.

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Pursuit of Targeted Enemies

from BW
... 1. To find the murdering sons of dogs who had attacked us, and to punish them for their actions.

That mission has not been accomplished (my prior post on the four ends of punishment). That mission is not geo-focused since the targets have moved - and may move again and again. My take is: that mission should not be time-limited (the Scythian, Roman & Mongol dogged pursuits of specific enemy leaders are models - we could use a Subodai in charge of that project); and would be best done by my little belled cat (a hitman at heart), who seems not what he is (at heart).

What is the danger of dogged pursuits ? The danger is not in the pursuit of targeted individuals. The danger is in attempting to "take care" of all AQ, or all Taliban, or all terrorists. We have an example of that strategy. In 1649, as a culmination of a series of "beaver wars", the Iroquois destroyed the Huron homeland (near Lake Simcoe, Ontario). Not satisfied with that, they relentlessly pursued the Huron remnants in all directions as they fled to other tribes. As those refused to give up their "guests", the Iroquois attacked them in far flung efforts from the Mouth of the St. Lawrence, into the wilds of Ontario, and onto the Ohio valley and the Great Lakes.

In the early 1660s, the Iroquois had gone a few portages too far; and suffered two major defeats by the Ojibwe and their allies (the remnants of the tribes attacked by the Iroquois in the "Great Pursuit" of the Huron remnants) - one near Green Bay, the other at Iroquois Point near S.S. Marie. The net result of the Great Pursuit was devastation of Ontario, Lower Michigan, the Ohio Valley and a good chunk of Pennsylvania. It also resulted in the decline of the (then) Five Nations, both economically and militarily. So, that vignette should be a lesson learned.

In any event, the targeted AQ mission is not a reason for substantial force projection in Astan - the belled cat requires only his own little litter box and a good supply of yummies.

That brings me to BW's major question:

from BW
So, I ask this august group, those who feel morally compelled to hold this piece of dirt at all costs when no enemy action fixes us to it, nor does any critical interest become exposed to enemy action if we withdraw to better ground, which, exactly, of these two ends do you think we can either achieve or enhance by this plan??

I am not the best person to brief this point, which is really Ken's point - and, as to that, I'm not totally convinced. But, what follows are my thoughts.

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Compromise and "Saving Face"

My initial reaction to Ken's argument (that compromise is considered surrender) was that can't be totally right; but it isn't totally wrong - and that I've seen a better explanation elsewhere. I found it in my Manchu law book (S. van der Sprenkel, Legal Institutions in Manchu China (http://www.amazon.com/Legal-Institutions-Manchu-China-Sociological/dp/1845200020), 1966 - from a long ago Comp Law class).

The Chinese have two words that physically can mean "face"; but which non-physically form the CoG of their traditional village legal system.

The first is mien-tzu, which focuses on prestige and reputation; and as such can be accumulated (or diminished) by deliberate efforts. For example, mien-tzu can be increased by a series of successful kan-ch'ing transactions (private and personal relationships, economic and non-economic) - or decreased by a series of unsuccessful transactions. In short, mien-tzu is an intangible "stock of goods" which can be added to, or decreased, by degrees.

The second (and more important) is lien, which focuses on the image of good character and personal integrity. It involves the confidence that others have in the person with lien, and the confidence that person has, to conscientiously fulfil his social role - at whatever the cost to the person with lien. A necesary corollary is that higher demands are placed on those with higher social status. This last point is also made by the Chinese treatise on "Unrestricted Warfare" - the US (as a hegemon) has to comply with its own rules. So, this is not merely a theory of old Manchu law.

Unlike mien-tzu, lien is a quality which is kept intact or forfeited - one cannot have a little bit of lien. So, the question (rhetorical) was "since he doesn't care for lien, what can you do with him ?" And the answer is "nothing" - or in Manchu legal terms: pu-yao lien - not to want lien is a serious accusation meaning that the person does not care what society thinks of his character. That person is ready to obtain benefits in defiance of moral standards; and as to whom social sanctions have no effect because he does not recognize the rules of the game. Worse yet, if that person is in the habit of not wanting lien, his friends and neighbors cannot predict his future behavior. In the most extreme case, the person lacking lien becomes a pariah and outlaw.

What do mien-tzu and lien have to do with the concept of compromise - which is the key to settlement of Chinese village disputes; and, if properly done, does not involve loss of either mien-tzu and lien. Let's start with a very simple transaction - a loan from A to B. If B has to borrow, that is an admission of inadequate mien-tzu. So, we see the solution in what we call a simple promissory note:

B, being in need of money, borrows from A of X village with C as a middleman & witness, the sum of Y in principal and interest. This amount to be repaid on [date]. Oral agreements cannot be depended upon, therefore this written contract is signed.

/s/ Middleman C

/s/ Borrower B

What did the middleman (chung-jen) do for his 3% fee (his scribe got 2%) ? Simply stated, he negotiated the transaction - amount of principal and interest, due date, and his representation that A needed the money. If the loan was refused, the middleman was the scapegoat - and, if granted, was also responsible (in a moral sense) for the terms of the loan.

If the loan was not repaid, the original middleman (and perhaps added middlemen) entered the picture to arrange a settlement - often a compromise. In that way, the parties' positions were not cast in stone, but were the middleman's positions. Anyway, the middleman went back and forth (akin to a mediator) until a compromise was reached. In that compromise, mien-tzu might be gained or lost by one or both parties; but both parties retained their lien since the compromise was the middleman's moral responsibility.

So, that is why I suggested some form of Peace Enforcement as the Astan end goal, where the Astan govt, Pashtuns and Pakistanis are the parties to a negotiated settlement. And, where we (Coalition) are not parties to the negotiations. And, where we (Coalition) are not middlemen either. In short, we keep our nose out of the settlement negotiations - and any resultant compromises would be the responsibility of the middleman (e.g., Indonesia ?). In short, we should take a lesson learned from the Paris Accords and not try to be Kissengers.

If they don't start negotiations within a reasonable period (as determined by Slap :D ), we leave - except for the belled cat.

Isn't there something like a disappearing and reappearing cat ?

PS: When I bought the Manchu book in the 60s, softcover was $2.50 - now Amazon has it in hardcover for over $100. Ain't inflation wonderful - and going to get more wonderful unless we adjust our attitudes.

Bob's World

09-12-2009, 09:07 AM

I think Ken and I have both gone on record as big fans of "dogged pursuit." Like so many things in life, HOW one does them is far more important that WHAT one does. (Think MLK's streetsweeper speech). America MUST be relentless in the pursuit of AQ, but we started big and got bigger. My vote is for smaller, more focused, less demands on our allies and less impact on the states and populaces where the action takes place. Be very clear that this is an enduring effort, that we are not going to either ask for permission nor apologize for our actions, but that we have a duty and that we will pursue it. Then hand the mission to a small, well resourced team of quiet professionals and let them do their job.

As to Afghanistan, I think America has an opportunity to have a great relationship with this country, and that there is at a certain core level a lot in common between the American spirit and the Afghan spirit. We just need to 'rightsize' the relationship. It takes a big man to admit ones mistakes and to start fresh; but usually such action draws far more respect than disdain. I think its ok to say "we made some decisions, that in retrospect probably weren't the best ones, and we need to readjust our position and policy here. I find it a bit crazy that we can double our effort with greater ease than we can half our effort. That bit of psychology probably explains why nations get sucked deeper and deeper into these situations until they either 'win' or 'lose.' I think we win by taking a more moderate course in support of the Afghan government (whatever that may become) and its people. Rightsizing our 'dogged pursuit' efforts enables this as well.

davidbfpo

09-12-2009, 10:41 AM

Citing Slap
The Original concept of Problem Oriented Policing is better IMO....... similar to what they are calling Intelligence Led Policing.

Slap,

My impression from open sources from faraway is that in Afghanistan there's not that much intelligence at all levels. Yes, tactically we know the Taliban can fight - better - we cannot 'Find' them enough before they start shooting, laying IEDs etc.

The UK military in Helmand have pursued several approaches, each brigadier has a different emphasis (indicated recently in a SWJ article http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2009/09/tactical-strategic-communicati/ ).

I exclude the high value target (HVT) option which clearly can be successful, although I now note there are doubts over Rashid Rauf being killed in one strike.

The more I read here the deeper the quagmire appears.

davidbfpo

slapout9

09-12-2009, 02:10 PM

Citing Slap

Slap,

My impression from open sources from faraway is that in Afghanistan there's not that much intelligence at all levels. Yes, tactically we know the Taliban can fight - better - we cannot 'Find' them enough before they start shooting, laying IEDs etc.

The UK military in Helmand have pursued several approaches, each brigadier has a different emphasis (indicated recently in a SWJ article http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2009/09/tactical-strategic-communicati/ ).

I exclude the high value target (HVT) option which clearly can be successful, although I now note there are doubts over Rashid Rauf being killed in one strike.

The more I read here the deeper the quagmire appears.

davidbfpo

Hi David, I have said this many times that one of the best lessons and one of the hardest lessons I learned was to get the criminal to come to you.:)

This is a quote from the article you cited.

“We are not talking here of a major military operation to take Musa Qala….The idea is to let the population of Musa Qala come to us”.

There is another article I am trying to find about an NGO worker that preferred to deal with DEA intelligence because they were better then the Military type:eek:

Also the only problem I see with your armchair is you need to come out of it more, your insights are excellent.

marct

09-12-2009, 02:37 PM

MikeF

09-12-2009, 04:13 PM

However, I think it fails to take into account the ability of the Taliban and its motives, as well as the possible reaction of Pakistan and Iran. The GoA is experiencing a crisis of legitimacy at the moment in the international arena and a slow-motion destruction of said legitimacy in the eyes of the Afghan public. The withdrawal of foreign forces will mean in reality handing on-the-ground control over entire provinces of Afghanistan over to the Taliban and its allies. It is difficult to see how the GoA can survive in such a state.

Such a GoA would likely be forced to bandwagon support from what commanders it could bribe or manhandle to its side. Iran, and more importantly, the Pakistani military establishment, would seek out similar allies to entrench their own interests. Large segments of Pakistan's military appear to believe that Pakistan's interests are best served by aligning with the Taliban, the HiG, and the Haqqanis rather than the GoA.

The examples of El Salvador, the Philippines, and Colombia lack the troublesome neighbors that Afghanistan has, as well as the centrality to the jihadi universe that Afghanistan represents. All three states were also far more advanced and able than the GoA or the Afghan Army and Police are ever likely to be, even with American assistance.

Tequila,

Excellent points; however, we're probably going to face those issues regardless of the strategy we choose. We disrupted the balance of powers in SW Asia with our invasions in Iraq and Afghanistan. As the scientists say, for every action there is an equal reaction. I imagine we will see a lot of brinksmanship, deception, and coercion as different states seek hegemony.

We cannot copy/paste the Phillipines/ El Salv/ or Colombia solution into Afghanistan. We have to use METT-TC.

Slap- I've got my homework. :cool:

v/r

Mike

slapout9

09-12-2009, 04:59 PM

David and everybody, here is the article/BLOG post from the SWJ Blog by Allsion Brown, pay attention to point number 8 about Intelligence, also the whole article on dealing with drugs in A'stan.

8. "DEA intelligence experts and a growing network of informants — something other U.S. agencies have been unable to duplicate — are now providing detailed "actionable" information; "target sets" that can be rapidly exploited in "capture-kill" missions." No other U.S. agencies are tasked this way so no other agency has duplicated DEA efforts. More interesting is DEA's past unwillingness to heed recommendations from "networks of informants" used by other agencies. The "hit the kingpins not the farmers" strategy was suggested as early as February 2004 Kenefick and Morgan in a think piece for USAID (and perhaps earlier from sources I do not know). The US has not pursued this strategy till now. The works of David Mansfield and his colleagues on lowering incentives to produce poppy are cited in previous posts on this site.

http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2009/09/lieutenant-colonel-oliver-nort/

MikeF, glad you could find it.

jmm99

09-12-2009, 06:37 PM

A more in-depth look at AI and actual legal practice is found in this 200+ page thesis, Neural Networks for Legal Quantum Prediction (https://circle.ubc.ca/bitstream/2429/3460/1/ubc_1995-0026.pdf), Andrew J. Terrett (LL.M. 1994, UBC) - leave it to a Brit at a Canadian school. :D Good survey of the field up to early 90s (so, a bit dated)

Much of this, from the legal practitioner's standpoint, is pattern recognition - some implicit, some explicit. I have a case (that's a pattern). Have I seen similar patterns; if so, find them. Compare patterns - which ones are closest ? How does my pattern differ; how is it the same ? How can I develop my pattern ?

I think the most important thing is not trying to cram down the at hand pattern into an existing pattern. Each case is a little different, even from existing patterns which are quite close. So, not a cookbook solution; but one that requires discernment - and a bit of artistry, even if you are primarily a technician as I am. ;)

These same concepts may have some bearing on military and law enforcement solutions.

My bottom line is that, at least in law, there is no easy mechanical solution, where you can just check the boxes. Except, in easy cases; but lawyers do not get easy cases - those are resolved by the parties without need for much legal beagle input. :)

Ken White

09-12-2009, 06:39 PM

JMM:
In any event, the targeted AQ mission is not a reason for substantial force projection in Astan - the belled cat requires only his own little litter box and a good supply of yummies.I certainly believe that to be correct.

Bob's World:
So, I ask this august group, those who feel morally compelled to hold this piece of dirt at all costs when no enemy action fixes us to it, nor does any critical interest become exposed to enemy action if we withdraw to better ground, which, exactly, of these two ends do you think we can either achieve or enhance by this plan??I've heard no one concerned with 'holding' any dirt except the COIN fetishists with their 'clear, hold and build' routine and that implies only temporary holding in the cleared state. I don't think anyone is wedded to the dirt. I'm pretty well convinced the bulk of the US Army would like nothing better than to say goodbye to Afghanistan.

You are correct that no enemy action fixes us to it -- but that elides the point that history indicates that potential enemy actions merit consideration. You seem to disagree. Do you believe that there will be no effect if we abruptly depart or that such affect will not create other problems?

You say no critical interest becomes exposed to enemy action if we withdraw. Define 'critical' and define 'enemy action.'

Withdraw to better ground? Where, precisely would that be?

You prefaced the above quoted question with this"
So, based on this I argued then that the GWOT was really over, that we had met the ends and that what we were engaged in now was really something very different and we needed to either identify it as such, or begin standing it down.Two questions; While you have declared the GWOT over and the current Administration no longer uses the term; have all the actions put in play for that misnamed war ceased or should they cease. Note the underline, all...

If the answer to that question is no, then your solution is suspect at best and very premature at worst. Further, it would seem that we have in effect identified it as different -- in that the phrase is no longer used and the current Administration has said they propose to increase the Intelligence and Law Enforcement actions previously begun as a part of said misnamed war. It would also appear that we are in fact standing down the aspects of that 'war' you do not agree with -- just not doing it as rapidly as you seem to prefer.

You end that post with :
Physical Terrain in such warfare means nothing to the enemy, be it hill 875 outside Dak To; or an entire country such as Afghanistan. We need to focus on the populace...That's what seems to be occurring; the emphasis on holding terrain is a phenomenon induced by nothing more that poor education and training; learned habits die hard. The solution to that problem lies in better education and training, strategic thought has nothing to do with it...

That, however, merely explains some of the tactical level terrain oriented actions. I have seen absolutely no indication at the operational or strategic level with any concern for terrain other than as a mechanism to provide security for the populace. Thus, I submit that the intent to remain in Afghanistan a bit longer is not terrain oriented but is in fact populace oriented and specifically is an attempt to obtain what you say you desire, their neutrality if not their support.

Back to JMM on compromise is considered surrender. Bad statement on my part -- and Fuchs properly called me on it. There is validity to the premise, however a more accurate statement is that compromise is seized upon by born hagglers as a sign of weakness and something that must or can be exploited. The counterpoint, of course is that one should be quite careful and aware of the adversary's possible perceptions and his potential counter actions. In some cases it may be desirable not to the logical thing but to do something that seems perverse. That can be particularly true in cross cultural conflicts and to the denizen of the ME and South Asia, a withdrawal is interpreted, rightly or wrongly as a potential weakness and is to be exploited in every possible way. One has to tailor operations to counter the specific opponent.

Bob's World again:
My vote is for smaller, more focused, less demands on our allies and less impact on the states and populaces where the action takes place... Then hand the mission to a small, well resourced team of quiet professionals and let them do their job.That I agree with. My perception is that was planned all along and is getting worked up. What was also planned all along was a strategic disruption and a deterrent action. Those actions, had either been well stated by the political crowd and well executed by the US Army would have been over long ago. Due to errors of commission and omission by all the Armed Forces as well as the political heirarchy, it's off schedule. That simple. The basic plan is still being followed, it 'll just take a bit longer.
It takes a big man to admit ones mistakes and to start fresh; but usually such action draws far more respect than disdain. I think its ok to say "we made some decisions, that in retrospect probably weren't the best ones, and we need to readjust our position and policy here.There's more to it than that; the many mistakes -- not all at the strategic level -- have put us in a position of having to do what we said we would do for very good reasons. It's one thing to say "we erred." it's quite another to say "We erred and we meant what we said at the time but now we no longer want to do that."

You can correctly say that's not the case -- but I'm pretty sure that's the way the rest of the world will see it. Not just the Afghans and Islam; the rest of the world. Surely someone intent on restoring American values and prestige cannot be advocating walking into that trap?
I think we win by taking a more moderate course in support of the Afghan government (whatever that may become) and its people. Rightsizing our 'dogged pursuit' efforts enables this as well.So do I. Had we done a better job in Afghanistan, we wouldn't be having this discussion; we didn't so we're late in departing. I guess the difference is that we disagree on two things:

What, precisely, is such a moderate course at this time?

Are the 'quiet professionals' totally ready at this time to undertake that right sized pursuit?

The US Government seems to share my concerns...

Bob's World

09-12-2009, 10:15 PM

I guess that is the $64K question.

I actually think the scope of the solutions begins to take care of itself once one re-scopes their Ends-Ways-Means.

Step one: Go back to our original Ends. Deny Sanctuary to AQ in Afghanistan.

Step two: Flush the "Ways" of "Hold-Clear-Build" that sets as success the production of a military that looks much like ours (what would Afghanistan possibly need such a force for? Haven't the Greek, British, Russian and American experiences all proven that such a force is the wrong one to deal with any threat arising from the populace, and that the populace itself if the perfect force for dealing with any foreign military that dare invade??) coupled with a government that looks much like ours.

Step three: Set a new "ways" that focuses on building a security force that is very much a Gendarmerie that can do semi-military and civil policing both.; couple this with a very focused, targeted by community program of identifying those failures of governance that are most important to these many pockets of populace and facilitating Afghan efforts to address the same.

Step four: Stop using Afghanistan as a base of operations to attack the populace of Pakistan, and tailor our man-hunting against AQSL to just be the actual AQSL. Take any intel bubba who shows a "7-degrees to Kevin Bacon" type of chart as to why we need to attack some totally unrelated organization to the nearest infantry squad and make him walk point for a month. This includes stopping our campaign against the Taliban and entering negotiations with the same. These guys aren't "terrorists" and they aren't AQ, they are nationalist insurgents, and as such they are part of the future of any Afghanistan that emerges from the current drama. Make them pony up and help.

Step five: Assess the AQ(UW)N that is networked across the region and determine which nodes are critical to enabling AQ's influence, and what mid-low level guys actually make those specific nodes function. Take those guys out and disrupt the network.

Step six: Wrap all of this in a cogent narrative that matches both our own national principles as well as our actions on the ground. Never let any of those things get out of line, and remember that the entire world is watching, and they judge us by what and how we do it, not by what we say.

Step seven: Stop calling Afghanistan and Iraq "wars." America is at peace. Did we say we were "a nation at war" in 1876 when Custer led his men into the valley of the Little Big Horn? Did we say we were "a nation at war" when Pershing quelled the Moro uprising in 1911? The list goes on. Peace is dirty business for us in the Military, we don't need to drag the entire nation into the muck with us. Bad form, and it causes us to exaggerate consequences. Implement "Full-Spectrum Deterrence" instead, which includes everything described above as part of keeping a lid on things. It also includes re-balanced deterrence against state threats around the world and various other quasi-state, non-state, and insurgent threats in a comprehensive scheme that never lets actions to achieve an effect on one get so out of balance that they provoke many others.

Ok, there's a start. I hammered that out alone in 10 minutes. I suspect a real staff could clean up the holes in short order.

This isn't rocket science, it is social science. Once we stop trying to control every outcome, things will begin to sort themselves out. We don't cut and run, we stay in appropriate numbers and roles to enable evolution. The world is a dynamic place right not. We can't stop it, but we have to get in there and paddle like hell to keep up with the flow of change.

Oh yeah, almost forgot. All of these steps must be done concurrently.

Surferbeetle

09-12-2009, 10:55 PM

PS: For a view of how the legal system, judges & lawyers actually operate, take a look at "FROM LEGAL THEORIES TO NEURAL NETWORKS AND FUZZY REASONING (http://www2.cirsfid.unibo.it/~sartor/GSCirsfidOnlineMaterials/GSOnLinePublications/GSPUB1999IntroductionPhilipps.pdf)" (only 11 pages).

A more in-depth look at AI and actual legal practice is found in this 200+ page thesis, Neural Networks for Legal Quantum Prediction (https://circle.ubc.ca/bitstream/2429/3460/1/ubc_1995-0026.pdf), Andrew J. Terrett (LL.M. 1994, UBC) - leave it to a Brit at a Canadian school. :D Good survey of the field up to early 90s (so, a bit dated)

Mike,

Greatly appreciate the links to the papers...;) :D

Discovery Channel's Extreme Engineering: Hollands Barriers to the Sea (http://dsc.discovery.com/convergence/engineering/holland/interactive/interactive.html) is an interesting look at the large scale application of some of the underlying principles discussed in your links. Here's for one your reading files: ETL 1110-2-556, Risk-Based Analysis in Geotechnical Engineering for Support of Planning Studies (http://140.194.76.129/publications/eng-tech-ltrs/etl1110-2-556/toc.html).

Best,

Steve

Ken White

09-13-2009, 01:02 AM

Step one: Go back to our original Ends. Deny Sanctuary to AQ in Afghanistan.I do not think that was the original 'end.' I believe that 'end' was send a message that the hosting of purveyors on international terror attacks would draw a disproportionate response. It later was changed for reasons that are not yet clear as far as I know. If I'm correct, you're proceeding from the wrong premise. I am aware of what was said for public consumption, I'm also aware of the maneuvering over who was going to do what to who with respect to Afghanistan.

Um, I hate to say this but your ten minute effort shows some shortcomings that may take a while for the nation and DoD and all its organs -- and the Afghans --to digest. Doing what you suggest will take even longer than what we seem to be doing, I think. What I think we're trying to do BTW, doesn't seem to me to be that far removed from your approach.

Step two. I agree, What about the Afghans? What's their take -- I recall your concern that we not try to dictate to other nations and peoples

Step three. Comment above applies. Added questions: How long will it take to determine those problems and implement solutions; are the Afghans capable of doing this; if not do we assist them in so doing?

Step four. I'm not even slightly convinced that there are only two categories of opponents; AQ is one, the Talibs another -- but how many factions of Talibs are there. Those two do not address Haqqani (who is a nominal Talib only when it suits), Hekmatyr (who probably eats Talibs for breakfast) and their ilk -- or the drug smugglers among several others. I'm also not convinced that attacks within Pakistan are any more destabilizing than are the HVT hunts by some folks within Afghanistan that have hit specious targets and done excessive collateral damage. Do those cease also? As for dealing with the Talibs, I agree, I gather Karzai and others are trying to do that, that we and the British have also made overtures and that said Talibs, south Asian hagglers to a man, are playing hard to get -- as you know, it take two willing parties to deal...

Step five. I agree -- I thought that's what my Grandson in Law off the Hill was doing. That's what I'm pretty sure he he thought he was doing though he has said nothing (I may be old but I'm not unobservant). What do you think he was doing?

Step six. How do you propose to get rid of American politics? That's always been the long pole in your tent and you seem to discount it -- yet it impacts most of your goals. Not favorably, either...

Step seven. See response to Step six, that's at least part of the 'war' moniker, the politics of it all. Re your prior times questions; LINK (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/American_Indian_Wars), LINK (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moro_Rebellion). I agree with full spectrum deterrence. How long will it take to implement that as a national strategy? In the interim, my suspicion is that the kids over there getting shot at think they're in a war. I suspect that if you don't want to call it a war, they'll be tolerant and respectful but they'll snicker a bit when you aren't looking.

P.S

What do you do with NATO and the numerous others that we cajoled into coming to the Party with a promise to rebuild Afghanistan?

P.P.S

I did forget. Concurrently? By the USA? By DoD to include the Army and SOCOM? To include OGA? Oka-a-a-ay-y-y-. :D

jmm99

09-13-2009, 01:47 AM

Hey Bob and Steve

I see this from BW:

[1] Ok, there's a start. [2] I hammered that out alone in 10 minutes. [3] I suspect a real staff could clean up the holes in short order.

and my surfing golden bug friend is trying to get me to learn some civil engineering using the probabilistic approach. That one will get a PM; and Steve, I did try a case involving some of the factors in the Corps study (after staying at a Holiday Inn Express).

As to Bob:

1. Yup, it is a start - seriously; and it presents a discussion framework, which is a positive thing (easy to shoot down a target; harder to build and set up the target).

2. I had a comment about "in 10 minutes" - tongue bitten.

3. I had a comment about "real staff" - tongue also bitten.

Read Steve's article - some holes can't be cleaned up in short order.

Anyway, your seven points look interesting to me. My cup runneth over.

In fact, my glass of Guinness is empty.

Cheers,

Mike

Surferbeetle

09-13-2009, 02:39 AM

Armchair Operational/Tactical Level CAP/PRT Model assumptions:

Mr. Gates’ statement that we are staying in Afghanistan is accepted at face value.
Oil Spot theory is good…esoteric how many angels can dance on a pin models not so much...
Surferbeetle’s Grid Square will be replicated n times to cover however many grid squares in Afghanistan that we are to work in as per civilian strategy. Focus is limited to Economics, Security, and Governance all of which are pursued simultaneously.
ISAF inhabiting the grid square live on the economy, drink local water, and eat local food for the majority of their needs. (Ack!)
Reachback to civilian experts and single enterprise resource software (Oracle or SAP…who cares which) are mandated for all.

Security:

Marc & Anthro friends help to ID who’s in charge and FSO’s partner with GoA resident in Grid Square to cut some deals with local security elements.
Ken, his SF progeny, Slap (Police SME), Davidbfpo (Police SME), and Gendarmerie Experts partner with GoA resident in Grid Square to integrate and train local factions into a functional Gendarmerie (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=1584&highlight=police).
Ken, his SF progeny, Slap (Police SME), Davidbfpo(Police SME), and Gendarmerie Experts partner with GoA resident in Grid Square so that local factions reduce local security incidents by 7% or more.

Economics:

Marc & Anthro friends help to ID who’s in charge and FSO’s partner with GoA resident in Grid Square to cut some deals with local economics elements.
Department of Ag types examine existing crop and livestock outputs for SB’s Grid Square and partner with GoA resident in Grid Square to help local farmers and sheep herders to improve output by 7% or more.
Dept of Commerce types examine existing business within SB’s Grid Square and partner with GoA resident in Grid Square to help local business folk to improve output by 7% or more.
Corps of Engineers types examine existing road, irrigation, drinking water, and wastewater infrastructure within SB’s Grid Square and partner with GoA resident in Grid Square to help locals to improve capacity by 7% or more.

Governance:

Marc & Anthro friends help to ID who’s in charge and FSO’s partner with GoA resident in Grid Square to cut some deals with local governance elements.
Form of local governance is what it is...
Mike and DOJ friends examine existing system within SB’s Grid Square and partner with GoA resident in Grid Square to help to improve capacity of existing governance.

Okay, time for more beer...:D

Bob's World

09-13-2009, 02:42 AM

Hey, I didn't say I hadn't been thinking about this stuff since they handed me a copy of "Street Without Joy" to read at the Q-Course back in '89, but yeah, from the time I read Ken's post it took about 10 to hammer out the key points.

And Its not about how long COIN takes, COIN is a continuous process for every government, just as "insurgency" is a continuous process for every populace. It's the great dance...

Its about understanding what our role, not executing COIN, but conducting FID with a tailored effort to assist the Afghan COIN; while continuing to work the shadows to deal with AQ. Smaller force that understands we can not even appear to be occupiers, and that any Afghan solution we enable is better than any US solution we build for them.

Dayuhan

09-13-2009, 03:58 AM

Populaces are rebelling in the middle east for a reason. That reason is not "ideology," it is not about religion, and it is not "because they hate us." It is about politics, and human nature, and man's natural tendency to prefer a hell of his own making than a paradise forced upon him by another.

I know we've been through this before elsewhere, but it's an important question: are "populaces in the Middle East" really rebelling? Which populaces? Who has had a paradise - or anything else for that matter - "forced on him by another"?

slapout9

09-13-2009, 04:18 AM

Surferbeetle, Read the whole article. Slap would be hanging with the DEA and Allison Brown.

David and everybody, here is the article/BLOG post from the SWJ Blog by Allsion Brown, pay attention to point number 8 about Intelligence, also the whole article on dealing with drugs in A'stan.

http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2009/09/lieutenant-colonel-oliver-nort/

MikeF, glad you could find it.

jmm99

09-13-2009, 04:42 AM

This took more than 10 minutes. I've tried to be constructive and positive.

---------------------------------------
Step One

from BW
Step one: Go back to our original Ends. Deny Sanctuary to AQ in Afghanistan.

That is a good idea; so, let us do precisely that.

Under the Authorization for Use of Military Force(AUMF), §2(a), 115 Stat. 224, note following 50 U. S. C.§1541 (2000 ed., Supp. V), the President is authorized “to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons.”

This is a broad threat-centric mandate. It has not been updated. To date, no nation has been proved to fit the definition of a "nation" which "planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001". The direct participants in 9/11 can be fairly defined as AQ and its members who "planned, authorized, committed, or aided" those attacks. Indirect participation (that is, "aided"; as in financial assistence) extended to various organizations and persons - some known in open source, some not. Since the direct actors (the AQ "SMUs") died, the focus was on those AQ members who "planned, authorized" the attacks, as well as the "aiders".

The AUMF went on to include in its focus "those nations, organizations, or persons" which "harbored such organizations or persons". The Taliban of Mullah Omar (not a nation - as proved by many of my spilled bytes) was such an "organization" - and the good mullah is such a "person". That having been said, AQ (which I agree acts as a base to wage unconventional warfare via its own "SOF" units and via supported indigenous groups) is very much a transnational enterprise. It has been and is supported by any number of organizations and persons in any number of countries. Astan is not the only country within the scope of the AUMF.

The AUMF also looks to the future, stating clearly its purpose was "to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons.” That lamguage would, of course, justify a conclusion that, AQ having left Astan (I believe that is presently factual - corrections accepted), steps could be taken to deny them future sanctuary in Astan. And, also in Canada, Mexico, the UK, Germany, Israel, etc.

Conclusion: "Step one", as stated, is not only a misconstruction of the AUMF; it would seriously limit the scope of the 2001 AUMF to one nation and one organization. As such, its error is similar to those who looked upon the Tonkin Gulf Resolution as being limited to Vietnam; whereas, its focus was on SE Asia, where the president was authorized to take appropriate action based upon the circunstances that ensued in that region. Of course, having a hunting license does not require an attempt to kill everything in the woods. The adverse results of the Iroquois' "Great Pursuit" of the Huron remnants (to the Iroquois and to the regions they devastated) is a lesson learned on point.

Also see comment to Step Seven.

-----------------------------------
Step Two

from BW
Step two: Flush the "Ways" of "Hold-Clear-Build" that sets as success the production of a military that looks much like ours (what would Afghanistan possibly need such a force for? Haven't the Greek, British, Russian and American experiences all proven that such a force is the wrong one to deal with any threat arising from the populace, and that the populace itself if the perfect force for dealing with any foreign military that dare invade??) coupled with a government that looks much like ours.

My comments here are very limited because this forum has a huge number of officers and SNCOs who have done COIN and FID in armed conflicts from Korea up to the present - and many have written about their experiences and those of others.

My suggestion is that the US and NATO (to say nothing of the Astan military and police) have limited capabilities in Astan. I concur with my UK friend David that those limited capabilities would be better applied in the "North". My geo-line was Hwy 1 (as mapped); David may have other thoughts - as may many others. The bottom line is that we have to focus COIN and FID within a limited geo-area; and take into account a limited timeframe (e.g., a presidential cycle ?).

-----------------------------------------
Step Three

from BW
Step three: Set a new "ways" that focuses on building a security force that is very much a Gendarmerie that can do semi-military and civil policing both.; couple this with a very focused, targeted by community program of identifying those failures of governance that are most important to these many pockets of populace and facilitating Afghan efforts to address the same.

I'm prejudiced in favor of gendarmerie in this situation. Astan's neighbors are too big for a conventional military force to be useful.

As to governance, Astan is totally FUBAR - have an article on my HD by a NG CPT which points out the many problems. E.g., two guys who have a property line dispute have no "judicial" recourse, except for our Taliban friends. A small - focus on local (village) - criminal and civil justice system (built on traditional Astan village justice) might be possible in secured areas.

It would not be pretty, but it might work.

A national criminal and civil justice system is presently (and for far in the future) a joke. What Astan has now is a national government on paper (nice org charts with names). So did Diem (one can read Thompson's book to find all about that - which was a lesser problem than Astan).

I'll thnk about that one - Rule of Law on a local level.

-----------------------------------------
Step Four

from BW
Step four: Stop using Afghanistan as a base of operations to attack the populace of Pakistan, and tailor our man-hunting against AQSL to just be the actual AQSL. Take any intel bubba who shows a "7-degrees to Kevin Bacon" type of chart as to why we need to attack some totally unrelated organization to the nearest infantry squad and make him walk point for a month. This includes stopping our campaign against the Taliban and entering negotiations with the same. These guys aren't "terrorists" and they aren't AQ, they are nationalist insurgents, and as such they are part of the future of any Afghanistan that emerges from the current drama. Make them pony up and help.

I'll attribute this semi-diatribe to ???; it does have some good points otherwise. IF, the Pashtuns (which include the Taliban) can be brought to the negotiating table. Our policy has not been to attack the "populace of Pakistan" (unless you know something I do not). We have targeted various Taliban faction leaders. Whether with or without Paki approval, I know not.

My take on negotiations has been stated:

(1) We (Coalition) force negotiations between the Astan govt (this will include Northern Alliance factions which are still very much alive); the Pashtuns (including a bunch of Taliban factions); and the Pakistanis. That is what coercive peace enforcement is all about (for those unacquainted, RTFM).

(2) We (Coalition) will not be a party to the negotiations - no point in losing credibility if they fail completely or folks don't like the result.

(3) We (Coalition) hire a Middleman (called a mediator), which probably should be a Muslim nation-state to understand the Islamic mediation process.

(4) If negotiations are DOA or fail within a reasonable time period, we leave - and make this clear from the beginning.

(5) The end time of our (Coalition) involvement hinges on the Interested Parties - a form of "self-determination", I suppose.

jmm99

09-13-2009, 05:11 AM

continued

-----------------------------------------------
Step Five

from BW
Step five: Assess the AQ(UW)N that is networked across the region and determine which nodes are critical to enabling AQ's influence, and what mid-low level guys actually make those specific nodes function. Take those guys out and disrupt the network.

Yes. That's your business; I'd as soon not know about it at all - no PR stuff from the WH would be nice; but that would be dreaming.

All citizens should take responsibility for special ops (whether military or other agencies) even if they don't know the details. The idea is not to hang the operators out to dry if things go wrong - genuine rogues excepted.

---------------------------------------------------
Step Six

from BW
Step six: Wrap all of this in a cogent narrative that matches both our own national principles as well as our actions on the ground. Never let any of those things get out of line, and remember that the entire world is watching, and they judge us by what and how we do it, not by what we say.

Yes. A big information effort (less during the unveiling and more during the process) has to be mounted. Too bad that we no longer have USIA. Have a diagram on that (needs a little "photo-shooping").

-------------------------------------------------
Step Seven

from BW
Step seven: Stop calling Afghanistan and Iraq "wars." America is at peace. Did we say we were "a nation at war" in 1876 when Custer led his men into the valley of the Little Big Horn? Did we say we were "a nation at war" when Pershing quelled the Moro uprising in 1911? The list goes on. Peace is dirty business for us in the Military, we don't need to drag the entire nation into the muck with us. Bad form, and it causes us to exaggerate consequences. Implement "Full-Spectrum Deterrence" instead, which includes everything described above as part of keeping a lid on things. It also includes re-balanced deterrence against state threats around the world and various other quasi-state, non-state, and insurgent threats in a comprehensive scheme that never lets actions to achieve an effect on one get so out of balance that they provoke many others.

You are technically right that what we are doing is not a "war" under Hague (it is what used to be called MOOTW). It is an "armed conflict" under Geneva - at least as far as US courts are concerned - so far. If you take "armed conflict" out of the picture, using the "belled cat" against AQ (as you suggest and I agree) would be patently illegal. Please understand that and please be careful about legal terms.

From what I've observed in 60+ years, the military is the last party likely to create a muck party. All those "illegal" CIA ops were sanctioned by one president or the other. Our nation (us) have to stand up for the guys and gals who do the dirty work at NCA direction.

-------------------------------------------
Not the best memo I've written, but I'll stick with the general drift.

Hey Steve, you present a pretty good bulletpoint and it was done pretty quickly too - seriously.

Were you one of those "good staff officers" ? :)

Surferbeetle

09-13-2009, 06:39 AM

Surferbeetle, Read the whole article. Slap would be hanging with the DEA and Allison Brown.

Slap,

Where-ever your comfortable and we could get er done...;)

Step Seven

You are technically right that what we are doing is not a "war" under Hague (it is what used to be called MOOTW). It is an "armed conflict" under Geneva - at least as far as US courts are concerned - so far. If you take "armed conflict" out of the picture, using the "belled cat" against AQ (as you suggest and I agree) would be patently illegal. Please understand that and please be careful about legal terms.

From what I've observed in 60+ years, the military is the last party likely to create a muck party. All those "illegal" CIA ops were sanctioned by one president or the other. Our nation (us) have to stand up for the guys and gals who do the dirty work at NCA direction.

Mike,

Your post (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=76028&postcount=45) on the 2007-2008 UNAMA Report was pretty interesting and I wonder if it feeds in here as well?

Hey Steve, you present a pretty good bulletpoint and it was done pretty quickly too - seriously.

Were you one of those "good staff officers" ? :)

The Army likes utility infielders and puts together a job map that one is expected to more or less follow if one wants to stay in...which is a long way of saying that yes I have been a staff puke and even enjoyed it :eek: team time was probably the best however...its usually far from the flagpole :wry:

Bob's World

09-13-2009, 10:43 AM

I know we've been through this before elsewhere, but it's an important question: are "populaces in the Middle East" really rebelling? Which populaces? Who has had a paradise - or anything else for that matter - "forced on him by another"?

The same thing happened in SEA following WWII (different ideology applied, but ideology content is moot so long as it works, and Communism is what worked in that region)

Middle East populaces (and Eastern European) were held static by the Cold War policies of both sides throughout that competition, with the governance of each largely shaped by the respective outside power. The Soviets made the shocking decision to "just let it go" and not exert forced to hold it all together once the populaces revolted, so it went relatively peaceful. Plenty to still shake out there. In the Middle East, we did not roll back our (less direct, but still very much in place) system of controls as the Cold War ended and the populaces of the former Soviet Block were enjoying their new found freedoms. Friction and resistance has been building since. AQ is real, and their regional UW plan is very real, and all of the nationalist insurgent/subversive movements they enable and encourage are very real.

AQ's primary message is one of reduced Western influence over the region, and removal of these governments either put in power, shaped or sustained by the West; with the recognition that they must first work together to break the support of the West if they hope to be successful in their nationalist efforts.

All of this was immediately conflated and twisted by the West into an attack on us to destroy our security, economy and way of life (three top national interests). So our response, given that perspective is as natural as the response of the Middle Eastern populaces to AQ (though given the conditions that exist, if not Bin Laden, someone else, and if not AQ, some other organization).

Once we are able to gain a clearer perspective that recognizes that we had a role in shaping the current conditions, and we change our focus from one of trying to sustain those outdated conditions in the face of change, and instead work to help shape that change, we will be on our way to success.

Bob's World

09-13-2009, 11:11 AM

I think if we sat down over a few beers clear up some of the gaps that are inherent to this type of communication.

We went to Afg. because we had to do something, and it was the logical place to go and do it. Keep to the original intent, and guard against mission creep. We also must guard very much against "intel creep" that works to make connections and compelling cases for waging similar operations all over the world. If we succumb to that logic, we will enable the building of a Caliphate through our actions far more effectively than AQ could ever do on its own. Look how we have motivated divergent bands of the Taliban to work together. A common threat breeds strange alliances. We do not want to become the glue that binds this thing together.

And to say we did not target the Pakistani populace is a far different thing than to not attack them. We would not fire missiles from drones into East LA neighborhoods to take out known drug houses. Clearly it would be outrageous to even consider it and anyone could reasonably foresee that there would be both innocent victims directly from the blast as well as a huge popular backlash, both within that community and within similar communities around the nation and even into other countries. We all know this, yet we do such things in someone else's country and rationalize that it is somehow different, or that the populace will "understand" because we are the good guys? This is the problem with intel-led operations. You get target fixation and lose perspective.

We need to grant the same rights of sovereignty to others that we demand for ourselves; and that is a concession we don't have to make (i.e., no state can force us to do it); but one that we must impose upon ourselves.

There is no greater application of power than restraint.

Shifting from a war footing to a deterrence footing enable this mindset. Act judiciously. Does anyone else remember the days when the use of deadly force by the military of the US against another was a very rare, and very big deal?? The bombing of Libya in the late 80's? Post Cold War we started down a very slippery slope indeed.

Ike was right, containing the Soviets was only half of the equation of our strategies of containment. The other half was to contain ourselves. This is the only half of the equation that is still valid, and yet it is the half that most were never even ever aware of in the first place. Ironic.

Dayuhan

09-13-2009, 11:58 AM

The same thing happened in SEA following WWII (different ideology applied, but ideology content is moot so long as it works, and Communism is what worked in that region)

I'm not at all sure that it is the same thing.

In the Middle East, we did not roll back our (less direct, but still very much in place) system of controls as the Cold War ended and the populaces of the former Soviet Block were enjoying their new found freedoms. Friction and resistance has been building since. AQ is real, and their regional UW plan is very real, and all of the nationalist insurgent/subversive movements they enable and encourage are very real.

I'm not saying that AQ isn't real, it obviously is. I'm not at all sure it's an insurgency, and if it isn't, we do ourselves no favors by responding to it as if it is something it's not.

Where exactly do you see an American "system of controls" operating in thre Middle East? Where is there a populace in rebellion against a US-supported government? Where in the Middle East is AQ supporting a nationalist insurgent/subversive movement?

Iraq is an obvious answer, but of course our Iraq excursion, ill-timed and poorly managed though it was, did not create AQ. I wouldn't even say resistance to the US presence in Iraq or the US-supported government is enabled by AQ, more the other way around.

Is AQ a popular insurgency or a religious revival movement? It's an important question,, because those are very different things requiring very different responses.

Once we are able to gain a clearer perspective that recognizes that we had a role in shaping the current conditions, and we change our focus from one of trying to sustain those outdated conditions in the face of change, and instead work to help shape that change, we will be on our way to success.

We may have had some role in shaping current conditions, but so did many others, and we cannot undo the past. The idea of helping to shape change sounds rather appealing, but in reality our options are pretty limited and our efforts are as likely to inflame resentment as to alleviate it. What changes would you have us shape, and where?

Bob's World

09-13-2009, 01:40 PM

I wrote a pretty nice reply, and then hit the wrong button while editing it, causing it to vaporize into cyber space....

But AQ is neither an insurgency nor a religious movement, and I explained why. Will re-attack on that later.

I googled US in the middle east and this article came to the top. I haven't seen it before, but agree with it completely. And it was written in 1991. This may help explain what I mean:

http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=1019

Ken White

09-13-2009, 02:51 PM

I'm not at all sure that it is the same thing.I'm positive that what happened in SEA after WW II is not the same thing that is occurring within some pockets of Islam today -- far from it and that's a dangerously flawed allegory that can lead to some bad misapprehensions.
I'm not saying that AQ isn't real, it obviously is. I'm not at all sure it's an insurgency, and if it isn't, we do ourselves no favors by responding to it as if it is something it's not.True and we have not done the response well though my perception is that is improving as more realize the truth of what you and Bob's World say -- it is neither an insurgency nor a religious movement though it has facets of both.

We may have had some role in shaping current conditions, but so did many others, and we cannot undo the past. The idea of helping to shape change sounds rather appealing, but in reality our options are pretty limited and our efforts are as likely to inflame resentment as to alleviate it.Critical point. I agree we had a role -- even agree with the thrust of the Cato piece Bob posted -- but we cannot undo the past, a past that was created, with respect to US actions by our political processes and our domestic politics as much as for any other reason. Bob wants to forget that and fix our political process, so in my view his desires and your very valid question:
What changes would you have us shape, and where?have to start with fixing that political reality -- nothing he has said he wished to achieve will occur lacking that prerequisitie...

slapout9

09-13-2009, 03:02 PM

I was watching a special last night about A'stan and everywhere they went it was always Americans doing all the work while all these Young healthy males were sitting around talking,watching riding bicycles complaining about how bad things are. There were some ANA and ANP but not many.

Question? Where is the national mobilization program for able men? They don't have to stand alone...... but they have got to stand up.

marct

09-13-2009, 03:14 PM

Hi JMM,

A more in-depth look at AI and actual legal practice is found in this 200+ page thesis, Neural Networks for Legal Quantum Prediction (https://circle.ubc.ca/bitstream/2429/3460/1/ubc_1995-0026.pdf), Andrew J. Terrett (LL.M. 1994, UBC) - leave it to a Brit at a Canadian school. :D Good survey of the field up to early 90s (so, a bit dated)

Nothing like some light reading on a Sunday morning ;). I'm downloading it now...

Much of this, from the legal practitioner's standpoint, is pattern recognition - some implicit, some explicit. I have a case (that's a pattern). Have I seen similar patterns; if so, find them. Compare patterns - which ones are closest ? How does my pattern differ; how is it the same ? How can I develop my pattern ?
....
These same concepts may have some bearing on military and law enforcement solutions.

I think they do, and not only in those fields. What you are describing here could easily be a description of Anthropological fieldwork analysis and/or the type of Interdisciplinary research that I teach.

My bottom line is that, at least in law, there is no easy mechanical solution, where you can just check the boxes. Except, in easy cases; but lawyers do not get easy cases - those are resolved by the parties without need for much legal beagle input. :)

Hey, JMM, there is always an easy, mechanical solution available; it just doesn't usually achieve the results anyone wants :D!

slapout9

09-13-2009, 03:19 PM

Afghan Police....do they really do this over there? Looks like Michael Jackson's Thriller Video with funny music.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BGppvNdXmT8

Bob's World

09-13-2009, 03:46 PM

I'm positive that what happened in SEA after WW II is not the same thing that is occurring within some pockets of Islam today -- far from it and that's a dangerously flawed allegory that can lead to some bad misapprehensions.True and we have not done the response well though my perception is that is improving as more realize the truth of what you and Bob's World say -- it is neither an insurgency nor a religious movement though it has facets of both.Critical point. I agree we had a role -- even agree with the thrust of the Cato piece Bob posted -- but we cannot undo the past, a past that was created, with respect to US actions by our political processes and our domestic politics as much as for any other reason. Bob wants to forget that and fix our political process, so in my view his desires and your very valid question:have to start with fixing that political reality -- nothing he has said he wished to achieve will occur lacking that prerequisitie...

Ken is dead right. You can't change the past. But we must understand it. We also must understand that no amount of military effort can make bad policy work, and that if the policy makers want bad situations to be better they must change the policy first, and the military will work with alacrity to help them enact that policy.

Bottom line is we need to put the turd in the right punch bowl. The policy types are the ones who dropped it in the bowl, and they think they can simply hand that bowl to the military to take care of for them. Not that simple. No amount of good tactics or operational effort can make bad policy work. We can go out and beat down the symptoms of that bad policy, much like the British military did for 150 years, but at the end of the day your bad policy will prevail over such mitigating efforts.

DOD need to help the policy team understand the problem and craft new policy. Problem is that many in DOD who are in that feedback loop don't understand what we are dealing with either.

As to the comparison between post WWII SEA and Post Cold War Middle East, I stand by my assessment.

The populaces of SEA sought self-determination and sovereignty free of Colonial control, and achieved it. This is why the Muslim populaces of SEA are largely immune from AQ's message. Sure, there is some support, but they are out from under colonialism, so the causation that exists in much of the Middle East simply isn't there. Same is true in Iran. They threw off Western control when they tossed out the Shah. Sure, they still have poor governance, but populace recognizes that it is of their own choosing. The issue with Iran is very different, it is one of rising nationalism. Much as we see with Russia, India, and China. Historic regional powers rising as nations to seek roles that they see as more appropriate. That is a very important, and related, but very different dynamic. Rising populaces applying insurgency to seek self-determination in one cauldron of witch's brew. Rising nations seeking regional influence and nationalism in another cauldron of witch's brew. The US led West wishing that both would simply accept the roles we have cast for them as good guys, and wondering why there is so much friction aimed in our general direction. Hmmm.

Thing is, we are good guys. Good guys armed with sadly outdated policy and a crop of very successful Cold Warriors in DC that don't understand how dangerously outdated their thinking is. The new team of non-Cold Warriors in DC have good instincts, but they don't understand the dynamics of insurgency and nationalism that are driving these two cauldrons either, and are getting a lot of well intentioned, but I believe, very flawed advice.

I'd just like everyone to step back, and try to take an unbiased look at what is going on. It mirrors historic examples in many ways, but is new in how today's information age empowers non-state actors and populaces to be resistant to state-based controls.

Afghanistan is just a side-show to this much larger dynamic, and we risk losing the strategic bubble /big picture if we get sucked into the tactics of this little sideshow. As I have stated before, if the Decisive Point in the Middle East is anywhere, it is not Iraq or Afghanistan, nor is it Israel or Iran. I believe it is Saudi Arabia. Not that we must defeat anyone there, but that we must get our policy right there first. We must get straight with the government and populace of Saudi Arabia first, and the rest on the insurgent "cauldron" will follow. Similarly, we must also recognize and address the reasonable nationalistic roles of the rising states that I mentioned and make them allies, not enemies. This is all policy business. Instead we cast these all as threats and apply the military to them. That is very dangerous.

slapout9

09-13-2009, 05:12 PM

Afghanistan is just a side-show to this much larger dynamic, and we risk losing the strategic bubble /big picture if we get sucked into the tactics of this little sideshow. As I have stated before, if the Decisive Point in the Middle East is anywhere, it is not Iraq or Afghanistan, nor is it Israel or Iran. I believe it is Saudi Arabia. Not that we must defeat anyone there, but that we must get our policy right there first. We must get straight with the government and populace of Saudi Arabia first, and the rest on the insurgent "cauldron" will follow. Similarly, we must also recognize and address the reasonable nationalistic roles of the rising states that I mentioned and make them allies, not enemies. This is all policy business. Instead we cast these all as threats and apply the military to them. That is very dangerous.

Yes, the power shift started with the Oil Embargo in the 1970's when Jimmy Carter called it the Moral Equivalent of War...which it was and still is. The highest National Priority is to get off Oil, Carter was the last President of the US to be able to say that we imported LESS oil when he left office then before he took office....and we have been going down hill ever since. He was the last President to have a true Strategy to deal with situation.....we haven't had one since.

Surferbeetle

09-13-2009, 05:14 PM

Ken White

09-13-2009, 05:43 PM

... No amount of good tactics or operational effort can make bad policy work...at the end of the day your bad policy will prevail over such mitigating efforts.I totally agree but I think there must be a mechanism to mitigate if not preclude bad policy and I'm unsure the US political system will afford that lacking a significant existential threat. Domestic politics drive our international relations and as I've tried to point out here on many occasions, the presumed policy continuity in the Cold War was a myth. The question is how do you get accurate assessments (themselves a problem) and vice -- reality -- through to the policy makers?

Recall also that all the policy errors of the last eight years have not been made by civilians; they were also made by uniformed folks in DC -- and Tampa, both buildings -- so while I agree with you in principle, how do you address this separate problem?
As to the comparison between post WWII SEA and Post Cold War Middle East, I stand by my assessment.

The populaces of SEA sought self-determination and sovereignty free of Colonial control, and achieved it...Hmmm.They are different therefor they are alike -- okay... :wry:

Minor point, Iran does not have a new found sense of nationalism, that is a potentially dangerous policy mistake if it is a widely held view. Recall that not one but several Persian empires once stretched from Greece almost to China and often ruled the ME (many 'Arab' customs are in fact inheritances from the Persians). Iranian nationalism is far older than you and I and John T. Fishel combined -- and that's old. :D

Recall also that Persians think of Arabs as lesser beings -- and that Arabs know this and return the favor. The Afghans think both are pretentious snobs and they both think the Afghans are barbarians. The only unifying force across the region is religion, not any sort of nationalism, and that unity is extremely tenuous (and thus easily manipulated by those so inclined) and only prevails to present a united front of sorts to the hated Ferenghi.

Make no mistake; folks in that area are truly polite. They are also very pragmatic. Those two things cause them to be reasonable in polite western company -- but basically, they truly hate westerners and it's a lot deeper than colonialism.

All that makes me wonder how many policy makers are operating off flawed ideas. Flaws in judgment are endemic, none of us can have perfect information or insights and all of us need to listen to people who know and understand the area and processes with which we contemplate trifling.

History shows that in the US, such advice has virtually always been available -- and that it has routinely been ignored by policymakers and senior officers. My perception is that is mostly an ego problem. How do you propose to fix that problem whatever its cause?
Afghanistan is just a side-show to this much larger dynamic...Totally true. But...
...and we risk losing the strategic bubble /big picture if we get sucked into the tactics of this little sideshow.that is not necessarily true, there is a risk but it can be avoided and, I believe is being considered and will not have any significant effect on the main show. There is another risk to leaving too soon. Balancing those risks is the issue.
We must get straight with the government and populace of Saudi Arabia first, and the rest on the insurgent "cauldron" will follow.I don't think that's correct. Wanting to be the center of thought and having the money to get close to that aspiration and actually being the center of thought are not the same things. Saudi Arabia is important, no question and its vast treasury is misused for many things but I do not believe the rest of the ME is as sycophantic as the Saudis would like or as many seem to believe. In my travels around that area, admittedly some time ago (but an area where change comes very slowly) I found the Saudis to be universally despised, gathering little or no respect and envied only for their wealth -- and thus a target for the pragmatic to obtain some of that wealth.

Nor do I think the ME is an 'insurgent "cauldron.'" It is today pretty much what it has always been, an area with a lot of humanity in a harsh environment who have adapted to that environment with their own methods of doing things (not least fighting...) and who have suddenly (for them) inherited a lot of oil money. In US southern terms, the whole area (save Turkey and Iran) are new rich white trash with a chip on their shoulder and a crazy Uncle in the cellar. Looking at them in that vein will give you a better perspective than most others, including the insurgent / nationalist bit. Xenophobic? Yes, quite. Nationalist -- not so much. That Xenophobia, BTW, is strongly ethnic or racial, thus the Persian / Arab (and Afghan...) divide.

The question all that raises is how many are developing policy based on flawed reasoning or inputs and how do we address that ancient and debilitating problem? How do we get policy that has widely diverse inputs and comes up with a best judgment consensus to present to decision makers?
Instead we cast these all as threats and apply the military to them. That is very dangerous.I'm not sure that is the case so much as using the tool that found / discovered the issue to fix the 'problem' they found. That said, I agree it's ill advised if not dangerous. The question though is do we (the civilian policy makers) cast them as threats and apply the military or does the military discover the problem (because Congress has ruined the State Department and will not adequately fund them whereas the DoD has tons of unneeded money and has a less politicized reporting process) and then get told to handle it in the absence of anyone else having even a slight clue?

Ken White

09-13-2009, 05:57 PM

Carter was the last President of the US to be able to say that we imported LESS oil when he left office then before he took office...Not so much his doing as the result of the OPEC withhold to raise prices...:D
and we have been going down hill ever since. He was the last President to have a true Strategy to deal with situation.....we haven't had one since.True, gotta give James earl credit for that -- but he gets an 'F' on execution. He got sidetracked on the Tehran Hostage problem which he woefully mishandled and sadly lost the bubble on oil independence. Pity. :(

Just as Nixon figured out early on after the Munich Olympics that Islamist terrorism was going to be a problem -- he got side tracked by Watergate. And Reagan figured out the US Voter had little appetite for getting involved in the ME thus, the Beirut debacles (plural). Bush 41 figured the cost of removing Saddam wasn't worth it; Clinton imposed his will on Bosnia and Kosovo to keep the US Europhiles on his side but had no will when it came to OBL & Co. or others from the ME.

All of which proves US domestic politics drive our foreign policy -- or lack thereof... :eek:

slapout9

09-13-2009, 06:24 PM

True, gotta give James earl credit for that -- but he gets an 'F' on execution. He got sidetracked on the Tehran Hostage problem which he woefully mishandled and sadly lost the bubble on oil independence. Pity. :(

Bullseye! and we ain't had know respect since then!

Ken White

09-13-2009, 07:06 PM

a lot of respect when I first went abroad in 19-ought-47. Lot of fear in some places, lot of desire for any money we might donate in others but not a lot of respect. Fortunately, most people are polite even if they don't like you -- that and we're big spenders. Always popular, that trait.

Unfortunately, we lowered the fear quotient after Korea, lowered it more after Viet Nam, put it in the cellar with Tehran and have just started pulling it back up to a decent level. If you aren't going to be respected and we are not, then best have a tiny bit of fear -- and uncertainty -- out there. Our low point in furrin popularity was in in about 75-76, started back up then Tehran took it back down. Been sort of in the sputtering mediocre range ever since with an occasional jump one way or the other. Iraq probably did more to ease that problem than most anything else in the last 30 years or so. Afghanistan may enhance or erase that beneficial result; we'll see.

Hard to get much respect when commerce is your over riding foreign policy goal and you're really up front about it -- the poor hate it 'cause you are costly, the wealthy hate it because commercialism is so crass. :D

Folks would respect us more if we did what other nations did; same goal but never, never publicly admit it. Honesty isn't always the best policy for some purposes... :wry:

Bob's World

09-13-2009, 07:08 PM

This then is the core essence of my theory: The key to developing an effective solution lies in understanding the causation of the problem.

While the peripheral facts of the Far and Mid East are very different (cultures, ideologies applied, religion, etc) At the core the causation is the same: Both place had populaces placed under colonial control, and in both places after a major strategic shock event disrupted that colonial control, the populaces took advantage of the opening to seek self-determined governance and sovereignty.

This goes to why I believe Saudi Arabia is the Decisive Point. I don't give two damns about the Saudi royal family. In fact, I'm a little disgusted at how our fearful addiction to their oil has blinded us to allowing them to play us a suckers on a number of occasions and issues. But I digress. This is where Islam was born. It is symbolic. Bin Laden sees it as his main effort, and the Saudi populace has arguably be the most insurgent of all the populaces of the region for years (though ruthlessly and effectively suppressed in those endeavors). A Decisive point is where if one wins there, the rest will fall into place. The "victory" is not a military one at all. In fact, NO military should be used (other than as the credibility behind the President's play). If we can out-compete bin Laden in this effort to force the Saudi Royals to address the concerns of their populace, and we can respect their customs in the process; we can begin turning this whole thing around. It will disempower bin Laden's UW message; and allow this to degenerate into a handful of uncoordinated nationalist movements. Each can then be addressed separately as part of a coordinated scheme of engagement with the region.

As to the Iranians, I understand they are the historic big boys on the block; also that because of that it chafes all the more that they have been subjugated to Western colonial powers for the past several years. It doesn't have to be too old of a map to see that much of what we call "Iraq" and "Afghanistan" today, was and is considered to be part of "Persia." I am confident that Iran will rise again to dominate the politics of this region, and that that is not a bad thing. It is only a bad thing if we refuse to get over the fact that they tossed us out and continue to insist on seeing them as enemies or threats. I believe that both the Israelis and Saudis encourage that bad behavior on our part. We need to tell both of those allies to take a knee, and offer an olive branch to the Iranian people. Besides, when we do that it infuriates the hell out of their current government and hastens the advancement of that country to a much better government for everyone involved. To continue to snub them actually makes the current gang stronger.

Which brings us back to Afghanistan. What a great opportunity to mend our relationship with Iran by asking them to work with us to help finish our business and get out of there. This also disempowers Bin laden.

davidbfpo

09-13-2009, 09:15 PM

Citing Ken:
(Referring to the Middle East) It is today pretty much what it has always been, an area with a lot of humanity in a harsh environment who have adapted to that environment with their own methods of doing things (not least fighting...) and who have suddenly (for them) inherited a lot of oil money.

Yes there are many countries in the region that have made a fortune from oil (from Algeria in the west to the UAE in the east), many others, often with large populations, have not been so endowed - notably Eygpt and Syria. Nor have the richer nations made investments that have alleviated the lot of the common people in those countries.

Just as Nixon figured out early on after the Munich Olympics that Islamist terrorism was going to be a problem

It would be a mistake to label the terrorism at the 1972 Munich Olympics as 'Islamist'; it was "hard line" Palestinian nationalists, 'Black September' that the PLO disbanded in 1974 and Islam was not an issue.

davidbfpo

jmm99

09-13-2009, 09:34 PM

Hi Steve & all,

Your reminder of my post, Part of a larger picture ?, (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=76028&postcount=45)is on point. That post sums up the connection between the ISAF mandate - peace enforcement (Chap VII, UN Charter) and the OEF mandate (2001 AUMF). The two mandates can play together. It also sums up peace enforcement under JP 3-07.3 (http://www.smallwarsjournal.com/documents/jp3073.pdf): Joint TTP for Peace Operations. Peace enforcement is not a UN "blue cap" activity - it can have teeth - to be used with discernment to force the end goal, a diplomatic solution between the indigenous warring parties usually involving mediation. The content of that post should be added to "Step One".

Since "David Donovan" (a pen name for Terry Turner) was mentioned, a couple of quotes from him seem apt to this thread. From a 2008 interview (http://www.corrupt.org/articles/culture/brett_stevens/interview_with_a_warrior_king-david_donovan_speaks_to_corrupt):

Q: "Our guys read the newspapers. They resent being sent over here to die for nothing." More than anything else, Vietnam was the first really televised war. Are citizens able to appreciate why a war might be just? Or will they simply oppose all war, because war (like life) has many horrible aspects? When they do oppose wars, will they forever alienate soldiers as they did your fellow soldiers?

A: I think citizens can appreciate why a war might be just so long as the cause is sharp and stark. Pearl Harbor. The World Trade towers. Where the need for war is difficult to comprehend is when the war arrives due to reasons two or three times removed from direct effect on the country. We went to Vietnam because it was a proxy for our otherwise "cold" war with the Soviets and China. The rationale was hard to sustain as time went on and on with little consistent progress. Finally, someone realized that the South Vietnamese were never going to stand on their own, so we said, "enough already."

We went to Afghanistan as a result of 9/11. There has been little or no complaint about that. We went to Iraq under more dubious circumstances and there has been more and more complaint as the war has gone on and on. Americans see little if any affect of such a war on themselves or their aspirations, so most are now saying, enough already. I believe any war not the result of sharp and certain evidence of national harm will eventually, perhaps shortly, see opposition. That sharp and certain evidence of national harm might have to be an actual attack like Pearl Harbor or 9/11 before opposition will be quieted, especially for a long, enduring war.

I think those who oppose a particular war will always to some degree alienate the soldiers fighting it, even if on the surface the soldier understands that opposition. War is a visceral, life-changing thing. It is hard to always understand that those who oppose the war do not oppose you and the goals you are striving for. On the other hand, I do not think most soldiers are forever alienated. At least there is not a through-and-through alienation. They come to understand, if they did not understand already, that opposition to the war was opposition to policy, not opposition to them. Most learn to adjust.

and from one of his webpages (http://www.ddonovanbooks.com/faq.html):

Q: Do your experiences in Vietnam speak to the counterinsurgency effort being made today in Iraq and Afghanistan?

A: Absolutely. Anyone having read OWK would have been able to anticipate the difficulties imposed by cultural and religious differences when a western country goes to war in an eastern one. They should have known that local corruption would be a cancer eating at the heart of our efforts to rebuild and reconstitute such a country. They should also have known that westernized elites over-promise the democratic tendencies of their more traditionalist countrymen. Also, the traditions of tribe or village over country are difficult for westerners to give credence to, yet they are a part of the experience discussed in OWK. On the other hand, for the soldiers, especially soldier-advisors, in the current conflicts, I hope the incidents, emotions, and methods mentioned in the book can be some sort of guide. What is now called “asymmetric war” is at its heart counterinsurgency. It is small-unit, in-the-bushes warfare conducted in an atmosphere where winning the approval, even the affection of locals is vital to success. OWK is the story of one such war in one village, but its application, I think, is much more general.

Now, according to Kilcullen's book TAG (based on World Bank stats), there are 40,020 villages in Astan. While I doubt that the number 20 is accurate, 40,000 is a reasonable shot at the order of magnitude of the task that you, Steve, have assigned me (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=82450&postcount=269).

Governance:

1. Marc & Anthro friends help to ID who’s in charge and FSO’s partner with GoA resident in Grid Square to cut some deals with local governance elements.

2. Form of local governance is what it is...

3. Mike and DOJ friends examine existing system within SB’s Grid Square and partner with GoA resident in Grid Square to help to improve capacity of existing governance.

Marc would be a decent partner in that project, but please understand that the ghost of Saul Alinsky's methodology lurks in both of our closets. Speaking just for myself, that requires a bottom up - bubble up approach. Our approach in Astan has been to create a good paper system of governance (nice org charts), a top down - trickle down system.

To an Alinskyite, local governance is what it is all about. In effect, the organizing efforts at the village level (all 40,000 of them seem beyond present capabilities) must drive the organization of governance at the higher levels (district, province and national).

The problem with local governance in Astan is that it has been devestated by 40+ years of turmoil. Many of these problems are themselves tiny - in comparison to the regional strategic issues which BW and Ken have been discussing. E.g, two guys trade sheep, but one of the sheep is "defective". How does the guy with the bad sheep get what the parties consider fair justice ?

Another problem you might face with Marc and me is what we might do if the GoA partner is part of the problem and not part of the solution. All here might dwell on that question, which emerges as well in the more elegant area of regional geo-politics.

Have to run now.

Cheers

Mike

Ken White

09-13-2009, 09:58 PM

This then is the core essence of my theory: The key to developing an effective solution lies in understanding the causation of the problem.I agree. However, we do not seem to agree on what we believe are underlying causes.
...the populaces took advantage of the opening to seek self-determined governance and sovereignty.This is an example -- sovereignity, yes. Self determined governance not so much; that's a western construct and both the Asian and the Middle Eastern ideas differ -- from each other and from the western model. Neither wants all that much 'self' in the equation and what they want that government to do varies significantly. Also, the Asians resented Colonialism -- the Middle east resents the west. That is a significant difference and if one misses that difference, one can head down the wrong path.
This goes to why I believe Saudi Arabia is the Decisive Point...This is where Islam was born. It is symbolic...That's true. However, it is negated by:
If we can out-compete bin Laden in this effort to force the Saudi Royals to address the concerns of their populace, and we can respect their customs in the process; we can begin turning this whole thing around.Possibly true -- but your "if" there's almost as big as the one pertaining to you getting the US political milieu to develop and stick to a long term grand strategy. I do not believe we have the time or the inclination to do that. If we could do it which is questionable at best.
It will disempower bin Laden's UW message; and allow this to degenerate into a handful of uncoordinated nationalist movements. Each can then be addressed separately as part of a coordinated scheme of engagement with the region.First problem is that your idea IIRC got pre-empted by Abu Musab al-Suri in his writings and he urged a fragmented design that will negate your goal. A tenet of all that is no nationalist sentiment but Islamic passion instead.

That is not to say that what you suggest cannot be done, simply to preface my statement that is certain to be a very lengthy effort and the outcome would be doubtful.
As to the Iranians, I understand they are the historic big boys on the block; also that because of that it chafes all the more that they have been subjugated to Western colonial powers for the past several years.They very much recall the empires and believe they merit more respect than they get from the west, no question. Not so on subjugation, though and the fact they have never been colonized is a point of pride with them.

If you meant our presence there when the Shah was in power, not true for the vast majority of Iranians, our footprint was light and so was the touch and they knew it. Even today most Iranians have no strong anti-US feelings. If you mean in recent years and the sanctions, they are not a significant problem to Iran and most there blame their own regime in any event.
I am confident that Iran will rise again to dominate the politics of this region, and that that is not a bad thing.Interesting, they are too. Or at least they want that to occur. I doubt that will happen for a number of reasons. Just do the Math...
It is only a bad thing if we refuse to get over the fact that they tossed us out and continue to insist on seeing them as enemies or threats.They didn't toss us out, we elected to leave after we totally screwed up following their faux pas in the Embassy takeover.

l Don't disagree with the intent but do not think it will afford the result you desire. Iran is as distrusted in the ME for reasons that go back centuries as we are in the wider world. Many in Iran have never forgiven the Arabs for the Islamic subjugation of their country -- one reason they are Shia -- they will tell anyone that; the Arabs know this. that's one reason I never worried about an Iranian dominated Iraq; won't happen.
To continue to snub them actually makes the current gang stronger.In some respects. Sanctions never work, Iran, North Korea or Cuba, they're all dumb. However, I don't think accord with us makes a significant difference in Khameini's hold.
Which brings us back to Afghanistan. What a great opportunity to mend our relationship with Iran by asking them to work with us to help finish our business and get out of there. This also disempowers Bin laden.Two very big mistakes.

The Pushtuns er, dislike, a good term, the Iraniha. Badly. The population of Afghanistan is only about 40% Pushtun and while the Tajiks and Hazara in Afghanistan would welcome more Shia involvement you would thus further fragment an already badly fragmented nation. Recall also that Pushtuns will say they are Pushtun first, Muslim second and then Afghan or Pakistani -- thus the 13M or so Afghan Pushtuns have about twice that many friends and relatives just south of the Durand line.

It would have a positive effect on Bin Laden's power, little as it really is, because he would mobilize a few more Sunni fundamentalists than he can today simply due to the fact that 'the Great Satan had allied with heretics...'

slapout9

09-13-2009, 10:20 PM

Unfortunately, we lowered the fear quotient after Korea, lowered it more after Viet Nam, put it in the cellar with Tehran and have just started pulling it back up to a decent level. If you aren't going to be respected and we are not, then best have a tiny bit of fear -- and uncertainty -- out there. Our low point in furrin popularity was in in about 75-76, started back up then Tehran took it back down. Been sort of in the sputtering mediocre range ever since with an occasional jump one way or the other. Iraq probably did more to ease that problem than most anything else in the last 30 years or so. Afghanistan may enhance or erase that beneficial result; we'll see.

Yes, which is why I believe there is no military solution to the A'stan problem but there is a political solution. Our Grand Strategy should be to organize our national resources to where we have the fewest foreign dependencies possible, which will allow us to deal with other nations by choice, which will generate a better and more useful form of respect than just fear of a military strike.

Bob's World

09-13-2009, 11:54 PM

Surferbeetle

09-14-2009, 12:04 AM

...in many of the places that I visit on Uncle Sugar's dime is described in the blog ALL=Afghan Lessons Learned for Soldiers (http://afghanlessons.blogspot.com/)

Just like 90% of the world's population, including our own, 90% of Afghans are simply trying to survive and feed their family. Nothing more. Nothing less. The difference is that Americans are trying to survive two car payments and a mortgage. Afghans are trying to survive nature itself. They aren't trying to earn $40,000/year. They're trying to grow enough food in the high desert to feed 2 wives and 10 kids.

I cannot tell you how to gain the loyal friendship of an Afghan and neither can they. I can tell you how to ensure you never gain that friendship and that is to attempt to change them. It is to demean them. It is to be rude to them. It is to try to game them.

They recognize insincerity like an animal recognizes fear.

Just a few rambling observations about our illiterate but highly intelligent, stubborn, and resilient friends. Ignorance is not stupidity.

jmm99

09-14-2009, 12:57 AM

from Slap
Yes, which is why I believe there is no military solution to the A'stan problem but there is a political solution. Our Grand Strategy should be to organize our national resources to where we have the fewest foreign dependencies possible, which will allow us to deal with other nations by choice, which will generate a better and more useful form of respect than just fear of a military strike.

and yes.

Ken White

09-14-2009, 01:10 AM

but when the asian countries got rid of the government chosen for them in exchange for one chosen by themselves, that is self-determination. Call it what you will.No question. I misused your self determination to sort of mean 'open pure democracy' which wasn't what you said at all. My error. In my defense, I did say "...both the Asian and the Middle Eastern ideas differ -- from each other and from the western model. Neither wants all that much 'self' in the equation and what they want that government to do varies significantly..." So I understood what you meant even if I did use it incorrectly. Apologies.

The critical point that bears remembering in that paragraph of mine I quoted from is this: "Also, the Asians resented Colonialism -- the Middle east resents the west. That is a significant difference and if one misses that difference, one can head down the wrong path." May seem insignificant but it is not. Sort of ties into the rest of your last post:
When the countries in Africa struggle with or reject such Western imposed forms of governance we call them "failed" or "failing." Now THAT is a western construct.Too true. Also note the African nations have the attitudes of both the Asians and the ME when it comes to their relations with Europeans and westerners in general...

Ken White

09-14-2009, 01:31 AM

It would be a mistake to label the terrorism at the 1972 Munich Olympics as 'Islamist'; it was "hard line" Palestinian nationalists, 'Black September' that the PLO disbanded in 1974 and Islam was not an issue.I should have said international terrorism originating in or from the Middle East, saying Islamist was simply laziness on my part.

Nixon convened a Cabinet committee to address the issue. This LINK (http://www.gaffneyledger.com/news/2005/0124/AP_News/040.html) leads to a news summary. The entire report makes some interesting reading. It may be declassified now but I can't turn it up. At the time many did not support it but it really did some useful work. My point was that all this did not happen and surprise the world, the potential problems were known in 1948 when the US Secretary of State told Harry Truman; "Mr. President, I serve at your discretion but if you insist we recognize the new state of Israel, I will not be able to vote for you in the next election." Forward to 1972 and the Nixon committee and its 1977 final report -- went downhill from then to 2002-3. No one should have been surprised.

Ken White

09-14-2009, 01:53 AM

The problem with local governance in Astan is that it has been devestated by 40+ years of turmoil. Many of these problems are themselves tiny - in comparison to the regional strategic issues which BW and Ken have been discussing. E.g, two guys trade sheep, but one of the sheep is "defective". How does the guy with the bad sheep get what the parties consider fair justice ?From the local Shura or local warlord -- if either were allowed to operate as they should and were not constrained by Eurocentric concerns over equity and 'the rule of law.' Nothing wrong with the rule of law, it just doesn't have to be our version of law... ;)
Another problem you might face with Marc and me is what we might do if the GoA partner is part of the problem and not part of the solution. All here might dwell on that question, which emerges as well in the more elegant area of regional geo-politics.Why dwell on it -- it is a western imposition that the Afghans believed they were compelled to take in order to get some of the aid they desperately needed. It was a really dumb idea and the USA forced it down everyone's throat and we put one of Kipling's 'wily Pathans' in charge. He's being wily. What a surprise. They're untrustworthy. What a surprise. "The ANP tell the bad guys we're coming." What a surprise. There's corruption in the government. What a surprise. In one of my first dozen posts on this board over a couple of years ago I said, re the way things were then going in Afghanistan; "Welcome to South Asia." Still true.

Of course the GOA is part of the problem. We created it thus it's become our problem. ;)

jmm99

09-14-2009, 03:29 AM

from Ken
From the local Shura or local warlord -- if either were allowed to operate as they should and were not constrained by Eurocentric concerns over equity and 'the rule of law.' Nothing wrong with the rule of law, it just doesn't have to be our version of law...

if it were the case.

The problem, as I understand it, was the destruction of Astan's local legal institutions which existed ca. 1970, under a loose form of monarchy which was slowly moving toward "modernity" (which possibly, but for the wars, would have developed its own Afghan form).

The Rule of Law has to be the rule of law indigenous to its subjects. I have been consistent with that theory in many posts - and have to be, given my belief that law "bubbles up" from the society who are subjects of that Rule of Law. Those subjects are also its creators.

Now, given the case at hand, if you have evidence that local legal systems, whether local Shura or local warlord, are actually working in Astan, I would like to see it and would be happy to be proved wrong. That situation, if applicable to a material portion of Astan's 40,000 villages, would give me much more confidence for the future than I have. So, please bring on any such evidence that shows a working local legal system in Astan.

------------------------------
Unfortunately, this is probably true, at least in part:

from Ken
Of course the GOA is part of the problem. We created it thus it's become our problem.

My take is that we do have an obligation to clean up the garbage in a neighborhood, even if (1) we should not have been in the neighborhood in the first place; or (2) if we were there for a good reason, we should not have littered the neighborhood. Our former friend Saddam Hussein was such garbage, which for that and other reasons had to be removed. The means used to clean the neighborhood need not be as extreme as that in Iraq.

But, our obligation to clean up our garbage is subject to a limitation. We have to forego that obligation if in doing so we will worsen the neighborhood's condition. I believe that Astan is very close to that tipping point.

jmm99

09-14-2009, 04:01 AM

Thanks for the good link, A.L.L. = Afghan Lessons Learned for Soldiers (http://afghanlessons.blogspot.com/).

It has two good map links, Afghanistan Topographic Maps (http://www.aims.org.af/sroots.aspx?seckeys=126) & Afghanistan District Maps (http://www.aims.org.af/sroots.aspx?seckeys=124).

Best for your travels

Mike

slapout9

09-14-2009, 04:49 AM

"Self-Determination" may be a Western phrase; but when the asian countries got rid of the government chosen for them in exchange for one chosen by themselves, that is self-determination. Call it what you will.

Government imposed by others is rarely sustainable. When the countries in Africa struggle with or reject such Western imposed forms of governance we call them "failed" or "failing." Now THAT is a western construct.

I'm sticking to my guns on this one.

Bifurcation:eek: systems remain integrated (whole) when they provide mutual benefit which is why they were caused to form in the first place. (the governed ....the government.... and the binding consent to be governed) When they don't they begin to bifurcate (split apart) as in the Civil War(war of northern aggression). Which is why it is total bullstuff that democracies are stable. They are designed to be unstable :eek: there is always a party that looses with the ever present idea to bifurcate (split off from the system) or become violent or start an insurgency. Which is why we usually cause most of our own problems in the world.

Ken White

09-14-2009, 05:00 AM

"From the local Shura or local warlord -- if either were allowed to operate as they should and..."

I do believe you missed the first part of my comment and that significant 'if.'

Which of course means that I do not have the foggiest idea how well the system that I know did work almost 40 years ago works today, else I might have made a more positive statement. :D

However, I'd hazard a guess that it works well in some places, less well in others -- and part of the 'less well' is due to ongoing conflict. Been my observation that no system of local government or law works that well when rounds get fired too frequently.

My take is that we do have an obligation to clean up the garbage in a neighborhood, even if (1) we should not have been in the neighborhood in the first place; or (2) if we were there for a good reason, we should not have littered the neighborhood.

But, our obligation to clean up our garbage is subject to a limitation. We have to forego that obligation if in doing so we will worsen the neighborhood's condition. I believe that Astan is very close to that tipping point.In reverse order, probably not that near a tipping point IMO.

On governmental change, good wrapup on our errors on the front page of SWJ by one JT (LINK) (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2009/09/on-general-krulaks-email-to-ge/#c004377). He agrees with you.

I do not. I'm afraid it might create more problems than it solves, not least because it would likely dump some on the fence Pushtuns off said fence. My personal view is that it would merely shuffle one group of Afghans doing what Afghans do best for another group who would do pretty much the same thing, just with different people. Plus, like it or not, the wishes of NATO must be considered, no clue what their reaction might be.

Our obligation clean up our garbage is also, I am afraid, subject to not get done because governments are generally loath to admit they erred -- and we surely did err in forcing the Bonn meeting, a Constitution with glaring holes and a President we didn't understand all that well. Still, in this case we have a new US Administration that is busy repudiating all those things it inherited from its predecessor that said predecessor did not shrewdly lock in to tie the hands of the USG for many years in the future. Does Afghanistan fit in that category? Dunno. We'll see. My suspicion is that we'll just try to nudge the Afghans to do their own changing. Doubt it will result in much improvement...

Noticed that a move of all US elements to the East is being considered; that will increase pressure on some Pushtun heavy areas if true and it is done. It may also relive pressure on some others -- or allow for an Afghanization. Fun times in River City...

As an aside on Iraq and Afghanistan; those people haggle for sport -- we have absolutely NO business getting in haggling contests with them. They are not going to do things in the western way, period. Two Rudyard quotes:

"Asia is not going to be civilized after the methods of the West. There is too much Asia and she is too old."

"And the epitaph drear: "A fool lies here who tried to hustle the East.""

Bob's World

09-14-2009, 12:20 PM

Bifurcation:eek: systems remain integrated (whole) when they provide mutual benefit which is why they were caused to form in the first place. (the governed ....the government.... and the binding consent to be governed) When they don't they begin to bifurcate (split apart) as in the Civil War(war of northern aggression). Which is why it is total bullstuff that democracies are stable. They are designed to be unstable :eek: there is always a party that looses with the ever present idea to bifurcate (split off from the system) or become violent or start an insurgency. Which is why we usually cause most of our own problems in the world.

India like to promote itself as "The World's Largest Democracy!"

A savvy friend of mine pointed out, that the dark side of that proclamation is that they have the world's largest suppressed minority. This is a country with a number of smoldering powder kegs beneath it. The growing middle class is a hope for a stabilizing influence, but only if it cuts across the class and culture divides that define this power.

I mention this, because our course in Afghanistan has pressed hard into Pakistan; and that in turn begins to apply pressure on India. On more good reason to consider an appetite suppressant in our approach to Afghanistan.

slapout9

09-14-2009, 12:43 PM

India like to promote itself as "The World's Largest Democracy!"

A savvy friend of mine pointed out, that the dark side of that proclamation is that they have the world's largest suppressed minority. This is a country with a number of smoldering powder kegs beneath it. The growing middle class is a hope for a stabilizing influence, but only if it cuts across the class and culture divides that define this power.

I mention this, because our course in Afghanistan has pressed hard into Pakistan; and that in turn begins to apply pressure on India. On more good reason to consider an appetite suppressant in our approach to Afghanistan.

Absolutely! Democracy promotes conflict:eek: it institutionalizes us vs. them.

marct

09-14-2009, 02:04 PM

Hi Mike,

Governance:

1. Marc & Anthro friends help to ID who’s in charge and FSO’s partner with GoA resident in Grid Square to cut some deals with local governance elements.

2. Form of local governance is what it is...

3. Mike and DOJ friends examine existing system within SB’s Grid Square and partner with GoA resident in Grid Square to help to improve capacity of existing governance.

Marc would be a decent partner in that project, but please understand that the ghost of Saul Alinsky's methodology lurks in both of our closets. Speaking just for myself, that requires a bottom up - bubble up approach. Our approach in Astan has been to create a good paper system of governance (nice org charts), a top down - trickle down system.

Oh, you're not speaking just for yourself there ;). It's not only the Alinski influence - there's also compelling theoretical reasons for it as well (e.g. Malinowski).

To an Alinskyite, local governance is what it is all about. In effect, the organizing efforts at the village level (all 40,000 of them seem beyond present capabilities) must drive the organization of governance at the higher levels (district, province and national).

Totally true. Still and all, the US went through exactly the same process, as did the UK and many other countries. At a systems analytic level, top-down organization only appears to be "stable" when there is a cultural belief in a major external threat (e.g. Russia), and even that requires a balancing act between the local and "national" levels of governance. This certainly isn't the case in Afghanistan, where both the cultural beliefs and the previous "national" governments beliefs were pretty much aligned around local (kin and para-kin) organization.

The problem with local governance in Astan is that it has been devestated by 40+ years of turmoil. Many of these problems are themselves tiny - in comparison to the regional strategic issues which BW and Ken have been discussing. E.g, two guys trade sheep, but one of the sheep is "defective". How does the guy with the bad sheep get what the parties consider fair justice?

Bingo. But, and this is really why it is important, the entire concept of legitimacy revolves around the perceptions of individuals that their minimum expected "needs" from a governance organization are being met. Given the Feds control over judging a sheep issue is anathema, since they all "know" that the Feds are a) corrupt, and b) shouldn't be that powerful anyway. Besides that, the Feds would take half the sheep as "costs" and they don't know the local context of the sheep in question.

Another problem you might face with Marc and me is what we might do if the GoA partner is part of the problem and not part of the solution. All here might dwell on that question, which emerges as well in the more elegant area of regional geo-politics.

LOL. Well, given my family background, I certainly understand the concept of a long revenge :D. The trick in so much of this is to figure out how to construct that revenge as non-kinetic; basically to exapt certain components of pastunwali into the political process. I have some ideas on that, but i won't put them up here ;).

Cheers,

Marc

jmm99

09-14-2009, 05:25 PM

from Ken
"From the local Shura or local warlord -- if either were allowed to operate as they should and..."

I do believe you missed the first part of my comment and that significant 'if.'

No, I didn't miss what you said. I did focus on the "if either were alllowed to operate". That meant to me that you believe the institutions exist, but are being prevented from operating by somethiing or someone (us ?).

Here is my understanding of how the local legal system operated about 40 years ago. Basically, it was a triangle of the village elders (local Shura), the local mullah and the local government official (who I suspect doubled as the local warlord). The local Shura would handle legal disputes not involving religious issues (e.g., property lines and bad sheep); the local mullah would handle religious questions (many family law matters) and the local warlord would handle matters dealing with the government. If a matter was important enough and crossed into all three areas, the triangle would get together over tea and arrive at a solution acceptable to them - and then have a big feast.

If that was close to what you observed 40 years ago, then we are on the same page then. It worked because it had developed over the course of centuries. After that, my understanding is that the centuries old system was destroyed because it was replaced by non-local mullahs (the Taliban of Mullah Omar's Emirate) in some places; and by many local dictatorial warlords in other places. The local Shuras lost their clout in those places

No doubt there are areas where the traditional system still works; but two generations of turmoil resulted in a situation where the traditional system cannot be restored by simply flipping a switch. It would have to be rebuilt from the ground up - and we (Coalition) are not the people to do it. We would try to impose a Western system of national courts down to the district level. In fact, there is a pilot program to that effect, which was initiated with great fanfare with a flag officer (JAG if I recall) cutting the ribbon.

My take is that a Westernized national justice system would have the same value to an Astan villager as the court of the hsien (district) magistrate had to a Chinese villager in Manchu times - for the reasons that Marc states:

Given the Feds control over judging a sheep issue is anathema, since they all "know" that the Feds are a) corrupt, and b) shouldn't be that powerful anyway. Besides that, the Feds would take half the sheep as "costs" and they don't know the local context of the sheep in question.

The Rule of Law has to be an Afghan solution; and on that I think we all agree.

As to Karzai, etc., I should have made my point more bluntly. Getting rid of Karzai by coup or otherwise would probably do much more harm than leaving him there. E.g., toppling Diem with a succession of coups by generals might be a lesson learned on point. That's what I meant by "tipping point" - as 1963-1964 was a "tipping point" in Vietnam. Which leaves me with the course of action to force negotiations between Karzai (Northern Alliance), Pashtuns (probably including some Taliban of various stripes) and Pakistan.

As to which, we (Coalition) should not be a party, because as the Man says:

As an aside on Iraq and Afghanistan; those people haggle for sport -- we have absolutely NO business getting in haggling contests with them. They are not going to do things in the western way, period. Two Rudyard quotes:

"Asia is not going to be civilized after the methods of the West. There is too much Asia and she is too old."

"And the epitaph drear: "A fool lies here who tried to hustle the East.""

omarali50

09-14-2009, 05:51 PM

cross posting from registan.net, basically triggered by the Zakariya article, but relevant here.
The whole "tribes" notion is such bull####. The "tribes" were never that coherent and have become even less relevant since the Afghan war started in the late seventies. Fareed Zakariya, unfortunately, has no idea what the hell he is talking about. The taliban have already overtaken the tribal structure. It is possible to talk of local warlords being paid off or otherwise coopted, but the notion that its time to bring back the sahibs from Nikalseyn sahib's heyday is just lazy and idiotic..and I believe that even in Nikalseyn sahib's day, the real issue was the ability of the British to deliver retribution for bad behavior and rewards for good behavior. As long as the taliban have the longer knives and longer memories, no tribe or warlord is going to get too far on their wrong side. When the other side has shows its able to deliver both carrots and sticks and preferrably do so without raping women and kidnapping boys, then the taliban will lose, otherwise they win (at least in their part of afghanistan). And if the taliban are the power with the ability to deliver retribution, then they will get all the money you pay out in subsidies and bribes as well. Power still grows from the barrel of the gun...The real question is: does the US have a legitimate interest that makes it necessary to win this war? and secondly, does it have the ability to do so even if it wants to? I am not sure about the first question, but rather more confident about the second (maybe because i have never been on the inside, so I dont know how bad things really are?). But in any case, Zakariya cannot have it both ways: to win, and not to have to do anything terribly hard in the process. That is not going to happen. The US can give up (of course, while trying to minimize the fallout of failure, but knowing that SOME fallout is inevitable) or it can commit to winning, which will not be easy and may include buying and selling "tribes", but cannot be achieved without showing who is boss where it matters i.e. in matters of life and death.

jmm99

09-14-2009, 07:07 PM

A number of points accord with my armchair understanding of the Astan local situations (meaning that there are a multiplicity of local situations, not all the same):

from omarali50
... The taliban have already overtaken the tribal structure. ... As long as the taliban have the longer knives and longer memories, no tribe or warlord is going to get too far on their wrong side. ... And if the taliban are the power with the ability to deliver retribution, then they will get all the money you pay out in subsidies and bribes as well. ...

But then we reach your questions:

The real question is: does the US have a legitimate interest that makes it necessary to win this war? and secondly, does it have the ability to do so even if it wants to? I am not sure about the first question, but rather more confident about the second (maybe because i have never been on the inside, so I dont know how bad things really are?). But in any case, Zakariya cannot have it both ways: to win, and not to have to do anything terribly hard in the process. That is not going to happen. The US can give up (of course, while trying to minimize the fallout of failure, but knowing that SOME fallout is inevitable) or it can commit to winning, which will not be easy and may include buying and selling "tribes", but cannot be achieved without showing who is boss where it matters i.e. in matters of life and death.

I do not want you to address what you mean by "win" or "winning" because too many bytes have been spilled on SWC addressing the semantics of those terms.

So, what are your proposed courses of action toward whatever you define as the end state acceptable to you ?

In doing that you should take into account the capabilities (1) that are realistically available for use; and (2) that can be used within legal, moral and ethical constraints.

An example, as to the first point, is the First Indochina War (1946-1954), where France was considered the Goliath and the Viet Minh the David. True in the initial stages, but by 1954 the military strengths were very evenly matched - in fact, the VM probably had an edge. The point is that even a great power can only commit a percentage of its military forces to assist in overcoming an insurgency.

As an example of the second point, let us look at raw US "ability" to do things. The US could, for example, flatten every village and infrastructure on the other side of Hwy 1 by use of conventional munitions and, if those weren't enough, by employing tactical nuclear weapons. That would surely disrupt that area of the country - and create millions of new refugees among the survivors. That course of action would be illegal, immoral and unethical.

slapout9

09-14-2009, 07:31 PM

As an example of the second point, let us look at raw US "ability" to do things. The US could, for example, flatten every village and infrastructure on the other side of Hwy 1 by use of conventional munitions and, if those weren't enough, by employing tactical nuclear weapons. That would surely disrupt that area of the country - and create millions of new refugees among the survivors. That course of action would be illegal, immoral and unethical.

But it sure would be effective ;)

Ken White

09-14-2009, 08:01 PM

If that was close to what you observed 40 years ago, then we are on the same page then.and I think we are that on the whole topic...

omarali50

09-14-2009, 08:01 PM

I do not want you to address what you mean by "win" or "winning" because too many bytes have been spilled on SWC addressing the semantics of those terms.

So, what are your proposed courses of action toward whatever you define as the end state acceptable to you ?

The short answer is: "I dont know". But you know there is going to be a long answer as well. So here goes:
1. I dont see how the US can turn around and say we are leaving anytime soon (next 2 years?). I dont think that is likely EVEN if it were the best course available.
2. I dont see how a pullout (any kind of pullout) will leave the afghan people in a better position, at least in the medium term. Any pullout will be followed by renewed civil war and massive killing.
3. I think the change of scenery in Pakistan (from the time when jihadi demos were organized in the main cricket stadium in Lahore, with posters all over town asking people to come and see mujahids rapelling down a wall and so on, to the current situation where SOME previosly beloved ISI assets, at least at foot soldier level, are being hunted down and their bodies are turning up lying around the byways of Swat) is due to American pressure and specifically the american presence in Afghanistan. If the US leaves, Pakistan could revert to the good old days, which is really bad news for India, but not just for India. Ordinary Pakistanis will pay a heavy price too.
So, you can see why I think its better if the US DOES manage to overcome the core jihadi insurgency and establish a semi-functional regime in Afghanistan before a pullout. Purely as an American, I am not sure, but as a Pakistani-American I cannot be too relaxed about the idea of a precipitate US departure.
How to "win"? Without knowing any inside details, I guess it would involve taking a realistic inventory of assets and enemies and prioritizing efforts. Which may be hard to do with an unweildy international coalition and massive bureaucratic and ideological blinders within the US establishment, but my guess is that if its done smartly, the US CAN do it..i dont think its unrealistic, but its likely to be hard and it would be a good start to know what the aim is, what the resources are, and what the priorities are going to be....This is just a collection of platitudes, but I do think its important to focus on tracking down and taking out particular leaders. Its a myth that every dead number three is immediately replaced by another number three. The issue is not who is number three now. The issue is establishing that being alqaeda or taliban number three is a high risk and low reward operation. What you are establishing is the notion that the govt (in this case, the afghan govt and its foreign supporters) has a longer arm and a longer memory than any particular gangster. That does not stop gangsters from existing, but it severely limits their ambition. Don Corleone buys judges and politicians and dreams of "senator corleone" but he is not out to overthrow the govt..that would be a step too far for him and his kind because the state has institutional resources that are much deeper and greater than his nimble but small operation. If you were fighting this war, wouldnt you have an intelligence detachment dedicated to collecting and sifting information about your opponents and building up a data base which may not hit paydirt on day one, but is eventually going to be overwhelming? firefights and FOBs are just part of the deal, its the inertia of the state that discourages rebellion and keeps things at the level of crimes rather than rebellion. What is being done about that part of the afghan state and can more be done? Again, I am focused on the fact that this kind of fluid situation where every adventurer is calculating the odds and switching sides four times a day is not sustainable and will end in disaster. Somehow, you have to move from this to a state where the default expectation is that open rebellion is just too costly...

Dayuhan

09-15-2009, 01:02 AM

I googled US in the middle east and this article came to the top. I haven't seen it before, but agree with it completely. And it was written in 1991. This may help explain what I mean:

http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=1019

This article seems curiously non-specific, speaking in broad terms of policy trends without much in the way of clear examples of those trends and suggestions for alternative policies that coukd have been more effectively applied in those cases. The Iran example... well, yes, we all know our forbears pulled a naughty and it had consequences. There are some lessons to be learned there, for sure, but they are not universal or absolute. The only other concrete example the Cato piece cites is here:

President Bush's willingness to sacrifice American lives to remove Iraqi forces from Kuwait, to restore the "legitimate" government of that feudal monarchy, and to create a "new world order" proceeds logically from the premises and policies of past administrations.

This seems a quite peculiar criticism to me. The need to defend Kuwait was solidly grounded in both international law, which does not award sovereignty solely to democracies, and in American interest, which would have been ill-served by ceding Kuwait's oil reserves to Saddam and inviting a grab at Saudi Arabia. Kuwait's form of government is completely irrelevant: it may seem odd to us, but if the Kuwaitis accept it, that's hardly any of our business. Aggression is aggression, whether against a democracy or a monarchy. This piece seems an argument grounded primarily in an ideology of absolute non-intervention, a position that would be lovely if we were self-sufficient in all things and isolated from the world, but which is simply unrealistic in the actual world.

This then is the core essence of my theory: The key to developing an effective solution lies in understanding the causation of the problem.

While the peripheral facts of the Far and Mid East are very different (cultures, ideologies applied, religion, etc) At the core the causation is the same: Both place had populaces placed under colonial control, and in both places after a major strategic shock event disrupted that colonial control, the populaces took advantage of the opening to seek self-determined governance and sovereignty.

I agree that understanding causation is an important part of developing solutions. First we have to understand causation, and I'm not sure that the causative pattern you suggest is accurate. It's also worth noting that while examining causes is a useful part of developing solutions, even an accurate understanding of causes does not assuer an effective solution.

There is substantial evidence that Middle Eastern populaces prefer sovereignty and are suspicious of Western influence, which is why any attempt by the US or other Western actors to influence or pressure Middle Eastern governments is likely to meet substantial popular suspicion and resistance. It is rather less evident that there is extensive popular demand for "self determined governance" in any form that the West would recognize as such, and I think you may be imposing the Western notion that all people seek "democracy" on populaces that may not share it.

This goes to why I believe Saudi Arabia is the Decisive Point. I don't give two damns about the Saudi royal family. In fact, I'm a little disgusted at how our fearful addiction to their oil has blinded us to allowing them to play us a suckers on a number of occasions and issues. But I digress. This is where Islam was born. It is symbolic. Bin Laden sees it as his main effort, and the Saudi populace has arguably be the most insurgent of all the populaces of the region for years (though ruthlessly and effectively suppressed in those endeavors). A Decisive point is where if one wins there, the rest will fall into place. The "victory" is not a military one at all. In fact, NO military should be used (other than as the credibility behind the President's play). If we can out-compete bin Laden in this effort to force the Saudi Royals to address the concerns of their populace, and we can respect their customs in the process; we can begin turning this whole thing around. It will disempower bin Laden's UW message; and allow this to degenerate into a handful of uncoordinated nationalist movements. Each can then be addressed separately as part of a coordinated scheme of engagement with the region.

I see a fair number of unsupported declarations here, and I do not agree that Saudi Arabia is a decisive point, particularly for the conflict in Afghanistan, to which SA is decidedly peripheral. I also don't agree that US attempts to influence or pressure Saudi Arabia are needed or appropriate, which is a good thing, since we have no means at our disposal to apply such pressure.

How do you support the claim of an insurgent Saudi populace? If they are so insurgent, why is there no insurgency? Brutal suppression is not an adequate explanation: everywhere else we look, we see that brutal suppression of a truly popular insurgency only serves to inflame and exacerbate the insurgency. Why should SA be different? Are the Saudi security services really that magnificently efficient? Or is it possible that the populace in question is a good deal less insurgent than you think? Where and when have we seen the Saudis suppressing a widespread or truly populace-based insurgency.

We should also dispose of the notion that the Saudi government was imposed by the US or the West. It was not: the House of Saud has been a dominant political force on the peninsula for several hundred years.

I also cannot agree that we need to "out-compete bin Laden in this effort to force the Saudi Royals to address the concerns of their populace". I see no evidence that bin Laden is trying to force the Saudi Royals to address the concerns of the populace (and it should be noted that "the populace" is not a monolith with a single set of concerns). If bin Laden's message really represented the concerns of the populace he would have generated far more support and been able to muster something resembling an insurgency. The reality on the ground suggests that his message has a very powerful appeal to a very limited number of people, which is why it manifests itself as a terrorist group rather than as a mass-based insurgency.

Saudi Arabia did pass through a very difficult time, with a great deal of discontent, in the 90s. The primary cause was the oil glut, which had a devastating impact on the Saudi economy. It didn't help that the royals kept their personal spending rolling right along, and the presence of American forces gave religious radicals the leverage to suggest that the low oil prices and consequent economic miseries were somehow being imposed by the Americans. Despite this, bin Laden never gained sufficient influence to muster an insurgency. These conditions have already been reversed: the American forces are gone, the oil glut is a dim memory, the nation is awash with cash and the government is spending huge sums on public services, infrastructure, and job creation.

What "concerns of the Saudi populace", specifically, would you have us pressure the Saudi government to address? How, specifically, would we apply such pressure? I don't see that we have a great deal of leverage, or that the populace would appreciate our intervention. How do we even know what their concerns are?

I think you may be overestimating the degree of coordination in the various Middle East/South Asian insurgencies and nationalist movements, and I think it's very dangerous to assume that AQ is enabling these movements. I see the situation as the opposite: it is the nationalist movements and insurgencies that enable AQ. If we resolve these situations, each in its own difficult and gradual way, we deprive AQ of its raison d'etre. AQ was not born out of an insurgent situation in Saudi Arabia, it was born out of the jihad against the Soviets. Bin Laden tried to follow that up by creating an insurgency in Saudi Arabia, and failed. In order to survive as a relevant force, he needed an enemy: a jihadi is nothing without a jihad. Hence the attacks on the US: an attempt to draw the US into a conflict that would give AQ a continued reason to exist.

I don't see that we have to resolve anything in Saudi Arabia: a good thing, because it is not in our power to resolve anything in Saudi Arabia. We do need to resolve our business in Afghanistan and Iraq... and it would help a bit, if only in PR terms, if we were a bit less solicitous toward the Israelis. The West Bank settlements issue provides, I think, an excellent opportunity to show a little backbone in that quarter. They are not an existential or a vital security issue for Israel, and the US can and should apply some weight toward rolling them back.

Ultimately, though, Afghanistan is not about Palestine or Saudi Arabia, and anything we do there will be peripheral. There may be a few foreign fighters motivated by those issues, but without the core Afghan resistance they can do nothing: our problem is not the foreign fighters, it is the indigenous resistance. Afghanistan is about Afghanistan... and that's more than enough of a problem.

Bob's World

09-15-2009, 03:19 AM

Dayuhan

09-15-2009, 04:12 AM

Many people see this in the same way you do. I don't. I'm comfortable with that.

I won't even try to convey the volumes of historical and theoretical information that would be required to bring you from where you are to where you can begin to understand where I am coming from. Keep reading, and asking questions, and challenging what others tell you things mean. That's what I did.

There's no right answer, but some are better than others.

Those thoughts didn't exactly spring from a vacuum: I've been through a fair bit of history and theory, and done business in the Gulf for many years. I know that on occasion we've waded into the region and messed things up, but I doubt that we can alter that by wading in again with the idea that we can set things right, or pressure others into doing so according to our prescriptions. Good intentions do not assure good outcomes, and the idea of the US trying to act as self-appointed spokesman for the Saudi populace strikes me as something that could yield all manner of unintended consequences, most of them undesirable and many of them downright horrible. I'd prefer to see less meddling, not more, and none at all until we've resolved our current entanglements.

I'm still very curious about what you'd like to pressure the Saudis to do, and what sort of pressure you think would yield positive results.

Steve the Planner

09-15-2009, 06:11 AM

For every complex problem there is a pefectly simple solution that is entriely wrong. H.L. Mencken, The Baltimore Sage

I actually thought some of the earlier comments in this blog held a lot of insights.

Thinking about this problem in systemics: What kind of systems are we dealing with? Non-state, local/tribal, regional and cross-border, minimal governmental structures.

Somebody started out with the idea of closing off the Paki border, then a retort that (1) that is not possible; and (2) it is not desirable.

Then there was amish-mash of different ideas and strategies about how to "do something" or get out.

What systems dynamics approaches start with is an effort to identify all the basic complex systems and subsystems, and their interactions with each other. You start with what is there, not with what we would like it to be. You look at what's broken, not who is to blame. You figure out what the system (the peoples of these border and conflict areas) will realistically accept and the trade-offs associated with effecting your reasonably determined desired end states. Then you look for ways to modify, interact with, or improve the system's performance in some reasonably attainable manner not inconsistent with the desired end state.

I keep reading reports and opinions from some pretty well-informed folks about the various complex sub-systems, the minimalist governmental structure and resources, and the resourcefulness of opposition to us.

But nobody seems to have focused on putting a viable program or plan into motion that addresses the real system that is there, and what can credibly be accomplished by it. Just a lot of bits and pieces, and incoherent government-speak (or worse yet, military jargon). Folks bandying about old fashioned nation-state stuff about this country opr that country, and how to fix "it," when we all know that these kinds of places aren't really nation-states, and the problem definitions and solutions are well outside that kind of thinking.

Seems to me somebody ought to start defining these places based on the people (down to the smallest levels in the places that matter) that are there, what they are about, up to, or motivated by, and what, with our increasingly limited resources and capabilities, and the severe geography, weather, and economic limitations, we can realistically achieve.

Success in Afghanistan is a question, not an answer. What do we want to achieve in that real and complicated place, and how do we intend to attain it?

Steve

Bob's World

09-15-2009, 07:53 PM

Those thoughts didn't exactly spring from a vacuum: I've been through a fair bit of history and theory, and done business in the Gulf for many years. I know that on occasion we've waded into the region and messed things up, but I doubt that we can alter that by wading in again with the idea that we can set things right, or pressure others into doing so according to our prescriptions. Good intentions do not assure good outcomes, and the idea of the US trying to act as self-appointed spokesman for the Saudi populace strikes me as something that could yield all manner of unintended consequences, most of them undesirable and many of them downright horrible. I'd prefer to see less meddling, not more, and none at all until we've resolved our current entanglements.

I'm still very curious about what you'd like to pressure the Saudis to do, and what sort of pressure you think would yield positive results.

The Saudi's need to listen to their own populace, and open that dialogue so as to develop some reasonable reforms. Currently, they are talking reform, but really have no incentive to surrender much if any of the total control that they have employed for generations to control this populace. The times are changing though. Its hard to keep the "boy down on the farm" once he's seen Paris.

The perception that Bin Laden tries to play up is that the King is corrupt, and worse has sold out to Western influence as manifested in the U.S. relationship; and that good Arabs must purge the peninsula of this apostate influence, and that to do so they must first break the support of the U.S. to the King.

I recommend that the US adopt about 80% of Bin Laden's message. I agree that we have become too involved in the politics of the region as part of our Cold War engagement and efforts to ensure the flow of oil; and that we too believe that the King should be more sensitive to the desires of his populace.

Then announce and implement a program of lessening out "footprint" in the country, while at the same time facilitating ("carrots and sticks" to get the King to the table) a series of meetings between the King and representatives of key interst groups in the Kingdom to discuss reform. By doing this we disempower bin Laden tremendously. There is no need for the US to actually participate in the talks, and best if we do not. Hell, let AQ send reps. I suspect that only moderate change will come from this, but it will be much more than what would come without it. As an example, many in the Kingdom want a judiciary free from the King's control. That would be a huge change forward. More importantly we facilitate a much more positive narrative for us while at the same time disempowering bin Laden's ideological message in a major way. There is no fast answer; but we must change our approach. Currently we call Saudi insurgent's "terrorists" and enable the King's efforts to ruthlessly suppress these popular movements in the name of GWOT. This empowers bin Laden's message.

When you find yourself in a hole, stop digging.

Hopefully this helps highlight the type of efforts I mean. To over-engage to this end is as bad as the over-engaging that we have done to date in the other direction.

Once we make some progress here, we can add issues like greater Saudi effort on the Palestinian problem; or less support to AQ, etc.

Bob's World

09-15-2009, 11:18 PM

that is, if you interpret the Commander in Chief's guidance:

]"Afghanistan[/B]: The President’s new strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan will ensure that all elements of national power are engaged and integrated in an effort to defeat al Qaeda to prevent attacks on the homeland and on our Allies and partners. We are asking our friends and allies to join us with a renewed commitment. We also will regularly assess the progress of our efforts and those of the governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan through clear measurements to ensure ongoing informed accountability."
http://www.whitehouse.gov/issues/defense/

To mean also defeating the Taliban, and also to build from scratch centralized democratic government and infrastructure provided by foreign hands, where no local hands have ever built it before...then yes, he will need far more than 21,000 additional men to accomplish the mission.

http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/2009091/ap_on_go_ca_st_pe/us_us_afghanistan

"A properly resourced counterinsurgency probably means more forces, and without question, more time" and dedication, Mullen said.

Perhaps ADM Mullen is asking the wrong question of the wrong party. Clearly his commanders and staff have brought him a COA to execute the Commander-in-Chief's guidance that fails the "Acceptable-Suitable-Feasible" test.

Yes, asking the commander for more time, forces, and an expanded mission statement in order to make your COA pass the "Feasible" test is an option; but it still does not account for just how unacceptable both the current plan and the expanded proposed effort are to so many stakeholders; and "Suitable" is a criteria that should be open to debate as well, as reasonable minds can certainly differ as to the veracity of the proposed campaign plan.

I'm not judging, but if this was being played out at BN level, the company commander would be told to come up with a better plan before going to BDE to ask for this degree of expanded resources, authorities, and time.

(Besides, we aren't doing COIN in Afghanistan, its FID. Until we can identify the mission correctly, it stands to reason that the plan to execute it might be a bit off. Oh, and I would also suggest to the boss to change the criteria for AQ from "Defeat" to "Neutralize," as the pursuit of defeat brings far too many negative 2nd and 3rd order effects and is not necessary to achieve the ends of making America safe.)

raptor10

09-15-2009, 11:26 PM

That's interesting - isn't there a worry that if we accepted AQ reps in talks about grievances, it would legitimize their use of "irregular warfare" (a euphemism obviously).

marct

09-15-2009, 11:28 PM

Hi Bob,

Most of what you say, snarkiness included ;), I agree with. I do, however, have a bit of a problem with this:

(Besides, we aren't doing COIN in Afghanistan, its FID. Until we can identify the mission correctly, it stands to reason that the plan to execute it might be a bit off. Oh, and I would also suggest to the boss to change the criteria for AQ from "Defeat" to "Neutralize," as the pursuit of defeat brings far too many negative 2nd and 3rd order effects and is not necessary to achieve the ends of making America safe.)

I used to argue that Afghanistan was FID / SFA, but I am now really having second (and third) doubts. FID (and SFA) seem to imply two criteria that I believe are missing from the current situation:

a (locally) "valid" (however we want to define it) HN government; i.e. one that s/b able to stand up without massive external support and resources, and
a situation where the HN government actually has some measure of control over the ROE.

Honestly, I don't really see either of these implied conditions being met, so I don't see how we can be said to actually be "doing" FID (or SFA). I don't think we have a decent alphabet soup acronym for this situation. What do we call it? Military-based social engineering on the cheap (MBSEC)?

marct

09-15-2009, 11:30 PM

That's interesting - isn't there a worry that if we accepted AQ reps in talks about grievances, it would legitimize their use of "irregular warfare" (a euphemism obviously).

AQ, yes, the Taliban, no. If we focus on the basic mission, not the "mission creep on steroids" version, then the Taliban need to be part of the solution.

slapout9

09-15-2009, 11:33 PM

But nobody seems to have focused on putting a viable program or plan into motion that addresses the real system that is there, and what can credibly be accomplished by it. Just a lot of bits and pieces, and incoherent government-speak (or worse yet, military jargon). Folks bandying about old fashioned nation-state stuff about this country opr that country, and how to fix "it," when we all know that these kinds of places aren't really nation-states, and the problem definitions and solutions are well outside that kind of thinking.

Seems to me somebody ought to start defining these places based on the people (down to the smallest levels in the places that matter) that are there, what they are about, up to, or motivated by, and what, with our increasingly limited resources and capabilities, and the severe geography, weather, and economic limitations, we can realistically achieve.

Steve

Excellant post.The only way out of this problem to is to begin looking and thinking of the situation as a system and not as Afghanistan, because Afghanistan doesn't exist in the System of Tribe-A-Stan.;)

Ken White

09-16-2009, 01:32 AM

...Oh, and I would also suggest to the boss to change the criteria for AQ from "Defeat" to "Neutralize," as the pursuit of defeat brings far too many negative 2nd and 3rd order effects and is not necessary to achieve the ends of making America safe.)I'm not even sure they can be neutralized, I'd settle for 'significantly disrupted.'

MarcT said:
What do we call it? Military-based social engineering on the cheap (MBSEC)? That about sums it up... :wry:

Bob's World

09-16-2009, 02:33 AM

Hi Bob,

Most of what you say, snarkiness included ;), I agree with. I do, however, have a bit of a problem with this:

I used to argue that Afghanistan was FID / SFA, but I am now really having second (and third) doubts. FID (and SFA) seem to imply two criteria that I believe are missing from the current situation:

a (locally) "valid" (however we want to define it) HN government; i.e. one that s/b able to stand up without massive external support and resources, and
a situation where the HN government actually has some measure of control over the ROE.

Honestly, I don't really see either of these implied conditions being met, so I don't see how we can be said to actually be "doing" FID (or SFA). I don't think we have a decent alphabet soup acronym for this situation. What do we call it? Military-based social engineering on the cheap (MBSEC)?

Their competence may well determine if they succeed or not, but it does not somehow transpose their role as the COIN executor to an outside FID provider. This is a ruthless business, and if they are too weak they will be replaced by a stronger force or one with greater popular support. It happens.

This goes to the heart of what I call "populace-centric" approach. We cannot tie ourselves to some particular government, but must work with whatever government emerges to lead. Governments come and go, threats come and go, the populace endures. To step in to co-opt the COIN mission simply because WE as the outside FID provider want a particular government to prevail really violates our founding principle of Self-Determination and the inherent right of every populace to insurgency..

jmm99

09-16-2009, 03:13 AM

slapout9

09-16-2009, 04:30 AM

OK, systems people, you have my attention. What does the system and its sub-systems look like ? Maybe a bulletpoint and/or chart for JMM types.

Sounds like a serious approach that will at least identify the components to a political-diplomatic solution.

Mike

May be to late:eek: Afghan nationals are here with alleged links to AQ the real Enemy system! and were the target of a Anti-Terror Raid.....that did not have the best results. I was afraid that this was going to happen sooner or later. The way we have handled the whole situation almost made it inevitable, but I am keeping the faith:)

http://www.cnn.com/2009/CRIME/09/15/terror.raid/index.html?iref=hpmostpop

jmm99

09-16-2009, 05:37 AM

slapout9

09-16-2009, 02:02 PM

I would be surprised if there wasn't a group of Astanis linked to AQ. This may or may not be a serious event - no bombs, no arrests.

A more important question (re: Astan itself) to me would be what Taliban groups are linked to AQ, and how strongly they are linked. What Taliban groups are not linked to AQ.

Thinking of chemical molecules (hey, they're systems, aren't they) - single bond, double bond, triple bond.

What Pashtun groups are linked to the Taliban, but not of the Taliban. What Pashtun groups are anti-Taliban. What Pashtun groups are simply neutral.

The big deal is they are doing it HERE! No bombs, No arrests because they got away:eek: The bigger point is this, as we prepare to surge in A'stan suppose they surge in America with AQ support......suppose they decide not to be good little enemy systems and stay in their country while it's blown up but decide to come HERE with an IED campaign. What would the 2nd and 3rd order effects be of just a single strike.....mass hysteria? stock market crash?
Insurgency warfare is based on infiltration they know how to run between the raindrops and we don't know how to stop that with any degree of certainty.

marct

09-16-2009, 02:24 PM

Hi Bob,

Their competence may well determine if they succeed or not, but it does not somehow transpose their role as the COIN executor to an outside FID provider. This is a ruthless business, and if they are too weak they will be replaced by a stronger force or one with greater popular support. It happens.

Can the US (and NATO) actually be said to be "outside FID provider[s]"? This gets to the heart of the lexical problem I have with this - the US put Karzai and the current gov't in place, both individually and as to its form. This was similar to what happened in Germany and Japan after WW II. But, having done that, it appears as if there is a stepping back and saying that "they" are independant. Put simply, the Karzai gov't and the current GoA is an imposed regime that you are now trying to define as internally legitimate. I sense a paradox here :cool:.

You go on to say that "if they are too weak they will be replaced by a stronger force or one with greater popular support" and there are certainly precedents for that. The Taliban (greater popular support) ousted the Soviet backed GoA while the US (greater force) ousted the Taliban. My point here is that just by calling the current GoA "legitimate" and, as a result of that act of naming, saying that they hold the "role of COIN executor" doesn't hold water. It's not FID, although it may be FIDOS (Foreign Internal Defence On Steroids*).

This goes to the heart of what I call "populace-centric" approach. We cannot tie ourselves to some particular government, but must work with whatever government emerges to lead.

Does that mean that you would work with the Taliban? That's not, BTW, a joke, I mean it quite seriously. The way you have worded your comment implies that you are viewing US FID efforts as an outsourced, stance-neutral provider of military power rather than an effort with a specific, national policy objective.

Governments come and go, threats come and go, the populace endures. To step in to co-opt the COIN mission simply because WE as the outside FID provider want a particular government to prevail really violates our founding principle of Self-Determination and the inherent right of every populace to insurgency..

I agree that it does violate that principle, but that certainly hasn't stopped the US in the past and I doubt it will stop it in the future. If there was a fair and free vote in Afghanistan (not likely, but let's suppose...) that called for a withdrawl of all US and NATO forces, my gut guess is that it would win with a 65% in the affirmative. In that case, would you advocate withdrawl?

I'm really not trying to be a sierra-disturber, here, but I think it is absolutely necessary that people not get caught up in lexical illusions that end up causing major problems with missions.

Cheers,

Marc

*************
* With, I will note, a whole of government approach as in the whole of the GoA is a foreign creation.

marct

09-16-2009, 02:26 PM

Insurgency warfare is based on infiltration they know how to run between the raindrops and we don't know how to stop that with any degree of certainty.

Yup. One of the ironies that Britain learned the hard way is that while a channel may prevent most types of invasions / attacks, it doesn't prevent all of them. The US is still learning that lesson (BTW, Canada doesn't seem to think that we need to, but that's another story :wry:).

09-16-2009, 02:47 PM

Bob's World noted that the competence of a sitting government does not decide the mission. That is completely true in so far as the mission is determined without respect to the wishes of the country in which the mission is being performed. But when that happens, the correct name for any such mission is "aggression."

Earlier in this thread, we considered that the right analogy for Afghanistan as something like a domestic dispute that has slipped into significant violence. I'm thinking that Bob's World's latest forays would lead us to a situation akin to the Lincoln County Wars of the American West.

As MarkT alludes, to do what Bob's World posits is to make our "FID" forces little more than the hired guns used by one or another "cattle baron" to ensure grazing rights for his herds. That does not support the will of the people: we've got to consider the sod-busters, sheep herders and merchants in town in the equation too.

marct

09-16-2009, 03:17 PM

Interesting article worth reading (from the SWJ blog & NY Times)

http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/16/opinion/16goodwin.html?_r=1&ref=opinion

If there is any entity more reviled in Afghanistan than the Karzai government and coalition forces, it is the Taliban, so I never took these desperate exclamations to be literally true. But these outbursts reveal a disgust with the current government so pronounced it cannot be dismissed. And the international community’s reluctance to fight corruption head-on has inextricably linked it with the despised administration. As we continue to give unequivocal support to a crooked government, our credibility is greatly diminished and the difficulty of our mission greatly increased.

Ken White

09-16-2009, 03:22 PM

Can the US (and NATO) actually be said to be "outside FID provider[s]"?Lexically and honestly, No. Politically, it sort of has to be...
This was similar to what happened in Germany and Japan after WW II. But, having done that, it appears as if there is a stepping back and saying that "they" are independant.Is not the difference that those two governments were defeated, modified and were retooled and allowed to continue to govern while we and others were Occupying powers? Whereas in Afghanistan the nominal but not totally accepted government of the day was defeated and actually departed (or hid themselves thoroughly) and thus there was a need for some form of government and that fairly quickly (which does not mean we did it right...) as we did not want to be seen or legally tabbed as 'an occupying power.'
My point here is that just by calling the current GoA "legitimate" and, as a result of that act of naming, saying that they hold the "role of COIN executor" doesn't hold water.I'm not sure that's correct. What I am sure of is that the alternatives are probably worse. The real difficulty arises not from the legitimacy of the Afghan government, I think it's legitimate even if it is totally corrupt (Boy, what a surprise...) and I suspect most legal opinion would agree -- the UN seems to -- however the problem is that governments major partner happens to be a big, bureaucratic mono-whatever that does not play well with others. We want them to be in charge BUT to do everything our way, not a good plan with a proud and xenophobic people. Makes for an uneasy relationship (that's my understatement for the day). :wry:
...that called for a withdrawl of all US and NATO forces, my gut guess is that it would win with a 65% in the affirmative. In that case, would you advocate withdrawl?See Iraq. I'm pretty sure we would go, quickly -- and heave a huge sigh of relief. There seems to be a belief by many that the US Army or the US in general wants to be in Afghanistan. My sensing is that's totally incorrect on both counts. Hmmm. I do believe that's two understatements today... :o
...but I think it is absolutely necessary that people not get caught up in lexical illusions that end up causing major problems with missions.Lexical perhaps -- the larger problem is that we tend to cater more to domestic politics -- or to political illusion -- than to an accurate reading of the international situation in the use of force abroad. Not terribly smart on our part. Only the restraints imposed by Allies in WW II kept us from doing some dumb stuff *.

We're like a big, brash, dumb but not ill intentioned teenager, we can do a bit of damage unless a more sedate friend constrains us a bit. Get upset when told to cool it, too. Especially if we know we need to do that... :D

* I would be remiss if I did not also mention that they caused us to do some other dumb stuff. Fortunately, it worked out fairly well... ;)

marct

09-16-2009, 04:13 PM

Hi Ken,

Lexically and honestly, No. Politically, it sort of has to be...

Yup, I'd agree with that, although, speaking politically, I'm not sure how well the image would play out.

Is not the difference that those two governments were defeated, modified and were retooled and allowed to continue to govern while we and others were Occupying powers? Whereas in Afghanistan the nominal but not totally accepted government of the day was defeated and actually departed (or hid themselves thoroughly) and thus there was a need for some form of government and that fairly quickly (which does not mean we did it right...) as we did not want to be seen or legally tabbed as 'an occupying power.

It's an interesting problem. In both cases, although moreso in Japan, there was a lot of retooling. There was continued governing, but primarily at the local level under constant watch. In Afghanistan, OTOH, there was a very rapid more to create a "national" government after the defeat of the Taliban, but very limited moves to create local governments, for exactly the reasons you state. This situation, however, led to some serious problems.

While there was a "national" government, it had very limited local reach. Can a government be "legitimate" with such a poor grasp over its claimed populace? (If so, the Pretender to the Throne of Jerusalem may be wanting to talk with the DoS fairly soon). Part of the problem, IMO, was that there was a perfectly good "Government-in-Exile" that had a fair bit of support but for ideological reasons, they were left out in the cold. Given that, there is no way that the US/NATO could be viewed as much else than an "occupying power" since it obviously wasn't there to restore the "legitimate" government (in-Exile).

'I'm not sure that's correct. What I am sure of is that the alternatives are probably worse. The real difficulty arises not from the legitimacy of the Afghan government, I think it's legitimate even if it is totally corrupt (Boy, what a surprise...) and I suspect most legal opinion would agree -- the UN seems to -- however the problem is that governments major partner happens to be a big, bureaucratic mono-whatever that does not play well with others. We want them to be in charge BUT to do everything our way, not a good plan with a proud and xenophobic people. Makes for an uneasy relationship (that's my understatement for the day).

I'm not sure that all of the alternatives were worse; then again, I'm a great believer in constitutional monarchies :D. I certainly agree with your last point, and therein lies the rub and why I find it difficult to accept the outsourcing model Bob implied.

See Iraq. I'm pretty sure we would go, quickly -- and heave a huge sigh of relief. There seems to be a belief by many that the US Army or the US in general wants to be in Afghanistan. My sensing is that's totally incorrect on both counts. Hmmm. I do believe that's two understatements today... :o

Yup, and I suspect that there would be a huge sigh of relief if it happened in A'stan, too - at least until the international blame for the US breaking things and not fixing them started showing up (about 3 days after the withdrawl).

Lexical perhaps -- the larger problem is that we tend to cater more to domestic politics -- or to political illusion -- than to an accurate reading of the international situation in the use of force abroad. Not terribly smart on our part. Only the restraints imposed by Allies in WW II kept us from doing some dumb stuff *.

Agreed on the domestic politics angle; it's a problem all democracies have, and there's not much that can be done about it (as a related aside, I always loved the Plays of Aristophanes; they are worth reading given the parallels).

We're like a big, brash, dumb but not ill intentioned teenager, we can do a bit of damage unless a more sedate friend constrains us a bit. Get upset when told to cool it, too. Especially if we know we need to do that... :D

I think the best comment I can make here is "No Comment" ;).

jmm99

09-16-2009, 04:30 PM

This is my personal take, which I've had since 9/11.

1. We must expect attempts at violence in the US by AQ, either directly, via supported groups or by persons who are simply thinking in parallel with AQ.

2. So far, the violent incidents have been few (e.g., the DC snipers & the Arkansas shootings by "parallel thinkers"); and a number of plots have been foiled.

3. We cannot expect this successful record to continue without a serious incident happening. It will occur. Homeland security will not be perfect.

4. How people react will depend on the person. If you were terrorized by 9/11, you probably will be terrorized by the event which will surely happen. If you were intensely angered by 9/11 without feeling terrorized, the same emotion will probably flow from that event.

5. I (and every US citizen, for that matter - some will disagree with this), since 9/11, have sent hundreds of thousands of guys and gals into situations where they don't have our at home luxuries and are subject to far greater risks than we have at home. So, it is time for the homeland to grow up about risks of violence.

6. I don't suggest we adopt the mentality of a herd of prey stalked by predators. But, I do suggest that, besides the logical COA to arrest or kill when we can, we realize that AQ (as it presently stands) is not an existential threat to the US. It is simply a threat.

End sermonette.

Bob's World

09-16-2009, 04:43 PM

That's interesting - isn't there a worry that if we accepted AQ reps in talks about grievances, it would legitimize their use of "irregular warfare" (a euphemism obviously).

Codified it in our Declaration, and employed it to seek a change of governance.

The value of having AQ at the table is that it would most likely highlight how extreme some of their positions are in the context of the conservative changes that most of the populace prefers. It also takes away the propaganda tool of their being able to claim that they still represent what the people really want and that they are still being denied by a sham process hosted by the Apostate Government and shaped by the West.

Besides, you can't fully appreciate crazy until you put it in the context of sanity.

Ken White

09-16-2009, 04:45 PM

This situation, however, led to some serious problems...Part of the problem, IMO, was that there was a perfectly good "Government-in-Exile" that had a fair bit of support but for ideological reasons, they were left out in the cold. Given that, there is no way that the US/NATO could be viewed as much else than an "occupying power" since it obviously wasn't there to restore the "legitimate" government (in-Exile)...at least until the international blame for the US breaking things and not fixing them started showing up (about 3 days after the withdrawl).True on problems, some foreseen, some not. All predictable. :mad:

Also obviously correct on the 'legitimate' government issue but that was always as much a non-starter as not toppling the Taliban. I suspect the moral there is be careful what you want, you may get it. :wry:

On the withdrawal, that international opprobrium was, I suspect, why we elected to stay instead of departing after toppling. In my personal view, that was not adequate reason to stay -- nor is it adequate reason to not withdraw. The nominal reason we stayed, 'to deny safe haven...' has now become the real reason we cannot withdraw. The fact that staying will lessen (but not eliminate) international blame for the existence of halitosis and other things that are the responsibility of the US is just a bonus. :cool:

Bob's World

09-16-2009, 04:51 PM

Hi Bob,

Can the US (and NATO) actually be said to be "outside FID provider[s]"? This gets to the heart of the lexical problem I have with this - the US put Karzai and the current gov't in place, both individually and as to its form. This was similar to what happened in Germany and Japan after WW II. But, having done that, it appears as if there is a stepping back and saying that "they" are independant. Put simply, the Karzai gov't and the current GoA is an imposed regime that you are now trying to define as internally legitimate. I sense a paradox here :cool:.

You go on to say that "if they are too weak they will be replaced by a stronger force or one with greater popular support" and there are certainly precedents for that. The Taliban (greater popular support) ousted the Soviet backed GoA while the US (greater force) ousted the Taliban. My point here is that just by calling the current GoA "legitimate" and, as a result of that act of naming, saying that they hold the "role of COIN executor" doesn't hold water. It's not FID, although it may be FIDOS (Foreign Internal Defence On Steroids*).

Does that mean that you would work with the Taliban? That's not, BTW, a joke, I mean it quite seriously. The way you have worded your comment implies that you are viewing US FID efforts as an outsourced, stance-neutral provider of military power rather than an effort with a specific, national policy objective.

I agree that it does violate that principle, but that certainly hasn't stopped the US in the past and I doubt it will stop it in the future. If there was a fair and free vote in Afghanistan (not likely, but let's suppose...) that called for a withdrawl of all US and NATO forces, my gut guess is that it would win with a 65% in the affirmative. In that case, would you advocate withdrawl?

I'm really not trying to be a sierra-disturber, here, but I think it is absolutely necessary that people not get caught up in lexical illusions that end up causing major problems with missions.

Cheers,

Marc

*************
* With, I will note, a whole of government approach as in the whole of the GoA is a foreign creation.

We just have to face the fact, that sometimes things will not go the way WE want them to go. Cold War engagement to contain was all about exerting control. We have come to see exerting our will and control as the model for success today as well.

I suggest that it is not, and that we better serve our national interests in the emerging security environment by learning to be the outside enabler of choice, to be the facilitator of evolution vice the obstacle. We often refuse to recognize governments that rise to power in ways we object to. I just don't see where that position has helped us to stabilize those regions and advance our interests. In fact, usually the opposite occurs.

Bob's World

09-16-2009, 04:54 PM

slapout9

09-16-2009, 05:59 PM

Link to a memo by a former FBI agent on the real reason we are in Afghanistan and why we are not to going to leave.

http://dir.salon.com/story/news/feature/2002/06/05/memo/

Ken White

09-16-2009, 07:11 PM

His complaints that is...

The pipeline issue has been bruited about for years, the fact that UnoCal, Kalzay and the Clinton and Bush Administrations all did what he says they did is also old news. He says:
"The Bush White House stepped up negotiations with the Taliban in 2001. When those talks stalled in July, a Bush administration representative threatened the Taliban with military reprisals if the government did not go along with American demands."Okay, par for the course in our not too swift and not too diplomatic efforts to insure free trade (preferably on US terms or else...). We've been doing that for over 200 years. However, he then says:
"It shows al-Qaida's keen interest in the U.S.-Taliban negotiations and raises new questions as to whether the U.S. military threat to the Taliban in July 2001 could have prompted al-Qaida's Sept. 11 attack."(emphasis added /kw)Um, I love it when the FBI, adds 2 and 2 and gets 7.6. Given that they tell us that the preparations for 9/11 started in late 1998 or early 1999 I'm unsure how he arrives at that conclusion that a July 2001 'threat' could or would precipitate anything to do with 9/11. They were into the execution phase before Bush was inaugurated...

I do agree with his last sentence, though:
Would that U.S. intelligence agencies' investigations into al-Qaida activities in the months before Sept. 11 had such a productive ending.As to 'it's all about the oilll...' being the reason for entry and for staying, part of it, not all by a long shot. ;)

slapout9

09-16-2009, 07:48 PM

Ken, I think we are there for the oil (and some other stuff) but don't misunderstand I think the pipeline is a good thing, it will bring stability and money to the area if the darn thing ever gets built. So the trick is to get Tribe-a-stan to support Pipeline-a-stan and we all live happily ever after plus that will shut out a lot of AQ influence over the Talliban.

Dayuhan

09-17-2009, 03:56 AM

Link to a memo by a former FBI agent on the real reason we are in Afghanistan and why we are not to going to leave.

http://dir.salon.com/story/news/feature/2002/06/05/memo/

A fascinating exercise in disinformation, and obviously an effective one.

The word "pipeline" rings an immediate and reflexive bell, and unless you've taken the time to dig into the issue a bit, it's very easy to reach all the wrong conclusions.

The "revelation" that AQ was monitoring the Taliban's pipeline negotiations is hardly earthshaking; my personal reaction was along the lines of "duh". The negotiations were anything but secret, they were widely reported at the time. There was quite vocal opposition in the US, particularly from women's groups, who were fairly irate at the idea of US companies doing business with the Taliban (back then American liberals didn't like the Taliban). Of course AQ would take an interest in their chief protector negotiating with their chief enemy, and of course they would monitor that situation: it would be more surprising if they hadn't been monitoring the situation.

Many people have reached the conclusion that the US was pressuring the Taliban to accept the pipeline project, and that the Taliban were resisting. This is simply wrong. The Taliban badly needed the revenue and were actively pursuing the project, even sent a delegation to Texas to negotiate. The US was trying to steer the project to Unocal over a competing consortium (all governments of industrialized countries do this, some much more aggressively than the US), but there was no need to persuade the Taliban to pursue the project; they were already on board. The pipeline was not derailed by Taliban resistance, it was derailed by US and later UN sanctions, which would have made it illegal for Unocal to even talk to the Taliban.

The real disinformation comes here:

The Bush White House stepped up negotiations with the Taliban in 2001. When those talks stalled in July, a Bush administration representative threatened the Taliban with military reprisals if the government did not go along with American demands.

This is, of course, literally true. The author doesn't come out and say it, but the implication is that the US was threatening violence if the Taliban didn't allow Unocal to build the pipeline, a rather bizarre notion, since at the time US law would not have allowed Unocal to build the pipeline. In reality, the threat of violence and the pipeline deal formed a carrot-and-stick package aimed at persuading the Taliban to turn over bin Laden and sever relations with AQ. The package was simple: if the Taliban turned over bin laden and broke with AQ, the US would lift sanctions and allow the pipeline deal (and potentially other business) to proceed. If not, military reprisals were on the table.

The notion that we are in Afghanistan "for the oil" simply doesn't stand up to examination. The pipeline would have carried natural gas for the Pakistani market, not for the US. It would have been a big deal for the Taliban - any source of hard currency would have been a big deal for the Taliban - but the amount of gas involved was far to small to have any significant impact on the global market, and the project was far to small to drive major action. The US did see the pipeline as a useful lever to move the Taliban to a more moderate stance, and as a potentially nice little carrot to toss to a smaller US company, but if you look at the actual size of the project, the idea of it serving as a major casus belli is really pretty absurd.

slapout9

09-17-2009, 05:03 AM

Dayuhan, you did see the clarification I posted later? I think it is a good idea for A'stan as it provides some revenue and stability as opposed to their drug crop.

Ken, I think we are there for the oil (and some other stuff) but don't misunderstand I think the pipeline is a good thing, it will bring stability and money to the area if the darn thing ever gets built. So the trick is to get Tribe-a-stan to support Pipeline-a-stan and we all live happily ever after plus that will shut out a lot of AQ influence over the Talliban.

Dayuhan

09-17-2009, 06:44 AM

I agree that it would be a good thing for Afghanistan... and for Pakistan, and for Uzbekistan. It's not the reason we're in Afghanistan, though, and Bush was not threatening the Taliban to force them to accept the pipeline project.

I do think that the prospect of the Taliban striking a deal with an American company would have been a very upsetting prospect for bin Laden and AQ, and might well have motivated them to press on with attacks against the US. As the Taliban settled into the role of government there would be a natural need to deal with things like revenue and investment, and that need would tend to bring more moderate and pragmatic individuals forward. AQ would not have seen this trend as anything positive, and would surely have wanted to disrupt it.

Greyhawk

09-17-2009, 10:21 PM

slapout9

09-17-2009, 11:47 PM

The Salon article is certainly interesting - but can anyone point to an (online) translation of the referenced Atef memo? My search turns up nothing, though apparently it was also an exhibit (Government's Exhibit 300B-T) in US vs Osama (or Usama) bin Laden et. al.

Greyhawk, might try researching John O'Neil this guy is really an unsung hero of the whole Counter Terrorism/911 event. PM jmm99 on research for legal documents.

slapout9

09-18-2009, 03:03 PM

Steve the Planner

09-18-2009, 04:20 PM

Slapout:

The priorities from Iraq were:

Water

Energy

Mobility-freedom of exchange/markets, security/viability of movements in a classical economic geography sense

All as a precondition for essential services (including security), economic and agricultural restart, and governance.

In Afghanistan, where subsistence is, perhaps, more important than trade there is some tweaking to do, but my general understanding of the econ/ag strategy is to move beyond subsistence-level activities, which implies a substantial regional mobility system, and, in turn triggers the priority for energy availability.

Once the above three are assured, self-improvement starts to become viable and sustainable.

Steve

slapout9

09-18-2009, 04:46 PM

Mobility-freedom of exchange/markets, security/viability of movements in a classical economic geography sense

Steve

I think that is a mistake. Connecting the system comes after the Guerrilla Warfare problem has been brought under control. My Opinion anayway. Think of "Safe Places" first.

omarali50

09-18-2009, 04:46 PM

cross posting from another thread about Pakistan:There may be situations where immovable objects face unstoppable forces with tragic results. The writers of this report assume that "countries and their interests" are natural and eternal categories, but such may not be the case. I would submit that Pakistan has already lost control of the Islamic Emirate and does not possess the military force or the political will to reconquer it on its own terms. Eventually, it will settle for a strategy of holding the "settled areas" and I would not be surprised if one day the indo-tibetan border police is being asked to come and help defend Islamabad. Stranger things have happened. The US will inshallah create a reasonable facsimile of a regime in Afghanistan and this regime will contend with the Islamic Emirate for territory and influence for the next generation or so. China, US, EU, even India, will continue to subsidise corrupt "pro-western" regimes in Pakistan and Afghanistan and will wait for time to work its healing magic. This is the best case scenario. Other possibilities include the humiliation and withdrawal of the great satan, followed by an orgy of violence and an expanded Islamic emirate surrounded by India, China and other local powers and at war with all of them. OR, if India and China fail to cooperate, China may use rump Pakistan or the islamic emirate to humiliate and destroy India, but will be left holding the most explosive bag in history, allowing the United States to recover from its near-terminal decline while China tries (unsuccessfully) to pacify Southwest Asia. OR, we could see the triumph of rationality and peace will reign as Pakhtuns buy Chinese HD players to play Indian movies while eating Ramen noodles. My apologies for being flippant, but its than kind of day...

tequila

09-18-2009, 05:11 PM

Steve the Planner

09-18-2009, 05:58 PM

Absolutely. Makes no sense until some level of fighting has ceased.

But effective reconstruction isn't really going to work until you get it: safe travel routes for critical market movements. In Iraq, the Pipeline Exclsuion Zone, a linear fort along the pipelines, made movement safe.

So do you fight a general war, or prioritize efforts to things like safe convoy movements, or PEZes?

Critical questions: What needs to be moved, from where to where, how do you secure it?

Steve

slapout9

09-18-2009, 06:20 PM

In Iraq, the Pipeline Exclsuion Zone, a linear fort along the pipelines, made movement safe.

Steve

Linear Fort.......no problem..... works for me. For some reason when I say a defensible perimeter people jump to the conclusion that it is round, like a moat or something or a wall. It may in fact be a very odd shape, depends on what you are trying to secure. It may be a wall, a fence,a ditch, a soldier with a pair of binoculars, it may be all of those but it needs to be defensible. To me COIN is a big access control problem. Let good people into the safe place, keep the bad people out of the safe place and in the kill zone.
The safe place needs to be self sustainable or as close to that as possible.

Further thoughts. EBO which is a bad word now a days. Time is the ultimate enemy, the longer it takes you to achieve the desired effect the greater the chance that it will go wrong or the enemy will adapt. So here is how I look at things offensively against the enemy..... impose operational paralysis. defensively........ deny operational paralysis to the protected population. Target wise here is what I look at:
1-kenetic...instant
2-air(as in breathing)...minutes
3-food....weeks
4-shelter months
5-medical.....wild card minutes to months

omarali50

09-18-2009, 08:13 PM

Feeling the blues today, omarali?

I don't think we've reached the point of Pakistani state collapse quite yet. The Pak Taliban cannot advance anywhere the Pakistani Army isn't willing to concede - i.e. non-Pashtun areas. I have yet to see any real danger of Punjabi jihadists like Jaish e-Mohammad or Lashkar i-Jhangvi being able to take on the Pakistani Army in any way - posing a terror threat is not the same as being able to topple the state. The idea that these groups would be able to destroy the state, never mind replace it with an "emirate" of any kind, seems quite farfetched.

Tequila, I did not mean that the emirate has replaced Pakistan. I refer to the Taliban ruled area of FATA as the Islamic Emirate (their own preferred term, and we should always respect people in this matter, if they call it myanmar, we call it myanmar..). THIS islamic emirate is very much in existence. My "best case scenario" assumed that this emirate will remain confined to more or less its current boundaries and Pakistan will shrink to the "settled areas" of NWFP and Punjab and Sindh,with ongoing insurgency in balochistan. Thats all. Not a collapse of the state. Cheers.

jmm99

09-18-2009, 09:19 PM

US v Bin Laden (Embassy bombings) was filed in the Southern District of New York (main webpage (http://www1.nysd.uscourts.gov/index.php)).

Find Law has an index to some of the trial record (http://news.findlaw.com/legalnews/documents/archive_b.html#binladen), which you will find here - mainly transcripts of the trial.

Many court records (if electronically filed or scanned) are available via PACER - see SDNY PACER service (http://www1.nysd.uscourts.gov/pacer.php) here.

PACER is an acronym for Public Access to Court Electronic Records and, it permits account holders to view documents that have been filed within the Court’s Electronic Case Filing (ECF) System. It also permits the public to query this database for a particular individual, case name, and other case information.
....
PACER provides access to the case summary, docket entries, and copies of documents filed in federal cases. If a paper document is needed, or if a case cannot be located when searching by case number, party name, or using the U.S. Party Case Index (USPCI ) then contact the Court to request a court record.

But as the above says, some records have to be requested the old-fashioned way (http://www1.nysd.uscourts.gov/cases_records.php). :(

Sign up for a PACER account at the PACER Service Center (http://pacer.psc.uscourts.gov/). Registration is free - charges are $0.08 (8 cents) per page downloaded (if less than $10 per year, the charges for that year are waived).

-----------------
PS: to add a 6. to Slap's targets:
....
6. Governance and Rule of Law - decades to centuries.

Greyhawk

09-20-2009, 05:18 AM

US v Bin Laden (Embassy bombings) was filed in the Southern District of New York... etc. - good intel, much appreciated. Will see if I can acquire target.

Steve the Planner

09-20-2009, 07:23 PM

Slapout:

For agricultural reconstruction purposes, it is important to remember that farmers have a critical movement before and after crops. They don't need a permanent safe road, but a safe route movement at crop cycle times.

Pre-US, Northern Iraq was arguably no safer than today, so there were set times and rendevouz points where farmers would meet up with a police/military escort to move crops to market. The road was not safe, nor did it need to be, on a permanent basis---just needed safe movements to market at critical times.

So, the drone has two weakness: It can see more than a human analyst can follow 24/7, and, while it sees, it doesn't always know what its looking at---a wedding party, a gathering of farmers with crops to move to market, or a rally point of bad guys.

Better to understand critical movements, then lay on the route clearance, surveillance, protection when it is needed. Triage is not general on a permanent basis, but linear security for critical movements, when they are needed.

Linear forts like the PEZ aren't bad, but in Iraq, they failed to truly optimize the concept. Not just pipelines and power lines, but a secure land bridge: a road down the center with trailer/connex/oil storage terminals at critical locations.

Steve

Rex Brynen

09-20-2009, 08:57 PM

Taliban Capitalizes on Afghanistan's Election Controversy (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/09/20/AR2009092000995.html?hpid=topnews)

By Craig Whitlock
Washington Post Foreign Service
Sunday, September 20, 2009; 12:43 PM

KABUL, Sept. 20 -- The big winner in the fraud-ridden, never-ending Afghanistan elections is turning out to be a party not even on the ballot: the Taliban.

A stream of revelations about systematic cheating during last month's vote has given the Taliban fresh ammunition in their propaganda campaign to portray President Hamid Karzai's administration as hopelessly corrupt. Infighting among U.S., U.N. and European diplomats over whether to accept the results with Karzai the winner or force a new round of voting has also fed the Taliban line that the government in Kabul is merely a puppet of foreign powers.

Mullah Omar, the Taliban's reclusive leader, broke his silence Saturday to denounce "the so-called elections which were fraught with fraud and lies and which were categorically rejected by the people."

In a statement released on the Internet to mark the end of Ramadan, Omar also railed against what he called "the rampant corruption in the surrogate Kabul administration, the embezzlement, drug trafficking, the existence of mafia networks, the tyranny and high-handedness of the warlords," according to a translation by the NEFA Foundation, a terrorism research group.

The problem for the Afghan government and its chief benefactor, the Obama administration, is that the Taliban's rhetoric has been echoed in recent days by U.S. and European officials, as well as some Afghan leaders, who have characterized the Aug. 20 election as a debacle and Karzai's government as inept.

MikeF

09-20-2009, 09:45 PM

Bob's World offered that Saudi Arabia is the decisive effort in this fight. There is merit in that argument, but I'll suggest something different.

In the short-run, Islamic terrorism is a threat. Twenty years from now, I'm convinced it will be a footnote in our history. What if we just ignored it? What if we simply shifted to a deep-seeded strategic approach of advanicing our common interests with the world?

What if we decided/strived to develop a coalition with China and Russia to defeat transnational terrorism and broker deals to impower the universal constructs of democracy and capitalism?

Just some of my Sunday afternoon light-pondering. The Carolina Panthers are headed to a horrible season so I had to concentrate on other things...

The worst thing we could do to Mullah Omar or OBL is minimize/ignore their voice.

v/r

Mike

slapout9

09-20-2009, 10:35 PM

Steve the Planner

09-21-2009, 03:01 PM

Slapout:

Where is Rube when we need him?

Steve

slapout9

09-21-2009, 03:06 PM

Slapout:

Where is Rube when we need him?

Steve

Until you win the war think movable Infrastructure.....then you can build the more permanent large scale projects.

davidbfpo

09-21-2009, 04:22 PM

slapout9

09-21-2009, 04:49 PM

Via an IT security blogsite ( http://www.schneier.com/blog/ ) an article on terrorist havens in US strategy: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/09/15/AR2009091502977.html?wpisrc=newsletter The author Paul Pillar is ex-CIA.

davidbfpo

Yep, good article. Like I said one of the capabilities of AQ is that it is Terrain Independent. At the Strategy level we have never dealt with that and figured out how to counter it. We can't go around and invade every country in the world just because they have a group that is operating there. Only one thing left to do.....hire some more PhD's and pay them a few million dolllars to study it for a few years:wry:

davidbfpo

09-23-2009, 01:47 PM

Accoring to this odd article: http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/sep/22/afghan-warlords-will-fight-if-us-gives-aid//print/ these warlords are offering their help against the Taliban. Rhetoric aside - is this a "quick fix" to the lack of Afghan troops i.e. ANA?

I can hear the critics already on relying once more on the warlords, let alone the Northern Alliance and it's human rights record. Plus the presentation aspect of non-Pashtuns campaigning in the south and east.

Could a re-mobilised "temporary ANA" deployed in the north, even around Kabul, enable ANA units re-deployment and enable R&R for those in the south? Not a "quick fix", but IMHO a good fix.

On reflection and assuming Karzai retains the presidency, which Dostum supported, could Karzai use that re-mobilisation himself and show NATO / ISAF that he can provide more ANA troops.(Note I am aware that the ANA is a mixture, but has a large core fom the North and few Pashtuns).

davidbfpo

Old Eagle

09-23-2009, 05:34 PM

When we originally tried to develop a comprehensive and cohesive Ministry of Defense, one of the aims was to work the warlords out of job. Amb (then MG) Eikenberry was one of the major forces in this attempt. Recall that the 1990's success of the Taliban was due in large part to a de facto civil war among feuding warlords. Dostum himself was a large contributor to the destruction of Kabul and the surrounding areas. Returning to that model IMHO does not offer much chance of long term success. Thousands killed, millions of refugees. (Although there remains the populist argument that those killed and displaced are only little brown people.) There was and probably still is enough popular Afghan support to make some sort of civil government system work.

"I have not failed. I have discovered 10,000 ways that don't work."
Thomas Edison

omarali50

09-23-2009, 06:50 PM

Empowering the warlords sounds like a very bad idea. The people who need to be empowered are the ANA. Seriously committing to training, arming and supporting the ANA is the way to go, but it doesnt look like there is any clarity about this in the US command (in fact, it increasingly looks like the US is flailing about without a strategy). Fixing Karzai's regime is the other priority. Even using less than perfect means to do so. But first you have to know what you want. I am having some doubts about this part and if those doubts are correct, that means everything else will fail. I hope to be proved wrong...

tequila

09-23-2009, 06:57 PM

Agree with both Old Eagle and omarali that re-empowering the warlords is a terrible idea and probably unworkable at this point.

Empowering a Karzai government at this point, however, doesn't look a lot more feasible, unfortunately. The election's ugly results have, I fear, crippled its image in the international community, while the government's corruption and incompetence has wrecked much of its reputation amongst the Afghan population.

A runoff or new elections entirely are the best temporary route out of this morass, but Karzai's intransigence may lose us everything.

Combined, these factors are probably why the President is hesitating to commit to McChrystal's full COIN option --- COIN doesn't work if the host government is seen as illegitimate by the population.

Steve the Planner

09-23-2009, 09:30 PM

I keep looking for some convincing way to punch holes in Rory Stewart's arguments, but I'm still waiting to hear it. Lots of ways, means, sub-ways, and sub-means.

Isn't targeting UBL a mission, not a war?

Steve

http://www.lrb.co.uk/v31/n13/stew01_.html

davidbfpo

09-23-2009, 10:32 PM

I've read and listened to Mr Rory Stewart, who is impressive, but what does he offer? Some experience in Iraq (note he literally arrived and asked for a job) and time in Afghanistan - with a charity. Now with sometime in the USA's academic cloisters so beloved by Europeans who seek office at home.

In the LRB article, finely written, but what does it say? IMHO not very much. Re-hashing historical and current debates that there is no "quick fix".

davidbfpo

Steve the Planner

09-23-2009, 11:13 PM

David:

I'm sure Rory Stewart's core view is that he knows what he knows, and it is not comprehensive. His disclaimer in the Prince of the Marshes is pretty broad and comprehensive.

One of the big nuggets that he suggests in the lbr article is the unlikeliness of Taliban hegemony if we left. How did they sweep into power initially? By lack of focus by all the other warlords. How acceptable are they today? Not very. Who is going to oppose them? The regional warlords, urban and more settled cities and provinces in the North West, all linked to multi-regional and extra-national systems and networks---it is not just the Taliban that don't recognize Afghanistan's "borders."

I've been trying to understand the rapid urbanization in Afghanistan and elsewhere, and how such urbanization changes all the contours of US understanding and strategies. Also, to understand Afghanistan through any lense other than the Taliban. Knowing your enemy (which we don't) is only a small piece of knowing where this is going. What is the rest of the story (the other Afghans).

Far be it for me to know all the answers, but my contacts on the ground are raising a lot more questions about what the US knows about this place, and how to plan and address it.

I come out of the regional, local government world, where operational governance and public service systems need to be built, staffed, operated and financed. Dumb stuff like sewer and water rates, taxes, staffing are real limitations. If you can't find Afghan recruits for the army who can read and do math, how is the rest of the system supposed to function?

Quite frankly, I don't see a credible understanding on the US civil/mil side in how, as a practical matter, any of this grand central government "high concept" stuff can be structured, staffed or funded. Just lots of misplaced, half-formed ideas that give way to waste, failed projects and corruption.

A lot of folks on SWJ are military focused, with the idea that they are going to hand their gains off to some civilian entity that is going to build and hold.

But, if you track the reconstruction side of Iraq (and Afghanistan), it has been a catastrophic failure, racked with corruption and incompetence. State's S/CRS has already stated that it can not gear up and staff anything in Afghanistan---their focus is for the "next" crisis.

Try googling Iraq, reconstruction, and you get the litany on the current status of corruption and payola investigations---not of Iraqis but of serving US Army officers, civilian contractors and CPA/ITAO staff. The most recent article was claims emerging from Anbar of US troops demanding a "cut" of CERP projects from the locals (God, I hope that proves unsubstantiated, but...)

It is against this context that I know it does no good for the military to clear against an expectation of somebody else building and holding absent an actual and viable civilian strategy (ways, means and end)----the thing that's lacking, and where Rory Stewart comes in.

Yes, I know some of his folks from "Marshes," and what he saw and learned as virtual civilian governor of Maysan in 2004. Yes, I have toured my share of US-built schools and medical clinics that never saw a patron, and some of the seriously flawed multi-million boondoggles (Basrah Children's Hospital, Kirkuk's $25 million solid waste disposal system (too expensive to operate), etc...).

All the more why it pisses me off that the military does not get it. The civilian side, to date, is a mess, until NSC gets serious and finds a new and viable civilian strategy. Actual civil practitioners are key to real planning. Foreign service officers and re-flagged "diplomats" can't make a phone system work whether at home or abroad. It is just nonsense and boondoggle (multiplied by Billions).

The general's request for more troops cannot be taken out of context from the overall game, and the ultimate civilian/political resolution.

At least, that's my concept.

Steve

davidbfpo

09-24-2009, 10:50 AM

(This is an updated edition, partly due to a request for citations and one mistake by me).

The ANA thread has posts on increasing the ANA due to illiteracy and more http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=5384&highlight=trainers . "Afghanisation" is deeply flawed in reality IMHO, but sounds good politically and especially if you are going to leave - announced or un-announced.

Other sources are: http://usacac.leavenworth.army.mil/blog/blogs/coin/archive/2009/09/22/does-literacy-really-matter-to-the-afghan-army.aspx and the last paragraph in: http://www.esquire.com/print-this/afghanistan-war-stories-0809. Also try: http://blog.freerangeinternational.com/ for an on the ground viewpoint.

When you learn that the UK has funded drilling wells in Helmand and ended up paying a huge amount US$ for each - you realise we are been "milked" to be polite. (The figures cited were added to SWC and now cannot be found. I do recall it was similar to US$20m to the national Afghan government and forty wells were drilled. Rather expensive I'd say).

Let alone the UK's aid agency DFID allegedly supplying fertiliser in Helmand that can be used to make bombs; pretty simple thing to avoid. This one citation came from http://defenceoftherealm.blogspot.com:

As for the IEDs that have been killing "Our Boys" – many of them now home-made using agricultural fertiliser - the aid agencies thought about that as well. Very helpfully this season, they have supplied the (Taleban) Afghani farmers with a total of 4,749 metric tons, conveniently packaged in 25-kilogram bags.

I appreciate from this "armchair" criticism is easy and undoubtedly some projects are solidly based. IMHO many more are not. freerangeinternational comments today on this with a privately organised work scheme in Jalalabad, achieving more than the huge PRT.

Also I noted last week after the Kunduz incident that a senior German police officer commented that few of his staff wanted to volunteer for service in Afghanistan (I cannot now find the reference). Echoed IIRC by others about finding enough military trainers.

Germany's initial role was in the development of the Afghan National Police. The Germans provided training, but could not perform the operational mentoring that is needed to really make lasting progress. From: http://billandbobsadventure.blogspot.com/ has a short comment and the failure has been commented upon widely IIRC.

Urbanisation in Afghanistan I knew was increasing; can you supply any figures in support? IIRC 80-85% rural population is usually cited when the population-centric approach is mooted.

Elsewhere Kandahar city is possibly out of Afghan control. I cite the Kagan ppt (http://www.irantracker.org/sites/irantracker.org/files/pdf_upload/analysis/TTT_Afghanistan_-_Kagan.pdf slide 29. In July I came across this concise explanation of the Canadian-Afghan role around Kandahar, with open source mapping overlay: http://www.snappingturtle.net/flit/a...11.html#006414

I would suggest that ISAF contributors would prefer to stay out of the cities (except Kabul) for all manner of reasons.

I increasingly fear ISAF / NATO etc will create a "hard shell' of security and there will be nothing behind it. OK, let the Afghans develop in their own way the foundations and develop. We are not really that patient as Ken reminds us.

daviidbfpo

Steve the Planner

09-24-2009, 11:47 AM

David:

Anne Marlowe, writing in Forbes (Sep. 3, 2009), writes a piece (A Humane Afghan City) ostensibly on real estate development in Mazar-i-Sharif---emerging "New Towns" and gated communities for the affluent.

In that article, she cites Afghan Ministry of Finance figures that the share of agriculture is 30%, industry 28% and services as 39%, and seeks to dispel the notion that Afghanistan is a population of tiny rural villages:

"There's a popular notion that most Afghans live in tiny villages, but the population may be as much as 50% urban now, due to the push-pull of years of drought and superior urban job opportunities created by rapid economic growth. Farming is still the livelihood of most Afghans, but other activities are now contributing more to GDP. According to Ministry of Finance adviser Dallas Newby, the share of agriculture in the overall economy is just 30%, while industry provides 28% and services 39%. "

She is citing the urban/rural pop stats National Settlement Programme/UN Habitat Report (April 2009) from the Ministry of Urban Development. In that report, they note the results of the continued pattern of urbanization---mostly in informal urban settlements created to serve the rush of urban migration resulting from refugee movements, including from drought.

This pattern of "rural flight" to the cities is very typical of the Middle East and Asia, and, in part, exacerbated in conflict areas. Conflict aside, drought, and other rural hardships, always serve as an independent driver for what has been called the "ruralization" of cities in these areas---highly unstable informal settlements springing up to accommodate a largely rural and uneducated farm flight population. The rates of shift, as much as 5-10% percent, really accelerate during conflicts, and, as with distorted economies like Afghanistan's where such large percentage of the economy is preoccupied by international aid.

David, I absolutely agree that the US should seek to avoid urban conflict if possible, but, to some extent, we are applying the law of the hammer rather than seeking tools appropriate to the problems that actually exist in the conflict zone.What happens if, two years from now, Afghanistan is solidly 60% urban (as the rate and projections suggest), with Sadr Cities everywhere, and we are still chasing around the mountainsides.

We know from Sadr City (and Pakistan) that these rural slums are a substantial breeding ground for dissenters of all types. Do we wait for a Sadr to emerge, and then, all of a sudden, discover our selves in a very much more serious urban conflict setting?

Demographics may not be destiny, but major population trends will run over any of our multi-year "strategies" that do not recognize them.

Steve

davidbfpo

09-27-2009, 10:21 PM

Steve and others,

Within a long article by Micheal Yon on other matters (UK PR in Helmand) he says (dated 25th):
This dispatch is being written in downtown Kandahar City and I have not seen a soldier in days. The Taliban is slowing winning this city. There have been many bombings and shootings since I arrived in disguise. Cited from: http://www.michaelyon-online.com/bull####-bob.htm

Perhaps my first posting (above and now edited ) was wrong - when I said Kandahar was 'out of control', but Yon suggests there is no real ANA / ANP activity nor as expected any ISAF presence in the city.

Apologies now as an "armchair" observer. What is going on in Kandahar city? I read about a population-centric approach and this is happening. Despair.

davidbfpo

Steve the Planner

09-28-2009, 12:09 AM

David:

The more I watch from my armchair, the more I see the emergence of a substantial potential for growing urban conflict, especially in Kandahar.

The in the Wash Post's outlook section, Rajiv Chandrasekaran, raises the same issue:

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/09/25/AR2009092502009.html?hpid=opinionsbox1

"If more forces are not forthcoming to mount counterinsurgency operations in those parts of the province, he concluded, the overall U.S. effort to stabilize Kandahar -- and by extension, the rest of Afghanistan -- will fail.

"We might as well pack our bags and go home . . . and just keep a few Predators flying overhead to whack the al-Qaeda guys who return," he said, speaking on the condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of the issue. "There's no point in doing half-measures here." "

So what do I make of this Afghan rural village stuff? We are chasing the wrong thing.

A rapidly emerging "informal urban settlement pattern" is a pattern of desperate, disenfranchised, and largely uneducated farmers waiting for the next Sadr.

Knowing the costs, complexity and consequences of urban warfare, I am increasingly uncomfortable.

Steve

Steve the Planner

09-28-2009, 12:25 AM

David:

I read the recent Kagan powerpoint, which cites AIM population data. According to that data, Afghanistan has between 26 and 30 million people---that's plus or minus 4 million by my mark.

Assume 42% of that "uncertain" figure are Pashtun, and ten percent of them are active opponents: 168,000 opponents that do or don't exist---somewhere...maybe twice that many.

And if we don't even know whether 30% of them are urban, or 50%+, how could we really be planning and implementing any kind of effective civilian post-conflict or reconstruction strategy, except "in the land of make believe?"

Is it incompetence, or just recklessness that we aren't out there trying to screw that number down to a gnats ass?

Maybe they are up a valley in some abandoned inks pot, or, more likely, anonymously blending into informal urban settlements.

Steve (Urban Planner & Demographer by the way)

jmm99

09-28-2009, 12:47 AM

The WP article has this:

McChrystal's 66-page confidential assessment makes the case for a far more expansive counterinsurgency mission, one that would involve sending more troops and civilian reconstruction personnel to Kandahar and other key population centers to improve security, governance and economic opportunities for Afghans. Although the general never used the term in the assessment, his strategy amounts to a comprehensive nation-building endeavor.

He wants U.S. and NATO personnel to expand training programs for Afghan soldiers and policemen, reform the justice system, promote more effective local administration and ramp up reconstruction. If that occurs, he and other counterinsurgency experts contend, then Afghans who have sided with the Taliban out of fear or necessity will eventually switch sides and support the government. Building an effective state, in McChrystal's view, is the only way to defeat the insurgency.

I don't necessarily see the GEN's report as a call for "a comprehensive nation-building endeavor"; but as more of a call for enhancing the security sector according to what are presently considered "best COIN practices". That will be difficult enough.

For those who accept the WP's author's view of the report - "a comprehensive nation-building endeavor" - they should plow through James Dobbins, Seth G. Jones, Keith Crane, Beth Cole DeGrasse, The Beginner’s Guide to Nation-Building (2007) - RAND download here (http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG557/). They should pay particular attention to the (other than military) constituent elements that make up any nation-building mission: police, rule of law, humanitarian relief, governance, economic stabilization, democratization, and development. And, those should be considered in light of the size, topography and population of Astan.

To conclude, I steal a thought from Taiko (in another thread and in another context (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=83325&postcount=135)):

I think that's worth repeating, without a viable and functioning 'state' there is no security. South Vietman during the late 60's-70's perfect example. Again, this is CvC's paradoxical trinity at work. You can surge all you want, 100 000-200 000 soilders but it is important to remember that the military is only one side of the trinity, there is also the people and the government. At the end of the day if you do not have a stable government as the head of state then you are heading into a protracted war which will cost blood and treasure without a necessarily beneficial outcome for the people.

Regards to all

Mike

slapout9

09-28-2009, 01:03 AM

Thats why I have been saying the COG is not the people......it's the Government. Always has been always will be, thats why we have Revolutions and Insurgency. Guvmints either cause problems or provide solutions and A'stan is a really Big problem. Whenever Guvmint provides common benefit to ALL the people they prosper......when they don't......they follow the SBW unstoppable law......they dis-intergrate!

Ken White

09-28-2009, 01:38 AM

...that's plus or minus 4 million by my mark...168,000 opponents that do or don't exist---somewhere...maybe twice that many...And if we don't even know whether 30% of them are urban, or 50%+, how could we really be planning and implementing any kind of effective civilian post-conflict or reconstruction strategy, except "in the land of make believe?"

Is it incompetence, or just recklessness that we aren't out there trying to screw that number down to a gnats ass?In fact, I'm pretty sure it is neither incompetence or recklessness but a combination of caution -- not too many demographers want to wander around collecting data when people are popping caps all over the place -- and the xenophobic reaction of ALL hill people to outsiders who flat do not want you to know too much about them or their business. Afghanistan is not Iraq and the Afghans are not Arabs. Compared to Afghanistan, Iraq is a conflict free modern paradise on several accounts and levels...

Still sort of unsettled in the 'Stan. When it settles down a bit more, there will then be time to gather data to do the planning. Can't do much reconstruction in the post conflict mode until the conflict dissipates a bit in any event.

Steve the Planner

09-28-2009, 03:20 AM

Ken:

No offense, but there are plenty of ways to get out reasonable estimates (+/-5%) without knocking on doors like a census worker in the wilds of Kentucky.

Right that there are no demographers there, but plenty of special ops, CA, etc... who have a pretty good idea of what's going in their turf.

I got a lot of that in Iraq for the wild areas, but with a little luck, and once people knew what I was looking for, had a steady stream of SF who would stop by and brief me on towns and settlements not shown on any maps, and exactly how many folks were in each house (after we field checked them with air photos). Plenty of other ways to count bodies, too, ya know.

Problem is that to get aggreagte data---the things needed for decision-making---somebody has to be very systematic about collecting and assembling it into "information."

Guarantee you there ain't nobody doing that, but IMHO must be if they are going to plan and effect success.

Steve

Steve the Planner

09-28-2009, 03:39 AM

Slapout:

Problem is the concept of "government" which all these US actors are desperately seeking.

In Iraq, you had a post-Ottoman culture and gov/social structure based on a strong central government (very top down) and provincial/local administration through "bureaus" from the national ministries. We decided to create some kind of half-assed Jeffersonian democracy grounded in states rights and all lkinds of other great political theories. A very tough row to hoe, and no certainty that it will actually work. The old bureaucracy always existed, and will continue to exercise power, particularly because, in that Country, and geography, central control was an important functional structure for ag control, water and canal management, etc... It was the backbone of making "the land between two rivers" a bountiful place.

By contrast, Afghanistan never had a strong central government, and probably never will. There are so many large and small functional regions, each with a unique economic, social, ethnic, religious, geographic relationship (including cross-border). Unlike Iraq's Bureaus, Afghan regions were organized through elders and jirgas, and never through bureaucratic systems of any kind (national or provincial).

In Afghanistan, we take the opposite approach to Iraq (central vs, decentral), but, our desire does not make it so, or even practical. Or, as the saying goes" Good luck with that!"

At best, you would have a national government that effectively engaged the functional regions, and served as a conduit for international aid. But that's about it. Regions (whether a village or tribe that guides a small valley, or a Kandahar that drives a big province) are the game.

Steve

slapout9

09-28-2009, 04:14 AM

The whole idea is that we can send a few ODAs instead of a few Divisions to places like this where we have concerns that are important, but that for whatever reason are best managed with a light hand on the wheel.

Trust me, we understand moral obligation. We just don't think one should wear it like a badge of honor to cover motivations that are in fact something very different....

Bob,STP, I should have responded to this earlier but now is as good a time as any. I am very familiar with what an ODA can do or used to be able to do. 12 to raise an train 1200. Twice my First Sergeant volunteered me to be assigned to an SF group for training. Here is what I was taught the SF methodology was. Used to be called the 7 steps from Hell.

1-Psychological preparation of the target audience.
2-Initial contact between Guerrillas and US contacts.
3-Infiltration of USSF.
4-Organizing of the Guerrillas.
5-Build up of the Guerrillas.
6-Employ the Guerrillas in Guerrilla Warfare.
7-Demobilize the Guerrillas.

You don't need no stinking army or police force or funny looking uniforms:wry:all you need is people,guns and money and leadership.

And did I tell you about taking over the local radio station, back then they were a little bit country and I was a little bit Rock and Roll:D:D about an hour later the parking lot was full of Volunteers!

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SboRijhWFDU

Steve the Planner

09-28-2009, 05:00 AM

Slapout:

I thought it was "Lawyers, Guns and Money?"

Steve

Entropy

09-28-2009, 05:05 AM

Steve,

Do you have a link to the UN report? All the estimates I've seen (including from the UN), put the urban population at around 25%.

I don't really understand this idea I've been hearing that we need to defend population centers in Afghanistan. What do people think we've been doing since 2001? Long ago we put FOBs in or near all the major cities/large towns, built new roads to several (ie. Tarin Kowt) and have, in general, kept these urban areas relatively safe. In 2007 it was pretty clear the Taliban (Quetta Shura) wanted to take back Kandahar - they began with an IO campaign but never got anywhere because their forces were destroyed whenever they tried to mass. Perhaps now they are trying to infiltrate the urban areas (esp. Kandahar).

Regardless, I don't see how a "defend the cities" strategy that I've heard some advocate is going to get us anywhere.

The economic statistics may be true if the poppy trade is not included - the poppy trade dwarfs all other economic sectors. There is simply no way the service sector could be 39% of the economy with poppy included.

Ken White

09-28-2009, 05:33 AM

No offense, but there are plenty of ways to get out reasonable estimates (+/-5%)...Plenty of other ways to count bodies, too, ya know...Yep, been other places and done that, the data got used when it was a good time to use it...
Guarantee you there ain't nobody doing that, but IMHO must be if they are going to plan and effect success.You did it in Iraq and you presume no one is as smart, dedicated or committed in Afghanistan?

Perhaps but I suspect there probably is a Steve clone there -- maybe a few.

The problem is not the data -- the problem is the security situation and ability to use that data. As I understand it, total responsibility for all projects and planning are migrating to the Embassy and the Aid / PRT crowd other than minimal CERP funds. Units are being told to submit all requested projects so it would seem someone has enough data on which to operate that the Punditocracy isn't aware of -- not that it's at all difficult to have information they aren't privy to...

Steve the Planner

09-28-2009, 05:33 AM

Entropy:

I have the report in pdf. March 30, 2009, Ministry of Urban Development Report to the UN Habitat National Settlements Program in Nairobi.

Too big to post, but email me.

Meeting at CSIS, in DC tomorrow. UNAMA Development Chief. Should have a copy, although it was to UN's Habitat Group. (Stovepiping there too)

We have a Global Planners Network to which Afghanistan particpates. Civilian only, but these urbanization issues are fundamental to everybody in that region. Staffs from Afghanistan in 2004 showed 20% urban, then 30% about 2005, and now estimates may be at or over 50%. See a pattern? Same, but more so, in most Middle East, Asian Countries, but exacerbated by drought and conflict resettlement.

I don't think an urban warfare concept is the way to go either, but it is foolish not to realize that these places are a routine and well-marked haven. Engagement and tracking is critical at this stage; urban war fighting is not. Civic relief, and community assistance stuff is key at the moment (ala Rory Stewart), not expensive USACE projects. It ain't about us building things, but them helping themselves (with reasonable help from us).

A recent article I saw somewhere recently indicated that that whole poppy revenue thing was overblown. Like anywhere we are engaged, it is just to easy to make lots of money grafting our reconstruction projects. The more we waste, the more they have. Why work too hard?

Steve

Steve the Planner

09-28-2009, 05:39 AM

Ken:

In Jan, I heard from lots of top US folks that it was all done, but from folks on the ground in Afghanistan that it is not. One of them was one of the guys in the US that changed his position once he got there. Who you gonna believe?

Steve

Be nice if they did, but I would worry a lot less if I wasn't staring at the Kagan Report from this month that shows the obvious. Pop in Afghanistan is between 26 and 30 million. What?????

Entropy

09-28-2009, 05:54 AM

Steve,

Going from 20% to 50% urbanization would mean an increase in the urban population of about 8 million over the course of 4 years. That's pretty extraordinary if it's true. Personally, I'm very skeptical.

Steve the Planner

09-28-2009, 05:57 AM

Re: Demographics

Demographers clearly distinguish between estimates of population and forecasts of population. This was a serious problem in US undertstanding of Iraqi practices.

A simplistic estimate, or projection, takes two prior data points and carries the line forward.

A forecast takes the projection and adjusts it to account for important factors such as major population relocations, conflict displacement, increased birth, life expectancy or death rates.

Iraq's official figures routinely consisted of projections for each province based on changes shown between the 1988 and 1998 Census, carried forward to 2008. They did, in fact, include some forecast components for a few major displacement areas.

The US never quite got the drift, but, since the 1950's, Iraq had a well-established system of provincial census reporters, all UN and British trained, and highly capable. Most continued to count everything (sheep, citrus groves, tractors, cars, trucks (by type), and people) throughout occupation. They just didn't report it to us. These ministries know far more than they ever shared with us. Why was that?

Steve

Steve the Planner

09-28-2009, 06:08 AM

Entropy:

The report indicates a return of some four million refugees, plus conflict and drought-driven farm abandonment. That many would not necessarily be likely to go the places of US concern, but to the North and West (where the real estate booms are going on), but mostly in "informal settlements in and around urban areas.

Best way to check for much of it is to follow refugee patterns in surrounding and sponsoring nations (Germany for Afghans?). Or that informal Afghan refugee camp near the Calais crossing in France?

Hard to see the forest for the trees sometimes, but what if the pop really was near 30 million at some point, and 30% urban, but four million fled for Germany? Downward changes in aggregate pop also affect percentages without any change in urban pop. But it does change the character and distribution of the people at issue.

Steve

PS- Don't have the time or resources to track it down now. Just following open source data and published background trends. Like the men in black, reading the National Enquirer for the latest alien sightings.

davidbfpo

09-28-2009, 12:42 PM

A variety of links and some will be cross-posted on other threads i.e. ANA & ANP. Not in order of priority.

1) Britain calls for mini-surge in Afghanistan to help train army. Of note is the claim the UK can deploy only 3k of the 9k troops in Helmand and that the ANA now have 8k deployed in Helmand (which I simply find incredible) http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/Afghanistan/article6851607.ece

2) http://www.captainsjournal.com/ has some amazing reports on the ANA and ANP. This is the longest, citing many sources (many on SWC I'm sure) and covers both the ANA and ANP: http://www.captainsjournal.com/2009/09/22/here-is-your-afghan-national-army/

3) A Canadian OMLT veteran (from Kandahar Province) on the ANA, including literacy, training and more: http://www.snappingturtle.net/flit/

4) The ever useful: http://blog.freerangeinternational.com/ with two pieces on What To Do and this older piece: http://blog.freerangeinternational.com/?p=1943

davidbfpo

slapout9

09-28-2009, 08:05 PM

Slapout:

I thought it was "Lawyers, Guns and Money?"

Steve

Thats true we had one as part of our auxillary.....he was the county prosecutor:)

slapout9

09-28-2009, 08:12 PM

Ken White

09-28-2009, 09:43 PM

In Jan, I heard from lots of top US folks that it was all done, but from folks on the ground in Afghanistan that it is not. One of them was one of the guys in the US that changed his position once he got there. Who you gonna believe?Neither of the above -- the truth is most likely somewhere in between; to wit: A few folks are probably trying to pull it together but it's very difficult to do due to the environment. Plus, people vary in their ideas on the worth of metrics...

On Kagan and data -- or anyone else and 'data' out of Afghanistan (or Iraq -- or Kentucky, for that matter), I'm not a data wonk and am pretty well convinced that most metrics are meaningless in warfare. Thus any data from a ploicy wonk here in CONUS is sorta suspect to me -- all those pundits have agendas; they can't make policy but they like to think they can affect it.

So data IMO is sort of inconsequential in warfare. It is not in planning, building or reconstruction or even providing aid (though that last is subject to environmental caveats), just in warfare.

I tend to take all demographic data with a grain of salt; I do not believe you can finitely track numbers, categories and 'needs' of people with the degree of accuracy many like to believe. People are too devious, unpredictable and varied to allow true accuracy -- you can get a ball park for most things and that's adequate.

You get in a backward area like parts of rural Kentucky where I'm from and those mountain dwellers won't tell you much, will deceive you if they think it's in their interest, will inflate or deflate figures to improve their situation and more. Much more; they'll lie to you and hassle you just to say they did. There are guys -- and gals -- there that'll cut your throat for a hundred bucks. And they're sort of on your side. Afghans aren't on your side, you're a Kaffir and to be lied to with no penalty, ripped off or killed without a blink (no money involved) and they've been playing both ends against the middle for 3,000 years. No way you're going to get accurate data.

So I do understand your requirements and complaint but I doubt you'll get much accuracy in numbers for a good many reasons. YMMV -- that should be okay with both of us. Is with me.

Ken White

09-28-2009, 09:55 PM

...older SF teams had Civil Affairs and PsyOps as part of their organization...then something happened:eek:happened. Him / that and 'added missions' for budget justification. CA and PsyOps weren't glamorous enough to attract money in the lean 90s...

Pol-Mil FSO

09-29-2009, 12:22 AM

Kandahar has never had much of a coalition force presence and until recently was ignored by ISAF. There is a Canadian PRT camp in the northeastern part of the city, with a mech infantry company as its force protection element, and there is also a SOF compound on the northwest edge of the city, but that is it for coalition forces. The ANP and NDS have had the lead on security and until recently there wasn't even an ANA presence inside the city apart from some headquarters and support units.

Kandahar Air Field (Pogadishu II), the headquarters for RC-South, Task Force Kandahar, and various other units that make up the nearly 20,000 (and rising) bodies behind the wire is actually located twelve miles south of Kandahar City. For those at KAF who travel outside the wire via ground movement Kandahar City has been usually seen as merely a place to transit on the way to somewhere else (typically Helmand or Uruzgan) except by the PRT and SOF personnel who actually live in the city. The city has been a black hole for ISAF as far as understanding what is going on there and there has been little appreciation for Kandahar's significance for the Taliban and for the Pashtun people.

Per the Washington Post and other media articles, people are now paying attention to Kandahar City. The deployment of additional U.S. troops to the RC-Soth AOR played a large part in bringing the city up on the radar screen, and, I suspect, the change of leadership in ISAF headquarters in Kabul also played a part. The issue of security in Kandahar City is now being addressed and I believe that we will see some significant changes.

I read with interest the Kagans' briefing on required reinforcements but I would take the demographic figures with a grain of salt. I don't think that anyone has a good idea of the population of Kandahar City - I've heard estimates ranging from half a million up to one and a half million. I think that figures for districts are not much more than guesses and complicated by the displacement of population that can be temporary, permanent, seasonal, and/or periodic. If I had to guess, I would say that a majority of the population in the south still live in villages. I also got the sense that the culture remains largely rural and is extremely insular - on the latter point, much more so than Helmand Province, for example.

The conventional wisdom is that the Taliban are attempting to take over the districts surrounding Kandahar City with the goal of attacking and occupying the city itself. Leaving the aside the fact that the Taliban are already present in the city - for example, the area of the city north of the Canal is reportedly a Taliban stronghold - I am not convinced that this is the Taliban goal. Rather, I suspect that the Taliban are aiming to demoralize and shatter resistance through the staging of spectacular attacks. This would presumably lead to the melting away of government authority to include the defection of ANSF units to the Taliban side. The June 2008 attack on Sarpoza prison was likely a preview and a real eyeopener for me because the reaction of Kandaharis to this attack demonstrated that support for the Afghan Government was extremely shallow.

Steve the Planner

09-29-2009, 02:50 AM

Pol-Mil:

Thanks for the sobering assessment of Kandahar. My concern is that, as we role forward, making sure cities like Kandahar don't get too out of control, is the defense against possible future urban conflict.

Spent the afternoon with the policy wonks on K Street (CSIS). Mark Weber, UNAMA Developer/Donor Coordinator provided a sobering stat: A Demographic Time Bomb: 7 million young Afghans will soon be graduating from schools and need real jobs to keep them occupied, one million per year graduating soon.

In the US, we track the teenager age-cohort bubbles as the trigger/driver for crime.

On the good side, his talk was refreshingly inspiring as to a possible positive future for Afghanistan. Very different than what most folks here and are discussing.

Some bullets:

-Coordinating efforts for higher education options, vo tech that can serve the Country's needs, and revenue/jobs stategies based on exploiting natural resources (iron ore, minerals and natural gas).

-Challenge: Afghan assets are in the North and West, not the area of US interest, and need major infrastructure investments to exploit.

-Challenge: Break down stovepipes within ministries, move toward NSF & NDP based approaches driven by Afghans.

-Challenge: Move US PRTs from quick hits to coordinated and focused projects/programs grounded in Afghan NSF/NDP approaches.

-Opportunity: Infrastructure needs their not subject to major graft, corruption, destruction.

http://csis.org/multimedia/video-afghanistan’s-new-development-priorities

Certainly, there is a long way to go between positive UNAMA early steps, and actual major accomplishments, but, for the first time in a while, I was inspired to be "guardedly" optimistic about Afghanistan's future.

Mark is here to start trying to sell the concepts to the US.

What do you think?

Steve

Pol-Mil FSO

09-30-2009, 03:28 AM

Steve:

I don't have any answers on how to get to success in development. All I can offer are some observations about why it is appears to be such a challenge.

1. Intellectual Capital: A somewhat imperfect analogy that I like to use is that Afghanistan is like Cambodia in that an entire generation lost the opportunity for education. Outside of those who went into exile, there appears to be a large shortfall of university or even high-school educated persons among those Afghans who came of age in the 1980's and 1990's. This has obvious implications for governance and development efforts. It also doesn't match up well with our civilian and military modus operandi in Afghanistan, which I would characterize as seeking information dominance by creating ever larger and more complex bureaucratic structures. The international community can continue to pour bodies in to staff the working groups, coordination boards, and other bureaucratic entities but the Afghan Government doesn't have the bodies to do the same. Is there some way of making progress on development without heavy reliance on technocratic skills and bureaucratic structures? Maybe this is something that academics and think tanks should look at.

2. Centralization in Kabul: In addition to the obvious stovepipe problems created by placing line ministry representatives at the provincial level, centralizing decision making in Kabul founders on the fact that Afghans (and international community personnel) in Kabul have very little knowledge of what is actually going on in the provinces. Trying to run everything from Kabul is a show stopper in my opinion, but the Afghan elite (and the international community?) is fully committed to such an approach. I believe that development, governance, and security efforts will all fail unless the Afghan Government develops a construct that involves some sort of regional autonomy.

3. Targeting Assistance: During my time in Kandahar, the two greatest development priorities of Afghan authorities in Kandahar City were electrical power and potable water. Electricity was available to most inhabitants for only five-ten hours per week and potable water was an equally great shortfall. For reasons that are unclear to me, the international community seemed unable to provide any significant assistance in these two areas. Kandahar officials were acutely aware that they were risking popular support from a failure to deliver essential services and also understood that availability of power was a basic requirement for any sort of sustainable economic development. I am still puzzled about Kabul's apparent inability at the time to connect the dots.

Steve the Planner

10-01-2009, 02:31 PM

So, here we are at the decision-point.

On the military side:

Is it a Counter-Intelligence Operation? COIN, Population-focused, troop-intensive, expensive, fraught with risk of appearance of foreign occupation, offset by substantial civilian engagement (nation-building?), including rapid and intensive Afghan forces training and build-up

Is it a limited Counter-Terrorist Operation? Bomb the bad guys if and when you see them. Limited population outreach or engagement, focus from defensible bases, but with limited access to the population, local knowledge, and increased risks of collateral damage, rely on rapidly expended Afghan forces for regional and national defense

On the civilian side:

In accordance with COIN, establish and maintain a high tempo and profile for national, regional, and local reconstruction, training, government support (vs. insurgents)

In accordance with limited Counter-Terrorism Operations, initiate local/regional projects in order to maintain security around bases, or (the opposite) redouble civil engagement (either/or at national/regional/local levels despite that this field may be the weakest link in the US arsenal, and fraught with substantial risks (fraud, waste, factionalism, and limited security/visibility to issues

In that consideration, the points raised by Pol-Mil, and others here, are critical dimensions.

I guess we all just wait for the shoes to drop...

Steve

slapout9

10-01-2009, 02:54 PM

link to the Army COIN center blog on new Canadian approach. If they(A'stan) don't start cooperating they are going to stop development:)

http://usacac.army.mil/blog/blogs/coin/archive/2009/09/30/hearts-and-minds-a-new-canadian-approach-in-afghanistan.aspx

Steve the Planner

10-01-2009, 03:42 PM

slapout9

10-01-2009, 04:13 PM

Slap:

Are you suggesting that basic concepts like tough love, or "don't build where it can't be secured," should join the toolkit?

Remember, this is foreign aid/reconstruction. These are usually held to be in a separate universe.

Steve

Sorta......basically if the Afghans don't cooperate by giving information as the article suggest...... then they are aiding the enemy! Now if it was up to me I would be arresting them. Why are we protecting the enemy? The Canadian General is right they(Afghans) need to make a choice. If you bite the hand that feeds you.....then I would become an Invisible Hand:D:D that is an bad Economics Joke.

omarali50

10-01-2009, 05:18 PM

Sorta......basically if the Afghans don't cooperate by giving information as the article suggest...... then they are aiding the enemy! Now if it was up to me I would be arresting them. Why are we protecting the enemy? The Canadian General is right they(Afghans) need to make a choice. If you bite the hand that feeds you.....then I would become an Invisible Hand:D:D that is an bad Economics Joke.

The afghan "authorities" (and the Pakistani ones, for that matter) certainly include a number of people who take a very mercenary view of these things . And they are totally convinced (not without cause?) that the "real decisionmakers" in the US are equally cold blooded and mercenary. They have made their calculations and they think the US is not going anywhere soon and has no other good choices. I have talked to such people and their line is as follows: "lets cut the bull####. Americans have their own reasons to want job A done. We have our price. No one is being nice or biting feeding hands or other hogwash. We are doing X and being paid X in return. Pay us what you pay Halliburton and maybe we will jump higher". Make of that what you will.
An anecdote: After the Mumbai terrorist attack, a friend asked some Pakistani foreign office type "when alqaeda attacked New York, we handed over many suspects to the americans and generally made a show of cooperation, now that LET has attacked India, why are we so unwilling to do the same"? He expected some geostrategic BS in reply, but was rather stunned by the cool reply "The Americans are paying us 2 billion dollars a year. How much has India paid??"
But I dont want to give the impression that this is unique to Pakistan or Afghanistan. I have had similarly cynical and mercenary comments from the son of an American consular official in Lahore. Apparently, that is how the real world works.

Pol-Mil FSO

10-01-2009, 05:20 PM

when I hear about "drive-by" ultimatums to Afghan villagers to cooperate with coalition forces or else lose assistance. The obvious rebuttal from the Afghan side - which I actually heard voiced once when a U.S. Army Major made a more low-key plea for cooperation - is "if you want us to help you why don't you give us some weapons or stick around in order to protect us from the Taliban?" We can't expect Afghan villagers to risk their lives to provide us with intel when we have no ability to protect them from reprisals because we are clueless as to who is doing the intimidation and because we return to our FOBs rather than live with the villagers. There is also an assumption, that is probably false in many cases, that Afghan villagers actually care enough about foreign assistance to change their beliefs or patterns of behavior. I do not know the particulars of this "model village" but I wouldn't be surprised if the project was designed by Canadian development officers with Afghans viewed more as recipients than participants. Finally, I doubt that the Canadian military has the power to make a unilateral decision to cut off assistance to this model village project. The civilian agencies have a say in this and there is a strong political imperative from Ottawa to continue with the project.

slapout9

10-01-2009, 05:45 PM

I have talked to such people and their line is as follows: "lets cut the bull####. Americans have their own reasons to want job A done. We have our price. No one is being nice or biting feeding hands or other hogwash. We are doing X and being paid X in return. Pay us what you pay Halliburton and maybe we will jump higher". Make of that what you will.

I would have no problem with that what so ever. In fact I think that is the solution.

slapout9

10-01-2009, 05:52 PM

"if you want us to help you why don't you give us some weapons or stick around in order to protect us from the Taliban?" We can't expect Afghan villagers to risk their lives to provide us with intel when we have no ability to protect them from reprisals because we are clueless as to who is doing the intimidation and because we return to our FOBs rather than live with the villagers.

Exactly! arm the villagers so they can protect themsleves if we can not always be there. That is why I say they don't need an army or police force they need a counter guerrilla army 1st.....all the other stuff should follow IF the Afghans want it to. This is all very mysterious to me because when I learned UW(early 70's) those were the basics. :confused:

jmm99

10-01-2009, 08:26 PM

slapout9

10-01-2009, 11:25 PM

Perhaps something along the lines of the original CIDG program (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Civilian_Irregular_Defense_Group) conducted by the CIA and SF in early Vietnam - or the USMC Combined Action Platoon (http://www.capmarine.com/) program a bit later ?

Best

Mike

Hi jmm, I would just follow the 7 steps I learned. True it was training but it was surprising just how realistic it was, example we had to find, buy or acquire our own food and water except for the initial amount we had during infiltration,gives you a lot of insight into the real problems of G-Force logistics;). The CIDG is close but I was thinking more along the lines of the link I attached. Where is the plan to MOBILZE the country to throw the Taliban/AQ out of the country. Trying to build an army,police force,guvmint are a waste of time. A G-Force is part of a political organization 1st.... they are the new guvmint all ready to go:wry: It's the Band of the Hand.

http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/works/1937/guerrilla-warfare/ch01.htm

Replace the word Japanese with Taliban/AQ in the report.

Steve the Planner

10-02-2009, 12:05 AM

Isn't that the big deal? Who has the power.

I'm very much of the opinion that our "bull in the China shop
tendency to fix things, and do it now or I'll do it for you creates a substantial imbalance in responsibility. When it becomes your project, and not their project that you are helping with, the expectation of support is, in some ways, inappropriate. Echo to Pol Mil's comment on whether they are recipients or participants.

But, as with the unarmed villagers, what do you do when they are faced with unequal threats, other than to equalize---sometimes with arms.

Is the real answer to increase arms for local militias or self-defense, despite the many obvious risks?

Steve

slapout9

10-02-2009, 12:27 AM

Isn't that the big deal? Who has the power.

Steve

That is how I look at it.

slapout9

10-02-2009, 12:38 AM

Straight from the Chairman's mouth.

All the people in an area should arm themselves and be organized into two groups. One of these groups is a combat group, the other a self-defence unit with but limited military quality. Regular combatant guerrillas are organized into one of three general types of units. The first of these is the small unit, the platoon or company. In each county, three to six units may be organized. The second type is the battalion of from two to four companies. One such unit should be organized in each county. While the unit fundamentally belongs to the county in it was organized, it may operate in other counties. While in areas other than its own, it must operate in conjunction with local units in order to take advantage of their manpower, their knowledge of local terrain and local customs, and their information of the enemy.

jmm99

10-02-2009, 03:16 AM

I think we are talking about two different things. CIDG and CAP are examples of foreign security assistence efforts to indigenous inhabitants.

Mao (and Giap) were indigenous insurgents (to begin with), writing to their own folks on how to do it - e.g., Mao's 7 points in your link:

1. Arousing and organizing the people.
2. Achieving internal unification politically.
3. Establishing bases.
4. Equipping forces.
5. Recovering national strength.
6. Destroying enemy's national strength.
7. Regaining lost territories.

So also Lenin. To do that sort of stuff you have to be indigenous, or be so much a part of the landscape that you are accepted as indigenous. You also have to be on all fours with the cause or causes of the indigenous people.

What if your indigenous valley folks hate the Karzai governmental like poison; dislike the "Taliban" (different herds of them), but don't hate them as much; don't like AQ at all (a bunch of intervening Arabs who are nuts); are only interested in the almost complete automony of their little series of inter-connected river valleys; and don't really care about whether AQ or "Taliban" exist in other parts of the country - so long as they do not bother the valley folks.

What's the solution for that kind of situation ?

Mike

slapout9

10-02-2009, 03:40 AM

I think we are talking about two different things. CIDG and CAP are examples of foreign security assistance efforts to indigenous inhabitants.

Mao (and Giap) were indigenous insurgents (to begin with), writing to their own folks on how to do it - e.g., Mao's 7 points in your link:

So also Lenin. To do that sort of stuff you have to be indigenous, or be so much a part of the landscape that you are accepted as indigenous. You also have to be on all fours with the cause or causes of the indigenous people.

What if your indigenous valley folks hate the Karzai governmental like poison; dislike the "Taliban" (different herds of them), but don't hate them as much; don't like AQ at all (a bunch of intervening Arabs who are nuts); are only interested in the almost complete automony of their little series of inter-connected river valleys; and don't really care about whether AQ or "Taliban" exist in other parts of the country - so long as they do not bother the valley folks.

What's the solution for that kind of situation ?

Mike

No not at all. When I was in the original mission of SF was to raise and train indigenous forces and carry out missions beyond the scope of regular troops at least that is all my memory can recall.

Everything Mao said works just as well on the other side. In my case I was supposed to be the indigenous folks! SF was there to train and advise us on how best to fight our war. The fighting/mobilization process is the same, what you call yourself CIDG,UW,Freedom fighter depends on your point of view and which side of the struggle you are on.

Part two of your question. I would answer that the CIA and original SF teams new who and how to gain the cooperation of the various tribes, so I can only answer that with another question. what happened to all the original support? It may no longer be there........ which means maybe we shouldn't be there either:eek:

Also you didn't notice any similarities between clear,hold, and build and Galula,Trinqiuer and Mao's 7 points?

Steve the Planner

10-02-2009, 03:58 AM

Isn't the difference here that you are talking about sub-national units?

There may be a strong concept of Afghanistan, but are people going to rally, fight and die for it?

To be come indigenous to the local people,and to become indigenous to a concept of nation sound like two different things in the case of a weak national government with some, but not too much support.

The storyline that I am trying to follow, if one could read the real tea leaves from the elections, is not how many votes are attributed to President Kharzai, but from one sectors. Did he get as strong a Pashtun vote as a Tajik or Uzbec? Was his constituency based in the East or West?

That would lay a foundation for where the central government might find a stronger affinity, but it still sounds like regions and localities to me.

Otherwise, perhaps the last comment has bigger resonance.

Steve

slapout9

10-02-2009, 04:20 AM

Isn't the difference here that you are talking about sub-national units?

There may be a strong concept of Afghanistan, but are people going to rally, fight and die for it?

To be come indigenous to the local people,and to become indigenous to a concept of nation sound like two different things in the case of a weak national government with some, but not too much support.

Steve

STP,That is why PSYOP and Civil Affairs(that would be you and Beetle) used to be part of SF. The Guerrilla action unit is just one part of the entire organization that you have at your disposal. But
as Ken pointed out SF had that capability removed from them......ain't real bright in my opinion.

Steve the Planner

10-02-2009, 04:49 AM

We've managed to divide and conquer a lot of things---usually ourselves.

Steve

Tom Odom

10-02-2009, 04:54 AM

We've managed to divide and conquer a lot of things---usually ourselves.

Steve

As long as we love ourselves and treat ourselves as liberators, we all will be wonderful...:wry:

jmm99

10-02-2009, 05:30 AM

The example I gave:

What if your indigenous valley folks hate the Karzai governmental like poison; dislike the "Taliban" (different herds of them), but don't hate them as much; don't like AQ at all (a bunch of intervening Arabs who are nuts); are only interested in the almost complete automony of their little series of inter-connected river valleys; and don't really care about whether AQ or "Taliban" exist in other parts of the country - so long as they do not bother the valley folks.

is much the same as what the CIA and SF found in the Central Highlands.

Their highlands tribes were non-Vietnamese, were treated badly by both the Saigon and Hanoi folks, and harrassed by the VC. The VC were the bigger enemy to those tribes. The project fell apart once the Saigon folks were brought back into the picture and the national government was re-imposed.

The bottom line is that, if the masses (in a region) really dislike the national government and if the foreign assistence forces are constrained to enhance the national government in that region, Mao-type (Saul Alinsky community organizing :) ) simply won't work.

That is especially so where the anti-government forces, also in that region, have a strong security presence and are more than willing to apply authoritarian methods.

The alternative is then to apply a "population-centric" approach, which has its harder and softer takes in many flavors. They also use much of Mao's 7 steps, but apply them in different orders.

---------------------------
Long Wiki article on 2009 Astan Election (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Afghan_presidential_election,_2009). Peter Galbraith (brother of Slap's economics guru) was fired by the UN (http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/Afghanistan/article6856029.ece) - I'll go with Galbraith's take on the election.

IEC Election Results (http://iec.org.af/results/index.html) (with a nice interactive map). Karzai lost in most "Northern Alliance" provinces; he won in Pashtun provinces (the questioned votes). Very regional and ethnic from all appearances; but a province by province study would have to be made.

jmm99

10-02-2009, 06:19 AM

From the IEC link:

Karzai won in 20 of 34 provinces, with a national margin of 1,500,000+ (54.6%). I called one province a tie; so, 13 for his opponents.

What follows are his winning provinces, sorted by % of vote for Karzai, with his approx. margin over the next candidate.

Paktika 180,000+, 91.1%
Kandahar 200,000+, 87.6%
Helmand 100,000+, 83.7%
Khost 90,000+, 83.0%
Kunarha 89,000+, 82.8%
Nimroz 40,000+, 82.3%
Paktia 170,000+, 82.2%
Laghman 70,000+, 79.9%
Nangerhar 255,000+, 76.2%
Farah 50,000+, 71.9%
Zabul 9,000+, 69.7%
Urozgan 18,000+, 69.1%
Wardak 30,000+, 63.6%
Juzjan 35,000+, 58.4%
Faryab 50,000+, 57.4%
Kabul 160,000+, 55.0%
Herat 45,000+, 48.6%
Ghazni 12,000+, 46.9%
Sar-i-Pul 10,000+, 45.5%
Logar 12,000+, 43.1%

Nite, folks

Watcher

10-02-2009, 12:28 PM

Hi guys longtime lurker first time poster....im just a mid 30's civie and wannabe fitness instructor never been in a uniform (doesnt that involve pressing?).

Saw this today on the crossfit mainsite - a insightful overview of tribal mindset as pertains to the Afghan campaign...and some suggestions as to changing direction over there. Thought you gents might be interested :)

"Its the tribes stupid" -

Part1
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ioCcO3_k6v0&feature=player_embedded

Part2
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eePwGi4RINw&feature=related

Part3
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Z-e6P5SymTY&feature=related

Part4
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YdeH0VvUpII&feature=related

Part5
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vJsB9-wFAEQ&feature=related

More here -

http://blog.stevenpressfield.com/

Probably not news to most of you guys (Afghan central government has not managed to exert effective influence across the whole country etc), and that ISAF/NATO should have realistic goals and expectations . I believe Rory Stewart has been saying similar as well....

tequila

10-02-2009, 01:03 PM

Argh.

Stay away from Pressfield unless your mind absolutely needs comfort food. He's the historical equivalent of a bag of Doritos.

Read Foust (http://www.registan.net/index.php/2009/06/09/steven-pressfield-on-the-tribesman/)or Bleuer (http://easterncampaign.wordpress.com/)in your internet downtime. Read Maley (http://www.amazon.com/Afghanistan-Wars-Second-Twentieth-Century/dp/0230213146/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1254487739&sr=8-1)and Dorronsoro (http://www.amazon.com/Revolution-Unending-Afghanistan-Comparative-International/dp/0231136269/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1254487762&sr=1-1)and Grima-Santry (http://www.amazon.com/SECRETS-FIELD-ETHNOGRAPHERS-WESTERN-PAKISTAN/dp/1420806742)if you want to really start learning something.

Watcher

10-02-2009, 01:14 PM

Shouldve known you guys had seen his works before ;)

Cheers for those links Tequila!

William F. Owen

10-02-2009, 01:23 PM

Argh.

Stay away from Pressfield unless your mind absolutely needs comfort food. He's the historical equivalent of a bag of Doritos.

Concur. Simplistic and inaccurate. Essentially, if the "tribes" are on your side, "tribes" are not a problem.

Steve the Planner

10-02-2009, 02:20 PM

Finally, we are talking about Saul Alinsky and community engagement processes. All the civil/mil jargon stripped of.

Planners, as a profession, are all about community engagement. While we usually cite our own, and particularly non-military, sources, exercises and practices, I believe the anti-military bias that has been discussed prevents many from understanding that reconstruction, post-conflict stabilization, hearts-and-minds, and even SF are all really about the same thing. We are all in the same business.

On a tangent, I am not big on including an extensive quote, but this, from the recent Senate Foreign Relations Committee deliberations on Pakistan Aid provides compelling expert testimony on the Afghan issue:

Milt Bearden is a former Central Intelligence Agency station chief in Islamabad.

"The Soviets spent 10 years, with an average troop strength of 120,000," said Milt Bearden. "This was always enough to fuel an insurgency that matched every effort that they put out to quell the insurgency. But it never, ever was enough to defeat that insurgency."

Bearden said there will always be enough ethnic Pashtuns in Afghanistan who view any foreign force as an occupation and who will engage U.S. troops on the battlefield. The former CIA officer spelled out his view of how likely a surge in U.S. military forces would be to succeed.

"There is no, in my opinion, there is no possibility for the United States to provide enough troops in Afghanistan to pacify the situation," he said.

Another expert at the hearing, Maleeha Lodhi, a former Pakistani ambassador to the United States, also said: That a U.S. military escalation would be unlikely to succeed and would intensify rivalries in the region, such as the one between India and Pakistan. Lodhi warned of other negative consequences of a military surge in Afghanistan on Pakistan.

"It will lead to an influx of militant and al-Qaida fighters into Pakistan".

Lodhi warned that a surge in U.S. troops would enhance the vulnerability of U.S. and NATO ground supply routes throughout Pakistan, and would likely mean more Afghan refugees pouring into Pakistan.

She said, most importantly:

"It could endanger, erode and unravel the key public consensus that has been achieved in the past one year to fight the militancy."

Lodhi said a fragile consensus has been formed among the general public in Pakistan to fight against the Pakistani Taliban.

Steve Coll, President and CEO of The New America Foundation, a Washington-based public policy institute, agreed with the other panelists at the hearing that neither an abrupt withdrawal of all U.S. forces nor a troop surge is the answer.

Coll said there is a more sustainable solution, and he hopes it is the one President Obama will choose.

"It would make clear that the Taliban will never be permitted to take power by force in Kabul or major cities," said Steve Coll. "It would seek and enforce stability in Afghan population centers, but emphasize politics over combat, urban stability over rural patrolling, Afghan solutions over Western ones. And it would incorporate Pakistan more directly into creative, persistent diplomatic efforts to stabilize Afghanistan and the region."

http://www.voanews.com/english/2009-10-01-voa53.cfm

William F. Owen

10-02-2009, 02:26 PM

F

Milt Bearden is a former Central Intelligence Agency station chief in Islamabad.

"The Soviets spent 10 years, with an average troop strength of 120,000," said Milt Bearden. "This was always enough to fuel an insurgency that matched every effort that they put out to quell the insurgency. But it never, ever was enough to defeat that insurgency."

IIRC wasn't the US reason for supporting the insurgency, that if they did not, the insurgency would be defeated? - and would have been without massive external aid?

slapout9

10-02-2009, 02:53 PM

The bottom line is that, if the masses (in a region) really dislike the national government and if the foreign assistence forces are constrained to enhance the national government in that region, Mao-type (Saul Alinsky community organizing :) ) simply won't work.

jmm, A Mao type organization is what the Taliban is! That is why they are winning. Their primary weapon is political (Sub Rosa to Religion) the fighting is just one small portion.

For us to succeed we have to figure out "whos cheatin who" and gain counter popular support. That will not be easy nor conventional.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=APRTHOEcnb0&feature=related

William F. Owen

10-02-2009, 03:07 PM

jmm, A Mao type organization is what the Taliban is! That is why they are winning.
Moa (Tse-tung) formed highly codified and organised units, with strict operational regulations. He was also an adherent of Clausewitz, and saw conventional operations as the only way to achieve decisive political effect. "Guerilla warfare" was merely a precursor to conventional and decisive operations. Is this the Taliban's plan?

Their primary weapon is political (Sub Rosa to Religion) the fighting is just one small portion. Their means (weapon) is political or their aim is political. Point being, if they are achieving their aim throught non-violent means (politics), why are they expending huge amounts of resources using violent means?

slapout9

10-02-2009, 03:35 PM

Moa (Tse-tung) formed highly codified and organised units, with strict operational regulations. He was also an adherent of Clausewitz, and saw conventional operations as the only way to achieve decisive political effect. "Guerilla warfare" was merely a precursor to conventional and decisive operations. Is this the Taliban's plan?

Their means (weapon) is political or their aim is political. Point being, if they are achieving their aim throught non-violent means (politics), why are they expending huge amounts of resources using violent means?

1-Yes he did and each unit had a political commander as well as a military commander. Like the Taliban and the connection to their madrassas a religious/political organization with military capabilities. As TX Hammes has pointed out Guerrilla Warfare is evolving, they don't need a conventional Army to achieve their goals.

2-surprised you ask that, as you have said many times war is politics carried on with different means. Or as Mao said political power comes from the barrel of a gun.

jmm99

10-02-2009, 05:07 PM

as to this:

from Wilf
Their means (weapon) is political or their aim is political. Point being, if they are achieving their aim throught non-violent means (politics), why are they expending huge amounts of resources using violent means ?

Since we both follow CvC and the Taliban are engaging in warfare, their end has to be political. As to means, military (violence) is an obvious means used.

Based on GEN McChrystal's report, the Quetta Taliban has established "shadow governments" in the regions they control, and in some of the areas controlled by other Taliban groups (p.15 of report). The portion of Astan controlled or contested by the Taliban, or not controlled by ISAF (two different metrics) is redacted (see attached snip from p. 15). So, another means is political.

-------------------------
As to this:

Steve the Planner
Finally, we are talking about Saul Alinsky and community engagement processes.

A number here have studied Alinsky's methodology, and we occasionally rear our heads (or posteriors). :) Good quote from Milt Bearden (and, in brief to Wilf, the direct support for the anti-Soviet insurgency came from Pakistan via ISI links - sound familiar ?).

Following Alinsky (cf. Mao, Giap, Lenin), the solution has to be bubble-up, indigenous and long-term - although all recognized the possibilities of some events akin to "punctuated equilibria" (e.g., insurrections, but in the context of underlying mass movements).

As Wilf can tell you (and cite valid historical examples), there also are various top-down solutions which can work in certain contexts. Bearden seems to think not for Astan. Steve Coll seems to be suggesting an enclave or demographic lines solution (both suggested, but rejected, in Vietnam).

Whatever the solution, it has to solve the key problems as perceived by the Afghanis (see attached). While the largest % problem is security (military and paramilitary areas), the remaining problems are largely civil.

The appearence of high prices (inflation) as a double-digit problem in 2008 is interesting, because the same thing happened in South Vietnam as our force levels increased.

The Asia Foundation has an Astan Section (http://asiafoundation.org/in-asia/tag/afghanistan/).

Have to run now and attend to my "day job" - if I can recall what that is. :)

Cheers to all

Mike

Steve the Planner

10-02-2009, 05:26 PM

JMM99

Here's my two cents from a piece I'm submitting to the WP (who knows if it would ever get published?)

Steve

A Plan For Afghanistan?

October 6th is Planner’s Day on Capitol Hill, when state and local planners will descend to meet with their local representatives on a host of domestic planning, project and program issues.

Sometimes invisible, planners typically work behind the scenes to research and orchestrate community engagement to develop and implement the mundane but critical plans, regulations, budgets and projects to implement, enforce and deliver communities’ needs and visions, through effective and comprehensively planned, phased and budgeted projects and programs which minimize waste, and through a well-defined and generally transparent process which, on the whole, resists and precludes major corruption.

Their subject field is defined by highly technical work in Geographic Information Systems (GIS), engineering, environmental, and systems sciences. Still, to the greatest extent possible, a planner’s role is to interpret the complexity and define relevant choices for decision-makers and the public.

Typically, behind-the-scenes planning only enters the press sphere in the context of heated community debates over a proposed plan, but it is that context, community engagement focused on vetting and resolving future plans and activities, even where controversial or complex, that underscores the complexity and importance of the planning process. The planners’ role is to create and support that public process, and the means and ends of, hopefully, comprehensive, effective, and cost-controlled implementation.

What does domestic civilian planning have to do with the big foreign policy and defense issues before the Nation’s Capitol today? Everything.

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee recently hosted a panel of experts on Pakistan and Afghanistan. At that hearing, Foreign Policy expert Steve Coll described the counter-productive effort of more troop deployments, yet the need to assure the Taliban never regained control of Afghanistan’s capitol.

He went on to describe a proposed strategy, grounded in the need to enforce stability in Afghan population centers, with emphasis on politics over combat, urban stability over rural patrolling, and Afghan solutions over Western ones.

Coll has described an end, but not a means.

Brush aside all the military and foreign policy jargon used in Iraq and Afghanistan, however, and you are describing the state of US civic affairs in the Tammany Hall days: major corruption, billions of dollars of waste on unneeded, ineffective, and ill-conceived piecemeal public and private projects and programs, and a complete lack of effective public engagement. The US Afghan reconstruction effort, as presently divided into discrete cones of economic, governance, democracy building, civil affairs, and managed by competing, and often conflicting, US agencies, NGOs, and international donor agencies, assures the delivery of disjunct chaos, and contains no possibility for progress.

Last week, a Special Forces veteran was explaining the importance of Saul Alinsky and community engagement on Small Wars Journal. So, where is this headed?

The irony is that the military is chock-full of civilian planners designing, maintaining and budgeting the continuous operation of vast and increasingly complex military base infrastructure, negotiating substantial impacts on adjacent communities, and routinely applying community engagement processes. Like Anthony Hopkins’ butler character in “Remains of the Day,” the planners are the butlers making possible the complex systems, infrastructure and buildings in which military and foreign affairs experts are increasingly debating how to do what those butlers do every day---keep the house running.

Afghanistan, as anyone familiar with it knows, is just too broken, backwards, and diffuse to lend itself to ready reconstruction, temporary “quick hit” projects, and passing military and foreign aid initiatives. So stabilizing Afghanistan, or just a few key urban centers, is a big, deep and complex challenge requiring substantial research which has not yet been done, and development, with realistic Afghan participation, of an overall multi-phased and hierarchically prioritized strategy. In Iraq, like Afghanistan, our efforts routinely focus on “quick hits” and “low-hanging fruit” that often prove unsustainable and ineffective. Progress can be made, but “more of the same,” delivered by our current structure of competing, conflicting, and uncoordinated efforts and staffing, even if “re-labeled” as planning and planners, will only produce more of the same.

When Planner’s day unfolds on October 6, 2009 with domestic planners coming to the Hill for their own domestic issues, perhaps it would make sense for military and foreign affairs leaders to ask them how they do what they do, and what lessons can be learned to close our substantial gaps in a critical component of the “big picture” strategy in Afghanistan. Knowing how to solve a problem is a big step on the road to a viable solution.

Stephen Donnelly, AICP, is a Planning Consultant from Crofton Maryland. He served as Senior Urban Planning Adviser to the State Department during the 2007/2008 Civilian Surge in Iraq, and will be on the Hill for Planner’s Day. He is a member of the American Planning Association, and its Institute of Certified Planners.

(Rights reserved)

Fuchs

10-02-2009, 07:38 PM

Their means (weapon) is political or their aim is political. Point being, if they are achieving their aim throught non-violent means (politics), why are they expending huge amounts of resources using violent means?

* coercion
* demonstration of power
* recruitment propaganda

Their art of war isn't much advanced on the operational level, though.
Some of their action are counter-productive. Attacking the Germans up north, for example. It harms them more than it helps.

jmm99

10-02-2009, 08:45 PM

Good fortune in getting your piece published.

Sadly, I have to agree with this:

Brush aside all the military and foreign policy jargon used in Iraq and Afghanistan, however, and you are describing the state of US civic affairs in the Tammany Hall days: major corruption, billions of dollars of waste on unneeded, ineffective, and ill-conceived piecemeal public and private projects and programs, and a complete lack of effective public engagement. The US Afghan reconstruction effort, as presently divided into discrete cones of economic, governance, democracy building, civil affairs, and managed by competing, and often conflicting, US agencies, NGOs, and international donor agencies, assures the delivery of disjunct chaos, and contains no possibility for progress.

Civil affairs in Astan are a big mess. I suspect that the Astan debate will be resolved in the end by domestic policy considerations, which also have to address something of a big mess and which count higher in the polls.

davidbfpo

10-02-2009, 09:13 PM

Bob's World

10-03-2009, 12:41 AM

All insurgency is politics, intra to a state. Otherwise, it isn't insurgency.

Thus, the Taliban is insurgency.

All UW is politics as well inter to a state, otherwise it isn't UW.

Thus, the AQ operation is UW.

The religious flavor of the ideology applied is simply a handy tool to the two political operations above. None of this is about religion, but religion is essential to making it happen. As an insurgent leader, or a UW leader, you select an ideology that speaks to your target audience and that takes a position that your target government is either unable or unwilling to co-opt. This is the nature of the game.

Steve the Planner

10-03-2009, 01:10 AM

Somewhere I read, take the taliban out of the equation, and Pashtuns would still be opposed to our entry into their country.

Under that theory, even without the Taliban, the answer is still not on the table.

In some strange and not foreseeable reality, I wonder which of Afghanistan's many "countries" would step in even if the Afghan Taliban was gone. This is a very complex world with it's own intricate extra-national dynamics.

Back to all politics is local?

Steve

Bob's World

10-03-2009, 01:23 AM

Like Gen. Odierno noticing recently that when there is less US presence in Iraq there is less resistance to US presence in Iraq. Hmmm.

Now, while we are dealing with what is primarily a resistance insurgency in Afghanistan we look to increase the primary motivation to the insurgency: US presence.

Steve the Planner

10-03-2009, 01:59 AM

Bob:

I don't know why it is so hard to understand.

On the civilian side, I would sit at a meeting with a provincial DG, who, as a Sunni returned from Dubai to help rebuild his country, had personal reasons for opposition to the US, but, after return, was even more deeply offended by the foolishness he witnessed among US reconstruction and military folks in his AO. They treated him, and his aids like fools, or children to be "helped," (shades of recipient vs, participant). So, despite his abundant capabilities and superlative technical education, he responded, at best, in the way they expected.

Had he been an Afghan tribal leader versus a trained and committed government professional, it would be easy, from his perspective, to understand how resentment and frustration could boil over to something more emotive. Clearly, we have to understand more about how our hosts perceive our actions.

I once worked on a private sector project with one of the biggest jerks you could find. He was fond of recommending to other people that they read "How to Win Friends and Influence People" to improve THEIR people skills, and continually found more and more people who, in his opinion of their reactions to him, needed that advice. Go figure.

Steve

Sometimes, we create the results we must live with.

Ken White

10-03-2009, 02:19 AM

All insurgency is politics, intra to a state. Otherwise, it isn't insurgency...Thus, the Taliban is insurgency.it does raise the questions (1)Which Taliban groups, plural, are so involved and does the existence of disparate groups mean there are multiple insurgencies; (2) The Talibs are intra to Afghanistan and to Pakistan. They are also therefor 'inter'. Does this then become and interintrainsugency (I³)... :D
All UW is politics as well inter to a state, otherwise it isn't UW...Thus, the AQ operation is UW.Now we have introduced AQ and UW added to the Talibs and insurgency (ies). What about the Drug Gangs, the smugglers and the many non-Talib, non-AQ Afghans from not only Pushtun but other ethnic groups that do not want a strong Afghan State. Where do they fit?
Like Gen. Odierno noticing recently that when there is less US presence in Iraq there is less resistance to US presence in Iraq. Hmmm.Why the "Hmmm." That's the sort of thing you've been saying all along -- though you never seem to notice that most here agree with that thesis -- so why express thoughtfulness?
Now, while we are dealing with what is primarily a resistance insurgency in Afghanistan we look to increase the primary motivation to the insurgency: US presence.Unfortunately, two and two do not make five. I'd first note that as we are not the government in Afghansitan, the insurgents are not insurging against us, they're insurging against the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. Though it does not seem logical, you may decrease insurgency in Afghanistan by decreasing US presence. However, you are more likely to increase it by removing US troops, thus allowing your insurgents (supported by the drug crowd, the smugglers and your AQ types plus my other disaffected Afghan types) to increase their pressure, giving them a win, which is how they will see it and broadcast it.

Less resistance to US presence is one thing; there is absolutely no evidence that US presence in Afghanistan is "the primary motivation to the insurgency." That's quite another thing...

Infanteer

10-03-2009, 02:29 AM

Wasn't the "foreign troops are an antibody to peaceful settlement" idea something that guided operations in Iraq from about 2004-2006(ish)? End result was gangs and militias taking over the streets?

Bob's World

10-03-2009, 02:33 AM

Well, the white man's border between Afghanistan and Pakistan is moot to the Pashtun populace, of which the Taliban is a subset, so (just like the false border of North and South Vietnam to that populace years ago) it does not apply to understanding of the insurgency that is going on. You can't just draw a line through a populace and change an insurgency into a state on state conflict.

Second, there is PLENTY of evidence that the majority of the insurgencies motivation for action is the presence of the foreign invader. This, in the history of these people in this region, is the one thing that they can come together to agree upon: all internal conflict must be set aside to deal with any outside intrusion. Once that is done, they they can get back to their ongoing internal dramas.

This in no means is a recommendation that the US needs to cut and run, but rather that the current labor intensive strategy on the table is not what is needed to get to the best solution in Afghanistan, either for the people there, or for the US. Less is more.

And, if the Taliban should happen to prevail someday in Afghanistan (which I highly doubt, at least in the extreme form they operated before, as the information age is making the type of dark age Islam they promote less tenable every day) we need to not have painted ourselves into such a position that we can only see them as "enemies." We need to learn to work with the government in charge, not just governments in charge that we either helped shape or otherwise approve of. (And this hold to every country, not just Afghanistan).

jmm99

10-03-2009, 02:47 AM

is the evidence at hand with respect to this:

from Ken
Less resistance to US presence is one thing; there is absolutely no evidence that US presence in Afghanistan is "the primary motivation to the insurgency." That's quite another thing...

Among Astan's Biggest Problems as perceived by Afghanis (chart posted earlier (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=83704&postcount=432)), "Interference of foreign countries" (I marked that item in the chart with an *) resulted in responses:

2006 - 1%
2007 - less than 1%
2008 - 3%

So, on the narrow issue as stated, the SMG has tossed the COL a fastball - I'd have to call it a strike, unless the COL has some evidence to the contrary.

The Afghanis' perception of higher prices (double-digit problem in 2008) might be due to inflation caused by US and other international spending in Astan, which would include a component of military spending. However, the same problem (if that is the cause, which is quite possible) would be magnified by a much larger civilian and FID effort (as some have proposed).

Added after last BW post: "PLENTY of evidence". Have to say this - fellow attorney: Make your case. Prove it. :)

Nice to see both of you back on this thread in fine form. :D

Regards

Mike

jmm99

10-03-2009, 04:12 AM

I put "Taliban" in quotes because those "Islamic scholars" are not a monolith - as GEN McChrystal's report makes clear, there are three major groups.

In late 2007, the Senlis Council (not quite mainstream) was chided for its claim that - More Than Half of Afghanistan "Under Taliban" (http://www.truthout.org/article/majority-afghanistan-under-taliban-control). By 11 Sep 2009, VOA was broadcasting (http://www.voanews.com/english/2009-09-11-voa10.cfm) the ICOS (International Council on Security and Development in London) report that the Taliban have a "permanent presence" in 80 percent of Afghanistan.

As so often he does, Bill Roggio provides us with two different pictures:

3 Sep 2009 - Data from Afghanistan's Interior Ministry; map from Reuters (http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2009/09/afghan_forces_and_ta.php).

11 Sep 2009 - The ICOS' meaningless map on Taliban presence in Afghanistan (http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat-matrix/archives/2009/09/icos_rating_on_taliban_control.php).

and provides brief explanations for both maps - which prove that how you define terms has a definite impact on use of statistics. ;)

A large (8MB pdf) version of the ICOS map is here (http://www.icosfilm.net/static/video/050_map.pdf).

Roggio makes this point, which seems valid:

If you want to know about the level of Taliban presence, it makes more sense to break out the country by districts. And you need to look at more than just attacks and sightings. Are the Taliban collecting taxes, running a parallel government, openly recruiting fighters? Are local security forces providing security or are they holed up in district centers? Does the Taliban run the region from dusk until dawn? Do schools remain closed due to Taliban threats? Were the people in the district able to vote in the last election? Etc.

Very much standard stuff (much of it keyed to the presence & extent of "shadow goverenment"), which is well to be reminded of.

The attached snips from the map based on data from Afghanistan's Interior Ministry shows a fair amount of "Taliban" activity north of Hwy 1 (approx. location shooped in by me). It supports Roggio's point that a district by district analysis is required, which is not an armchair sport to be attempted at home.

Ken White

10-03-2009, 04:25 AM

You can't just draw a line through a populace and change an insurgency into a state on state conflict.Not that I said it was a state on state conflict, merely pointed out there was some interstate traffic. However, it is de facto and de jure interstate -- may have been dumb for the British to draw that line but draw it they did, like it or not that line exists and the fact the Pushtun do not like it doesn't render it moot. It's there, we're there. That's reality; messy stuff, that... ;)
Second, there is PLENTY of evidence that the majority of the insurgencies motivation for action is the presence of the foreign invader.Not what I hear from folks there. Though I acknowledge that some folks there say that's their motivator -- amazing how many people all over the world, in high and low places, lie about their REAL motivation. Also see JMM's post.
Once that is done, they they can get back to their ongoing internal dramas.They're engaging in their internal dramas (plural, not all insurgencies, as previously noted) now, we just happen to be in the line of fire. :D

And we volunteered for that...:wry:
(And this hold to every country, not just Afghanistan).I'm with you -- all you gotta do is stop all those librul politicians from both parties in DC from trying to save the world and make it look like us. :rolleyes:

Bob's World

10-03-2009, 09:05 AM

I put "Taliban" in quotes because those "Islamic scholars" are not a monolith - as GEN McChrystal's report makes clear, there are three major groups.

In late 2007, the Senlis Council (not quite mainstream) was chided for its claim that - More Than Half of Afghanistan "Under Taliban" (http://www.truthout.org/article/majority-afghanistan-under-taliban-control). By 11 Sep 2009, VOA was broadcasting (http://www.voanews.com/english/2009-09-11-voa10.cfm) the ICOS (International Council on Security and Development in London) report that the Taliban have a "permanent presence" in 80 percent of Afghanistan.

As so often he does, Bill Roggio provides us with two different pictures:

3 Sep 2009 - Data from Afghanistan's Interior Ministry; map from Reuters (http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2009/09/afghan_forces_and_ta.php).

11 Sep 2009 - The ICOS' meaningless map on Taliban presence in Afghanistan (http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat-matrix/archives/2009/09/icos_rating_on_taliban_control.php).

and provides brief explanations for both maps - which prove that how you define terms has a definite impact on use of statistics. ;)

A large (8MB pdf) version of the ICOS map is here (http://www.icosfilm.net/static/video/050_map.pdf).

Roggio makes this point, which seems valid:

Very much standard stuff (much of it keyed to the presence & extent of "shadow goverenment"), which is well to be reminded of.

The attached snips from the map based on data from Afghanistan's Interior Ministry shows a fair amount of "Taliban" activity north of Hwy 1 (approx. location shooped in by me). It supports Roggio's point that a district by district analysis is required, which is not an armchair sport to be attempted at home.

As I have stated before, I am a big fan of polling as the best way to gather the most valuable information for shaping FID engagement and advising a HN on their COIN activities. But also, of course, we all know how one has to always be cautious when dealing with any "measure" of such subjective things.

So, given that a very effective insurgency can be driven by a very small portion of a state's total populace, my first observation would be that the percentage may well be fairly small in a poll if asked this question. Similarly if on would have polled the American colonies, particularly outside of Massachusetts, in 1776, one would probably not made an overwhelming case for an independence movement either.

I would be curious though to see what percentage of the insurgent populace believes that their primary objective is the removal of the Americans and their allied military presence? These things are complicated; as an example of that complication, as I looked at the "enemy controlled" map it looked almost identical to "Karzai controlled" maps I had seen from the election... Not shocking in that both Karzai and the Taliban represent the same main regions and ethnic groups; but complicated. I haven't seen much discussion of this apparent incongruity.

Bob's World

10-03-2009, 12:09 PM

is the evidence at hand with respect to this:

Among Astan's Biggest Problems as perceived by Afghanis (chart posted earlier (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=83704&postcount=432)), "Interference of foreign countries" (I marked that item in the chart with an *) resulted in responses:

2006 - 1%
2007 - less than 1%
2008 - 3%

So, on the narrow issue as stated, the SMG has tossed the COL a fastball - I'd have to call it a strike, unless the COL has some evidence to the contrary.

The Afghanis' perception of higher prices (double-digit problem in 2008) might be due to inflation caused by US and other international spending in Astan, which would include a component of military spending. However, the same problem (if that is the cause, which is quite possible) would be magnified by a much larger civilian and FID effort (as some have proposed).

Added after last BW post: "PLENTY of evidence". Have to say this - fellow attorney: Make your case. Prove it. :)

Nice to see both of you back on this thread in fine form. :D

Regards

Mike

Ok, this is single source, and I don't offer this as conclusive by any means, but it is collaborative of the point I am making. In reading this summary of interviews with several Taliban members, there are subtle, yet important windows into how they think in how they phrase their comments.

Example:

Pg 41: Kahn: "The Americans and their Afghan allies..."

(If this were a revolution, I would expect him to say this in the opposite order)

Pg 41: Akhundzada: " There are famous Taliban poems about how mujahedin come to free villages from occupiers at the point of a bayonet."

(We should remember that Taliban motivation and purpose when we first invaded the country is very different than it is now as they come back to remove the invaders. Certainly they hope to take power and return to their fundamentalist Islamic approach, but while they may achieve the first, the latter will be much less likely in today's environment - particularly if the US remains engaged with whatever government emerges in Afghanistan, and does not isolate itself from a victor that it does not approve of)

Pg 41/42 Haqqani: " Between 2006 and 2009 I have personally raised hundreds of new recruits to join the resistance...The unpopularity of the Karzai regime helps us immensely. In 2005 some Afghans thought Karzai would bring positive change. But now most Afghans believe the Taliban is the future. The Resistance is getting stronger day by day."

Ok, like I said single source. Newsweek has an agenda, as do all of the men they spoke with. Take it with a grain or two of salt, but don't just discount what these men say. Hell, our intel guys quote everything that AQ puts out as if it were carved on stone tablets, and far more of the content of those carefully crafted bits of propaganda are BS than these candid comments from rank and file Taliban.

These guys are not AQ, and are fairly open about their disdain for the Arabs. We should be leveraging this. The Taliban could expel, capture, or kill AQ in a matter of days if they wanted to, certainly they could shut them down in Pashto lands quickly and indefinitely. I simply offer that we may have lost our perspective as to why we are in Afghanistan in the first place, and that by changing our approach to the Taliban we could most likely get much more quickly to an end of AQ in the region, and a relatively stable Afghanistan and Pakistan with legitimate, self-determined governments in place that are at worst neutral toward the US.

This a danger of a threat-centric approach that tends to expand the scope of an operation rather than limit it. Also the danger of "War on AQ" approach that leads to the tendency to try to make AQ connections to bring "threats" into the band of authorities for action.

When we start treating the Taliban more like a political party and less like a militant arm of AQ we will begin moving in the right direction.

davidbfpo

10-03-2009, 01:54 PM

I once again recommend reading: http://blog.freerangeinternational.com/ which makes valuable points that ISAF have not learnt: use of Afghan highways (including blocking Highway 1 for hours), off-FOB night time work by the French (unlike most ISAF), ISAF response to highway accidents and working with the Afghans - cited below:

ISAF is here to bring security to the people of Afghanistan so they can re-build their economy and infrastructure. But ISAF can’t protect the people of Afghanistan – they cannot even protect themselves. The reality is that we have this backwards – it is the people of Afghanistan who are able to provide the protection and security us foreigners need to operate outside the wire. All we need do is demonstrate commitment to the people thus providing a reason for them to believe in us and support our mission. (My emphasis).

That is why my son and I can travel around as freely as we do – the people protect us – they warn us if danger is about – they look after us when we walk around the bazaars. The reason the people protect us is because everyone in Jalalabad knows who we are and what we are doing and they appreciate it. In Gardez the Taliban came to several of our projects and asked what was going on. The local people told them in no uncertain terms that the rehabilitation of their karez’s and canals was the first good thing which has happened to them since the Americans came and that if the Taliban interfered the people would fight them. The Taliban did not interfere and I suspect many of them were working on our projects – 6 bucks a day is good pay for unskilled laborers in Afghanistan.

Our FOB’s are full of men and woman who would love to have the freedom to operate like we do so they too could make a difference. I recieve emails from them daily. But our military system will not let them off the FOB’s, out of the body armor, or out of the large stupid, dangerous MRAP’s. Instead we continue to bring “security” to the local people at the point of a gun. How stupid is that?

davidbfpo

slapout9

10-03-2009, 03:04 PM

Infanteer

10-03-2009, 03:13 PM

Second, there is PLENTY of evidence that the majority of the insurgencies motivation for action is the presence of the foreign invader. This, in the history of these people in this region, is the one thing that they can come together to agree upon: all internal conflict must be set aside to deal with any outside intrusion. Once that is done, they they can get back to their ongoing internal dramas.

This in no means is a recommendation that the US needs to cut and run, but rather that the current labor intensive strategy on the table is not what is needed to get to the best solution in Afghanistan, either for the people there, or for the US. Less is more.

Oh, I don't doubt that. I'm sure if bearded men in man-jammies and turbans were cruising around my town looking to rustle up some of my neighbours, I would harbour some resentment, regardless of their motive.

I guess there is two important factors - who pisses off the locals more and what's in it for them. Who do locals resent more, us or some proselytizing assholes or local thugs who kick them around? I'm not to sure, and I'm willing to bet the answer differs, largely, from village to village. I bet that "time" plays a factor for the locals in deciding whom to support - better the asshole you know than the stranger in a long line of strangers who is likely to leave. Self-interest is a pretty big motivator.

That being said, if locals see "increased foreign soldier presence" equals "better protection by the government", then perhaps more soldiers is the answer? However, this begs the question - is a strange ANA soldier likely to afford you any greater perception of local security than a strange ISAF soldier when your conception of nationality doesn't really go beyond your local fields or district?

And, if the Taliban should happen to prevail someday in Afghanistan (which I highly doubt, at least in the extreme form they operated before, as the information age is making the type of dark age Islam they promote less tenable every day) we need to not have painted ourselves into such a position that we can only see them as "enemies."

Thank you for that. So much of what we read these days warns of imminent Taliban takeover without a change to ISAF strategy. First, the Taliban are not taking anything over with 100,000 NATO soldiers in that country. They tried Mao Phase III in Kandahar in 2006. Second, the rise of the Taliban was the result of some very specific regional conditions - Afghan split between feuding warlords, Pakistan given free reign, and Russia and the West basically cutting all strings for various reasons. Now-a-days, Pakistan has a slightly different take on militant Islam, Russia, India and the US all seem to have interests in providing support to Kabul, and life is somewhat going in most of the country.

I'm not willing to give the Taliban status as the "natural governing party" of Afghanistan just quite yet.

Anyways, I'm rambling - cheers,

Infanteer

davidbfpo

10-03-2009, 03:20 PM

From JMM earlier: IEC Election Results (with a nice interactive map). Karzai lost in most "Northern Alliance" provinces; he won in Pashtun provinces (the questioned votes). Very regional and ethnic from all appearances; but a province by province study would have to be made.

Thanks for the link. Can anyone here offer an explanation on why so few people across the country voted in the provincial elections? It is very marked.

davidbfpo

A reply came from a SWC rare lurker:

There are many reasons why provincial counts were lower. The first is levels of education. Many of the voters did not know who the provincial candidates were or what they represented. This is, of course, sometimes a problem here in the West, despite all our advanced channels of communications. The lack of even basic infrastructure in parts of the country
means that this is far more of a problem in Afghanistan.

The second problem is that the emphasis was on who becomes the president. There was a lot of interest in the elections at 'street/village' level. There was a degree of cynicism of course but I observed a great deal of enthusiasm for the elections on election day. The turnouts were higher than expected, but all the focus was on presidential candidates.

In some provinces, voters appeared to be either happy or indifferent towards their provincial governors; both also explain lower voting patterns.

On the election generally:

In certain communities (eg some of the kuchi nomads), it is alleged no one voted or that headmen stuffed ballot boxes. So far, until the ECC work is complete, there is no way of substantiating this rumours. I did not see any of this practice. I heard a lot of rubbish being spouted by journalist in Kabul - some of whom hadn't even been on the ground at all (except in the safe Kabul and Panjshir areas).

The writer recommends this website (international election observers): http://democracyinternational.com/afghanistan/

Steve the Planner

10-03-2009, 03:38 PM

Right. Fighting for themselves, and what they are trying to accomplish. (Whoever themselves might be).

Two comments really triggered my reaction. First, about economics, and second about blocking the road.

Its really hard to explain the distortive effects of reconstruction, as presently applied.

One deputy governor in Iraq explained to me that, if they really wanted a school, they could have one built in very nice condition for about $150,000. If the US did it with locals, maybe $500,000 (and a piece of crap to boot). If the US did it through USACE, after a 6 month engineering project in North Carolina, and bids through central bidding processes (Oh yeah, Dubai and Quttar where all the payola was rolling), maybe $5,000,000, but in a condition that was, typically, unihabitable, and at the wrong location. As he said with great irony, "And the Americans call us thieves?"

Their was a story in today's Wash Post about how the Anbar shieks made money: A $300,000 profit on a $450,000 school project.

Sounds like the Deputy Governor knew the numbers pretty well.

But when educated community leaders can make $300,000 a pop for a small handful of US projects, they are not focused on community needs. Obviously.

And when the economy is flat on its back due to trade restrictions and war limitations, it gets flooded with imports, all of which are being chased by the war profiteering silly money.

I am always enthralled, after a major earthquake or disaster, with the routine efforts people, even under the greatest challenges, will go to to get their lives back to some semblance of normal. VERSUS, in US conflict countries, they all stand around and wait for the cash. What is wrong with our strategy?

At the same time, I recall plowing through the streets (on the wrong side of the road) of Tikrit in our armoured column, 50 Cal warning shots going at each intersection, cell phones jammed, and everything coming to a stop for our one hour visit. Folks running in panic in some places we went. Our barricades permanently disrupting routine traffic and social flow, blocking natural drainage, etc...

From an Iraqi civilian perspective, those Americans were dangerous, powerful, and not to be messed with. So do what they say, and don't try to question.

Do I need to go to Afghanistan to tell whether that is going on there? No. Regretably, it is the "American Way!"

So we bring the place to a standstill to save it from some obscure geo-political issue that, at best, was way off their radar screen in the course of living their daily lives. But we disrupt those daily lives on so many levels.

I sincerely believe there is a better way to approach all of this, but, that's just my opinion.

Steve

Ken White

10-03-2009, 04:16 PM

William F. Owen

10-03-2009, 04:25 PM

1-Yes he did and each unit had a political commander as well as a military commander. Like the Taliban and the connection to their madrassas a religious/political organization with military capabilities. As TX Hammes has pointed out Guerrilla Warfare is evolving, they don't need a conventional Army to achieve their goals.

Well the "Political officers" are basically your CA guys, with a smattering of PSYOPS. In Colonial times they were the "Civil Commissioners."
My point is, the Tailban is absolutely no different from the vast majority of Irregular armed forces throughout 3,000 of military history.
They are nothing new and nor are their methods - 99% weapons are over 40 years old. TX is plain wrong and I keep telling so. There is simply no evidence - just a belief.
To whit, what is "Guerilla Warfare" and how is it evolving?

2-surprised you ask that, as you have said many times war is politics carried on with different means. Or as Mao said political power comes from the barrel of a gun.
My enquiry is to the nature of your statement. Mao was paraphrasing CvC -poorly as it happens - but simply put, if the Taliban could not inflict casualties using violence, they would be politically irrelevant.

Ken White

10-03-2009, 04:46 PM

...Certainly they hope to take power and return to their fundamentalist Islamic approach, but while they may achieve the first, the latter will be much less likely in today's environment - particularly if the US remains engaged with whatever government emerges in Afghanistan, and does not isolate itself from a victor that it does not approve of..No question. That at least partly explains the Taliban. What about the drug dudes and the Smugglers, the Afghans who simply do not want an effective powerful central government -- or simply a Pushtun dominated central government. Need to be careful not to oversimplify the issue, that can lead to flawed decisions...
These guys are not AQ, and are fairly open about their disdain for the Arabs. We should be leveraging this. The Taliban could expel, capture, or kill AQ in a matter of days if they wanted to, certainly they could shut them down in Pashto lands quickly and indefinitely.True, they could -- but they won't because AQ are Muslim, rich and provide international intelligence information not otherwise available in addition to funds.

On another note, I draw your attention to this op-ed piece by a gentleman who, as I do, offers a counterpoint to your oft repeated -- yet doomed -- plea for American minimalism; LINK (http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/03/opinion/03miller.html?_r=2&ref=todayspaper).

slapout9

10-03-2009, 05:13 PM

Well the "Political officers" are basically your CA guys, with a smattering of PSYOPS. In Colonial times they were the "Civil Commissioners."
My point is, the Tailban is absolutely no different from the vast majority of Irregular armed forces throughout 3,000 of military history.
They are nothing new and nor are their methods - 99% weapons are over 40 years old. TX is plain wrong and I keep telling so. There is simply no evidence - just a belief.
To whit, what is "Guerilla Warfare" and how is it evolving?

1-That is my point to?! the Talban are not any different. The evolution part as it relates to Mao is that it is not going to be necessary to have a formal uniformed military force to achieve your objectives.

2-I don't understand all this IW,UW,FID,COIN stuff it is all the same to me. My definition of Guerrilla Warfare or Irregular warfare comes the SOE Syllabus on Irregular Warfare (declassified and for sale in the UK don't have a link; linked added: http://www.amazon.com/SOE-SYLLABUS-Lessons-Ungentlemanly-Warfare/dp/190336518X and not cheap).

Irregular warfare has 3 objectives, to achieve control of the Political, Economic and Military functions of the target Country/area. The methods are propaganda, sabotage,espionage,passive Resistance,secret armies and Political-Military uprisings. That is a condensed version anyway.

Exact wording can be found on pages 35-36 of SOE Syllabus of lectures.

jmm99

10-03-2009, 08:09 PM

We often look too hard (IMO) at the "small wars" aspects of Mao and his ChiComs - though, no doubt, those "irregular warfare" aspects were important and laid the ground work for the future. We should also look at how Mao actually won in the major contest (ending with creation of the PRC, 1 Oct 1949), and his counter-unconventional warfare campaigns against Nationalist remnants left on the mainland after the KMT government fled to Formosa.

Lesson Learned No. 1 - Winning a conventional war, using unconventional warfare tactics in the enemy's rear areas.

The Chinese Civil War (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chinese_Civil_War) began in 1927 (somewhat earlier dates have some justification) and extended until 1949 (one could argue that it is still playing out in less violent forms). It was interrupted by the Second Sino-Japanese War, resulting in the two parties (KMT and CPC) forming a Second United Front (the First United Front had disintegrated ca. 1927). We best know Mao from his writings regarding the first phase of the Civil War and the Japanese War.

After the Japanese were defeated, warfare between the KMT and CPC was very much a conventional war (divisions, corps, field armies). It did, however, have an unconventional side from the CPC standpoint, with guerrilla units and cadre infrastructures established in nominally KMT-held areas. In addition, it also included a sophisticated subversion program within the KMT forces, which eventually turned entire units (corps, plural) to the CPC side - four KMT Armies (5th, 15th, 16th & 20th) defected within a month (this Google Book (http://books.google.com/books?id=siZLk8XKCcIC&pg=PA133&lpg=PA133&dq=%22china%22+%22civil+war%22+%22changing+sides%2 2&source=bl&ots=C-v1AC3DiS&sig=dHcumTy0RJWvgx91NIWlU81Yh5o&hl=en&ei=t15mSueaGuORtgfpmKz0Dw&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=5#v=onepage&q=%22china%22%20%22civil%20war%22%20%22changing%20 sides%22&f=false), pp. 132-133).

The numbers (from the Wiki link) tell it all:

KMT Strength

4,300,000 (July 1945)
3,650,000 (June 1948)
1,490,000 (June 1949)

CPC Strength

1,200,000 (July 1945)
2,800,000 (June 1948)
4,000,000 (June 1949)

A reasonable generalization, which is Infanteer's point:

First, the Taliban are not taking anything over with 100,000 NATO soldiers in that country. They tried Mao Phase III in Kandahar in 2006.

is that "irregular threats" can be disruptive and deadly; but they generally are not existential, unless they can reach the winning conventional phase (which requires them to either develop adequate conventional forces, Mao and Giap; or link-up with external conventional forces - the end game in old FM 31-21). Apparently, the intel folks in Bob's shop would disagree (are they in the mindset that we are akin to the Cuban Batista regime, which did fall without a conventional military phase ?).

-------------------------------
Lesson Learned No. 2 - Waging counter-unconventional warfare campaigns.

When the KMT government and its best forces departed for Formosa, they left behind over a million second rate troops and militia with instructions to wage guerrilla warfare against the ChiComs. Those KMT units were spread all over China. The three principal campaigns were:

Campaign to Suppress Bandits in Northern China (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Campaign_to_Suppress_Bandits_in_Northern_China)

Campaign to Suppress Bandits in Central and Southern China (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Campaign_to_Suppress_Bandits_in_Central_and_Southe rn_China)

Campaign to Suppress Bandits in Eastern China (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Campaign_to_Suppress_Bandits_in_Eastern_China)

While the campaigns (and the sub-campaigns within them) were somewhat different (METT-T), they had roughly three phases:

1. Employment of regular CPC conventional forces (with militia holding already secured local areas) to defeat more conventional KMT guerrilla forces. Essentially this was "salami slicing" - breaking up the larger KMT forces into much smaller packages. The regular CPC footprint was generally kept to the minimum required to defeat the KMT forces which opposed them.

2. Once phase 1 succeeded, political cadres were deployed to the secured area - standard stuff: armed propaganda (including targeted assasinations), political agitation of the masses, development of local defense forces, etc. The number of political cadres was close to the number of regular forces (e.g., one instance of ~40K regulars with ~30K political cadres). Nice to have political commissars as the political struggle intensifies.

3. Once phase 2 succeeded (which also involved some "salami slicing"), the effort passed to what we would call a law enforcement effort along gendarmerie lines, where kill became subsidiary to capture and convert - the ChiComs being big on "re-education".

This was an indigenous effort. As to it working in Astan, it would have to be an effort by the Astan National Security Forces. You can judge whether that would be feasible under present and reasonably into the future conditions.

PS: When the Taliban captured Kabul in the 90s, their effort was very much conventional warfare - in Astan terms.

A List of Chinese battles (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Chinese_battles#Modern_China).

Regards to all - interesting posts

Mike

PS - to BW: I too noticed the correlation between Karzai's mammoth vote totals and the "Taliban" areas as I was compiling his provincial totals (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=83665&postcount=422). Don't know what (if anything - see last quote in my signature) to make of that. It is interesting to speculate on what Karzai really wants as his vision of a future Astan.

Pol-Mil FSO

10-03-2009, 09:23 PM

I have to disagree with the contention that the Taliban are basically no different from any other insurgent group in past history. I believe that T.X. Hammes is on to something, especially his point about what he labels as the "generational" mismatch between the two sides in a conflict.

The Taliban have clearly evolved from the period during which they ruled most of Afghanistan. Not just on the military side, with the migration of TTPs from other conflicts and the linking up with international jihadists, but also on the political and psychological sides. Two examples that I'll cite: 1) after the Paris donor conference in June 2008, the civilians in the Kandahar PRT were passed a copy of critical Taliban talking points on PowerPoint slides. The points were extremely well written, to the point that they almost seemed to have been drafted by an NGO with deep experience in Afghanistan. In the pre-2001 Taliban regime I don't think that any Taliban official would have even known about this conference, cared about it, or had the education to effectively criticize it. These Taliban talking points drew a "wow" from the PRT political officers but there seemed to be little if any interest in them from ISAF, at least at the RC-South level. 2) In 2008, Canadian officials discovered that at least half of the National Solidarity Program projects in Zhari District in Kandahar Province had apparently been compromised by the Taliban. In some cases the money was reportedly being turned over to the Taliban once it got out to the field and in other cases the funding was being diverted at the bank account level. This from a program that is considered one of the great development success stories in Afghanistan. However, it now seems to be dawning on people, thanks in large part to a September 2009 media report on globalpost.com, that the Taliban have infiltrated the entire aid disbursement process and are receiving substantial funding from foreign assistance for Afghanistan. It reminds me of stories I've heard about the FARC insurgents in Colombia stopping people at roadblocks and using laptops to verify their financial status.

Getting back to T.X. Hammes' point about a generational mismatch, I like to use the following joke: What would happen if Mullah Omar and COMISAF put out edicts to their subordinates to compose a piece of music? In the Taliban case, they would round up some musicians and tell them to write a piece of music. It probably wouldn't be very sophisticated, but it would be done quickly and would be recognizable as music. On the other hand, if the ISAF staff was given this tasking, the first thing they would do is to create several cells of at least 25-50 officers each. One cell would analyze the history of music composition, one cell would analyze the structure of musical notes, another cell the psychological effects of music, etc. After several weeks of exhaustive work the staff would deliver several alternatives to the commander, none of which would be recognizable as music, at least not to Afghans. I think the Taliban is inside the ISAF OODA loop, and not just in the IO area.

Steve the Planner

10-03-2009, 09:31 PM

Pol Mil:

Your description triggered a nightmare image of the meeting where the, no doubt, 100 slide powerpoint was haggled down to a final form for presentation.

Race horse designed by committee?

Steve

Pol-Mil FSO

10-03-2009, 10:05 PM

Steve:

I think the decision brief would be slimmed down to 40 slides with 150 back up slides.:wry:

Steve the Planner

10-03-2009, 11:02 PM

Right, but only after days of fiery debate. Not to mention an endless effort to add just one more bullet point to the slides (How small can we make the text and still call it a power point? 6 pt?

Steve

Bill Moore

10-04-2009, 04:38 AM

Posted by Pol-Mil FSO:

I have to disagree with the contention that the Taliban are basically no different from any other insurgent group in past history. I believe that T.X. Hammes is on to something, especially his point about what he labels as the "generational" mismatch between the two sides in a conflict.

The insurgents in Afghanistan are using standard fare insurgent tactics that have been tried and tested by many other insurgent groups over the years. Insurgencies are a form of political warfare and the two examples you listed as new are in fact very old, and reinforce GEN McCrystal's observations.

Insurgents have used talking points throughout history, this is part of the political mobilization process. The only thing new now is that they can propagate their talking points to a global audience through the cyber medium. The fact that insurgents use talking points shouldn't surprise anyone. The point that they were sophisticated perhaps indicates that the PRT really doesn't know their enemy at all, thus they underestimated them?

In 2008, Canadian officials discovered that at least half of the National Solidarity Program projects in Zhari District in Kandahar Province had apparently been compromised by the Taliban.

GEN McCrystal addressed this issue in his assessment, and it high time we wake up to the reality of this type of warfare. Our focus generally tends to be on the overt guerrilla warfare piece, while the enemy's main effort is actually focused on political organization (normally clandestine at first) so they can establish control of the populace (that key terrain we're both fighting over). Of course the insurgents are going to attempt to: infiltrate our programs, influence elections, establish shadow governments and courts, etc. IMO opinion our intelligence completely misses the boat on this, because they are largely focused on finding combatants (IED cells for example). While that must be done, if you only recognize the combatants as the enemy, you are missing the focus on the more important aspects of this conflict, because you're ignoring the enemy's underground political structure. So once again, I offer that the PRT's surprise shouldn't have been a surprise at all.

Bernard Fall wrote an article (sorry, I only have a hard copy, and I can't find it at the moment) about communist subversion in Vietnam and noted that the Americans frequently underestimated the amount of control the communists actually had over the people in various villages because they were using the wrong metrics (I'm paraphrasing). He suggested asking the people who they pay their taxes to (the VC or the government) and who appoints their teachers to determine who was actually in control. We need to ask the same type of questions, such as if an Afghan in this village commits a crime, who will punish him? If the answer is Taliban run Shari'a courts, then the government doesn't have control (or they have incomplete control).

I'm an advocate for refocusing our counterintelligence personnel on rooting out this type of infiltration instead of looking for IED cells. Not a popular opinion, but we have other personnel who can track down the IED cells.

Getting back to T.X. Hammes' point about a generational mismatch, I like to use the following joke: What would happen if Mullah Omar and COMISAF put out edicts to their subordinates to compose a piece of music? In the Taliban case, they would round up some musicians and tell them to write a piece of music. It probably wouldn't be very sophisticated, but it would be done quickly and would be recognizable as music. On the other hand, if the ISAF staff was given this tasking, the first thing they would do is to create several cells of at least 25-50 officers each. One cell would analyze the history of music composition, one cell would analyze the structure of musical notes, another cell the psychological effects of music, etc. After several weeks of exhaustive work the staff would deliver several alternatives to the commander, none of which would be recognizable as music, at least not to Afghans. I think the Taliban is inside the ISAF OODA loop, and not just in the IO area.

Well said, and what you're describing can be called "skilled incompetence". I just read about this in an article/study on DoD's failure to rapidly adjust to the IED threat.

http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA502129&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf

In short it involves skilled personnel making decisions using routine systems/processes (doctrinal systems for example), while completely missing the context of the problem, thus skilled personnel frequently come up with incompetent solutions, which is what your joke implied. Too bad we're so hamstrung by our doctrine and bureaucratic procedures. In a free market system, you would ask your 18-22 y/o kids in the units to work with their Afghan partners to write songs, and they wouldn't be tested by our staff or approved by the Ambassador, but rather by the market (the Afghan people). The songs that are popular will spread widely, the ones that don't hunt will flop. We know how to do this in the real world, but once you enter the U.S. military and other U.S. government organizations decision making process you almost enter a level of control similiar to the communist system. Control is perceived to be more important than results. Anyway, my two cents.

William F. Owen

10-04-2009, 06:11 AM

1That is my point to?! the Talban are not any different. The evolution part as it relates to Mao is that it is not going to be necessary to have a formal uniformed military force to achieve your objectives.
Well nor did the Irish in 1921, the Jews in Palestine in 1948, or Castro in Cuba. Again, not new. I see no evolution.

2-I don't understand all this IW,UW,FID,COIN stuff it is all the same to me. My definition of Guerrilla Warfare or Irregular warfare comes the SOE Syllabus on Irregular Warfare (declassified and for sale in the UK don't have a link; linked added: http://www.amazon.com/SOE-SYLLABUS-Lessons-Ungentlemanly-Warfare/dp/190336518X and not cheap).

Concur and thank you for the link.

Irregular warfare has 3 objectives, to achieve control of the Political, Economic and Military functions of the target Country/area. The methods are propaganda, sabotage,espionage,passive Resistance,secret armies and Political-Military uprisings.
OK, so how does Irregular Warfare differ from regular in terms of "objectives."

My differentiation of Regular and Irregular is the Classical "Small Wars" construct of one or more parties to the conflict, not being Regular Military Force.

Bill Moore

10-04-2009, 08:02 AM

Posted by JMM,

is that "irregular threats" can be disruptive and deadly; but they generally are not existential, unless they can reach the winning conventional phase (which requires them to either develop adequate conventional forces, Mao and Giap; or link-up with external conventional forces - the end game in old FM 31-21). Apparently, the intel folks in Bob's shop would disagree (are they in the mindset that we are akin to the Cuban Batista regime, which did fall without a conventional military phase ?).

It might be more accurate to state the insurgents will adapt whatever strategy is required to achieve their objectives, than state that they have to resort to "conventional" warfare. Conventional warfare simplifies the nature of the conflict to a conflict between opposing military forces (rarely is any conflict confined to such simple terms, but especially not this one), but this is a war focused on winning control of the populace (coerced or otherwise). I don't believe Mao called it conventional war, but rather something along the line of war of movement, or the strategic offensive phase. The intent of the phase is to defeat the remaining military forces and establish political control, if you execute too early you get your butt handed to you (e.g. the Tet offensive). Where Mao may have been more effective than we are in general (in this type of war) is that his military and political apparatus were largely integrated (one organization). On the other hand we're still struggling with how to make our interagency process work. In the mean time we attempt to separate the military from the political approach. It shouldn't be a surprise that our influence operations are so flawed.

Getting back to your question, do BW's analyst's think the insurgents can win without resorting to conventional war? I doubt that BW's analysts are of one mine, but historically I suspect there are more examples than Castro's surprise rise to power where insurgents won without resorting to a so called conventional warfare phase.

They can wage two types of strategies (or three if they combine the two) where conventional warfare isn't necessary. The first is to wage a war of attrition (simply create an unacceptable level of casualties). Second, they can wage an exhaustion strategy, which is focused on depriving the enemy of the resources he needs to continue the fight (Sherman's March). In theory, in some irregular warfare scenarios it is feasible that the insurgents could isolate the governing power from local and international support. I have no idea if this is the Taliban's plan, but from the limited reading I have done on this conflict it appears that the Taliban is waging a war of attrition against the U.S. and ISAF, which if effective will enable a strategy of exhaustion against Karzai's government (if he is cut off from substantial international aid).

Like many here I sometimes have a hard time distinguishing the sometime blurry lines between COIN, UW, IW, regular warfare etc., because most conflicts don't fit nicely into any one box. I generally find those who argue hardest about a particular definition are not the warriors on point, but rather the resource staffers who are attempting to protect their organization's interests. Perhaps a necessary evil in our system, but in the end it probably does more harm than good.

Recent history in simple terms (experts on this conflict please correct me if I'm wrong):

"various" Afghan insurgent movements with substantial support from numerous countries defeated the Soviets waging an attrition strategy against the Soviets.

then the groups were no longer unified, but the strongest tribe (the Taliban with support from Pakistan) shifted gears and waged a war of exhaustion against the government left in place, and since the Soviets cut off the support required, they couldn't hold the line, much like us pulling the rug out from underneath the S. Vietnamese.

The final fighting was pretty much peer to peer fighting (rather than truly pitched conventional battles). I'm not aware of any real large battles at this point?

When we first entered Afghanistan late 2001 in response to 9/11 we waged a hybrid of UW and conventional warfare. The Taliban and Northern Alliance were pretty much peer competitors at this point of the conflict, but the fire power we brought to bear on the enemy (conventional) quickly changed the calculation.

After the Taliban large maneuver forces were ousted they resorted to insurgent tactics against our occupation and then against Karzai's government. I believe with ample support from foreign donors.

If we're not careful we risk repeating history, if the world pulls out it will be very difficult for the current government to hold against an insurgent movement with substantial external support.

That's a long answer to your question, but the answer is "yes" it is possible to win without resorting to large scale conventional fighting if the government forces are not motivated to fight. Is it likely? Don't know.

Fuchs

10-04-2009, 08:14 AM

I wonder why the idea that guerrillas need to go conventional to win on their own persists.

Unconventional warfare have proved its ability to restrict conventional forces - even into their bases.

Unconventional warfare has also proved its ability to cause mass desertion (break the enemy's will) at least among domestic conventional opponents.

There's no need for going conventional if you can gain control of 95% of the country and destroy conventional opfor without.

Bob's World

10-04-2009, 09:28 AM

I suspect our heavily doctrinal approach to sequential phases for operations causes us to mirror image that onto Mao's three phases. The key is to understand the fundamental principles of insurgent warfare, but to always remember that there are no rules, no timelines, no movement sequentially through phases. Success can occur in any phase for the insurgent, and he is always seeking success, not the next phase.

The phase just helps understand what he is doing to succeed, not what he must do next to succeed.

Good COIN is like good yard work. No matter how great your yard looks on Saturday afternoon when you've just "finished" and put your tools away, it will start to look ragged in a few days without constant maintenance. It is not a failure of the yard that causes this to occur, it is the nature of things. One can blame the sun, the rain or invading insects, but they too are part of the natural process that one is attempting to "control" through their gardening efforts. Virtually every Gardener understands this, yet virtually every politician for some reason does not.

Here is a chart I've put together that tries to capture the essence of what I believe to be the essence of insurgency:

William F. Owen

10-04-2009, 09:45 AM

Good COIN is like good yard work. No matter how great your yard looks on Saturday afternoon when you've just "finished" and put your tools away, it will start to look ragged in a few days without constant maintenance.

So again the Governance stuff? Defence is good yard work, so is politics. Politics is the root cause of conflict. You can get "insurgencies" caused by any brand of politics that can be advanced by violent means. - same as any war.

Bob's World

10-04-2009, 10:16 AM

So again the Governance stuff? Defence is good yard work, so is politics. Politics is the root cause of conflict. You can get "insurgencies" caused by any brand of politics that can be advanced by violent means. - same as any war.

The advancement of politics is rarely the problem, as a wide range of political beliefs and perspectives are advanced every day in every country. Again, it is the nature of things.

It is the "failure" of the existing governance in some important way, like a break in one's skin, that allows such an advancement of politics to invade an otherwise healthy governmental/popular body; and left untreated it will fester and spread. Without that break in the skin, most such advancements cause no harm. Do you blame the virus when you have a cut that gets infected? Do you attempt to defeat the source of the virus? Or do you blame yourself for not being wise, or diligent enough to do the basic things that one knows they must do to avoid infection, or once infected, to address one's own body in such a way as to defeat the infection and repair the breach that allowed it in in the first place.

"Small Wars Journal" is a catchy name, but it is also a horrible misnomer that may lead many to think that wars are differentiated by their size and not by their nature. Insurgency has a unique nature that must be understood and addressed that has nothing to do with size. A conventional conflict can be very small or very large, same with insurgency; yet both are very different in nature for all of their often similar qualities and appearances. Likewise, the presence of violence is not the key distinction either. Violence is like the infection, it lets you know you have a problem, and it will kill you if you do not treat it quickly and properly. But understanding the cause of the infection is essential to determining the proper treatment and preventing future episodes of the same.

Bob's World

10-04-2009, 10:36 AM

In the introduction to "Low Intensity Operations," Frank Kitson wisely noted that "In writing on this subject, the most difficult problems concerns the matter of terminology."

He specifically then went on to address the logic behind his approach to such internal, populace-based conflicts in a state, distinguishing first between those aimed at "...overthrow those governing the country at the time, or to force them to do things they do not want to do." (Subversion and Insurgency); vice similar appearing popular movements aimed at " ...a protest against the actions of some non-government body, or possibly as a demonstration of solidarity with a group or cause elsewhere in the world." (Internal Security Operations)

To ease discussions of the first situation, he broke a continuum of action into two parts, using the "use of armed force" as the dividing line between Subversion and Insurgency. On the chart I offer to the SWJ community for consideration, this is where one moves from Phase 0 to Phase 1.

My concern with Kitson's approach, while I agree with his logic, is that it leads some to see subversion and insurgency as different things, rather than as different stages or manifestations of the same thing.

I can provide the full paragraph, and it is definitely worth sharing, but my dogs are informing me that they need to go outside, and I want to take care of that before they advance to insurgency... :)

William F. Owen

10-04-2009, 11:14 AM

"Small Wars Journal" is a catchy name, but it is also a horrible misnomer that may lead many to think that wars are differentiated by their size and not by their nature. Insurgency has a unique nature that must be understood and addressed that has nothing to do with size.
Well if I were King, "Small Wars" would be "All Wars." - maybe it's a good thing I am not! :wry:
However, I find "small" useful, IF uniquely associated with irregular forces, and thus irregular warfare. Irregular warfare is not defined by the policy it is seeking to advance. - merely by the nature of who is doing the advancing. - Thus "Insurgency" as a description relates the political nature of what is being attempted. I am by no means sure that this qualifies it as unique or distinct.

He specifically then went on to address the logic behind his approach to such internal, populace-based conflicts in a state, distinguishing first between those aimed at "...overthrow those governing the country at the time, or to force them to do things they do not want to do." (Subversion and Insurgency); vice similar appearing popular movements aimed at " ...a protest against the actions of some non-government body, or possibly as a demonstration of solidarity with a group or cause elsewhere in the world." (Internal Security Operations)
OK, but how does that help? Seems to me that you mostly have both on-going at the same time. Strangely UK operations in Ulster were deemed ISO and not COIN. Context? Definitions?

To ease discussions of the first situation, he broke a continuum of action into two parts, using the "use of armed force" as the dividing line between Subversion and Insurgency.
With which I am very happy and where I began (though I did not know it at time) 25 years ago.

I can provide the full paragraph, and it is definitely worth sharing, but my dogs are informing me that they need to go outside, and I want to take care of that before they advance to insurgency...
Ahhh.... Dogs = Simple Insurgency. Wives = Complex Insurgency.

Ken White

10-04-2009, 04:54 PM

Bob's World, I think you're the only Attorney I know who's an absolutist... :D

Here are two bullets from your chart above:
Any effort that targets violence but not poor governance will produce a temporal effect.

Any effort that targets poor governance will produce enduring peace.By temporal, I suppose you mean a transient time less than eternity, thus I can agree with the first item as that time could be from days to centuries...

The second time, OTOH, is quite difficult to accept -- you can 'change' the governance to suit one generation and that new model may not suit the next generation -- or new immigrants, a significant economic change, fomentation by neighbors or others. I do not believe you can assert enduring peace without qualifiers.
""Small Wars Journal" is a catchy name, but it is also a horrible misnomer that may lead many to think that wars are differentiated by their size and not by their nature."Have to agree with Wilf, war's war. Small Wars as an indicator of amount of effort applied should make you a happy camper -- your prescription is for just that, Small Wars to preclude big ones. :wry:
My concern with Kitson's approach, while I agree with his logic, is that it leads some to see subversion and insurgency as different things, rather than as different stages or manifestations of the same thing.Perhaps but what if you fix the problem at the subversion level and thus preclude the insurgency? Ala your example of the Civil Rights Bill? :D

Bob's World

10-04-2009, 05:22 PM

As Kitson said, much of the debate lies in the definitions...

By "temporal", I mean that all one has accomplished is create a strategic pause while the festering causation regenerates whatever the "defeated" elements are to the subversion/insurgency. Could be more fighters must be recruited or even born and raised; or a new ideology; or new leadership. Like the weeds in ones poorly maintained garden, all you have to do is do nothing, and these things will emerge naturally.

By enduring, I mean that you have done the hard work to establish your garden, and with committed continued diligence in recognition that this is a job that is never over, you have enduring peace. Clearly the enduring effort of the governance must evolve along with it's populace or it will begin once again "to fail" / become "poor governance" and the seeds of subversion will find root yet again. To assume that what worked 50 years ago will work today, even with the same populace is a bad assumption indeed.

And yes, it is very popular to see all warfare as warfare. It is also historical fact that insurgent warfare is long and drawn out, and more often dosed with temporal suppression of the militant arm every few years for this very fact. I recognize this, but reject it. It is time to evolve and become more efficient counterinsurgents by holding our civil leaders to the ownership of both the prevention and the cure as the core of their day to day duties.

But we will never get there so long as those of us who are supposed to understand warfare the most pay more attention to what the media, politicians and academia tells us than what we can learn quite well from our own engagement and study. It seems that most are too blinded by what they "know" to see what they must in order to "understand." For example, knowledge born of hard years in Iraq is terrific, but only if it is applied toward a larger understanding of insurgency, not used to define insurgency.

If my role is to be a modern day Don Quixote on this mission, I'm comfortable with that; because to paraphrase much of the senior leadership in DoD "Some windmills just need killing." :)

Bill Moore

10-04-2009, 05:42 PM

"Small Wars Journal" is a catchy name, but it is also a horrible misnomer that may lead many to think that wars are differentiated by their size and not by their nature. Insurgency has a unique nature that must be understood and addressed that has nothing to do with size. A conventional conflict can be very small or very large, same with insurgency; yet both are very different in nature for all of their often similar qualities and appearances. Likewise, the presence of violence is not the key distinction either. Violence is like the infection, it lets you know you have a problem, and it will kill you if you do not treat it quickly and properly. But understanding the cause of the infection is essential to determining the proper treatment and preventing future episodes of the same.

You captured my concerns about the phrase "small wars" perfectly. It also leads to what GEN McCrystal has called a "culture of poverty" in our response, because we understand the scale of the conflict. A tip of the hat to you.

However, I suspect by your last sentence you mean the government has failed the people, thus the proper treatment is good government. There are many historical examples to support this argument, but like others I believe you're too much of an absolutist on this theory. Until convinced otherwise I'm convinced that a reasonably successful government can experience insurgencies. Hostile parties to the government can engage in subversion through propaganda to create the illusion of bad government, while at the same time using coercion to rally support. The insurgents have no intention of ruling more effectively, they simply want to rule. One size doesn't fit all, you wrote that above, but I don't think you mean it. :D

Bob's World

10-04-2009, 05:47 PM

"Temporal" occurs when just addressing the insurgent and not the poor governance that gave rise to him. It in effect, pushes the plot of the populace straight down in a reduction of violence, with no corresponding reduction in material poor governance. As soon as this artificial suppression is lifted (the end of the Tito regime in Yugoslavia; the removal of Saddam in Iraq, etc) the populace pops straight up into its "natural" state of insurgency.

For "enduring" both the poor governance and the insurgent are addressed together, pushing the plot of the populace down the inclined axis, into phase 0, where it then must be constantly tended to to keep it there.

While I do not recommend it, one could also ignore the insurgency and simply address poor governance, the violence will linger, but ultimately fade away along with it purpose for existing in the first place.

Best, however, to address both together; but probably better to not engage the violent actor at all then to employ to much state violence against ones own populace in the pursuit of ending the illegal violence. Best to error on the side of too little state violence than too much.

Ken White

10-04-2009, 09:42 PM

And yes, it is very popular to see all warfare as warfare.Not a question of popular, it's just reality. If it's violent, it's war, if not, it's something else.
It is also historical fact that insurgent warfare is long and drawn out, and more often dosed with temporal suppression of the militant arm every few years for this very fact. I recognize this, but reject it.So do I. Have rejected it and fought it for over 50 years -- hasn't done a whole lot of good.
It is time to evolve and become more efficient counterinsurgents by holding our civil leaders to the ownership of both the prevention and the cure as the core of their day to day duties.That's why it hasn't done any good... :mad:

Two problems with that last. First, while the smack at the Politicians is well aimed, deserved and highlights a much needed change; our -- the military -- performance also needs to be improved considerably by rejecting some old dogma and adopting a more comprehensive education and training program. The Armed Forces -- all -- are far from blameless in this mess...

Secondly, the US in particular has a significant problem due to its governmental structure and processes has and will have difficulty implementing the changes, civil and military, you desire -- until your strategy addresses that impediment, there will be little if any improvement.
But we will never get there so long as those of us who are supposed to understand warfare the most pay more attention to what the media, politicians and academia tells us than what we can learn quite well from our own engagement and study...Amen! It simply requires doing what's right instead of what's expedient or what someone says 'the Boss wants.' Bosses who say stupid things are part of the problem but most of 'em have someone nearby who's supposed to keep them from stepping on their string too often... :wry:

Failure comes when the watchers do not tell the Emperor/Empress he or she forgot his or her shorts.

That's part of the military problem, people unwilling to speak truth to power; the civil problem is more complex because Congress is deeply involved; they have impacts on many things and too often not at all favorably.
If my role is to be a modern day Don Quixote on this mission, I'm comfortable with that; because to paraphrase much of the senior leadership in DoD "Some windmills just need killing." :)Yes they do; having slew a few, I'm for Don Q in all his manifestations. Just that there are really a lot of windmills and best to kill the ones that most need killing, those whose death offers the most benefit...

slapout9

10-04-2009, 10:09 PM

Again, not new. I see no evolution.

No it is not new. Mao was just my start point. For a better explanation of evolution read TX's book "The Sling And The Stone" he traces it out rather well I think.

slapout9

10-04-2009, 10:12 PM

OK, so how does Irregular Warfare differ from regular in terms of "objectives."

My differentiation of Regular and Irregular is the Classical "Small Wars" construct of one or more parties to the conflict, not being Regular Military Force.

1-It doesn't it is the methods that are different.

2-The problem with the classic definition is both(more) parties could all be Irregular.

slapout9

10-04-2009, 10:22 PM

Where Mao may have been more effective than we are in general (in this type of war) is that his military and political apparatus were largely integrated (one organization). On the other hand we're still struggling with how to make our interagency process work. In the mean time we attempt to separate the military from the political approach. It shouldn't be a surprise that our influence operations are so flawed.

Hi Bill, exactly! add to that a "department of criminal revenue raising":wry: and you have a strong, survivable,tough organization.

slapout9

10-04-2009, 10:33 PM

My concern with Kitson's approach, while I agree with his logic, is that it leads some to see subversion and insurgency as different things, rather than as different stages or manifestations of the same thing.

Absolutley! that also applies to a lot of gangs and criminal organizations.

William F. Owen

10-05-2009, 06:41 AM

No it is not new. Mao was just my start point. For a better explanation of evolution read TX's book "The Sling And The Stone" he traces it out rather well I think.
Read the book. Argued with the author. 4GW is a forcing mechanism, that is very comfortable with poor history, and some evidence free statements.

1-It doesn't it is the methods that are different.

2-The problem with the classic definition is both(more) parties could all be Irregular.
1. OK. That makes sense.
2. That's not a problem. It's still Irregular warfare, as in the Congo.

Steve the Planner

10-05-2009, 01:48 PM

Bob:

Your point on the direct relationship between governance and conflict is right, but I take exception to the good vs. poor construct. I think the right construct is effective vs. ineffective, with the caveat that there are some very effective and stable governments that are neither good, nor just in our sense of the term.

Still, we are back to the weakest link...our civilian effort.

In Baghdad in May 2008, some of the biggest civilian noise was about "budget execution." We had worked to jam through the Iraqi local/provincial governments a raft of "projects" (schools, clinics, etc...) which the Iraqis would not execute.

In May, I attended an Iraqi national planning conference where the story was, in fact completely different, and in so many ways, logical from their perspective.

First, we brought a Div-level military governance LTC with us so that he could see the arguments and issues. They were very nice and diplomatic to him, thanking him for his service and interest, but emphatic that they could not have a uniformed soldier in the conference. They got him earphones, and set him up in the lobby of Al-Rasheed with coffee, snacks etc. He and everybody else understood, but the barrier between military and civilian self-rule has it's inherent limitations.

Second, like most conferences, the work really gets done on the formal and informal level.

On the formal level, what was going on was "reinstatement" of the well-known and well-established Iraqi process for submitting projects through ministries for national consideration based on a clear and coherent criteria, and supporting documents. If a school project was requested, it had to be supported by convincing demographics, with recommended siting, staffing and cost issues (Having spent years in state processes in the US, the process is the same as used everywhere by government professionals).

On the informal level, there were two pronounced issues. One was that the project lists flowing from the provinces were, in many instances, incompetent, unnecessary and wasteful (Sounds like the Special Investigator for Iraq's conclusion, too.) Two was that Iraq's national treasure and future should not be squandered on these projects, which, in many ways, were viewed as the locus, if not cause, of widespread corruption.

So here were listening to serious Iraqi technocrats arguing the exact defects that many understand, yet, arguing, debating and resolving a way forward, grounded in their prior formal processes for project review based on specific project justification---similar to that used in the US. The sentiment was that using these formal processes was the only way to break the back of corruption, and restore focus and sanity to a national reconstruction future.

We can continue to argue that Iraqis are corrupt and unable to execute, but there is an alternative explanation. Maybe, by ignoring their historical processes, we opened a Pandora's Box of corruption and ineffectiveness, and the bad guys (institutional forces to delay our projects) actually had some sound reasons for their actions. Better to stop or delay stupid projects to use the money later (after the American influence is gone).

Without dispute, Afghanistan's processes are totally different than Iraq's but grounded in their own well-established processes. Once you break out of them, you get either tremendous waste, fraud and ineffectiveness, or, like Iraq, you get well-intended people trying to stop them for good reasons (they are not projects consistent with "Afghan" interests and processes).

If the measure is effective governance, the question is whether we try to promote and enhance what they have and do, or whether we try to change things (nation-building?). (Recipient vs. Participant).

I get the sense that we are not, to date, effectively engaging them, but that if all of our independent "projects" played out, there would be no more effectiveness, and perhaps, less.

Whether we like it or not, it is a very big leap between ineffective and effective governance, and there is not much history of us "creating" effectiveness where it did not exist before.

But governance is a key.

Steve

Bob's World

10-05-2009, 03:22 PM

Steve,

I very intentionally adopted the "Good/Poor" Governance over "Effective/Ineffective" Governance to attempt to highlight the critical difference between the two.

In fact, my biggest concern with the current approach proposed for AFG. is that it is rooted in the belief and committed to a heavy US effort of producing "Effective" Governance.

While "Poor Governance" (see my two-part test) is likely often to be a sub-set of "Ineffective Governance," the fact remains that Ineffectiveness of itself does not produce insurgency, nor will the creation of Effectiveness defeat or prevent insurgency.

Often populaces with incredibly ineffective governance (like say, Bangladesh) are relatively stable because from the perspective of the populace they have "good governance."

Or, as in the American Revolution or Civil Rights movement; you can have incredibly effective governance, and yet if some distinct segment of that effectively governed populace perceives that it is experiencing "poor governance (intolerable conditions to them, and no legitimate recourse to address) you have causation for insurgency; requiring only motivation (ideology, leadership, key event, etc) to light the spark and set it in motion.

As Americans you can't help but see the ineffectiveness of governance in the countries where we show up to help deal with that nation's insurgency. I know it is incredibly difficult to see the forest for the trees, so to speak. We also tend to use a "made in the USA" ruler to measure and assess what is broken and how it needs to be fixed.

The wildcard, is that by over-engaging, not only are we possibly not even addressing the "right" issues as we expend ourselves addressing such huge problems; we also reinforce the perceptions of US legitimacy over the HN government, which then adds us to the target list of any insurgent movement that is out to change that governance.

By taking a smarter, more tailored, less invasive approach, I believe we get closer to achieving the ends we seek. This gets to the difference in the "Populace-Centric" approach that I have written about and the "Population-Centric" approach promoted by CNAS and currently in vogue with our senior leaders.

My model simply recognizes that the populace is the enduring element in any state, and that we should focus our engagement with their government to force/enable evolution of governance to better support the populace. Population-Centric seems to be far more on supporting the government, making it more effective in servicing and controlling the populace. I just don't think the latter approach will work, and it makes it very risky that we get too tied to a new crop of "friendly dictators" that at the end of the day we'd rather not be associated with. Stick with the populace, and work with whatever and whoever they put in power.

This requires us to give up some control over the process; which is critical, but we hate to not control what we know we have the ability to control. The question becomes do we have the right to control.

Cold War containment was rooted in exerting control around the periphery; so we have a habit of seeing this as both natural and the right thing to do, I just think it is far less valid in today's environment, and far less appropriate to today's threats.

(Sorry for the long, rambling reply, but I am working on several other things, so this was just a quick burst)

davidbfpo

10-05-2009, 06:31 PM

A German authored report on Afghanistan, from a new think tank (est. May 2009), the author has worked in country too and on a quick skim a good read: http://www.aan-afghanistan.org/index.asp?id=114

From the site:

In this first Afghanistan Analysts Network (AAN) report “The Other Side: Dimensions of the Afghan Insurgency. Causes, Actors and Approaches to Talks”, author Thomas Ruttig – an Afghanistan expert working on and in the country since 25 years – seeks to unpack the complexities of the insurgency in Afghanistan and develop a sophisticated approach to ‘talks with the Taliban’.

The report shows that the insurgency is not just ‘terrorist’. Many fighters are driven by internal Afghan problems: bad governance, alienation and an increasing sense of occupation. Amongst the Taleban, as the insurgency’s core, there are pragmatic elements. There is an internal debate and some Taleban look for a political solution.

The report recommends to explore how contacts can be developed without compromising progress made in Afghanistan since 2001. The international community needs to urge the Afghan government to take the lead in a coordinated and consistent strategy of ‘talks’ and reconciliation efforts. This strategy must include: options for outreach to all components of the insurgency; the establishment of ‘red lines’ (or principles of engagement) for negotiations; viable mechanisms that sustainably and honourably can absorb and integrate reconciled individuals and groups socially and politically. It needs to be embedded in increased efforts to enhance good governance at the national and sub-national levels in Afghanistan and working with Pakistan. All policies should be informed by the acknowledgement that Islamic terrorism cannot effectively be fought through alliances with Islamist extremists and corrupt politicians.

davidbfpo

jmm99

10-05-2009, 07:59 PM

for the link to the AAN "Tabiban Report (http://www.aan-afghanistan.org/uploads/200907%20AAN%20Report%20Ruttig%20-%20The%20Other%20Side.PDF)", which does answer in part COL Jones' question asked here (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=83756&postcount=447):

I would be curious though to see what percentage of the insurgent populace believes that their primary objective is the removal of the Americans and their allied military presence?

While the report has no quantitative metrics, it does address the question in a qualitative manner.

Other than motivations and objectives (which seem to vary), I found these snips interesting.

p.10

Organisationally, the insurgency is segmented and consists of seven armed structures: the Islamic Movement of the Taleban, the networks of the Haqqani and Mansur families in the South-East, the Tora Bora Jehad Front (De Tora Bora Jehadi Mahaz) led by Anwar-ul-Haq Mujahed in Nangrahar (Eastern region), HIG, small Salafi groups in Kunar and Nuristan provinces (Eastern region) [28] and, as a new phenomenon, a number of not inter-related local exmujahedin groups that (or whose historical leaders) had been pushed out of power, are taking up arms and starting to adopt Taleban-like language and behaviour.

[28] Official name (Society for the Invitation to Quran and Sunna). This group already established an Islamic mini-state in Nuristan in the 1980s. Its current leader Haji Rohullah joined the post-2001 process but was later arrested and detained in Guantanamo. It is registered as a political party in Kabul.

This may place the current events in Nuristan (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=8577) in a better perspective.

and:

p.14

Structurally, the Taleban can be described as a model of concentric circles. There at least three circles around a core that mainly consists of a small number of commanders around Mulla Omar that joined the movement early on and are mainly from the South, most of them ideologically motivated former mujahedin commanders with a basic religious education: (1) an inner ring of fighters that follow those ‘Kandahari’ and other commanders and are mainly recruited from their own tribes; (2) around that, a ring of indoctrinated madrassa students (the ‘original’ taleban) and foreign jehadis who are the rank-and-file fighters; (3) an outer ring of marginalized Pashtun tribesmen with local grievances, loyalties and interests (the majburi and ‘anti-corruption Taleban’) as well as hired fighters who join because of unemployment and poverty.

Slap may find this interesting.

Ski

10-06-2009, 04:19 AM

There is an excellent book by Stathis Kalvas called The Logic of Violence in Civil War. It was one of the first books we read in SAMS this year. I highly recommend it to use a potential framework for Afghanistan and Pakistan wars and how they are being conducted.

It doesn't hold all the answers, no theory or book is capable of such a thing, however, it may help you understand the war(s) in Afghanistan.

(Added)Links: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Logic_of_Violence_in_Civil_War and http://www.amazon.com/Violence-Cambridge-Studies-Comparative-Politics/dp/0521670047

Bill Moore

10-06-2009, 05:32 PM

Posted by BW's
As Americans you can't help but see the ineffectiveness of governance in the countries where we show up to help deal with that nation's insurgency. I know it is incredibly difficult to see the forest for the trees, so to speak. We also tend to use a "made in the USA" ruler to measure and assess what is broken and how it needs to be fixed.

The wildcard, is that by over-engaging, not only are we possibly not even addressing the "right" issues as we expend ourselves addressing such huge problems; we also reinforce the perceptions of US legitimacy over the HN government, which then adds us to the target list of any insurgent movement that is out to change that governance.

http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=7237

Definition:
Good governance is characterised by participation, transparency, accountability, rule of law, effectiveness, equity, etc.

Context:
Good governance refers to the management of government in a manner that is essentially free of abuse and corruption, and with due regard for the rule of law.

IMF, 2007, Manual on Fiscal Transparency, IMF, Washington DC, Glossary.

While agreed good governance by this definition would take the wind out of the sails of many conflicts (but not all, it still doesn't the reality of intolerance and hate), how in the world do "we" enable another country to achieve this? This seems to be the essence of your population-centric argument. Is there is a historical record that supports the argument that outside intervention can facilitate this? If this isn't possible, then does the our current COIN doctrine fall flat? Assuming we're focused more on U.S. interests, does the investment in a COIN approach justify the expense?

Granted the answer could vary case by case, but there seems to be school of thought out there that we need to conduct global FID/COIN. If it takes several billion dollars a year to address the good goverance problems in Afghanistan, then it is reasonable to assume that the "current" approach is not feasible on a global scale. What are the realistic alternatives?

Bob's World

10-06-2009, 07:24 PM

Bill,

I use the definition for GG and two-part test that I provided earlier in this thread. I realize this is a commonly used term, and probably has many "official" definitions. I would never promote taking on the task of the definition that you provided, as it is the entirety of "Effectiveness" plus "Utopia"! (Even SF couldn't make that happen :))

No, my definition and test trys to narrow this down to what I see as most important to address to have the best shot at defusing the violence in an insurgency and bringing it into phase 0 zone of normal ups and downs.

The key is to use polling of the populace as your primary metrics. Actually, I created a model for for this type of targeting that JSOTF-P has been employing for determing what projects to take on, where, etc for best effect. Coltroup briefed it at the last PASOC. He seemed to be pleased with the results, but you have better data than I do in that regard.

davidbfpo

10-06-2009, 07:55 PM

Bob,

You cited:
The key is to use polling of the populace as your primary metrics. Actually, I created a model for for this type of targeting that JSOTF-P has been employing for determing what projects to take on, where, etc for best effect. Coltroup briefed it at the last PASOC. He seemed to be pleased with the results, but you have better data than I do in that regard.

This question deserves it's own thread and so created on: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=8600

davidbfpo

Steve the Planner

10-07-2009, 01:20 PM

CSIS held an event yesterday with Congressman Adam Smith who laid out a very cogent argument for: Why Afghanistan?

In it, he clearly explains that Afghanistan is a unique environment for AQ training and operations base for a number of reasons. Somalia, Yemen, etc., have AQ but Afghanistan is as close to a home as they have ever had.

http://csis.org/event/congressman-adam-smith-congress-and-afghanistan

One subject I believe he addressed correctly and deeply was the failure of our civilian component. We are not doing development intelligently.

Of course, the lynch pin of Congressman Smith's strategic imperatives, is the need for a credible government partner. Afghan leadership is critical.

Recent disclosures today of the UN vote analysis, gradually leaking out, raise continue to raise questions of substantial vote fraud.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/10/06/AR2009100603816.html

So, how do we get there?

omarali50

10-07-2009, 04:27 PM

I just posted this on another thread, but it looks relevant here:
Lets not forget what the regional stakes are. Being the "biggest tribe" is not just about Afghanistan. In fact, I would submit its not even primarily about Afghanistan. Why is the US IN Afghanistan? Why should the US care who rules Afghanistan and who is the biggest tribe there? I think NOW THAT ITS THERE, one of the big reasons to stay and win is because it shows regional powers who is the biggest tribe. And IF one buys into the whole superpower deal, then that is much more important than showing some small villages who the biggest tribe is. You can see this dynamic in action in Pakistan right now. The Pakistani army has looked at Obama's good hearted wavering on Afghanistan and reached the (probably correct) conclusion that this particular American tribe is outa here in the not too distant future. Hence the reluctance to accept Kerry-Lugar conditionalities about the role of the army in Pakistan AND about Pakistani efforts to use jihadi proxies against India. On both these counts, GHQ now seems to think they can get America to blink (again, I think they may be right; the first has not historically been an American priority, always loved military dictators in third world countries, and the second is India's headache, not America's). The sticking point right now is the "good taliban" (just my guess, I have no inside info) and GHQ may be calculating that if they hold out long enough, Obama will accept the good taliban at least in Eastern-Southern Afghanistan and a few years later the good taliban can take care of the rest of the country, by which time American troops will be gone and no one will care.
Personally, I am not sure this is a correct assessment and even if it is, the net result is going to be a huge disaster for the region (where an American victory would be painful for some egos, but a net positive for the long suffering people of the region). But the american tribe is fast losing credibility and that means that eventually the coming civil war will be fought between India, Pakistan, Iran, Russia and China and their proxies. Thats bad for the region, but if I was an American officer, my main concern would be "If we are not going to win this tribal war and act all superpowerish, then we shouldnt be sacrificing men just to make it look good for a few years". Go in, or get out. NOTE: this is not an endorsement of a particular "surge" or COIN or whatever. I am not an expert on those tactical issues. Whatever works, you guys can sort it out. I am just looking at the forest, not the trees...

Steve the Planner

10-07-2009, 10:18 PM

In a previous message, I cited a CSIS Event with Congressman Adam Smith.

The link takes you to CSIS's Event page.

Looks like "The Jeff Show," a silly cyberterrorist submittal, has overriden the Video link.

You can still use the Download link to get the Congressman's excellent comments.

Cyber terrorism by silly folks. Who knew?

Steve the Planner

10-08-2009, 07:04 PM

OK, so CSIS got punked.

They sent the following:

"Hi Steve,

There was a problem with our host (blip.tv) feed. This has now been fixed.

http://csis.org/event/congressman-adam-smith-congress-and-afghanistan

Sorry for the inconvenience."

When I heard Congressman Smith's presentation (Armed Services/Intel), I thought: "Wow, for the first time, someone has presented the argument for Afghanistan in a simple compelling manner that anyone could understand."

Some here may quibble with points, and he probably could only say half of what he knows, but it was just damned good.

He also addressed the catastrophic civilian reconstruction side: Blunt, conclusive, and no comfort whatsoever to our military colleagues who are clearing over and again because nobody stepped behind then to effectively hold or build. Like he said, post-conflict reconstruction needs to be disengaged from State and placed under NSC along with the funds to support it---to plan and coordinate efforts.

Reasons: It is too important. State has another important mission: State has other important missions---diplomatic. US AID is just a contractor conduit, and doesn't have the expertise.

And he fielded a lot of other good questions, too.

Didn't know him before, but I would vote for him now. Do I have to move to Washington State, though? (I better ask a governance person?)

Steve

Surferbeetle

10-09-2009, 06:58 PM

If the measure is effective governance, the question is whether we try to promote and enhance what they have and do, or whether we try to change things (nation-building?). (Recipient vs. Participant).

I get the sense that we are not, to date, effectively engaging them, but that if all of our independent "projects" played out, there would be no more effectiveness, and perhaps, less.

Whether we like it or not, it is a very big leap between ineffective and effective governance, and there is not much history of us "creating" effectiveness where it did not exist before.

But governance is a key.

Steve,

Several points of agreement here.

The phrase Good Governance as I have often seen it executed sets my teeth on edge. I'll paraphrase..."If it's not based on Thomas Jefferson it is not Good Governance." We seem to rarely take the time to survey and assess what exists on the ground and craft a way to engage the existing structure, instead we seem to like to start over by writing a new constitution and electing new faces and then we wonder why everybody is all riled up :eek:

Steve the Planner

10-10-2009, 02:05 AM

Governance?

Yesterday, the Institute of Peace released a long awaited guide to post conflict reconstruction.

I usually have a lot of respect for their work, but not in this case. First, they described governance in the context of providing basic and essential services, then, somehow, at the implementer stage, it got lost in the foolishness of diplomats and US AID. Kinda forgot about engineers, repairmen, construction experts, public administration, budgeting, logistics, warehousing and distribution--- all the technical stuff on which basic and essential services are based.

As for Afghanistan, I increasingly see the likelihood of a call for a national Loya Jirga, and an end to the "American Way"---constitutions, one man-one vote (early and often?), presidents and the like. Then they can get back to figuring out how to build a minimal government consistent with their minimalist goals and history.

Steve

Rex Brynen

10-18-2009, 12:31 AM

The New York Times has just started a five part series by reporter David Rohde (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/David_S._Rohde), who was kidnapped by Taliban forces in November 2008, and held for more than seven months before he escaped (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kidnapping_of_David_Rohde). Particularly noteworthy was the media blackout during his abduction.

It promises to be a fascinating account, but this quote--which has profound repercussions for COIN strategy in Afghanistan--particularly caught my eye:

Over those months, I came to a simple realization. After seven years of reporting in the region, I did not fully understand how extreme many of the Taliban had become. Before the kidnapping, I viewed the organization as a form of “Al Qaeda lite,” a religiously motivated movement primarily focused on controlling Afghanistan.

Living side by side with the Haqqanis’ followers, I learned that the goal of the hard-line Taliban was far more ambitious. Contact with foreign militants in the tribal areas appeared to have deeply affected many young Taliban fighters. They wanted to create a fundamentalist Islamic emirate with Al Qaeda that spanned the Muslim world.

I had written about the ties between Pakistan’s intelligence services and the Taliban while covering the region for The New York Times. I knew Pakistan turned a blind eye to many of their activities. But I was astonished by what I encountered firsthand: a Taliban mini-state that flourished openly and with impunity.

You'll find Part One of his NYT account here (http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/18/world/asia/18hostage.html?pagewanted=1&_r=1&ref=global-home).

jmm99

10-18-2009, 01:44 AM

The Haqqani (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jalaluddin_Haqqani) group (see also Khalis (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mohammad_Yunus_Khalis)) has been closely tied to AQ and is probably closer to AQ in ideology than some of the other Taliban groups.

The concept of a fundamentalist Islamic emirate spanning the Muslim world (and in fact Worldwide) is scarcely new in Afghanistan and Pakistan. It predates AQ by decades and goes back to just before WWII, Sayyeed Abdul A'la Maududi (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abul_Ala_Maududi), "Jihad in Islam (http://www.muhammadanism.org/Terrorism/jihah_in_islam/jihad_in_islam.pdf)". Maududi's relatively mild manner of argument, and his apparent reasoned invocation of the Koran and strict Sharia law (he was a valid SME on both), seems to be generally ignored for more recent and more radical exponents of the extreme takfiri school.

Frankly, Maududi (if active today) would scare me more than the AQ spokesmen, who suffer from an excess of integral rigidity:

pp. 26-27, 29-30 pdf

A WORLD REVOLUTION

It must be evident to you from this discussion that the objective of the Islamic ‘ Jihād’ is to eliminate the rule of an un-Islamic system and establish in its stead an Islamic system of state rule. Islam does not intend to confine this revolution to a single state or a few countries; the aim of Islam is to bring about a universal revolution. Although in the initial stages it is incumbent upon members of the party of Islam to carry out a revolution in the State system of the countries to which they belong, but their ultimate objective is no other than to effect a world revolution.

No revolutionary ideology which champions the principles of the welfare of humanity as a whole instead of upholding national interests, can restrict its aims and objectives to the limits of a country or a nation. The goal of such an all-embracing doctrine is naturally bound to be world revolution.

Truth cannot be confined within geographical borders. Truth demands that whatever is right on this side of the river or the mountain is also right on the other side of the river or mountain; no portion of mankind should be deprived of the Truth; wherever mankind is being subjected to repression, discrimination and exploitation, it is the duty of the righteous to go to their succour.

The same conception has been enunciated by the Holy Qur’an in the following words:

"What has happened to you? Why don’t you fight in the way of God in support of men, women and children, whom finding helpless, they have repressed; and who pray, "O God! liberate us from this habitation which is ruled by tyrants". (4: 75)
....
The Terms "Offensive" and "Defensive" are Irrelevant

If you carefully consider the explanation given above you will readily understand that the two terms ‘offensive’ and ‘defensive’ by which the nature of welfare is differentiated are not at all applicable to Islamic ‘Jihad’. These terms are relevant only in the context of wars between nations and countries, for technically the terms ‘attack’ and ‘defence’ can only be used with reference to a country or a nation. But when an international party rises with a universal faith and ideology and invites all peoples as human beings to embrace this faith and ideology and admits into its fold as equal members men of all nationalities and strives only to dismantle the rule of an opposing ideology and set up in its place a system of government based on its own ideology, then in this case the use of the technical terms like ‘offence’ and ‘defence’ is not germane.

Even if we stop thinking about these technical terms, the division of Islamic ‘Jihad’ into offensive and defensive is not admissible. Islamic Jihad is both offensive and defensive at one and the same time.

It is offensive because the Muslim Party assaults the rule of an opposing ideology and it is defensive because the Muslim Party is constrained to capture state power in order to arrest the principles of Islam in space-time forces. As a party, it has no home to defend; it upholds certain principles which it must protect.

Similarly this party does not attack the home of the opposing party, but launches an assault on the principles of the opponent. The objective of this attack, moreover, is not to coerce the opponent to relinquish his principles but to abolish the government which sustains these principles.

I have to add that Maududi was equally committed to the political effort and the military effort. Both were part of the same struggle (jihad).