Winning the War in Afghanistan [Archive] - Page 3

Steve the Planner

10-22-2009, 04:16 PM

The immortal words of Winnie the Pooh when confronted with endless honey pot problems: "Think, think, think!"

LA Times carried a really insightful article (The Afghanistan Problem) by Carnegie Endowment's visiting scholar Gilles Dorronsoro.

http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/commentary/la-oe-dorronsoro20-2009oct20,0,2650413.story

"I was in Afghanistan during the summer, as 20,000 coalition troops tried to retake Helmand province, one of 11 provinces now under de facto Taliban control. But over three months, during which they sustained significant casualties, the troops failed to take control of even a third of the area. The coalition had built an archipelago of small outposts, leaving much of the territory between unsecured. As one Afghan told me in Kandahar, "The Americans control what they see." Imagine how many troops -- and how many casualties -- it would take to secure every one of those provinces, even under the most promising circumstances."

He goes on to describe many of the unique practical and cultural limitations of any strategy in Afghanistan, with rich allusions to his background in Afghanistan and its' history and peoples. He particularly draws the distinction between urban areas, where cooperation and aid strategies can work, and why they do not work in the unique, and highly independent atmosphere of a Pashtun village:

"History is not encouraging. In two centuries, the Pashtuns have never once tolerated a permanent presence of armed foreigners. Defending families and villages is a cultural duty of local men, and the presence of outsiders is generally perceived as a threat, especially when they are non-Muslim. Historical memories are long in this part of the world. Some Afghans still say prayers for mujahedin who fought against the British -- in the 19th century."

At the end, he concludes that the best available course is to focus on the cities, where some stability is possible, while building up a capable Afghan force.

My enjoyment in reading this and other work by Dorronsoro is that the breadth of his insights is remarkable, and often overlooked.

Steve

Jedburgh

10-30-2009, 07:15 PM

Posted on Steve Pressfield's War & Reality in Afghanistan (http://blog.stevenpressfield.com/) 26 Oct 09:

One Tribe at a Time: A Strategy for Success in Afghanistan (http://blog.stevenpressfield.com/wp-content/themes/stevenpressfield/one_tribe_at_a_time.pdf)

....One Tribe at a Time reflects what I believe to be the one strategy that can help both the US and the people of Afghanistan by working directly with their centuries-old tribal system. We can only do this by giving top priority to the most important political, social and military force in Afghanistan—the tribes. We must engage these tribes at a close and personal level with a much deeper cultural understanding than we have ever had before.

When we gain the respect and trust of one tribe, in one area, there will be a domino effect will spread throughout the region and beyond. One tribe will eventually become 25 or even 50 tribes. This can only have a long-term positive effect on the current situation. It is, however, not without pitfalls and difficulty.

But it can and must be done....

Bob's World

10-30-2009, 09:52 PM

davidbfpo

11-02-2009, 10:16 PM

Thanks to MPayson for pointing this out.

From the summary and what the brief does: What is the problem? What should be done?
In a new (Australian) Lowy Institute Policy Brief, Tom Gregg argues the importance of a more effective engagement of Afghanistan’s tribes, particularly in the country’s south east. This could help improve stability in a strategically important part of the country and avoid a situation where local tribes were turned against the Afghan national government and international military forces operating in the region.

Link:http://www.lowyinstitute.org/Publication.asp?pid=1157 (1Mb)

On a quick read well illustrated with anecdotes and worth a read - even for those due to deploy.

davidbfpo

davidbfpo

11-02-2009, 10:22 PM

The consistently good "on the ground" observer takes a wider view and some nice photos too: http://freerangeinternational.com/blog/?p=2291

davidbfpo

Steve the Planner

11-02-2009, 10:38 PM

David:

Stunningly clear picture, including the photos.

Steve

Steve the Planner

11-05-2009, 11:58 PM

Went to a Center for American Progress conference today.

Gilles Dorronsoro, Micheal Semple and Joanne Nathan (corrected), all non-US experts who have been in Afghanistan since before 2001.

Each had a presentation on their field. Most of you have heard some of this: Dorronsorro (secure the cities first, etc..), and Semple's work with the Taliban are pretty well known.

Nathan, an Australian, asked: What's this COIN thing about? I read the manual and it said Clear-Hold-Build, but all you ever do is Clear, Clear, Clear. No administrative purpose or capability. Why are you clearing unless you have civilian capacity to Hold and Build? Where has this strategy ever been applied?

Even Andrew Exum didn't take a stab at answering that.

The big question that all were asked to comment on: What do you think of these people who see one small part of the country, then try to exprapolte what they saw there to a bigger picture about the country? (Obviously, the Hoh question).

They were pretty devastating in explaining just a snippet of what they know about the whole country, and why that kind of speculation is not useful.

Like Exum said, DC is usually full of generalists, and it was a rare opportunity to have three leading specialists in one place.

Certainly worth hearing every word yourself to build or assess strategy.

http://www.americanprogress.org/events/2009/11/AfghanInsurgency.html/streaming.html

Steve

jmm99

11-06-2009, 01:47 AM

From IOL (Islam OnLine), US Offers Taliban 6 Provinces for 8 Bases (http://www.islamonline.net/servlet/Satellite?c=Article_C&cid=1256909637728&pagename=Zone-English-News/NWELayout), which I happened upon in looking for something else:

US Offers Taliban 6 Provinces for 8 Bases
By Aamir Latif, IOL Correspondent

(photo caption) Mullah Zaeef, a former envoy to Pakistan, reportedly represented the Taliban side in the recent talks.

ISLAMABAD – The emboldened Taliban movement in Afghanistan turned down an American offer of power-sharing in exchange for accepting the presence of foreign troops, Afghan government sources confirmed. ....
.....
"America wants 8 army and air force bases in different parts of Afghanistan in order to tackle the possible regrouping of Al-Qaeda network," the senior official said.

He named the possible hosts of the bases as Mazar-e-Sharif and Badakshan in north, Kandahar in south, Kabul, Herat in west, Jalalabad in northeast and Ghazni and Faryab in central Afghanistan.

In exchange, the US offered Taliban the governorship of the southern provinces of Kandahar, Zabul, Hilmand and Orazgan as well as the northeastern provinces of Nooristan and Kunar. ....

Has anyone been following this topic (US-Taliban negotiations); and are there any open-source confirmations of any such negotiations besides the 5 IOL links next to the article ?

slapout9

11-06-2009, 03:56 AM

From IOL (Islam OnLine), US Offers Taliban 6 Provinces for 8 Bases (http://www.islamonline.net/servlet/Satellite?c=Article_C&cid=1256909637728&pagename=Zone-English-News/NWELayout), which I happened upon in looking for something else:

Has anyone been following this topic (US-Taliban negotiations); and are there any open-source confirmations of any such negotiations besides the 5 IOL links next to the article ?

Looks like they are doing some thisin A'stan.
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=938

jmm99

11-06-2009, 06:02 AM

that's why I asked whether there are more open-source confirmations of the alleged negotiations. The stories at IOL could be Taliban Infofare.

davidbfpo

11-06-2009, 09:11 AM

From The Scotsman:http://www.scotsman.com/latestnews/Gordon-Brown-puts-up-a.5801195.jp

Professor Anatol Lieven, from King's College London, said: "The best we can now hope and plan for is a reasonably functioning military state that can hold the north and west of the country, and a few Pashtun cities like Khandar and Jalalabad, and restrict the Taleban to the Pashtun countryside."

davidbfpo

S-2

11-08-2009, 08:56 AM

...and restrict the Taleban to the Pashtun countryside."

So it follows that we'll be restricted to the few cities that can be quietly and slowly strangled?

Are there GREAT BIG FENCES we'll be erecting around these towns? If in one can you go to the other? If in one can you even step outside of it into that nasty pashtu countryside. Can any of those nasty pashtus step in?

My! How far our hubris has traveled? Got to hand it to our best and brightest, they've think-tanked us right into an impressively little box. Surrendering Konar and Nuristan now, eh? Somebody was putting in a trout hatchery in Konar. Wonder how that'll go now?

Guess my personal ambition to do a little flyfishing on the upper Kunar river ain't a happenin' thing.

Bummer...

davidbfpo

11-08-2009, 12:35 PM

S-2,

I suspect Anatol Lieven is looking at an end state for Afghanistan. As others have said e.g. Michael Semple there are many reasons why the Taliban will not regain power nationwide. If you look at the history of Afghan national government it's writ has rarely been national, so Lieven is returning to the past.

davidbfpo

Bill Moore

11-08-2009, 04:56 PM

Posted by BW

It's that the Government of Afghanistan must. Best not to forget.

(just one more example of why I tend to get rather adament that we don''t fall into the habit of calling our own operations COIN when we assist another country with their insurgency, and similarly that we don't end up seeing their war as our war. No good can come from it)

I can't make any strong arguments about what will and won't work in Afghanistan, but in "general" I disagree with this blanket assumption that the HN government must deal with their own insurgency. I think these blanket assumptions presented as principles that cannot be violated are dangerously misleading. In the case of Afghanistan, their insurgency (or parts of it) is our national security problem.

Throughout our history in small wars your assumption is generally the best way of doing business, but every case must be evaluated on its own merits. We didn't go into Afghanistan to help the current government (which didn't exist) defeat an insurgency, we went into Afghanistan to kill Al Qaeda and their supporters; a mission that is not complete yet. A new government emerged out of the ashes that according to most accounts I have read is ineffective. If the ineffective government of Afghanistan is not capable or willing to do our bidding of killing Al Qaeda and their supporters, then conducting FID in an attempt to do it through them is clearly a flawed strategy.

We get too caught up in catchy mantra's like the "indirect approach" and "through, by and with", which are nothing new, but we repeat them so often now that we now falsely assume a U.S. unilateral approach is the wrong answer. That is hardly a balanced approach, nor the only approach available.

What are "our" objectives? How do we best achieve them? It isn't always the book answer "FID".

Bob's World

11-08-2009, 05:11 PM

More accurately we went to Afghanistan to inflict a dose of revenge on AQ and to deny them the use of Afghanistan as a sanctuary.

Once that was done, we then used it as a base to support operations to continue to "defeat" AQ; and got into the business of helping the Afghan new government get its feet on the ground.

But Bill, the only "absolute" that I lay down is that if you are assisting another country with it's insurgency, the HN is conducting COIN, and you as the outside assistance are not conducting COIN. Most accurately you are conducting FID.

But in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the Philippines, and in dozens of other countrieis what we are really doing is countering AQ's UW campaign. THAT is the "War" for the U.S.; not any one particular area of operations where there are aspects of that complex problem set to be dealt with. In some of those countries we are helping to resolve nationalist insurgincies being inspired, supported, etc, by AQ. In others we are dealing with nodes of the UW network that AQ employs to execute this campaign. In others we deal more directly with AQ itself. In some we do all three. But in NONE of those countries are we in a war specific to that country. AQ is waging a global UW campaign, and no one country or insurgency they are working with is essential to them in the pursuit of their larger political goals. Similarly, no one country is essential to the US in the pursuit of our political goals.

Could we someday get so engaged in another country's insurgency where we have such tremendous U.S. national interests at stake within those borders and within that populace that it should be elevated to being an American war? Certainly. That day isn't today, and that country isn't Afghanistan.

Personal opinion.

slapout9

11-08-2009, 05:40 PM

Bob's World

11-08-2009, 06:07 PM

BW, what do you do with Politcal leaders that do think it is in our National Interest? Where is some objective standard to measure it as opposed to some Vodoo motive.

Other countries do a better job of establishing and publishing their interests than the U.S. does. In fact, as an American you have to actively go out and search a wide range of documents and statements to sort out what our interests are, which causes them to be much more fluid than they should be in general, and also means that 10 different people on such a quest are apt to come in with 10 similar, but different answers.

So, good questions like:

"What do you believe America's top 5 interests to be, and could you explain which of those interests are so deeply rooted in Afghanistan that you are willing to risk damage to them everywhere else to wage a war over them in that one country?"

(Such a question is likely get a fuzzy answer as to what our interests are, and a rhetoric laced statement about terrorists or AQ in return. That should then open the door to hard questions about the nature of AQ as an organization and their operations and how to best deal with them around the globe in a whole of government approach in conjunction with our allies, who by the way, have their own national interests which some may be shocked to learn do not necessarily coincide with, nor subjugate themselves to US interests.)

slapout9

11-08-2009, 06:33 PM

So, good questions like:

"What do you believe America's top 5 interests to be, and could you explain which of those interests are so deeply rooted in Afghanistan that you are willing to risk damage to them everywhere else to wage a war over them in that one country?"

That is a good question! Which usually gets you on the path to a solution.

jmm99

11-08-2009, 06:40 PM

for whatever they are worth - yours I suspect worth more than mine:

from BW
But in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the Philippines, and in dozens of other countrieis what we are really doing is countering AQ's UW campaign. THAT is the "War" for the U.S.; not any one particular area of operations where there are aspects of that complex problem set to be dealt with. In some of those countries we are helping to resolve nationalist insurgincies being inspired, supported, etc, by AQ. In others we are dealing with nodes of the UW network that AQ employs to execute this campaign. In others we deal more directly with AQ itself. In some we do all three. But in NONE of those countries are we in a war specific to that country. AQ is waging a global UW campaign, and no one country or insurgency they are working with is essential to them in the pursuit of their larger political goals. Similarly, no one country is essential to the US in the pursuit of our political goals.

My only semantic change would be to substitute "existential" for "essential" - in short, AQ's existence will not cease because of its plan being defeated in one country; and neither will the existence of the US if we suffer a "defeat" in one country. So, we can take a deep breath before darting from crisis to crisis.

Getting back to the larger point. AQ is setting or assisting those mulktiple "brushfires" by using a very small footprint in terms of its own operatives. I throw this out for discussion. Would not logic suggest that we (US) also follow the small footprint model if our target is AQ ?

Yet, we see estimates (IIRC ten-year projections) of trillion dollar costs for maintaining approximately a 100K force (present + in pipeline) in Astan. Based on GEN McChrystal's supposed request options that would not be optimum for what he wants to do (the 60-80K top range adds). That is scarcely a small footprint in either case.

Best to all

Mike

Bob's World

11-08-2009, 07:01 PM

Mike,

The General's estimates are, if anything, conservative for a mission of "nation building, US-led COIN for Afghansitan coupled with CT on AQ." If he were to be given a redefined mission he and his staff would provide a new plan with a different estimate.

Even in a "countering AQ UW" approach, Afghanistan remains important, and it would have a Deter mission on Insurgencies in those two countries (AF/PAK), Disrupt on the UW Network nodes that are critical to AQ's support of those insurgencies; and an appropriately tailored Defeat of AQ senior leadership (done in a fashion so as not to actually increase their support and effectiveness in other regions of the globe, or to destabilize the fragile governments of Afg or Pak further than they currently are.) This would still require a significant number of US troops, but by changing the context of the operation and the ways we pursue our ends you can begin to right-size both the footprint AND the public perception of the importance of this particular AOR in the context of the global mission-set and US interests as a whole.

jmm99

11-08-2009, 07:32 PM

this:

from BW
... AND the public perception of the importance of this particular AOR in the context of the global mission-set and US interests as a whole.

Since 9/11, the political side of our ledger has been operating in non-stop crisis mode (with different pages flipping in and out depending on political posturing).

It still amazes me that there was no in-depth contingency plan to handle AQ in Astan - and that one had to be developed on the run immediately after 9/11. That was a problem caused by the political side of the ledger, not the military side (IMO).

Regards

Mike

S-2

11-08-2009, 08:17 PM

Nice comments gents but why are you talking about A.Q. in Afghanistan if that's the target and mission?:rolleyes:

The number of A.Q. operatives and senior commanders we've caught or killed there is decidedly small.

They're not there. Why should they be? Place is crawling with ISAF, jets, and drones

Pretty expensive and mis-directed C.T. mission for a bunch of targets elsewhere. Pretty botched and mis-managed COIN mission if nation-building's the intent.

Trillion dollar mission?

Can we just write each afghan a cheque for $2000 and call it a day? Figure that'll save us $400B, a lot of afghan and ISAF lives, and we can go ahuntin' for ol' A.Q elsewhere.

Think I saw OBL in Portland, Oregon on Halloween eve. Sure looked like him anyway. Zawahiri too.

Couple of hotties with 'em too. Man, do they know how to party!

Steve the Planner

11-09-2009, 02:53 AM

S-2. You may be on the right track.

The other day, I attended a conference where Gilles Dorronsoro, Micheal Semple, and Joanne Nathan, three non-US Afghan specialists, gave their views on Afghanistan.

They spent a lot of time on details about different Taliban Commanders in different areas that they have met with.

After a while, an audience member asked: "Why haven't you mentioned Al-Qaeda?"

The response, led by Semple, was that Al-Qaeda isn't relevant to Afghanistan. It is just always brought up by the Americans to keep US public attention on this war far-far-away.

Like you, they are of the opinion that Al-Qaeda are in Pakistan now, and not a significant issue in the current "civil war."

They argue that the Taliban only has nominal support in Afghanistan, especially since some Pashtuns are unwilling to support them. Maybe 20% support on a national level.

Instead, they are trying to "masquerade" as opponents of foreign intervention---hoping there is greater support for them on that basis than as just another minority in contention in a civil war. Thus, in part, Dorronsorro argues to pull out of Pashtun areas to limit the strength of that message, while bolstering national power projection capabilities (the Army).

Steve

jmm99

11-09-2009, 03:52 AM

but US forces based in Astan to attack AQ in Pstan is what I glean from this:

from BW
Even in a "countering AQ UW" approach, Afghanistan remains important, and it would have a Deter mission on Insurgencies in those two countries (AF/PAK), Disrupt on the UW Network nodes that are critical to AQ's support of those insurgencies; and an appropriately tailored Defeat of AQ senior leadership (done in a fashion so as not to actually increase their support and effectiveness in other regions of the globe, or to destabilize the fragile governments of Afg or Pak further than they currently are.) This would still require a significant number of US troops ....

The Pakistani Army (and the ISI more so) have an aversion to non-Muslim forces setting foot in Pakistani territory. See this post on The Quranic Concept of War (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=85827&postcount=55), by Brigadier S. K. Malik of the Pakistani Army (originally published in Pakistan in 1979).

On Fareed Zakaria's GPS today (http://www.cnn.com/CNN/Programs/fareed.zakaria.gps/), former President Pervez Musharraf made it clear that US forces based in Pstan to attack AQ in Pstan was an unacceptable option.

The alternative is not to attack AQ in Pstan with US forces. You may support that alternative.

S-2

11-09-2009, 07:19 PM

I appreciate that you offer your views or, at least a personal summary of other views, instead of some article devoid of personally attached commentary/context.

They argue that the Taliban only has nominal support in Afghanistan, especially since some Pashtuns are unwilling to support them. Maybe 20% support on a national level.

Yup, if the ABC/BBC/ARD poll from last February is any indication. Most of that 20%, btw (and oddly), belongs to foreign irhabists-not the taliban. Taliban support is creeping up-all the way from about 4% to 7-8% range. They've no traction to speak of. Further of those taliban, probably only 20% or so are committed ideologues for their movement. The rest are a mish-mash of disaffected and revenge-motivated souls, unemployed, and those whom are criminally-inclined.

Yet we know that a.) the marines, for instance, have had a profound impact in the Nawa area and, b.) the taliban are telling the Nawa locals (whom are asking our marines if it's true) that we'll be shortly leaving. BG Nicholson, himself, has wondered at the possible tenuousness of our presence.

Thus, in part, Dorronsorro argues to pull out of Pashtun areas to limit the strength of that message, while bolstering national power projection capabilities (the Army).

What a roller-coaster we've put those people (and our own) upon. Can you or Dorronsorro contrast those thoughts against our massive infrastructure buildup that's currently taking place along with our troop expansion.

Seems the momentum to expand our effort is far out in front of Dorronsorro's comments. He's behind the eight-ball and waaaay late. Hate to vietnamize my comments but we're building a veritable Cam Ranh Bay in Kandahar for ourselves and eventually an army that's nowhere close to even the ARVN that we left behind.

Finally-

...there is greater support for them on that basis than as just another minority in contention in a civil war.

Well. There IT is. Somebody finally said it.

You've read about our helicopters transporting taliban to the north as fed by PRESS TV (Iran) to the willfully gullible afghans, correct? You've therefore seen the duplicitous reactions of both Karzai and Abdullah. Both agree publically with this sickening assertion-for differing reasons. Karzai clearly promotes such to deflect attention away from his terminally corrupt regime. Abdullah agrees with this contention but does so to separate himself from Karzai on a matter that affects his base of support in the north where, supposedly, these insurgents are being transported.

The factions, it would seem, have lined up and are ready to go. Further, I can't imagine Karzai suggesting as much if he thought his support from America hinged on more lucid and rational perspectives from his office.

I have to personally face facts, though. As much as I see the U.N./ISAF/U.S. presence in Afghanistan as utterly pointless for a variety of reasons (IMHO, all sound;)), the larger momentum is that our withdrawal from this fiasco isn't happening anytime soon. Instead, our escalation is widening.

Others will withdraw, of course. With each ISAF soldier whom departs without an ISAF replacement, that soldier's place will be absorbed by us. Obama's ratcheting of troops at whatever size he ultimately selects will be offset by these soldiers departure.

Net? Less than we publically sell now which STILL isn't what our ground force commander has projected as a baseline minimum (40,000 minimally with 80,000 his preferred troop augmentation).

Y'all at SWJ are SMEs of the first order. You see the individual trees really well and have all the buzz words and catch phrases down. You are collectively well-paid for such.

Who's seeing the forest, though? Further, who cares to see it? Our NCA? They seem to be relying on the likes of folks at the Jamestown Foundation, AEI, CSIS, CNAS, IISS and SWJ to provide the supporting analysis leading to that mythical light at the end of the tunnel.

I've watched SWJ's nat'l relevance grow in the three years plus I've been a member. I fear, as much as anything, that the membership here and those aforementioned think-tanks are convinced that we've boxed ourselves into no other recourse but to keep on keepin' on.

Thanks for your thoughts.

tequila

11-09-2009, 07:57 PM

The SWJ is well paid? Man, where's my check? :mad:

Dorronsoro is a genuine expert on Afghanistan, but I'm afraid of his prescription for the country. Every time I've heard him speak, he is prescribing, in essence, the division of the country --- reinforce in the north and the cities, protect non-Pashtun areas, and essentially concede that Pashtun areas are beyond help.

He also insists that the "McChrystal strategy just died in Helmand (http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/0911carnegie%2Dafghanistan2%2Epdf)." I think that statement's more than a bit premature.

S-2

11-09-2009, 08:19 PM

The SWJ is well paid? Man, where's my check?

Hmmm...

I see a need to elaborate.

O.K.

I guess I presumed SWJ is a hobby for professionals from related arenas. If sole-sourced from here, that might be a bit of a bummer...:D

Thanks.

Steve the Planner

11-09-2009, 08:52 PM

S-2:

You hit it right. I presented their views, not mine.

Dorronsorro may, in fact, be directly or indirectly arguing for partition, or at least, substantial independent regional alignments that beg the "nation" question. Don't know whether, however, that is his "final answer" but only the one that he believes is relevant to the current circumstance. Moreover, I believe that his deeply nuanced understanding of where to withdraw from particularly might not include Pashtun places where we are not in conflict.

As for Semple, I stand in deep reverence for what he knows, but a little skeptical about his "final answer." He is an Irishman deeply committed to bigger picture stuff, as he sees it, out in the field. How that may or may not relate to US interests is, I think, a jump ball. Especially where US interests may, for example, be fractional to the overall international interests at play there. Who knows what deals are being sketched out between the US and Pakistan? I don;t, but can't see the big picture without it.

Fortunately, I have the time and access to a lot of the DC think tanks, so it is fun to make this stuff available to our members for review and comment.

Jump in all you want.

Steve

davidbfpo

11-09-2009, 11:03 PM

A KOW academic has been on the ground in Helmand and has written:
(Opens with) The news from Afghanistan has been grim. The collapse of the second round of the national elections; Hamid Karzai's government tainted by corruption; and, last week, five British soldiers killed by a rogue Afghan policeman in Nad-e'Ali.....However, on the ground in Afghanistan things look a little more optimistic. I have just spent two weeks in Helmand, talking to dozens of civilian stabilisation advisers and military officers.

(Ends with)There is much to be done in Helmand, especially in towns such as Sangin and Musa Qala, where the Taliban still threaten security. But on the ground, one can begin to see the green shoots of progress and, in Garmsir, the conditions of stability and Britain's eventual withdrawal.

From:http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2009/nov/08/afghanistan-helmand-us-marines

davidbfpo

slapout9

11-10-2009, 12:20 AM

He will according to this Article from the new Military Review! he dose not have the right Strategy to win according to this article.

http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20091231_art004.pdf

Is there any merit to this article?

Moderator's note post copied to seperate discussion on the MR article: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=8975

Steve the Planner

11-10-2009, 01:34 AM

Slap:

Johnson and Mason are not far off where my lines are crossing, but coming around it from the civilian side.

So many folks in Iraq were preaching "Democracy" out of a very naive school book version. In Maryland alone, there are 23 counties and the city of Baltimore, and hundreds of individual "towns" and community associations with varying authority. Interwoven into that are hundreds of independent and interagency bodies with special authority, from local school boards to regional transit authorities. It is indeed a complex and locally engaged web of legitimate governing relationships that actually make the tribal, valley-by-valley thing look simplistic.

Sure, OK, there is a supposedly strong national government, but aside from some often-contested "must do's" (the Consititution), most actions from the top down are driven by carrots and sticks of payola and buy-offs. Else the idea fails to stick.

In Iraq, for a lot of immutable reasons, the power and rational of national ministries was inherent in the system---the DNA that operated in the background no matter what the US tried to do for reconstruction under a new "provincial" governance model.

By contrast, Afghanistan is two inherently conflicting fields of public---urban vs. rural, and the rural is tribal/district/sub-district.

Military and foreign service, on one year assignments, are not going to be able to grasp and engage these rural areas' leaders and formal and informal structures. Instead, any PRT cadre assigned to these areas (more like CORDS than PRTs) need to be something different than, for example, the PRTs deployed in Iraq.

I never understood the mishmash of Subject Matter Experts assigned down to PRTs in Iraq. Instead, the handful of Senior SMEs, in my opinion, should have been circuit riders to better support less top-heavy, younger, and more aggressively deployed PRTs (more like on an EPRT model as far as flexibility and local reach).

It would be far easier for me, for example, as a Senior Planning SME, to mini-train and coordinate programs and resources down to an engaged DRT System than to waste mine and their time and resources doing so for a few small villages.

What I took away from Johnson and Mason, as an organizational matter, is that a cadre of minimally cross-trained, but highly supported, DRTs, probably military for some time to come, would provide the best penetration/connections to the Pashtun (and other) rural villages---all as the necessary backstop to prevent Taliban encirclement of those urbanites.

Somewhere in the middle, you try to bridge gaps, whether by diplomacy or other means.

Is that about right?

Steve

Moderator's note post copied to seperate discussion on the MR article: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=8975

Steve the Planner

11-10-2009, 01:42 AM

PS- That's why I love disaggregated mapping and demographics. Get down to the DNA of a system, and you can start to understand and plan it.

The funny part about Iraq is that there were formal maps down to the district and sub-district levels which few people understood, older formal maps that many people and institutions (particularly the ministries) still followed, and other "facts on the ground" thematic maps, or zone of influence maps---resulting from how things "real are" , or how, through shifting power structures, influence or relocation---that showed how things are now on many levels.

Before long, they started to look like the kind of complex, disputing and interlocking layers of formal and informal governance that one actually finds in the US---but with translation to a language and culture that is, at times, microscopic, complex, and highly nuanced.

I'm gradually figuring some pieces of the puzzle out (at least, just in my lane).

Steve

jmm99

11-10-2009, 02:26 AM

S-2

11-10-2009, 03:25 AM

There are roughly 40,000 villages in Astan. That is the magnitude of the political action problem. No solution within our capabilities has been presented by anyone I've read.

At least those 80,000-100,000 troops will be securing the really important places...

...you know, where the hotels, beds, and airports are so our politicians, generals, and scholars can get in and out, a decent meal, and a good night's sleep.

So with my trusty pocket calculator I got 4,937,400 for the top 50 cities in Afghanistan per this (http://www.citypopulation.de/Afghanistan.html#Stadt_alpha) link.

So that leaves 24M or so floating around. The cities ran from 2.36M to 1,500.

Guess we don't need 2,000 troops to defend 1500 people though their security should be ASSURED with that many. Sadly, even at 100,000 troops we'd have, what, maybe 10,000 or so trigger-pullers?

I see a lot of empty space surrendered and a lot of people that we won't be protecting even if we doubled the city pop. data I have and cut the total pop. by a third.

Can we fudge some numbers so this population protection thingy doesn't look so whack?

jmm99

11-10-2009, 03:57 AM

So, feel free to fudge away. :)

A more relevant set of numbers would be the number of Afghani soldiers and police, with honesty and integrity, who are willing to go and live in the villages to provide security for the number of local villagers, who are willing to stick out their necks and provide local governance.

Does anyone have that set of metrics ?

Steve the Planner

11-10-2009, 05:01 AM

jmm:

As long as the Afghan troops/police sent are going to fit the area---to many stories about the potential conflict of sending urban Uzbek troops to rural Pashtun areas.

S-2:

Something tells me that our move to "safe" cities might not go un-noticed by the Taliban, so what was safe before might be a little more challenging than before. How much easier it is to blend into and destabilize an urban area than a rural one.

Steve

S-2

11-10-2009, 06:28 AM

How much easier it is to blend into and destabilize an urban area than a rural one.

Impossible...

...with an invisible but inpenetrable force field.:D

Here's (http://www.latinamericanstudies.org/uruguay/tupamaros-uruguay.htm) one nice lil' read about the Tupamaro movement.

Here's (http://www.learmedia.ca/product_info.php/products_id/879) a better movie-State Of Siege.

Battle of Algiers, also, obviously makes for worthy viewing for those disinclined towards lengthy and scholarly written works.

Honestly though, I don't think that urban versus rural will present any particular difficulties for the taliban until our allies leave and we can begin to replicate our "surge" tactics of COPs inside urban zones ala Iraq. I understand that Kandahar City is effectively "indian country" after dark and not much better in the day.

That model worked as it seemed to optimize our troop-population ratios in a meaningful 24/7 manner. Short of that, shabnamah will continue ruling the evening.

Comes down to training the afghans to make this work, it seems, and that seems damned discouraging when we can't even seem to train their president.

Steve the Planner

11-10-2009, 06:56 AM

S-2:

Good read.

Steve

Bob's World

11-10-2009, 11:11 AM

I'll leave aside the accuracy of their recollections of Vietnam. They point out the near-FUBAR state of the political effort in Astan. Their DRT concept seems a level too high. If Vietnam is any lesson, it is that security and political action must be solid at the village level. There are roughly 40,000 villages in Astan. That is the magnitude of the political action problem. No solution within our capabilities has been presented by anyone I've read.

The lesson I take is that when a couple of outside actors waging a much larger competition use the populace of some smaller state to wage their contest in a form of pawn warfare don't be so blinded by your own ends that you are oblivious to those of the populace involved.

We propped up a series of three different ass-hats in Nam because we didn't want the Soviets to go "+1" in the global pawn warfare game that defined much of the Cold War; while the Soviets backed the side seeking freedom from the widely hated scourge of Western Colonialism.

Today there are a large number of populaces across the Middle East also seeking to get out from under the remnants of Western Colonialism and the governments imposed by the West during the Cold War to assure "friendly" relations and the flow of oil...

Once again, I believe we have picked the wrong side, and that is a hard hand to play. This is why I strongly recommned that we co-opt the majority of the AQ message and ussurp them as the champions of the populaces of the Middle East in their quest for better governance. Such a move would sweep AQ's feet out from under them and bring the U.S. into line with our national principles.

But one'll never see this with their nose pressed against Afghanistan; or with their brain obsessed with rhetoric of the ideology AQ employs. Afghanistan is just one of many states in play, and ideologies are like socks, you need them, but you can change them too. Step back and the picture gets clearer.

Moderator's note post copied to seperate discussion on the MR article: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=8975

jmm99

11-10-2009, 06:05 PM

My comment re: lesson learned in Vietnam applied to the tactical level - and a very basic level, that of the villages and their hamlets.

Your comment pertains to the strategic level, which is fine since that is what you do for a living. Your comment goes beyond one nation (Astan) and looks to the region (basically Indian Ocean littorals and continental land masses, from say Egypt to Indonesia to include most of the Muslim World).

Going back 40-50 years, we (US) were looking at containment of two Communist powers (SovComs and ChiComs) in the region of Southeast Asia. The result there was a "win" from our standpoint - Indochina became Communist; but the remainder remained non-Communist - though not a US proxy (ASEAN, etc.). The key was Indonesia which found its third way, not without a great deal of bloodshed.

Whether that "model" has any application to the Muslim World is another question. Your "friends" in the Kingdom certainly employ much of AQ's message - in truth, AQ has co-opted much of the Kingdom's message and added enhancements to it. Unless I've misunderstood much of what you have written, the Kingdom does not fall within your definition of "good governance".

What would this Muslim World "Third Way" message look like ? You know me, I like concrete examples.

Regards

Mike

Moderator's note post copied to seperate discussion on the MR article: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=8975

Bob's World

11-10-2009, 08:16 PM

Mike,

I'm currently listening to Friedman's "Flat Hot and Crowded" (may be in a different order...). He lays down some great insights as to governance in countries that suck their money out of the ground. How good governance declines as oil revenues increase; or parallel to that thought that as a play on the American battle cry of "No taxation without representation" that in countries that do not have to tax their populaces it comes out more as "No taxation, so no representation."

As a forcing function to get to right and greater stability in the Middle East through governments that HAVE to be more open to the needs of their populaces; and a Middle East that the US is engaging through the highly clouded decision making process of an addict engaging his dealer; we must first dedicate our national energy to inventing and developing the next generation of energy.

Friedman describes energy as "Energy from Hell" (comes out of the Earth) vs. "Energy from Heaven" (comes from the sky). He gets a little too uber-green for my tastes at times, but his observations on governance in the Middle East and the impact of US energy policy at home on our foreign policy and and national security are insightful.

The Saudis are the worst offenders of the lot; and number one on the AQ hit parade for their association with the U.S. The al Saud family may be the best of bad options for governance there, but we need to change the nature of our relationship. We cannot simply embrace as partners in GWOT the Saudi and Lybian governments, who then in turn use that as a license to put the smack down on subversive nationalist movements seeking reasonable governmental reforms, or like the recent smack down the Saudis put on those Yemenes Shias. No good can come to America from validating such behavior.

Three key legs of the AQ platform are:
1. Remove Western Presence
2. Abolish Apostate Governments
3. Unite the Ummah

I think the U.S. should co-opt all three legs of that platform, but do so in a way that promotes Self-Determination and Freedom rather than the Stone Age version of Islam AQ is peddling.

There should be less overt Western influence over Middle Eastern Governance, and we should lead the effort to roll back the controls emplaced through colonialism and Cold War manipulations.

"Apostate" or more appropriately from our perspective, governments that draw too much of their legitimacy from foregin powers need to be brought into the embrace of legitimacy more widely recognized and accepted by the populaces they serve.

As to the Ummah, what does the West have to fear from an EU-like organization of Muslim states? We have far more to fear from the Muslim populaces who perceive they are being denied by the West the ability to seek such local collaboration. The Caliphate as the intel guys spin it to be is pure fanatsy. The old ones were built by conquest and held together at swordpoint. It just won't happen. But a political organization such as the EU is not only reasonable, but logical.

Look at the fear mongering that went on in the 50s and 60s over Communism. Seems silly now. It was never about the ideology, and far more about populaces seeking governments free of external controls; it was just our competition with the Soviets that muddied the waters. We don't need to go head to head with AQ by taking polar opposite positions; instead we simply steal their platform and and re-tune our engagement with the region to be more appropriate for 2010 rather than 1950. I think Ike would agree.

jmm99

11-10-2009, 09:03 PM

Taking these one by one:

1. Remove Western Presence - we can remove our presence easily enough.

2. Abolish Apostate Governments - not our mission.

3. Unite the Ummah - again, not our mission.

Why engage in the region at all, except on a DIE basis ? Seriously, what would be the long-term effects if we followed that policy ?

Regards

Mike

Bob's World

11-10-2009, 09:33 PM

Leaving isn't an option, as our energy demands and interests in the region have not changed.

So, if we stay, we must change the context of our presence. These three legs were designed specifically to challenge the current context and to take positions that are seen favorably by the populace. To stay and work to sustain the current context is to grow ever more mired in a conflict with populaces acting out and embracing change and willing to follow the leadership of whomever helps them get out from under their current positions.

It wasn't our mission to instal the "apostate governments" either, but we did, and then worked to sustain them in power. So I believe it is very appropriate for us to work now to help bring these governments and their people to the table to sort out a better future, an evolution of governance rather than the revolution of governance offered by bin Laden.

"Uniting the Ummah" creates a new potential ally, much like the EU or ASEAN. It will likely happen whether we resist it or embrace it, better to bring it on line on terms we can work with, than to resist it out of pure hard-headedness and create a powerful new enemy.

All of this supports the top three U.S. national interests of:
1. "Secure the Homeland" (defuse the powder keg of populaces currently attacking us)
2. "Access to Markets and Resources" (Overthrown governments = thrown out business contracts. Strating from scratch will not get us a better deal, and China and India will be in line making their offers as well)
3. "Preserve the American way of life." (I prefer to think of this as being able to live in accordance with the enduring principles in our Dec of Ind and Constitution; not as some particular standard of living measured by recent memory. Ensuring other populaces have access to similar freedoms helps to preserve our own as well.).

Steve the Planner

11-11-2009, 02:39 AM

Much talk about parallels to history. Iraq, Vietnam, etc... Note that with the recent discovery of Galbraith's secret 5% KRG Oil interests as he argued for Kurdish independence and enacted a provincial-focused Iraqi constitution, reveals a weird historical tie-in to a previous shadowy Turkish 5% man that got that amount of all Iraqi oil in the past, and the 5% man that was Prime Minister Bhutto's husband.

How about this one from Galbraith in 2007:

The Iraq war is lost. Of course, neither the President nor the war's intellectual architects are prepared to admit this. Nonetheless, the specter of defeat shapes their thinking in telling ways.[/QUOTE

The case for the war is no longer defined by the benefits of winning -- a stable Iraq, democracy on the march in the Middle East, the collapse of the evil Iranian and Syrian regimes -- but by the consequences of defeat. As President Bush put it: [QUOTE]The consequences of failure in Iraq would be death and destruction in the Middle East and here in America.

Tellingly, the Iraq war's intellectual boosters, while insisting the surge is working, are moving to assign blame for defeat. And they have already picked their target: the American people. In The Weekly Standard, Tom Donnelly, a fellow at the neoconservative American Enterprise Institute, wrote:
Those who believe the war is already lost -- call it the Clinton-Lugar axis -- are mounting a surge of their own. Ground won in Iraq becomes ground lost at home. Lugar provoked Donnelly's anger by noting that the American people had lost confidence in Bush's Iraq strategy as demonstrated by the Democratic takeover of both houses of Congress:
This "blame the American people" approach has, through repetition, almost become the accepted explanation for the outcome in Vietnam, attributing defeat to a loss of public support and not to fifteen years of military failure.

http://www.tomdispatch.com/post/174821/peter_galbraith_the_war_is_lost

jmm99

11-11-2009, 02:46 AM

Continuing the role of Devil's Advocate (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Devil's_advocate), and reciting again the AQ platform:

from BW
Three key legs of the AQ platform are:
1. Remove Western Presence
2. Abolish Apostate Governments
3. Unite the Ummah

Since

from BW
Leaving isn't an option, as our energy demands and interests in the region have not changed.

therefore, co-opting the first leg of the stool is an excluded option. In fact, taking action to co-opt the other two legs will project the "Western Presence" even deeper into the morass of Islamic politics and religion (which are intertwined).

"Apostate governments" are very much an extreme Salafist concept - are we (US), mostly non-Muslims, to issue our own fatwas, or to endorse fatwas of convenience which we do not really understand, as to what an "apostate" is. To "Unite the Ummah" would inject us even deeper into the Islamic concept of community. Those two legs are definitely not our mission.

Going back to my questions,

from JMM
Why engage in the region at all, except on a DIE basis ? Seriously, what would be the long-term effects if we followed that policy ?

the first posits removal of the "M" component in DIME, leaving DIE - thus, leaving the other variables in place.

Has anyone done an even-handed cost-benefit study of what would happen if we removed the "M" component, as opposed to continuing on the present path - or, on your modified "M" path if different ?

Another useful comparison (long-term) to study would be the cost-benefit effect on "our energy demands" from withdrawal of the "M" component. No doubt, some of the dozen or so regional powers (some global or near global powers) would enter to fill the vacuum. I suppose some of them might manage sweetheart energy deals to satisfy their energy requirements - which might be as shaky as the "apostate governments" they would now be supporting. Moreover, petro energy will eventually grow so expensive that alternative energy sources will become cost-effective. Those nations which take the lead (or are forced to take the lead) in this area will be the top dogs in the future.

One brief note before dealing with "the top three U.S. national interests". A compressed spring has a great deal of power. An uncompressed spring which has expanded to its limits has none. We seem to confuse "control" over territory (where that control is often an illusion) with power. By seeking to be powerful everywhere, we in effect are powerful nowhere.

1. "Secure the Homeland". I'm not enough of a Pollyanna to believe that withdrawal of the "M" component from Muslim lands will make everything wonderful. It would remove a source of provocation based on what seems to be a universal doctrine of the Islamic Law of Nations. Nonetheless, extremists will continue to see the US as a target. I expect those nations which rush in to fill the vacuum would find themselves the greater target.

2. "Access to Markets and Resources". If that is the basis for continued US military involvement, I guess Smedley Butler and Ike were right.

3. "Preserve the American way of life". So many Founding Fathers spoke of preservation of the "American Way" by not getting into foreign entanglements, that additional comment by me would be superfluous.

Regards

from Michael, Advocatus Diaboli ;)

------------------------

D=diplomacy and E=economic are self-explanatory. I=information and intelligence (not necessarily excluding direct action).

jmm99

11-11-2009, 03:02 AM

Whatever PG's financial interests, his futuristic picture from 2007 looks fairly probable at the end of 2009:

Iraq after an American defeat will look very much like Iraq today -- a land divided along ethnic lines into Arab and Kurdish states with a civil war being fought within its Arab part. Defeat is defined by America's failure to accomplish its objective of a self-sustaining, democratic, and unified Iraq. And that failure has already taken place, along with the increase of Iranian power in the region.

Take out the word "defeat", of course. And, we'll have to see if our leaving leads to a civil war in the Arab portion - or a war between the Arab and Kurdish portions. The increase in Iranian power is fact.

Regards

Mike

Bob's World

11-11-2009, 01:05 PM

It's all in "how" you go about your business. What we do is fine, how we do it is dated and inappropriate for the emerging environment.

So, don't expect me to get on the "We're right, everyone else is wrong, and if they chose to resist our rightness we will fight them" band wagon. We're better than that. Way better.

There is indeed great wisdom in the words of our founding fathers; and Washington's farewell address is a timeless classic and the essesnce of it still applies. Eisenhower's farewell holds wise advice as well.

Instead of being so focused on shaping those outside the US, we could stand a good dose of internal shaping instead:

1. Prioritize a naitonal program to take on the energy problem in a major way. Drop silly corn subsidies and develop sustainable programs under current technologies while pressing deep to develop the next generation of technology in all of what Dr. James Canton sees as the fusion of innovation and 5 key sciences (Nano-atoms, Cogno-neurons, Bio-genes, Info-bits, and Quantum-Qubits).

2. Prioritizing education in science in America.

3. Sticking to our enduring principles and interests as a nation, and not acting in such a way as to be perceived as denying the same for others.

The world is in an accelerating period of dynamic change. New technologies have been employed to do old things better; but as they come on line to do NEW things...we cannot even imagine what that means, and it is beginning to happen around us now. This is driving parallel changes in empowering individuals and therefore requireing adjustments in long held perceptions of appropriate governance and interactions between nations, and now non-states, and even individuals.

We must understand the past, but we must not seek to force the future to fit within its neat confines. Because it won't.

Steve the Planner

11-11-2009, 03:15 PM

Amen.

Steve

omarali50

11-11-2009, 05:17 PM

Mike,

... We don't need to go head to head with AQ by taking polar opposite positions; instead we simply steal their platform and and re-tune our engagement with the region to be more appropriate for 2010 rather than 1950. I think Ike would agree.

1. What does it mean to be "engaged" with the region? Is the US the world's policeman? or "securing energy supplies"? or making sure no arab state misbehaves with Israel? or what? It seems hard to get a clear answer on this question and yet everything else follows from this.

IF the US is the world's policeman (is it possible to have a world without a policeman?), what is the government whose writ this policeman enforces? what law does he uphold? Is it possible to be clearer about those two questions? (I personally think the US IS a sort of policeman (and some policing is generally better than no policing), but all too frequently its OWN agencies dont seem to know what law they are enforcing and in whose interest. This may be the best that can be done, but why not ask the question and see if it makes things move any differently?).

IF the US is "securing its energy supplies", it seems to be expending a lot of effort policing a region from where most of the energy actually flows to India, China, Japan and Europe. Do they all pay their share of the policing costs? Is this the best way to achieve such security? Or is it the case that its not so much about securing OUR supplies as keeping a chokehold on THEIR supplies? Does all this effort secure that chokehold and in what circumstances are we thinking of using it? (I personally think this is a reason that is frequently quoted, but in actual fact it has more to do with the business interests of particular companies and very little to do with securing our supplies OR interdicting anyone else's. The threat may be almost entirely theoretical, the benefits are almost entirely accruing to particular oil and gas companies and those companies are basically using the US taxpayers to subsidize/protect their commercial interests...and they care nought for the interests of those taxpayers, etc. etc).

I think the US clearly does carry a lot of water for Israel. But I dont think the elders of Zion control the world or any such thing. For a long time, the effort expended was peanuts from a superpower perspective and domestic political considerations made it worthwhile. But because the arabs have not rolled over and played dead, the law of diminishing returns is now beginning to kick in. I personally think the US will do less and less of Israel's work in the future and if the Israelis are sensible, they will make a deal while they hold a good hand. Before people jump on me, let me add that maybe its not possible to make a deal. OK, so they will fight it out. They are grown men, let them figure it out.

2. It is a mistake to assume that Alqaeda's propaganda about apostate regimes imposed by the US is necessarily correct. Saudi Arabia's royal family is an old-fashioned royal family. They dont rule the place because the US put them in power, they rule it because their daddy won it by force of arms. They have a cozy relationship with the US, but they definitely have their own ambitions and they are NOT as dumb and useless as Friedman implies. The US is in no position to keep them in power or remove them from power. They have, as the leftists are fond of saying, "agency"...And they didnt just support jihadist and salafist causes all over the world in order to "pay off the mullahs". In some "moderate" fashion, its THEIR cause as well and they have not abandoned it. Do they have a right to have this cause? what is the line that they are not supposed to cross? Maybe they know their limitations and capabilities better than Friedman thinks and maybe they dont, but will learn from setbacks.....Personally, I think they had ambitions of becoming the head honcho in some Sunni Muslim NATO (manpower and nuclear weapons component mostly Pakistani) but this dream is not going to work. In the end, they will have even less success playing "strategy" than the big boys have had. In fact, they will probably end up paying Pakistan to barely survive and they will soon be in trouble in Yemen and that will be the end of that.

3. The US HAS played a big role in keeping the Egyption regime in power and that is almost entirely about Israel. But even in Egypt, the US does not call all the shots. And the mess that is US-Iranian relations has a lot to do with US arrogance (as in treating Iran as some kind of banana republic) and maybe about Israel (though I have some difficulty figuring out why Israel is supposedly so scared of Iran. I dont get it). But the bottom line is that Iran is a real country and someday the US will figure out a way to deal with them.

In Pakistan, the US has supported military dictators over democracy in the past, but again we may be giving the US too much credit if we assume that someone in Washington can magically decide whether Pakistan has democracy or dictatorship. The army high command in Pakistan has its own agenda and uses the US at least as much as the US has ever used Pakistan. And this relationship is pretty much on the rocks as well.

4. Even when its intentions are good, the US embassy is a very crude instrument and lacks the finesse or local knowledge to efficiently (as in input vs output) regulate a far away country (or even a nearby country, see Mexico). I agree with the idea of keeping goals in line with abilities. The US has tremendous clout and can force local powers to bend to its will in some matters as long as it does not try too much.

Sorry, got to run, these are off the top of my head and not well organized or prioritized. I will try again later.

omarali50

11-11-2009, 05:20 PM

Amen.
I started writing my long winded reply and had to do some work, so missed the last two replies..which seem to me to pretty much sum it up.

Surferbeetle

11-12-2009, 04:05 AM

...but definitely not for delicate sensibilities. Not everybody likes America :wry:

From Asia Times: UNDER THE AFPAK VOLCANO, Part 2 Breaking up is (not) hard to do (http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/KK07Df01.html) by Pepe Escobar (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pepe_Escobar)...Spengler's (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/David_P._Goldman) relative?

Washington's rationale for occupying Afghanistan - never spelled out behind the cover story of "fighting Islamic extremism" - is pure Pentagon full spectrum dominance: to better spy on both China and Russia with forward outposts of the empire of bases; to engage in Pipelineistan, via the Trans-Afghan (TAPI) pipeline, if it ever gets built; and to have a controlling hand in the Afghan narco-trade via assorted warlords. Cheap heroin is literally flooding Russia, Iran and Eastern Europe. Not by accident, Moscow regards opium/heroin as the key issue to be tackled in Afghanistan, not Islamic fundamentalism.

slapout9

11-12-2009, 05:06 PM

davidbfpo

11-12-2009, 10:52 PM

Hat tip to Steve Coll, who has written a short commentary on new writing on the Taliban:http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/stevecoll/2009/11/decoding-the-new-taliban.html I have picked one sentence:
It is an outstanding and important collection—just the sort of locally specific, openly debatable, scholarly analysis about the diverse structures and leaders of the Taliban that will be required more and more if the international community is ever to understand the insurgents and divine how to prevent a second Taliban revolution.

Read more: http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/stevecoll/2009/11/decoding-the-new-taliban.html#ixzz0WgkGhQdS

The book's website is:http://cup.columbia.edu/book/978-0-231-70112-9/decoding-the-new-taliban

davidbfpo

PS Copied to the 'What are you reading' thread.

Fuchs

11-19-2009, 06:26 PM

(...)

I am in fact in favor of a VERY different operational idea; I WANT them to take over control of territories (territories in which their opponents can wage war freely, unlike the U.S. inside Pakistan).
They're vulnerable once they leave their covert mode, and they spend much manpower on running things once they're in control. Even more; they become more responsible for what happens, and can disappoint the population.
I wrote a text last year ago about how we could use a COIN equivalent of mobile defence; lure them to take over control, become visible, become careless, expose themselves - and then we could hit them badly.

That, of course, necessitates that we're able of waging war instead of merely a mix of peacekeeping, mentoring and occupation. It does also require that our art of war goes beyond logistics, beyond just piling more resources on a problem.

A strategic Mobile Defense equivalent for COIN

I read Manstein's "Verlorene Siege" recently. He's recognized as one of the greatest generals of WW2 and wrote that book in the 50's.

One of the interesting parts of that book was a repeated side-note; an accusation at WW2 generals that they failed to break the trench war pattern by voluntarily sacrifice ground to resume mobile warfare once the enemy advances into the widened neutral ground.
That fits pretty well to his WW2 operational concept "Schlagen aus der Nachhand" (Mobile Defense) which allowed the enemy to go beyond the Clausewitzian "Kulminationspunkt" (culminating point) before a decisive counter-attack destroys the attacking armies.
It requires a great deal of patience, discipline and military understanding by the politicians (Hitler most often lacked that) to allow the generals to use such a devastatingly effective operational plan.

I believe that I found a modern-time parallel for COIN.
The low level of Guerrilla combat in Iraq seems to me to be at least in part due to the overwhelming combat effectiveness of the occupation forces. The deterrence is so strong that the classic Maoist Guerrilla warfare stage of open confrontation was never really attempted. There were some major fights as in Fallujah, but those were in their size rather reminiscent of the numerous combat actions in Vietnam than Vietcong's all-out Tet offensive or Castro's drive to Havanna.

The parallel is probably not yet clear: Imagine the counter-Guerrilla parties would be able to provoke a general, decisive uprising that could be defeated conventionally and decisively.
The Vietcong didn't recover from the Tet offensive - regular Northern Vietnamese troops did most of the fighting afterwards.

To provoke such a large-scale open uprising would require less, not more military power in the country (but availability of quick strategic reinforcements).
The counter-Guerrilla forces would need to give up some strength and ground first and to deceive the Guerrillas about the relative physical and morale strengths.
That's certainly a risk; to give up some strength and ground to entice the enemy into an extremely vulnerable action to defeat him decisively.

To give provoke a risky Guerrilla offensive by intentionally giving up some control and strength could be a counter-Guerrilla strategy, resembling the extremely demanding operational concept of mobile defense / "Schlagen aus der Nachhand".
It might work in Afghanistan.

The equivalent to the culminating point would be the switch from covert to overt mode of operations; the critical point in regard to vulnerability.

tequila

11-19-2009, 06:50 PM

omarali50

11-19-2009, 07:17 PM

you should keep in mind that the army encourages all the crazy conspiracy theories (India funds the TTP, USA supports Baitullah Mehsud, etc) first and foremost out of a desire to keep the national security paradigm within Pakistan fundamentally unchanged. They fear (with some justification) that if the whole anti-Indian, Islamist, conspiracy minded paradigm is changed, then people will no longer tolerate their dominance in political affairs. Politicans will slip out of control and .....
This political need, and not some kind of superior strategic vision, primarily drives psyops in this domain....A second overlooked factor is the intellectual level of most of the high command. These are not great thinkers, they are army officers promoted in a system that rewards conformity and the ability to keep your mouth shut. They went to school and learned that "strategic depth" dictates X or Y. They never figured out that the whole scheme may be wrong. That, by the way, is a common failing in armies, which is why we have civilian control of the armed forces. Tunnel vision is part of the package (and a necessary part; was it Tolstoy who said a good general needs to be stupid or he would never manage to stay the course and win a battle? I will have to look it up..)

Entropy

11-19-2009, 07:49 PM

Interesting discussion, as usual.

I forget who, but someone once said that policymaking is the art of choosing the least bad option since very often there isn't a clearly "good" policy to choose. Choosing from a list of unsatisfactory policy choices, therefore, is really an exercise in prioritizing competing interests or values. Some interests and/or values will have to be sacrificed to enable the fulfillment of others. For obvious reasons politicians in democracies don't like making sacrifices which explains why that status quo is often so powerful and difficult to change.

The US role in the middle east is all about those competing priorities and unsatisfactory choices in my opinion. There's no way to have our cake and eat it too. We also need to be cognizant of the fact that actions (or inaction) we take with have 2nd and 3rd order effects - some predictable, others not.

So while I agree in theory with a lot of the policy changes Bob's World recommends, they would put at risk some pretty important interests. I do agree the hinge for policy change in the ME is energy. As long as oil remains the world's most important strategic resource I don't think we will see any dramatic policy shifts no matter how much we may wish for them. The strategic importance of oil isn't going away anytime soon either - even if we had a technically and economically viable alternative available now, the shift would take decades and hundreds-of-billions-of-dollars of investment. I think we have to acknowledge the reality that energy supply with continue to be a dominant - if not the dominant - interest we have in the region.

If that is the case, then we should look at what can be achieved given the limitations imposed by our energy interest.

slapout9

11-19-2009, 08:10 PM

So while I agree in theory with a lot of the policy changes Bob's World recommends, they would put at risk some pretty important interests. I do agree the hinge for policy change in the ME is energy. As long as oil remains the world's most important strategic resource I don't think we will see any dramatic policy shifts no matter how much we may wish for them. The strategic importance of oil isn't going away anytime soon either - even if we had a technically and economically viable alternative available now, the shift would take decades and hundreds-of-billions-of-dollars of investment. I think we have to acknowledge the reality that energy supply with continue to be a dominant - if not the dominant - interest we have in the region.

If that is the case, then we should look at what can be achieved given the limitations imposed by our energy interest.

Now that is some Strategic Thinking;)

slapout9

11-19-2009, 08:50 PM

Don't know if I posted this before or not. Link to Colonel Warden's analysis of the options in A'stan.

http://www.strategydevelopment.net/strategic-options-the-west-and-afghanistan.php

davidbfpo

11-19-2009, 10:11 PM

Slap,

I liked - at first - the last paragraph in Warden's piece:
This cursory strategic review would suggest that the best course would be to end the war in return for an agreement from the Afghan government not to allow any foreign group to operate against the West from Afghanistan. Verification would be easy and deviance could be addressed with tactics ranging from increased payments to Afghanistan to air operations against strategic targets within the nation.

Then on reflection is there an Afghan government capable to stop a foriegn roup, now or in the likely, traditional future we can glimpse? No. Verification would be easy. No, not convinced and in the future as hostile groups learnt more difficult. Clearly our ability now to "fix" is poor and done remotely as I think is envisaged even less reliable. The tactics used, well what strategic targets exist in the Afghanistan foreseen? Not many I venture, unless the heroin is collected to be bombed.

Now if we could persaude and "rent" enough Afghans to get agreement on excluding hostiles, even counterin them - then I could see the merit in such a strategic approach.

Made me think, thanks Slap.

slapout9

11-20-2009, 06:01 AM

Now if we could persaude and "rent" enough Afghans to get agreement on excluding hostiles, even counterin them - then I could see the merit in such a strategic approach.

Made me think, thanks Slap.

Much closer to what he has in mind. He also did a lot of work on the Pak-India problem and that is the real problem.

Bob's World

11-21-2009, 02:49 AM

Slap,

I liked - at first - the last paragraph in Warden's piece:

Then on reflection is there an Afghan government capable to stop a foriegn roup, now or in the likely, traditional future we can glimpse? No. Verification would be easy. No, not convinced and in the future as hostile groups learnt more difficult. Clearly our ability now to "fix" is poor and done remotely as I think is envisaged even less reliable. The tactics used, well what strategic targets exist in the Afghanistan foreseen? Not many I venture, unless the heroin is collected to be bombed.

Now if we could persaude and "rent" enough Afghans to get agreement on excluding hostiles, even counterin them - then I could see the merit in such a strategic approach.

Made me think, thanks Slap.

and not the government. There is a difference.

slapout9

11-21-2009, 03:24 AM

and not the government. There is a difference.

I agree with you on this.......the Government is the problem:eek:

Bob's World

11-21-2009, 12:39 PM

To clarify, we must work with the government, but the leaders with the most influence in the outer areas likely posses less formal authority and more enduring influence. Ask me again in couple months though, as I am shipping out next weekend to Kandahar.

davidbfpo

11-21-2009, 01:29 PM

Two items from FP, a montage of Karzai's cronies:
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/11/19/karzais_cronies

Useful if you mix in those circles.

Secondly a review piece by Paul Pillar 'Afghanistan Is Not Making Americans Safer. Will ramping up the war in Afghanistan embolden domestic terrorists? Which ends with:
The indirect effects of anger and resentment are inherently more difficult to gauge or even to perceive than the direct effects of military action in seizing or securing territory or in killing individual operatives. But this does not mean they are less important in affecting terrorist threats. They are the main reason that in my judgment, expansion and extension of the counterinsurgency in Afghanistan is more likely to increase than to decrease the probability that Americans inside the United States will fall victim to terrorism in the years ahead.

See:http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/11/19/afghanistan_is_not_making_us_safer?page=0,0

slapout9

11-21-2009, 04:18 PM

jmm99

11-21-2009, 05:59 PM

Stay safe in the Rockpile.

Regards,

Mike

davidbfpo

11-22-2009, 03:41 PM

A historian writes:http://www.spectator.co.uk/essays/all/5530328/sleepwalking-into-disaster-in-afghanistan.thtml

Summary opener:
John C. Hulsman says that America’s declining status will ultimately doom its Afghan campaign. Obama must learn from Britain how best to manage the decline of an empire. and ends with:
This is not to say that America will not remain, for a long time and by a long way, the most powerful nation on earth. However, nothing is inevitable. If America can finally realise that it cannot do everything in the world and all at once, paradoxically its power is likely to prove far more enduring and useful for global stability than if it fritters it away, believing itself to remain in a position of pre-eminence that has passed it by. President Obama could do with some more time spent thinking about how the last great power coped with decline.

Before anyone thinks the author is a cheeky "Limey" advising his "cousins", he's an American:http://www.john-hulsman.com/

davidbfpo

11-22-2009, 04:11 PM

Once again an on the ground viewpoint, which updates the recent Steve Pressfield and Jim Gant advocacy of working with the tribes:
http://freerangeinternational.com/blog/?p=2394

Both cited one tribal leader Ajmal Zaizi, who now is assessed by the local US Army as an AOG i.e enemy:
Thus a western educated, populist style leader who has been on the run from the Taliban, who lost his father to the Taliban, who has driven out the Taliban, established good order and discipline in his strategic valley and even reached across the border into Pakistan to strike up alliances with the hard pressed Shia tribes located in the Parrots Beak area (didn’t know there were Shia there did you? me either but I know how important that is and also how much those people need friends like us) is now considered by the U.S. Army to be an AOG leader. AOG means “Armed Opposition Group” which means Ajmal is now lumped in with the Taliban and drug barons.

Oh yes, cites the presence of ANP & ABP as a retrograde step.

Pressfield's blog:http://blog.stevenpressfield.com/ and Gant's article:
http://blog.stevenpressfield.com/wp-content/themes/stevenpressfield/one_tribe_at_a_time.pdf

M Payson

11-22-2009, 05:35 PM

Here's the September issue of "In Fight" magazine (http://occident2.blogspot.com/2009/11/afghan-taliban-photography-magazine.html), glossy compilation of photographs from the front put together by some element of the Taliban. October's issue is also available. Not sure if it's posted elsewhere on SWJ. I came upon it via Bill Roggio's reference to "Jalaluddin Haqqani on suicide bombings in Afghanistan," (http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat-matrix/archives/2009/11/jalaluddin_haqqani_on_suicide.php) which led to Jihadica's "New Interview with Jalaluddin Haqqani," (http://www.jihadica.com/new-interview-with-jalaluddin-haqqani/) which led to...Nawa-i Afghan Jihad, Urdu Internet Magazine (http://occident2.blogspot.com/2009/11/nawa-i-afghan-jihad-urdu-internet.html). Etc.

All make for interesting, if sobering, viewing.

Steve the Planner

11-22-2009, 08:45 PM

Winning a War in Afghanistan is nothing more than winning a ticket to an on-going conflict---unless something else happens.

Look at it from a basic economic/geographic standpoint. The core problem came in 1947 when the latest "carve-up" of this area was finalized based on a post-Durand change of circumstances.

In 1900, all these places were essentially under one dominant operating principal---colonial British empire. Did it really matter, for example, that Baluchistan was the port and harbor to Afghanistan's south as long as all were part of the same basic structure?

The essential Persian/Pashtun influence cycles affecting Afghanistan also didn't matter much as long as Iran was under US/British control.

Two big things happened after 1947. Pakistan and Afghanistan were separate countries. Pakistan experienced a huge mass migration as the Indus/Hindu culture fled to India, and the Muslim Indians fled to Pakistan.

Now, no matter what happens, there are three big unsurmountable issues: (1.) Afghanistan is the last big frontier (ungoverned space) in South Asia; (2.) It is surrounded geographically captured by Pakistan (Balochistan/ Gwadar); (3.) The importance of its hard-scrabble unexploited natural resources, due to external demand/markets, and internal/external population pressures, is driving the "bidding war" for this as-yet-unresolved real estate.

Stability lies in three alternate paths: (1.) Afghans united under great external pressure and massive investment strategies carefully played out (not likely, but possible with potentially divisive Indian or Chinese partnerships); (2.) Pakistan gains control either de facto or dejure; or, (3.) it stays on tenuous and unstable life support (conflict) while US/British/Euro interests continue to struggle against obvious challenges they are neither politically or economically able to meet and conquer (the warlords and tribes, divide and conquer approach).

Of course there are several major political/demographic/geographic fault lines (Urban vs. Rural, North vs. South, Pashtun Belt (Pashtunistan)) that impact fine grained solutions and interim steps. These are, I believe, arguments at the margins, and not the big picture.

Real sustainable strategy (Winning) lies somewhere in the above three paths.

If I was looking for big partners other than Pakistan for which US/British/Euro interests could be safest (least threatened), I would meet with India first and China second.

Who did President Obama meet with lately before any announcements? China and India.

Who, of the neighbors, is pouring the most into Afghan reconstruction? India, and China.

It will be interesting to see what the next roll of the dice produces.

Comments and criticism are actively invited.

Steve

davidbfpo

11-25-2009, 09:43 PM

Steve asked for responses to:
If I was looking for big partners other than Pakistan for which US/British/Euro interests could be safest (least threatened), I would meet with India first and China second.

Who did President Obama meet with lately before any announcements? China and India.

Who, of the neighbors, is pouring the most into Afghan reconstruction? India, and China.

It will be interesting to see what the next roll of the dice produces.

What better way of at worst diplomatically snubbing Pakistan than hosting in such a manner the Indian PM's visit to Washington D.C.? Taken in isolation this appears to be blatant power politics, then remember Pakistan's closest ally is China; albeit one that is not currently giving much for free. All very curious and is there a shared interest? Can China influence Pakistani policy on Afghanistan, my recollection is that the influence is very low profile now.

Whatever happens the USA cannot be seen - domestically - that it is in Afghanistan to help China and India.

Did I not see that Iran and India were holding talks or exercises recently?

Now where is Saudi Arabia and to a lesser the Gulf states - who have the cash?

Sorry Steve, more questions than I intended.

davidbfpo

11-25-2009, 09:58 PM

From a comment column in The Guardian, taking a different viewpoint on Afghanistan:
We cannot allow this foul insurgency to triumph. If we scuttle away from Afghanistan we will inflict horror on its people. The wrong people will win: in three years they might not.

From:http://www.guardian.co.uk/global/2009/nov/23/afghanistan-horror-insurgency-wrong-people

In a quiet way alongside the newsreel from Wootton Bassett the debate on the UK's role continues, although such comment articles have little impact on the public mood.

What maybe having an impact is the question 'Did our soldiers die for nothing?'. Most recently mooted by a very brave war widow, Christina Schmid; voice recording:http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/audio/2009/nov/25/olaf-schmid-funeral-british-army and the eulogy in full:
http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2009/nov/24/olaf-schmid-funeral-widow-eulogy

I cite:
We now have a duty to not just honour what he stood for but live lives which honour the sacrifice he made. Please do not allow him to die in vain.

Steve the Planner

11-25-2009, 11:38 PM

David:

I suspect the real answer for Afghanistan does not begin to emerge until some kind of successful international meeting occurs to resolve all the issues associated with Pakistan, India, Afghan borders with acceptance by China and Saudi Arabia, and in a manner that does not inflame new issues with Iran.

Is that a bit like asking for "World Peace," or resultion of the Isreal Palestine issues?

But, maybe something can aoccur in the interim (as part of focused activities) that lays groundwork for either "the games to begin" or to define the scope of a successful later activity.

I'm very interested in the India/China issues much more than the "ground appearance" of events in Pakistan. As India's Singh pointed out, the Pakistani military's actions are much more important than the civilian leadership's statements and commitments.

Pakistan's sole military focus is on India, not Afghanistan, but they play out their focus by consistent efforts to establish pro-Pak governments in Afghanistan. Better instability than an India-friendly government.

Pakistan, with 180 million, is apipsquek in the neighborhood of Chian and India. Afghanistan and its 23.5 million are a sideshow for all. Doesn't Pakistan have the potential to field an army/militia of at least the total population of Afghanistan? The mouse that roars?

Happy Thanksgiving.

Steve

slapout9

11-28-2009, 04:17 PM

The New JFQ is out and it is about A'stan bunch of good stuff in there. especially General Warner's piece. Link to entire edition is below.

http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Press/jfq_pages/i56.htm

M Payson

11-28-2009, 04:51 PM

A couple of publications on Afghanistan that speak to working with the tribes - and others, like religious leaders and ex-militants - as the environment really demands. Glad this approach is gaining traction.

"Religious Actors and Civil Society in Post-2001 Afghanistan (http://www.cmi.no/pdf/?file=/afghanistan/doc/071212%20Religious%20Actors%20and%20Civil%20Societ y%20in%20Post-2001%20Afghanistan%20_Paper.pdf)" by Kaja Borchegrevink. Published in 2007, it provides an interesting look at how the aid community in Afghanistan didn't (doesn't?) do much more than light, need-driven consultation with religious actors and points the way toward more substantial involvement. I'm having trouble with the link but think it's my browser.

"The Role of Culture, Islam and Tradition in Community Driven Reconstruction (http://www.theirc.org/resource-file/role-culture-islam-and-tradition-community-driven-reconstruction-pdf)" by Kim Maynard, Ph.D., about an adapted model of the National Solidarity Program in Khost and Logar, Afghanistan in 2003. (Disclaimer: I ran the program when this study was done.) Looks at ways to intensify tribal and religious (and ex-militant) involvement in programming, manage recruitment to maximize local economic impact, etc.

Steve the Planner

11-28-2009, 09:08 PM

Slapout9's citation is pretty interesting, but...

I was relishing the insights which I expected to read in John Nagl's "A Better War in Afghanistan," but all it was was a thorough critique of what went wrong in the past and an earnest plea to not do that again. He also cited Tony Cordesman's assessment for McC that the civ-mil mess is huge.

Making an ever-growing "oil spot" of Kandahar sounds like a pipedream, especially when, even today, Prov. Council Chief Karzai is watching the assassination attempts on the Governor. Until proven in an actual place in Afghanistan, oil spot is a theory, and not a reality ripe to build on.

No insights or roadmaps from Nagl.

2LT Joshua Welle did, I think, a great job in describing efforts at Civil-Mil improvements in some limited sectors, but as a model, they all broke down around the central problems of lack of Afghan central reach, and the multi-national actors.

I am looking forward to hearing the President's speech, but I suspect it will be more about slogans and concepts.

The complexity of actually managing, let alone, improving or substantively changing, a community, culture or nation is, of itself, a herculean challenge. To do so in the actual international, political, economic, cultural, and physical landscape is a challenge upon challenges.

It would be nice to have a meaningful discussion, once the resources and time line are set by the President and Congress, of what could realistically be achieved with those, and then build a plan around accomplishing that.

Was it Buzz Lightyear who said: "To Tuesday and beyond....!"

Steve

jmm99

11-28-2009, 10:24 PM

but in the meantime, I've been mulling a passage from FMI 3-24.2, Tactics in Counterinsurgency (http://usacac.leavenworth.army.mil/cac2/coin/repository/FMI_3-24%202.pdf) (p.16):

1-18. Commanders must be prepared to operate within a broad range of political structures. The Host Nation’s form of government may range from a despotic dictatorship to a struggling democracy. Commanders at all levels, including platoon leaders and company commanders, need to recognize the importance of establishing and reinforcing the HN as the lead authority for all operations. This reinforces the legitimacy of the HN government.

I'm not picking on this particular interim work, since the concept is all over the place. I've had some difficulty getting my arms around the questions I want to frame. The focus deals with the political effort side of the ledger.

I've put my off the top of my noodle comments in quotes to separate them from the questions.

1. If we posit that the political effort is the greater part of "best practices COIN", who (military or civilian) performs that effort ?

Since our civilian capabilities in this area have been allowed to atrophy (making the British Empire a bad metaphor, since they generally had competent civil administrations in place), the military seems the choice by default - at least in the present Astan case.

2. If the military is tasked with the political effort (essentially presenting the HN government as a better choice), who determines what political efforts should be made and whether they are likely to succeed ?

The knee-jerk response is that our political leadership should make those decisions because they are, well, "political". But, the political leadership does not have to execute those decisions - as we are positing, the military has that task.

3. If the military has the role to determine what political efforts should be made and whether they are likely to succeed, is the military competent to make them ?

We have a military which is non-political. Is this similar to asking a convent of truly celebate nuns to run a brothel ? I dunno; maybe or maybe not - I'm hung up on that one. Somehow, I'd like to put Karl Rove and David Axelrod in a sound-proof room and require them to come up with a consensus as to whether a political effort in Astan (that is within our capabilities) is viable.

And, yes, COL Jones, the concept of us supporting a "despotic dictatorship" - and sending our troops to be killed or maimed for that dictator, sticks in my craw big time.

Regards to all

Mike

Bob's World

11-28-2009, 11:36 PM

We'll see what the President lays out for us here in a couple days; then do our best to get it done. The "how" of it is far more important than the "what," so my personal goal is to try to make the "how" as good as possible, and not agonize over the what. I should be boots on the ground in a few days and look forward to the opportunity to play a small role.

Steve the Planner

11-29-2009, 02:24 AM

jmm:

The problem, as with Iraq post-conflict, is not that the military isn't, in theory, competent to manage the civilian country.

It is the practice where everything false apart. Ultimate;y it looks like Joe Stalin running everything, not by incompetence, but by lack of the routine market, political and feedback structures essential to making anything complex work. The biggest feedback structure missing is the one of typical constraints.

Ultimately, commanders felt compelled to work with "friendly" shieks, and to do things that either looked good to the shieks, or sounded good to an American.

The reason the number and type of schools exist in a society are often because that is all that could be worked out and sustained.

The reason, in Iraq, that many services were handled at the national ministerial levels was, in part, because the problem (like watershed management or oil production/distribution) was not something locals could handle (for a number of reasons). And the minimal level of local services/governance resulted from the lack of locally-generated revenues to support anything bigger, more-complex.

We tried to build local provincial structures which are quite simply unsustainable, at least as to service provision. Ultimately, Iraq was, and will be based on a national structure (where the money is) with a petition structure of one form or another from the local levels. This structure is not much different than the Ottoman days. Morer might doistributed down at different times, or "better," but the structure and dynamics remains the same.

When we try to break these places out of these systems, or act, based on our relative lack of constraints, they go along while we are there, but everybody knows it won't work after.

Even on this site, you read something suggesting how "we" change the tribes, or create a new relationship and dynamics between local, district, province and national, and most of us understand that that approach is not really going to work for long.

We hope, instead, that it will stick long enough for us to leave. That's what "expeditions" and "expeditionary forces" do.

Surferbeetle

11-29-2009, 03:42 AM

but in the meantime, I've been mulling a passage from FMI 3-24.2, Tactics in Counterinsurgency (http://usacac.leavenworth.army.mil/cac2/coin/repository/FMI_3-24%202.pdf) (p.16):

I'm not picking on this particular interim work, since the concept is all over the place. I've had some difficulty getting my arms around the questions I want to frame. The focus deals with the political effort side of the ledger.

I've put my off the top of my noodle comments in quotes to separate them from the questions.

1. If we posit that the political effort is the greater part of "best practices COIN", who (military or civilian) performs that effort ?

Mike,

The USAID website on PRT's (http://afghanistan.usaid.gov/en/Program.31a.aspx) may be of interest:

Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) have been the primary vehicle for the delivery of U.S. and international official foreign assistance outside of Kabul, particularly in unstable provinces. They are joint civilian-military operations that were established at the end of 2002 to improve security, extend the reach of the Afghan government, and facilitate reconstruction in the provinces.

A PRT typically consists of... military personnel, a USAID field officer and a DOS political officer. Many also have a USDA advisor.

The US DoS PRT website (http://careers.state.gov/ap-jobs/reconstruction.html) has job listings/descriptions and the following:

PRTs are a key element in a broader coordinated civil-military strategy, which includes continued Coalition combat operations, expansion of NATO/ISAF, implementing international donor development assistance, training and deployment of Afghan national army and police units, and diplomatic engagement with Afghanistan's neighbors.

PRTs focus on a range of activities relevant to their environment, including:

* Establishing and maintaining good working relationships with key government, military, tribal, village, and religious leaders in the provinces.
* Monitoring and reporting on critical political, military and reconstruction developments.
* Supporting Afghan authorities in providing security for activities such as the Constitutional Loya Jirga, presidential and parliamentary elections, and the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of militia forces.
* Assisting in the deployment and mentoring of Afghan national army and police units located in the provinces.
* Working closely with the UN and other donors providing development and humanitarian assistance.
* Implementing assistance projects that address local needs and gaps not filled by other donors, and focusing on building Afghan capacity.

jmm99

11-29-2009, 04:05 AM

than I expected at the end of 2003. So, you and others here can take credit for that.

My questions were more addressed to the political side of "best practices COIN" in general. I see some disconnects in the concept as laid out in FMI 3-24.3. For that matter, I see the same disconnects in the 1980s Summers-Krepinevich debate, and the current Gentile-Nagl debate - all very interesting from a military standpoint (the military effort); but without any real consideration by any of them as to the political effort required.

Most particularly, what do you do with an incompetent (corrupt, etc.) HN government ?

---------------------------------
I'd quibble about what what "expeditions" and "expeditionary forces" do. Of course they can invade with the purpose of occupying the country - we seem to be fixated on that, as opposed to a punitive raid no matter how gigantic it might be. FM 27-10 (par. 352 explains the distinction).

Coincidentally, I was just re-reading parts of Brian Linn's The Echo of Battle. At p.91, he deals with War Plan Green (a war with Mexico). We've had war plans for Mexico since the 1800s, but by 1922 the Mexican army was so weak that War Plan Green was changed to Special Plan Green, an occupation plan not unlike what we intended for Iraq: the army would establish a government, reform the education and legal systems, employ honest police and civil servants, with the clear and expressed US intention to create "peace and good order."

Now, it came to pass in 1924 that Special Plan Green was war gamed; and, surprise, the most probable COA for the Mexicans was not to resist the main invasion columns, but to wait a while and then engage in guerrilla warfare, etc. The majority staff conclusion was that the occupation would morph into a long, slow and frustrating unconventional war.

So, in 1927, Special Plan Green was amended to provide for a rapidly moving direct attack with the purpose of deposing the Mexican government, and then immediately withdrawing. The plan required that it be made clear that it did not intend a military occupation, was not an operation against the Mexican nation, but was an operation against the Mexican government.

OK, in Linn's terminology, I'm just a dinosaur "Guardian" of the "Never Again but" school, who apparently sees disconnects where others don't.

Regards

Mike

jmm99

11-29-2009, 04:32 AM

I've nothing against PRTs, nor against District Reconstruction Teams as recently floated. But, let's talk politics.

You and I start the Good Guys Party (since I use "guys" without gender distinction, we aren't male chauvinists, but are competent, honest and filled with integrity). So, how do we handle Michigan ? Well, we set up a PRT in Lansing. Will that win any elections ? Not in my experience.

So, we up the ante and set up DRTs in each county. Will that do better in elections ? Sure, but it is not the complete answer.

The answer is that you set up committees in every city, village and township - and then get down to neighborhoods (election wards, precincts). If you doubt me, ask Karl Rove and David Axelrod.

Thus, the political effort (just as the military effort) must reach down into the villages in each area which you want to secure. We win if we can keep ourselves and the villagers safe and if we have the better political message. If the political message is lousy (incompetence, corruption, venality), the political game is lost - regardless of how good the US is, cuz the HN "goodness" is the key variable.

That doesn't mean the insurgency cannot be defeated - you just use brute, overwhelming, authoritarian force and kill all the insurgents (and to make sure, use Giap's - better that 10 innocents die than one counter-revolutionary escapes). I don't think that can be our game plan.

Like I said, just an old dinosaur.

Regards,

Mike

Surferbeetle

11-29-2009, 06:01 AM

...during the day/night fish shift change (dawn and dusk) one needs to watch for sharks. Learned that particular bit of info one day after asking some of the locals why I was always the only one enjoying the water when the sun came up and everybody else was on the beach. Successfully surfing a Political 'Break' may be even more dangerous :wry:

Mike,

Let's see what we can do to avoid the sharks...

I've nothing against PRTs, nor against District Reconstruction Teams as recently floated.

Successfully and consistently addressing political considerations in an AO requires at least a baseline organizational design and depending upon importance, it may require one that is specifically tailored to the AO. Embassies, Consulates, DRT's, PRT's, CMOC's (Civil Military Operations Centers) are all attempts to answer the mail at some level be it Strategic, Operational, or Tactical. Successfully completing the mission is of course more important than organizational structure, however staffing and resourcing are deeply intertwined in completing the mission.

Dr. Lew Irwin's/COL Irwin's paper Filling Irregular Warfare’s Interagency Gaps (http://www.carlisle.army.mil/USAWC/Parameters/09autumn/irwin.pdf) and USN LT (O-3) Welle's paper Civil-Military Integration in Afghanistan Creating Unity of Command (http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Press/jfq_pages/editions/i56/6.pdf) are a couple of deep papers which examine how to optimize organizational designs for political and other important considerations. I have downloaded them both, given them the once over (300+ wpm), and will continue to mull them over as they are both keepers...

You and I start the Good Guys Party (since I use "guys" without gender distinction, we aren't male chauvinists, but are competent, honest and filled with integrity). So, how do we handle Michigan ? Well, we set up a PRT in Lansing. Will that win any elections ? Not in my experience.

For this particular exercise I'll defer to your regional experience (sociology: key informant (http://www.blackwellreference.com/public/tocnode?id=g9781405124331_chunk_g978140512433117_s s1-1)) with the caveats that we have established a shared understanding/consensus with regards to a stakeholder analysis of the region, a shared understanding/consensus as to the extent of wasta mobilized by the region, a a shared understanding/consensus of the key plank or two upon which the Good Guys Party is organized around (updated Manicheism (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Manichaeism)? :eek:), and our shared marketing analysis/efforts seem to indicate that we understand/can reach the demographics of whom we wish to influence.

So, we up the ante and set up DRTs in each county. Will that do better in elections ? Sure, but it is not the complete answer.

The answer is that you set up committees in every city, village and township - and then get down to neighborhoods (election wards, precincts). If you doubt me, ask Karl Rove and David Axelrod.

You are of course correct for Michigan, however we are ~7,000 miles away and very short on political experts who speak the local language and understand the local culture. Time for Git-R-Dun :wry: in my view we are back to the PRT and ePRT...

Thus, the political effort (just as the military effort) must reach down into the villages in each area which you want to secure. We win if we can keep ourselves and the villagers safe and if we have the better political message. If the political message is lousy (incompetence, corruption, venality), the political game is lost - regardless of how good the US is, cuz the HN "goodness" is the key variable.-emphasis SB

I am an advocate of oil-spot theory having both studied it as well as executed practical applications of the theory during OIF 1. Tailoring staffing and resourcing for our grid square/province in Afghanistan will be key to any future successes...

That doesn't mean the insurgency cannot be defeated - you just use brute, overwhelming, authoritarian force and kill all the insurgents (and to make sure, use Giap's - better that 10 innocents die than one counter-revolutionary escapes). I don't think that can be our game plan.

Killing the hard-core insurgents is an integral part of the plan my friend, but it's not the only part of the plan. Those folks will try and kill every last one of us and so we will do what we must to ensure that this does not occur while simultaneously implementing the additional lines of operation/lines of action required by the mission ;)

Best,

Steve

jcustis

11-29-2009, 04:38 PM

4. Oil spot theory presupposes active and effective development of the secured terrain. In 2006/7/8, that was not a realistic prospect. Except for road-building, pretty much all development efforts during this period were abject failures.

As many of you already know, I am spinning up for my next deploy, and it will be to Afghanistan. I will work much in the same vein that I did last time, as the lead for the non-kinetic effects team. As such, I am very interested in precisely what these abject failures were, and why, since development along the essential services line of operation will be a focal point.

jcustis

11-29-2009, 07:14 PM

History, as short or as long as it can seem, can easily be forgotten. In this case, I never even knew it to be true in the first place, as I either had not seen this story or simply was caught up in the shock of 9/11:

Taleban authorities in Afghanistan say calls to surrender alleged terrorist Osama bin Laden are a "pretext" to destroy Taleban rule in Afghanistan. About 1,000 Afghan Muslim clerics have gathered in Kabul for a meeting to discuss the fate of Osama bin Laden, who is wanted by the United States for his alleged role in the attacks on New York and Washington.

In a defiant speech read out to the clerics, the Taleban supreme leader, Mullah Mohammed Omar, said the enemies of Afghanistan view the Taleban Islamic system as a thorn in their eye and are seeking to finish it off.

In his speech to the gathering of the shura (council), Mullah Omar said Osama bin Laden is just the latest "pretext" being used by the enemies of the Taleban to destroy their rule. Mullah Omar said he wished to assure the United States and the rest of the world that Osama bin Laden had not used Afghan territory as a base for attacking anyone. However, the reclusive Taleban leader also repeated his offer of talks with the United States to settle all outstanding issues.

President Bush rejected the call for talks, saying now is the time to act.

There is a bit more at the VOA link: http://tinyurl.com/yfnw5xg

Was it hubris or vengeance that drove Bush's response? Could our nation have afforded then to open dialog to Omar, or had the issue become overcome by events? What if the august body of this Council had existed back then?

A choice was made back then, but I believe that this snippet documents an opportunity we need to go back to, if we are to achieve a decent interval in Afghanistan.

jmm99

11-29-2009, 07:50 PM

Hi Steve, the Shark Killer :)

I've downloaded the two articles and will read them. My eye caught the chart in Welle's article which outlines C-M co-operation (proposed for ISAF), which is:

975

similar to the Vietnamese Pacification Program (including CORDS), except that a Vietnamese chart would have gone down another level to the villages. In Vietnam, the villages were where the action was at.

The VPP was reasonably successful in some areas (especially in the agricultural effort of introducing multi-cropping rice, etc.). It might have been successful (the "might" because of the problems with GSV governance), if the South had not been hammered by Northern invasions (1968, 1972 and 1975). So, thought BG Tran Dinh Tho, Pacification (http://www.counterinsurgency.org/Tran/Tran.htm) (1977; one of the Indochina Monographs - 7mb DL. See this post, CORDS-Phoenix - the South Vietnamese View (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=79988&postcount=6).

However, as you correctly point out:

Successfully completing the mission is of course more important than organizational structure, however staffing and resourcing are deeply intertwined in completing the mission.

and:

... however we are ~7,000 miles away and very short on political experts who speak the local language and understand the local culture.

I'd add this up and infer that we (US civilian and military) are not capable of performing the political mission cuz we don't have the horses (political experts on Astan).

If that be so, then who will handle the political effort ? A rhetorical question, since the Astan government seems to get the ball by default. Is that government capable (competent, etc.) to prove itself the better alternative to the folks in the Astan villages. So far, it has not, even in so-called "secure" provinces (e.g., Kunduz). :(

-----------------------------
That current-events issue leads into my more general problem with FMI 3-24.3 and many proponents of "best practices population-centric COIN". Specifically, the mantra seems to me to be that: it doesn't matter what kind of HN government we have to deal with because by application of "best practices COIN" we can execute our mission. That's the only way I can read this:

1-18. Commanders must be prepared to operate within a broad range of political structures. The Host Nation’s form of government may range from a despotic dictatorship to a struggling democracy. Commanders at all levels, including platoon leaders and company commanders, need to recognize the importance of establishing and reinforcing the HN as the lead authority for all operations. This reinforces the legitimacy of the HN government.

Maybe you are going in that direction when you say:

Time for Git-R-Dun :wry: in my view we are back to the PRT and ePRT...

Originally Posted by jmm99
Thus, the political effort (just as the military effort) must reach down into the villages in each area which you want to secure. We win if we can keep ourselves and the villagers safe and if we have the better political message. If the political message is lousy (incompetence, corruption, venality), the political game is lost - regardless of how good the US is, cuz the HN "goodness" is the key variable.-emphasis SB

I am an advocate of oil-spot theory having both studied it as well as executed practical applications of the theory during OIF 1. Tailoring staffing and resourcing for our grid square/province in Afghanistan will be key to any future successes...

Now, I too like "oil spots" (key incumbant strategic base areas - adding some jargon); but that does not really answer my lines which you bolded. Sure, you as a CA officer and your team probably would execute your particular mission successfully (how's that for confidence in you); just as our member Mike in Hilo executed his mission well in his particular area of Vietnam. But, that does not equate to success nation-wide.

Looking back at Southeast Asia (yes, I'm back to the Jurassic again), I see failures in China and Vietnam (where the incumbant governments were not up to the political and military efforts), and successes in Malaya, Philippines and Indonesia (where the incumbants were up to those tasks).

Perhaps, the paradigm has changed and the "worth" of the HN government is not material to the end result - and that well-executed TTPs can overcome the HN government's deficiencies. If so, FMI 3-24.3 and "best practices population-centric COIN" do not suffer from "disconnects" ("contradictions" as Giap might well say). That really is my bottom-line question.

Best as always

Mike

jmm99

11-29-2009, 08:05 PM

Jon,

There were a number of back-channel US-Taliban contacts before and after 9/11 re: extradition of UBL and where he should be tried. The Taliban proposal (IIRC post-9/11) was an Islamic court under Sharia law. Efforts by both the Clinton and Bush II administrations went around in circles. Steve Coll covers some of this in Ghost Wars; and also Mike Scheuer (Anonymous) in his books on UBL.

IMO, based on what I've read and the Web stuff I was following at the time, there was nothing there which we would want to go back to. Present negotiations (via proxies) with the Taliban might be another story; but the Taliban are pretty rigid (especially if they think they are winning and inflicting more pain than they are suffering).

My best shot at creating a time machine to move SWC back in time to 2001. :D

Regards

Mike

jcustis

11-29-2009, 08:33 PM

Present negotiations (via proxies) with the Taliban might be another story;

That's more along the lines of what I meant. Current efforts are my concern for the most part..

Taleban leader Mullah Omar gets on message with speech aimed at West.

The Taleban’s reclusive leader has rejected President Karzai’s call for peace negotiations, which were made last week at his inauguration for a second term.

Instead, Mullah Omar issued his own “state of the nation” address yesterday, apparently designed to exploit public unease in Western countries over the Afghan war, and before an expected announcement next Tuesday that the Obama Administration will send up to 35,000 reinforcements. The 3,000-word speech attributed to Mullah Omar was distributed by e-mail in three languages — English, Pashto and Dari — by the Taleban’s propaganda wing. It addresses nine different audiences, in at times idiosyncratic English, including a call to the “Freedom loving people of the West”.

http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/Afghanistan/article6932459.ece

If I read Omar one layer deep, the talk/offer of peace negotiations at Karzai's second inauguration do not square well with talk of a surge, and stand to embolden the Taliban to continue to effort against the imperial invader. If this be the case, then we have a lot of work ahead of us...but then again, we all already know that.

davidbfpo

11-29-2009, 09:36 PM

I admire Tim & team's reporting, which is on the ground and often non-kinetic:
http://freerangeinternational.com/blog/?p=2404 They are currently visiting Nimroz province with no ISAF or GIRoA presence, to pursue a local project.

Tim cites two UK writers: the former BBC war correspondent, Robert Fox, in this:http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2009/nov/27/afghanistan-withdrawal-folly

I liked these closing lines:
The problem is that the argument is likely to be won and lost in the dining rooms of London and Washington and not in the fields and bazaars of Afghanistan. This is being conditioned by the enormous gap of perception between the metropolitan commentators at home and the reporters and workers out on the ground here. We are not so much worlds apart, but operating on different planets.

Not to overlook the Taliban working with communities approach (which is rarely reported here):
The township has its own community council. But seven weeks ago the Taliban kidnapped its head, then executed him out in the desert, and shot two other councillors in their office.

Secondly Adam Holloway, who Tim states is:
a British (Conservative) MP who has made several trips to Afghanistan traveling both inside the official security bubble and outside the wire....who has consistently demonstrated sound judgment, professional leadership, integrity and an inordinate amount of common sense

The article (via Michael Yon) is:http://www.michaelyon-online.com/images/pdf/inbloodsteppedinsofar.pdf (from a UK think tank site)

Adam Holloway is a known critic of what has happened (as posted before) and here is one paragraph:
Apart from top-down nation building, the fatal flaw of General McChrystal’s strategy. is the idea that “Afghan National Security Forces” will somehow bring order to the Pashtoon areas.
They won’t. They’ll be seen as outside occupiers.

Nothing startling on a first read.

jmm99

11-29-2009, 10:05 PM

This:

from David

Not to overlook the Taliban working with communities approach (which is rarely reported here):

The township has its own community council. But seven weeks ago the Taliban kidnapped its head, then executed him out in the desert, and shot two other councillors in their office.

was work for an "armed propaganda team" in Giap's parlance. If you can't convert them, kill them. The Taliban pay attention to villages, especially to non-Taliban oriented local government in villages. Works if the killings are selective and create more fear than enemies.

We don't need "armed social workers", but do need more "armed political workers" - but, only a limited number of ODAs exist. :(

Regards

Mike

jcustis

11-29-2009, 10:55 PM

Apart from top-down nation building, the fatal flaw of General McChrystal’s strategy. is the idea that “Afghan National Security Forces” will somehow bring order to the Pashtoon areas. They won’t. They’ll be seen as outside occupiers.

Guys, so besides the routine IO/psyop drivel, how do we counter this reality, in concrete terms?

I'm looking for ideas here, so that my key leader engagement script doesn't come off as the routine party line, "Well you know, the government is working to improve things, and the army is a key part of that. You need to be patient with them."

Official graft and corruption had a history behind it in Iraq, but unless I am reading things wrong, the Pashtun are either 1) just plain fed up with it in their areas, or 2) it has grown in a scale so great that it cannot be overlooked. Problems with the ANA and ANP seem to gain a lot of traction in the media and quasi-official observations, but are they really that significant compared to what has been the experience in Iraq?

slapout9

11-29-2009, 11:11 PM

jcustis, I don't know how much of this will help but what I would do is collect as much back round Intelligence on the Key Leaders as possible. Then look for surfaces and gaps in his personal life! Influence him on a personal level (help or hurt) before I would start talking about the Party Line so to speak.

jcustis

11-29-2009, 11:15 PM

Surferbeetle

11-29-2009, 11:41 PM

Guys, so besides the routine IO/psyop drivel, how do we counter this reality, in concrete terms?

I'm looking for ideas here, so that my key leader engagement script doesn't come off as the routine party line, "Well you know, the government is working to improve things, and the army is a key part of that. You need to be patient with them."

Official graft and corruption had a history behind it in Iraq, but unless I am reading things wrong, the Pashtun are either 1) just plain fed up with it in their areas, or 2) it has grown in a scale so great that it cannot be overlooked. Problems with the ANA and ANP seem to gain a lot of traction in the media and quasi-official observations, but are they really that significant compared to what has been the experience in Iraq?

Jon,

David's link for Adam Holloway's points on Afghanistan (http://www.michaelyon-online.com/images/pdf/inbloodsteppedinsofar.pdf) was worth the read.

My to-do list for a deployment includes:

1. Prepping my team.

2. Gaining an understanding of at least the governance, economic, and security systems before deploying.

3. Continually updating my understanding of at least the governance, economic, and security systems once I am on the ground.

4. Regularly reconciling (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stakeholder_analysis) my to-do list, timeline (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schedule_%28project_management%29), and cost estimates (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Estimation_%28project_management%29) with that of my internal and external customers.

You know as well as I do that it just sounds simple and easy...I'll send along a pm :wry:

Steve

slapout9

11-30-2009, 12:04 AM

Indeed! Thanks for reminding me of that aspect. Always go in knowing more about him and what he wants than he does.

Remember the 3 F's his family,,,,his friends,,,,his finances. Try to understand how everything You do impacts him or family or friends or his money/power base. If it benefits him he will probably support it, if it disrupts any of his personal systems he will fight you:eek: John Robb did a post recently along these lines called social system disruption....worth a read. Truth in lending he posted my 5 rings analysis so I am not an innocent bystander.......but I belive in it. If I get time I will PM you later(maybe tomorrow).;)

jcustis

11-30-2009, 12:42 AM

Remember the 3 F's his family,,,,his friends,,,,his finances.

I thought there was an "M"...for mistress? I remember very clearly that you wrote (must be a few years on by now) that if you found who they were sleeping with, you could get an 'in" to the bad guy.

This is funny too, as I just read an old Michael Yon post today that discussed the brothel(s) of Tal Afar and how information was gained from them.

slapout9

11-30-2009, 01:02 AM

I thought there was an "M"...for mistress? I remember very clearly that you wrote (must be a few years on by now) that if you found who they were sleeping with, you could get an 'in" to the bad guy.

This is funny too, as I just read an old Michael Yon post today that discussed the brothel(s) of Tal Afar and how information was gained from them.

JC,I told you I was going to send you a PM.......guess I don't have to now;) It was actually the fourth F...... who is fugging who. IMO opinion the world revolves around money,drugs,guns and women not necessarily in that order. Here is an idea.....introduce the women to birth control.....they want have to worry about another mouth to feed.

jmm99

11-30-2009, 01:42 AM

and don't really need to know. Based on your question from your last deployment, you will count sheep - didn't know that Bates (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bates_College) had a course in animal husbandry.

However, I posit that the team will be Marines; hence riflemen and capable of protecting themselves and others. So much the good. I also posit that non-kinetic might mean more contact with ANP than ANA. Hence, as to this:

from Jon
Problems with the ANA and ANP seem to gain a lot of traction in the media and quasi-official observations, but are they really that significant compared to what has been the experience in Iraq?

I can't speak to the ANA, but since Steve (Surferbeetle) assigned me the task of looking at the ANP and the rest of the Astan Justice System, I did - here are the official assessments for the ANP, prosecutors, judges, at this post, The dumb lawyer again (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=85103&postcount=9). Four fairly short reports, which suggest you would probably be better off without ANP in your sector (yeah, there probably are exceptions).

One of the provinces studied (all then considered "secure") was Kunduz. For the latest in ANP developments in Kunduz, see this post, Taliban in Kunduz (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=87831&postcount=39). Not a pretty picture. Your Marines would probably make better cops, providing they have interpreters who speak the local dialect (an important point made by Adam Holloway, a good read cited by Steve).

Beyond that, I've learned that both Huey Long and J. Edgar Hoover bequeathed to Slap their books of TTPs in digging up dirt on notables; and that Steve has duly placed in coded form the concept of the Continuing Area Study Assessment:

from SB
4. Regularly reconciling my to-do list, timeline, and cost estimates with that of my internal and external customers.

:D

Cheers

Mike

Entropy

11-30-2009, 01:46 AM

There is a bit more at the VOA link: http://tinyurl.com/yfnw5xg

Was it hubris or vengeance that drove Bush's response? Could our nation have afforded then to open dialog to Omar, or had the issue become overcome by events? What if the august body of this Council had existed back then?

A choice was made back then, but I believe that this snippet documents an opportunity we need to go back to, if we are to achieve a decent interval in Afghanistan.

To add to what's already been said, much of the diplomatic summaries have been declassified and are available on the GWU archive (http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/index.html#911).

This one, prepared in July 2001 (http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB97/tal40.pdf), provides a good short summary of all the diplomatic contacts.

I'm looking for ideas here, so that my key leader engagement script doesn't come off as the routine party line, "Well you know, the government is working to improve things, and the army is a key part of that. You need to be patient with them."

Official graft and corruption had a history behind it in Iraq, but unless I am reading things wrong, the Pashtun are either 1) just plain fed up with it in their areas, or 2) it has grown in a scale so great that it cannot be overlooked. Problems with the ANA and ANP seem to gain a lot of traction in the media and quasi-official observations, but are they really that significant compared to what has been the experience in Iraq?

This poll from earlier this year (http://www.asiafoundation.org/resources/pdfs/Afghanistanin2009.pdf) should provide some good source material for you to work through this problem. PM will be sent shortly with some additional info.

jcustis

11-30-2009, 02:10 AM

Based on your question from your last deployment, you will count sheep - didn't know that Bates had a course in animal husbandry.

Not certain on the sheep counting this time...maybe predominantly goats :D.

The focus of my team will be along the lines of operation that are less concerned directly with security, and yes, we will predominantly be Marines at the fore Imagine if you will the ringleader who has to supervise the synergy between folks like PRT reps, information operations and pysop, security forces development, USAID, intelligence types, and others, as that synergy applies to my particular patch of dirt.

During my last deploy, the sheep bit was a function of our recce efforts to determine the health of the livestock husbandry efforts south the Euphrates River Valley. We were looking at facilitating an Iraqi veterinarian to come in and provide care. Alas, we picked everything up and moved to just west of Tal Afar and there were few flocks left anyway due to the drought!:wry:

Thanks for the links, as well as yours Entropy.

Surferbeetle

11-30-2009, 02:16 AM

I can't speak to the ANA, but since Steve (Surferbeetle) assigned me the task of looking at the ANP and the rest of the Astan Justice System, I did - here are the official assessments for the ANP, prosecutors, judges, at this post, The dumb lawyer again (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=85103&postcount=9). Four fairly short reports, which suggest you would probably be better off without ANP in your sector (yeah, there probably are exceptions).

One of the provinces studied (all then considered "secure") was Kunduz. For the latest in ANP developments in Kunduz, see this post, Taliban in Kunduz (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=87831&postcount=39). Not a pretty picture. Your Marines would probably make better cops, providing they have interpreters who speak the local dialect (an important point made by Adam Holloway, a good read cited by Steve).

Beyond that, I've learned that both Huey Long and J. Edgar Hoover bequeathed to Slap their books of TTPs in digging up dirt on notables; and that Steve has duly placed in coded form the concept of the Continuing Area Study Assessment::D

Mike,

Meant to thank you for that legal study regarding the gridsquare a while back :wry:....

...and I note that you have been paying attention as well, Civil Affairs is a fun job, and we are always looking for sharp lawyers/judges ;) if we ever get around to direct commissioning highly experienced talent like we did in WWII please keep us in mind...we can always use help with the rule of law portion of the assessment (JAG usually hoovers you guys right up) :wry:

Best,

Steve

jmm99

11-30-2009, 02:37 AM

"direct commissioning" sounds like a good idea - three conditions:

1. Strip away 35 years from age.

2. Waive a couple of physical requirements (which would be immaterial to legal work).

3. Airline ticket to destination.

I wouldn't be too much of a pig - GS 15 equivalent would seem adequate (O-6 grade equivalency according to the General Schedule (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/General_Schedule)). :D

An interesting dream.

Regards

Mike

slapout9

11-30-2009, 02:40 AM

Beyond that, I've learned that both Huey Long and J. Edgar Hoover bequeathed to Slap their books of TTPs in digging up dirt on notables

Cheers

Mike

All rumors they cain't prove a thing:D

Steve the Planner

11-30-2009, 03:14 AM

Jmm's comments is so easy to minimize in the Giterdun spirit.

"Most particularly, what do you do with an incompetent (corrupt, etc.) HN government ?"

Where does the "What we do" fit in vs. the "What they do and don't do.

I hate to play tough love in this thing, but once we enter a landscape we tend do either dominate it or displace others.

The Lansing Michigan problem is not whether we could get elected---we show up with big guns. It is whether we could wisely administer after dominating.

In Iraq, I knew two ag guy in the same PRT. One was the master of getting DoS grants to send Iraqis to Jordan to learn how to farm. Same guys over and over again, all part of the same click of Tikrit "farmers." Of course, he spent weeks each year escorting them to the courses. A genuine expert on Jordan's nightlife and attractions.

The other was the actual dry land farming expert who spent his time out in the field, mostly in and around Tuz Khormatu. He would spend a dime of US money, and believed in kicking and prodding the actual large farm owners into gear, and helping where he could to help the locals to arrange irrigation system repairs, etc..., through their local to provincial gov structure. He also tried to serve as an effective sounding board for their decisions, and, when it fit in, an advisor on how to do things better. (He was always ordering ag books, old and new, from Amazon (on his own nickel)).

The one was very well thought of by DoS, continued for an extra tour, and by now, is probably already in Afghanistan arranging junkets to Thailand to teach locals how to raise hot peppers. The other quit in disgust, and probably would never have been extended anyway. He is very happy back home in AZ.

(In fairness, some of that provincial effort for Tuz was only accomplished through our D-9's but the point was they used their government to get it done (Always nice to have a DivEng and construction battalions at your back!).

The basic give them fish problem.

Custis. I assume you are like my dry land farmer friend, but, unlike him, the US is about to say: Do it now, and Do it fast!

The temptation to do it fast and wrong is ever present, but, I believe will be more so in 2010 Afghanistan.

Good luck, and stay safe. Might see you there if I can find a billet that I believe will allow me to do some good (not just cash in hours).

Steve

jcustis

11-30-2009, 03:51 AM

the US is about to say: Do it now, and Do it fast!

The temptation to do it fast and wrong is ever present, but, I believe will be more so in 2010 Afghanistan.

Aye...I'm not looking forward to the conditions and measures of effectiveness attached to the surge. I am further concerned that an exit strategy might be appended to the magic number of troops that is totally irrelevant to our task and purpose but makes the task that much more difficult.

jmm99

11-30-2009, 08:56 PM

Indeed we do - go again.

Let me make it very clear that I am well aware of how to do it by domination using the biggest bore cannon. The basic technique is to establish a very authoritarian dictatorship, have a damn solid state security service and eliminate all dissent. Those governments are the least likely to have insurgencies - many valid studies on that. In fact, they fare even a little bit better than established democracies.

Insurgencies are most likely to occur in the middle ground of authoritarian governments who are incompetent in rigorous state security (usually because they have misallocated resources), and struggling democracies who are also incompetent in rigorous state security (which contradicts the kind of democracy we see in established democracies), and are also incompetent in providing the governance we see in established democracies.

My question was directed not to a counter-insurgency methodology using the "big bore domination" approach, but to a counter-insurgency methodology using the "best practices COIN" approach, where the narrative is supposed to be a key element. My question boils down to whether the "best practices COIN" methodology has any real application where the narrative is factually lousy (the HN government is simply bad news).

Your Iraq example of the Ag "expert" and Ag expert (which you have posted before) is a good one, but it does not bear on my question. It does bear on the competency of one facet of a counter-insurgency effort. The Ag "expert" made it look good to his superiors (and got promoted) by generating chaff. He also exemplifies the "top down" approach. The Ag expert got out in the field and down to the people (employed a "bubble up" approach), was basically ignored by his superiors and retired. My vote is cast for the Ag expert in the field; and his efforts had nothing to do with "big bore domination".

So, back to where I started:

If the HN government does not provide "good governance", what aspects of "best practices COIN" are useable and what are not ?

Regards

Mike

jcustis

12-01-2009, 06:35 AM

My question was directed not to a counter-insurgency methodology using the "big bore domination" approach, but to a counter-insurgency methodology using the "best practices COIN" approach, where the narrative is supposed to be a key element. My question boils down to whether the "best practices COIN" methodology has any real application where the narrative is factually lousy (the HN government is simply bad news).

Bingo!!! Therein lies a hurdle I find myself thinking about daily.

Steve the Planner

12-01-2009, 07:28 AM

jmm:

That same issue of good governance vs. big bore seems to be bubbling to the surface again in Jordan.

Does the King, once again, dismiss the troublesome legislature, and act by fiat, or push for new elections---sure to recreate a similar troublesome legislature.

The reports seems to wander between complaints about the entrenched, ineffective and corrupt government vs. more "public participation" with subtantial potential for underlying volatility.

Who's right, who's wrong, who knows?

Interested in seeing the amswers to your question.

jmm99

12-01-2009, 07:21 PM

in another thread at this post (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=88107&postcount=38); as Jon has here as to the general question.

So, here is the general question and the specific sub-questions which are on the floor:

as quoted by Jon

My question boils down to whether the "best practices COIN" methodology has any real application where the narrative is factually lousy (the HN government is simply bad news).

and

as summed by STP

1. What if the HN government is a bunch of knockleheads themselves ?

2. Is a Strategy of Tactics ("best practices COIN") capable of defeating the insurgency under that condition ?

3. If so, what is the recipe ?

As to the recipe (another way of expressing it in my post above)

If the HN government does not provide "good governance", what aspects of "best practices COIN" are useable and what are not ?

Discuss - for the benefit of Jon and others who are or will be in the line of fire.

Regards

Mike

Eden

12-01-2009, 09:22 PM

All great questions, JMM. I wish I had the answers.

A couple of random thoughts, though. It seems to me that the most difficult form of counterinsurgency is that of third-party COIN, where a foreign power provides the bulk of the resources (military and economic) to fight an insurgency on behalf of an embattled host nation government without direct control of that government. I think this is a relatively recent phenomenon - at least, I can't think of many examples prior to the Cold War. Perhaps some of the historians could help me out.

Before then, third-party counterinsurgents inevitably took control of the host nation, de facto or de jure. It was a simpler time, and it seemed ridiculous to expend resources in far away places without any direct benefits accruing. Nowadays, in the West at least, it seems immoral to expend blood and treasure in the pursuit of simple self-interest - it requires a higher moral purpose, such as bringing democracy, freedom, protection of the weak, etc.

This creates the first conundrum of third-party COIN: forcing the HN government to behave in a way it is not disposed to do, without appearing to reduce it to puppet status.

Now, HN governments often behave in ways we don't like because they understand things we do not: unspoken local rules of conduct, the efficacy of bribery to get things done, the power of brutality to effect change in behavior, etc.

This leads to the second conundrum: forcing the HN to behave in ways acceptable to us without fatally weakening it.

I'm not saying it is impossible. We may have pulled it off in Iraq; time will tell. I'm not sure employing COIN 'best practices' is a useful line to pursue in seeking the answers, because I don't believe there are a set of universally applicable 'best practices'. Each insurgency is unique. However, even assuming that each insurgency is, in fact, a soluble problem, it is safe to say that remolding the military and the political philosophy of the host nation is going to be a long-term effort. If I could turn the clock back to 2002 in Afghanistan, for instance, I would have created an Afghan Army and police force with American officers and NCOs. By now we would have grown a corps of indigenous senior sergeants and field grades capable of leading battalions. By 2022, we might be able to turn the whole mission over to home-grown generals. I would definitely have grown the government from the bottom up, rather than the top down - again, by 2022 you might have a cadre of politicians ready to lead at the national level.

Which leads me to the third conundrum: How do you get the third-party nation to eschew the 'quick fix-low cost' approach and commit to the long-term program required for third-party COIN?

jmm99

12-02-2009, 03:41 AM

These:

from Eden
This creates the first conundrum of third-party COIN: forcing the HN government to behave in a way it is not disposed to do, without appearing to reduce it to puppet status.

Now, HN governments often behave in ways we don't like because they understand things we do not: unspoken local rules of conduct, the efficacy of bribery to get things done, the power of brutality to effect change in behavior, etc.

This leads to the second conundrum: forcing the HN to behave in ways acceptable to us without fatally weakening it.

are valid points, particularly with respect to the Narrative that will gain the support of the Assisting Nation's population for the AN's intervention. To folks in the US, helping a fledgling democracy sells better than supporting a despotic dictatorship.

My questions leave that AN Narrative on the shelf (for the moment) and focus on the HN Narrative (truthfully told ) which the HN population will find acceptable. The importance of the HN Narrative may well depend on which facet of the political effort is one's focus.

For example, I've focused on civil affairs stuff that I have some feel for: the local governance system (village councils and local liaisons with higher government) and the criminal and civil justice system. I'd include in those systems, law enforcement and state security services reaching the local level; as well as tax collecting, and population and property census, services.

With respect to those systems, my conclusion is that the HN Narrative, not only in words but in practice, must be acceptable to the HN population and is absolutely essential to any kind of "success" in those areas; except in the case of a harsh authoritarian regime [**]. If that HN Narrative does not exist (the HN government is a bunch of knuckleheads), the systems in my limited area will not develop in 18 years, much less 18 months.

Civil affairs work in other areas might tolerate a more flexible Narrative. Perhaps, agricultural and other local development projects (if competently executed) fit that category. Those here who have dealt with those projects should have the lead in pontificating on the importance and flexibility of the HN Narrative to that kind of project. I'd suspect that the educational system would be a very complex area with respect to the HN Narrative and its narrators, since schools and school teachers are key insurgent targets.

And, Eden, your third point:

from Eden
Which leads me to the third conundrum: How do you get the third-party nation to eschew the 'quick fix-low cost' approach and commit to the long-term program required for third-party COIN?

is situational dependent.

Once upon a time, I was in conference with a judge when another lawyer asked for a minute to tell the judge a case (a real stinker) had to be tried, saying: "Judge, some cases shouldn't be settled and should be tried." The judge answered: "Some cases shouldn't be brought."

And so it goes with third-party COIN.

Regards to all

Mike

------------------

If "truthful" seems subject to debate, one might add "accurate". The idea in any event is that the HN Narrative (information, propaganda, psychological operations) must be White (truthful, accurate) from White (overt from HN outlets) by White (overtly accepted, issued and executed by the HN government). That is following John Fishel, to whose expertise there I yield. The HN Narrative should not be a disinformation operation (Black or shades of Grey); nor, for that matter, should the AN Narrative (addressed to its population); authoritarian regimes excepted.

[**] A harsh authoritarian regime may allocate resources (above the Subsistence Level tolerated by its population) to enhanced state security services and propaganda (White, Grey or Black). The Haiti of Papa and Baby Doc, and present North Korea, are extreme examples.

jcustis

12-02-2009, 03:43 AM

Well, hurrying up and getting it done was clearly evident tonight in the President's speech. If I were the Commandant of the Marine Corps, I'd dispense with all previous planning factors, source the manpower for a single team, and put that team on a 18 month rotation and call it a day.

slapout9

12-02-2009, 04:20 AM

Something else is going on in the backround, we are not going to do the traditional clear,hold and build. Just my opinion but he (POTUS) seemed like he didn't believe his on speech.

jcustis

12-02-2009, 04:48 AM

I think he fully believes it. I felt that he aimed well when trying to tell the Karzai govt. that it is now living on borrowed time.

jmm99

12-02-2009, 04:58 AM

from here (http://www.professionalsoldiers.com/forums/showthread.php?t=26393), dealing with the civilian side of the ledger (the political effort and narratives):

Second, we will work with our partners, the UN, and the Afghan people to pursue a more effective civilian strategy, so that the government can take advantage of improved security.

This effort must be based on performance. The days of providing a blank check are over. President Karzai’s inauguration speech sent the right message about moving in a new direction. And going forward, we will be clear about what we expect from those who receive our assistance. We will support Afghan Ministries, Governors, and local leaders that combat corruption and deliver for the people. We expect those who are ineffective or corrupt to be held accountable. And we will also focus our assistance in areas – such as agriculture – that can make an immediate impact in the lives of the Afghan people.

The people of Afghanistan have endured violence for decades. They have been confronted with occupation – by the Soviet Union, and then by foreign al Qaeda fighters who used Afghan land for their own purposes. So tonight, I want the Afghan people to understand – America seeks an end to this era of war and suffering. We have no interest in occupying your country. We will support efforts by the Afghan government to open the door to those Taliban who abandon violence and respect the human rights of their fellow citizens. And we will seek a partnership with Afghanistan grounded in mutual respect – to isolate those who destroy; to strengthen those who build; to hasten the day when our troops will leave; and to forge a lasting friendship in which America is your partner, and never your patron.

Two points. One is that we should see soon whether the anti-corruption and anti-incompetence narratives are put into practice. I wonder (a serious question) whether there is a competent team to prosecute, and a competent court to try, a governmental corruption case ? I will await the mass indictments and firings with bated breath. :rolleyes:

I'd also expect that "immediate effect" civil affairs programs are linked to an 18-month schedule. Interesting that the President mentioned only one specific program - agriculture. Jon, indeed, you may soon be counting goats.

Regards

Mike

Steve the Planner

12-02-2009, 05:02 AM

Slapout wrote:

"Something else is going on in the backround, we are not going to do the traditional clear,hold and build. Just my opinion but he (POTUS) seemed like he didn't believe his on speech."

Get out your map, and look at the President's last major foreign visits/visitors.

It ain't that complicated, but it ain't in Afghanistan.

They don't call a pawn a pawn for no reason. Afghanistan itself is the sideshow to the Big Game about border turf and regional spheres of influence.

I don't know what cards are going to turn out of the deck in which order or hand, but it is pretty obvious which cards are in the deck. India, China, Russia to play against Pakistan 1 (military) and Pakistan 2 (civilian) and Pakistan 3 (Quetta), to play, in turn, against AQ, with Afghanistan as the pawn. The US wants to be the dealer, as long as its public will let them play.

Nobody has scheduled the Loya Jirga (with Taliban) yet, but ... the Tents are on the field.

Maybe even a regional international conference (I don't think they took the plastic off that deck yet)?

The deck is cracked open. We'll just have to wait to see the game play out.

jmm99

12-02-2009, 05:46 AM

The President framed AQ as the Main Adversary; that the 2001 AUMF continues in effect; and that he wants them gone. The Taliban were not so much declared an enemy as a power to the armed conflict that has to be roughed up for 18 months to lessen its rigidity to sitting at a negotiating table.

Nothing of great comfort to the Karzai government (partner, not a patron); nor to "nation builders" (that was excluded) - and the "civilian surge" seems to aimed at a minimalist, shorter-term effort.

Looks most like a "Peace Enforcement" military effort, with some future commitment expected to take AQ down (which would require some base areas, if that take down doesn't occur in the 18 months). If that could be accomplished, I'd find that a very acceptable result.

Actions will speak much louder than words.

Regards

Mike

Presley Cannady

12-02-2009, 07:24 AM

I think he fully believes it. I felt that he aimed well when trying to tell the Karzai govt. that it is now living on borrowed time.

In a country where "official in exile" might as well be boilerplate on a resume, just what leverage does Washington have on Karzai?

Steve the Planner

12-02-2009, 07:58 AM

Presley:

That, I believe, is one of those quizzical problems that logically arise from something discussed on another thread. COIN may be fine for Americans to do in America, or Afghans to do in Afghanistan, but what happens when you are trying, as a foreign force, to oppose an internal opposition to a fundamentally flawed central government?

The recent Guardian article that Amb. Holbrooke was unsuccessfully shopping a proposal for NATO to appoint a caretaker czar for Afghanistan, as a bypass to Karzai and Eide, sounds like a signal for current bad actors to grab what they can before they become "Minister-In-Exile."

I'm fairly comfortable with the regional game they are going to play---maybe even demanding Bin Laden's head on a plate as a condition for not giving Afghanistan to India (the partner that builds)---but, I assume the Afghan piece will be aplus/minus strategy depending on what can be accomplished before the Big Game plays elsewhere.

Steve

slapout9

12-02-2009, 10:55 PM

I think he fully believes it. I felt that he aimed well when trying to tell the Karzai govt. that it is now living on borrowed time.

JC, I saw a body language expert on CNN today(named Patti Woods) she doesn't think he believes it either. This is based upon his unusual head movements during the speech. If I can find the clip I woll post it.

slapout9

12-02-2009, 10:59 PM

It ain't that complicated, but it ain't in Afghanistan.

They don't call a pawn a pawn for no reason. Afghanistan itself is the sideshow to the Big Game about border turf and regional spheres of influence.

I don't know what cards are going to turn out of the deck in which order or hand, but it is pretty obvious which cards are in the deck. India, China, Russia to play against Pakistan 1 (military) and Pakistan 2 (civilian) and Pakistan 3 (Quetta), to play, in turn, against AQ, with Afghanistan as the pawn. The US wants to be the dealer, as long as its public will let them play.

Nobody has scheduled the Loya Jirga (with Taliban) yet, but ... the Tents are on the field.

Maybe even a regional international conference (I don't think they took the plastic off that deck yet)?

The deck is cracked open. We'll just have to wait to see the game play out.

STP, some interesting stuff there.

jcustis

12-03-2009, 05:38 AM

JC, I saw a body language expert on CNN today(named Patti Woods) she doesn't think he believes it either. This is based upon his unusual head movements during the speech. If I can find the clip I woll post it.

Body language expert? :confused: What will the media think of next?

slapout9

12-03-2009, 05:46 AM

Body language expert? :confused: What will the media think of next?

This is the lady can't find the clip from last night though.:mad:
http://www.pattiwood.net/

davidbfpo

12-03-2009, 10:19 PM

Stephen Tankel's measured analysis is worth reading: http://icsr.info/blog/First-Impressions

His last sentence I expect reflects the views of many in and outside Afghanistan:
The U.S. is gambling a lot on the ability to build an Afghan army and Afghan police force in the next 18 months. What happens if [or when, depending on your degree of pessimism] this does not come together?

Or the Australian CT analyst's comments:http://allthingsct.wordpress.com/2009/12/03/first-thoughts-on-obamas-speech/ She cites and qualifies the comments after her experience in Indonesia:
And there is NO way the Afghan forces will be up to scratch anytime soon. I’m no military trainer or expert but I was involved in counter terrorism capacity building efforts in my former life. This is a much easier job and even in Indonesia it took a long long time to do. And they have a functioning state.

davidbfpo

12-03-2009, 10:41 PM

From RUSI, a Whitehall think tank (I'm a member):http://www.rusi.org/analysis/commentary/ref:C4B177FBEE2288/

At present rates, some 400,000 ANSF personnel could be through the training programmes by 2013.They would need a year of operational support, so it might be regarded as effective from 2014, the earliest realistic date when the Coalition's 140,000 might begin seriously drawing down.....The final, unspoken, variable is the loyalty of trained and equipped ANSF personnel as they go out to work in the new Afghanistan.

zen

12-08-2009, 05:03 AM

Some suggestions (stupid ones very likely) on how to deal with the terrorists in Afghanistan:
- use the lie detector for everyone in 'suspect' villages,
- anyone suspicious plant a mike in their houses and have afghans listen (for example afghan refugees from Europe) and act accordingly.

Tukhachevskii

12-19-2009, 03:12 PM

http://www.nrc.nl/international/article2439445.ece/Afghan_soldiers_and_police_fight_each_other

Umar Al-Mokhtār

12-19-2009, 06:42 PM

to consider when pontificating upon Astan (http://easterncampaign.wordpress.com/2009/12/16/29-tips-for-bad-writing-on-afghanistan/).

Fuchs

12-19-2009, 09:17 PM

to consider when pontificating upon Astan (http://easterncampaign.wordpress.com/2009/12/16/29-tips-for-bad-writing-on-afghanistan/).

I plead guilty on #26, I think.
Maybe #1, but that's in the eye of the beholder.

Umar Al-Mokhtār

12-19-2009, 10:05 PM

are hilarious.

davidbfpo

12-30-2009, 08:11 PM

Free Range International (FRI) back on the ground reporting on several themes and always worth a read: http://freerangeinternational.com/blog/?p=2418

This is a prize quote:
We are not being beaten by the Taliban; we are beating ourselves. A point made by Ken White before IIRC and others.

Within the FRI piece is a link to an intriguing commentary by a former UK diplomat, including a stint in Moscow, known for his direct, non-establishment views called 'Coalition forces on the familiar road to failure in Afghanistan' :http://www.businessday.co.za/articles/Content.aspx?id=90398

Nice last paragraph:
The lessons of history are never clear, and it is risky to predict the future. The British and the Russians won their wars but failed to impose their chosen leaders and systems of government on the Afghans. The western coalition already has as many troops in Afghanistan as the Russians did, and smarter military technology. But neither the British prime minister nor the generals have explained to us convincingly why we should succeed where the Russians and the British failed, or why fighting in Afghanistan will prevent home-grown fanatics from planting bombs in British cities. Tactics without strategy indeed.

Just why it appears in a South African business paper eludes me.

Steve the Planner

12-30-2009, 09:08 PM

David:

Rock solid post, but one hell of a way to start off the new year.

How many tactics does it take to make a strategy?

Steve

Surferbeetle

01-07-2010, 03:28 PM

From the 6 Jan '10 Business Week U.S. Boosts Civilian Presence in Afghanistan to Counter Taliban (http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-01-06/u-s-boosts-civilian-presence-in-afghanistan-to-counter-taliban.html) By Bill Varner

The Obama administration is tripling the number of civilian experts in Afghanistan to about 1,000 early this year to spur economic development and counter the influence of Taliban and al-Qaeda insurgents, a U.S. envoy said.

Eide said 80 percent of aid to Afghanistan since the overthrow of the Taliban in 2001 has bypassed the government in Kabul. As an example of the mismatch between military and civilian assistance, he said Afghan provincial governors earn $70 a month and have operational budgets of $15 a month.

DiCarlo said the U.S. backs recommendations by Ban and Eide to strengthen UN assistance to Afghanistan, including through the appointment of a senior civilian official within the military command.

“We strongly echo the secretary-general’s call for strengthened coordination,” DiCarlo said. “To help reverse the Taliban’s momentum, we are focusing our reconstruction effort in areas where we can quickly create jobs, especially agricultural ones. Rebuilding Afghanistan’s once-vibrant agricultural sector will sap the insurgency not only of foot soldiers but also of income from narcotics.”

Steve the Planner

01-07-2010, 06:41 PM

Beetle:

It's pretty amazing to me to see Eide's take on Afghanistan---which Di Carlo says the White House embraces:

Taliban influence has spread recently to the north and center of the nation, Eide said, because of imbalances in development efforts.

“Before leaving for New York, I asked a number of Afghan politicians why the insurgency has spread,” Eide said. “One element mentioned by all was the neglect of stable provinces in the allocation of development resources. For that neglect we now pay a high price.

DiCarlo said the U.S. backs recommendations by Ban and Eide to strengthen UN assistance to Afghanistan, including through the appointment of a senior civilian official within the military command.[/QUOTE]

OK, so now we will have another senior civilian, but within the military command.

I went back and looked at your's, mine and Bruce's comments from the Iraq Civilian Thread.

Everything was about the things Eide was addressing, but none of it had anything to do with needing a new senior civilian.

Sounded more like a CORDS approach where civilian practitioners, linked closely to local, regional and national efforts, were taking on an earnest and serious effort to create, improve, drive civilian efforts.

But I don't see that happening yet. Maybe...

Steve

William F. Owen

01-21-2010, 11:49 AM

If this is actually true (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/8471789.stm), then it would seem to be a very significant problem.

davidbfpo

01-21-2010, 12:07 PM

Wilf,

The BBC story has a couple of telling phrases:
Pakistan's army has said it will launch no new offensives on militants in 2010, as the US defence secretary arrived for talks on combating Taliban fighters.

Army spokesman Athar Abbas told the BBC the "overstretched" military had no plans for any fresh anti-militant operations over the next 12 months.

The Pakistan army is overstretched and it is not in a position to open any new fronts. Obviously, we will continue our present operations in Waziristan and Swat.

This is IMHO reflects a Pakistani appreciation on the ground, which appears to have been hinted at recently - taken from another thread on Waziristan:
I was bemused to learn from a Pakistani military contact, who has visited the FATA recently, that he was reading 'The Frontier Scouts' by Charles Chevenix-Trench and learning that the old methods did indeed offer an answer to today's problems.

Or it is a return to the previous policy in the Musharraf era of 'stop, start'. Not sure about that, but as a BBC reporter commented - taken from US policy & Pakistan thread:
Public opinion which supported the military action in the Swat Valley could just as rapidly rebound and the military simply thought for fifty years the FATA was uncontrollable. Public support for the military campaign would last three to four years. Finally he'd never met a Pakistani Army officer who was not convinced the Afghan Taliban would win.

I have not noted any recent reporting on the public mood, although as the attacks are increasingly in the cities, not the FATA, one would expect public opinion to meander.

Bob's World

01-21-2010, 12:37 PM

The other day as I flew over the Arghandab district of Kandahar Province, I looked down at the overgrown, jumbles of trees, and thought "are those orchards? Almonds and Pomegranates? What a mess, I wonder why they don't prune their trees..."

Later, standing on the roof of the District Center overlooking the valley a rep from the department of agriculture described the very problem, solutions being worked, etc. Currently the orchards become a haven for insurgents, safe from prying eyes. His goal is to get them pruned, and to introduce the practice of painting the trunks white. Not only does it look more orderly, but it denies much of the overhead cover, and provides a contrast at ground level that makes it much harder to hide within. It also makes for more productive orchards.

Will introducing dozens of additional hardworking civilian experts into Afghanistan make a difference? Certainly. Will they cure the disease of poor governance that gives rise to insurgency? Of that I am less optimistic.

We are in the trap of if we just work harder we can make this go away. Perhaps. Far better to work smarter.

In the old days, District governors controlled a network that took money from the people and brought it up to their level, where they kept much and also used much to grease the system of governance that has functioned here forever. It does not produce a lot of services, but not a lot of services are required either.

Now we have extended this Afghan Pyramid scheme all the way up to Kabul. Every district Governor, Police Chief, etc is appointed by a patron in Kabul, and that patron must receive his payments for that appointment. No longer does the money rise to the District level and sprinkle about. It now rises to the national level and disappears. This is not better.

We have helped to create an official government in our image, but have dropped it into Afghanistan. The Afghan people don't need an "official" government; they need a "Legitimate" government. Pause and ponder that thought. It is a critical one. The Afghan people, all people, need a "legitimate" government. That is one that they see as being of, by and for them. One that has a source they recognize. What others think is moot beyond words.

Less is more; more is less. I've yet to see, hear, or read anything that would dissuade me from the strong belief that the best thing the West can do here is simply demand that a full-fledged Loya Jirga with representatives for all the major Afghan stake holders present be called. Create the environment that allows it to happen, and then simply accept the results that come from it.

Afghanistan will not become a sanctuary for AQ, our impressive collection and punishment capabilities will assure that. Afghanistan was simply a convenient backwater for AQ to use. There are other backwaters where they will draw less attention than here. We can then shift our focus back to our actual mission. Remember? To Defeat AQ to protect the homelands. This TB insurgency is a sideshow, an overwhelming supporting effort that has pushed the main effort into the wings somewhere.

We can "win" here. We can help end this insurgency too. But more military or civilian effort working harder is not the smart way to get there. The smart way is to focus first on creating more legitimacy of government on Afghan terms, not Western terms; and then build from there. Without that foundation of legitimacy, history does not offer good odds for quick success.

Steve the Planner

01-21-2010, 01:04 PM

Bob:

Eloquent. On Point.

Can you stop over at that conference in London? I don't think the message has gotten across.

Whether Arizona, Massachusetts, Iraq or Afghanistan, you have to take the facts on the ground that the problem definition and, however-broken-butchered-and-illogical-to-outsiders the local solutions seem to be, the only effective answers will come from them.

The answers cannot come from the military or US/Int'l civilians.

Steve

John

01-21-2010, 05:59 PM

We have helped to create an official government in our image, but have dropped it into Afghanistan. The Afghan people don't need an "official" government; they need a "Legitimate" government. Pause and ponder that thought. It is a critical one. The Afghan people, all people, need a "legitimate" government. That is one that they see as being of, by and for them. One that has a source they recognize. What others think is moot beyond words.

Concur. IMO, we will soon see this dynamic come to fruition in Iraq. American will has been imposed on top of a structure that does not readily recognize the government source. Given, just the topography of Afghanistan, nevermind we are starting essentially from scratch, in regard to infrastructure, the problems will be compounded.

jmm99

01-21-2010, 08:48 PM

Taking a look at the map in the BBC piece linked by Wilf here (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=91616&postcount=636), I noticed Kurram Province (Agency) sticking out like a sore thumb; and that it was not mentioned by MG Abbas:

In the capital, Islamabad, on Thursday, Maj Gen Abbas, head of public relations for the Pakistan army, told the BBC: "We are not going to conduct any major new operations against the militants over the next 12 months.

"The Pakistan army is overstretched and it is not in a position to open any new fronts. Obviously, we will continue our present operations in Waziristan and Swat."

What's interesting about Kurram is that the Pakis were conducting operations in Kurram last month, Pakistani troops kill 15 militants in Kurram Agency (http://rantburg.com/poparticle.php?D=2009-12-13&ID=285490).

And, of course, Kurram made the news in Feb 2009 (FP one of many), Tuesday Map: Osama bin Laden's current location (http://blog.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/02/17/tuesday_map_osama_bin_ladens_current_location).

For all the tea leaf readers

Mike

reed11b

01-21-2010, 08:50 PM

We are in the trap of if we just work harder we can make this go away. Perhaps. Far better to work smarter.

Now we have extended this Afghan Pyramid scheme all the way up to Kabul. Every district Governor, Police Chief, etc is appointed by a patron in Kabul, and that patron must receive his payments for that appointment. No longer does the money rise to the District level and sprinkle about. It now rises to the national level and disappears. This is not better.

We have helped to create an official government in our image, but have dropped it into Afghanistan. The Afghan people don't need an "official" government; they need a "Legitimate" government. Pause and ponder that thought. It is a critical one. The Afghan people, all people, need a "legitimate" government. That is one that they see as being of, by and for them. One that has a source they recognize. What others think is moot beyond words.

We can "win" here. We can help end this insurgency too. But more military or civilian effort working harder is not the smart way to get there. The smart way is to focus first on creating more legitimacy of government on Afghan terms, not Western terms; and then build from there. Without that foundation of legitimacy, history does not offer good odds for quick success.

Hey look at that, we agree on something. We did the same thing in Iraq when we took actual grass roots efforts at creating democracy by the Iraqi's and invaladated them and appointed intertrim leaders. Societies were strong central goverments are culturaly acceptable (South America for example) this tactic may work, but in the middle east we have to value the nature of the society we are working with. In Social Work we call it "meeting the client were they are at".

Will they cure the disease of poor governance that gives rise to insurgency? Of that I am less optimistic.

This I am far less sure about. Still not sold that all (or even most) insurgency is directly connected to "poor" goverance.

Reed

omarali50

01-21-2010, 09:13 PM

davidbfpo

01-21-2010, 10:34 PM

If this is actually true (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/8471789.stm), then it would seem to be a very significant problem.

Now I've found the US correspondent for The Daily Telegraph has filed this: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/pakistan/7046626/Pakistan-signals-North-Waziristan-offensive-this-year.html

A longer BBC piece: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/8472986.stm and opens with this:
With its announcement that it will launch no new offensives against the Taliban in 2010, Pakistan's army appears to have opened a new innings in its favourite game with the West

Perhaps I should amend my old adjective of 'Stop, start' to 'Stop, wrangle, start'? Apologies I do not follow cricket as the use of a cricket term would be better.

Bob's World

01-22-2010, 03:06 AM

I think the insurgency and governance are separate issues, related in some ways, but separate.
The insurgency is the problem ISAF can possibly help to solve. Governance will improve with time once its clear that come hell or high water, the insurgency is not gonna win, so everyone has to get off the fence and make deals.... For the insurgency to win, you need a base, a central organization, sustained source of funds (you need much less for an insurgency to splutter along, but that is not the issue), all three securely in place, you have an aura of inevitability. All three are currently headquartered in Pakistan; if they move to Afghanistan while ISAF is still there, their job is much harder. So long as they are secure in Pakistan, its a mathematical certainty that they will win (at least in the Pakhtun hearltand) because there is just no way a foreign force is going to stay forever, so everyone has to hedge their bets accordingly. If they are forced out of Pakistan, then their chances are dramatically reduced, especially if the current Afghan regime continues to get outside support on a massive scale at the same time.
Once the insurgency has lost its sheen of inevitability, its much easier to convince people to rearrange governance a little better. Since western "experts" are almost guaranteed to make a bad situation worse, their best bet is to do LESS in detail and let Afghans sort things out, make deals, do whatever it takes. But the foreign devils still have to pay for it because no one else has the money...
Make sense? no? yes?

We call it "Insurgency and counterinsurgency" because we look at it from the perspective of the government.

Looked at from the perspective of the insurgent you could just as easily call it "Governance and countergovernance."

But that isn't very sexy, and the boys at Leavenworth would start to question why they were writing a military manual for such an operation, and why the State Department or Justice wasn't the lead. Wouldn't want that to happen. There is violence involved, so Defense must be the lead, right?

Well, at least one reasonable mind differs with the majority opinion on that point.

I think the biggest mistake we make is that we try too hard to separate the two; to focus on defeating the insurgent for daring to counter the governance; instead of assessing more pragmatically the true nature and causation for the iinsurgency that you are dealing with. To make the main effort addressing the shortfalls of governance, and the supporting effort aimed at dealing with the insurgent in a manner that never forgets that insurgents are also citizens and are related and connected to law abiding citizens throughout the land. Calling them "insurgents" makes it easy to forget that essential fact.

omarali50

01-22-2010, 05:11 PM

We may differ only in details or not at all. Maybe its just semantics. My point was not that governance does not matter, but that governance is very hard to improve when the other side has military momentum and seems to be the guaranteed eventual "last man standing" and its historically something the US embassy doesnt do very well...i.e. manipulate and manage local politics.

Its not that governance is not needed. Its that governance is not the American imperialist's best suite. So, trying to be pragmatic, we try to do as little damage as possible in the governance area by trying to do fewer silly things.... and still help improve governance.
Meanwhile, killing people is actually something the military does pretty well and if Pakistan can be prevailed upon to move these people into Afghanistan, then the killing part can become easier. When people are getting killed, THEY will come up with better answers to the question of how deals are to be made....but, keep in mind that I am a total armchair amateur and am floating balloons partly to clarify my own thoughts and hear better thoughts from other people.

Rex Brynen

07-14-2010, 07:49 PM

The latest Afghanistan reports from CSIS:

If Petraeus and Eikenberry Can WinImplementing the Strategy in Afghanistan (http://csis.org/publication/if-petraeus-and-eikenberry-can-win)
By Anthony H. Cordesman
Jul 14, 2010

Afghanistan: Campaign Trends (http://csis.org/files/publication/100714_Afgh.NATO.pdf)
Jul 14, 2010

The latter has the usual interesting data on attacks (depressing), governance (depressing), SOF activities, etc, etc.

davidbfpo

07-14-2010, 09:44 PM

An offside viewpoint:http://www.opendemocracy.net/opensecurity/%25C3%25A1ngel-g%25C3%25B3mez-de-%25C3%25A1greda/losing-more-than-afghanistan

Overoptimistic calculations by western powers estimate that we are losing the war in Afghanistan. Far from it, we are losing the whole of Asia and, what is even worse, the credibility of the Alliance and the values it defends.

(Later)
Most of Asia is sitting on the stands of the Afghan stadium watching this absurd game and sounding their vuvuzelas. NATO and the US are defeating themselves at a very low cost for competing powers.

Rex Brynen

07-15-2010, 02:30 AM

An offside viewpoint:http://www.opendemocracy.net/opensecurity/%25C3%25A1ngel-g%25C3%25B3mez-de-%25C3%25A1greda/losing-more-than-afghanistan

Beware anyone who describes "Asia" as if it were a single, like-minded entity...

Fuchs

07-17-2010, 09:48 PM

Fuchs

07-19-2010, 05:01 PM

*bump*

Still interested in an answer.

jmm99

07-19-2010, 05:15 PM

doing pretty much this:

from Fuchs
... we would send ten new soldiers for every KIA and two new ones for every WIA.

in Vietnam.

It didn't discourage them, but it did a pretty good job on us.

So currently, our (US) deployment to our KIA ratio is about 100:1 - well ahead of your curve.

What exactly is your point - a whack the mosquito game scenario ?

Regards

Mike

Tukhachevskii

07-19-2010, 05:16 PM

This is maybe a stupid question:

Why did the West never apply a "Hydra" strategy in PsyOps and policy?
I mean, we could have pledged publically (and told all Afghans about it) that we would send ten new soldiers for every KIA and two new ones for every WIA.
Add in a thorough information on the size of Western military establishments and the claim that we've proved superiority over Russians historically.
After every KIA and WIA, let new troops arrive - as pledged - and spread the word, including some increased activity.

This might have discouraged them to some degree.

Could you ensure that the media was on side (for a change:D) and prevent them from exploiting this information, in the WORST posible way, to our ownpeople? No. I don't think you could. So on the one hand our own publics, who tolerate the campaign (not war) in Afghanistan, precisely because we (the UK that is, not sure about the US) have built up some immunity to the campaign and, though not totally for the campaign, aren't willing to topple governments over it either. When we start to treat it like a proper campaign as part of a proper war (yes, we ARE at war!) support may wane. Especially if they think that society is being mobilised for war. However, in a different vein, conducting the kind of IO tactics you are suggesting would in real terms also tie our own hands behind our backs; if the threat/bluff fails then we have to honour the pledge and escalate. Alternatively, if they call our bluff and we fail to back up the threat we hand a propaganda (and stratgeic) victory to our enemies which would dwarf anything that came before it ( i.e., the "defeat" of the USSR). Then the unmentionables really do hit the fan. Just my thoughts.

Fuchs

07-19-2010, 05:43 PM

JMA

07-19-2010, 06:23 PM

JMA

07-19-2010, 06:25 PM

So currently, our (US) deployment to our KIA ratio is about 100:1 - well ahead of your curve.

Regards

Mike

Mike, is this 100:1 kill ratio verifiable?

JMA

07-19-2010, 06:37 PM

Well, considering that we deployed more than the rule would have required - there could not have been any "tie our own hands" effect.

Doing something by accident is also not the same as creating predictability.
How could any Afghan claim to fight against foreigners if every "success" only leads to more foreigners in the country?

I aimed at creating a dilemma that discourages a specific kind of violence.

It cannot work if nobody knew about the dilemma, of course.

I think you have to realise that there is no chance of westerners winning the hearts and minds of Afghans. Once you have come to that obvious conclusion then you deal with the population in a manner that in order to get rid of you they have to submit.

They have no respect for ISAF, a little fear perhaps but no respect. How could they possibly have respect for a force that allows them to continue to cultivate poppies which end up as heroin on the streets of the west?

How can tribal warriors, way behind on the development curve, have respect for fighters (ISAF) who through their ROE give the appearance of soft and weak soldiers?

How can ISAF expect respect when they are seen to be propping up an illegitimate, corrupt and non representative government?

Ask the Afghan villagers to give you an example of what would indicate that ISAF meant business, ask them to tell you what the indications would be if ISAF were in fact "winning" the war.

tequila

07-19-2010, 07:19 PM

It would have been better to promise that for ever ISAF KIA there would be 100 Taliban KIA... and then prove that it was not an idle threat.

The Taliban are fighting the war like in the wild country they live in while the West is trying to fight it with the same ROE they would have if fighting in the UK or the US.

The problem is finding the 100 Taliban to kill for every Western soldier killed.

Of course we could resort to the Soviet method of assuming non-aligned Afghans = Taliban. Working under that assumption, the Soviets came very close to the 100:1 kill rate. If you throw in the crippled and the expelled, they far surpassed it - some estimate that between 1/3rd and 1/4th of the civilian population became refugees.

The problem became that the Afghan will to fight remained unbroken. A safe area consisting of the entire nation of Pakistan proved impossible to resolve.

Fuchs

07-19-2010, 07:20 PM

jmm99

07-19-2010, 07:58 PM

and this:

from Fuchs
We deployed more additional troops since 2005 than the Hydra strategy would have required (assuming the same KIA/WIA as without the strategy).

was my point.

I did not say "kill ratio". I cited 100:1 as our (US) deployment to our (US) KIAs (ratio = US troops deployed/total US troops KIA). If it works out closer to 60:1, so be it. As time passes, that ratio will get smaller as our deployment reaches its upper level ceiling.

That ratio = US troops deployed/total US troops KIA was in that same ballpark for Vietnam - which was the only point I wished to make.

Regards

Mike

Entropy

07-19-2010, 10:37 PM

Fuchs,

Your entire scenario rests on the assumption that increasing troop levels in response to our casualties (combined with an IO campaign) would discourage the Taliban or Afghans from fighting. That's a bad assumption.

It further rests on the assumption that the people in the US and other coalition countries would accept such a "strategy" for the commitment of forces. That is at least a questionable assumption if not downright politically impossible.

Finally, had your calculus been instituted at the beginning, it would have added about 33k troops since 2001. We now have about three times that number current in Afghanistan and the Taliban don't seem very discouraged.

Fuchs

07-20-2010, 06:51 AM

Hmm, to me it seems pointless to kill one if that spawns ten more.
I couldn't claim to fight against the foreign presence if every action of mine actually increases their numbers.
Pissed off elders would become even more pissed off if every action against foreigners merely increases their numbers and activity.
And by the way; the strategy would not need to completely discourage violence. It would already be a success if it reduces violence.

The domestic policies part shouldn't be much of a problem. The parliaments could simply authorise xy,000 troops and the head of state only deploys z,000 at first. Increasing the contingent maximums has been possible even in Germany where most people resent the ISAF participation. The involved Western governments didn't really bother much about their constituents opinions in the last years.
So where exactly is the domestic political problem with the strategy?

Again - we established no systematically discouraging, in advance known element to discourage them.
What we did was like a tax hike of 1,000 bucks months after you caused a car crash. This does of course not discourage reckless driving, especially not if the connection is not made visible.

Now imagine a fine of 5,000 bucks for every car crash you cause - without chance to appeal, and effective within days.

JMA

07-20-2010, 06:54 AM

and this:

was my point.

I did not say "kill ratio". I cited 100:1 as our (US) deployment to our (US) KIAs (ratio = US troops deployed/total US troops KIA). If it works out closer to 60:1, so be it. As time passes, that ratio will get smaller as our deployment reaches its upper level ceiling.

That ratio = US troops deployed/total US troops KIA was in that same ballpark for Vietnam - which was the only point I wished to make.

Regards

Mike

I'm trying to get my head around these figures.

The Brits claim a kill ration of more than 100:1, the yanks the same but Fuchs says it more like 60:1. Lets see.

Brit casualties KIA (as at 23 June) 269. That would mean they killed 26,900 Taliban.

The US casualties KIA (as at 2 July) 841. That would amount to 50,460 Taliban KIA.

A total of 75,000 plus Taliban KIA? Hmmmm...

JMA

07-20-2010, 06:56 AM

I'm trying to get my head around these figures.

The Brits claim a kill ratio of more than 100:1, the US the same but Fuchs says its more like 60:1. Lets see.

Brit casualties KIA (as at 23 June) 269. That would mean they killed 26,900 Taliban.

The US casualties KIA (as at 2 July) 841. That would amount to 50,460 Taliban KIA.

(figures from Wikipedia)

A total of 75,000 plus Taliban KIA? Hmmmm...

JMA

07-20-2010, 07:20 AM

JMA; three failures on your part:

1) How could it have been a bluff? We deployed more additional troops since 2005 than the Hydra strategy would have required (assuming the same KIA/WIA as without the strategy).

2) jmm99 did not claim a 100:1 kill ratio. Read again.

3) Your last post is unrelated and entirely unable to argue against the Hydra strategy.

@jmm99: It's more like 60:1 actually, and that ignores the WIA.

Fuchs I like your "hydra" idea but I'm afraid it would not be possible as the West does not have the stomach for such a prolonged game of brinkmanship.

Also there is no point in putting more troops into a conflict where even though you have air and artillery support available the restrictions on it use render it ineffective in the broadest sense. And that the ROE demand that ISAF forces have to deal with the enemy as if they were arrested in New York City for a traffic violation. You find a guy with GSR on his hands an hour after a contact and you have to process him through the system where by paying a bribe he can be out by morning. Can't understand this obsession with taking prisoners.

Then what of the Keystone Cops outfit called the Afghan National Army? All 134,000 of them. What exactly have they guys achieved?

I'm not talking about the soldiers here when I say the politicians and the generals do not have the stomach for a war. Nothing will be achieved in the end and the Afghans will claim to have seen off another invasion of their homeland.

A variation on your "hydra" concept would be the use of "surges" in areas where ISAF (and ANA) KIA have occurred.

JMA

07-20-2010, 07:25 AM

The problem is finding the 100 Taliban to kill for every Western soldier killed.

Agreed. With the current ROE the chance of that happening is zero.

But they are out there and can be found if the military is tasked to go after them rather than "hold ground" through a string of Beau Geste type forts.

Fuchs

07-20-2010, 07:42 AM

JMA

07-20-2010, 09:21 AM

JMA, you need to read & understand accurately.

I did not write about a 60 kills : 1 kill ratio.
I did write about a 60 soldiers in theatre : 1 KIA among them.

Thank you for correcting me on that.

Now how is that stat meaningful? How is it calculated? Averaged over the years? For the month of July 2010 only? What?

Fuchs

07-20-2010, 11:39 AM

It's relevant as the Hydra strategy proposed 10 additional troops per KIA and 2 per WIA.
The historical factor 60 clearly shows that the strategy alone would not have required us to deploy more than we did, nor would it have overextended us to date. This falsifies about half the contra arguments which I heard over the last months.

Btw, the Hydra strategy would not exclude the possibility of additional deployments, especially not in regions without substantial previous presence of Western forces.

Entropy

07-20-2010, 01:31 PM

Fuchs

07-20-2010, 04:43 PM

Fuchs,

Again, this "hydra" strategy rests on a bevy of false assumptions.

And, let's consider 60 new troops for each KIA instead of 10 - that would get us up to 116k troops which is in the ballpark for what we have now. What happens to your strategy when our capacity to supply troops is exceeded or when we deploy the maximum number of troops we possibly can and the Taliban still aren't discouraged from fighting us?

I'm sorry, but this whole idea is ridiculous.

In worst case, it happens the same as when we reach the maximum deployment strength without the strategy. Well, except that without the strategy, you get no benefits from it.

You made the classic conservative's mistake, as it's been observed millions of times with innovations and reforms:
An alternative does not need to be "perfect" - it only needs to be "superior" in comparison with the status quo in order to be preferable.

Two scenarios both having the same limitation does not in the least argue against the superiority of the alternative scenario.

In fact, I can point at advantages from the hydra strategy; the chance that decisionmakers are impressed by the dilemma and partially or completely discouraged.
You need to identify more important disadvantages (relative, not absolute!) to disqualify the strategy.

JMA

07-20-2010, 05:29 PM

Entropy

07-20-2010, 05:32 PM

Fuchs,

You can't show that a "hydra" stategy would be better than the status quo when you can't even show that it would have the effect you believe it will have. My whole point here is that there is nothing to indicate that such a strategy would discourage the Taliban from fighting. This is particularly true of the leadership which is relatively secure in Pakistan. That is what disqualifies the strategy. The entire premise is, at best, unsupported.

An alternative does not need to be "perfect" - it only needs to be "superior" in comparison with the status quo in order to be preferable.

That's fine. The problem is that you haven't demonstrated that your idea is comparatively superior - you've only, and repeatedly, asserted that it is. And when the ratios you've submitted are examined and calculated against real KIA and WIA figures (as I noted earlier), it demonstrates that had your strategy been put into effect it would not have made a difference. Current troop levels already exceed or are at the approximate level you say is required based on your ratios and the Taliban do not seem to be dissuaded from fighting.

Fuchs

07-20-2010, 06:14 PM

OK, he problem is apparently to understand the mechanism.

First of all: Discouraging TB (and the other present hostiles) is not the only desired outcome. There's also a possible effect on supporters and neutrals.
Just about everybody dislikes the presence of foreigners would have his own check whether he likes the violence that seems to inevitably pull more foreigners into the country or not.

OK, scenario.

A few insurgents (TB or other) sit together with local elders.
The insurgents attempt to win over the locals and motivate them for the resistance against infidel foreigners. It's obvious; the proposed approach is lethal violence.
The elders report about what they heard; the foreigner's pledge that they would move in ten soldiers for every KIA and two for every WIA. They also report that the foreigners claimed to be part of an alliance that has more than three million soldiers.
The insurgents reply that this is all lies and propaganda.
A few IEDs, rocket and rifle attacks later, the insurgents return and meet again. They tell about oh-so great battles and six kills (two in reality). The elders tell them the foreigners paraded yesterday in front of their camp and welcomed dozens new soldiers. This morning, there was already a patrol in the village with several new soldiers - all of them still in different, very clean uniforms.
The elders and insurgents discuss local affairs and the foreigners.

Two months later, there were additional KIA, WIA and many new soldiers, increased patrol activities and the insurgents were also hit by some strikes.
The insurgents come again to the village in order to secure the support and to address some civil issues. The elders are not happy with the developments. Every action only seems to bring more foreign troops in. The lethal violence seems to be counterproductive. They keep discussing. In the evening, the insurgents have secured the elder's support, but had to promise to attack ANA, ANP and contractors instead of the foreigners. Meanwhile, the elders join other elders from the region and launch a diplomatic effort in order to reduce the unwanted foreign presence.

Months later, some lackeys of the mayor of Kabul report about increasing stress with insurgents. It's 2006 now and Karzai decides to pay less attention to political conflicts and more on the Taliban. The Kabul faction is taking the brunt of the insurgent's pressure and has to become seriously involved instead of counting almost only on foreigners to fight for them.

Is it now understandable? I don't suggest that the dumb pawns in the TB ranks be discouraged. I don't expect TB leaders to become doves.
There is a moral effect if you face a Hydra, though. The futility of chopping off even more heads is too obvious if you don't know how to burn the wounds.

@Entropy: "...it would not have made a difference". In troop levels maybe not. The war isn't about troop levels, though. It's not about us. You used a completely irrelevant metric for favourablity. You also assume that troops have the same deterrence effect no matter what strategy. That is exactly what I am pointing at as false. A different strategy could have had a much greater psychological effect with less troops simply because a different strategy could have aimed at such an effect.

The lack of inventiveness, brilliance and success on the operational and strategic level in Afghanistan is extremely embarrassing.

@JMA: That's irrelevant / off topic to the question relating the Hydra strategy.

tequila

07-20-2010, 06:23 PM

Your scenario is predicated on the large increase in soldiers being out and about in the countryside, actually being visible to villagers on a daily basis --- rather than the actual reality of ISAF being concentrated in FOB-tastic clumps, with the majority never leaving the wire.

Fuchs

07-20-2010, 06:34 PM

Yes, it works best with outposts.

Nevertheless, there ought to be some visibility any way. You just need to make the reinforcements visible.
At the very least, it should make clear to anyone that killing does not reduce, but increase numbers.

Do good and talk about it!

tequila

07-20-2010, 07:10 PM

I think any positive effects from such a policy would be from the actual presence of the troops in the villages, in terms of security provided and resulting Taliban killed or deterred, rather than from any said influencing effect.

Unfortunately current NATO/ISAF policies would seem to prevent any such deployment.

Entropy

07-21-2010, 01:50 AM

Fuchs,

Your scenario simply does not reflect reality in Afghanistan.

If some coalition troops die to an IED on some isolated stretch of road, or in a sparsely populated agricultural area, or in the middle of an urban area, where do you parade these shiny new troops to impress the locals? How do you know you are showing them to the right people? "You just need to make the reinforcements visible." That is simply wishful thinking.

There are well over 30,000 settlements of various sizes in Afghanistan. Almost 2,000 of those are in Kandahar province alone. How many of those can we provide enough presence to generate the effects you cite? The answer is not very many, even if we get everyone off the FOBs.

Another problem is your assumption that the village elders will be able to negotiate with the Taliban. While that can happen in some instances, the vast majority of village elders don't have the pull to negotiate the Taliban into leaving foreign troops alone. In most cases there is no negotiation. The locals have nothing to bargain. Independent minded or pro-coalition leaders are likely to find themselves killed.

Most Afghans are very adept fence-sitters. If you think some new troops in shiny clean uniforms will get them off the fence you are mistaken.

davidbfpo

07-28-2010, 05:51 PM

Hat tip to KoW and a provocative article by a completly unknown writer, with a very brief bio, with six embeds in Afghanistan and so IMHO the right to comment on COIN:http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/new/blogs/marlowe/COIN_Heresy_The_More_Troops_We_Have_the_More_Viole nce_Grows

Taken from the start:
Now is the right time to consider more radical points of view — including the most radical I know, that we ought to withdraw from Afghanistan precisely in order to enable the Afghans to defeat the Taliban.

This position used to be a fringe belief. It runs directly counter to the dogma of COIN that the more troops you put among the people, the more secure the people feel, and the more they will reject the insurgents. But it answers a doubt that has grown in my mind over the course of six embeds with American troops. I’ve observed that the more activity we undertake, the more SIGACTS (violent incidents) occur in a province or district. This in turn makes the locals doubtful about the benefits of an American presence.

William F. Owen

07-29-2010, 05:23 AM

Hat tip to KoW and a provocative article by a completly unknown writer, with a very brief bio, with six embeds in Afghanistan and so IMHO the right to comment on COIN:http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/new/blogs/marlowe/COIN_Heresy_The_More_Troops_We_Have_the_More_Viole nce_Grows

To quote the article,

“I asked the commander when his men were getting hit by the enemy and he said, ‘When we go out on a patrol.’ And I said, ‘Well, if you stop patrolling, you won’t get hit.’ And he said, ‘But my job is to patrol, to show American presence, to find the bad guys, to interact with the locals.’ And I said, ‘No, that’s not your job. Your job is to increase security in Afghanistan. If your sending your men on patrol increases violence, you’re not doing your job.’”
That is garbage. The job of an Army is to destroy the armed opponent. That may include conducting "Security Operations" and "good" Patrolling (as opposed to stupid) is essential to that.
Standing still, doing nothing, is always bad.

Fuchs

07-29-2010, 09:22 AM

To quote the article,

That is garbage. The job of an Army is to destroy the armed opponent. That may include conducting "Security Operations" and "good" Patrolling (as opposed to stupid) is essential to that.
Standing still, doing nothing, is always bad.

You might want to look up the real, official mission of ISAF.

The whole concept of ISAF was Afghanisation from the beginning. The foreign forces are merely temporary substitutes till the Afghans take over. They shall provide security till the Afghans can do it, no victory over TB is required to declare mission success and leave (many seem to have forgotten this fact).

Standing still, doing nothing, is NOT always bad.
Exhibit A: Nukes.

William F. Owen

07-29-2010, 01:34 PM

You might want to look up the real, official mission of ISAF.

The whole concept of ISAF was Afghanisation from the beginning. The foreign forces are merely temporary substitutes till the Afghans take over. They shall provide security till the Afghans can do it, no victory over TB is required to declare mission success and leave (many seem to have forgotten this fact).
OK, the Policy may be very dumb, combined with a very bad strategy. That does not mean bad tactics, like passively sitting around doing nothing.

Standing still, doing nothing, is NOT always bad.
Exhibit A: Nukes.
That's not really relevant to the context.

Fuchs

07-29-2010, 02:42 PM

Wilf, you tend to think at the tactical level only.

A tactic that doesn't serve the operational plan and a operational plan that doesn't serve the strategy - that's never good, no matter how well it looks on the tactical level.
Basrah was a success. It sure didn't look like one, but the end result was a good one; moderate violence for years followed by a key event that empowered the central government. Mission accomplished. There are no marks for good looks in war.

Nukes are very relevant. They're the embodiment of deterrence.
A battalion ready to sortie is an effective deterrent against open warfare. Even sitting in the own camp and fighting only to protect camp & convoys serves a purpose. That purpose is not in what you achieve, but in what you prevent.

I tell you what's dumb: It's dumb to do the job for your protégé, leaving him completely off the hook. They sit back and let the job be done by foreigners - and enjoy getting bribed at the same time.
Let them fight themselves. They're no worse than their enemies (and much more numerous).
It's stupid to attempt to win an Afghan War by yourself. Let them fight. They have their indigenous methods that are more worth than our high tech.

Steve the Planner

07-29-2010, 02:45 PM

huskerguy7

07-30-2010, 01:01 AM

The whole concept of ISAF was Afghanisation from the beginning. The foreign forces are merely temporary substitutes till the Afghans take over. Standing still, doing nothing, is NOT always bad.

I completely agree. I just finished some reading about the early days of OEF. There was an interesting debate between having the Coalition called ISAF or ISF (something along those lines). Several officials wanted the word "Assistance" in the group's title. Why? Because they want the Afghan's to know that they're going to have to take the lead sometime.

I'm all down with Wilf's and other's views that a military is "supposed to" be in the business of finding, fixing and immobilizing/killing and enemy, but that is not the mission here, and is probably impractical.

That's a very important point. Several policymakers (VP Biden for example) are big proponents of this kind of strategy. Why? It sounds easy and simple with little consequences. The problem is that it's impractical in some situations, and OEF Afghanistan is one of them. I'm all for this strategy-only if it can work in the current environment.

William F. Owen

07-30-2010, 06:22 AM

Wilf, you tend to think at the tactical level only.
Sorry but that is patently not true. How many times do I refer to the need for a strategy that reflects the policy and strategy achievable in tactics? Ever read any of my posts? This is what I spend most of my time writing and talking about.

A tactic that doesn't serve the operational plan and a operational plan that doesn't serve the strategy - that's never good, no matter how well it looks on the tactical level.

Strategy can only be enacted by tactics. An operational plan merely ensures that tactics occur in the time and place relevant to the strategy. There is NO linkage between tactics and operations, other to ensure the time and place relevant to the strategy.

A battalion ready to sortie is an effective deterrent against open warfare. Even sitting in the own camp and fighting only to protect camp & convoys serves a purpose. That purpose is not in what you achieve, but in what you prevent.
I disagree. Yes deterrence is critical/essential, but you have to do things to make it real. Traditional Deterrence only works if the enemy believes in the credibility of the threat. That means going out and being very threatening and real. Nuke deterrence was based on mutual destruction and thus the absence of strategy.

Bob's World

07-30-2010, 08:40 AM

Fuchs brings up the obvious point that is both critical to the mission, and central to the metrics of that mission.

Afghanization is the mission, or converting what we now consider as a foreign effort into an Afghan one.

In that regard, doesn't the number of bad guys (or Talib brothers) NOT killed by ISAF provide a relevant metric of actual success in Afghanization?

I'm all down with Wilf's and other's views that a military is "supposed to" be in the business of finding, fixing and immobilizing/killing and enemy, but that is not the mission here, and is probably impractical.

If hearts and minds comes from "projects," how many projects? What have they accomplished toward hearts and minds?

In the bad guy realm, is the ratio of detained/killed by Afghans vs. ISAF a better measure? How's that going?

1. The definition of COIN is written from the perspective of the HN government, but does not clarify that fine point, so when an intervening power comes in to assist and calls its mission COIN as well, they tend to take on roles and responsibilities that exceed thresholds in ways that often dis-enable the same HN whose capacity they are attempting to build; and also tend to reinforce perspective among an already wavering populace that their
government is unable to serve them adequately.

2. COIN also brings with it a presumption that "success" is measured by a defeat of the insurgent, coupled with a preservation of the current government. This lures the intervening power away from a broad focus on stability and the preservation of the national interests that led them to intervene to begin with that might be achievable in many ways, to a much narrower perspective that limits options tremendously.

This is why I think it is important that we back away from the widely accepted terminology such as "COIN" and "War" for our interventions in places like Afghanistan; and instead see them in softer, more flexible terms such as "FID", "IDAD" and "MSCA". It is also why I suggest we need a more effective overarching construct for the approach globally than "CT" or "COIN" offer, the most accurate one being "Counter UW."

WILF makes sound points for warfighting; and if indeed warfighting is what is required for success he is right. Others argue for approaching the problem in a very non-warlike way, but still cling to the "war" moniker.

I think shaping the operation as a whole is critical to its proper execution, and that a recharacterization of this operation as something other than War and COIN frees our minds to design effective supporting engagement that is focused on our interests and adequate stability to support the same. This is far more that semantic namesmanship; it is as simple as painting lines on the road so that everyone understands what their lane is.

Fuchs

07-30-2010, 10:35 AM

Sorry but that is patently not true. How many times do I refer to the need for a strategy that reflects the policy and strategy achievable in tactics? Ever read any of my posts? This is what I spend most of my time writing and talking about.

I've had the impression that you focus on the tactical level for more than a year and just dropped it as a remark here.

Calling for a strategy is not the same as thinking about strategy.
You seem to think of the higher levels primarily because you want a coherent plan that leads to your preferred tactics, to your understanding of what ground forces are supposed to do in war.

I'm under the impression that your desired tactics (the super competent infantry that aggressively hunts down INS in the region) would not play a major part in any of the smart strategies and operational plans because really smart ones could eliminate the need for such tactical excellence.
I'm also under the impression that you're too fixated on tactical excellence to think creatively about how such smart operational plans or strategies would look like.

The absence of good strategy and operations in Afghanistan for almost a decade (at last on our part) opens a huge area for discussions and original thinking. The tactical level (where troops run into the huge problem of the enemy's elusiveness again and again) is the least promising one.

Red Rat

07-30-2010, 01:07 PM

1. The definition of COIN is written from the perspective of the HN government, but does not clarify that fine point, so when an intervening power comes in to assist and calls its mission COIN as well, they tend to take on roles and responsibilities that exceed thresholds in ways that often dis-enable the same HN whose capacity they are attempting to build; and also tend to reinforce perspective among an already wavering populace that their government is unable to serve them adequately.

Agree. It also creates a great degree of confusion. How can we (the UK and US) be conducting COIN when we we are not directly facing an insurgent threat (the Afghan Government is)? Then we start misreading history and fail to realise that in many of the successful COIN campaigns it was COIN and we were the government, and in unsuccessfull campaigns it wsas not COIN and we were assisting an indigenous government. UW is better as it is so broad a concept it forces us to think harder about the nature of the conflict we are involved in.

2. COIN also brings with it a presumption that "success" is measured by a defeat of the insurgent, coupled with a preservation of the current government. This lures the intervening power away from a broad focus on stability and the preservation of the national interests that led them to intervene to begin with that might be achievable in many ways, to a much narrower perspective that limits options tremendously.

From the perspective of the government fighting an insurgency success is probably measured first in preservation of the government and secondly in defeating the insurgent. For an intervening or assisting nation both, one or neither of these may be true.

slapout9

07-30-2010, 01:38 PM

davidbfpo

08-03-2010, 08:10 AM

Hat tip to milblogging.com and a new blog on OMLT work with the ANA:
I am a Captain in the MN Army National Guard, and Blackhawk pilot. Spent 04/05 deployed to Kosovo and Bosnia, 07/08 deployed to Balad Air Base Iraq. Currently on a deployment to Afghanistan with an Operational Mentor Liason Team from MN to work to train the Afghan National Army.

Link to blogsite:http://mrassler.blogspot.com/

He is based at Camp Spann, near Mazar-e-Shariff in the north.

JMA

08-03-2010, 12:53 PM

Agree. It also creates a great degree of confusion. How can we (the UK and US) be conducting COIN when we we are not directly facing an insurgent threat (the Afghan Government is)? Then we start misreading history and fail to realise that in many of the successful COIN campaigns it was COIN and we were the government, and in unsuccessfull campaigns it wsas not COIN and we were assisting an indigenous government. UW is better as it is so broad a concept it forces us to think harder about the nature of the conflict we are involved in.

From the perspective of the government fighting an insurgency success is probably measured first in preservation of the government and secondly in defeating the insurgent. For an intervening or assisting nation both, one or neither of these may be true.

With respect the brush is too broad here.

What happened in the Oman? A lot of "outsiders" used there. Does the same theory apply?

The more I read the COIN comment here I more I see that there is general confusion about insurgencies as if it were a totally different and unique form of warfare. What is really different? The enemy behaves differently. So you need to adapt. It becomes a corporals war and not a generals war.

David Galula said: "“If the individual members of the organizations were of the same mind, if every organization worked according to a standard pattern, the problem would be solved."

How, may I ask, do you get everyone of the same mind if you don't know what the illegitimate and corrupt government you are propping up is really thinking? Or when you wheel your troops through for six months at a time where they neither learn the ropes nor understand the people and the geography in that time scale.

OK so lets take it that for reasons better known to the US and Britain they have decided to follow a policy that will ensure their troops do not become fully operationally effective in Afghanistan (through specialising in the tactics needed to successfully fight the Taliban and spending long enough in-country to learn about the enemy and the terrain to meet the Taliban on close to an even playing field.)

I have mentioned it before that I see the danger that all levels of soldiers are starting to have their heads filled with all manner of the latest, the greatest, the bestest of the new fangled ideas that go under the heading COIN. It is merely a different set of fighting skills that are required. Radically different it seems. The enemy is the the once anticipated Soviet tank masses heading towards western Europe. It is a guy in sandals with an AK and pocket full of ammo moving about over terrain (both human and geographical) that he is expert and attacking a hapless government supporting soldier who is flailing around under these mosquito or flea like attacks.

Let the soldiers get on with fighting the war (20%) and let the politicians handle the rest (80%) and for heavens sake put a civilian in charge of the whole bang shooting match (not a general).

The loss of the war in Afghanistan will be chalked down to:
* The illegitimate and corrupt nature of the government.
* A lack of unity of purpose between government and outside forces.
* The inability of the government supporting forces to adapt to the tactics used by the Taliban.

So lets answer these easy questions:
* Is there any chance of defeating an insurgency when the government is illegitimate and corrupt?
* Is it possible to plan a winning counterinsurgency strategy when there is no unity of purpose between the government and the foreign military?
* How does one expect to win the shooting war when government forces don't have the locally required tactical skills to defeat the Taliban in the field?

I suggest that we not search for a scapegoat when we probably know exactly where the problem lies. Afghanistan for the US and Brit militaries is a self inflected wound.

Ken White

08-03-2010, 03:35 PM

I can -- regrettably and unfortunately -- broadly agree with you. I could quibble about the edges but your essential point is correct. The governments and the institutional Armed Forces of both the UK and US are excessively hidebound and bureaucratic and have not served their citizens or their Forces members at all well.

In defense of those forces and the people in them, they are reflections of the society from which they spring. Thus I'm inclined to fault the governmental milieu and the total populace a bit more than you but there is little question that the Force's approach has been poorly chosen even in view of the admittedly limited discretion they have. The institutional Forces did not foresee the pitfalls clearly. The fact that many senior people did not know what they were getting into due to doctrinal, educational and training errors of omission by their predecessors is a sad excuse, more so because in the US (and I expect also in the UK) there were Force members who cautioned against many aspects of the effort. Regardless, the senior leaders almost certainly did not speak up as forthrightly and strongly as they should have before the decisions to deploy were made.

Thus it is indeed a self inflicted wound -- and the fact they had a lot of help and were directed to do something is not much solace. The other fact, that both Forces had and have historically induced limitations, may provide the reasons for many things but it provides little to no excuse.

Sclerosis is a pain. Political correctness is more than an annoyance... :mad:

Red Rat

08-03-2010, 06:55 PM

With respect the brush is too broad here.

What happened in the Oman? A lot of "outsiders" used there. Does the same theory apply?

Hmm, I look on Oman as a campaign where things were got right. We supported the in-place government, when that looked to be ineffective in meeting our interests we supported the coup against the government. And we did Loan Service. But I do not see Oman as a COIN campaign waged by UK plc, it was a COIN campaign conducted by the Omani government supported by the UK government. It was also (significantly) not a Coalition effort.

The more I read the COIN comment here I more I see that there is general confusion about insurgencies as if it were a totally different and unique form of warfare. I quite agree with you, there is a fundamental confusion over this. War is war, the character changes but not much else. I am off to brief this heresy to the Infantry Battle School next month ;)

What is really different? The enemy behaves differently. So you need to adapt. It becomes a corporals war and not a generals war. Yes, but if corporals are doing all the right stuff for the wrong reasons (strategy) it still is not going to turn out well.

David Galula said: "“If the individual members of the organizations were of the same mind, if every organization worked according to a standard pattern, the problem would be solved." That is what doctrine is supposed to do.

How, may I ask, do you get everyone of the same mind if you don't know what the illegitimate and corrupt government you are propping up is really thinking? Or when you wheel your troops through for six months at a time where they neither learn the ropes nor understand the people and the geography in that time scale.

Two separate points here. The first I agree with. It is difficult to get everyone of the same mind if the government whom you are supporting in its counter-insurgency efforts may not see its best interests as necessarily coinciding with yours. Hence IMHO some of the issues we are having in Afghanistan.

The second is understanding the people. It is the degree to which you understand the people. Even in a 2 year tour, or four year tour or a 10 year tour there will still be soldiers who do not understand the language or people. Hell - I know soldiers who have spent 16 years in Germany, married a German lass and still do not speak a word of German! Most soldiers will spend 4-6 years in Germany and come away only knowing how to ask for 'fumf bier bitte!' :D Now 6 months is plenty time to learn the local geography, most boys in a ground holding company will know their patch inside out in about a month - the AOs are not physically that large. Knowing the human terrain takes much much longer - but you need an aptitude for it as well as the time to learn it. Gaining tactical proficiency probably takes about a month as well.

Personally I think we should extend tours but given the current intensity of combat I suspect that 9 months would be enough, after that it would not make sense due to the overall impact on military effectiveness.

OK so lets take it that for reasons better known to the US and Britain they have decided to follow a policy that will ensure their troops do not become fully operationally effective in Afghanistan (through specialising in the tactics needed to successfully fight the Taliban and spending long enough in-country to learn about the enemy and the terrain to meet the Taliban on close to an even playing field.) I think what you are saying is not that troops 'do not become fully operationally effective' (we do not send them out there unless we think they are!) but that we could optimise further their effectiveness. That is true, and I think that we could extend their tours somewhat, but there are advantages to the way we do things as well as disadvantages. Again I hark back to 'this is a limited war with limited resources'. We cannot specialise in the tactics we use in Afghanistan partly for the simple reason we do not have the kit to do so and I do not see that changing for the forseeable future.
Secondly TTPs evolve constantly and we need to train our soldiers on the constants and not the variables. You train on the variables when they are certainties. When we ran Iraq and Afghanistan concurrently the training for each was quite different as the fighting was very different in the two different theatres. If all we were ever going to do was Afghanistan then maybe we would change things more (if we had the money!).

I have mentioned it before that I see the danger that all levels of soldiers are starting to have their heads filled with all manner of the latest, the greatest, the bestest of the new fangled ideas that go under the heading COIN. More of an officer problem!

It is merely a different set of fighting skills that are required. Radically different it seems. The enemy is the the once anticipated Soviet tank masses heading towards western Europe. It is a guy in sandals with an AK and pocket full of ammo moving about over terrain (both human and geographical) that he is expert and attacking a hapless government supporting soldier who is flailing around under these mosquito or flea like attacks. It is a guy with sandals an AK and a plentiful supply of IEDs. The basics of the fighting skills are not that different for the close combat infantryman from that which were taught in the Cold War or from what you would recognise from your experience. The biggest difference in TTPs has been brought about by the IED threat. In WW2 we faced the same threat (but we called them 'schuh mines' (now it would be called a 'low metal content victim operated IED') and various other bits of nasty stuff) but that was an unlimited war and we were not quite so sensitive about casualties (although the Kangaroo APC was specifically developed to counter the issue of AP mines and in particular schuh mines which were a bugger to detect). Away from the grunt on the ground the biggest difference at HQ level is the complexity and amount of battlespace management, information management and consequence management required.

Let the soldiers get on with fighting the war (20%) and let the politicians handle the rest (80%) and for heavens sake put a civilian in charge of the whole bang shooting match (not a general). "War is too serious a matter to leave to soldiers" Georges Clemenceau. I am completely with you on this one. Unfortunately the politicians seem to think that war should be left to the generals. One of the clear lessons from the UK Iraq Inquiry Iraq Inquiry (http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/) is that there was no clear command (and no interest) at UK Cabinet level. Personally I would call the former UK Governments attitude neglectful, bordering on 'criminal neglect'. This jury is still out on the current regime.

The loss of the war in Afghanistan will be chalked down to:
* The illegitimate and corrupt nature of the government.
* A lack of unity of purpose between government and outside forces.
* The inability of the government supporting forces to adapt to the tactics used by the Taliban.

So lets answer these easy questions:
* Is there any chance of defeating an insurgency when the government is illegitimate and corrupt?
* Is it possible to plan a winning counterinsurgency strategy when there is no unity of purpose between the government and the foreign military?
* How does one expect to win the shooting war when government forces don't have the locally required tactical skills to defeat the Taliban in the field?

I suggest that we not search for a scapegoat when we probably know exactly where the problem lies. Afghanistan for the US and Brit militaries is a self inflected wound.

In answer to your questions:
1) Yes. Numerous examples of this having happened.

Imperial Germany in the Herero Campaign in German South-West Africa (modern day Namibia) from 1904 until 1907.
Sri Lanka against the Tamil Tigers
Russia against the Chechens (eventually :wry:)

From all the perspective of respective governments (Imperial German, Sri Lankan and Russian) these were and are successful campaigns. From the perspective of the insurgent or rebellious supporting population the governments were illegitmate and very often corrupt as well; they still lost.

2) Very difficult, and I can think of no example.

3) You cannot. But both Afghan Government and Coalition forces appear to have the tactical skills concerned in Afghanistan, there just are not enough of them and I am not convinced by the strategy either.

Finally a question from my end. I agree that we are meeting the insurgent on nothing close to an even playing field; it is (at the tactical level) considerably skewed towards us. What makes you think it isn't? ;)

Eden

08-03-2010, 07:24 PM

Finally a question from my end. I agree that we are meeting the insurgent on nothing close to an even playing field; it is (at the tactical level) considerably skewed towards us. What makes you think it isn't? ;)

Hmmmm, I'm not so sure. Sure, we have greater firepower and more or less complete dominance in the air, but there are a number of factors, both inherent and self-imposed, that limit our ability to apply firepower or exploit our air power. We are also, for the most part, better at fire and maneuver. But even with those advantages we cannot always impose our tactical will on the enemy. The terrain is often the insurgent's friend, from mountains to the corrugated fields around Kandahar that offer cover, concealment, and numerous avenues of approach or withdrawal to the bad guys.

More important, though, is our lack of mobility. Our inability to pursue in any meaningful sense (due to poor off road ability, too few helicopters, heavily burdened infantry, and a reluctance to accept the inherent risks of pursuit) means that we can rarely exploit the tactical dominance we enjoy. In other words, the enemy normally enjoys the initiative and freedom to maneuver...and in my experience this tends to cancel out our dominance in precision application of firepower

JMA

08-03-2010, 07:26 PM

Red Rat

08-03-2010, 07:51 PM

Hmmmm, I'm not so sure. Sure, we have greater firepower and more or less complete dominance in the air, but there are a number of factors, both inherent and self-imposed, that limit our ability to apply firepower or exploit our air power. We are also, for the most part, better at fire and maneuver. But even with those advantages we cannot always impose our tactical will on the enemy. The terrain is often the insurgent's friend, from mountains to the corrugated fields around Kandahar that offer cover, concealment, and numerous avenues of approach or withdrawal to the bad guys.

More important, though, is our lack of mobility. Our inability to pursue in any meaningful sense (due to poor off road ability, too few helicopters, heavily burdened infantry, and a reluctance to accept the inherent risks of pursuit) means that we can rarely exploit the tactical dominance we enjoy. In other words, the enemy normally enjoys the initiative and freedom to maneuver...and in my experience this tends to cancel out our dominance in precision application of firepower

Hmm yes and no. I agree with what you have said , but in the overwhelming majority of tactical engagements Coalition forces still come off the better. The issue is our perceived inablility to tie these tactical successes into anything more meaningful. Our lack of tactical mobility linked to lack of resources (manpower) and risk aversion (self-constraining our ability to manoeuvre effectively what we have) does mean that we are tied to a slow process of securing areas by lots of FOBs in order to generate stability in order to gain support.

However:

1) The tactics we are using are very troop intensive - the one thing we lack above all else. With our lack of troops we should be manoeuvering more (not less) and taking the fight to the enemy. It is a matter of balance and I am not convinced that we have the balance right.
2) The strategy of stabilising at district level in order to win support for the Government of Afghanistan IMHO appears flawed because I am not too sure if the Afghan Government is very interested in many of the districts in an altruistic manner.
3) The successes and gains we do have are not perceived as such, quite possibly because intuitively people (the media) recognise that stabilising at district level is not going to lead to conflict resolution without change at national level.

Ken White

08-03-2010, 09:25 PM

...With our lack of troops we should be manoeuvering more (not less) and taking the fight to the enemy. It is a matter of balance and I am not convinced that we have the balance right.And an emphatic yes at that. Terrible thing is that most of the Troops are more than willing...
...I am not too sure if the Afghan Government is very interested in many of the districts in an altruistic manner.Agree and if we can see that, why cannot the policy makers...:rolleyes:

Great understatement, BTW. ;)

3) The successes and gains we do have are not perceived as such, quite possibly because intuitively people (the media) recognise that stabilising at district level is not going to lead to conflict resolution without change at national level.Yea, verily. Raises the same question...

Sigh. :wry:

davidbfpo

08-03-2010, 10:04 PM

Originally Posted by JMA:
With respect the brush is too broad here.
What happened in the Oman? A lot of "outsiders" used there. Does the same theory apply?

Which Red Rat replied to:
Hmm, I look on Oman as a campaign where things were got right. We supported the in-place government, when that looked to be ineffective in meeting our interests we supported the coup against the government. And we did Loan Service. But I do not see Oman as a COIN campaign waged by UK plc, it was a COIN campaign conducted by the Omani government supported by the UK government. It was also (significantly) not a Coalition effort.

JMA is right the Oman campaign (1970-1976):wry:, mainly in the border province, Dhofar, with then South Yemen, involved a lot of "outsiders" and it was a coalition effort (:wry: RR is wrong). I am not familiar with how the Omani government, the Sultan, asserted national control or oversight, but present on the ground were: UK SAS, a large brigade-sized Imperial Iranian force, a Jordanian contingent, mercenary Baluchis from Pakistan made up a good part of the Omani Army and in the air were the RAF, Iranian AF and an Omani AF with a good number of Brits and Rhodesians:D on contracts.

From 1958-1978 a UK officer was the Omani Armed Forces No.2, a Brigadier Colin Maxwell and a UK loan officer was the Dhofar Brigadier, John Akehurst (who wrote a book 'We Won the War:The campaign in Oman 1965-1975). 'SAS Operation Oman' by Tony Jeapes is another book.

Red Rat

08-03-2010, 10:46 PM

Originally Posted by JMA:

Which Red Rat replied to:

JMA is right the Oman campaign (1970-1976):wry:, mainly in the border province, Dhofar, with then South Yemen, involved a lot of "outsiders" and it was a coalition effort (:wry: RR is wrong).

I stand corrected!

My understanding is that the other elements were under Operational Control (OPCON) the Omani Armed Forces. I do not recall there being a Coalition structure per se, it was all under a unified chain of command crossing both political and miltary spheres. The UK No 2, Brigadier Colin Maxwell, certainly started off as a contract officer with the Omani armed forces which until the early 1970s (for the rank and file) consisted largely of Baluchis (circa 70% and arabs (30%), a ratio which was reversed over the 1970s.

I wait for someone to enlighten me on the pol/mil command arrangements for the Iranian contingent (who manned the so called 'Red Line') and others.

We seemed to be much more pragmatic about command arrangements then. The equivalent now would be to make an American 4 star general Afghan Minister of Defence, an American Ambassador as the Minister of Interior (the UK dominated the Ministry of the Interior in the 1950s and 1960s as well) and double hat the Minister of Defence as COMISAF. While we are at it we officer the ANP and ANA with contract officers on attractive salaries and run similar schemes in the civil service for 10-15 years until the locals can take over.

JMA

08-04-2010, 06:49 AM

Originally Posted by JMA:

Which Red Rat replied to:

JMA is right the Oman campaign (1970-1976):wry:, mainly in the border province, Dhofar, with then South Yemen, involved a lot of "outsiders" and it was a coalition effort (:wry: RR is wrong). I am not familiar with how the Omani government, the Sultan, asserted national control or oversight, but present on the ground were: UK SAS, a large brigade-sized Imperial Iranian force, a Jordanian contingent, mercenary Baluchis from Pakistan made up a good part of the Omani Army and in the air were the RAF, Iranian AF and an Omani AF with a good number of Brits and Rhodesians:D on contracts.

From 1958-1978 a UK officer was the Omani Armed Forces No.2, a Brigadier Colin Maxwell and a UK loan officer was the Dhofar Brigadier, John Akehurst (who wrote a book 'We Won the War:The campaign in Oman 1965-1975). 'SAS Operation Oman' by Tony Jeapes is another book.

From a strategic view I recall that what was decisive in the "hearts and minds" part of the Dhofar rebellion was that they used "turned" insurgents (Firqat units) in the main to work among the locals as they were kith and kin.

Surely that must be a lesson for Afghanistan?

Don't use Uzbeks to police Pashtun areas. Understand and exploit the tribal/ethnic diversity to best advantage.

huskerguy7

08-04-2010, 07:03 AM

Don't use Uzbeks to police Pashtun areas. Understand and exploit the tribal/ethnic diversity to best advantage.

I remember this assertion (which I concur with) when reading a report discussing suggestions for the ANP. Scenarios like the one quoted are really happening. To be specific, there has been a significant amount of cases where Tajiks are deployed to police in Pashtun areas. This results with some ethnic friction.

Some ask "How is the ANP/ISAF so stupid in this scenario?" Are they thinking clearly? Answer: Yes, their actions can be supported by a legitimate argument.

Everyone can agree with the fact that the ANP are quite corrupt and don't always carry out the law. The thinking behind this deployment was that if people from the outside, who aren't familiar with the area, then they're going to be less prone to corruption. But, as we have noticed, ethnic friction can occur.

So, what do you guys think? Should "outsiders" (not ISAF soldiers) be sent to these villages, or should we try to rely on local forces?

JMA

08-04-2010, 07:44 AM

Have to do this one in a couple of bites.

Hmm, I look on Oman as a campaign where things were got right. We supported the in-place government, when that looked to be ineffective in meeting our interests we supported the coup against the government. And we did Loan Service. But I do not see Oman as a COIN campaign waged by UK plc, it was a COIN campaign conducted by the Omani government supported by the UK government. It was also (significantly) not a Coalition effort.

This has been covered in another post.

But I would say that it is seldom a matter of how many soldiers and where they came from but rather what they did on the ground.

I quite agree with you, there is a fundamental confusion over this. War is war, the character changes but not much else. I am off to brief this heresy to the Infantry Battle School next month ;)

I would be interested in how you approach this issue.

Yes, but if corporals are doing all the right stuff for the wrong reasons (strategy) it still is not going to turn out well.

Fortunately at section level the corporal does not much more than take part in the shooting war (hopefully). So if he and his men are shooting men with guns there's not much wrong with that. If he shoots people on the their way to lay IEDs, in the process of laying IEDs or on the way back from laying IEDs then there is not much wrong with that either.

It is the Generals who need to have the mind change and stop looking at the war as moving brigades around and sweeping large areas with large forces and let the minor tactics decide the shooting war.

That is what doctrine is supposed to do.

For any doctrine to work you first need to have that doctrine and people who understand it enough to train the masses to march in lock-step in this regard.

JMA

08-04-2010, 07:50 AM

I remember this assertion (which I concur with) when reading a report discussing suggestions for the ANP. Scenarios like the one quoted are really happening. To be specific, there has been a significant amount of cases where Tajiks are deployed to police in Pashtun areas. This results with some ethnic friction.

Some ask "How is the ANP/ISAF so stupid in this scenario?" Are they thinking clearly? Answer: Yes, their actions can be supported by a legitimate argument.

Everyone can agree with the fact that the ANP are quite corrupt and don't always carry out the law. The thinking behind this deployment was that if people from the outside, who aren't familiar with the area, then they're going to be less prone to corruption. But, as we have noticed, ethnic friction can occur.

So, what do you guys think? Should "outsiders" (not ISAF soldiers) be sent to these villages, or should we try to rely on local forces?

To follow on with my line of thinking...

There has been and continues to be a lot of denial about the role of tribalism in Africa. Yet at the heart of nearly every conflict in Africa there has been the tribal or to a much lesser extent the Muslim/Christian issue.

If you want resentment put a traditional enemy in charge or in a position of authority over another. As long as the colonial master was there to force the situation through things held together but the moment that control was removed things fell apart.

There is a historical record of tribal/ethnic rivalries in Afghanistan.

To bring an Uzbek in to prevent corruption among the Pashtuns is just throwing more salt into old wounds. Then that the US bring in their old enemies the Uzbeks to control them turns the Pashtuns even more against the US. The friend of my enemy is also my enemy.

I suggest that you see outsiders in Pashtun areas as other Pashtuns who don't have a specific "family" connection in that specific area that can be used to subvert their integrity. Under no circumstances bring in outsiders as in Uzbek or Tajik.

Surely you can dig up examples from your own US history in dealing with the various indigenous tribal nations? Playing one off against the other, exploiting differences and old tribal animosities? If you understand the phenomenon you can play it in other areas... or avoid the pitfalls.

Added later: I believe the decisions made in this regard should not be on the basis of what "makes sense" or "sounds logical" to someone out of London or New York City but rather based on an understanding of the Afghan tribal dynamics as they stand. Nobody is going to change these dynamics. Ignore them at your peril.

Bob's World

08-04-2010, 09:43 AM

There are a variety of reasons that have combined to both the ANA and ANP being largely recruited and trained in the north, which is more Tajik th an Pashtun.

First this is where the training was set up, so this was the available recruiting base.

Second, the northern populace has in general been more willing to recognize and accept the legitimacy of the Karzai government, so more willing to work for it.

Third, Pashtuns make terrible "defensive" security forces, but are equally terrific "offensive" security forces. They have no interest in manning checkpoints, guarding things, etc; they want to get out and move to contact. Tajiks in general are more accepting of police work.

Fourth is this perspective on rather local or imported police are less corrupt. I suppose the best answer is "it depends." Local ties can actually make the police more accountable to the populace and reduce corruption. Local control by a police chief who owes his position to a local power broker can be bad. "Corruption" is not a one dimensional issue, and the local vs "foreign" (someone from the next valley is often considered foreign) police is just one aspect. I've seen both work well, and both work poorly in just my short experience there.

Personally I would shift the focus from the birthplace of the policemen themselves, and instead focus on the leadership. The ANP has a culture of corruption, and the leaders are beholding to others, and these are seen as money making positions for that very culture, and payments are expected up the chain. I'd recommend looking at how to disrupt that chain that runs all the way back to Kabul that keeps pressure on the police to shake down the populace. Better the shakedown only brings money to the local officials and stays in the region, than be funneled up to Kabul and then out to the UAE.

The Village Stability Operations that so many pundits are trying to portray as SF building private militias are no more than local police, recruited by the local council and leaders, trained locally, and employed locally. They receive less training, and therefore less pay, and have a more narrow mission (no offensive operations, no arrest authority) than other ANSF, but are on a tashkil and are part of the ANP. These forces then snap in with full ANP and ANA (and coalition forces) working in their AORs. This helps fuse local legitimacy up to the official ANSF sent down from Kabul, and provides a check on corruption, a source of more effective humint, and also "humanizes" the local populace more in the eyes of the imported ANP from up north.

William F. Owen

08-04-2010, 11:27 AM

With respect the brush is too broad here.

What happened in the Oman? A lot of "outsiders" used there. Does the same theory apply?
Britain had a Policy in Oman. The Sultan wanted us there.

Let the soldiers get on with fighting the war (20%) and let the politicians handle the rest (80%) and for heavens sake put a civilian in charge of the whole bang shooting match (not a general).
This "COIN is 80% political" is rubbish. All war is political. Soldiers set forth policy, using violence. Politicians create policy. No politics = no wars.

The loss of the war in Afghanistan will be chalked down to:
* The illegitimate and corrupt nature of the government.
* A lack of unity of purpose between government and outside forces.
* The inability of the government supporting forces to adapt to the tactics used by the Taliban.
Broken policy = broken strategy - which is why the UK only "risk/resources" 10,000 men at a time.

So lets answer these easy questions:
* Is there any chance of defeating an insurgency when the government is illegitimate and corrupt?
Yes, but what is the "Policy?"

* Is it possible to plan a winning counterinsurgency strategy when there is no unity of purpose between the government and the foreign military?
No war can be won under that condition.

* How does one expect to win the shooting war when government forces don't have the locally required tactical skills to defeat the Taliban in the field?
No war can be won under that condition.

Pete

08-04-2010, 12:52 PM

This is a good thread. It shows that there are no glib answers for how to resolve the situation in Afghanistan, even though we've known that for quite some time now.

JMA

08-04-2010, 01:49 PM

Two separate points here. The first I agree with. It is difficult to get everyone of the same mind if the government whom you are supporting in its counter-insurgency efforts may not see its best interests as necessarily coinciding with yours. Hence IMHO some of the issues we are having in Afghanistan.

I would have thought that the last election would have been the deal breaker with the Karzai regime. From here on its all downhill like after the ouster of Diem in South Vietnam.

The second is understanding the people. It is the degree to which you understand the people. Even in a 2 year tour, or four year tour or a 10 year tour there will still be soldiers who do not understand the language or people. Hell - I know soldiers who have spent 16 years in Germany, married a German lass and still do not speak a word of German! Most soldiers will spend 4-6 years in Germany and come away only knowing how to ask for 'fumf bier bitte!' :D Now 6 months is plenty time to learn the local geography, most boys in a ground holding company will know their patch inside out in about a month - the AOs are not physically that large. Knowing the human terrain takes much much longer - but you need an aptitude for it as well as the time to learn it. Gaining tactical proficiency probably takes about a month as well.

This is why, I submit, you need specialised units and not just the run of the mill soldiers who signed up because the "good" jobs in civvie street were scarce at the time. The problem is that by the time these guys get to know a little about the place they are on their bicycle back to the UK. It is just a tour afterall. There is no mental commitment which drives them to want to learn more about the place and the people. Now if it takes a month to get the troops up to tactical proficiency then surely the answer is to drop the "jolly" to Kenya and extend the tour by the month and do a battle camp in a quiet area/province so by the time they get to Helmand they hit the ground running.

Of course I have issues with rotating battalions in toto as the whole battalion needs to settle down and a good enemy will take advantage of that. Permanent units rotating platoons on a R&R basis while maintaining a permanent presence down to company level provides the best operational continuity. Now I'm sure you will come up with some reasons why this will not work either. ;)

Personally I think we should extend tours but given the current intensity of combat I suspect that 9 months would be enough, after that it would not make sense due to the overall impact on military effectiveness.

Are you saying that military effectiveness begins to deteriorate beyond 9 months? Not sure I agree with that. What sort of R&R system would you propose for a 9 month tour? What do the US say, as they have both 9 months and a year tours?

Ken White

08-04-2010, 03:41 PM

This is why, I submit, you need specialised units and not just the run of the mill soldiers who signed up because the "good" jobs in civvie street were scarce at the time.I'm not sure anyone here disagrees with the logic of that. The issue is UK and US political viability of so doing. That's what precludes it other than for a few small highly specialized units.
Of course I have issues with rotating battalions in toto ... Now I'm sure you will come up with some reasons why this will not work either. ;)Don't know about Red Rat but I will agree that it would work and would be an operational improvement, thus I cannot give you a reason it will not work -- I can give you a reason it will not happen: Service and domestic politics plus potential employments in or deployments to other theaters. Unlikely at this time but no Leader in either nation is willing to risk that it absolutely will not be required.
Are you saying that military effectiveness begins to deteriorate beyond 9 months? Not sure I agree with that. What sort of R&R system would you propose for a 9 month tour? What do the US say, as they have both 9 months and a year tours?In reverse order, the US Army has had one year tours (briefly 15 months), going to nine months (hopefully). The Marines and some SOF use seven month tours. The Marines and SOF do not get out of country R&R, the Army grants one two week leave, mid tour to anywhere the individual wishes to go.

The move to the nine month tour is desired to cut combat exposure time, move to a 9 month out / 18 month home regimen in the belief that for most troops (not all), such a regimen will aid in reducing combat stress, PTSD, family stress at home (a BIG item politically. A really big item...) and in aiding overall force retention plus readiness for other contingencies. Recall that for the UK and US world wide commitments are possible and must be catered for. Both nations have other things going on and Afghanistan is not the reason for existence of their armed forces. In fact, it is viewed as a major inconvenience rather than a pressing need. That has to do with the 'strategy' and the apparent strategic necessity -- or desirability... :wry:

As to a deterioration of military effectiveness at nine months, LINK (http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htmoral/20100625.aspx), LINK (http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0408/041708bb1.htm). Aside from those links, conversations with people currently involved provide strong anecdotal agreement or corroboration. It's not a question of 'cannot do it' -- it's a question of best balance for the troops (and their families -- most are married nowadays; the divorce rate is worrisome to many politicians), for the nations in toto, potential other commitments, costs (all sorts) and, lastly, effectiveness. Noting for that last, rightly or wrongly, that acceptable as opposed to optimum is sought...

Steve the Planner

08-05-2010, 03:05 AM

Pete

08-05-2010, 02:14 PM

All the US training, tactics and deployment schedules will not put the genie in the box.
As Red Rat stated in a previous post, what seems to have lacked is the determination to win at the highest political level. I doubt that Bush or Obama-- or for that matter Blair, Brown, or Cameron--ever told the generals to win within x number of years. If I recall correctly Rumsfeld originally wanted to get out of Afghanistan and Iraq before insurgencies there ever took root. When we decided to stay to see the jobs through the full implications of those decisions probably weren't fully understood at the time or even given much discussion. Hence this multiple personality disorder national policy of conducting COIN ops from now until forever, one tour at a time, but with artificial "deadlines" for bailing out as a concession to the left-of-center part of the electorate.

Red Rat

08-05-2010, 06:57 PM

I would have thought that the last election would have been the deal breaker with the Karzai regime. From here on its all downhill like after the ouster of Diem in South Vietnam. And that is why we study history!

This is why, I submit, you need specialised units and not just the run of the mill soldiers who signed up because the "good" jobs in civvie street were scarce at the time. The problem is that by the time these guys get to know a little about the place they are on their bicycle back to the UK. It is just a tour afterall. There is no mental commitment which drives them to want to learn more about the place and the people. Now if it takes a month to get the troops up to tactical proficiency then surely the answer is to drop the "jolly" to Kenya and extend the tour by the month and do a battle camp in a quiet area/province so by the time they get to Helmand they hit the ground running.

Of course I have issues with rotating battalions in toto as the whole battalion needs to settle down and a good enemy will take advantage of that. Permanent units rotating platoons on a R&R basis while maintaining a permanent presence down to company level provides the best operational continuity. Now I'm sure you will come up with some reasons why this will not work either. ;) But our 'good guys' and not the 'run of the mill blokes' are doing this to a certain degree already. In terms of operational effectiveness putting units on 2 year tours (as per N. Ireland) or forming units to work permanently in Theatre is a good practical step. There are reasons why it would be difficult to do (but not impossible!).

1. The UK government has only just (2009) signed up to Afghanistan being a rolling 3 year commitment. Prior to that it was a rolling 6 month commitment. Now we can plan 3 years out (but no more) in terms of structures and finances.

2. Intensity of fighting (linked to the point about combat effectiveness). 205 Corps, the in place Afghan formation is becoming increasingly battle fatigued. Any individual posted to a unit in Helmand is likely able to do only so much before the same happens, so a tour length of 2 years linked to a rotation in and out of the line?

3. To have an impact the unit or formation is going to have to be large enough to have an impact - so probably brigade sized to replace the brigade that is out there (I do not see what a unit can do which is not already being down by the units and individuals on extended tours in theatre already). Not all the c10,000 troops in AFG will need to be on permanent tours, probably just the ground holding units and HQ elements, so circa 2500-4000. This is where it gets messy. If AFG was a Big War and not a Small War then we would no doubt flip ourselves inside out to meet the requirement, as we have done before. But AFG is a small war and we have been told to meet the (changing) national objectives at minimal cost so, with that in mind in order to find the men for AFG how much do we change the Army's:

Training system (individual, unit and formation)
Promotion system
Pay system (we pay personnel on extended tours in AFG considerably more)
Postings system

All these are affected, not so much by the people who go out there (volunteers who get better prospects across the board) but those left behind.

Of course finding a quiet place or province for people to train up in, if it was outside the current British AO might then necessitate a Coalition wide agreement, exposing all the countries to renegotiating their slice of the cake and that might be a political risk that NATO may not want to take with so many waverers at the moment. Coalitions of the now reluctant are always messy.

Lastly most soldiers going to AFG have a huge mental commitment to learn more about the people and the culture, partly professional (it is needed to get the job done) and partly personal (it is a matter of survival). But the Army is not all Tier 1 (SF) or Tier 2 (Para/Commando). There are some who are esceptional, some who are good and most who are average. Whether you encourage or force the exceptionals and very goods to go to AFG for extended tours the end result is that you are going to penalise the remainder in terms of operational effectiveness.

Putting units and formations into AFG for extended periods is a good idea from the point of view of operational effectiveness on the ground. But it might not be a good idea for the army as a whole or (more likely) it would be prohibitively costly. Units permanently or semi-permanently in theatre, rotating sub-units through if done right will work. The issues are in the details.

To sum - in many ways a good idea. Would be messy to implement but not impossible. The deciding factor in whether to do it or not is the perceived cost and whether it is regarded as acceptable or not. Note that this is the UK perspective. The US when faced with some of the same issues adopted various policies ('stop loss', extended tours etc) which had very much the same impact as some of the stuff I speak about above, for Iraq. But that was a political decision to run the armed forces very very hard because it was perceived as worthwhile. UK plc has not made the same call.

Should we do what JMA suggests now? I think the moment has passed. We have units and individuals in Theatre for extended periods and the ANA and ANP are more capable. What is more interesting is why wasn't this model looked at in 2006? I suspect because there was no desire to look forward more then 6 months at the time, certainly at senior civil servant level and politician level there was a willing suspension of belief that they needed to plan long term. how much the senior military hierarchy bucked this or not, and the reasons why they did or did not I do not know.

JMA

08-05-2010, 11:28 PM

And that is why we study history!

Sadly a lot of the people making the massive strategic decisions only read history. I am light in the area of reading widely myself. But the key IMO is the ability to extract the lessons that can be learned from the past and not merely reading about it.

But our 'good guys' and not the 'run of the mill blokes' are doing this to a certain degree already. In terms of operational effectiveness putting units on 2 year tours (as per N. Ireland) or forming units to work permanently in Theatre is a good practical step. There are reasons why it would be difficult to do (but not impossible!).

1. The UK government has only just (2009) signed up to Afghanistan being a rolling 3 year commitment. Prior to that it was a rolling 6 month commitment. Now we can plan 3 years out (but no more) in terms of structures and finances.

Yes, it is never too late and now that the parameters are finite it makes things a lot easier.

2. Intensity of fighting (linked to the point about combat effectiveness). 205 Corps, the in place Afghan formation is becoming increasingly battle fatigued. Any individual posted to a unit in Helmand is likely able to do only so much before the same happens, so a tour length of 2 years linked to a rotation in and out of the line?

I had suggested that the org be so structured that a battalion will always have four rifle companies in the field which in turn will always have three full strength platoons. Now as far as ensuring that you always have three platoon in the field on ops you will need a fourth platoon to facilitate R&R rotations.

So the potential out of the front line is in fact 25%... not bad. The trick would be to get them out of theatre for the full time of their R&R - get a belly full of beer, get into a few fights and get their leg over etc etc - and then straight back into the fray. Taking a small retraining bite out of their 25% from time will do no harm.

3. To have an impact the unit or formation is going to have to be large enough to have an impact - so probably brigade sized to replace the brigade that is out there (I do not see what a unit can do which is not already being down by the units and individuals on extended tours in theatre already). Not all the c10,000 troops in AFG will need to be on permanent tours, probably just the ground holding units and HQ elements, so circa 2500-4000. This is where it gets messy. If AFG was a Big War and not a Small War then we would no doubt flip ourselves inside out to meet the requirement, as we have done before. But AFG is a small war and we have been told to meet the (changing) national objectives at minimal cost so, with that in mind in order to find the men for AFG how much do we change the Army's:

Training system (individual, unit and formation)
Promotion system
Pay system (we pay personnel on extended tours in AFG considerably more)
Postings system

All these are affected, not so much by the people who go out there (volunteers who get better prospects across the board) but those left behind.

The key to the training is the initial predeployment stuff. Thereafter you train at platoon level in the size of the call-signs you fight in (4 man, 8 man, 12 man? Platoon?)

Pay - you pay them their normal salaries plus (what do you call it) their combat allowance? No more.

Promotions must be in line with their normal career paths. If during the next say three years the odd NCO needs to go off and do a tactics or other career necessary course then he goes.

Postings Well you may as well take them for the period until its all over in AFG. I would think you may well have them fighting over the opportunity to serve in a shooting war for three years at full combat pay. Of course you may well have a number of RTUs of people who fold-up or aren't up to it. Another incentive to serve would be to ensure that where the want to they will be given preference to sign on for additional service in the army after the three years.

Of course finding a quiet place or province for people to train up in, if it was outside the current British AO might then necessitate a Coalition wide agreement, exposing all the countries to renegotiating their slice of the cake and that might be a political risk that NATO may not want to take with so many waverers at the moment. Coalitions of the now reluctant are always messy.

Much less applicable if you have them permanently posted to AFG than for the guys swinging through for 6 months every two years. No real negotiation would be necessary as you would get the yanks to break the news to the "1,000 odd Outer Batislavians" in some peaceful backwater that some Brits will be conducting some training in their patch from time to time ;)

Lastly most soldiers going to AFG have a huge mental commitment to learn more about the people and the culture, partly professional (it is needed to get the job done) and partly personal (it is a matter of survival). But the Army is not all Tier 1 (SF) or Tier 2 (Para/Commando). There are some who are esceptional, some who are good and most who are average. Whether you encourage or force the exceptionals and very goods to go to AFG for extended tours the end result is that you are going to penalise the remainder in terms of operational effectiveness.

Well this "commitment" to learn is going to get less and less as the "end" approaches for those doing 6 month tours.

Exceptional soldiers at Brecon or on Salisbury Plain may turn out to perform around the average level when they find themselves way out of their geographical comfort zone and among strange and exotic people (otherwise found only in small numbers in London). I suggest then that soldiers improve the more experienced they become in theatre. Good will become very good, average will become better - that is if the basic soldiering skills are up to standard from the get go.

Putting units and formations into AFG for extended periods is a good idea from the point of view of operational effectiveness on the ground. But it might not be a good idea for the army as a whole or (more likely) it would be prohibitively costly. Units permanently or semi-permanently in theatre, rotating sub-units through if done right will work. The issues are in the details.

I can't see how it could be more costly than it is now.

Having formed permanent/semi-permanent units in AFG would release others like armour for example to start to prepare for the next mechanised war requirement. It will also negate the objection that the whole army will end up being specialised for AFG to the exclusion of all else and of course it will simplify the equipment uses.

To sum - in many ways a good idea. Would be messy to implement but not impossible. The deciding factor in whether to do it or not is the perceived cost and whether it is regarded as acceptable or not. Note that this is the UK perspective. The US when faced with some of the same issues adopted various policies ('stop loss', extended tours etc) which had very much the same impact as some of the stuff I speak about above, for Iraq. But that was a political decision to run the armed forces very very hard because it was perceived as worthwhile. UK plc has not made the same call.

Once the commitment has been made it will all fall into place quite simply. (I promise ;) ) This is not rocket science... all it needs is an executive decision and the compliance of the rank and file.

Should we do what JMA suggests now? I think the moment has passed. We have units and individuals in Theatre for extended periods and the ANA and ANP are more capable. What is more interesting is why wasn't this model looked at in 2006? I suspect because there was no desire to look forward more then 6 months at the time, certainly at senior civil servant level and politician level there was a willing suspension of belief that they needed to plan long term. how much the senior military hierarchy bucked this or not, and the reasons why they did or did not I do not know.

Had this been considered in 2006 then it would have been a cake walk by now.

Now is the time to do it so that it can take care of the last three years and allow other specialised armour, para, marine units to get back to their core business.

Of course subject to how things pan out you can, say, after two years or so start to integrate Afghans into the units with the view to handing over the unit and its duties to Afghans by the end and maybe retaining a training or mentoring function thereafter.

JMA

08-05-2010, 11:42 PM

If I am an Uzbek or Tajik who suffered at the hands of Pashtuns when they were in charge, I would be stoking contacts and resources for a time when Pashtuns may come to power again with Pak backing.

These folks aren't stupid, and they aren't counting on us to save them.

Stand by.

All the US training, tactics and deployment schedules will not put the genie in the box.

If I were an Uzbek or a Tajik I would be looking for a federal system to protect minority rights or they will be facing a crisis like the Kurds in Iraq and Turkey.

Sucking up to the Pashtuns would be incredibly stupid. Can you trust the word of a Pashtun? Ask the Brits.

Steve the Planner

08-06-2010, 12:54 AM

jcustis

08-06-2010, 05:21 AM

Everyone can agree with the fact that the ANP are quite corrupt and don't always carry out the law. The thinking behind this deployment was that if people from the outside, who aren't familiar with the area, then they're going to be less prone to corruption. But, as we have noticed, ethnic friction can occur.

So, what do you guys think? Should "outsiders" (not ISAF soldiers) be sent to these villages, or should we try to rely on local forces?

Ethnic friction aside, I've never quite understood this assertion, who came up with it first, and how it has grown in belief and conviction among policy-makers, that local forces are more prone to corruption.

My two sense is that it is totally poor planning to use forces from regions outside the AO.

- It means that when they are allowed leave, they are going to spend more time away just traveling home from one district to the next (or even province to province) than if they were headed to a village just down the road.

- One could more directly see the impact of their pay being infused back into the community that they came from if it were close, and not hundreds of kms away.

- I cannot fathom how someone from outside the community is going to be expected to be less corrupt, except in the realm of being less inclined to perhaps take a bribe to release a captured knucklehead who flashed some money or had an intermediary do so. In fact, every I know about this place (and it is a tiny snapshot) tells me that security forces from other areas are going to be more inclined to "tax" people that they don't know, and if they too commute to work, they have zero connection to the local population and are more inclined to think that they can get away with nefarious actions such as fleecing the people at checkpoints or during village seraches. That is the most common security forces action that I am worried about. It is up to partnered forces to have a handle on both framework operations and detention operations, but I am convinced we are more likely to be able to positively influence detention operations and the rule of law, as compared to what happens out at the VCPs and on patrol. So...let's accept the risk at the level of detentions and RoL (which happen significantly less than framework ops and interactions with local), and employ home-grown forces for local AOs.

- Locally-raised forces are also more keen on their surroundings, and know the physical as well as the human terrain, better than a soldier or patrolman posted from 100 kms away. No one can convince me otherwise, no matter how loud they yell, on that subject.

If you want to reduce or even eliminate corruption, implement a wage that is sufficient to keep the need for graft and fleecing down to a manageable level.

I'm forming the conclusion that even raising security forces from agricultural areas are problematic for a number of reasons besides the points raised above:

- Having an able-bodied son is an investment to these families. He can work the land, have children who can work the land, and will care for the parents when they are too old to do for themselves. Filial piety is so powerful here that it's not even funny. Why should they risk that investment and place him in jeopardy of being killed off someplace else, when they can suffer through a little intimidation and Taliban taxation from year to year yet maintain their investment. It's basic game theory outcomes down here when it comes to risk .
- Sons are needed to work the land throughout the majority of the year, especially on tenant farms. Now, if the son's pay was such that the father could hire capable workers through it, we might have a starting point, but we'd still have to navigate the worry of whether that son is going to make it home during his next leave rotation.

present on the ground were: UK SAS, a large brigade-sized Imperial Iranian force, a Jordanian contingent, mercenary Baluchis from Pakistan made up a good part of the Omani Army and in the air were the RAF, Iranian AF and an Omani AF with a good number of Brits and Rhodesians on contracts.

From 1958-1978 a UK officer was the Omani Armed Forces No.2, a Brigadier Colin Maxwell and a UK loan officer was the Dhofar Brigadier, John Akehurst (who wrote a book 'We Won the War:The campaign in Oman 1965-1975). 'SAS Operation Oman' by Tony Jeapes is another book.

Are these the best books on the subject of the Oman campaign? The only one I recall reading that mentioned Oman was one of Andy McNab's follow-ups, IIRC. I'd really like to sink teeth into something with depth, especially now that I have seen that Iranian and Baluchi Paks were involved. How that coalition was formed is of definite interest to me.

davidbfpo

08-06-2010, 08:26 AM

davidbfpo's original
present on the ground were: UK SAS, a large brigade-sized Imperial Iranian force, a Jordanian contingent, mercenary Baluchis from Pakistan made up a good part of the Omani Army and in the air were the RAF, Iranian AF and an Omani AF with a good number of Brits and Rhodesians on contracts.

From 1958-1978 a UK officer was the Omani Armed Forces No.2, a Brigadier Colin Maxwell and a UK loan officer was the Dhofar Brigadier, John Akehurst (who wrote a book 'We Won the War:The campaign in Oman 1965-1975). 'SAS Operation Oman' by Tony Jeapes is another book.

Which led to Jon's comment and question:
Are these the best books on the subject of the Oman campaign? The only one I recall reading that mentioned Oman was one of Andy McNab's follow-ups, IIRC. I'd really like to sink teeth into something with depth, especially now that I have seen that Iranian and Baluchi Paks were involved. How that coalition was formed is of definite interest to me.

Jon,

It is twenty-five years since I read the two books and IIRC the coalition aspect was not well covered, as the focus was on the Omani effort and the UK role. I think the RUSI Journal had shorter articles. Later I will have a look around and perhaps our UK Army contributors can comment too.

Moderator's Note: a RFI thread has been started on the Oman campaign, so responses there please and this post has been copied over. later if I find other Oman posts those will be copied over too.

jcustis

08-06-2010, 10:14 AM

Thanks David.

JMA

08-08-2010, 10:58 AM

My two sense is that it is totally poor planning to use forces from regions outside the AO.

Is it not perhaps that there are not local Pashtun volunteers available? You must use what you got. If you ain't got them you can't use them.

JMA

08-08-2010, 01:24 PM

JMA:

Exactly. Absent an effective federal system, they are at risk. A federal system is not in the offing, and sucking up to the wayward brothers is hazardous.

So, what do you really do?

Prepare for the storm to come, with a substantial possibility for a fault line between the Pashtun control areas and the rest. I'm not sure that civil war is the right term so much as internal partitioning grounded in security imperatives.

Steve

Well we (the West) should know by now how these longstanding ethnic/religious rivalries bubble to the surface periodically.

I would have thought that the West would have learned by now what with Bosnia, Rwanda, Nigeria and Kenya being recent obvious examples. But then again they seem to use "smart" guys who apply "logic" and "intelligence" to these situations yet have less common sense than any given individual you would find in any Afghan village.

So in Afghanistan it will be one more time then. Desperate situation.

Bob's World

04-08-2011, 10:44 AM

http://www.marines.mil/news/publicat...%20Warfare.pdf

On Guerrilla Warfare by Mao Tse-tung is worth a PhD in COIN simply in the reading of Captain (1940) and Brigadier General retired (1961) Samuel B. Griffith's outstanding introductions.

So many passages from both his lengthy introduction and Mao's base work jumped out at me with special meaning for today.

Regarding the dichotomy I see in the Taliban movement in Afghanistan, that I have frequently described as having two tiers, an upper tier revolutionary movement among the leadership taking sanctuary in Pakistan, and a lower tier resistance movement among the rank and file fighters in Afghanistan:

"THE FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCE between patriotic
partisan resistance and revolutionary guerrilla
movements is that the first usually lacks the ideological
content that always distinguishes the second.
A resistance is characterized by the quality of spontaneity;
it begins and then is organized. A revolutionary
guerrilla movement is organized and then begins.
A resistance is rarely liquidated and terminates when
the invader is ejected; a revolutionary movement terminates
only when it has succeeded in displacing the incumbent
government or is liquidated.
Historical experience suggests that there is very little
hope of destroying a revolutionary guerrilla movement
after it has survived the first phase and has acquired the
sympathetic support of a significant segment of the population.
The size of this "significant segment" will vary; a
decisive figure might range from 15 to 25 per cent.
in addition to an appealing program and popular support,
such factors as terrain; communications; the quality
of the opposing leadership; the presence or absence of
material help, technical aid, advisers, or "volunteers" from
outside sources; the availability of a sanctuary; the relative
military efficiency and the political flexibility of the incumbent
government are naturally relevant to the ability of a
movement to survive and expand."

Dayuhan

04-08-2011, 12:16 PM

Regarding the dichotomy I see in the Taliban movement in Afghanistan, that I have frequently described as having two tiers, an upper tier revolutionary movement among the leadership taking sanctuary in Pakistan, and a lower tier resistance movement among the rank and file fighters in Afghanistan:

That begs the question of how the two tiers can be disaggregated. If the generally local issues motivating the bottom tier - the guys actually fighting - can be resolved, the top tier is no threat at all.

I quite agree with Mao here:

a revolutionary movement terminates only when it has succeeded in displacing the incumbent government or is liquidated.

I see little to no chance of appeasing the ideological revolutionary core of these insurgencies: they will only stop fighting when they seize complete power or are liquidated. They will not be content with "participation" unless it's seen as a step toward full control. They are not fighting for a voice, they are fighting to be the only voice. They want power, and they are not about to share it.

The actual fighters, now there's a different story. Find out what they want, give it to them, and see what happens... they're the ones taking the risks, after all, and they aren't the ones who would be getting the big rewards in the event of victory. They are not fighting for the right to sit in the big chair and call the shots; that's not an option that will be open to them in any event. They need some motivation to fight, and that motivation may be addressable and resolvable.

Bob's World

04-08-2011, 12:47 PM

Well, this is Griffith's assessment of what he learned from his time with Mao's movement and a lifetime of service and study, writing this as part of his intro to a 1961 re-release of his transition of Mao's "On Guerrilla Warfare."

My take is that the top drives the bottom; the Revolution drives the Resistance; not the other way around. To attempt to resolve the resistance movement in an effort to resolve the overall insurgency is therefore an act in futility. One's very presence to execute such engagement adds fuel to the resistance even if executed in a very "population-centric" way. Far more so when executed in a "Threat-Centric" or "counter-guerrilla" way. IMO, this is the principle flaw with our current operational design in Afghanistan, is that we do not recognize this dichotomy for what it is, and we do not appreciate the futility of leveraging heavy engagement of any nature against the resistance while leaving the revolution and the issues driving the revolution intact.

The best we can hope for is some temporary suppression from such engagement. Perhaps that is the plan, and perhaps that is enough. Frankly, I find it to be more than a Little disingenuous to the populaces of all of the Coalition nations if that is the case. I prefer to believe we are merely ignorant and blinded by our biases.

As to Griffith's assessment on the Revolution I am less pessimistic than he is. Certainly if one is committed to preserving the status quo of governance and defeating the illegal revolutionary challenger, I believe he is right. Liberty can be delayed, but not denied. (Recognizing that the leaders of the "liberation" may well, and often do, deny liberty in their own way to the very populace who carried them to victory. Malign actors exploit such events, but they do not cause them.)

I believe, and historic examples bear this out, that if the government commits itself to true change on the actual issues driving the insurgency, the government can win the competition for the support of the populace and the revolution will fade to where it is no longer a threat. Today we see many Arab governments attempting this very maneuver. Most, however, are merely throwing expensive bribes at their people and pointedly avoiding the types of substantive reforms that could quell the rebellions and save their regimes. This is what the Saudis are doing, and I predict they will fall if they do not seriously consider and adopt substantive reforms.

But not all revolutions are "all or nothing" for the people who support them. Sure, the leaders may well want it all and will take it all if the government falls, but the government can win back the populace with reforms far short of capitulation.

Our very commitment to the protection of GIRoA enables them to avoid making such reforms. Perhaps after we leave GIRoA will get serious about providing good governance to their entire populace, but I doubt it. They will attempt to continue to suppress the rebellion on their own, and then when it is far too late they will offer far too little, and they will fall.

Too bad, as it is avoidable. In Afghanistan, and across the Middle East where "Arab Spring" and "Fighting Season" are beginning to bloom.

Dayuhan

04-08-2011, 10:03 PM

Liberty can be delayed, but not denied.

Revolutionary leaders rarely fight for liberty. They fight for power. The populace that supplies the fighters may very well be fighting for a perception of liberty. That's a difference that can be exploited to pry the two apart.

if the government commits itself to true change on the actual issues driving the insurgency, the government can win the competition for the support of the populace and the revolution will fade to where it is no longer a threat....not all revolutions are "all or nothing" for the people who support them. Sure, the leaders may well want it all and will take it all if the government falls, but the government can win back the populace with reforms far short of capitulation.

This is exactly what I'm talking about and trying to recommend. You don't win back the populace by dealing with the revolutionary leaders, though. You also don't win them back by shooting them, or trying to protect them from themselves. You win them back by addressing and resolving the local, immediate grievances that they are fighting over. Changes in the capitol often won't do that, because the capitol is very far away and what happens there often has little to no impact on life in the field. Forget about a nation-wide populace, because there isn't one. Find the reasons why the fighters in any given place are fighting... address those reasons, and you may get them to stop fighting.

In a centralized, capitol-based urban revolt like those of the so-called "Arab Spring" (worth recalling that after spring comes summer, and summer is hot) the central government is the issue. In decentralized, rural-based revolution the insurgent leaders have to leverage local issues and concerns to draw support for their campaign to take power. Shuffling the deck chairs in the capitol won't change that. It often won't even be noticed in the countryside. Targeting those local issues does get noticed.

Take away leaders, new leaders emerge. If the fighters see their local concerns addressed and stop fighting, the leaders became a bunch of toothless old men yapping hysterically in the distance. It can happen; I've seen it happen at close range. Whether or not it can happen in Afghanistan is another question, but it seems worth a try.

Changes in the capitol may be needed to effect change in the countryside... but change in the capitol can't be seen as an end itself. If it doesn't effect change in the countryside - and in decentralized societies change in the capitol often means nothing in the countryside - it won't accomplish anything.

Of course if the issue driving the actual fighters is our presence, rather than what happens in Kabul, we're in a bind.

I still think trying to reform Afghan governance, trying to get Afghans not to govern as Afghans govern, or trying to create a western-style democracy in Afghanistan were fool's errands from day 1... but we never seem able to just make a point and leave.

JMA

04-09-2011, 12:47 PM

Revolutionary leaders rarely fight for liberty. They fight for power. The populace that supplies the fighters may very well be fighting for a perception of liberty. That's a difference that can be exploited to pry the two apart.

[snip]

I still think trying to reform Afghan governance, trying to get Afghans not to govern as Afghans govern, or trying to create a western-style democracy in Afghanistan were fool's errands from day 1... but we never seem able to just make a point and leave.

At last.

I finally find two paragraphs (above) from you that I can fully agree with.

I thought I should mention this.

jcustis

04-09-2011, 05:00 PM

This is exactly what I'm talking about and trying to recommend. You don't win back the populace by dealing with the revolutionary leaders, though. You also don't win them back by shooting them, or trying to protect them from themselves. You win them back by addressing and resolving the local, immediate grievances that they are fighting over. Changes in the capitol often won't do that, because the capitol is very far away and what happens there often has little to no impact on life in the field. Forget about a nation-wide populace, because there isn't one. Find the reasons why the fighters in any given place are fighting... address those reasons, and you may get them to stop fighting.

I think the unique thing to the Afghanistan issue is the simple fact that before the coalition set down stakes in the country, the people didn't have any grievances. They seem to have been more than happy to plod along, eking out a bare existence (for those in the hinterlands) and living under the rule of the Taliban. It was better than the chaos and anarchy of multitudes of warlords pitted against each other. That was the true instability.

Taking the Northern Alliance out of the equation, that's pretty much what I have seen. They'll be more than happy to tell you how appreciative they are that you lifted the yoke of the Taliban off of their shoulders...and then they'll ask for a handout. Before we arrived and started prodding around in the poppy fields, and building schools and clinics and slapping plaster up to repair mosques, the people probably could have cared less. The Taliban were bad guys, but from the Afghans perspective, "he's MY bad guy, and you have no business over here trying to tell me what to do."

The "angry brothers" are fighting for two reasons and two reasons only, TCAF assessments about causes of instability be damned. They fight to protect the drug nexus (therefore not a source of instability in the mind of the average poppy sharecropper) and they fight because the coalition is rooting around in their lands, patting children on the head, taking pictures like it's a safari, setting up district councils because we believe that type of representation is good for them, forcing other norms on their culture, putting our women in homes to talk with Afghan women while the men are in the fields, and enticing complicity with a few shots from a vet here and there, or a few ailments resolved with two Tylenol and a bit of cooing from a doctor.

We struggle forward with, frankly, our collective heads up our asses over the issue of drugs and their production. I've stood in fields of marijuana as tall as a standard American ceiling. Could I cut it down and destroy it where it grew? No...not in our mission profile and not covered by any number of policies that were often unclear, arbitrary, and ignored the reality that our district produced 1/4 of the poppy in Helmand, and therefore (IIRC) 1/4 of the poppy in all of Afghanistan. Interdiction during the distribution phase was allowed, but the mission was made more difficult by the fact that the drugs were mobile by that time. Although the governor pushes his alternative crop agenda, the poppy continues to grow. It will expand, or at least stay at current levels, unless there is a blight or the coalition and GiROA can wipe the Taliban off the face of the map, but the people in the dusty villages don't see the wind blowing that direction right now. Sit and talk with an Afghan academic or elite, and most researchers are going to get the answer that the educated Afghan thinks they want to hear, time after time. The narrative vibrating at the local level tells a totally different story.

The people who need to see and hear what is truly going on at the local level don't get out to where they need to, and don't talk to the people they need to, at the right time or in the right places. The coalition troops do, but even they get a sham of a shura, too often, that is orchestrated to deliver a mix of what they think we want to hear, and what the opportunist in them tells them they can squeeze out of us. You get the true gems when you visit a man after he has spent the day in his fields, and share a bit of hospitality in the way of chai on a woven mat outside his compound, when the night air has cooled and the children feel more like dozing than peeking around corners. When he is not afraid that a neighbor will snitch on him, he will often tell you many surprising things that crush perceptions you've held the entire deployment.

I've held the Afghan male to task for not getting off of his knees on this board before, criticizing him for not finding an AK or a pistol and putting a bullet in the head. of the next Taliban who saunters into his neighborhood to collect a tax, or murder a khan, or post a night letter. I've also thought that they were riding the fence very well, but now I am not so sure. Their learned helplessness in the face of the Taliban is depressing, but I've recently spent a lot of time thinking about the matter, and I don't think it's because they are helpless and scared. They simply don't see the Taliban as the source of instability that we do. Our value system and framework for analyzing the problem is flat out wrong, but what the hell, there's money to be spent, and so we gloss over what is right in front of us, patrol until the unit replacing us sends its first echelons into country, and then we go home, forget what we learned, and re-deploy with a new command team and new philosophies.

The fighters are fighting us because every 7-12 months, a new band of invaders arrive and start the cycle all over.

PS. And don't even get me started about the civ-mil divide occurring on the ground. I would prefer to grab a handful of members from the Council, pay you $150,000 of my tax dollars to work the problem, and let you have at it.

Of course if the issue driving the actual fighters is our presence, rather than what happens in Kabul, we're in a bind.

I still think trying to reform Afghan governance, trying to get Afghans not to govern as Afghans govern, or trying to create a western-style democracy in Afghanistan were fool's errands from day 1... but we never seem able to just make a point and leave.

No way I would ever argue with that Dayuhan, because that's exactly what it happening on the ground.

Ray

04-11-2011, 04:09 PM

My take is that the top drives the bottom; the Revolution drives the Resistance; not the other way around. To attempt to resolve the resistance movement in an effort to resolve the overall insurgency is therefore an act in futility. One's very presence to execute such engagement adds fuel to the resistance even if executed in a very "population-centric" way. Far more so when executed in a "Threat-Centric" or "counter-guerrilla" way. IMO, this is the principle flaw with our current operational design in Afghanistan, is that we do not recognize this dichotomy for what it is, and we do not appreciate the futility of leveraging heavy engagement of any nature against the resistance while leaving the revolution and the issues driving the revolution intact.

This is an interesting take that is very pertinent in attempting to solve insurgencies.

However, as far as Afghanistan is concerned, as far as I understand, it is not a homogeneous 'revolution'. While the core issue may be common, the tribal interests of each region or even sub region, possibly takes predominance within the structure of the 'core interest'.

Therefore, not only the core issue has to be addressed, but also alongside this, the tribal 'interests' of each region or sub region has to be addressed so that a more cogent response can be structured. I would not know if you all would understand, but each tribal leader has this 'Khalifa' mindset; in simpler terms it means that the world revolves around him wherein the temporal supersedes the spiritual!

This, possibly, is what makes the approach to the campaign complex and difficult.

To add to the problem is the interest of neighbouring nations, on both sides, who because of regional and religious or sectarian affinity regularly churns sentiments that appeal to the regional and religious or sectarian interests.

As to Griffith's assessment on the Revolution I am less pessimistic than he is. Certainly if one is committed to preserving the status quo of governance and defeating the illegal revolutionary challenger, I believe he is right. Liberty can be delayed, but not denied. (Recognizing that the leaders of the "liberation" may well, and often do, deny liberty in their own way to the very populace who carried them to victory. Malign actors exploit such events, but they do not cause them.)

I believe, and historic examples bear this out, that if the government commits itself to true change on the actual issues driving the insurgency, the government can win the competition for the support of the populace and the revolution will fade to where it is no longer a threat. Today we see many Arab governments attempting this very maneuver. Most, however, are merely throwing expensive bribes at their people and pointedly avoiding the types of substantive reforms that could quell the rebellions and save their regimes. This is what the Saudis are doing, and I predict they will fall if they do not seriously consider and adopt substantive reforms.

One wonders how far one can compare Afghanistan with the Arab countries, where some sort of a revolution is underway.

While the Arab countries have modern infrastructure, are more educated and are aware of the happenings in the outside world, I wonder if the Afghans have the same advantage. Therefore, to expect a people who are basically illiterate and have never has experienced the instruments of modernity and hence having little need of 'creature comforts' to emulate the Arab revolution, maybe a trifle too early in the day.

A people who have history no idea of 'liberty' in the western sense of the word, would hardly be concerned about liberty (in the western sense of the word) coming instantaneously or being delayed.

Just to explain with a simple example.

While the world laments that a vast majority of those living in third world countries work and live under $2 a day and are horrified. However, the flipside is that it really is not horrifying in real terms. $2 may fetch little in the US, but it is somewhat adequate (with a pinch) for for a person from the the third world. And if the family works and each fetches $2 at the end of the day, it sort of works out. This also explains why there family planning exercises flounder and why child labour, much that it is distasteful to the West, flourishes.

In short, to address Afghanistan, one has to think like an Afghan to fight an Afghan, rather than superimposing western modes to combat the situation.

04-19-2011, 12:10 AM

I have been meaning to mention this for awhile. This morning's NYT reminded me.

Remember how many of the suicide attacks against American and Iraqi forces in Iraq were attributed to terrorists "wearing Iraqi military uniforms", implying that enemies were simply putting on military or police uniforms to gain access to conduct their attacks?

I did a piece on SMC (!!pNSFW!!) http://swedemeat.blogspot.com/2006/12/black-market-uniform-story.html in 2006 expressing my skepticism about such representations.

I've since received confirmation of our suspicions, follow up investigations nearly always ID'ed the perp[s] as real members of the security forces.

The media have been regurgitating the same narrative in Afghanistan https://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/19/world/asia/19afghanistan.html:

It was the latest in a string of attacks targeting Afghan government and military officials in what the Taliban have called the beginning of their spring offensive. On Saturday, a suicide bomber killed five NATO service members in eastern Afghanistan A day earlier, a suicide bomber killed the police chief of Kandahar Province. In both attacks, the bombers were dressed in Afghan army or police uniforms.

The same motive for the media manipulation is in play. To acknowledge that enemies have infiltrated our only hope for a decent exit from the war (such as it is) would cast some doubt about the strategy we are hanging our hats upon.

This is far from our only problem in Afghanistan. Pak sanctuaries, Afghan gov incompetence (and corruption), challenges in getting enough warm bodies to join Afghan mil and police, and dwindling options to address all of these issues are certainly more serious obstacles.

But deluding ourselves is rarely a recipe for success in any endeavor.

Bob's World

04-19-2011, 03:56 AM

In short, to address Afghanistan, one has to think like an Afghan to fight an Afghan, rather than superimposing western modes to combat the situation.

If this is your take, and it is a reasonable one, then it sounds like something best left to Afghans. Who will prevail? Ahh, that it the $64000 question that keeps us stuck to this tar baby that we have created.

Once we get comfortable with the understanding that we really don't have any vital national interests at stake that demand us staying and artificially propping up a particular solution, the sooner we can evolve to more reasonable approaches.

Governance is a a market economy. The best might not prevail, but the strongest will. If that too turns out to be bad new challengers will emerge. Right now we are propping up an artificial solution that is failing the governance "market" model. Kind of like the Fed printing cash or bailing out banks at home. Maybe Afghanistan is so important it warrants such artificial measures that create long-term risks for short-term gains. Maybe not. Reasonable minds can indeed differ.

Personally, I think walking away has to be on the table as a real option. If we do not put it there then Karzai and GIRoA have no incentive to truly seek to govern the entire populace. They will just keep serving the Northern Alliance populace and excluding the rest.

Tukhachevskii

04-19-2011, 12:58 PM

Governance is a a market economy.

Explain (please).

omarali50

04-19-2011, 01:22 PM

The way I see it, this is the "cunning rationality of history" at work (to use Hegel's phrase). Let us say that a subsistence economy and a medieval ideology (talibanish Islamism) exists in a country surrounded by slightly more advanced (or, dont use the word "advanced" if it sounds too Whiggish to you, say "sophisticated") societies, in a world with several MUCH more advanced (sorry, "sophisticated") societies hungry for raw materials, access, imperial dreams, whatever. What is going to happen? Some locals will be enrolled as agents of the more sophisticated societies as they expand into what they see as a vacuum. These more sophisticated societies will use their proxies to advance what they regard as "their interests". They will get into fights with each other. Their actions AND the desire of the primitive locals for some of the "cargo" occasionally parachuted in will upset the status quo...its inevitable. There IS no Afghan way of life that will survive in some museum watched over by benign protectors from the rest of the world. The only question is, who upends what part of the status quo and how.
Btw, the "status quo" does not mean the 1999 Taliban. They would just be one step on the road to upending the status quo that has been unwinding itself for 200 years. You can never go home again. But of course, the US army can definitely go home. Let the Chinese and the Pakistanis and the Indians and the Russians pay for their own fights..
There is another layer to it (among many others): Some of the super-sophisticates may have evolved their own crude way of maintaining bare-minimum worldwide order. Maybe that is why they are there, to make sure newbies like Pakistan and India don't upset the applecart and start fires that will effect everyone in the long run. But if that is the case, then wouldnt it be helpful to make this a bit explicit and have everyone contribute to the maintenance of world order? Or is it the case that the big boss (even though running short of cash) has no mechanism for thinking that clearly? In which case the cunning rationality of history may have "other ways to make you talk"...

Fuchs

04-19-2011, 01:44 PM

Explain (please).

There are indeed theories that treat governance like an economic system. Please note that "economic" in this context is a scientific term and means the avoidance of waste.

There is for example an economic and political theory of bureaucracy and elections can be analysed in economic terms (especially the optimisation of votes, which is very similar to siting a shop).

Pete

04-19-2011, 03:46 PM

I've also thought that they were riding the fence very well, but now I am not so sure. Their learned helplessness in the face of the Taliban is depressing, but I've recently spent a lot of time thinking about the matter, and I don't think it's because they are helpless and scared. They simply don't see the Taliban as the source of instability that we do. Our value system and framework for analyzing the problem is flat out wrong ...
During the Civil War many people in my local area didn't like it when either army was in the neighborhood -- it usually meant that your split-rail fences would be used for firewood, your barn would be dismantled for its lumber and your livestock would be consumed. Athough this was a strongly pro-Southern area there is circumstantial evidence that the local town of Inwood founded in the 1880s as a station along a new railroad line may have been named after a Union provost marshal of that name who operated here during the spring of 1865. By then the area was infested with deserters from both sides, freebooters and loosely-affiliated guerrilla bands. The locals may have been grateful to see some law and order restored even if it was a Bluecoat who was doing it.

Tukhachevskii

04-19-2011, 07:06 PM

There are indeed theories that treat governance like an economic system. Please note that "economic" in this context is a scientific term and means the avoidance of waste.

There is for example an economic and political theory of bureaucracy and elections can be analysed in economic terms (especially the optimisation of votes, which is very similar to siting a shop).

I am well aware of the various economic theories of governance, thank you. I want to know what Bobsworld is talking about in plain English.

jcustis

04-20-2011, 02:57 AM

Our very commitment to the protection of GIRoA enables them to avoid making such reforms. Perhaps after we leave GIRoA will get serious about providing good governance to their entire populace, but I doubt it. They will attempt to continue to suppress the rebellion on their own, and then when it is far too late they will offer far too little, and they will fall.

Despite the greatest degree of seriousness on the part of GIRoA, it will never get past the tribalism, corruption, deceit, and apathy to make a difference, at least not until tens of years have past and the people have succumbed to the pain.

By that point, it will require a warlord/dictator to rise up and rule through the way of the gun, not by the true ballot. GIRoA will be largely irrelevant at that point.

Bob's World

04-20-2011, 05:11 PM

Explain (please).

I mean that if the people don"buy" it, it won't endure. You cannot force a failed model forever, ulitimately the customer has the final say, and will switch brands if the current brand is unable or unwilling to evolve to suit the current situation.

This is one reason I find major fault in arrogant concepts such as "government having a monopoly on violence." Legal violence, perhaps, but the people always have the option to step outside the law to break up such monopolies that are employed to force failed models.

Dayuhan

04-20-2011, 09:32 PM

I mean that if the people don"buy" it, it won't endure.

The problem, as in so many other places, lies in getting the various factions that constitute "the people" to "buy" the same product. If the prevailing pattern is that you either rule and kick ass or someone else rules and you get your ass kicked, it's hard to sell any faction on a system that doesn't involve them ruling.

I think we've learned enough to abandon the idea that America can adjust other political cultures to suit our interests... but i could be wrong!

Pete

04-21-2011, 01:31 AM

The only reason I post Civil War anecdotes in this thread is because they show the ambivalence of civilian populations for military forces operating in the area where the local people live. They're all-American tales too, stuff that really happened around here.

When the Confederacy and its units began falling apart in the Spring of 1865 many soldiers, particularly cavalrymen, "Headed for the Hills," in this particular case in eastern West Virginia about three miles from the Virginia state line. They thought they could wait things out here to see if things improved for the Confederacy. However, armed men without rations or forage did what they had to do to eat and feed their horses, so honorable soldiers who had decided to lay low for a while eventually turned into de facto vagabonds and criminals.

That's where Captain Inwood, the U.S. Army Provost Marshal came in. There were U.S. Army garrisons in Martinsburg, WV 12 miles north, and also 12 miles south in Winchester, VA. The route of travel between the two places, the Valley Pike / U.S. Route 11, was relatively unpoliced until Captain Inwood came along. But he quickly restored a measure of order to the area. His contribution may be the reason the town of Inwood, WV has the name that it does.

Bill Moore

04-21-2011, 05:27 PM

http://www.voanews.com/english/news/asia/Afghan-Taliban-to-Open-Office-in-Turkey-119874414.html

14 APR

The Turkish foreign minister has confirmed that preparations are underway for opening an office in Turkey for the Afghan Taliban. During a recent visit to Turkey, the president of Pakistan, together with his Turkish counterpart, made a commitment to support political initiatives to end the war in Afghanistan. Ankara has been calling for talks with the Taliban, and having strong ties with both Afghanistan and Pakistan is seen as a key element in facilitating talks.

For now, the Taliban is sending out conflicting messages over whether it would be prepared to talk. But Ankara is reportedly using all its diplomatic influence to find a political solution to the conflict. That stance is supported by the Turkish former civilian head of NATO-led forces in Afghanistan, Hikmet Cetin, who says talking with the Taliban is a necessity

http://www.breitbart.com/article.php?id=D9MNFCJO0&show_article=1

20 APR

ISLAMABAD, April 20 (AP) - (Kyodo)—The top U.S. military officer on Wednesday confirmed reports that the Afghan Taliban would be setting up an office in Turkey, Pakistani private television channel GEO TV reported.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/turkey_says_it_would_consider_hosting_a_taliban_of fice_as_part_of_efforts_to_end_afghan_war/2011/04/11/AFtboUJD_story.html?wprss=rss_world

Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari was to arrive in Turkey late Monday, and Afghanistan is expected to be high on the agenda of talks. Any solution to the Afghan conflict would likely require the support of Pakistan, and in particular elements of its security forces that are believed to have links to insurgents in Afghanistan.

Mehmet Seyfettin Erol, coordinator of the Eurasia Strategic Research Center, a research center based in Ankara, said the opening of a Taliban office in Turkey would boost the legitimacy of the insurgents.

“The idea also signals that there is an agreement with Pakistan over integrating the Taliban into the political system in a new Afghanistan,” he said.

Steve the Planner

04-22-2011, 01:24 AM

Custis:

Wow! Very heavy and insightful.

Bill:

The whole story and history along the old silk road just never got onto US radar screens, but its is the erf of these places.

Connecting each other together is what they are about. We are just something the anti-bodies will eventually reject.

Bill Moore

04-22-2011, 01:58 AM

Connecting each other together is what they are about. We are just something the anti-bodies will eventually reject.

But, but, but if we build more schools and roads maybe they'll like us and want us to stay????:(

Steve, good catch on jcustis comments above, I think they were pretty much on target. Assuming that is the truth, then what is the correct strategy to achieve our objectives and relieve the Afghan people of ISAF's occupation like activities?

Dayuhan

04-22-2011, 02:12 AM

what is the correct strategy to achieve our objectives

What are our objectives? It started out with "disrupt, deny, defeat AQ", but it seems to have crept on to something entirely different. Hard to form a strategy to achieve an objective if we haven't got a clearly delineated and achievable objective in mind.

Tukhachevskii

04-22-2011, 03:37 PM

I mean that if the people don"buy" it, it won't endure. You cannot force a failed model forever, ulitimately the customer has the final say, and will switch brands if the current brand is unable or unwilling to evolve to suit the current situation.

This is one reason I find major fault in arrogant concepts such as "government having a monopoly on violence." Legal violence, perhaps, but the people always have the option to step outside the law to break up such monopolies that are employed to force failed models.

I see. You were speaking metaphorically rather than applying some economic model of governance to a situation I didn't think was appliacable. Thanks for the clarification.

AdamG

05-21-2011, 08:00 PM

(CNN) -- The commander of coalition forces in Afghanistan is warning troops of increased high-profile attacks over the summer, calling on NATO-led forces to balance its tactical needs with those of the civilian population.

It is likely that insurgents will pursue high-profile attacks this summer in an attempt to demonstrate their ability to strike, Gen. David Petraeus said in a memorandum to the International Security Assistance Force.

http://www.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/asiapcf/05/21/afghanistan.petraeus.casualties/index.html

WASHINGTON -- As fighting and casualties in Afghanistan's war reached an all-time high, U.S. soldiers and Marines there reported plunging morale and the highest rates of mental health problems in five years.

The grim statistics in a new Army report released Thursday dramatize the psychological cost of a military campaign that U.S. commanders and officials say has reversed the momentum of the Taliban insurgency.

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/05/19/afghanistan-troop-morale_n_864370.html

Ray

05-23-2011, 02:50 PM

The elimination of Al Qaeda is not going to “disrupt, dismantle and defeat” terrorist networks bent on striking on cities in the US and its Nato allies. This would require relentless counter-terrorism action across the Durand Line. Given the heavy dependence of the Americans on the Pakistanis for logistical support to transport supplies through Pakistani territory, such action would be unthinkable just now. But, with an estimated 50 per cent of supplies now coming through Russia and Central Asia, this dependence on Pakistan will become much less important in coming years as American troop levels in Afghanistan are significantly reduced. In such a scenario, the US will be more open to effective counter-terrorism action across the Durand Line, as Vice-President Joe Biden and others like Ambassador Robert Blackwill have advocated. The US is negotiating a strategic partnership agreement with Afghanistan, which will enable a residual military presence even beyond 2014. Its provisions will be important in outlining long-term American objectives.
http://www.dailypioneer.com/338013/Future-tense-in-Afghanistan.html

davidbfpo

06-08-2011, 08:22 PM

Hat tip to Watandost for highlighting a Canadian article on the apparent strategy, using the two 'police' generals General Daud Daud in the north and the promotion of Brigadier-General Abdul Razik in the south:http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/wedded-to-the-warlords-natos-unholy-afghan-alliance/article2047158/page1/

Some choice comments by others and this stark IMHO paragraph:
Having failed to establish a working government in many parts of Afghanistan, NATO is increasingly dependent on so-called strongmen, commanders whose power comes not only from their affiliation with Kabul but from militias, tribes and, often, the narcotics trade.

davidbfpo

06-08-2011, 08:30 PM

Following the Canadian trail I read this article, which includes a short commentary on Sir Sherard Cowper-Coles's book, which has been commented upon before and elsewhere on The UK in Afghanistan thread.

A partial quote:
Such a military-focused approach risks making Afghanistan safe not for better governance, but for the warlords and narco-Mafias whom the Taliban originally targeted when they took power in the mid 1990s. Once again, the poor Afghan people could be the losers.

There's a reference to a previously unheard book by Alex Strick van Linschoten and Felix Kuehn, researchers who have lived in Kandahar since 2006 and have published their substantial research as 'An Enemy We have Created: The Myth of the Taliban/Al Qaeda Merger in Afghanistan 1970-2010'.
IIRC some here are critical of their previous work.

(this) offers a rigorous and detailed description of this problem.

They note, first, that the Taliban and al-Qaeda have almost nothing to do with each other any more, beyond some money being channelled to one faction of Taliban fighters. The Taliban, extremely distrusting of foreigners, tend to hate al-Qaeda, which has no Afghan leaders.

But, they warn, this could change if the senior leadership of the various Taliban groups is obliterated: “The new and younger generation of Afghan Taliban is more susceptible to advances by foreign jihadist groups including al-Qaeda … Current policies pursued by domestic and international actors – led by the United States – are a key factor driving the Afghan Taliban and al-Qaeda together.”

Link:http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/opinions/opinion/were-killing-the-afghans-we-should-be-speaking-to/article2037846/

davidbfpo

06-11-2011, 08:09 PM

A lengthy article which is upbeat and cites a variety of sources, including two ministers sacked by Karzai:http://www.economist.com/node/18681871

The sub-title is:
It’s been a long slog, but Afghanistan may at last be able to contemplate more stable government.

davidbfpo

06-15-2011, 04:44 PM

An odd story from a previously unknown source, Gareth Porter of IPS, who let's say has some "baggage" for his unconventional views and is being circulated in the UK by a Muslim think-tank.

Opens with:
During his intensive initial round of media interviews as commander in Afghanistan in August 2010, Gen. David Petraeus released figures to the news media that claimed spectacular success for raids by Special Operations Forces: in a 90-day period from May through July, SOF units had captured 1,355 rank and file Taliban, killed another 1,031, and killed or captured 365 middle or high-ranking Taliban.

(Continues)..But it turns out that more than 80 percent of those called captured Taliban fighters were released within days of having been picked up, because they were found to have been innocent civilians, according to official U.S. military data.

Link:http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=56038

IIRC Afghan detainees in the field are usually transferred to Afghan custody after a short period, maybe 72hours and I do not follow why those captured were treated differently - except it is a JSOC operational process.

jmm99

06-15-2011, 07:47 PM

I read the same Porter article - the term "innocent civilian" is intriguing. :rolleyes:

Here is the story on detention in Astan (current as of last year), Detainee Review Boards in Afghanistan: From Strategic Liability to Legitimacy (http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/Bovarnick-Detainee.pdf), by Lieutenant Colonel Jeff A. Bovarnick, Professor and Chair, International and Operational Law Department, The Judge Advocate General’s Legal Center and School, Charlottesville, Virginia (JUNE 2010, THE ARMY LAWYER, DA PAM 27-50-445).

As to the ISAF vice USFOR-A (OEF) distinction (pp.13-14, footnotes in original omitted below):

A. Combat Operations in Afghanistan ISAF/NATO and U.S Forces–Afghanistan/OEF

Because the 2 July 2009 detention policy is explicit in its application, it is informative to describe the units operating in Afghanistan. On 30 June 2010, General David Petreaus was confirmed by the U.S. Senate as the dual-hatted Commander of U.S. Forces–Afghanistan (USFOR-A) and the International and Security Assistance Force (ISAF).

Although they fall under the same commander, USFOR-A and ISAF operate under two different detention paradigms. As described in detail below, the 2 July 2009 policy for the new DRBs only applies to USFOR-A/OEF units. This section provides a brief explanation of the ISAF detention policy, which is separate and distinct from the USFOR-A detention policy. The majority of U.S. forces in Afghanistan (78,430 out of approximately 95,000) are assigned to ISAF, which operates as part of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization NATO) mission in Afghanistan.

The remaining 17,000 or so U.S. troops fall under USFOR-A and continue to operate under the authority of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). Currently, USFOR-A is made up of U.S. Special Operations Forces (the capturing units), Joint Task Force 435, which runs all detention operations in Afghanistan (discussed in detail below), and other critical enablers, such as route clearance and Palladin units. The 2 July 2009 detention policy does not apply to roughly 80% of U.S. troops operating in Afghanistan.

As described later, USFOR-A can send captured personnel to the DFIP whereas ISAF units (including the U.S. forces assigned to ISAF) cannot. Since December 2005, all ISAF units have been required to turn captures over to the Afghans within ninety-six hours of capture.

In early 2010, complaints from U.S. units (assigned to ISAF) surfaced over this relatively short time period to turn captured personnel over to Afghan authorities. In March 2010, in response to these complaints, the Secretary of Defense extended the period to fourteen days, thus authorizing the U.S. caveat to the ninety-six-hour rule for U.S. forces assigned to ISAF. The ninety-six-hour rule is still in effect for non-U.S. ISAF units.

All insurgents captured by ISAF troops must be turned over to the Afghan National Security Directorate (NDS), either within ninety-six hours for non-U.S. ISAF units or fourteen days for U.S. ISAF units. The NDS is Afghanistan’s domestic intelligence agency with jurisdiction over all insurgent and terrorist activity.

In essence, the NDS has the right of first refusal to accept the transfer of captured personnel believed to be insurgents or terrorists. In addition to the personnel that might be expected to make up an intelligence agency, the NDS also has a staff of investigators that specifically work to prepare cases for prosecution within the Afghan criminal justice system. Currently, a team of Afghan prosecutors and judges with special expertise are temporarily assigned to work exclusively with the NDS to coordinate this effort to try suspected insurgents and terrorists under the appropriate Afghan criminal laws within the Afghan criminal justice system. Each province in Afghanistan has at least one judge and several prosecutors assigned to work on NDS cases.

I expect LawVol knows the current conditions better than anyone else at SWC.