Winning the War in Afghanistan [Archive] - Page 4

Ken White

06-26-2011, 05:15 PM

Ken, the simple truth is that "winning" in Afghanistan is no longer considered possible and now it is just a matter of a US withdrawal in a face saving manner (if that is possible) if not leave like the Soviets did.It was never possible. I've been saying that since early 2002 when what we wanted (not necessarily needed) to do there was effectively completed. We should not have decided to stay because once we did we locked ourselves in to a no-win situation.

Unfortunately, George W. Bush forgot his job as POTUS and recalled that he was a good Christan and did the Christan thing, he decided to 'fix' what 'we' had 'broken.' There were four big flaws in that.

- The job of POTUS is to take care of US interests, humanistic follies and US domestic political concerns as well as personal beliefs can be -- should be -- considered but net cost should be weighed against benefits. He did not accept the cost-benefit analysis which pretty much predicted what has occurred though it underestimated those costs. He made a poor decision...

- The possibility of our being able to 'fix' it in less than two generations -- if ever -- was microscopic at best.

- The 'we' gets transmogrified in affairs like this. The US DoD has a vested interest in creating conflicts and places to go, things to do. We as a nation too often succumb to that interest and poke into things we should not and yet we do not have the political will (we here includes uniformed and civilian 'politicians' and their ilk...) to use force properly so we end up doing a poor job -- and get way with it... :mad: That same organization has a 'can do' attitude and will salute and say "Yes, Sir" while marching over a cliff. It is reluctant to say that some things are not possible or not with the tools available so the relatively ignorant civilian masters give a flawed task and the Armed Forces will try to execute even if they do not have the wherewithal to do it. G.W.B. said "go forth and do great things" and few if any said "Boss, that is really stoopid..."

- We did not break it, it was already broken.

So we got engaged where we should not have in a manner that we had earlier proven was totally futile and not appropriate to the US and I've been saying since '02 that we'd get out based on the US electoral cycle. Just as we 'got out' of Iraq and elsewhere...

We're slow learners, we have no continuity mostly because of oversize egos so we love to reinvent the wheel, because, after all the "They failed but we're smarter so we can do it correctly" attitude, while very human, has adversely affected nations for years. See socialism... :rolleyes:

Dayuhan

06-27-2011, 03:03 AM

- The 'we' gets transmogrified in affairs like this. The US DoD has a vested interest in creating conflicts and places to go, things to do. We as a nation too often succumb to that interest and poke into things we should not and yet we do not have the political will (we here includes uniformed and civilian 'politicians' and their ilk...) to use force properly so we end up doing a poor job -- and get way with it...

I don't really think the impetus toward prolonged occupation and "nation-building" efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan came from DoD, vested interests or not. I recall the main agitators there being a civilian clique, actually rather small and with no significant constituency. They just happened to be on the spot post - 9/11 with an explanation and a plan, which nobody else was offering. It wasn't a very good plan, but it was superficially attractive: it was big, it could be made to sound noble, and it involved smacking around a bunch of Muslims, a significant domestic political imperative in those days. GWB bought it, and the rest is history.

I wonder if the Michael Ledeens of the world ever go back and read the tripe they published in those days...

There were timely warnings about Iraq invasion and there were warnings about the Afghanistan occupation - they were ignored. It's a failure of the society, and said society has to learn or else it will fail again and again and again. All delusion about being exceptional doesn't help here....

...Now everyone go back and look up who was smarter years ago already. Look up the few warning voices in newspapers, in academia, in bureaucracies.
And next time listen to them!

I was one of those voices, though on a completely irrelevant scale. As you say, nobody listened. Maybe they will in the future, though I doubt it. Not that I expect the US to take on another regime change/occupation/nation building sequence any time soon, but we'll likely find some other stupid thing to do.

For what it's worth, I put this out on the street a while back. It is part of the discussion currently on the hill as politicians and policy makers grapple to craft solutions to a problem they do not well understand, that in turn the believe they can sell to their constituency back home.

(There are aspects of my proposal, such as not calling what we are doing in Afghanistan a "war" that causes such a radical change of perspective that many can understand, but struggle with how that makes them look when it goes to their electors back home).

I quite agree that good and inclusive governance would solve Afghanistan's problems. i just don't think the US has the ability to impose or create good and inclusive governance in Afghanistan.

I still don't know why so many Americans seem so surprised and so offended that Afghans installed as a government by Americans still govern like Afghans. Who would possibly have expected that?

Ken White

06-27-2011, 04:33 AM

I don't really think the impetus toward prolonged occupation and "nation-building" efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan came from DoD, vested interests or not. I recall the main agitators there being a civilian clique, actually rather small and with no significant constituency. They just happened to be on the spot post - 9/11 with an explanation and a plan, which nobody else was offering. It wasn't a very good plan, but it was superficially attractive: it was big, it could be made to sound noble, and it involved smacking around a bunch of Muslims, a significant domestic political imperative in those days. GWB bought it, and the rest is history.

I wonder if the Michael Ledeens of the world ever go back and read the tripe they published in those days...DoD (minus a few...) and the Army wanted little to do with Afghanistan and nothing to do with Iraq.

However, that vested interest primes the pump and gives civilian deciders -- Carter, Reagan, Bush 41, Clinton, Bush 42 , Obama and all their hangers-on a big toy with which to play. And play they will. :eek:

If DoD would put the national interest ahead of their budget, manpower and general clout, we'd all be better off. Of course if the policy wonks, ala Ledeen or Nyel and crews would do the same, who knows what might happen. I'll not hold my breath waiting for either thing to occur... :wry:

Dayuhan

06-28-2011, 12:59 AM

Of course if the policy wonks, ala Ledeen or Nyel and crews would do the same, who knows what might happen.

Wonks? Wonkers? For all these years I've been writing those words with and "a" instead of an "o". Guess I had it wrong... maybe.

Ken White

06-28-2011, 02:16 AM

Two coins of the same side -- or something like that...:D

Bob's World

06-28-2011, 04:37 PM

http://english.aljazeera.net/news/asia/2011/06/2011628131923580846.html

An interesting article on several levels regarding a growing IDP problem and also a blaming of ALP.

Some quick takes: If so many people leave where we "C-H-B" one must ask why? Why do the poulaces fear being brought under GIRoA control?

Blaming ALP: Karzai hates this element of now official security that arguably draws more patronage to local (below district) leaders than to him through his appointees.

Steve the Planner

06-28-2011, 09:41 PM

Don't disagree with much of what was said, but, in an appropriate after action autopsy of both Iraq and Afghanistan, in my view, would indicate that many things could have been done better, with less loss of life and limb, less waste of money and resources, and more effective engagement of Iraqis and Afghans in shaping a post-departure environment that was more beneficial, and less conflict-ridden.

As one whose belated mission was not to win in Iraq, but to help extricate us from it, I absolutely believe that same fresh wind needs to blow through the Afghan mission: Given the new resources and time frame, what can be accomplished in this limited period to improve the post-departure environment in the process of our relatively rapid wind-down?

That is a very different problem/objective/mission fraught with relevance even to the likes of Fuchs. OK, now we are leaving. What is our best path for Afghans?

Chaos. Mass retaliations. Renewed factional and regional conflicts. Institutional and society collapse. Economic decompression (the bends). Potentially millions of civilian refugees trapped in between the next round of the Big Game.

These are, by default, likely outcomes absent some very serious thinking, planning and execution.

With "winning" now off the table, what to do next?

Dayuhan

06-28-2011, 09:49 PM

Why do the populaces fear being brought under GIRoA control?

Do we know that GIoA control is what they fear?

Maybe they run because they don't want to be in a contested area where the GIRoA rules by day and the Taliban rule by night. That's like being the puck in a really nasty game of hockey: everyone slaps you around and when the game is over you're left out in the cold. I can imagine people wanting to bail.

Steve the Planner

06-28-2011, 11:01 PM

Steve the Planner

06-28-2011, 11:25 PM

The recent IDP report raises troubling contradictions in the US's perception of the security value of local police, and the refugee agencies reports to the contrary.

More troubling is the food report---that instead of feeding 7 million (one quarter of Afghanistan's putative population, UN only has funding for less than 4 million.

In Iraq, we were faced with a devastating drought, but the solution mandated improved logistical relief strategies, since some minimum level of water was always available.

In Afghanistan, if only enough food aid for "women and children," the result is, regrettably, predictable, including a substantial renewal of illicit activities, social instability, and economic disruption.

As a social analyst, I would be much more concerned with food shortages than Pakistan (where, arguably, the same problem exists), and its military threats. 450 rockets ill-targeted rockets can not do as much damage as 3 million newly-starving refugees.

Dayuhan

06-29-2011, 02:16 AM

Dayuhan:

You mean the GIRoA that includes, or excludes, the wayward cousins?

The one that embraces or enshrouds women?

The one whose army includes or excludes Talibs?

It's defies credibility, at this late stage, that a serving US officer does not understand Afghan resistance to centralized government control under the Karzai regime.

But seriously folks, that ain't gonna happen during our watch.

Like you said: "Don't put me and my family in a firing line" is a pretty good survival strategy.

When it comes to people leaving town and becoming "internally displaced", my gut feel is that it isn't about resistance to or fear of the Karzai government (or anyone ese), and that who includes, excludes, shrouds or embraces who. It's probably more about folks seeing a big fight coming and not wanting to be in the middle of it.

I have to wonder, on a local level, how many are really resisting centralized government and how many are backing the side they think is most likely to win. As you suggest, survival strategies often trump the question of what future anyone wants for the country. In general, not getting killed today has a higher priority than what sort of governance one thinks is best for the country... especially when you assume as a given that all governance is bad, and the best one can hope for is something least bad for you.

Steve the Planner

06-29-2011, 05:43 AM

"...all of them imaginary."

Bob's World

06-29-2011, 10:04 AM

This article makes a bold leap in connecting IDPs to an ALP program that is less than a year old. Seriously, someone is grinding an ax or using this reporter as a hand puppet.

As to why people leave their homes during the clear phase, that is obvious. No one want to have their family in the middle of a fire fight. Why they don't return is another matter entirely.

Land disputes are one of the biggest issues in Afghanistan. Every time the regime changes (and it has changed pretty often over the past 20 years) there are radical changes of patronage winners and losers. The losers who can leave, leave; The winners then move in and take over the good land, jobs, etc. Rich farm land such as lies along the Helmand or the Arghandab rivers, where much of our C-H-B operations have taken place, served to evict non-Northern Alliance patrons for replacement by those more in favor with the current regime. If anything, ALP is an obstacle to GIRoA being able to evict people from their homes to award some more favored tribe or family.

This article pokes a sharp stick at ALP and night raids; while not a fan of night raids, I suggest one gets closer to the truth when they follow the money, and money in Afghanistan follows the patronage and follows the land.

Fuchs

06-29-2011, 10:54 AM

Rich farm land such as lies along the Helmand or the Arghandab rivers, where much of our C-H-B operations have taken place, served to evict non-Northern Alliance patrons for replacement by those more in favor with the current regime. If anything, ALP is an obstacle to GIRoA being able to evict people from their homes to award some more favored tribe or family.

Wait ! :eek:

Do you say that NATO is enabling now what if fought against in 1999 ?

Does this mean now it's according to our own assertions legit to bomb us?

Bob's World

06-29-2011, 12:49 PM

It is lost to most, and beyond comprehension to westerners who is first in right on these land ownership matters. But we essentially enabled the current big shuffle the day we sided with the Northern Alliance to pursue our own ends in Afghanistan, so that horse is long out of the barn.

Only through reconciliation that leads to some future shared governance will this issue ever be reolved. I would not take any odds as to when that happens though. Certainly nothing we are currently supporting with GIRoA is directed toward breaking this age-old cycle, thus the enduring insurgency...

Steve the Planner

06-29-2011, 01:26 PM

Bob:

Land tenure by political favor is not a viable way forward, whether in the past, present or future.

It undermines that basic concept of community essential to a stable society.

Bob's World

06-29-2011, 05:48 PM

Bob:

Land tenure by political favor is not a viable way forward, whether in the past, present or future.

It undermines that basic concept of community essential to a stable society.

And yet it happens over and over again in Afghanistan.

How does one possibly arrive at a "just" resolution when vitually every title of any value could be disputed by previous owners or their heirs who have reasonable claims that they were illegally disposessed of their land?

A good laydown from this report:
http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpDocuments)/3E2AD065B3616B2D802570B7005876F4/$file/Land_disputes_NRC_june04.pdf

"The underlying causes of land and property disputes

The main causes of land disputes in Afghanistan can be summarized under the following headings:

· Conflict. Since the invasion by the Soviet Union in 1979 Afghanistan has experienced 25 years of almost continual conflict that has caused millions of people to flee from their homes. During their absence, these people’s land and property was often occupied, or bought and sold and now, as they return home, they are demanding its restitution.

· Regime changes. Successive governments have violently replaced one another over the last 30 years and different regimes have pursued different land policies, often based on rewarding their own supporters through favorable land allocations.

· Unclear ownership. The unorganized land registration system, the large number of missing title deeds, and the fact that disputed land has often been sold many times over, makes it very difficult to determine who owns what.

· Reliance on customary documents and mechanisms. Many land and property transactions take place without being officially approved by the courts, using customary documents or traditional dispute resolution mechanisms, such as Shuras and Jirgas.

· Land shortage. Only 12 per cent of the land area of Afghanistan is suitable for arable farming. A further 45 per cent is currently being used as pastureland by both settled and nomadic farmers, but tenure arrangements over pastureland are often unclear and disputes are frequent. Land pressure is exacerbated by Afghanistan’s high birth rate and the rapid return of so many refugees in 2002.

· Landlessness. A large number of people in Afghanistan have no land and when they return back from exile they sometimes occupy other people’s land, or government-owned land because they have nowhere else to go.

· Tribal and ethnic disputes. Competition for scarce resources, such as land and water, is often linked to ethnic or tribal tensions or to other political conflicts.

· Corruption. There are numerous reliable reports that members of the judiciary and executive organs are abusing their positions for personal or political interests, or due to pressure exercised by other powerful members of society.

· Lack of a rule of law. Even where the courts, public authorities or customary dispute resolution mechanisms issue fair decisions there is no guarantee that these can be enforced. A large number of powerful commanders, and their supporters, consider themselves to be ‘above the la w’ and the lack of an effectively functioning legal system means that many people rely on the use of force to settle disputes."

Fuchs

06-29-2011, 05:56 PM

And yet it happens over and over again in Afghanistan.

How does one possibly arrive at a "just" resolution when vitually every title of any value could be disputed by previous owners or their heirs who have reasonable claims that they were illegally disposessed of their land?

Communist land socialization. Communist laws also work against Sharia.
Man, the commies were about to fix Afghanistan in '79??? ;)

Pete

06-29-2011, 08:22 PM

Chaos. Mass retaliations. Renewed factional and regional conflicts. Institutional and society collapse. Economic decompression (the bends).
At least it would be them doing it to them, not us. I doubt Afghanistan can be turned into a functioning country.

Dayuhan

06-29-2011, 11:19 PM

And yet it happens over and over again in Afghanistan.

Exactly. It happens over and over, predictably. That's the way the political culture is structured.

What baffles me is why anyone would think we could change that by decree, or that Afghans installed as a government by Americans would cease to govern like Afghans and start governing like Americans. They won't.

We can't change the way Afghans govern. They can, but they will have to do it their own way, it will take time, and there will be violence involved. That was built into the picture from the start, our problem is not the way they govern, but our failure to recognize that reality and plan around it from the start. That's something we'd do well to remember in places like Libya.

Democracy cannot be installed. It has to grow, and that growth is a long and tortuous process.

omarali50

06-29-2011, 11:44 PM

It used to be a functioning country. It could have become one again, but it needed a smarter colonial power and a weaker opponent to do that.....the irony is that ISI's great victory will probably harm Pakistan more than anyone else. I think GHQ will shoot itself in the neck by winning and would have done better to "lose"..

Steve the Planner

06-30-2011, 10:40 PM

Right, but my question was not Can Afghanistan be fixed.

Given that the international aid compression and lack of food assistance is only going to make things more unstable in the next three years, what of the things we are doing could be improved to leave something valuable out of this mess?

Fuchs

06-30-2011, 11:14 PM

The fun really begins when you begin to think about the withdrawal shock.
Afghanistan has has a transfer-based economy for a decade. The end of the ridiculously large hard cash influx will be 'tough'.

It will probably destroy the cash economy, leaving mostly the subsistence economy and grey markets.
The 2000's will be economically a lost decade, even without all the war effects.

omarali50

06-30-2011, 11:53 PM

I think things can be done to mitigate the aftermath, even now.

Steve the Planner

07-01-2011, 04:13 AM

There is enough cash rolling around (maybe in Dubai) for certain folks to buy their own pieces of the country. But what will they get in return? Back to warlords and regional fiefdoms (or was it ever anything different?).

I think that we underestimate how quickly things can unravel once the path is set.

It has been remarkable to me that, so far, US planned withdrawals have gone so relatively smoothly. I don't see the same context in Afghanistan.

JMA

07-01-2011, 09:00 AM

It was never possible. I've been saying that since early 2002 when what we wanted (not necessarily needed) to do there was effectively completed. We should not have decided to stay because once we did we locked ourselves in to a no-win situation.

Winning wars?

To me Afghanistan had more of a "mission accomplished" or "objectives achieved" feel to it. The "war" was won when the Taliban government collapsed and the leadership made a run for Pakistan.

The mission creep to "nation building" can be understood given the momentum that had built up since 2002. Not accepted... but understood.

Again I refer to the Principles of War and the first one on the British list being - The selection and maintenance of the aim and the US equivalent being - Objective – Direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive and attainable objective.

My question is that when the politicians feel the need to "revise and develop" the mission/objective why there is no howl of protest from the generals?

It appears that at a certain point in their careers the generals reach a point in their development where they roll-over and play submissive to the politicians. What a waste of all that training and experience.

Fuchs

07-01-2011, 11:49 AM

Let's look at the context:

1999, air power 'wins' the Kosovo conflict all on its own.
U.S. Army panics over its lack of "relevance" and hyper-speed "deployability" of anything heavier than a soft truck.
Russian mechanised paras embarrass the U.S.Army even further by being quicker in the occupation race.
U.S.Army gets to occupy Kosovo as a consolation prize.

2001, air power in cooperation with few dozen spec ops 'win' the war in Afghanistan, Marines are at least quick enough to deploy a regiment-sized force to Kandahar in time.
U.S.Army gets to occupy Afghanistan as a consolation prize.

It wasn't exactly the most obvious choice to reject even the consolation prize when your institution is still panicked about proving its 'relevance' in order to maintain its budget share.

The decisions were furthermore most likely made quicker than the leaders were able to catch up with info and historical experiences about comparable conflicts.

Bob's World

07-01-2011, 12:09 PM

JMA - Who rolled over for who? (or whom, never did get that rule straight)

I see politicians rolling over to military assessments and positions on a a problem they have framed as a war to be won all the time.

Even now, as Lt Gen Allen steps up to follow Petreaus he caveats that he is ok with the President's scheduled reductions of troops unless he feels that he is not meeting his military objectives... Guess what general, not your job.

This all goes back to us mis-defining particular theaters of our operations to punish and dispute AQ in an effort to make America safer from terrorist attacks as separate and distinct "wars" to be won or lost. They aren't.

The problem is the emphasis on location over war as a helpful start. For example WWII:

We had The War in the Pacific, and The War in Europe; or The War against Japan, and The War against Germany; but no one ever made the ridiculous case that we were fighting dozens of wars all over the world, we were fighting "the war."

Same with The War on terrorism (or against AQ, whatever). Locations are far more moot in an effort to defeat a non-state organization than they ever were in a war to defeat specific states, yet we fixate more than ever on the locations we fight rather than on the problem we are seeking to resolve.

Truth be told, a clear-eyed assessment makes a pretty easy case that AFPAK region is no more or less important than a dozen other such regions in terms of its value/importance to the problem we face. One can also make the case that the harder one pounds at this problem in a particular location the worse one makes it.

AQ conducts UW and leverages the grievances of others to recruit individuals and organizations to support their larger goals as well. How many Pashtuns had grievances of such a nature against the US prior to our decision to go into Afghanistan?? Not many I suspect, equally I suspect that is not true today. Most of these recruits to AQ came from places like Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Libya and Egypt. When one mentally frees themselves from the specific locations where we went to fight one can begin to focus on the locations where the problems of US relations with other state governments and populaces that drive this threat actually exist.

Arab Spring is 10 times more important to getting to success for reducing the threat of terrorist attacks against the US than ANYTHING we are doing in Afghanistan.

But this is not something for the military to figure out, plan and lead. This is all about foreign policy. The military is a 1000 lb tail wagging a 40 lb dog, I fear. We need to break this cycle. Soon.

Steve the Planner

07-01-2011, 01:33 PM

Bob:

Well, said, but with one caveat.

The US has no effective diplomatics structure to address these problems which, essentially, are not problems of diplomacy.

They are largely problems of internal and sub-national governance, civil society, and the effectiveness of services to the people to support on-going betterment.

This is long-term, internally based civil advancement stuff. Neither military, nor diplomatic.

What role, if any, should the DoD or DoS play?

Bob's World

07-01-2011, 02:14 PM

Steve,

Don't go back to the locations where the problems manifest, one must focus on where the policy radiates out from.

We must get over the idea that we have a duty or a right, or even that it is premised in any kind of rational logic, to go out and force people all over the world to stop complaining and acting-out in response to US policy as it manifests around the world.

Look, we have interests, and some of those interests are truly vital and we must act to preserve and support those interests. The problem of "global terrorism" directed at the United States, and wide-spread insurgency directed at many of the non western governments where we have long-standing alliances is a CRYSTAL CLEAR metric that the Ways and Means we have been employing to pursue those Ends are in need for an extreme make-over. Instead we send the military to force those old Ways and Means down the throat of those who dare to complain.

We are the United States of America. We are better than this. We are smarter than this. Right? I hope so. We are not living up to our own hype though. Not at all. We are acting very much like regimes that we have looked at with disdain for their dark methods. We are learning that it is not so easy to remain a leader.

Perhaps it is time to stop trying to lead those with no desire to be led, and instead focus on being an example.

I think we would raise holy hell if any other country dared to follow our current example in a manner that challenged our interests. Time for a hard look in the mirror.

When I read our National Security Strategy I shake my head in wonder and dismay. I agree with much of the description of the environment (much of which was crafted by guys like myself and "Mr. Y" Puck Mykleby in a little skunk works on the fringe of the USSOCOM campus, and then injected into the NSS by a persistent little "UW" campaign by Puck); but when I read the conclusion about our goals and interests, I can only exclaim "WTF???!"

We talk about forming and leading a new world order

We talk about our interests being to protect the US, our citizens, and our allies and partners. (Ok, so we are willing to go to war if any of these partners are attacked? Did anyone do the math on that???)

We talk about US values as being "Universal" and and our dedication to getting everyone in this new world order that we are leading to submit to those beliefs ( I had to check the cover to see if I had picked up a copy on Mein Kamph or the Communist Manifesto by mistake). Historic experts on US policy warn wisely against excessive promotion of US fundamentalism, we should listen.

We talk about "enduring" interests. (and then list a bunch of new interests). Look, yes, we need some consistency in our interests, but they must also be tailored to the needs and resources of the nation for the era they guide us through. Off the top of my head the US has gone through several broad, but distinct eras where we had distinctly different interests. From the 1770s to 1820s we were just focused on forming a survivable nation (Washington's example and farewell address were guides). From the 1820s to 1900 it was all about establishing a coast to coast nation (guided by the Monroe Doctrine and protected in effect by the British Navy). Our interests expanded during an era of US Imperialism, and again during the Cold war. But what now? Is this the time to expand our interests yet again?? I think not.

I believe this is a time to pull back from the expanded interests and controlling approaches of the Cold War, not expand to an even more expansive US-led world order.

I think we find wisdom in the words of our past leaders. Now is a time to refocus on how we adjust ourselves to better function in the world that is coming to exist around us, not to double down our efforts to force others to submit to a US-centric world as we choose to define it.

Obviously this goes far beyond "winning in Afghanistan," but perhaps that helps point out how silly it is that we are so consumed by how to win in Afghanistan, when we are so negligent of the much larger framework that makes our efforts in Afghanistan or anywhere else make sense.

Bob

ganulv

07-01-2011, 03:31 PM

Same with The War on terrorism (or against AQ, whatever). Locations are far more moot in an effort to defeat a non-state organization than they ever were in a war to defeat specific states, yet we fixate more than ever on the locations we fight rather than on the problem we are seeking to resolve.

We are the United States of America. We are better than this. We are smarter than this. Right? I hope so.

but if the War on Drugs is any indication—and given that our policy seems very much focused on fighting it in places rather than as a problem it seems to be a perfect analogy if not homology—then no we aren’t. :cool:

Steve the Planner

07-01-2011, 04:44 PM

New World Order????

Bob:

Right. What struck me were the supposed (but nebulous) values discourses.

What exactly are the US values to be emulated?

Our historical "values" which I believe much of the myth is built around is a supremacy of technology, economy, managerial and manufacturing pre-eminence, unlimited resources, and, as the Big Dog, the ability to make things happen (by whatever means necessary) to accomplish our will and interests (diplomatic, commercial, etc..), even where those interests may not have, in the long run, been wise or well thought through.

While I have ultimate faith that the US is, and will return to being a guiding light for many things advancing human civilization, there is no straight-line path---we screw up, we correct, we learn and adapt---eventually, I am concerned that our "leadership" is really in neutral (some would say reverse) at this juncture.

Wrapping a lot of this crap into a nebulous flag does nothing to change the fact that our leadership role is only imperiled by the "us" and "our" future which we are currently in gridlock over.

Relentless demographic and economic changes continue to change the "us" of the US, and the world in which our effective leadership can be applied.

The 'gift' our forefathers and founding documents provided is the mechanism to change and adapt, and that process is continuous.

Personally, I believe we and "they" are in such profound change at the moment that what makes sense today is merely reactive---stop blatantly bad things from happening where there is imminent and actual peril to our safety and interests.

In that context, I am very unsurprised about the shift of leadership at CIA/DoD, and the probability that our tools for external responses have shifted beyond a military one to one of more effective threat-based intelligence and highly targeted strikes. This is just not rocket science.

The question, as we shift gears, is How to manage the transition?

slapout9

07-01-2011, 08:02 PM

We talk about our interests being to protect the US, our citizens, and our allies and partners. (Ok, so we are willing to go to war if any of these partners are attacked? Did anyone do the math on that???)

Yep, we do not have budget deficit, we just never collected from all the other countries we have been carrying for all these years. It's time to start collecting!! Here is the big Washington con game Social Security,Medicare,etc. are SEPARATE SELF FUNDED TRUST FUNDS, they don't even get voted on. They are self funded and they have nothing to do with the current budget deficit!!!!!!!!, practically all of the budget deficit is shortfalls due to tax cuts,corporate welfare,funding to states and the big whomper stomper is the military, because of all the black budgets and off balance sheet budgets some people say that 50% of every tax dollar goes to to the military:eek: The world owes us a bunch of money and they better start paying up. Just to let you know my opinion on this matter:D:D Happy Independence day!

JMA

07-02-2011, 07:19 AM

Yep, we do not have budget deficit, we just never collected from all the other countries we have been carrying for all these years. It's time to start collecting!!

Well if it is a "service" of a commercial nature then surely the customer must have some say on what service is being received and the quality thereof?

Do you really think the Germans, the Italians, the Japanese and the Brits would be prepared to pay for a service they have increasingly less say in the conduct of?

Korea may be a different story but then again why not try to bill China for the costs as they could bring that whole stand-off to an end in an instant if they wanted to?

Then if the US had the martial will they could start to collect protection money from the likes of Taiwan, Vietnam, Georgia etc etc who really have a problem and will surely be willing to pay big money for protection?

Oh yes and happy Independence Day for the 4th.

slapout9

07-02-2011, 01:18 PM

Well if it is a "service" of a commercial nature then surely the customer must have some say on what service is being received and the quality thereof?

Do you really think the Germans, the Italians, the Japanese and the Brits would be prepared to pay for a service they have increasingly less say in the conduct of?

Korea may be a different story but then again why not try to bill China for the costs as they could bring that whole stand-off to an end in an instant if they wanted to?

Then if the US had the martial will they could start to collect protection money from the likes of Taiwan, Vietnam, Georgia etc etc who really have a problem and will surely be willing to pay big money for protection?

Oh yes and happy Independence Day for the 4th.

Ok some folks will get a rebate:wry:

Bob's World

07-02-2011, 02:29 PM

Ok some folks will get a rebate:wry:

Way to take my strategic rant down a Slap-centric rabbit hole!:p

Steve the Planner

07-02-2011, 06:38 PM

Is this Iraq/Afghanistan rebate thing one of those online phishing scams?

JMA

07-02-2011, 08:29 PM

What exactly are the US values to be emulated?

The basics.

Fundamental freedoms and human rights.

When last did you read the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (http://www.ohchr.org/EN/UDHR/Pages/Language.aspx?LangID=eng) and realise what is taken for granted in the US and yearned for across much of the earth?

Ever paused to think about in how many countries the local equivalent of this could lead to the "disappearance" of the cartoonist?

http://t1.gstatic.com/images?q=tbn:ANd9GcSThKTiJFYnHr8PM7Mn1eqntdZGPC7ce gizdIyKtxFzfERLd3M5

Bob's World

07-02-2011, 08:51 PM

I prefer US "principles" (Life, liberty, pursuit of happiness, self-determination of governance, all men created equal, etc)

I find any program of US values (any of the above principles with a current USA 2011 judgment applied to it) to be a bit offensive to push onto others (gay marriage, democracy, senseless entitlements for people who sit at home and produce nothing to society, health care for all with no revenue to resource, etc).

But yes, human rights are indeed important. I find in my research that people everywhere expect "legitimacy" of government (one they recognize as having the right to govern them); respect/dignity (all segments of the populace treated equitably regardless of race, religion, creed, etc); Justice (how the populace feels about the rule of law as it is applied to them); and hope (having trusted, certain and legal means IAW the respective culture to affect/shape government). These, I find, when absent, are the drivers of insurgency.

We need to take a big humility pill and back off on the rhetoric a bit. (Oh, and all of the drivers of insurgency described above are present in spades in Afghanistan; unless one is attached through patronage to the Northern Alliance and Mr. Karzai.)

JMA

07-03-2011, 06:15 AM

I prefer US "principles" (Life, liberty, pursuit of happiness, self-determination of governance, all men created equal, etc)

Bob, you (Americans) don't get to choose what the people of the world wish to emulate (from what they hear or understand happens in the US).

I grew in up parts of Africa where democracy became a buzz word. Few if any knew what democracy was other than a change in their current circumstances (that they were told by western do-gooders would be good for them). Sadly for most if not all the crisis of expectation was not satisfied and they moved from the frying pan into the fire (and the older people remember that they were delivered into evil by these western-gooders - while the youth see America as Hollywood and KFC and a place where you can call the president an ass or worse). Where the daily routine involves grinding poverty and fear of the regimes thugs such terms as "Life, liberty, pursuit of happiness, self-determination of governance, all men created equal" are meaningless. Life is cheap, liberty is non-existent, pursuit of happiness is limited to sex, self determination of government - what?, all men created equal -you are joking right?

In countries that have never known freedom I suggest that these rights and ideals get couched in simple locally understandable language. For example in a brutal dictatorship where the secret police "lift" people at 3 o'clock in the morning the message would be understood if it were stated as "no more three o'clock knocks on the door".

I suggest that the US credits certainly the third world with enough intelligence to realise while the US turns a blind eye to the goings on in China, Saudi Arabia etc etc the message whatever it is will not be taken seriously... the aid money will be accepted (even demanded) but the message will be ignored.

In the case of Afghanistan do we really known what they want and yearn for? And how does that differ from what the US wants? At one stage long ago I thought that all the US wanted was to prevent Afghanistan allowing AQ to use the country as a safe haven and springboard for attacks on the US?

Fuchs

07-03-2011, 08:28 AM

The basics.

Fundamental freedoms and human rights.

When last did you read the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (http://www.ohchr.org/EN/UDHR/Pages/Language.aspx?LangID=eng) and realise what is taken for granted in the US and yearned for across much of the earth?

Oh, you mean human rights !
The philosophical concept that was invented in Europe before the U.S. constitution was written !?

Isn't it strange how much Americans believe that's theirs? Sounds a lot like China discussing copyright infringement against their original Rolex production to me.

Dayuhan

07-03-2011, 09:57 AM

I suggest that the US credits certainly the third world with enough intelligence to realise while the US turns a blind eye to the goings on in China, Saudi Arabia etc etc the message whatever it is will not be taken seriously... the aid money will be accepted (even demanded) but the message will be ignored.

I don't see how the goings on in China or Saudi Arabia are any business of the US, or what anyone would expect the US to do about them. The goings-on in Afghanistan didn't need to be any business of the US, until the people in charge started sheltering people who killed our people.

It seems to me perfectly reasonable for the US to deliver the message that attacking us or our allies or sheltering those who do will have immediate and horrible consequences. Imposing our principles or values seems (again, to me) a whole lot less reasonable, and a whole lot less possible.

JMA

07-03-2011, 10:56 AM

Oh, you mean human rights !
The philosophical concept that was invented in Europe before the U.S. constitution was written !?

Isn't it strange how much Americans believe that's theirs? Sounds a lot like China discussing copyright infringement against their original Rolex production to me.

Its all about consistency of course. Once successive sets of spin-doctors (from consecutive Administrations) are finished with the issues little wonder that US citizens get a little confused. I learned early that one must take a jaundiced view of "official" statements and comment. Surprised by how the TV channels fall all over themselves to cover announcements and statements by head of state and cabinet ministers... and in the case of the US a "spokesman" from each Department.

The thing that really gets up my nose is that these "leaders" really expect their electorates to believe them. As far as China is concerned what has it got that the world needs (other than rare earth minerals)?

But you are correct different rules for different folks, China can kill as many "dissidents" as it likes but Libya can't. Bahrain can suppress its population while Syria can't. Russia can commit war crimes in Chechnya but Sri Lanka can't when suppressing the Tamil Tigers. I'm confused already.

JMA

07-03-2011, 11:20 AM

I don't see how the goings on in China or Saudi Arabia are any business of the US, ...

You can't? Then you are beyond help.

... or what anyone would expect the US to do about them.

The US does as its national interest dictates.

Steve the Planner

07-03-2011, 03:37 PM

JMA:

The US does as its political system dictates, some of which may be in the nebulous "national interest," and some of which may actually be very bad for the national interest (depending on the viewer and his vantage point).

The pursuit of the rights of man and individual property rights are, in fact, one of our western euro/US heritage which we know created great opportunities for civil and societal advancement.

Very important to me, but the Middle Kingdom, and the Shia Islamic States have a very different perspective of this whole system. One thing we do know is that all systems of human arrangements have inherent frailties, including the potential for corruption, ineptitude, personalities, to name a few.

Having spent time on corrupt and dangerous systems in and out of the US, I can say with certainty that our system, over time, has moved us forward, in general.

Whether our system is the only one that can do so, or is appropriate for all cultures and peoples at all times, would require too many speculative leaps for me.

If our practical goal is stability and freedom for US foreign and domestic interests, our values (whatever they may actually be), and their broad dissemination to other places, may be too often lost in translation, or, as you said about the three o'clock visits, lost in the local context: (ie: Enforce rule of law by way of reinforcing locally corrupt police).

ganulv

07-03-2011, 04:47 PM

The thing that really gets up my nose is that these "leaders" really expect their electorates to believe them.

I can’t speak about any other nation’s voters, but as far as it goes in the United States you should never underestimate the gullibility and lack of understanding of the issues possessed by the modal American voter (http://www.npr.org/2011/07/02/137573479/political-gridlock-rises-and-the-debt-ceiling-doesnt).

As far as China is concerned what has it got that the world needs (other than rare earth minerals)?

It does help prop up the coin of the realm (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Treasury_security#Top_Foreign_holder s_of_U.S._Treasuries). And it’s combination of a relatively educated and cheap workforce, ever-better infrastructure, and centralized decision making make it attractive to manufacturing companies (http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/02_24/b3787031.htm).

slapout9

07-03-2011, 05:36 PM

Way to take my strategic rant down a Slap-centric rabbit hole!:p

Sorry about that. I think we need a Cash or Gas Foreign Policy (nobody rides for free). War is the only thing America still has an export monopoly on....so let's get all capitalistic and start a professional protection business.:)

JMA

07-03-2011, 08:18 PM

JMA:

The US does as its political system dictates, some of which may be in the nebulous "national interest," and some of which may actually be very bad for the national interest (depending on the viewer and his vantage point).

As an outsider I continue to be amazed that there is so little consensus in the US as to what constitutes US national interest.

I truly the outside world understands that the US will act in what it considers its national interest even though there will always be those who whine and complain about it. 9/11 was an act of stupidity where some idiots thought they could pull the sleeping lions tail and get away with it. Just a pity the US seemed to strike out like a drunken bar brawler. The initial action in Afghanistan was good IMO but thereafter it turned into a box of frogs. I lament the observable lack of consistency in such actions but have to accept that there are always nuances that may be be immediately clear to outsiders.

Yes there are method/approach/implementation subtleties which could be improved upon but essentially if the US needs to act, it acts. As an old soldier I am scathing of the politicians (not only US) who enter into conflicts rather like an athlete showing up at a track meet for a race and only finding out the distance after the race has started. The soldiers are committed and have to just soldier on (while the politicians just step off the track when they get tired).

The pursuit of the rights of man and individual property rights are, in fact, one of our western euro/US heritage which we know created great opportunities for civil and societal advancement.

Freehold property rights are but a dream for many in the world either because of the price barrier to ownership or that freehold is just not an option. You are correct though but here in South Africa where the "previously disadvantaged" get given basic houses by the government the majority are sold off as soon as possible get get cash in hand rather than viewed as a long term asset. In how many days/weeks/months are these poor people back where they started do you think?

Very important to me, but the Middle Kingdom, and the Shia Islamic States have a very different perspective of this whole system. One thing we do know is that all systems of human arrangements have inherent frailties, including the potential for corruption, ineptitude, personalities, to name a few.

And importantly just about everything is prioritised differently. Can be frustrating.

Having spent time on corrupt and dangerous systems in and out of the US, I can say with certainty that our system, over time, has moved us forward, in general.

This took some time and continues to take time to evolve. But the US continues to move forward and the rest of the world looks on and learns from every stumble and fall the US has along the way.

Whether our system is the only one that can do so, or is appropriate for all cultures and peoples at all times, would require too many speculative leaps for me.

It would be simpler and a lot less painful to accept that the US system is not a "one size fits all" condom type solution for everyone country and everyone. This is why I suggest human rights as the basis for countries to move forward. Support those who do and side line those who don't (other than where it is in the national interest to tolerate those with poor human rights records.

If our practical goal is stability and freedom for US foreign and domestic interests, our values (whatever they may actually be), and their broad dissemination to other places, may be too often lost in translation, or, as you said about the three o'clock visits, lost in the local context: (ie: Enforce rule of law by way of reinforcing locally corrupt police).

Don't force things on them. Let them prioritize their values and tick them off one by one as they progress. If they backslide you have to apply the diplomatic equivalent of "tough love". They will squeal and look to China and Russia for help but that's just tough. Africa's initial post colonial problem was the cold war and the ability for states to turn to the Soviets and China if they could not get their own way. Now it is much less Russia and much more China and what does China care about human rights?

Dayuhan

07-03-2011, 11:26 PM

But you are correct different rules for different folks, China can kill as many "dissidents" as it likes but Libya can't.

Libya could, and did, for decades. That changed when Libyans held a revolution with an outside chance of success, and provided the option of intervention with an acceptably low level of commitment and expense. The Chinese haven't done that yet. If they do, maybe things will change, though it's unlikely that the commitment/expense level of intervention in China is ever going to be acceptable.

Nothing inconsistent or incomprehensible there at all. Libya provided an opportunity, China doesn't. There's no reasonable way for the US to impose its human rights standards on China.

Bahrain can suppress its population while Syria can't. Russia can commit war crimes in Chechnya but Sri Lanka can't when suppressing the Tamil Tigers. I'm confused already.

Syria can and does suppress its population, and Sri Lanka could and did commit war crimes when suppressing the Tamil Tigers. What's the difference?

The US doesn't decree what others can or cannot do. It may at times act to support those doing things it likes or oppose those doing things it doesn't like, but such action is always constrained by the size, expense, and potential for adverse consequences of the proposed action. Pretty obvious, really.

As an outsider I continue to be amazed that there is so little consensus in the US as to what constitutes US national interest.

In what democracy do we see consensus on what constitutes national interest?

"National interest" is an abstraction, rarely if ever agreed upon. Different factions within a nation have different interests and will naturally debate what the nation's interest at any given point. Perceived national interest is what is acted upon, and both interests and perceptions change.

Outsiders often find it difficult to grasp the extent to which foreign policy is a secondary consideration in US politics. There are times when it takes center stage, but those times are occasional and generally of limited duration.

This is why I suggest human rights as the basis for countries to move forward. Support those who do and side line those who don't (other than where it is in the national interest to tolerate those with poor human rights records.

The US doesn't have the capacity to "sideline" a Russia, a China, a Saudi Arabia. Their resources and/or capacities put them at center stage no matter what the US wants.

If they backslide you have to apply the diplomatic equivalent of "tough love". They will squeal and look to China and Russia for help but that's just tough. Africa's initial post colonial problem was the cold war and the ability for states to turn to the Soviets and China if they could not get their own way. Now it is much less Russia and much more China and what does China care about human rights?

China doesn't care about human rights at all, and that makes "the diplomatic equivalent of "tough love" even more ineffectual than it was before. They squeal and look to China for help, and they get it. Then they tell us to stick our "tough love" where the sun don't shine. The US can't compel others to conform to our standards of human rights, like it or not.

Bob's World

07-04-2011, 12:26 PM

Interests, like beauty, are in the eye of the beholder. They are both very real and very theoretical at the same time. Both enduring and ephemeral. Both political and practical. Wise definition and pursuit can save a nation; foolish definition and pursuit can destroy one even faster.

Hitler thought it was a vital interest to defeat the Soviet Union, or internal to that, to seize Stalingrad. In that same era the US thought it was vital to prevent the Eurasian landmass from being dominated by any unfriendly state or coalition of states; and to establish and maintain a global market open for commerce. Germany was destroyed and America emerged on the backs of their dedicated efforts to pursue their interests as they defined them.

What today? What if the US dedicated ourselves with equal energy to the pursuit of the interests listed in our current National Security Strategy? Would it elevate our nation to a new level, or would it over-extend us in ways that weaken us so greatly that we end up a shadow of our former self????

If one reads the following literally, and takes it seriously, I would have to assume the latter is far more likely than the former:

"American interests are enduring. They are:

•• The security of the United States, its citizens, and U.S. allies and partners;

•• A strong, innovative, and growing U.S. economy in an open international economic system that promotes opportunity and prosperity;

•• Respect for universal values at home and around the world; and

•• An international order advanced by U.S. leadership that promotes peace, security, and opportunity through stronger cooperation to meet global challenges."

Somehow "Everyday will be Christmas" did not make the final cut. Seriously though, read in its entirety, is this really what the US wants to sign up for as our guiding priorities and proclaim to the world that this is our intended agenda?? Breaking it down a bit:

•• The security of the United States, its citizens, and U.S. allies and partners;

What exactly qualifies one as a "partner" and just how dedicated are we to securing virtually every nation on the planet????

By securing a partner, do we mean the nation-state as a package (Territory, populace and government); or do we also mean that we will help a friendly government suppress its own populace when they rise up in insurgency against them? This is a head scratcher gaining a great deal more attention of late as Arab Spring continues to expand across the Middle East. As the Saudis show little intent to implement true change, it will ultimately explode there, which will be the ultimate test for how the US decides to draw this line.

•• A strong, innovative, and growing U.S. economy in an open international economic system that promotes opportunity and prosperity;

Ok, this is actually much like the number two interest we carried into WWII; the big difference now and then is that then we were an emerging economy locked out of many important global markets due to colonial monopolies established by our European competitors. Famously FDR held a dinner during the summit in Morocco early in WWII, hosting Arab national leaders, promising liberty and asking for free trade; while Churchill chewed his cigar in frustration, complaining about the absence of alcohol at the affair. Sure we were saving England, liberating lands under Nazi and Japanese control etc; but for America we were also on a crusade to open markets from which we had long been denied.

Now it is we who suffer from a lack of market protections as our economy at home flags, unable to compete with far cheaper labor in foreign lands; and it is China and others who seek inroads with trading partners we have come to see as "ours." Perhaps we can better appreciate Churchill's frustration and could use a drink ourself as we think about the full implications of truly "open" economic systems.

•• Respect for universal values at home and around the world;

Ok, this one bothers me most of all. What exactly are "universal values" and who gets to decide what those are???

What if some organization or nation "around the world" opts to disrespect these "universal values" as we have defined them in favor of some historic or modern value system they find more appropriate for themselves???

Are they no longer an "ally or partner" and therefore outside our circle of security?? That's some bad news for the Saudis and many others if that is the case....

Are we going to levy economic sanctions to coerce such immoral characters back into line??
That seems to run a bit afoul of an "open international economic system" to me...

Frankly my position is that this entire position has no place in a short list of "enduring interests" for any nation. Particularly not for the United States. I believe we should attempt to set high moral standards for ourselves, and to then live by those standards to the degree and extent possible. But no one made us the setter or enforcer of global morality, and we come across like self-righteous pricks when we make such announcements; and expose ourselves as hypocrites later when we are forced to overlook morality where convenient in pursuit of interests that are truly vital.

Lastly:

•• An international order advanced by U.S. leadership that promotes peace, security, and opportunity through stronger cooperation to meet global challenges.

An "international order advanced by US leadership" Really??? Will some pigs be more equal than other pigs in this order?? I'm all about the US acting in a manner that makes others want to follow us. I am all against the US telling everyone that we are the leader, we are defining an international order, and that (for their own good) we want them to follow us.

Getting our interests right is a critical task. We have not accomplished that critical task here. I give this list an "F" and send it back for a re-do.

motorfirebox

07-04-2011, 05:51 PM

•• Respect for universal values at home and around the world;

Ok, this one bothers me most of all. What exactly are "universal values" and who gets to decide what those are???

What if some organization or nation "around the world" opts to disrespect these "universal values" as we have defined them in favor of some historic or modern value system they find more appropriate for themselves???
Heh, I'm not sure that really qualifies as a "what if". It's an American conceit that if we can just depose The Bad Guys' Leader (whoever that is this week--Hussein, Mubarak, Gaddafi), then the people will rise up and spontaneously create a western-style democracy with western, er I mean, "universal", values. One reason that's stupid is that we can't even agree on what "western values" actually entails, right here in the west. Example: what do Universal Values© have to say on the topic of gay rights? And yet this idea continues to be propagated and incorporated into planning, pretty much no matter who's in charge.

Firn

07-15-2011, 09:05 AM

The only thing that's forced us into anything is the cabal of not quite genius in DC that decided we have to transform Afghanistan. Not that the Pak army/ISI haven't exploited that particular piece of stupidity, but people will do that, if we insist on making bad decisions.

And from an European perspective the error was to follow that strategy suit, even if the investment in effort and men was in relative terms mostly greatly inferior and some leeway could be made due to diplomatic issues.

Of course we don't have the alternative history present in front of us, so the criticism comes easier.

Ken White

07-15-2011, 02:28 PM

The alternative history proposed by D. Rumsfeld was to leave Afghanistan by early 2002. Unfortunately, G. W. Bush, good Christian he, was convinced by a number of the humanitarianly inclined foreign policy 'elite' ( "fpe" - lower case, advisedly...) in Washington to stay and bring a failed State into the World Community. :rolleyes:

In addition to Rumsfeld, there were others who thought that alternate history advisable and that the real history, staying, was a bad idea and said so. Unfortunately they were drowned out by the "fpe" who also insisted on bribing, cajoling and bullying NATO into doing something that is so far outside of NATO's interest (even inimical to it IMO) as to boggle even the Afghan's minds... :eek:

Thus yet another humanitarian military endeavor -- great contradiction in terms, that -- leads folks into the abyss. Backsight Foresight knew that as well... :wry:

carl

07-16-2011, 11:18 AM

Ken:

Anything Mr. Rumsfeld says is primarily intended to make Mr. Rumsfeld look good. In this case it is "See! If we'd done what I wanted to do we wouldn't be in this mess."

There was no chance we weren't going to stay in Afghanistan in some measure after the anti-Taliban forces kicked out the Taliban with the help of US airpower. It was felt that one of the primary reasons 9-11 came was because AQ found a congenial home in Taliban run Afghanistan and one of the primary reasons Taliban was running Afghanistan was because we stopped paying attention to the place after the Soviets left. So we were going to stay on.

If we hadn't stayed on, the Taliban would have been back shortly since they just moved across the border. That would have amounted to trading a raid for a raid leading to more raids probably. Sort of medieval.

I don't think NATO's involvement is inimical to NATO's interests at all. It is critical if NATO is to survive as an alliance. Refusal of the alliance to support its most important member in the face of an attack would have meant the end of the alliance. Involvement in Afghanistan may be inimical to individual country's interests, but to the alliance, no.

Bob's World

07-16-2011, 12:26 PM

15 Saudis, 2 UAE, 1 Lebanese, 1 Egyptian; planning and preparing in the sanctuary of Southern California and South Florida; launching attacks directed by an exiled Saudi citizen taking sanctuary in Afghanistan; Launching from multiple locations within the US to attack multiple locations within the US.

An event most Afghans have never heard of; that involved no Afghans; and that quite likely the Afghan (Taliban) government at that time was completely unaware of.

And now this is somehow a mission that demands an enduing commitment by the US and NATO to ensuring that no one associated with a 10-years gone Taliban government (who's primary sin was to not violate their cultural code of Pashtunwali and give up a guest to the demands of the US after the fact), ever rises to power again in a country they have historically ruled???

Their is no rational logic in such an argument. It is purely emotional in nature, and frankly is not Feasible, Acceptable, or Suitable.

We have created a monopoly of governance in Afghanistan, and then enabled the formalization of of that monopoly when we oversaw, supported, and protected a sham of an election that elevated our hand-picked man to the Presidency, and led to the production of the current constitution that vests all patronage from the District level and above in that same man. In this land, such a monopoly of governance and patronage means a corresponding monopoly on economic opportunity as well.

It was only once we had this in place that the revolutionary insurgency growing out of the exiled leadership in Pakistan began to seriously grow. it was only after we began to increase our efforts to suppress that revolution that the resistance insurgency among the people began to grow as well.

We have mis-defined the problem.

We have mis-defined our interests.

We have mis-defined the threat.

We have created and dedicated ourselves to the preservation of an illegitimate monopoly on governmental and economic opportunity in Afghanistan.

To hold NATO to supporting this folly burns the US relationship with those allies and degrades our influence.

To demand that Pakistan act counter to their own interests in the support of this folly burns the US relationship with that ally and degrades our influence.

Both of those actions have served to increase internal instability over the past 10 years in NATO countries and Pakistan.

Now we act as a conduit to bring an increased Indian presence into Afghanistan. Sure Karzai welcomes them, because he knows the US will ultimately depart, and he also knows that India will stay.

That knowledge enables Karzai to continue to avoid the one thing that must be done to bring any hope of stability to this region: Break down the monopoly on governance and allow legal competition for influence and political and economic opportunity in Afghanistan.

In 2001 there were no Afghans involved in the attacks on the US and the primary driving issues were perceptions of too much US influence over Arab countries in the Middle East. To continue the current course of action may very well be a self-fulfilling prophecy in creating the very terrorist sanctuary and dangers in South Asia that we claimed were there to begin with. It is far more likely that future attacks against the US will occur, and will involve issues and actors from the AFPAK region because of our actions there, not in spite of the same.

It is time to act smarter, not harder.

carl

07-16-2011, 03:26 PM

Bob's World:

Who thunk up the idea and what were the countries they were hanging around at the time? Where did the money come from and maybe more importantly where was it directed from? Where was the guy who inspired the whole thing living at the time? He wasn't living in Orange County. It was perfectly reasonable for us to assist the anti-Afghan forces toss out the Taliban, especially since they refused to give up AQ after we were attacked, and by the way they were encouraged NOT to give up AQ by our reliable ally, the Pak Army/ISI.

If they had given AQ up, we probably wouldn't have assisted the anti-Taliban forces like we did. It doesn't matter if the Talib didn't know what AQ was up to, they knew after the fact and they didn't give them up. So in we come. That seems reasonable to me.

Now you talk about Pashtunwali. I believe it requires sanctuary be given. I don't believe it requires that the supplicant be allowed to use the house as a base of operations to carry on a war. Also if I remember correctly, if you stay on permanent like you put yourself at under the authority of the guy protecting you. All in all, I don't think the Pashtunwali thing washes.

You mentioned that the Pashtuns have historically ruled Afghanistan. Is that a justification for that pattern to continue? If it is should we not amend our foreign policy to reflect the belief that if this or that ethnic group has been on top they should continue to be on top and we should help them stay there? Besides, the Taliban has always gone out of its way to affirm that it is an Afghan group, not a Kandahari Pashtun group. They themselves don't profess to believe the Pashtuns should run the joint, they say Taliban should run the joint.

The Talib leadership didn't begin to grow because they burned with the desire to redress growing injustice in Afghanistan after they were booted out, it took awhile for them to recover and it took awhile for the Pak Army/ISI to get its nerve back and go back in. I would bet a lot that MO never ever thought he wasn't going to get back in the game as soon as he could.

Personally, I grow weary of appeals to see things from the side of the Pak Army/ISI. They got themselves into the worsening mess they are in and they could get themselves out if they cared to. They take our money and kill our guys with it. It is a little much to ask me to be understanding of the way they view the world and their loony view of Pakistan's interests. Our actions don't burn our relationship with this "ally", their murder of American soldiers does.

How do you figure we act as a conduit for Indian entrance to Afghanistan? How would we stop them? Why would we want to; because the Pak Army/ISI will be cross with us and stop being the reliable allies they are? If we tried to stop the Indians both they and Karzai would tell us to go pound sand and we would have to do it.

You're right it is time to act smarter not harder. It is time for us to force the Pak Army/ISI to decide whether they are friend or foe and act accordingly.

Fuchs

07-16-2011, 04:19 PM

Bob's World:

Who thunk up the idea and what were the countries they were hanging around at the time?

Florida, enjoying the climate and learning to fly (not take-off or land ... just fly).

Hamburg, Germany, feigning to study engineering.

ganulv

07-16-2011, 04:22 PM

Personally, I grow weary of appeals to see things from the side of the Pak Army/ISI. They got themselves into the worsening mess they are in and they could get themselves out if they cared to. They take our money and kill our guys with it. It is a little much to ask me to be understanding of the way they view the world and their loony view of Pakistan's interests. Our actions don't burn our relationship with this "ally", their murder of American soldiers does.

I am not an expert in the area’s affairs, but doesn’t any extensive military effort in Afghanistan necessitate a land corridor with a node in Karachi? That’s leverage the ISI is always going to have. And the ISI is so enmeshed in Pakistani political and social life that they aren’t going anywhere. I think you have to play ball with them or not play at all.

Fuchs

07-16-2011, 04:29 PM

I am not an expert in the area’s affairs, but doesn’t any extensive military effort in Afghanistan necessitate a land corridor with a node in Karachi? That’s leverage the ISI is always going to have. And the ISI is so enmeshed in Pakistani political and social life that they aren’t going anywhere. I think you have to play ball with them or not play at all.

Actually, back in 2002 GWB received an offer from Iran to settle disputes. That could have opened a trans-Iranian route.

There's no 11th commandment "Iran is your enemy!"

carl

07-16-2011, 04:32 PM

Ganulv:

The Karachi supply line is the key. If we are willing to give it up and make other arrangements, which we are well on the way to doing, we can exert huge pressure on the General sabibs. The will be in the game alright, but we shouldn't be playing by their rules. We should try to make them play by ours.

carl

07-16-2011, 04:33 PM

Florida, enjoying the climate and learning to fly (not take-off or land ... just fly).

Hamburg, Germany, feigning to study engineering.

KSM and OBL were in Florida and Hamburg, I didn't know that.

Ken White

07-16-2011, 05:05 PM

Anything Mr. Rumsfeld says is primarily intended to make Mr. Rumsfeld look good. In this case it is "See! If we'd done what I wanted to do we wouldn't be in this mess."Easy for you to say. I believe the reality is different and I for one certainly agree with what he wanted to do in 2001 versus what anyone says today. Regardless, it is a fact that had we not stayed...
There was no chance we weren't going to stay in Afghanistan in some measure after the anti-Taliban forces kicked out the Taliban with the help of US airpower. It was felt that one of the primary reasons 9-11 came was because AQ found a congenial home in Taliban run Afghanistan and one of the primary reasons Taliban was running Afghanistan was because we stopped paying attention to the place after the Soviets left. So we were going to stay on.I understand the thought process on the part of the "fpe," its hangers-on and fellow travelers that led to our staying. I have no question that going into Afghanistan in 2001 was really necessary, not just desirable -- and that on both strategic and tactical bases. We went in the and the guys did well and then, as I said "Unfortunately, G. W. Bush, good Christian he, was convinced by a number of the humanitarianly inclined foreign policy 'elite' ( "fpe" - lower case, advisedly...) in Washington to stay and bring a failed State into the World Community." That was a poor decision, understandable on the face but wrong on the strategic merits in almost all senses. I've been watching and participating in that foolishness for a good many years. It is terribly flawed logic and does more harm than good, almost always.

The "fpe" and it's allies are some conflicted folks. They espouse humanitarian interventions to protect the locals from themselves and then want to dictate how said locals behave. Fascinating. To say we, the US should dictate to folks that certain "...things should be done as we wish you to do them is in your best interest and that's why we came here to save you" would be knee slapping hilarious if it weren't so sad and didn't do so much damage to the US and to the locals the "fpe" crowd wants to save. I become more convinced as time passes that all that is less about 'saving' others than it is about dictating to others how they should behave in a "Nanny knows best" mode and an effort to make themselves feel better.

Other nations have a right to their interests and way of life and it is not up to us to prescribe nirvana. Bob's World is correct, we need to break that foolish, dangerous and ill affordable addiction. The World has changed and we are way behind the power curve.
If we hadn't stayed on, the Taliban would have been back shortly since they just moved across the border. That would have amounted to trading a raid for a raid leading to more raids probably. Sort of medieval.So? Trick to that is to make your raids hurt more than theirs, easily done -- unless the raiding instrument either (a) gets bogged down or (b) is so poor at execution that it fails to achieve a required level of hurt. Of those, 'b' is a capability issue and we have deliberately not developed that as fully as we should due to the "fpe" objecting to that as 'not nice' (and the ostensible leaders of the raiders being unduly risk averse in the upper -- not the lower, actually do it -- echelons).

Far more regrettably, 'a' is often a conscious decision will fully undertaken for dubious reasons as opposed to being an inadvertent occurrence. That would be the Afghan issue...
I don't think NATO's involvement is inimical to NATO's interests at all. It is critical if NATO is to survive as an alliance. Refusal of the alliance to support its most important member in the face of an attack would have meant the end of the alliance. Involvement in Afghanistan may be inimical to individual country's interests, but to the alliance, no.I believe there are several stretches of reality there. Inimical is an opinion, we can differ. Criticality to NATO survival is also an opinion and we differ on that as well.

Stretching Article 5 as the US did and you support was IMO very ill advised. I will certainly acknowledge that, since we stayed, it was politically a smart move on several levels and that is in some senses beneficial to the alliance. That does not make the staying beneficial to us or the alliance.

You seem to be an interventionist as are many members of the "fpe." While I have no problem with intervening or with violence if the results will be beneficial for the US, I strongly object to such activity when the results will be detrimental and / or the cost benefit ratio is quite poor -- not a little poor but quite poor. I even more strongly object when the nominal results are unachievable or will do more long term harm to the US and when the cost-benefit ratio is quite averse. If as is often the case it can be reliably predicted that such interventions will likely worsen the state of the local populace then the action is even more objectionable. That was and is the case in Afghanistan and is also the case with Libya. The "fpe" OTOH relishes interventions that spread sweetness and light and 'improve' the state of the masses as they see it. They're most always wrong. That, again, was and is the case in Afghanistan and is also the case with Libya.

The "fpe" and the pro intervention always crowd, accompanied and encouraged by those in the DoD and DoS establishments that see such efforts as budget, power and prestige enhancing who ally with them and come up with some really fascinating rationales to justify them -- and expand them with mission creep beyond all recognition or logic. JFK's rather foolish "...bear any burden..." collection of bravely spoken words have much to answer for.

Fuchs

07-16-2011, 05:15 PM

KSM and OBL were in Florida and Hamburg, I didn't know that.

Atta was the leader of the cell and developed the plan.

Ken White

07-16-2011, 05:32 PM

Atta was the leader of the cell and developed the plan.All those others did was fund it and send others off to do the dirty work. That's the easy part, lots of folks are into that side of it. Some don't even do that much... :rolleyes:

Dayuhan

07-16-2011, 11:00 PM

We have created a monopoly of governance in Afghanistan, and then enabled the formalization of of that monopoly when we oversaw, supported, and protected a sham of an election that elevated our hand-picked man to the Presidency, and led to the production of the current constitution that vests all patronage from the District level and above in that same man. In this land, such a monopoly of governance and patronage means a corresponding monopoly on economic opportunity as well.

We didn't create the monopoly of governance, that's implicit in Afghanistan. It's the way they govern. We can't simply decree that henceforth there shall be inclusion and shared power... or rather we can decree it, but nobody's going to listen.

We have created and dedicated ourselves to the preservation of an illegitimate monopoly on governmental and economic opportunity in Afghanistan.

That we did do, foolishly IMO. I'm not in a position to declare anything "legitimate" or "illegitimate" in Afghanistan, and I'm not convinced that any American is in that position, but we did put one faction in power and invest ourselves in keeping it there. Not a good idea.

Now we act as a conduit to bring an increased Indian presence into Afghanistan. Sure Karzai welcomes them, because he knows the US will ultimately depart, and he also knows that India will stay.

Are we doing that? How? I've yet to see any evidence that the US is acting as a conduit to build Indian influence. As others have said here, the Indians are quite capable of pursuing their own interests with or without our help or approval.

That knowledge enables Karzai to continue to avoid the one thing that must be done to bring any hope of stability to this region: Break down the monopoly on governance and allow legal competition for influence and political and economic opportunity in Afghanistan.

How are we supposed to do that? By decreeing what shall henceforth be considered "legal competition"?

I think you vastly overestimate the US ability to reshape Afghan political culture and change the way Afghans govern. We can't do that. They can, over time and through an evolutionary process, but it won't happen because we want it to happen.

What we could have done was to simply provide evidence to whoever was going to monopolize power (it was always going to be somebody) that attacking us or our allies or sheltering those who do would produce immediate and horrible consequences.

We could have done that and left. We obviously can't know how that would have played out, but it's hard to see how it could have been worse.

Bob's World

07-17-2011, 01:46 AM

Yes, we did create the monopoly; and yes we did enable the envelopment of Pakistan by India. Both were avoidable, and both are very bad to the longterm stability of the region.

We tend to discount those who can read as somehow being not as smart as us. Foolish that. Men who control vast networks and who have survive multiple swings of power are well equipped to play our linear thinking policy officials like a cat plays a mouse. Unlike the mouse, however, we delude ourselves that we are in control of the situation. We are not.

Ken White

07-17-2011, 02:32 AM

Unlike the mouse, however, we delude ourselves that we are in control of the situation. We are not.Not even close are we. We're being played like a Bass Fiddle on Bourbon Street at 0330... :wry:

And not only in South Asia... :rolleyes:

Dayuhan

07-17-2011, 02:59 AM

Yes, we did create the monopoly

We may have created this particular monopoly, but we didn't create the tradition of winner-take-all monopoly rule, nor can we change it. Any government we installed would have ended up with monopoly rule based on patronage: Afghans are going to rule like Afghans, even if they are put in power by Americans. Why would we expect otherwise?

and yes we did enable the envelopment of Pakistan by India. Both were avoidable, and both are very bad to the longterm stability of the region.

Has Pakistan been enveloped by India? When did that happen? Certainly the Indians are trying to boost influence in Afghanistan, but they will do that whether we like it or not: like the Pakistani's they are not going to ask our permission before pursuing their perceived interests. They are a long way yet from controlling the place, or from enveloping Pakistan.

I suspect that Pakistan would be perfectly happy to see India mired down in the graveyard of empires, with dubious supply routes and vulnerable to attrition. I can think of few other places where Pakistan and its proxies would have as good a chance of imposing a military defeat on India.

Unlike the mouse, however, we delude ourselves that we are in control of the situation. We are not.

We are absolutely not in control of the situation. We certainly can't control how Afghanistan is governed, we can't change the political culture, we can't force inclusion or power-sharing, and we can't control what India does. All the more reason not to have stuck around and tried to transform the place.

Bill Moore

07-17-2011, 04:14 AM

Posted by Carl,

It was felt that one of the primary reasons 9-11 came was because AQ found a congenial home in Taliban run Afghanistan and one of the primary reasons Taliban was running Afghanistan was because we stopped paying attention to the place after the Soviets left.

Carl please, this argument gets a bit old. After the Soviets departed Afghanistan, their puppet government remained in place for a couple of years. They just didn't leave and then the country fell apart the next day and we ignored it. Pakistan supported the Taliban so they could gain a controlling influence in Afghanistan for their strategic purposes (not ours). We probably didn't care that much back then, because if you recall UBL left Pakistan and went back to Saudi for awhile, and then he went to Sudan used that has his base before he went to Afghanistan. The Taliban provided safehaven to fello muj who helped them fight the Soviets, that doesn't mean the Taliban were ideologically aligned with their vision of global revolution (at that time).

I agree with Ken, we just needed to keep conducting punishment raids and I suspect the Taliban would have gotten tired of their AQ friends over time. If not, at least they would be in area where we could readily kill them at a cost that would be reasonable. Kicking AQ out of Afghanistan and then continuing to sit there spending billions to fight the Taliban isn't going to protect from further terror attacks. If were there for humanitarian reasons, for women's rights, to fight the opium trade, etc. then so be it, but AQ is another matter.

carl

07-18-2011, 12:45 AM

Ken:

Money may be the easy part, but it is the critical part. No money, no execution no matter how brilliant the plan.

Trading raids is sort of medieval. It goes on forever. If your plan is to make the raid so painful they won't counter, that is a plan to fix the problem permanent. And as such, it depends on our being able to determine at what level of pain they will say uncle or even what constitutes pain. I don't think we would be so good at that. Also it would be complicated by trying to figure what to hit. From afar we would be just as likely to kill lots of civilians as bad guys. That wouldn't cause a police state much pain but their propaganda efforts subsequently would surely cause us a lot of pain. Lastly, that kind of thing I don't think would go over in the long run with Americans. This year's raid, next year's raid and the raid the year after that. People would start asking why don't we just fix the thing.

I didn't say I supported stretching Article 5. I said in 2001, the members of the alliance had to support us, or felt they had to, if the alliance was to remain strong. They didn't have to if they didn't want to. The French didn't and we still like them. The alliance is probably a not so useful relic of the past in any case and I don't think the help we get from NATO vs. individual countries is worth the trouble.

I don't know if I am an interventionist. You think I am. I do know that if we are going to intervene we should do it right.

Bill Moore:

That argument may be old but it is still true. Like you said, we didn't care much back then and we let the situation do what it did and look what happened. It doesn't really matter what Taliban knew before 9-11. They knew after and they didn't give up AQ. That is a pretty easy thing to interpret.

I don't understand why you guys think we could have raided Taliban into submission. The punitive strikes would neccassarily (sic) have been air raids. When have air raids (aside from atom bombs) ever broken an enemy's will to fight? We beat the bejabbers out of NV and NK and Germany and Germany pounded London and none of that resulted in much effect if any on the will to fight.

Ken White

07-18-2011, 02:20 AM

Money may be the easy part, but it is the critical part. No money, no execution no matter how brilliant the plan.True. Fortunately or unfortunately, it is widely available and there are multiple sources that can and will provide it to hurt or embarrass the great Satan. People willing to fly themselves and airplanes full of others into buildings are in far more short supply...
Trading raids is sort of medieval. It goes on forever.Not at all. Not if you do it right -- however, given the sway of the "fpe" in DC today I'll admit that could be problematical in the near term. Shouldn't be but likely would.
From afar we would be just as likely to kill lots of civilians as bad guys.One absolutely cannot do an effective job from afar, not at all. See below. Even if up close and personal, some civilians likely will be casualties -- but far, far fewer than are likely over an intervention of years or even months...
Lastly, that kind of thing I don't think would go over in the long run with Americans. This year's raid, next year's raid and the raid the year after that. People would start asking why don't we just fix the thing.As well they should -- the point being that military intervention will most often inadvertently do more harm than good. A Raid, OTOH is designed to do more harm than good; inadvertent lack of harm is to be avoided. Not too subtle difference there. :wry:

As I'm sure you know, one should use one's tools for the purpose designed. One can do other things with them but it is usually not as effective and can be hard on the tool -- which you may want for other things.

"Fixing" it requires non-military solutions while attempts at military-centric or heavy fixes usually worsen the situation.
I didn't say I supported stretching Article 5. I said in 2001, the members of the alliance had to support us, or felt they had to...Then I misunderstood this from the earlier Post:
""Refusal of the alliance to support its most important member in the face of an attack would have meant the end of the alliance.""That any refusal would have ended the Alliance, I doubt. I also do not think we are the most important member -- biggest, yes, important not so much...
I do know that if we are going to intervene we should do it right.I agree with that. However, as I keep trying to point out to you, we will not -- indeed, we cannot -- do it 'right.' Ergo it's best not to do it.

Bill Moore can answer for himself but FWIW, this isn't correct:
That argument may be old but it is still true. Like you said, we didn't care much back then and we let the situation do what it did and look what happened.It is not true. It IS the position of the "fpe" (or many of them; the 'we must help' and the 'Realist' subcrowds...) but they're quite wrong often and on many levels. Afghanistan wasn't of much concern to us then and should not be now. Just as the Kennedy brothers elevated the nothing that was Viet Nam to a major effort in order to boost the economy, show they were "tuff on kommunism" and wag the dog, so too did Jimmy Carter stick our nose into something that did not need our help. That our 'abandonment of Afghanistan' contributed to the Taliban and /or to AQ being there is "fpe" hype and it's fallacious logic to foster internationalism and such. Boosts budgets, too...

Afghanistan was doing what it wanted to do and will again, our intereference in their affairs has done and will do more harm than good. The Talibs rose and would have fallen on their own eventually, not our problem. AQ would have found somewhere to hang out, just as they will again in the future. Not a problem -- AQ is not a problem unless we let it be one (which we did.:rolleyes:). We would be advised to worry a bit more about Hezbollah than about AQ...
I don't understand why you guys think we could have raided Taliban into submission. The punitive strikes would neccassarily (sic) have been air raids. When have air raids (aside from atom bombs) ever broken an enemy's will to fight? We beat the bejabbers out of NV and NK and Germany and Germany pounded London and none of that resulted in much effect if any on the will to fight.I think you just made our point -- one cannot raid OR bomb anyone into submission, thus "submission" should not be even a minor goal.

The elusive pursuit of victory and submission, of breaking the enemy's will is a legacy of a bygone era and those things need to be discarded as aims barring a major existential war, an unlikely occurrence in the next decade or so. Just as Parents can no longer kill kids who disobey -- indeed, in many nations, they can't even physically strike them no matter how lightly -- so submission and victory are relics of the past. What Parents can do is make bad behavior really disagreeable if not painful to one degree or another. Same with Nations, submission is not an issue -- acute discomfort is. With Non-state actors, the gloves can come off a bit but the goal then is conversion or elimination (level of fanatacism dependent), not submission or breaking will (which just defers the end state).

Punitive strikes by air are pointless and will never do the job -- even nukes, no longer new and awesome, won't change that -- in fact, air efforts will merely worsen the situation because they are so ineffective and annoying to those who endure them and survive. Air power gets to transport the Troops in, provide distractive and supportive strikes but as a main effort, it would fail. Ground action is required. Precise strikes by decently trained units, not SOF in all cases, aimed at judiciously selected targets. We do targeting and do a good job at it. We can better train and equip properly to do this and do so more economically than many other options.

The point of such raids and the key effort in the raid must be to show that we can inflict greater harm than can the opponent and that we can do it pretty much when and where we want to -- and, even more so (thank you, G. W. Bush...) to show that we are not predictable. Regrettably today we certainly are highly predictable, to the veritable fault -- and you're advocating continuing to do what has failed miserably for 60 years with only two minor strategic successes which were regrettably and rapidly transmuted into business as usual by the "fpe" crowd...

Long time passing, indeed.

Bill Moore

07-18-2011, 02:57 AM

Carl,

I agree with what Ken wrote, but sadly it will fly over most folks heads, because their heads are buried in new age hype disguised as a National Security Strategy. It was a pretty sad day when a flag officer said we need to go to dark places because that is where all the threats are. That is complete hogwash, but here we are spending billions on dark places (ineffectively spending that money in Afghanistan) to no end.

I never said raid until they submit, I don't expect any state or non-state actor to submit unless we conduct total war like we did against Germany and Japan (where "we" killed tens of thousands of civilians). The intent of the raid is to change an actors cost-benefit assessment, and once the U.S. shows the will to act (and not my launching missiles or dropping bombs from airplanes, but by putting boots on the ground) and inflict pain, the groups will be "less" likely to strike (or if they're fanatical like AQ, their hosts will be less receptive to allowing them to act out their fantasies). Raids can serve multiple purposes, but I'm focused on two, first is the pre-emptive strike (that doesn't mean invade and then occupy a country) and second a retalitory response. Both are viable and affordable options, not permanent solutions, I don't think there are any permanent solutions. If you think occupying Afghanistan and breaking our piggy bank is going to lead to a permanent solution well then just keep hoping away...

Fuchs

07-18-2011, 08:43 AM

Let's face the Afghanistan War problem/project at a more abstract level. This helps the clarity of thought.

I say:

The problem is the extremist view on warfare and national security (http://defense-and-freedom.blogspot.com/2009/11/extremist-warfare.html).

Evidence:
I cannot remember a single war in history where governments believed that an alliance was still to be committed to a fight AFTER the aggressor was pushed out of power (para)militarily. Wars usually end when the aggressor lost power.

This time it's even more extreme: The alliance only really committed itself AFTER that government had lost power. How dumb is that?

Even MORE extreme: Said government wasn't even the aggressor. The aggressor was a state-independent and transnational group of criminals, none of whom resided in the country in question, were born there, raised there or belonged to one of its ethnic groups. The ones who commited the crime died in the process.

2,200 years ago, Cato repeated after every Senate speech (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carthago_delenda_est) (and he lived very long, was Senator for many decades) that he believed that Carthage muzst be destroyed. Carthage posed no real threat any more, but he wanted it destroyed.
Such extremism was not atypical in ancient Rome: As long as it could, the Republic and early Empire were not able to accept the survival of a threat. They were quite childish and naive, obviously. The consequence was war after war, expansion after expansion - until the empire had not only passed its optimal size, but even grown further to a size that was so much suboptimal that the benefits of a small empire were consumed to the degree of fragility of the huge empire.

This same inability to stand the survival of even a small threat, this extremist view that sheds centuries of warfare that usually had a lot of restraint - this inability probably stems from 1943 when the Allies demanded unconditional surrender (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Casablanca_conference). This counter-productive extremism means that easy ways out of troubles are blocked by extremism.

The whole extreme treatment of the AQ/AFG affair was totally counterproductive, even if we ignore all the expenses, WIA and KIA.
By the time of the invasion AQ was still denying responsibility for 9/11, right?
With that denial (a condition for Taliban's hospitality) there would have been no global jihad fashion and thus much less if any follow-on attacks.
If AQ had on the other hand accepted responsibility while in AFG, this would have helped denying them this safe haven.

In other words; smarter diplomacy and national leadership could have
# either solved the AQ/AFG issue 100%
or
# avoided the global jihad fashion

Instead, resources were thrown at the problem and governments acted like 4 year olds.

Now could we at least getb rid of the latter and shed the extremist view on warfare?

Bob's World

07-18-2011, 10:22 AM

Gen Wardak reports that Jan Mohammed Khan was killed by suicide bomber attacks at his home in Kabul.

Jan Mohammed, though lately mostly in Kabul, was the #1 powerbroker in Uruzgan Province and a very close family friend of the Karzais. He also was the primary patron of the uber-corrupt Uruzgan Police Chief, Juma Gul; and the Uncle and patron of the unber controversial ANP Colonel / Private Security company owner / close friend of US and Aussie SOF but hated and distrusted by the Dutch, Uruzgan strongman Mattiulah Kahn.

This is as significant as the hit on AWK. Gloves are off and "they" (whoever that might be) is tightening the loop and striking very close to the throne.

Some results will be that Juma, having lost his patron will either have to find a new one or fade away. Not sure what Juma is doing lately, but he has always wanted to get back to Kabul, and saw his time in Uruzgan as the route back. If not in Kabul he will seek to get there. Mattiulah, on the other hand, has been building a broad base of support across traditional tribal lines in Uruzgan, has long been the most effective fighting force in the region and the key to keeping the road from Kandahar to Tarin Kowt open, and has been chaffing at the constraints of Jan Mohammed Khan's dominance in recent years. He will now likely make moves to clearly establish himself as heir to the role of principle power broker in Uruzgan.

TDB

07-18-2011, 11:04 AM

davidbfpo

07-18-2011, 11:46 AM

Time for a 'Red Team' to have some input in Kabul and beyond.

Question for them: The Taliban's leadership campaigning poses a danger to ISAF & GIRoA, how can the danger be mitigated?

Secondly given the spread of the insurgency far beyond the traditional areas and outside the Pashtun areas, what would be the dangers that poses and how to counter them better?

Bob's World

07-18-2011, 03:42 PM

David,

I believe we miss the mark when we think of the "insurgency" as a particular type of activity in a particular location. Locations to act and actions to take are merely tactical choices for dealing with the larger dynamics behind such actions.

So, rather than thinking about this as a "spread of insurgency," far more helpful to ask "why the change of tactics"?

I would be curious as to where Juma and AWK stood on reconciliation? Where do their likely successors stand on that critical issue? This goes to the primary fracture between the Northern Alliance and the Taliban. Then there are the growing fractures within the Northern Alliance. Two powerful Pashtus close to Karzai are gone, does this open doors for Uzbeks, Hazara or Tajiks to move into? Is it possible that some Tajik faction is more open to reconciliation with the Taliban as a move to displace Karzai, and that weakening Karzai's base preps the way for that shift?

One can speculate all day.

As to how this affects GIRoA, that depends on what GIRoA's intentions are, both currently and in the future. Changes may be in play that could change that significantly.

"Danger to ISAF" is a bit of a funny one. There is no real danger to ISAF, but perhaps there is to ISAF's current definition of the problem and choice of approaches for dealing with the same?? These may be changes to be leveraged rather than merely "countered." But first we must be able to step back from myopic focus on how we have defined the conflict to date, and take on a bigger perspective of what it is that is truly important to the issues that led to the creation of ISAF in the first place.

Bob

Dayuhan

07-19-2011, 12:38 AM

I would be curious as to where Juma and AWK stood on reconciliation? Where do their likely successors stand on that critical issue?

It may be a critical issue to us, but how critical is it to the various fghan factions? I doubt that the Karzai crowd have any real interest in reconciliation, except as a tool to co-opt some Taliban leaders and increase their own hold on power. I doubt that the Taliban have any real interest in reconciliation, except as a tool to get some of their people inside the tent and advance their own quest for the power monopoly.

We shouldn't assume that our objectives are shared by any of those we have to deal with. Better to accept that it's their country and their system, and we aren't going to change it. If we take on a set of goals that require us to transform the way Afghanistan is governed, we set ourselves up for failure.

carl

07-19-2011, 01:52 AM

2,200 years ago, Cato repeated after every Senate speech (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carthago_delenda_est) (and he lived very long, was Senator for many decades) that he believed that Carthage muzst be destroyed. Carthage posed no real threat any more, but he wanted it destroyed.
Such extremism was not atypical in ancient Rome: As long as it could, the Republic and early Empire were not able to accept the survival of a threat. They were quite childish and naive, obviously. The consequence was war after war, expansion after expansion - until the empire had not only passed its optimal size, but even grown further to a size that was so much suboptimal that the benefits of a small empire were consumed to the degree of fragility of the huge empire.

Seeing as how Rome lasted a rather long time after the death of Cato the Carthage killer, I'd say that they were doing something right, however childish and naive it may have been. Also I think maybe you could say that one of the things that did Rome in was that they did actually started to accept the survival of external threats in order to fight each other. They were too interested in civil war and neglected the external threats which eventually did them in. That huge new empire wasn't fragile because it was huge, it was fragile because the Romans cut themselves to pieces.

This same inability to stand the survival of even a small threat, this extremist view that sheds centuries of warfare that usually had a lot of restraint - this inability probably stems from 1943 when the Allies demanded unconditional surrender (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Casablanca_conference). This counter-productive extremism means that easy ways out of troubles are blocked by extremism.

That is easy to say now when political and emotional realities of the time can be easily forgotten. At the time, rather harder to do, especially given the nature of the opposition. Besides, we did end up allowing the Japanese some conditions.

carl

07-19-2011, 02:47 AM

Ken:

Mr. Atta wasn't likely to collect much money, no fame, no ideology, no cachet; all things Mr. Bin Laden had. That was the hard thing to build up and OBL had the power to bring in the bucks. Anybody can bring dumb young muscle to blow themselves up or fly planes into buildings. There are lots of them around. The last decade has proved that.

the point being that military intervention will most often inadvertently do more harm than good. A Raid, OTOH is designed to do more harm than good; inadvertent lack of harm is to be avoided. Not too subtle difference there. :wry:

As I'm sure you know, one should use one's tools for the purpose designed. One can do other things with them but it is usually not as effective and can be hard on the tool -- which you may want for other things.

I am a bit confused by the first part here. Military intervention will do more harm than good, presumably to our side. But, a raid, which is military intervention, will do more harm than good to their side, but not to our side but it is military intervention which does more harm than good to our side. I'm lost.

True you do use the correct tool for the job. But you don't pick and choose the jobs you do because you only have one tool. Buy or make another. The military should be more akin to a tool kit than one single tool. Ok this half century I have to invade Normandy so I need this tool from the kit. Next half century I have to fight a bunch of small wars so I use this other tool from the kit. I don't think it wise that you say no, I am not going to do that because I like using this one tool and don't feel like learning to use one of the others.

I also do not think we are the most important member -- biggest, yes, important not so much.

Just out of curiosity, which country is the most important member of NATO?

However, as I keep trying to point out to you, we will not -- indeed, we cannot -- do it 'right.' Ergo it's best not to do it.

I don't buy that. We can do it right and have done it right. To say we shouldn't because we just can't is a rationalization for laziness or fecklessness. And, it is an invitation for clever enemies to follow a path that will confound us.

Bill Moore can answer for himself but FWIW, this isn't correct:It is not true. It IS the position of the "fpe" (or many of them; the 'we must help' and the 'Realist' subcrowds...) but they're quite wrong often and on many levels. Afghanistan wasn't of much concern to us then and should not be now. Just as the Kennedy brothers elevated the nothing that was Viet Nam to a major effort in order to boost the economy, show they were "tuff on kommunism" and wag the dog, so too did Jimmy Carter stick our nose into something that did not need our help. That our 'abandonment of Afghanistan' contributed to the Taliban and /or to AQ being there is "fpe" hype and it's fallacious logic to foster internationalism and such. Boosts budgets, too...

Afghanistan was doing what it wanted to do and will again, our intereference in their affairs has done and will do more harm than good. The Talibs rose and would have fallen on their own eventually, not our problem. AQ would have found somewhere to hang out, just as they will again in the future. Not a problem -- AQ is not a problem unless we let it be one (which we did.:rolleyes:). We would be advised to worry a bit more about Hezbollah than about AQ...I think you just made our point -- one cannot raid OR bomb anyone into submission, thus "submission" should not be even a minor goal.

The fact of the matter is AQ was hanging out in Afghanistan, killed a bunch of us and then the Talibs didn't give them up. What would have happened, or not have happened is immaterial. That did happen. We reacted as is normal for a nation subject to mortal attack.

We would be advised to worry a bit more about Hezbollah than about AQ...I think you just made our point -- one cannot raid OR bomb anyone into submission, thus "submission" should not be even a minor goal.

But didn't you just say we could bomb people into submission. You implied that if our raids hurt them enough, they would stop raiding back. And since the raids would mostly be air raids (they would have to be, we haven't done big punitive ground raids much and the one we did in Mexico didn't work well) and submission would consist of not raiding back...I don't get it.

How did Hezbollah get into this? When was the last time they attacked New York?

The elusive pursuit of victory and submission, of breaking the enemy's will is a legacy of a bygone era and those things need to be discarded as aims barring a major existential war, an unlikely occurrence in the next decade or so. We would be advised to worry a bit more about Hezbollah than about AQ...I think you just made our point -- one cannot raid OR bomb anyone into submission, thus "submission" should not be even a minor goal.

Until human nature changes, that just isn't true. That is what humans do, try to win and beat the other guy.

Punitive strikes by air are pointless and will never do the job -- even nukes, no longer new and awesome, won't change that -- in fact, air efforts will merely worsen the situation because they are so ineffective and annoying to those who endure them and survive. Air power gets to transport the Troops in, provide distractive and supportive strikes but as a main effort, it would fail. Ground action is required. Precise strikes by decently trained units, not SOF in all cases, aimed at judiciously selected targets. We do targeting and do a good job at it. We can better train and equip properly to do this and do so more economically than many other options.

The point of such raids and the key effort in the raid must be to show that we can inflict greater harm than can the opponent and that we can do it pretty much when and where we want to -- and, even more so (thank you, G. W. Bush...) to show that we are not predictable.

How you going to do all this without very large bases close by and a very large logistical effort and a whole lot of airlift? We don't have the airlift. Given the force-pro proclivities of the modern military, I don't see how we could move in and out of anywhere fast enough to make big punitive ground raids work. And I don't see how we could ever hurt them more than they hurt us given our probable greater sensitivity to casualties. All they would have to do is shoot down one, just one C-17 or Herc loaded with troops.

and you're advocating continuing to do what has failed miserably for 60 years with only two minor strategic successes which were regrettably and rapidly transmuted into business as usual by the "fpe" crowd...

What am I advocating exactly? Something now or something in the future?

carl

07-19-2011, 03:01 AM

I never said raid until they submit, I don't expect any state or non-state actor to submit unless we conduct total war like we did against Germany and Japan (where "we" killed tens of thousands of civilians). The intent of the raid is to change an actors cost-benefit assessment, and once the U.S. shows the will to act (and not my launching missiles or dropping bombs from airplanes, but by putting boots on the ground) and inflict pain, the groups will be "less" likely to strike (or if they're fanatical like AQ, their hosts will be less receptive to allowing them to act out their fantasies). Raids can serve multiple purposes, but I'm focused on two, first is the pre-emptive strike (that doesn't mean invade and then occupy a country) and second a retalitory response. Both are viable and affordable options, not permanent solutions, I don't think there are any permanent solutions. If you think occupying Afghanistan and breaking our piggy bank is going to lead to a permanent solution well then just keep hoping away...

I don't see the US military ever doing something like that given the culture. I don't see the politicians ever giving the ok. I don't think it practically possible unless there are big bases nearby. I don't think we would ever be able to figure the variables enough to insure we would hurt them more than they hurt us. For example, what if the subject government fell even if you didn't want it to? The new gov has a different outlook and isn't going to do what we want. What would we do, restore the old one because we had them figured? I just don't see it working at all.

The only thing permanent in human existence is human nature and death. Given that, I am happy with results that last for a few decades.

What breaks our piggy bank is entitlement spending. Military spending is a drop in the bucket.

ganulv

07-19-2011, 04:38 AM

What breaks our piggy bank is entitlement spending. Military spending is a drop in the bucket.

Well, a ladleful, maybe. ;)

Dayuhan

07-19-2011, 04:42 AM

The fact of the matter is AQ was hanging out in Afghanistan, killed a bunch of us and then the Talibs didn't give them up. What would have happened, or not have happened is immaterial. That did happen. We reacted as is normal for a nation subject to mortal attack.

Going there and stomping some people was indeed a normal and predictable reaction. Staying on and trying to transform the place into a democracy... maybe normal and predictable for us, but I wouldn't say advisable.

Success is achieving your goal. The first step toward success is selecting a specific, practical, achievable goal. The transformation of Afghanistan is none of those.

Ken White

07-19-2011, 05:54 AM

Mr. Atta wasn't likely to collect much money, no fame, no ideology, no cachet; all things Mr. Bin Laden had. That was the hard thing to build up and OBL had the power to bring in the bucks.As did and do many other people. OBL just had his 15 minutes of fame and grasped it.
I am a bit confused by the first part here. Military intervention will do more harm than good, presumably to our side.No, it most always does more harm than good to the people and /or nation that the intervenors are nominally trying to help. Interventions rarely do the intervenor that much good either, they are expensive and seldom achieve their objectives.
But, a raid, which is military intervention, will do more harm than good to their side, but not to our side but it is military intervention which does more harm than good to our side. I'm lost.I noticed. A raid is not a military intervention.

An intervention is the deliberate act of a nation or a group of nations to introduce its military forces into the course of an existing controversy in another nation or nations. It may be planned to be for a brief period or may be a long term effort.

A Raid is a surprise attack by a small armed force usually entailing sudden and often unannounced forced entry into an operational area with no intention of staying. It can be conducted to seize or destroy materiel or enemy forces or specific persons, it can be tailored be a spoiling operation a disruptive operation or a specific locale destructive operation.

The intervenor intrudes between two or more parties and this type of effort typically last for a period of time. A raid is specifically designed to be a brief operation.
True you do use the correct tool for the job. But you don't pick and choose the jobs you do because you only have one tool... I don't think it wise that you say no, I am not going to do that because I like using this one tool and don't feel like learning to use one of the others.I agree with all that in principle but the fact is that ANY military force is or should be a tool designed to be destructive. It is not a building tool.
Just out of curiosity, which country is the most important member of NATO?In what sense? The US money wise; probably Germany geographically, possibly the UK politically. It's an alliance of nations who all have importance in one respect or another.

Reference my statement "However, as I keep trying to point out to you, we will not -- indeed, we cannot -- do it 'right.' Ergo it's best not to do it.you said
I don't buy that. We can do it right and have done it.Oh? What's your basis for saying we can do it right? I'm quite curious to know when we did "it right" as I sure can't think of one off hand where a large US force was committed. When you come up with one, be sure it's a post WW II example, we could do it reasonably well prior to that, since then the bureaucracy and the "fpe" have destroyed our capability to successfully perform such operations; so name me one.
To say we shouldn't because we just can't is a rationalization for laziness or fecklessness. And, it is an invitation for clever enemies to follow a path that will confound us.That's funny. What I propose is far more work and more dangerous with more risk that an intervention. Nothing lazy or feckless about it. In no way is it such an invitation to our current clever enemies who are confounding us and you as we write here. You're advocating playing the other guys game on his turf -- that's where and when we get confounded.
We reacted as is normal for a nation subject to mortal attack.We did and I've said I agree with that reaction. I did and do not agree we should have stayed much past mid 2002.
But didn't you just say we could bomb people into submission.No.
You implied that if our raids hurt them enough, they would stop raiding back. And since the raids would mostly be air raids (they would have to be, we haven't done big punitive ground raids much and the one we did in Mexico didn't work well) and submission would consist of not raiding back...I don't get it.Obviously. Strategic Raids do not have to be and should not be totally by air, those are ineffective. Nor should we attempt the big punitive ala Mexico 'raid' (that was not a raid BTW, it was a Punitive Expedition, it was not intended to strike one or a few targets and rapidly depart -- it was, in fact an intervention.... Small tailored ground forces air (or sea, location dependent) lifted in, quick strike and out.
How did Hezbollah get into this? When was the last time they attacked New York?They got into this because I brought them in. They exist and are more competent and dangerous (and have more money) than AQ. The USSR never attacked New York either but they were a concern. Hezxbollah is also a concern, or efforts to disrupt AQ have been effective -- we have not done much to by, for or with Hezbollah. Yet.
Until human nature changes, that just isn't true. That is what humans do, try to win and beat the other guy.I agree that's true for human nature and a grea many people -- I do not agree it applies to western democracies specifically and to most governments in the world today. I suggest that the world has changed to an extent and you seem to have missed it. ;)
How you going to do all this without very large bases close by and a very large logistical effort and a whole lot of airlift? We don't have the airlift. Given the force-pro proclivities of the modern military, I don't see how we could move in and out of anywhere fast enough to make big punitive ground raids work. And I don't see how we could ever hurt them more than they hurt us given our probable greater sensitivity to casualties. All they would have to do is shoot down one, just one C-17 or Herc loaded with troops.All valid concerns. We should have improved our airlift capability in the 90s to include procuring stealthy insertion and extraction transports. We did not but we can. We do know that the Armed forces of the US have been only marginally successful in most of our recent operations and we do know the way we've been operating is part of the problem and that we must change. We also need to improve our strategic reach as the large bases are an Achilles heel for us that we should have foregone twenty years ago -- but Armed Forces change slowly... :mad:

Most of the "fpe" wants to change minimally and many -- not all -- of them would indeed recoil at a bird or two getting downed (the obvious counter to that is to avoid it...). I disagree on the sensitivity to casualties. That too is a "fpe" mantra but most Americans will accept casualties provided they see some successes to counter that cost.
What am I advocating exactly? Something now or something in the future?I don't know about now or the future but you seem to espouse intervention or military action for social engineering or humanitarian purposes.

I object to those. It's not personal but it is a deep seated anger. My anger is directed at the "fpe" crowd, civilian AND military, who lobby for foolish interventions that too often do more harm to everyone than they do good for anyone. The "fpe" desire to help other is truly laudable. I really mean that. However, their chosen methodology is just generally pathetic in insofar as results achieved are concerned and that is historical fact. My position is not based on an academic study of the issues or on the rights or wrongs of a given event, rather it is based on experience in implementing those flawed visions in a a number of places around the world and seeing the costs, short and long term, to everyone involved in them

We cannot change the world so that any and all follow in our image -- nor should we want to do so. Attempts to achieve such change cannot be made by force of arms, the changes may be induced or introduced but they in the end must be voluntarily accepted by the local population. The minute you intervene with an armed force you effectively preclude voluntary acceptance. You can impose a force on a people and that force will be respected because it has to be, however, the likelihood of force -- not necessarily used, just present -- convincing any locals to change lifelong attitudes and habits is infinitesimal. If the habits that are presumed to be in need of change have been imbedded culturally over many generations then its going to take at least two or three generations to achieve any meaningful movement, longer to achieve significant modification.

Strategic raids are not the be-all and end-all, they are just another tool and should and can be only part of our military posture. They are hard for some of the reasons you've stated and others -- but they are moire effective and will be better suited to the next decade or so than will long, costly interventions. The bad news is that the feckless and lazy thing is to do the interventions, it's easier on the "fpe" and they sound like those folks mean well, they like that...

But. How have they worked out over the last 60 years?

Bob's World

07-19-2011, 09:42 AM

It may be a critical issue to us, but how critical is it to the various Afghan factions? I doubt that the Karzai crowd have any real interest in reconciliation, except as a tool to co-opt some Taliban leaders and increase their own hold on power. I doubt that the Taliban have any real interest in reconciliation, except as a tool to get some of their people inside the tent and advance their own quest for the power monopoly.

We shouldn't assume that our objectives are shared by any of those we have to deal with. Better to accept that it's their country and their system, and we aren't going to change it. If we take on a set of goals that require us to transform the way Afghanistan is governed, we set ourselves up for failure.

You miss the point. I too doubt any of the "Karzai crowd" have any interest in reconciliation. Why would they? They have all the money and power as it stands, so too do all of their friends, family and tribes in this patronage system. But for everyone with power in Afghanistan, there is someone behind him wishing that it was him. (Oh, and big typo, I wrote "Juma" but meant "Jan," I don't think Juma's star will rise now that his patron is gone, but who knows...).

The fact that ISAF has completely delegated reconciliation to the "Karzai crowd" is, IMO, outrageous. This is the essential task for any kind of stability born of compromise (rather than suppression born of brute force); yet we leave it to the one group with nothing to gain from such action; and then enable them to do nothing by committing ourselves to the protection of them and the care of their populace. Crazy.

My muse though, was who might be in the wings to potentially move up, and what deals such players might have cut or be willing to cut to stay alive while they build their own power and fortune. And we do need to care if we hope to be able to depart Afghanistan any time soon and not have the whole mess collapse in short order on those who actually trusted in ISAF while we were there.

Besides, if the eviction of AQ is still the main mission, no one can deliver that faster and more effectively than the Taliban. That was true in 2001, and it is still true today. That is a fine point that really needs to be moved to the top of the buffer.

davidbfpo

07-19-2011, 12:36 PM

With political murders of late FP Blog has added context and a judgement on the tradition of bribery and killing reappearing with a vengeance:http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/07/18/assassin_nation

Dayuhan

07-19-2011, 01:11 PM

You miss the point. I too doubt any of the "Karzai crowd" have any interest in reconciliation. Why would they? They have all the money and power as it stands, so too do all of their friends, family and tribes in this patronage system.

That's only half the equation. The other half is the Taliban, who have no reason to reconcile either. The goal, on either side, is not reconciliation but dominance. One had it, lost it, wants it back. The other has it and wants to keep it. We can dream all we want about getting them to share, but that won't make it happen.

The fact that ISAF has completely delegated reconciliation to the "Karzai crowd" is, IMO, outrageous. This is the essential task for any kind of stability born of compromise (rather than suppression born of brute force); yet we leave it to the one group with nothing to gain from such action; and then enable them to do nothing by committing ourselves to the protection of them and the care of their populace. Crazy.

To whom would you give the task? It's not as if ISAF, or any other outside power, can produce reconciliation. "Stability born of compromise" may be an ideal outcome for us, but if it isn't sought by either of the contending parties, what we want really doesn't matter.

My muse though, was who might be in the wings to potentially move up, and what deals such players might have cut or be willing to cut to stay alive while they build their own power and fortune. And we do need to care if we hope to be able to depart Afghanistan any time soon and not have the whole mess collapse in short order on those who actually trusted in ISAF while we were there.

If our ability to depart Afghanistan without collapse rests solely on our ability to produce "stability born of compromise", we have a problem. We can't force compromise on anyone, and the parties involved don't seem terribly interested in it.

Besides, if the eviction of AQ is still the main mission, no one can deliver that faster and more effectively than the Taliban. That was true in 2001, and it is still true today. That is a fine point that really needs to be moved to the top of the buffer.

Can deliver and will deliver are two very different things. The Taliban might decide to keep AQ out if they are convinced that the costs of harboring AQ are greater than the gains. It's not likely that they will offer up AQ as a bargaining chip to gain partial power when they see the likelihood of claiming total power in short order if they can only hold on until we leave.

Certainly it would work very nicely for us if the Taliban would give up any AQ connection in return for inclusion in a representative government. What works well for us is irrelevant if the parties involved aren't interested. Why would we think the Taliban, Karzai and the Northern Alliance, or anyone else in Afghanistan would want to rearrange their political culture to suit our needs?

Bob's World

07-19-2011, 02:30 PM

That's only half the equation. The other half is the Taliban, who have no reason to reconcile either. The goal, on either side, is not reconciliation but dominance. One had it, lost it, wants it back. The other has it and wants to keep it. We can dream all we want about getting them to share, but that won't make it happen.

To whom would you give the task? It's not as if ISAF, or any other outside power, can produce reconciliation. "Stability born of compromise" may be an ideal outcome for us, but if it isn't sought by either of the contending parties, what we want really doesn't matter.

If our ability to depart Afghanistan without collapse rests solely on our ability to produce "stability born of compromise", we have a problem. We can't force compromise on anyone, and the parties involved don't seem terribly interested in it.

Can deliver and will deliver are two very different things. The Taliban might decide to keep AQ out if they are convinced that the costs of harboring AQ are greater than the gains. It's not likely that they will offer up AQ as a bargaining chip to gain partial power when they see the likelihood of claiming total power in short order if they can only hold on until we leave.

Certainly it would work very nicely for us if the Taliban would give up any AQ connection in return for inclusion in a representative government. What works well for us is irrelevant if the parties involved aren't interested. Why would we think the Taliban, Karzai and the Northern Alliance, or anyone else in Afghanistan would want to rearrange their political culture to suit our needs?

So, Dayuhan, your point appears to be: To do the right thing is hard.

Concur. I would add, that to knowingly do the wrong thing (unless some far greater matter elsewhere hinges upon our continuing to do the wrong thing in Afghanistan) is foolish. To continue to do the wrong thing in Afghanistan in a manner that actually puts much larger issues at a greater risk is criminal.

You assume that the Taliban would not negotiate a withdrawal of the sanctuary they grant AQ in exchange for the US either driving a Mediatied settlement with GIRoA or our withdrawal from the region (with the firm promise that we will be pack to conduct just the type of Strategic Raids advocated by Ken and Bill on this thread if they again turn to hosting NSAs who would do us harm). That is a fair assumption. But it is one that should be a high priority to put to the test. Worst case it goes no where and we are right where we stand currently. Best case it opens the door for a new era of Afghan stability.

You assume the GIRoA senior leadership would never be open to reconciliation. Again, a fair assumption that should be put to the test. Karzai needs an ultimatum with some balls behind it. So long as we convince ourselves that we can only protect America by either staying in Afghanistan to keep the Northern Alliance in power, or creating such a powerful security force that the Northern Alliance can keep themselves in power, we will be powerless to make Karzai do what he knows he must do for Afghanistan and will in turn enable him to do what he wants to do for himself.

I believe the interests we quote as our rationale for staying in Afghanistan are grossly over-stated.

I believe that we increase the threat of trans-national terrorism to the US and our interests through our current courses of action; as they validate AQ's message regarding the danger the US posses and they also motivate the populaces of an entirely new region of the world (from the one already so motivated on 9/11) to volunteer to assist AQ in their ends as a means to free their own people from excessive, unwanted US intervention in their national affairs.

I believe we are fixed to a minor, supporting effort in South Asia while the main effort (which is largely political and diplomatic) in North Africa and the Middle East goes largely ignored and not recognized for how critical it is to defusing the popular angst against a wide range of national governments and Western influence over those governments is to this mis-stated "War against AQ" that we are waging (why we wage war against an organization that is a symptom of the problem rather than addressing the policy and political issues that cut to the heart of the problem I will never understand. I realize it is easier to send the military out to punish those who disagree with obsolete approaches than it is to actually evolve those approaches for the world we live in today, but come on...).

So, test the assumptions. If your assumptions prove correct, then we pack up and go home. It really is that simple.

Ken White

07-19-2011, 02:44 PM

A sensible and aware objection that is quite valid. Good hit. :cool:
I don't see the US military ever doing something like that given the culture. I don't see the politicians ever giving the ok.You got that right. Those same politicians that do not have the moral courage to rein in entitlements and Federal spending in general are the ones that have not had the moral courage to stop problems outside the US because they are too busy getting reelected to be bothered. Most are capable of doing better but have succumbed to a culture. I believe you are quite correct in that statement for now -- what the future brings may alter that for the better. I think it will. I will acknowledge that if it does not, all your other objections will be more or less correct. Those other objections are real but easily overcome IF the political will and strategic acumen are available.

The military culture issue is less a problem. We used to do strategic raids, we even trained to do them as late as the early 60s. The Army lost its way after Viet Nam and is now groping for a better path. My sensing is that while the senior leadership is fighting and will fight that change, they're going to lose rather badly -- and this is a good thing...

My only fear is that the heavy Euro-centric folks will win the day aided by USSOCOM who quite wrongly IMO want primacy in all things other than Armored Warfare and the US Congress who wants to buy expensive toys to garner votes. I've got a gut feel that effort will be overcome but we'll have to wait and see...

As you probably know, the real issue here is that US politicians are so focused on the US internal dynamics that they pay little attention to foreign issues until it's literally too late and they go into reactive mode. I believe that changes in communication and international norms are going to force modifications to that model. They'll have to be forced, the Congroids on their own will never adapt and will fight efforts to make them do so -- but I think that's exactly what's going to occur. The natives are getting restless...
I don't think it practically possible unless there are big bases nearby.Given our current methods of operation, valid point -- but also rather easily correctable. We need to quit the bases, they were necessary and they arguably led to the way we've been operating over the past half century or more but they are no longer vital, there are better alternative -- our elephantine bureaucracy slows our ability to change and the bases were problematic 20 years ago yet we've done nothing. That lack of strategic acumen thing...
I don't think we would ever be able to figure the variables enough to insure we would hurt them more than they hurt us.We can differ on that. We are as mentioned pretty good at targeting, we just have a penchant for not attacking the critical targets because it's too hard or someone might object. That's an education and training issue that can be remedied.

The issue is to determine what would be an adequate hurt and then to ruthlessly inflict it with full realization that it might bring temporary hurt in terms of own and civilian casualties and such but that such hurt is acceptable and really preferable to the longer term and deeper hurt, even more casualties plus the other costs a protracted campaign is absolutely certain to bring. As someone said the other day, our current approach is the old "Boil the Frog" technique. Unfortunately, because we're sort of clumsy, what we do is turn over the pot, get hot water all over everything and have a pizzed off frog to deal with... :wry:

US Politicians used to almost encourage our numerous forays of varying lengths and intensities around the world from 1782 until WW II. What they and we have not done since 1950 or so is adapt well to changing world social mores and norms of behavior.

We are not ordinarily ruthless but Americans can be quite ruthless if properly led and or fired up. As I mentioned earlier, we really do Targeting fairly well, it is our execution that needs work. We need to quite recognizing a problem and then attacking something else as we've been doing for the past 60 years.
For example, what if the subject government fell even if you didn't want it to? The new gov has a different outlook and isn't going to do what we want. What would we do, restore the old one because we had them figured?That's simple strategy; what result do you want, what will get you there, what are the possible alternatives or outcomes, what can be done to eliminate or minimize those not deemed favorable.

The fact is that in all our recent adventures, those within your memory, we did not get to or perform the last two steps -- we just reacted and then made it up as we went along. The US political system is designed to do things in that manner but that's easy to adapt to -- just consider it a feature, accept that its real and design accordingly. We have failed to do that because we have used flawed European models in politics and diplomacy (before Fuchs attacks, those methods are not flawed for Europe, they just do not work well for us...). Our good strategists -- and we do have some -- get over run by the civilian Think Tanks who mostly are not that helpful and they certainly are not innovative.

Here's a quote from Martin van Creveld that Backwards Observer placed on the front page of SWJ:

""As to the U.S, I do not see that it follows any particular set of principles except hypocrisy: meaning, the heart-felt need to dress up its extraordinary hunger for power with fine-sounding phrases about freedom, democracy, women's rights, etc.""

That's not totally accurate but it certainly is accurate enough to serve as an indictment of the way we've been using our military power since 1945. That really needs to change.
I just don't see it working at all.Heh. Neither does the Army War College;

Note two articles in the SWJ Blog today. The US Army War College Key Strategic Issues List is scary -- it is a compendium of business as usual. So they're on your side (that culture thing -- which can be changed...). No pushing the envelope there. Hidebound uber alles, Conventional and constrained r us...

OTOH, for some fresher thinking, check the Monograph linked and available for download at "The New Aztecs: Ritual and Restraint in Contemporary Western Military Operations" It's impressive. Here's the important quote from it:

""The problem develops, however, when leaders are “anxious to go to war, but unwilling to fight.” Leaders, ignorant of the realities of war, try to limit the political harm flowing from an unpopular operation by heavily restricting the methods used in order to minimize the casualties and costs.""

Exactly. That's where we are now, that has not worked at all well for us -- and you want to continue doing just that? :confused: :eek:

davidbfpo

07-19-2011, 02:56 PM

Originally Posted by Bob's World
The fact that ISAF has completely delegated reconciliation to the "Karzai crowd" is, IMO, outrageous.

Bob,

My recollection is that there was at the early stages considerable non-Afghan involvement, notably Michael Semple (who was expelled in 2007, see:http://circlingthelionsden.blogspot.com/2009/11/how-to-bring-peace-through.html ) and MG Graeme Lamb in 2009 (see:http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Graeme_Lamb)

There is a review of reconciliation:http://www.ndu.edu/press/recalibrating-the-afghan-reconciliation-program.html

Bob's World

07-19-2011, 03:08 PM

Bob,

My recollection is that there was at the early stages considerable non-Afghan involvement, notably Michael Semple (who was expelled in 2007, see:http://circlingthelionsden.blogspot.com/2009/11/how-to-bring-peace-through.html ) and MG Graeme Lamb in 2009 (see:http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Graeme_Lamb)

There is a review of reconciliation:http://www.ndu.edu/press/recalibrating-the-afghan-reconciliation-program.html

David,

When I was there last year the message was simple and clear:

"ISAF does reintegration of local Taliban fighters back to their home villages in conjuction with GIROA and local leaders; while GIRoA does reconciliation of the larger issues between them and the Taliban leadership in Pakistan."

To me, that is "delegated."

Said another way, ISAF is totally focused on the resistance insurgency, while we leave the revolutionary insurgency to GIRoA to address.

The problems with that are, as Dayuhan points out, GIRoA wants to cling to the whole pie, and the Taliban would like to have the whole pie as well, so neither is particularly inclined to reconcile so long as they have hope of reasonably retaining or gaining said pie. The larger problem is that no amount of engagement against a resistance insurgency is apt to do more than temporarily suppress it in certain areas so long as the revolutionary insurgency is alive and well.

We default to the resistance (reintegration) because that is the more military mission and ISAF is a military headquarters. If we were wise enough to establish a civilian headquarters to run this effort perhaps then we would see it as more appropriate to shift the main focus to the main political / diplomatic matters of the revolution (reconciliation) that keep the insurgency alive.

Bob's World

07-19-2011, 03:24 PM

Oh, and a critical point: Currently ISAF and GIRoA demand that any who reconcile or reintegrate swear allegiance to the current constitution of Afghanistan.

This fails to recognize that the current Constitution of Afghanistan formalizes a Northern Alliance monopoly on governance and also centralizes all patronage from the District level and up into one man. The constitution is the primary driver of insurgency, so swear allegiance to such a document a one who is currently ostricized by the same document is to volunteer for a life of marginalized servitude.

When one looks up "Marginalized servitude" in the dictionary one does not find a picture of a Pashtu man next to it.

For reconciliation to have a prayer of a hope the process must include a comprehensive constitutional loya jirga to create a document more tuned to the culture of Afghanistan, and better designed to protect the interests of all Afghans equally. It must allow legal competition for influence as well, and that means the West must be willing to accept what it produces.

Ken White

07-19-2011, 03:31 PM

...that means the West must be willing to accept what it produces.And as they say, "There's the rub..." :rolleyes:

Bob's World

07-19-2011, 03:42 PM

And as they say, "There's the rub..." :rolleyes:

Indeed. Which brings us back to this:

JMA

07-19-2011, 06:30 PM

Oh, and a critical point: Currently ISAF and GIRoA demand that any who reconcile or reintegrate swear allegiance to the current constitution of Afghanistan.

Well... (says I shaking my head) history should have thought that the word of a Pashtun should be taken with a pinch of salt (ask the Brit General Elphinstone (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Massacre_of_Elphinstone's_Army))

Some people never learn...

...oh yes, Karzai is a Pashtun.

JMA

07-19-2011, 06:41 PM

Indeed. Which brings us back to this:

Which is irritating because Maiwand (http://www.britishbattles.com/second-afghan-war/maiwand.htm) was a battle between 2,500 Brit and Indian forces against 12,000 Afghans and the outcome would be predictable.

A more evenly matched battle where the Brits were soundly thrashed was Magersfontein (http://www.britishbattles.com/great-boer-war/magersfontein.htm) (2nd Boer War) where 8,000 Brits were arrayed against 9,000 Boers.

Bob's World

07-19-2011, 06:46 PM

Or Bunker Hill, Or New Orleans, or...

davidbfpo

07-19-2011, 07:10 PM

Ken W.,

You cited in Post 849:
OTOH, for some fresher thinking, check the Monograph linked and available for download at "The New Aztecs: Ritual and Restraint in Contemporary Western Military Operations" It's impressive.

It is a SSI article available here, not on SWJ:http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1076

Synopsis:
The Western way of war has come full circle. After centuries of evolution toward increased totality and brutality, it has turned back once again to the ritualistic and restrained methods of primitive warfare. Largely, this has been due to an interaction between the perceived lack of utility in contemporary warfare, developing humanitarian public opinion, and increasing professionalism among militaries. The significance of these evolutionary trends in the way that the West engages in modern warfare is that they are potentially dangerous, and they include the possibility that the West will be unprepared for a future foe whose defeat requires more unrestrained methods.

The article got a critical response on KoW, taken from the first paragraph:
I must say that I profoundly disagree with its author. He misunderstands several of his key premises, including Clausewitz’s fundamental dictum. What is more, I think that the piece is a thinly veiled polemic which unhelpfully encourages an essentially militaristic perspective on the conduct of contemporary war.

Link to KoW:http://kingsofwar.org.uk/2011/07/how-do-you-say-bollocks-in-aztec-war-is-political-and-it-should-be-too-so-deal-with-it/#comments

Ken White

07-19-2011, 07:32 PM

Ken W.,

You cited in Post 849:

It is a SSI article available here, not on SWJ:http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1076

Yes, it is an SSI article but it is linked to from this SWJ Blog entry: LINK (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2011/07/ritual-and-restraint-in-contem/). I should have cited that entry by title. Thanks for the direct link.
The article got a critical response on KoW, taken from the first paragraph:
Heh. Yep, people will disagree about things. Thanks for that link also.

Dayuhan

07-19-2011, 10:54 PM

So, Dayuhan, your point appears to be: To do the right thing is hard.

My point is that setting goals we can't achieve sets us up for failure.

Concur. I would add, that to knowingly do the wrong thing (unless some far greater matter elsewhere hinges upon our continuing to do the wrong thing in Afghanistan) is foolish. To continue to do the wrong thing in Afghanistan in a manner that actually puts much larger issues at a greater risk is criminal.

Agree. I don't think we should ever have tried to dictate how Afghanistan will be governed, and I think it's absurd to think that an Afghan Government put in power by Americans will not govern like Afghans.

You assume that the Taliban would not negotiate a withdrawal of the sanctuary they grant AQ in exchange for the US either driving a Mediatied settlement with GIRoA or our withdrawal from the region (with the firm promise that we will be pack to conduct just the type of Strategic Raids advocated by Ken and Bill on this thread if they again turn to hosting NSAs who would do us harm). That is a fair assumption. But it is one that should be a high priority to put to the test. Worst case it goes no where and we are right where we stand currently. Best case it opens the door for a new era of Afghan stability.

You assume the GIRoA senior leadership would never be open to reconciliation. Again, a fair assumption that should be put to the test. Karzai needs an ultimatum with some balls behind it. So long as we convince ourselves that we can only protect America by either staying in Afghanistan to keep the Northern Alliance in power, or creating such a powerful security force that the Northern Alliance can keep themselves in power, we will be powerless to make Karzai do what he knows he must do for Afghanistan and will in turn enable him to do what he wants to do for himself.

I think many people would be perfectly willing to negotiate and even reach a show of agreement, but the goal wouldn't be reconciliation. The process would simply be a step toward the goal of maintaining or achieving a power monopoly. We don't play those deception games well at all, and I think both sides would jerk us around like the world's richest yo-yo. Next thing you know we'd be dispensing vast sums to all and sundry, and the only ones holding their end of the bargain would be us. I don't think we need that.

Reconciliation can't work if it starts as our goal. It has to be their goal, and it has to be shared by both of the parties we propose to reconcile. We can only mediate effectively if both sides accept us as a mediator. Do any of those conditions exist in Afghanistan?

I believe the interests we quote as our rationale for staying in Afghanistan are grossly over-stated.

A - $%#@ing - men.

I believe that we increase the threat of trans-national terrorism to the US and our interests through our current courses of action; as they validate AQ's message regarding the danger the US posses and they also motivate the populaces of an entirely new region of the world (from the one already so motivated on 9/11) to volunteer to assist AQ in their ends as a means to free their own people from excessive, unwanted US intervention in their national affairs.

Agree again... but if we decree that the answer is reconciliation, and if we try to impose reconciliation, isn't that just more excessive, unwanted intervention?

So, test the assumptions. If your assumptions prove correct, then we pack up and go home. It really is that simple.

Ideally, yes. In practice, once we commit ourselves to a venture and invest ourselves in it, it's very difficult for us to let it go. Setting forth reconciliation as a goal - a goal we are not likely to achieve - is likely to draw us even deeper into the failed effort to control and dictate how and by whom Afghanistan is going to be governed.

I think mission creep dragged us to a set of goals that are too ambitiuos and too nebulous to be achievable, and that we need to scale objectives back to something specific, practical, and achievable.

Bob's World

07-20-2011, 10:41 AM

In Vietnam we only negotiated for a "decent interval" in an effort to save our own pride, while abandoning the people (the government had abandoned us long before) of South Vietnam who had trusted us the most to an inevitable conclusion as that insurgency entered phase III conventional operatoins and unified the country.

In Afghanistan we have the opportunity learn from those mistakes and attempt to negotiate a better deal for those, such as the villages in the VSO program, who have trusted us the most and who will suffer the most when we withdraw. Our loyalty should be to the people this time, and not the government.

Uzbek and Hazara elements of the Northern Allinace rightfully fear reconcilliation and are obstacles to seeking political balance. I fear they too will lose it all in their effort to keep it all.

First, however, we must re-frame the problem. Our current framing is an unsustainable disaster. Most generals just don't get it, it is too far outside their training and experience, and certainly outside the mission they have been asked to perform and the parameters of what their commands are trained, organized and equipped to do. There are some exceptions obviously, certainly Nick Carter on the UK side is one, but even still, this is not a military mission and to make it one dooms us to failure.

carl

07-20-2011, 01:47 PM

Besides, if the eviction of AQ is still the main mission, no one can deliver that faster and more effectively than the Taliban.[/B][/I] That was true in 2001, and it is still true today. That is a fine point that really needs to be moved to the top of the buffer.

I don't think that is true at all. Mr. Bin Laden wasn't found in the heart of Talibanlandia. He was found in the heart of Pak Armystan. What may have been true in 2001 is not at all true today.

carl

07-20-2011, 02:04 PM

Finally...A sensible and aware objection that is quite valid. Good hit.

Well, you know what they say about a monkey and a typewriter, me being the monkey.

Dayuhan

07-20-2011, 10:26 PM

First, however, we must re-frame the problem. Our current framing is an unsustainable disaster.

I agree with that completely. I just don't think we are going to solve the problem by digging ourselves deeper into the hole.

We can't govern Afghanistan, and we don't want to. If Afghanistan is going to be governed by Afghans, we have to accept that they will govern their way, as their political culture determines. We cannot persuade or compel them to govern the way we think Afghanistan should be governed. Trying is a fool's errand that can only end in failure... and our failures, given our tendency not to acknowledge them, are often prolonged and very expensive.

Instead of trying to transform Afghanistan and Afghan governance, we could have simply taken up the specific, practical, and achievable goal of convincing all contending parties that the cost of attacking us or harboring those who do is too high to bear. Bit late for that now, of course...

carl

07-21-2011, 12:42 AM

Ken:

I understand the importance of doctrinal definitions to the military. But to the civilian, those make no difference. Military intervention, raid, tactical or strategic or whatever, it is the our forces going into a country or place and doing military things. The doctrinal fine points are lost on most people and mostly on me too.

I agree with all that in principle but the fact is that ANY military force is or should be a tool designed to be destructive. It is not a building tool.

True of course, but selectively destructive. And historically, military forces have often been used to build things, especially infrastructure.

Reference my statement "However, as I keep trying to point out to you, we will not -- indeed, we cannot -- do it 'right.' Ergo it's best not to do it.you said Oh? What's your basis for saying we can do it right? I'm quite curious to know when we did "it right" as I sure can't think of one off hand where a large US force was committed. When you come up with one, be sure it's a post WW II example, we could do it reasonably well prior to that, since then the bureaucracy and the "fpe" have destroyed our capability to successfully perform such operations; so name me one.

Don't go stacking the deck Ken, "Well tell me one time that worked between the hours of 10 and 2 on the second Wednesday of the month?" There are a few occasions in American history when things worked at 0900 every Monday. But let's pick one from after the conclusion of WWII, South Korea. We intervened in civil war and it worked out pretty good for several generations of South Koreans.

We can also pick one where we didn't intervene where I think we could have and should have, Rwanda. We suffered no hurt at all but 800,000 Rwandans did.

That's funny. What I propose is far more work and more dangerous with more risk that an intervention.

Then why on earth should we do it?

Strategic Raids do not have to be and should not be totally by air, those are ineffective. Nor should we attempt the big punitive ala Mexico 'raid' (that was not a raid BTW, it was a Punitive Expedition, it was not intended to strike one or a few targets and rapidly depart -- it was, in fact an intervention.... Small tailored ground forces air (or sea, location dependent) lifted in, quick strike and out.

Punitive expedition or raid or not, the Pershing adventure is the same thing to a civilian. Our forces went in and mucked about for a bit to no great purpose.

They got into this because I brought them in. They exist and are more competent and dangerous (and have more money) than AQ. The USSR never attacked New York either but they were a concern. Hezxbollah is also a concern, or efforts to disrupt AQ have been effective -- we have not done much to by, for or with Hezbollah.

That is because Hezbollah has not done much by, for or with us. They are Lebanese and interested in Lebanon and Israel. As of yet they are no great threat to us cause the don't want to be.

I suggest that the world has changed to an extent and you seem to have missed it. ;)

The world has changed. Human nature has not and won't so I don't think I missed anything.

All valid concerns. We should have improved our airlift capability in the 90s to include procuring stealthy insertion and extraction transports. We did not but we can. We do know that the Armed forces of the US have been only marginally successful in most of our recent operations and we do know the way we've been operating is part of the problem and that we must change. We also need to improve our strategic reach as the large bases are an Achilles heel for us that we should have foregone twenty years ago -- but Armed Forces change slowly... :mad:

There is no getting around physics. Without big bases nearby we can't put enough force in in a raid or anything else to do much of anything. Stealthy or not, any type of transport needs either a base nearby or beaucoup tanker support. Those tankers would need bases relatively close. In any event our tankers are on the verge of falling out of the sky and the replacements are still a program, not a flightline full of airplanes.

The only other option is a strike from the sea. But of course the target has to be close to the sea. That will still require big bases. Those ships can't sortie from San Diego. They will need big bases in the region unless we recreate the naval logistics train we created in WWII, which we won't do. And even then we would still need regional bases. And also the Navy is falling apart.

Most of the "fpe" wants to change minimally and many -- not all -- of them would indeed recoil at a bird or two getting downed (the obvious counter to that is to avoid it...). I disagree on the sensitivity to casualties. That too is a "fpe" mantra but most Americans will accept casualties provided they see some successes to counter that cost.

I agree partially on the casualty part. But the complicating factor is the airplane part. Americans are very sensitive to airplanes going down and especially aircrew getting captured. That would go double if say a C-17 was forced down and the whole crew and all the soldiers in the raiding party went into the bag.

I don't know about now or the future but you seem to espouse intervention or military action for social engineering or humanitarian purposes.

Social engineering not so much. Humanitarian purposes yes; but only if practicable and only if done with vigor. It was practicable in Rwanda, it isn't in Darfur.

Strategic raids are not the be-all and end-all, they are just another tool and should and can be only part of our military posture. They are hard for some of the reasons you've stated and others -- but they are moire effective and will be better suited to the next decade or so than will long, costly interventions. The bad news is that the feckless and lazy thing is to do the interventions, it's easier on the "fpe" and they sound like those folks mean well, they like that...

The effectiveness of strategic raids is neither here nor there if we can't physically do them. We can't physically do them unless we have big bases in the region to launch or support them from. We won't be able to maintain big bases in the region unless we dominate it which sort of leads us right back to where we are now.

Ken White

07-21-2011, 02:40 AM

I understand the importance of doctrinal definitions to the military. But to the civilian, those make no difference. Military intervention, raid, tactical or strategic or whatever, it is the our forces going into a country or place and doing military things. The doctrinal fine points are lost on most people and mostly on me too.The doctrinal fine points and the names aren't important -- what is actually done in that other country is very important. Long term stay versus short stay are understandable by most. Doing no harm as opposed to doing great harm are also fairly easily understood concepts. What works and does not work seems to be a slightly more difficult concept even though there's plenty of history out there about both sides of that...
True of course, but selectively destructive. And historically, military forces have often been used to build things, especially infrastructure.Poorly and inefficiently...

That's one of those world has changed things -- and yes, human nature, too -- pick and shovel work is not needed so much in current engineering and is not in the cards for today's armed forces; the kids hate manual labor. :D
... let's pick one from after the conclusion of WWII, South Korea. We intervened in civil war and it worked out pretty good for several generations of South Koreans.Here's where that definition stuff get into things. Did we intervene or did we join and assist one nation that had been invaded by another? That was not a civil warm it was a state on state conflict...

We stayed, not to nation build, do COIN or FID support which is what you seem to espouse, but because there was not an official end to that war between the two States, both of which still exist and both of which are still de jure at war. We stayed prepared to engage in combat operations if necessary -- not anywhere near an intervention for humanitarian or development purposes. South Korea pulled themselves up, we provided very little aid to that effort.

Got another one? You can go back further if you wiah, I was just trying to make it easy on you and relevant to today's social norms (human nature may not have changed much but those norms sure have).
We can also pick one where we didn't intervene where I think we could have and should have, Rwanda. We suffered no hurt at all but 800,000 Rwandans did.We can disagree totally on that one. Not one iota of US interest there. We would have 'intervened' halfheartedly, done a poor job and Clinton would've pulled out rapidly making it a fiasco of greater magnitude than it was. We quite likely would have done as much or more harm as good and almost certainly would have done the USA no favors.
Then why on earth should we do it?Because it is cheaper and far more effective than long term intervention. We can of course continue take that easier but eventually more expensive and invariably less effective route and continue to play by the opponents rules on his court but it seems sorta dumb to me. YMMV.
Punitive expedition or raid or not, the Pershing adventure is the same thing to a civilian. Our forces went in and mucked about for a bit to no great purpose.Okay, so regardless, you want an armed force to go in and muck about to no great purpose? Have you considered a job at CNAS? :wry:

The object is to go in to attack a limited objective, quickly and harshly and leave rapidly. That is done to avoid an open ended Mexico or Afghanistan like effort. I don't think any civilian has any difficulty with that concept unless they have an ideological bent which opposes that or espouses another sort of effort and thus they wish to deliberately conflate or confuse things.
That is because Hezbollah has not done much by, for or with us. They are Lebanese and interested in Lebanon and Israel. As of yet they are no great threat to us cause the don't want to be.That's what Clinton AND G.W. Bush thought about AQ...
The world has changed. Human nature has not and won't so I don't think I missed anything.We can differ on that as well. Human nature may be a constant but it has been overlaid with a veneer of mores and attitudes that I have difficulty recognizing and that my father wouldn't recognize. The nature may be in there but it's buried under stultifying norms.
There is no getting around physics...The only other option is a strike from the sea...And also the Navy is falling apart.Also on most all that. While much is now correct, there are ways...

As an aside, on the basing thing, our payments to and tolerance for the well known proclivities of the Pakistani Army and the ISI are not as much wishy washiness as it is that basing requirement. It may be a fact of physics -- but, geopolitically, it's a strait jacket and one that can and should be eliminated instead of encouraged.
Americans are very sensitive to airplanes going down and especially aircrew getting captured. That would go double if say a C-17 was forced down and the whole crew and all the soldiers in the raiding party went into the bag.And even on that. You're closer to right on that, particularly the bit about capture -- that is one major cultural shift (more for the Armed Forces than for the American populace...). I think its easily handled but acknowledge many will not agree. Won't know until it happens -- the American people in my observation are far more tolerant of casualties, captures and military misadventures than the Politicians and the Media seem to think.
Social engineering not so much. Humanitarian purposes yes; but only if practicable and only if done with vigor. It was practicable in Rwanda, it isn't in Darfur.After a brief partial agreement, we're back to disagreeing on Rwanda but can agree on Darfur -- probably for different reasons... ;)
The effectiveness of strategic raids is neither here nor there if we can't physically do them. We can't physically do them unless we have big bases in the region to launch or support them from. We won't be able to maintain big bases in the region unless we dominate it which sort of leads us right back to where we are now.We again disagree in part. What you say is true as far as is now publicly known. My belief is that need not remain true -- in fact I strongly believe it will not; we have the capability to remedy the shortfalls you identify, they've all been well known for years. We have deliberately chosen not to openly develop things in a head-in-the-sand risk averse effort to NOT do such raids and thus deny the Government that capability. The Armed Force may be able to keep that charade up a bit longer but I have a gut feeling that they won't be able to do that for long -- again, we'll have to wait and see.

carl

07-21-2011, 01:03 PM

That's one of those world has changed things -- and yes, human nature, too -- pick and shovel work is not needed so much in current engineering and is not in the cards for today's armed forces; the kids hate manual labor.

Got another one? You can go back further if you wiah, I was just trying to make it easy on you and relevant to today's social norms (human nature may not have changed much but those norms sure have).

Have you considered a job at CNAS? :wry:

Human nature hasn't changed. American mores have as you indicate. My observation on human nature has more to do with the people of the world. You can do an awful lot with a pick and shovel overseas and you will have lots of guys who want to swing them.

How about the Philippines? (I know you're expecting that and have a reply pre-printed.)

CNAS won't have me. I can't get through Clauswitz and didn't read Galula's second book. I keep thinking "What did Clauswitz have to say that Slim's SGT didn't and what is in the other book that isn't in The Village?"

Bob's World

07-21-2011, 03:42 PM

How we have defined this problem makes it appear like a long, dark tunnel with a very dim light at the far end, and no room to turn around even if we wanted to.

That is a self-imposed perception that fails virtually any logical test one might throw at it.

Of the two, Pakistan or Afghanistan, the stabilty of Pakistan is the more important to US interests.

To best stabilize Pakistan we need merely withdraw from our decades long intervention and occupation in Afghanistan; and cease or reframe the majority of our operations directed at AQ in both countries.

To avoid such a withdrawal from having tragic effects on the weaker segments of the Afghan populace in the Hazara and Uzbek communities who see a continuation of a Northern Alliance/GIRoA monopoly on governance as their best hope for a prosperous future; and the members of rural communities who have put faith in GIRoA and Coalition programs such as VSO; there must be some form of negotiated settlement between the various Taliban functions and GIRoA, complete with an external forcing function, left behind.

The end result may still be a Pashtu dominated Afghanistan, that is heavily influenced around the fringes by its neighbors. There is no denying that possibility. What is challengable, however, is the assumption that America and NATO would be placed at greater risk of AQ attack by that happening than they currently are.

Because of a very very tenuous "but what if" we commit ourselves to the certainty of an extremely unacceptable status quo reality. That is just not very smart. The alarmists will always be out there, but we do not have to give counsel to the fears they peddle.

Ken White

07-21-2011, 03:45 PM

It points out quite well that an Army can be misused to turn victory into defeat...;)
Human nature hasn't changed. American mores have as you indicate. My observation on human nature has more to do with the people of the world. You can do an awful lot with a pick and shovel overseas and you will have lots of guys who want to swing them.True on that last but I thought we were talking about the US Army and its operations / operating techniques. Americans can do pick and shovel work and will if pushed and the basic nature can reassert and give you a fully functional, thinking, independent human being -- but you've got to scrape off that veneer first and the Politicians will resist that to the death because they like that veneer and the complaisance and compliance it brings...
How about the Philippines? (I know you're expecting that and have a reply pre-printed.).My pre-printer's broke... :D

Philippines? Which time?

Today? Good pick -- note that it is low key and there is no introduction of major US Forces, only low key advice and assistance. It not an intervention, it is FID assistance which is beneficial. That is quite sensible and to be encouraged as much as large troop commitments should be discouraged. Good intel, diplomacy before crisis level is reached and low key military and development assistance are fine -- it's commitment of large bodies of troops that create more problems than they can solve. There's a secondary issue with the purpose of any intervention. They can vary but just have to pass the common sense ("Will this make things truly better or worse?"). If that answer cannot easily be determined, then with a small footprint there is far less risk of making things worse. A large footprint will almost invariably create problems that will force mission alterations that can go rapidly downhill. That is true of any force; it is particularly true of the US forces which are incredibly bureaucratic and ponderous while being aggressive -- a very bad combination that militates (pun intended) against the flexibility and skills required to properly conduct most operations other than war. We can do it, we'll rarely if ever do it right or well simply because we can't.

Post WW II? No real intervention there, no troop commitment.

Post the Battle of Manila Bay in 1898 ? That was not an intervention by any definition, it was the seizure of a nation to colonize it. It involved a war with the then Colonial power and their ejection, running into a full scale war with local nationals and only later became a sort of 'intervention' of the COIN / FID sort -- not too humanitarianly oriented, though (yet another reason for my post WW II restriction earlier; human nature may not have changed but what's broadly acceptable in treatment of others and the limits of engagement capabilities therefrom descending sure have...).

The Philippine War started off not as an intervention but as a full scale, nominally declared war; the issue being viability of a free and independent Philippine state. The stupidity and aggressiveness of the US Army contributed to that war in spite of orders from DC to avoid it (shades of I-Rak...). It was conducted as a mid intensity war initially, with real atrocities on both sides and officially ending in 1902. Our use of segregation and concentration camps plus some of the rather harsh tactics enabled that 'win' and then, the 'war' thus won, things descended into a low grade insurgency which lasted over ten additional years.

I doubt conditions today will lend themselves to a US 'intervention' that effectively runs out a ruling or colonizing nation, takes on the citizens of the country involved in a 'war' that ranges between mid intensity combat and low grade insurgency for thee years and kills about 30K+ members of that nations forces plus over 200K civilians. If it then devolves into a low order insurgency for ten more years with still more deaths and atrocities, I can picture the NYT headlines...:D

I'll acknowledge that particular War and Insurrection did not lend themselves to strategic raids as an alternative. One cannot seize another nation with strategic raids (fortunately, there isn't much call for such seizures on the horizon), however I also do not think it can be classed as an intervention of the type we are discussing. If one wishes to call it that, one can but one should then acknowledge that it took 13 years or so and caused a lot of casualties -- expensive for results achieved IMO -- and that it was a classic example of 'mission creep' that is almost inevitable with commitment of a military force into another nation where some object to that presence. As for its 'success' -- that's problematic, arguable and up to each person to assess (Would the Philippines have better progressed without US presence? We cannot know, the US was there) but there is no question that the overall cost-benefit ratio was quite bad.
CNAS won't have me. I can't get through Clauswitz and didn't read Galula's second book. I keep thinking "What did Clauswitz have to say that Slim's SGT didn't and what is in the other book that isn't in The Village?"A bit in both cases. Those books aren't at odds, they complement each other. Every war is different.

The folks at CNAS have probably read most all those. Problem is that they seem to have cherry picked them to get the tropes they want and ignored the rest , a rather natural human tendency... :wry:

Infanteer

08-04-2011, 06:27 PM

What we need is a strong Afghan ruler, in the mold of Hussein or Gaddaffi, or Stalin...

Karzai could probably be strong, but we hamstring him with our Western civility. If you look at the long line of Pasthuns who have ruled from Kabul, none have ever ruled by winning the hearts and minds of their unruly cousins in the South....

Moderator's Note: a number of the following posts appeared on the thread The UK in Afghanistan and were moved 7th August 2011 to this more appropriate, general thread on Afghanistan.

ganulv

08-04-2011, 07:57 PM

Karzai could probably be strong

The bipolar issue is a bit Cromwellian, I suppose.

but we hamstring him with our Western civility.

Not necessarily untrue, but I do think there is a ton of crosstalk when words like ‘civility’ and ‘brutality’ are used in a cross-cultural context. The rulebook in the contemporary Western world is certainly different than in Central Asia and the Middle East. What is happening in Syria right now seems pretty sickening to most Western sensibilities, and I think not just because of the carnage involved but because most Westerners are of a mind not so much that carnage is always unacceptable but rather that carnage done in that particular fashion is always unacceptable. That seems fine to me so long as Westerners do not pat themselves too hard on the back about not perpetrating brutality (and I am not suggesting that you are doing that in the above post, Infanteer). As someone who has lived in a place where people went to bed at night with a justifiable fear that men dressed in black might break down their doors and drag them away to a hole in the ground before daybreak I do not care for the way night raids in Iraq and Afghanistan are consistently portrayed as benign technical affairs (http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2011/06/actually-special-ops-night-raids-are-rather-gentle/) to the American public. Which is not to say that there is no argument to be made for such a strategy, just that Westerners should make an effort to face up to the fact that their chunk of the world is in on nasty things, too.

In Middle America the boogeyman is a Muslim wearing a bomb vest; in rural Afghanistan he is a Christian with a SCAR. If the residents of both places were able to take seriously that each others’ fears are legitimate we all might be in a better place. Don’t mean to drag the thread off topic; climbing off my soapbox now.

JMA

08-06-2011, 03:58 PM

What we need is a strong Afghan ruler, in the mold of Hussein or Gaddaffi, or Stalin...

The US had one in Egypt and see what happened to him. ;)

Seriously though the Edward Luttwak (http://www.harpers.org/archive/2007/02/0081384) perspective is just about right... that is why the West can't win in Afghanistan.

TDB

08-06-2011, 05:25 PM

The US had one in Egypt and see what happened to him. ;)

Seriously though the Edward Luttwak (http://www.harpers.org/archive/2007/02/0081384) perspective is just about right... that is why the West can't win in Afghanistan.

He seems to be suggesting a carrot and stick method to COIN. Well that throws up a few issues, our western liberal ideas would not permit out soldiers to carry the stick. I would search for it but lack the energy, a few years ago footage emerged of British soldiers beating Iraqi youths who had thrown stones at them and had been rioting at the same time shots were fired at said British troops. This didn't go down too well on the homefront, in an age of 254 hour rolling media and wikileaks such stick methods would get out. Of course it can be said that this wouldn't matter if the method achieved results. I'm sceptical of this, i feel that having seen how Afghan public opinion turned swiftly against an abusive Afghan government and security apparatus, then the result would be the same.

Bob's World

08-06-2011, 06:26 PM

Afghanistan needs a strong ruler who is picked by Afghans for Afghans, in a system not shaped or manipulated by outsiders.

They actually had that in Mullah Omar, but we didn't like the fact that he refused to violate Pashtunwali and give us AQ as we demanded. I suspect he had no idea how serious we were, and I am sure we had no appreciation for how important Pashtunwali is either. A tragic failure to communicate.

Stability demands reconciliation, but reconciliation currently demands swearing an oath of loyalty to the current constitution and is denied entirely by those deemed to be "beyond the pale". I cannot help but think of a similar offer made to Josey Wales and his fellow guerrillas in that Clint Eastwood classic.

The best thing the west could do to get a strong leader in Afghanistan is leave. If what we have created there is sustainable it will endure. If it is not it will evolve or be replaced. Then we must have the humility and honor to work with whomever emerges and whatever form of government these people opt to create for themselves. If they saw value in what we have been selling these past 10 years, they will retain those aspects they liked all on their own. It won't look like what Western politicians and diplomats would want, but then, it isn't their call.

JMA

08-06-2011, 07:41 PM

Afghanistan needs a strong ruler who is picked by Afghans for Afghans, in a system not shaped or manipulated by outsiders.

Bob, just how was Mullah Omar 'picked' by Afghans?

JMA

08-06-2011, 07:52 PM

He seems to be suggesting a carrot and stick method to COIN. Well that throws up a few issues, our western liberal ideas would not permit out soldiers to carry the stick. I would search for it but lack the energy, a few years ago footage emerged of British soldiers beating Iraqi youths who had thrown stones at them and had been rioting at the same time shots were fired at said British troops. This didn't go down too well on the homefront, in an age of 254 hour rolling media and wikileaks such stick methods would get out. Of course it can be said that this wouldn't matter if the method achieved results. I'm sceptical of this, i feel that having seen how Afghan public opinion turned swiftly against an abusive Afghan government and security apparatus, then the result would be the same.

The moral of this story is that you can't win an insurgency by throwing money at the population while the insurgents execute anyone and everyone who 'cooperates' with you.

The 'war' was won in 2001 and that's when the US should have exited with the warning that if you let AQ back and start the poppy nonsense again we will be back with more of the same. But some smart guys had another plan...

Bob's World

08-06-2011, 10:08 PM

Bob, just how was Mullah Omar 'picked' by Afghans?

That was an internal transition when the Taliban ran off the government that the Soviets had put in place. Sure, Pakistan supported that play, nothing is ever simple, but I don't think Pakistan was nearly as prescriptive as the various European/Western interlopers have been.

Just because sometimes a populace has to use bullets rather than ballots to elevate a government of their own over one imposed upon them, does not mean it is not a popular decision. Afther all, it is a much more significant commitment to self-determination to join a revolution than it is to drive down to the local fire station and cast a vote.

Bill Moore

08-06-2011, 10:18 PM

I don't think Pakistan was nearly as prescriptive as the various European/Western interlopers have been.

I think the above comment is debatable. The radicalization of the Taliban happened in Pakistan under the guidance of the ISI, and the Taliban still answered to the ISI when they took over Afghanistan. The Taliban didn't wage a successful insurgency, they waged conventional warfare against the Soviet installed/supported (though not supported much) government in Kabul. While the Soviet installed government was largely ineffective and the people of Afghanistan initially welcomed the Taliban victory (not sure what percentage welcomed their victory), they soon realized they just replaced one devil for another. The Taliban was not installed by the Afghan people, they were not legitimate political rulers, they were simply winners, and they won due to the support they received from Pakistan (and maybe the U.S.).

Fuchs

08-06-2011, 10:44 PM

I didn't check any books, but I think you two miss a big part in your timeline.

The Taliban did not oust the socialist government (which happened in '92 iirc), but the "Mujaheddin" warlords (Hekmatyar etc) who proceeded to have so much infighting that their conflict left more ruins in Kabul than the whole 79-92 conflict phase.

Bob's World

08-06-2011, 10:54 PM

Well, I for one find the whole "radicalization" position to be just one more excuse governments make to shift responsibility for their own problems onto some convenient foil. Nothing radicalizes a populace to action more than the actions and policies of the government in question. Period.

As to percentages, when does any leader have a mandate? American Presidents of late are lucky to have 50% of the populace behind them.

To be clear, I am not advocating that Omar was democratically elected; I am making the point that he rose to power in a process of self-determination that evicted a govenrment that lacked local legitimacy because it was formed and protected by the Soviets.

I suspect that sadly, unless someone has a major strategic wake-up call regarding our current approach to Afghanistan, that 10 years from now there will similarly be a process of violent self-determination to remove the GIRoA gang that was elevated to power and protected by the US and the Coalition. Nature has a way of seeking balance when it is disrupted once that disruption is removed.

Fuchs

08-07-2011, 12:02 AM

You shouldn't bring rule of force and legitimacy so close to each other. It's badly misleading.

Dayuhan

08-07-2011, 12:17 AM

I suspect that sadly, unless someone has a major strategic wake-up call regarding our current approach to Afghanistan, that 10 years from now there will similarly be a process of violent self-determination to remove the GIRoA gang that was elevated to power and protected by the US and the Coalition.

That process is already going on, isn't it? I'm not sure how much "self-determination" is involved, though. More like determination by whoever has the most armed men in any given place at any given time. I think we may overrate the degree to which the populace will determine who wins. The various portions of the populace will most likely try to stay alive, and side with whoever they think is going to advance - or least damage - their interests. Generally that means siding with whoever they think is going to win.

I personally don't think changing our approach is going to make much difference. We're coming up against limits to our capacity, not limits to our approach. Afghans will govern as Afghans govern. We can't change that. If we aren't going to govern the place ourselves, we have to accept that it will be governed in the Afghan way. We can't force the GIRoA to govern as we think they should, and we can't force either the GIRoA or the Taliban to reconcile and cooperate.

We did have the option, once upon a time, of accepting that our capacity to shape Afghanistan is limited and selecting a similarly limited objective. We could have simply set out to convince everybody in the place that no matter who came to power, attacking us or sheltering those who do is a bad idea with adverse consequences drastically exceeding the benefits. We'd have had a quite reasonable chance of accomplishing that. Instead, we let the mission creep on to "installing democracy"... something that we will someday understand that we cannot do.

If we fail to achieve the objective of reshaping Afghan governance - and I suspect that we will fail - it will not be because we took the wrong approach or used the wrong tactics. It will be because we selected an objective that is out of proportion to our capacity and to the resources we're prepared to commit.

We dug ourselves into this hole when we decided to dictate how Afghanistan should be governed. It's a difficult hole to get out of. I don't think digging deeper - meaning further attempts to shape Afghan governance to suit our objectives - is going to help.

ganulv

08-07-2011, 12:28 AM

You shouldn't bring rule of force and legitimacy so close to each other. It's badly misleading.

Just a guess based mostly on what I have read of Habermas’s work (all of it in English), but the concept of legitimacy seems to play a far greater role in German discourse than it does in the U.S. So the word ‘legitimacy’ might have a more precise or perhaps just a different meaning for you than it would for an American using the term. Again, just a guess.

Bill Moore

08-07-2011, 12:42 AM

Posted by Fuchs

The Taliban did not oust the socialist government (which happened in '92 iirc), but the "Mujaheddin" warlords (Hekmatyar etc) who proceeded to have so much infighting that their conflict left more ruins in Kabul than the whole 79-92 conflict phase.

Yes, there was a dark ages period after the fall of the USSR established government for 3-4 years or so before the Taliban established control. I suspect with high confidence that Pakistan played a role in Afghanistan's affairs prior to pushing the Taliban across the border, but at this point (at least on my part) it is largely conjecture.

but the "Mujaheddin" warlords (Hekmatyar etc) who proceeded to have so much infighting that their conflict left more ruins in Kabul than the whole 79-92 conflict phase.

This is a point we all need to remember and why abandoning Afghanistan completely could be a humanitarian disaster. We can downsize considerably without pulling the rug from underneath the people there by still providing some military and economic support.

Bob's World

08-07-2011, 01:20 AM

Ok, yes, my mistake on the timeline, and I made an incorrect assertion because of that.

The major point I was attempting to make, however, is one that we need to stop for a minute and think about. If, internal to a country, be it by force, or ballot, or whatever, a government forms free from external manipulations it is superior to any government created by such external manipulations, regardless of what form that externally created government might take.

If we would have satisfied ourselves by conducting a strategic raid, such as Ken White often advocates here, and either gone home, or simply focused on the hot pursuit of AQ out at the few Special Ops bases without trying to solve all of Afghanistan's problems back in the rear, we would have been fine. And Afghanistan would be more stable today that it is as a result of our well intended meddling to create a government that suited us, led by the man who suited us.

I find fascinating parallels to this as I read Rufus Phillip's excellent book "Why Vietnam Matters." There too we over engaged early to shape things politically to what we felt were best from our perspective, and there too we also reached in and manipulated the constitution to suit us. Diem started off as a man with tremendous potential, but then we manipulated things so heavily around him he soon lost his path and his window of opportunity to make a viable competitor to what Ho and the North were offering. So too in Afghanistan with Karzai. Both could have been the men to lead their people to a brighter future, and both were sidelined in that mission by well intended, but highly manipulative actions by the US to shape things to be what we thought were best for us.

We need to learn to let people figure it out for themselves, and to then be willing to work with what emerges and to stop trying to control things. People will much more gladly accept government that is not very effective if it is their own, than government that is highly effective if it is forced upon them by someone else.

When we overly protect and promote some leader we bury them in the absolute power of our support. And we all know what absolute power does...

Bill Moore

08-07-2011, 05:47 AM

Bob, those are good points, and obviously more in focus in hindsight. I'm currently reading "Thinking in Time" and found the authors' comments discussing the difference between developing plans based on advocacy and plans based on real analysis.

We have strong advocates pushing the global COIN/nation building agenda with little to no analysis on how they reached this policy recommendation. I can't help but to think of the damage groups like CNAS have created over the years by pushing (advocating) half baked ideas disguised as analysis.

Only half way through the book, but one of the implied lessons is stop, think, and think again before deciding to take action. Much easier said than done when you have humans making decisions. Maybe if we had Vulcans like Mr. Spock from Star Track in all key positions we could make more logical decisions?:D

JMA

08-07-2011, 09:06 AM

Just because sometimes a populace has to use bullets rather than ballots to elevate a government of their own over one imposed upon them, does not mean it is not a popular decision. Afther all, it is a much more significant commitment to self-determination to join a revolution than it is to drive down to the local fire station and cast a vote.

Bob, it is always about how to accurately gauge the wishes of the people. Stalin, Asaad, Saddam, Gaddaffi, Mugabe, you name them all claimed to be the legitimate and sole representatives of the people.

I'm not sure when the US drifted into the 'everything is negotiable' mode but I suggest that is the source of the current US global weakness.

I accept that the recognition of the Saudi Kingdom is based on oil, I accept that the recognition of China is based on the fact that China owns the US and so on.

But by what stretch of logic does accepting and tolerating the worlds largest drug operation in Afghanistan take?

By what stretch of logic does applying military force to maintain a corrupt and illegitimate Karzai government in power?

Now there are many trying to stretch logic to justify walking away from Afghanistan and leaving it to slide back into its medieval iron-age existence by applying some barely believable spin.

Bob, Afghanistan (post the 2001 bombing campaign) was a class 1 cock-up. It is better to admit so and withdraw like the Soviets did rather than wait around to be bled dry and soundly humiliated.

Dayuhan

08-07-2011, 10:26 AM

I'm not sure when the US drifted into the 'everything is negotiable' mode but I suggest that is the source of the current US global weakness...

But by what stretch of logic does accepting and tolerating the worlds largest drug operation in Afghanistan take?

We must have drifted into "everything is negotiable" mode a long time ago, then, because I don't recall any American objections when the British Empire was running probably the largest and most successful opium dealing operation in history.

More recently I seem to recall the US providing money and arms to a bunch of coke dealers in hopes they'd overthrow o government of Nicaragua that we didn't much care for.

When exactly was this mystical time when everything wasn't negotiable?

davidbfpo

08-07-2011, 10:49 AM

Bill,

You posted:
I'm currently reading "Thinking in Time" and found the authors' comments discussing the difference between developing plans based on advocacy and plans based on real analysis.

Not heard of the book, I assume it is 'Thinking in Time:The Uses of History for Decision-Makers' by Richard E. Neustadt and Ernest R. May? Pub. 1986 and a FP review:http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/40907/gaddis-smith/thinking-in-time-the-uses-of-history-for-decision-makers

davidbfpo

08-07-2011, 10:54 AM

Moderator's Note

I have moved many of the recent posts to this thread, from The UK in Afghanistan, as it is a far better place for them.

Meantime carry on. Yes, I cannot alter the post's title.

JMA

08-07-2011, 01:45 PM

We must have drifted into "everything is negotiable" mode a long time ago, then, because I don't recall any American objections when the British Empire was running probably the largest and most successful opium dealing operation in history.

More recently I seem to recall the US providing money and arms to a bunch of coke dealers in hopes they'd overthrow o government of Nicaragua that we didn't much care for.

When exactly was this mystical time when everything wasn't negotiable?

Are you for real?

Everyone knows about Perfidious Albion (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Perfidious_Albion). They did it for Empire.

...at least they never railed on and on about ethics, integrity, honesty, honour, truth, justice, morality etc. etc. while they were swimming at the bottom of the cesspool with the scum of the earth.

Dayuhan

08-08-2011, 12:24 AM

They did it for Empire.

They did it for money, like all drug dealers.

But again, when exactly was this mystical period when everything wasn't negotiable?

JMA

08-08-2011, 06:31 AM

They did it for money, like all drug dealers.

But again, when exactly was this mystical period when everything wasn't negotiable?

No, I'm not following you into a school yard argument.

My point is simple, and that is today everything is negotiable. Specifically the following:

"ethics, integrity, honesty, honour, truth, justice, morality"

This is the state of play today and the who, what, when and where of the past (while maybe interesting to some) does not alter this fact (even if some try to use the past to justify the present ;) )

Dayuhan

08-08-2011, 06:49 AM

You made specific reference to "when the US drifted into the 'everything is negotiable' mode". That suggests pretty strongly that you think there was a time when some other mode applied. I don't think there was one, and I can't think of any time, anywhere, when any nation has ever tried to build a foreign policy around "ethics, integrity, honesty, honour, truth, justice, morality", negotiable or otherwise.

Why lament the passing of a fantasy that never existed... and why try to attribute today's problems to a drift out of a state we were never in?

Fuchs

08-08-2011, 07:00 AM

There was a time when the U.S. did not negotiate about things concerning expansion of the Soviet's influence, for example.

Even today not everything is negotiable. To discuss along this extreme idea that everything is negotiable is misleading and fruitless. You better focus on the original theme; the readiness to do business with dictators.

That, btw, was always there - and it should be. There's no reason why a nation should refuse a win-win negotiation with a dictator if it doesn't compromise its own rules.

JMA

08-08-2011, 07:46 AM

jmm99

08-08-2011, 05:13 PM

that is, subject to the process of negotiations - but, not everything is agreeable or even acceptable - WRT to the end result of that process.

Regards

Mike

AdamG

08-25-2011, 11:38 PM

audible farting has been banned for some Marines downrange because it offends the Afghans.
http://militarytimes.com/blogs/battle-rattle/2011/08/23/for-marines-in-afghanistan-be-careful-where-you-fart/

taabistan

08-26-2011, 06:29 AM

I had the opportunity to go to Kabul for two weeks, and spent some time speaking with my friend General Wardak and some of the ISAF/NATO commanders.

It seems to me that the military leaders are very apprehensive of a draw down of the military, even though most civilian experts (Andrew Wilder, Rory Stewart, Michael Semple and myself) have been advocating it for years. They believe they are making progress and the changes by Obama to be detrimental to that "success."

What do the posters think of the proposition of having between 10,000-20,000 Special Forces and nothing more in the country, a reduction in foreign aid to curb corruption and promote patient re-building, and a larger civilian presence (diplomats) that will engage in negotiations and treaties with the Taliban?

davidbfpo

08-26-2011, 09:38 AM

Taabistan asked:
What do the posters think of the proposition of having between 10,000-20,000 Special Forces and nothing more in the country, a reduction in foreign aid to curb corruption and promote patient re-building, and a larger civilian presence (diplomats) that will engage in negotiations and treaties with the Taliban?

Sounds good is my first reaction. Then I thought what are the objectives? Is it in very short summary: keep AQ out of Afghanistan or build a 'new' Afghanistan?

From my faraway "armchair" your 'Four Points' suits keep AQ out. Cost benefit analysis when applied needs to factor in political sustainability at home and the financial cost. The way your plan is presented will differ which side of the Atlantic Ocean you are.

Foreign aid needs to be greatly reduced either way; the more one learns about Afghan ways the less I want to pay for it. As for more civilians that is fanciful, as proven already by the difficulties in getting them in country, let alone out of Kabul and compounds.

My understanding is that Afghans prefer their own ways an outsiders can only nudge them along. My expectation is that a smaller military presence (even smaller than 10-20k SOF), less aid, fewer civilians and less nudging would suit Afghans across the country.

Finally I do not want to see the UK, let alone the West & allies, in Afghanistan in such a format in five years time (max).

Ken White

08-26-2011, 04:15 PM

While I too am writing from an armchair far removed and have not served in Afghanistan, I have talked and do talk with those who have and are there now. Based on my own small knowledge of the US, its Army and the events in Afghanistan as well the words of those to whom I talk, it strikes me that this from Taabistan:
It seems to me that the military leaders are very apprehensive of a draw down of the military, even though most civilian experts (Andrew Wilder, Rory Stewart, Michael Semple and myself) have been advocating it for years. They believe they are making progress and the changes by Obama to be detrimental to that "success."is quite likely far more indicative of the US military 'Can-Do' attitude, a reluctance to admit lack of success and concern over impending budget cuts than it is a valid military assessment -- or, far more importantly, a valid political assessment...

The sensing I get from folks on the ground is that most units are doing a little good but the bulk of contacts that achieve much real success in any measure are by the SOF elements, the rest are there, doing their best under poor circumstances. Those include but aren't limited to the short tour length, poor rotation plans, excessive force protection efforts all affected by the foolishly announced draw down and departure 'time table' and the known poor political effort that bizarrely envisioned making Afghanistan into a unitary modern state in a short time -- an effort doomed before it started.

One gets a sensing the Troops are doing what's asked of them to the best of their ability (significant training shortfalls considered) but that in far too many cases, the wrong things have been and are being asked. That means a lot of Marines and Soldiers are being frittered and misused.

To what purpose?

All that said, IMO the potential for "a reduction in foreign aid to curb corruption and promote patient re-building, and a larger civilian presence (diplomats) that will engage in negotiations and treaties with the Taliban?" is not likely to be a significant improvement. Slight, yes -- but no major change in trajectory.

"Rebuilding Afghanistan" is a great example of the dictum "be careful what you want; you may get it..." :(

Fuchs

08-26-2011, 04:20 PM

That "Taabistan" proposal is pretty much the "CT" scenario that Biden was said to have favoured while Obama bought into the "surge" thing?

Bob's World

08-26-2011, 04:46 PM

For US interests pure CT probably works, so long as we back off from targeting nationalist insurgents and focus solely on AQ leadership and the foreign fighters they bring in.

GIRoA's interests are adequately served by the stalemate we are in currently, particularly as it assures our continued presence to both protect them and bring in large sums of money. If GIRoA wanted to resolve the insurgency they would embrace reconciliation and work this out. In listening to a former senior Afghan security official a few days ago he was quickly able to list the handful of tribes from which the bulk of the insurgency comes from, and equally quick to accuse the Coalition for not understanding this and addressing the problem.

I thought, gee, that is really your problem, not ours, and why is it that GIRoA has not reached out to achieve a reconciliation with the leadership of those few tribes? Simple answer is that that would require a Northern Alliance-based government to share what, with Coalition protection, it need not share. So long as we stay it is not in their interest to resolve this. As soon as we depart it is.

This is not a "war" that we must either "win" or "lose" and we do ourselves a disservice when we couch it in such terms. This is merely one node of a much larger problem that we are supposed to be dealing with, best that we put it in the proper perspective sooner rather than later...

JMA

08-26-2011, 04:58 PM

From my faraway "armchair" your 'Four Points' suits keep AQ out.

We know how to prevent AQ being allowed into the country by any future Afghan government. As in the promise of a repeat of the first phase of Operation Enduring Freedom in 2001. No need for any special forces in the meantime.

The message should be clear. No AQ and no opium... or we bomb you out of business... again.

JMA

08-26-2011, 05:04 PM

... most units are doing a little good but the bulk of contacts that achieve much real success in any measure are by the SOF elements, the rest are there, doing their best under poor circumstances. Those include but aren't limited to the short tour length, poor rotation plans, excessive force protection efforts all affected by the foolishly announced draw down and departure 'time table' and the known poor political effort that bizarrely envisioned making Afghanistan into a unitary modern state in a short time -- an effort doomed before it started.

That pretty much sums it up.

TDB

08-26-2011, 09:20 PM

I think the interesting thing about the COIN Vs CT argument is that CT is inherently selfish, we are deploying the smallest force to simply conduct kill or capture missions, along with training mainly Afghan Special Forces to carry out the role foreign Special Forces were. Now we have to accept that in terms of COIN such kill or capture missions have been extremely negetive, creating anger amongst communities falsely targeted etc. CT it seems is only sticking your finger in the dyke (and even then not stemming the flow of torrent enough), in other word the reasons behind the growing insurgency which is mainly discontent within the Afghan population toward an inept and corrupt Afghan government is still there. Unless we do something to tackle this, COIN or whatever then all hell will break lose once we've gone. Of course there is always the option we arm the Afghan government to the teeth and create another dictatorship, Karzai isn't far off as it is.

Bill Moore

08-26-2011, 10:08 PM

Posted by TDB,

COIN Vs CT argument is that CT is inherently selfish

So? Exactly whose dollars and son's lives do you plan to be generous with if it doesn't serve our national interests?

in other word the reasons behind the growing insurgency which is mainly discontent within the Afghan population toward an inept and corrupt Afghan government is still there. Unless we do something to tackle this, COIN or whatever then all hell will break lose once we've gone.

Why are we concerned with the Afghan's internal insurgency? The fact that all hell was going to break lose wasn't missed by the regional experts, but it was ignored by the policy makers who decided to transform Afghanistan into a viable nation-state and not having a plan nor the resources to do so, assuming this is even possible. I'm not sure why "we" have to do something about this, or self interests are Al Qaeda and while there are some links between AQ and the insurgency they are not strong and the marriage of convenience won't last long if the cost of retaining the relationship is unacceptable.

option we arm the Afghan government to the teeth and create another dictatorship, Karzai isn't far off as it is.

There is the "we" again, why can't the Afghan people determine their own future? That is what an insurgency is all about.

120mm

08-27-2011, 10:30 AM

I think Ken has an accurate assessment of where we are.

Bob's World: Unfortunately, Petraeus decided he could kill his way out of this, and part of that has been allowing various ethnic groups to settle old scores by using or SOF troops to target their enemies.

Bill: I wouldn't use "selfish". I'd use "short-sighted". If you're ok with the US acting as a rogue state, randomly killing anyone in the world who displeases us, I guess CT is just fine. Sooner or later, the world will decide to put us down like a rabid dog, and frankly, they would be right to do so.

The underlying problem, is that AQ in Afghanistan and the Taliban were created by America, when it decided to exploit Afghans to bog down and ultimately destroy the Soviet Union using their country/sons and then discarding them when we were finished. If you LIKE the idea of the US being the modern equivalent of Nazi Germany on steroids, fine. Personally, I think that lack of ethics will bite us in the rear, again.

TDB

08-27-2011, 10:53 AM

Posted by TDB,

So? Exactly whose dollars and son's lives do you plan to be generous with if it doesn't serve our national interests?

Why are we concerned with the Afghan's internal insurgency? The fact that all hell was going to break lose wasn't missed by the regional experts, but it was ignored by the policy makers who decided to transform Afghanistan into a viable nation-state and not having a plan nor the resources to do so, assuming this is even possible. I'm not sure why "we" have to do something about this, or self interests are Al Qaeda and while there are some links between AQ and the insurgency they are not strong and the marriage of convenience won't last long if the cost of retaining the relationship is unacceptable.

There is the "we" again, why can't the Afghan people determine their own future? That is what an insurgency is all about.

Well the decision was made by the Bush administration when deciding to invade. Entering a country which was already in a mess, removing what little form of government there was and hoping everyone would suddenly realise they were free, put on suits and go and work in an officer. Hyperbole aside. If you make the decision to invade a country, then make the decision to put in place a government which will prevent terrorist from training in it, then you need to put the work in and make sure it works. Now I'm not going to say that the life of an Afghan civilian in 20 years time is worth more than a 19 year old soldier now. It pains me to hear the news that another British soldier has been killed. My point was not from an emotional stand point, it was from pratical stand point. The insurgency is of America's making, yes pointing the finger at the U.S. Going into a country with no idea of social/tribal/ethnic schisms, the way power is handled. This followed up by years of blundering by ISAF created the beast. The international community made the Taliban's job a hell of a lot easier.

As for national interest, staying away from the fuzzy idea that the whole world should just get along and someone has to slap people on the wrist when they fall out. Obama himself has talked about regional security, the situation is rapidly turning into one which resembles a failed state (not that I like using the term), IF (big if) when ISAF/US leave the GoIRA/ANA/ANP cannot cope and the Taliban return to power and decide to carry out their plans for a greater Pashtunistan in the FATA/NWFP I can't see India sitting idly by. This is pure speculation, but we know that both countries have an interest in Afghanistan due to their "cold war". Then there is the assent of China, involved in construction project in Afghanistan, tell that isn't in America's national interest. My point is that what goes on in Afghanistan is very much in the U.S national interest, it may not be in the interest of the voter, but when have the two been mutually exclusive.

Now, I'm not saying that we should carrying on with the "COIN" strategy in Afghanistan, because lets face it, it isn't COIN. In terms of blood and treasure, we could deffinitely see a reduction in the coist in blood if we implemented something more in line with what some of the Small Wars contributors perscribe.

Please do not, for one moment believe that I care nothing for the lives of service men and women. I do very much, having several close friends who have served in Afghanistan, the gut wrenching moment when a death is announced and the gap between that and the official naming is awful.

Infanteer

08-27-2011, 01:58 PM

The underlying problem, is that AQ in Afghanistan and the Taliban were created by America, when it decided to exploit Afghans to bog down and ultimately destroy the Soviet Union using their country/sons and then discarding them when we were finished. If you LIKE the idea of the US being the modern equivalent of Nazi Germany on steroids, fine. Personally, I think that lack of ethics will bite us in the rear, again.

How so? AQ wasn't around until after the Soviet Union had disappeared; it's predecessor Makhtab al Khadamat never recieved a dime from the U.S.

The Taliban are also a post anti-Soviet Jihad creation; an organization fuelled by Pakistan's flirtation with islamist policies to help fight in the Kashmir. The Taliban were an outcome of traditional Afghan warlord politics.

To say that AQ and the Taliban are second-order effects of U.S. dealing with South-East and South Asian dictators like the House of Saud, Mubarak and Zia-al-Haq would be fairly accurate. To say that the AQ and the Taliban are consequences of a new "Nazi Germany"'s direct intervention in Afghanistan is rubbish.

bumperplate

08-27-2011, 08:19 PM

TDB

08-27-2011, 10:44 PM

While this is not the best of statements to make, I have to say, I believe there are a lot of people in uniform that are still looking for a fight. Not sure if it's a "warrior ethos" thing or that many have gotten used to it or that many feel they still need to go out onto the battlefield and prove themselves or re-prove themselves as warfighters and leaders of warfighters.

Based on this thread, not sure if any form of victory is going to be declared or realized for OEF. Still not really sure about Iraq either. If OIF & OEF are going to shut down, where is the next war?

If we don't bring both theaters to a palatable conclusion, we are going to suffer some of the same ills suffered after Vietnam, with a lot of veterans wholly disappointed and left feeling as their deeds were meaningless. If that happens and it's back to garrison 24/7, it's going to get ugly. Discipline problems are going to go sky high, people leaving the service are going to take their combat experience and expertise with them, and the garri-troopers will be left running the show, once again.

Interesting dynamic and I truly hope that whatever we end up with in both these theaters is either victory or the best substitution for it - and that we are not left being lead by garrison leaders, but rather by combat leaders with true visionary skills, not management skills.

The issue with your notion of combat leaders is that it requires constant combat to teach junior officers how to lead in combat so they can be promoted in what the continuous turn over through the ranks. This has been a problem during the current conflict, high rankers with little or (more likely) no combat experience. This will however be an ever present threat in the mordern age.

Regarding your point about a vietnam-type syndrome, I fear we are alread feeling its effect. The UK is not immune to this, we experienced it after the Falklands and Op Banner in Northern Ireland. We are having soldiers return with extreme mental anguish ans PTST with very little established to deal with them. I believe it is the same situation in the States, this is an issue, though I believe that unlike in Vietnam the general concensus is "bring our boys home" so they don't die as opposed to "stop bombing vietnam". We haven't had that My Lai moment and I hope we won't. Public opinion is not against the soldiers but rather the cost in blood and treasure. Bringing the conflicts to a preferable end may act in a cathartic way for those who served, I'd rather it create a situation where further intervention is not required.

Bill Moore

08-27-2011, 10:55 PM

TDB posted:

As for national interest, staying away from the fuzzy idea that the whole world should just get along and someone has to slap people on the wrist when they fall out. Obama himself has talked about regional security, the situation is rapidly turning into one which resembles a failed state (not that I like using the term), IF (big if) when ISAF/US leave the GoIRA/ANA/ANP cannot cope and the Taliban return to power and decide to carry out their plans for a greater Pashtunistan in the FATA/NWFP I can't see India sitting idly by. This is pure speculation, but we know that both countries have an interest in Afghanistan due to their "cold war". Then there is the assent of China, involved in construction project in Afghanistan, tell that isn't in America's national interest. My point is that what goes on in Afghanistan is very much in the U.S national interest, it may not be in the interest of the voter, but when have the two been mutually exclusive.

TDB, my points were intentionally provokative and I don't concur with the statements I made 100%, actually far from it, but on the other hand it gets tiring hearing comments from various think tanks that we need to continue the course when the course we're on is not working. More time won't fix a faulty strategy, you have to change the strategy itself. Time in itself will continue to march on indefinitely (in theory), changes in the security situaion won't magically happen just because we give it more time.

Agreed there will be consequences if we pull out of Afghanistan, just as there will be other types of consequences if we stay. We're between the proverbial rock and a hard place, and while some of it couldn't be avoided, some of it is simply due to pie in the sky policies. If we stay, we will support the current government (that we put in place), which many (to include many Afghans) thinks needs to change. The only way it will change (so it seems) is if we step back and stop protecting it and let an internal revolt unfold. Then the question is who is best postured to overthrow the government if we step back (not pull out)? I suspect it is either the Taliban or the military, and if the military takes over and forms a transition government, then that will deal a blow to us psychologically because we will failed to establish a democracy (as though we have one there now). Knee jerk reactions from our government will call for a rapid transition back to civilian government, when a rapid transition is probably the last thing needed. In short we rea major part of the problem in Afghanistan, and only a minor part of the solution.

I am definitely not advocating for the old days where the CIA interfered with foreign governments by sponsoring coups, but instead finding (if possible, and it may not be) a way to step back from protecting the current government. Let the Afghan people determine their future. If the current government can hold, then perhaps it is more legitimate than we give it credit for; if it falls, then we can only hope the new leaders (dictators at least initially) will provide for their people better, and that the West doesn't automatically start prancing around on the world stage about sanctions, form a new government now, etc.

It appears all of our strategic efforts are focusing on transforming a government (while the tactical units continue to trade blows with the insurgents) that apparently doesn't want to transform, and ISAF realizing that has shifted much focus to the local level to include the Village Stability Operations (or whatever it is called now), which has made some impressive gains, but to what end? Are we somehow going to connect a functional lower level village to a dysfunctional state and then go home?

Sacrifice comes with the military profession, and while the military (especially the Soldiers and Marines on the tip of the spear trading blows everyday with the enemy) have little input into the policies, they are not blind to how ineffective they are. We have thousands of examples of tactical success that are not synergic, but simply good independent actions that don't add up to success beyond a small place during a small period of time. Being Soldiers and Marines they still do their job from relatively well to very well (units and individuals vary in quality), but knowing full well if they stay on the current track they won't see much change in the long run.

Personally, I think we need to stay in Afghanistan (what size, our roles, etc. are all up for debate), but significant changes need to be made to the strategy. Unfortunately, we're gearing up for election season in the U.S., so rational discussions will be silenced with the same ole faulty logic employed on previous elections, so any option other than staying the "current" course will be spun as weakness on the war on terror. Actually having the will to change course to more effectively fight terrorists would require greater strength than continuing to march down the same ole established path, but our national psychology won't allow that to happen.

bumperplate

08-27-2011, 11:37 PM

I believe I made a similar comment in another thread but I'll also mention it here: I like the theory of CT and SOF-centric approaches. However, aren't we placing too much on our SOF community and tasking them to the point where they are forced to abandon some of their core competencies, hence losing some of those core competencies?

Why can't we train our more conventional forces to take on some of those mission sets that are on the edge between conventional and unconventional? FID v. SFA seems to be an area we can really maximize the conventional side. I have rarely seen conventional force personnel establish rapport with indigenous forces at the same level as I've seen this accomplished by Army SF. But, let's face it, it's not magic - it can be taught and developed. In order to do so, our conventional forces must stop being the 'ugly american' and need to sit down, shut up, and take in what a lot of our talented SOF pax have to say, and importantly our conventional people need to check their rank and ego at the door. This "mental" side of the equation: putting yourself in the correct mindset, getting to the "act tactically, think strategically" side, rather than just trying to please your rater/senior rater, is where I see the greatest disparity in my limited time being in joint environments with conventional and unconventional units in the same AO. However, I see a great possibility for these talents and skillsets to be passed on by the SOF side to the conventional side.

This is not meant to be a probing question, but is there that much of a difference between some of our conventional units and SOF units in terms of executing some of these COIN and CT missions? For example, if 20 or so people are to go to a village and execute a raid in order to roll up some HVI, why can't those 20 people come from the 101st, as opposed to 2/75, or an ODA, etc?

My point here is that I see the issue of force-tailoring to be a recurring theme in the comments about the way ahead in Afghanistan. I also see that we are taking on great risk to our SOF community by continually stating that things need to be SOF-centric. Seems to me, if the approach needed is solidly supported and well founded, then we ought to be making sure we act accordingly by training the forces necessary and providing some long term protection to our SOF capabilities for the health of that community and the capabilities we'll assuredly need from them in the future.

I think we were on to something with the MiTT concept and it had great promise after some bad beginnings, but it seems we've pretty much abandoned that. It could have developed into an increase in capability and broadened the conventional force and provided some flexibility to the unconventional side - at least that's my opinion.

In the end, I think we have some bright minds out there that have or can identify the road to victory for our strategic purposes. But, as usual, we have some roadblocks and a general unwillingness to execute because it's either out of our comfort zone or just doesn't jive with the way we've been doing business. However, as the saying goes, if you do what you've always done, you're gonna get what you've always got.

Thanks to TDB for your previous response.

Bill Moore

08-28-2011, 12:31 AM

Bumperplate,

What makes SOF special beyond the personnel selection? In my view it is their organization (very flexible) and special tactics. As you said once the Army actually starting picking some good guys to man th MITTs the program made an impact. The Marines did fairly well with their CIDG equivalent in Vietnam with platoons. If conventional force leaders are willing to power down and detach units and give them greatr automony many will be very successful, but then the big boss can't micromanage them, and the big boss also assumes more risk that many conventional officers in the senior ranks aren't willing to accept, so while your idea is good in theory, unfortunately weak spined senior leaders will find a way to avoid doing it. They could do it now if they wanted, and I'm pretty sure some of the Marine units are. It would be pretty powerful if we decentralize more and more of our forces so we could deny freedom of movement to the Taliban more and more, but I think there are some poles in the tent that need to be addressed, such as the number of terps and how we sustain the forces logistically. Air dropping water and MREs shouldn't be too much of a problem, hell we may even be able to do with it drones in the near future.

But still, E7s and LTs making tactical decisions without Bn and Bde oversight! Simply unheard of :wry:

jcustis

08-28-2011, 01:21 AM

Bill Moore

08-28-2011, 02:01 AM

What is different now from then, and why can't we get back to impacting their combat power in a similar fashion.

We transitioned from a liberating force that supported the NA and the Afghan people to an occupying power in the eyes of the Afghans.

Also worth noting the USSR's initial efforts were successful also for different reasons.

Ken White

08-28-2011, 02:06 AM

To go back to Bumperplate:
Why can't we train our more conventional forces to take on some of those mission sets that are on the edge between conventional and unconventional?... But, let's face it, it's not magic - it can be taught and developed. In order to do so, our conventional forces must stop being the 'ugly american' ... rather than just trying to please your rater/senior rater, is where I see the greatest disparity in my limited time being in joint environments with conventional and unconventional units in the same AO...This is not meant to be a probing question, but is there that much of a difference between some of our conventional units and SOF units in terms of executing some of these COIN and CT missions? For example, if 20 or so people are to go to a village and execute a raid in order to roll up some HVI, why can't those 20 people come from the 101st, as opposed to 2/75, or an ODA, etc?In a word -- Turf.

Prior to the Viet Nam fiasco, conventional units trained for and could do those missions -- all of them. SF (there were few SEALs, no CAG, no 75th) was relatively small and focused on IW in an offensive mode. Initial US Troop deployments in Viet Nam were by units that had trained for SFA and that could and did do all Bumperplate suggests and did it pretty well.

Then the Personnel system took over, the one year tour was established and rotations began. In 1966 what I've called the Second Team came in and they weren't as competent at the basics for the environment because they had trained exclusively for European deployment; they weren't quite as capable so SF was expanded. In 1967, the Third string arrived and things started downhill. To cut this short, the 'conventional' force became less and less competent and so was cut out of the more exotic stuff. Didn't need to happen and should not have but it did...

Fast forward to 1987 and USSOCOM was established (an interesting tale unto itself... :rolleyes:), By that time the big Army had bought into a very flawed Task, Condition and Standard training system which was designed to train marginal recruits rapidly to minimum skill levels -- it did that and, with no war on, that seemed okay. This system did not produce units that could reliably do the more sophisticated and complex missions and, as USSOCOM was looking for missions to justify themselves, they migrated direct action missions into the folder. It was more complex than that and there were other factors but that in essence is why conventional units don't do that stuff today. Most cannot due to marginal training and -- turf... :(

Bill Moore:
What makes SOF special beyond the personnel selection? In my view it is their organization (very flexible) and special tactics.Heh. I'll grant selection, add training (and money therefor...) and the organization's flexibility. OTOH, the tactics aren't special based on my experience and that of a currently serving Son, his friends and another couple of relatives including one currently deployed CIF type ;).

Most -- not all of those TTP -- are things any decent infantry battalion should be able to do (and have done and almost certainly will again if we have another war on the scale of Viet Nam or Korea, much less WW II) and most used to be able to do at least some of those things (good units could more than others but that never changes and is still true today). That was back in the Pleistocene era as shown in the attached picture (XVIII trained for light roles and SFA; II Corps trained for Europe and the ME, both on the basis of 80% primary mission / 20% the other mission).
But still, E7s and LTs making tactical decisions without Bn and Bde oversight! Simply unheard of.In your time -- not prior to 1970. Different world back then. Risk aversion was killed quickly if it raised its ugly head (today it seems to be encouraged...). PSG /SFCs and LKTs who wouldn't seek responsibility and independence of action got fired in many units. I ran Recon Platoons, Airborne and Armored Cavalry off and on for seven years, less than two years total out of that with a Platoon Leader (counting all five, from one month to 10 at various times. Did that in peace and war (both combat deployments without a PL and had some interesting and independent missions far away from the flag pole). I assure you there were many other SSG and Platoon Sergeants who were acting platoon leaders and who were as well or even more trusted. Viet Nam killed that and the smart guys that rebuilt the Army foolishly left trust building (among other things...) out of their repertoire...

Shorter that - you're right for now; didn't use to be that way; can be fixed; will have to be with a big commitment. ;)

Back to Bumperplate -- Turf -- and training. Units aren't trusted to do things like that because our training doesn't embed the basics of the trade at all well. Lack of training breeds lack of capability, one cannot or at least should not ask people to do things they have not been trained for.

Today's individuals are, across the board, better trained than were those in the days of that picture -- but the units can't do half what those units could do then. If I were a conspiracy theorist, I'd think it was by design to limit the missions on which the Army might be employed but I suspect it's a Hanlon's razor thing. I hope that's all it is...

Ken White

08-28-2011, 02:12 AM

We transitioned from a liberating force that supported the NA and the Afghan people to an occupying power in the eyes of the Afghans.However, the good news is my spies tell me that we're going back to a variation the 2001-02 policies with a couple of added hookers after being Americans and trying every conceivable alternative... :D

Bill Moore

08-28-2011, 02:49 AM

The new plan sounds great:D

Ken, my comment on SOF tactics compared to GPF tactics is two fold. First, we do practice and implement more complicated DA/SR tactics based on the mission, the quality of our people, equipment, organization and so forth. Good news on you your son doing some CIF work over there, but as you know the combined operations are generally less complex for various reasons. I don't want to risk crossing security lines, but I think I can find some unclassified examples of SOF tactics that GPF doesn't use. I don't buy the argument that DA and SR are hyper conventional, that is a turf battle comment, not reality.

Doesn't mean GPF couldn't employ these tactics if they were trained to do so, but they don't train that way. Their tactics require more control/micromanagement. Instead they're busy doing that task, condition, standard stuff, ensuring they tie a proper square know on their pressure dressing, and disassemble their weapons IAW the steps in the manual, any other path will disqualify you even if you disassemble your weapon. We can't afford to train that stupidly in SOF. Although some of the leadership in SF over the years pushed this crap, we had to do 10 random Army Common Tasks every year as part of certification. One of the stupidiest diversions I have ever seen in our ranks.

Moving on, second is our approach to a mission, while it isn't necessary a tactic, it is the whole SF view of the world using area studies, area assessments, intelligence, leveraging locals, working indirectly as well as directly, working in small units unafraid in the middle of the badlands, etc. GPF has been doing this in a spoty manner, some units are actually good at it, while others will focus on defending their FOB to the last man. I think calling it Special Warfare is appropriate and yes GPF can conduct Special Warfare if they choose to do so, but it requires different training and a whole new mindset in their officer ranks.

I agree that the Army can fix itself in relative short order if the leaders push the change. Right now they talk a lot about the strategic corporal, but the reality is that strategic corporal generally wears LTC and COL wings. In some cases that mentality leaks into SOF ranks, but that is the exception, not the rule.

Case in point, I witnessed the same SOF unit deploy to OIF with different leaders each time. The first time they had a micro manager who was risk adverse and a lot of good SF troops had their reputations soiled by this chicken ####. The same unit deployed again under and up and coming super SF Commander and they did fantastic. Leadership is decisive period, if you want to change the culture in the Army you put the right leaders in the right places and empower them (and they in turn empower their men, and those who can't handle it are weeded out).

I remember my earlier days in the Army, the Platoon Sgts were walk on water NCOs in the infantry. They walked their talk and were constantly mentoring their troops in practical combat skills. Not sure when it broke, but it did break.

Dayuhan

08-28-2011, 03:19 AM

At the outset, we had situations where taliban had been captured or had otherwise surrendered en masse.

http://www.combatfilms.com/cfrtv_archive_0013.asp

What is different now from then, and why can't we get back to impacting their combat power in a similar fashion.

I believe I have my own answer, but are they more mobile and dispersed than they were in '01-'02, more committed given that they are in a resistance insurgency phase?

I tend to rub my temples when I think of the successes at the beginning, and try to ascertain why this has become so hard.

Coming from a completely non-military perspective here, though I've watched these processes in a few places.

I think this may have something to do with that transition from "clear" to "hold". When you're clearing, you have the initiative; you decide where you will clear and when. The other guy has to react to your choices. Holding is a lot more passive. If you're holding a lot of territory you have to spread out, and you have to support those spread out folks. The other guy can watch you. learn your routines, and decide where and when he wants to challenge your hold. He takes the initiative.

Of course holding doesn't preclude offense, but once you make that transition a large part of your effort, likely most of it, will be devoted to an essentially passive process that can allow the other side to take over the initiating role.

Again, a comment from an amateur perspective that may make no sense at all to the professionals... disregard if that's the case!

Ken White

08-28-2011, 03:31 AM

First, we do practice and implement more complicated DA/SR tactics based on the mission, the quality of our people, equipment, organization and so forth.I know -- but I also know that as you later note, it's a training level issue as much as anything. My point was not to dispute what is but to remind anyone reading this that what is now has not always been and, far more importantly, can be changed and will likely be changed in a larger commitment than either Iraq or Afghanistan (and both).
your son doing some CIFNot what i wrote; he's there but is non SF and non CIF, never has been. The CIF guy also there is another relative who has long had a beanie.
...the combined operations are generally less complex for various reasons.Various; yes...
I can find some unclassified examples of SOF tactics that GPF doesn't use.I can think of several real quick and could probably dredge up a dozen more in a minute or so -- I can also come up with some the GPF uses that SF does not and cannot. That's not an issue or a question IMO. My point was just that in the past the line was more blurred and the future may make it so again...
I don't buy the argument that DA and SR are hyper conventional, that is a turf battle comment, not reality.Doesn't that depend on many factors? Isn't that comment itself a little bit of a turf comment? :wry:

I fully grant that some DA stuff and much SR is beyond the capability of the GPF -- some is beyond the capability of the CIF Cos, much less a garden variety ODA. Some SR would stymie the Army of Northern Virginia and John Mosby. Horses for courses and all that...
Their tactics require more control/micromanagement...We can't afford to train that stupidly in SOF.Again, now true (though I could argue the tactics requiring more micromanagement -- I wouldn't say requiring, just currently enduring...). Should it remain so? Probably not but it likely will until the next big war comes then a good time will be had by all -- with a whole lot of changin' goin' on... :D
...it requires different training and a whole new mindset in their officer ranks. Yes to all that, noting that the same thing has been long ago done with GPF units. Still what's now is what is. Agree that the Officer corps (not GPF specific) needs to rethink their value system.

SOF is important and SOF units are needed. SF is important and SF units are needed (and IMO should not be given DA or SR missions among others, that's using a Cadillac de Ville to do a Mustang job and wasting a whole slew of that cultural and language training on a shooter job...). I'm not convinced Rangers are either important or needed but they exist (mostly because the Army realized in 1973 that they were dumbing down the GPF to such an extent that they needed somebody to be a little high speed...). The GPF is important and is needed. Everyone has a niche but the deliberate dumbing down of training for the GPF has had a number of adverse consequences.

Touting the superiority of SF / SOF in some things -- things that it was designed and is funded and equipped to do -- doesn't change the fact that many missions now being done by SF/ SOF were once done by the GPF and almost certainly will have to be again given a larger war. One can put the GPF down but one had better hope one never has to have that GPF come get ones tail out of a sling... ;)

Parochialism and turf battles do more damage to the US Armed Forces than any evil enema...:rolleyes:

Ken White

08-28-2011, 03:40 AM

Of course holding doesn't preclude offense, but once you make that transition a large part of your effort, likely most of it, will be devoted to an essentially passive process that can allow the other side to take over the initiating role.Add the psychological shift in focus from active to passive and the not so minor debilitation and mind set modification that results. Focus is focus. Protecting your stuff is protecting your stuff...

The Army clears, the cops hold, the economy builds. You can change that but it won't work well. Don't have adequate Cops? keep clearing until you do. You can waste money building before you hold but it'll really drive up your costs...
Again, a comment from an amateur perspective that may make no sense at all to the professionals... disregard if that's the case!I'm sure some professional will reject it because of it's provenance.

They should not; it's accurate.

jmm99

08-28-2011, 06:26 AM

Bob's World

08-28-2011, 10:57 AM

The problem is not, and rarely is, the ability to conduct counterguerrilla operations. The problem is, and usually is, getting people to understand that countering the guerrilla as the main effort only suppresses the problem at best. Often it inflames the problem and deepens the core grievances within the community of the actual "insurgency."

Three interesting current examples, all with very different roles by the US.

1. Afghanistan. There the US actively supports the sitting government in suppressing nationalist challenges, and actually does much of the killing for them. We call this war.

2. Libya. There the US actively supports the nationalist challengers, but in a minimalist kind of way. Moral support and some air primarily.

3. Syria. There the US vigorously condoms the government for doing essentially what the government of Afghanistan is doing, though Syria does so to a much smaller degree. We say things like "they are murdering the populace" about Syria.

I was speaking with some experts on Yemen (yes, expertise is a relative thing) and many of the people in the streets of the areas Westerners have access to (not much) are confused and frustrated by why the US supports others and not them.

My assessment is that actually the US acts very consistently: we do what we think will best support our interests as we define them on the day of the decision. The problem IMO is that we more than any other people stand on a moral soapbox and make loud judgmental proclamations about what our enduring and universal values are and why they are superior to all others. Yet we subjugate values to a very confused assessment of interest; that we further confuse with odd positions on loyalty that sometimes trumps, but some time doesn't. Not hard to see why people scratch their heads in wonder.

Ken White

08-28-2011, 02:43 PM

Are you (both of you) not getting close to what George Decker told Pres. Kennedy: "Any good soldier can handle guerrillas." And, by extrapolation, any "good" soldier can handle any (perhaps, "almost any" is better) military situation.Probably... :wry:
To me (an isolated outlier), "good" means a "B" ("average" = "C"; "excellent" = "A"; "outstanding" is better than an "A", but is like "porn" - known when seen, but not easily defined). Of course, "special operations forces" tend to get more of those who are above "C".Most would agree. I do. There are a couple of things connected to that. The first is that in a major war, history shows one has to accept a large quantity of C- people and units; the numbers required dictate that. Unfortunately, the institution that is the US Army has a fetish about mobilization and opts all too often (and post Viet Nam particularly...) for that being acceptable at all times because it is adequate for war preparation, easier on leaders and trainers, cheaper, adored by Congress (as fair but cheap and calling for BIG equipment expenditures. They like that last...) and generally acceptable even though it means that some missions will not be well served (see Afghanistan, Iraq) or served at all (see Apaches to Kosovo :D).

That 'C-' state was entered during and remained after WW II. After Korea, the Army determined to improve itself to a general 'B' standard with some 'As' and set about doing that with some success. That effort was halted neatly in its tracks by Robert Strange McNamara and forced into regression by Viet Nam. A combination of lack of understanding and circumstances halted a needed and beneficial effort.

Post VN, the 'C / C-' state was deemed adequate (and also helped avoid some missions...). It worked because democracies in general aren't too comfortable with large competent Armies (one adjective is okay, both are suspect...). I think that's where we are today.

My belief is that we have a professional force operating as a conscript Army, that we should upgrade capability to 'B' or even 'B+' and that we could do that with better training and a refocus. Whether we will do that remains to be seen...:(

The existence of SOCOM owes much to the simple proposition that a 'C-' Army is okay but you have to have a few elements that can do better in an emergency. Interesting things help drive that; Big Army's excessive concern with uniformity and pervasive mediocrity, "...elitism not allowed here..." While the SOF-types desire to be 'different' and elite...
All of that is relevant, but not really material, to the major US interventions from Korea and Vietnam to the Sandbox and the Rockpile - those have all been marked by difficult or impossible political constraints on both military strategies and tactics.

The military has and does beat itself for things that are and have not been within its control.That's true but it's also true the military is not blameless in the lack of success or difficulties in all those efforts. Part of the problem is that the personnel system drives much operational effort in sometimes wrong directions. For example, had either Korea or Viet Nam had most commanders with Pacific Theater experience rather than European experience...

Also, too often, the forces have been more concerned with protecting the institutions than in doing the assigned task. There's some merit in that. The civilian policy makers are rarely concerned with the state or well being of the armed forces yet someone has to preserve the ability to react to major events requiring force, so due to the blase treatment and poorly thought out missions assigned by those civilians, the services tend to husband their being and resources and not go all out to get the job done. Balancing the requirements and conflicts is not easy and all things considered, the guys at the top do a fair job. Not great, usually -- the system does not like that...

Peril of democracy I think... :wry:

120mm

08-28-2011, 03:12 PM

How so? AQ wasn't around until after the Soviet Union had disappeared; it's predecessor Makhtab al Khadamat never recieved a dime from the U.S.

The Taliban are also a post anti-Soviet Jihad creation; an organization fuelled by Pakistan's flirtation with islamist policies to help fight in the Kashmir. The Taliban were an outcome of traditional Afghan warlord politics.

To say that AQ and the Taliban are second-order effects of U.S. dealing with South-East and South Asian dictators like the House of Saud, Mubarak and Zia-al-Haq would be fairly accurate. To say that the AQ and the Taliban are consequences of a new "Nazi Germany"'s direct intervention in Afghanistan is rubbish.

You've missed my point so completely in your literal minded way, I fear there is nothing I can say.

The US caused the current mess we are in by choosing to fight the Soviets in Afghanistan.

We created the warlords, who later trashed the country.

The warlords trashing the country allowed the Taliban to succeed.

Our removal of the Taliban made us responsible for replacing their governance with something else.

The US has been conducting diplomacy by bombing the sh*t out of any country that strikes our whim and fancy. Based on our President's approval numbers. That makes us a mad dog on the world stage.

Even our "rebuilding" is stupid. To date, there are several things we destroyed in the 2002 campaign that we destroyed, much of it unnecessarily, that we STILL refuse to fix/rebuild/replace, to this day.

What about that are you too simple minded to understand????

ganulv

08-28-2011, 03:22 PM

SOF is important and SOF units are needed. SF is important and SF units are needed (and IMO should not be given DA or SR missions among others, that's using a Cadillac de Ville to do a Mustang job and wasting a whole slew of that cultural and language training on a shooter job...). I'm not convinced Rangers are either important or needed but they exist (mostly because the Army realized in 1973 that they were dumbing down the GPF to such an extent that they needed somebody to be a little high speed...). The GPF is important and is needed. Everyone has a niche but the deliberate dumbing down of training for the GPF has had a number of adverse consequences.

Touting the superiority of SF / SOF in some things -- things that it was designed and is funded and equipped to do -- doesn't change the fact that many missions now being done by SF/ SOF were once done by the GPF and almost certainly will have to be again given a larger war. One can put the GPF down but one had better hope one never has to have that GPF come get ones tail out of a sling... ;)

Does this have something to do with the lack of a true mountain warfare unit in the U.S. military I was asking about (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?p=125037)? My understanding is that mountain units are traditionally like airborne units in that they have a role as elite light infantry in addition to their specialized capabilities.

carl

08-28-2011, 06:47 PM

Here is a link that David posted in another thread last week.

http://www.understandingwar.org/files/Backgrounder_PakistansKurramOffensive.pdf

The report covers a large scale convential offensive mounted by the Pak Army in Kurram. The object of the offensive is to clear a supply line for the Haqqanis and others from Pakistan into Afghanistan. The offensive was complete with air support, some of which may have been provided by F-16s.

So. We have the Pak Army fighting to clear a supply line so the Haqqanis and others can more easily kill Americans. And they are probably using aircraft made in Texas to help do the job.

Our efforts in Afghanistan, no matter how sagely effectuated, are useless unless this situation changes. Period.

Ken White

08-28-2011, 09:07 PM

Does this have something to do with the lack of a true mountain warfare unit in the U.S. military I was asking about (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?p=125037)? My understanding is that mountain units are traditionally like airborne units in that they have a role as elite light infantry in addition to their specialized capabilities.Your understanding is correct for European Armies. The US Army has always been selectively egalitarian and has eschewed specialized units. We form 'em ad hoc for a given war but after that war, we usually disband them and the system rejects formation of new types to a great extent. That fact, hidebounditis, also led to the creation of USSOCOM.

The problem with fighting in really mountainous terrain is that a premium is place on small unit and independent action -- apparently anathema to today's Army -- so the US Army has seemed to take the position that "We don't like to fight in Mountains so we do not need mountain specialist units." Or something like that...:rolleyes:

Roger Beaumont wrote a book tiled Military Elites -- he dislikes them; I've always contended that when he was a non-airborne MP officer, a bunch of young Airborne troopies smarted-off to him and they were only quelled when one of their NCOs told them to knock it off. :D

The book does illuminate the US Army attitude toward such units. Here's a LINK (http://www.ebay.com/itm/MILITARY-ELITES-Beaumont-Special-Forces-Green-Beret-/280253042101). I wouldn't buy it, mildly educational but not that good. A large library will likely have it as will possibly arXiv or other academic databases.

Bill Moore

08-28-2011, 09:48 PM

Posted by Ken,

The existence of SOCOM owes much to the simple proposition that a 'C-' Army is okay but you have to have a few elements that can do better in an emergency. Interesting things help drive that; Big Army's excessive concern with uniformity and pervasive mediocrity, "...elitism not allowed here..." While the SOF-types desire to be 'different' and elite...

Ken, my comments were not about turf battles between GPF and SOF, but turf battles within the SOF ranks. Lots of penis envy going around, and I guess that just comes with the turf (pun intended) when you're working with triple type A personalities. If you're organization isn't doing the sexy DA, then the DA stuff isn't SOF, it's conventional, and passing out candy to the kids, building schools, and training locals to defend themselves is SOF. All of this discussion is good for a laugh, but it also unfortunately results in dumb decisions and dumb policies over time that try to box everyone into specific boxes, so they can tell the Congressional delegates why their unit is unique (and of course why they're the only true SOF element) :D

The point you made above, the one I put in bold, is exactly what is holding back the GPF (and SOF to a lesser extent). GPF units have little authority to deviate from the master plan, so everyone goes through the same communist like indoctrination and training programs, those that deviate from TRADOC approved crap will be publically executed. Want to get ahead in this man's Army you better be mediocre.

As to your point about SF doing SR and DA (CIF like work), I think it is appropriate if SF does it as part of a indigenous (or foreign force in another country, like Chinese Nungs in N. Vietnam) organization serving as trainers and advisors. These are the skills needed at the moment and will continue to be needed for at least the next few years. We need grade B and better indigenious forces also for the tougher missions, and SF is uniquely trained and organized to do this. As for SR, my definition of SR goes well beyond the typical view of small teams sitting in hide sites watching a NAI. SF is uniquely suited to conducting some types of SR, they shouldn't be wasted on conducting hide site SR. That type of SR is hard and requires a lot of training to do it well (you need to do it well if you plan on surviving in a hostile environment), so if SF is going to get good at this, it means it will become a training focus, which will distract them from their primary mission sets. We have other units who can do this type of SR, SF should focus on the type of SR that they're uniquely suited to (getting country, gaining access, developing relationships, developing a deep understanding of the issues, etc.).

Dayuhan, I think your assessment is a large part of what happened, though as always there is a little more to it. As for not being a military expert, I suspect that may make you a superior tactician and strategist. Our military experts have had their butt handed to them again and again by non-military experts. Your mind is still free of self limiting doctrinal views.

bumperplate

08-28-2011, 10:50 PM

Interesting course the thread has taken in the past two or three pages of comments. Also interesting in light of the recently published Army Reading List which includes books like 'Starfish and Spider', 'Click', and others, where a central theme is on organizational culture and the power of decentralization and trust - juxtapose that with the comments about the Army as a whole and you have not only a brand new discussion but some interesting views regarding this winning in Afghanistan thing.

Not long ago, I think it was either GEN Dempsey or GEN Casey was interviewed and was asked what book was on his desk for current reading. The reply was that it was the Starfish book. Makes me wonder about what that will lead to, if anything.

This thread is about 47 pages now and some of the biggest take-home points I see are that we (the U.S. military) are really hurting for some strategists, and really hurting for some leadership that people believe in, at the most senior levels. Additionally, it seems our relationship with the current governing body(ies) in Afghanistan is hugely problematic, not to mention those in Pakistan. There was something I remember from Clausewitz and some trinity or whatever, something about governments and their roles. But a lot of people these days are telling me that Clausewitz is now irrelevant, that we've entered a new era, a 4th or 5th generation of warfare that explains our inability to understand Afghanistan, and certainly that would preclude our victory there.

Personally I think many of our leaders in uniform go with the generational approach to warfare to either captivate audiences (and sell books later in life) or to produce excuses for their ineffectual ways. I believe some referencing of classic books and ideas, with a lot of common sense thrown in will show us a clear and simple way forward. When I come up with a task/condition/standard statement for that way forward, I'm sure it'll be adopted right away.

Ken White

08-29-2011, 01:12 AM

Lots of penis envy going around, and I guess that just comes with the turf (pun intended) when you're working with triple type A personalities.True dat.
and of course why they're the only true SOF element) :DOr only really important war fighting organization -- that attitude's a lot broader than the SOF community...
The point you made above, the one I put in bold, is exactly what is holding back the GPF...Want to get ahead in this man's Army you better be mediocre.I'm afraid you're right -- and also bothered that is so. We managed to stave off disaster long enough to get marginally competent by the end of WW II. That time may not be available in the future.
As to your point about SF doing SR and DA (CIF like work), I think it is appropriate if SF does it as part of a indigenous (or foreign force in another country...As for SR, my definition of SR goes well beyond the typical view of small teams sitting in hide sites watching a NAI...That type of SR is hard and requires a lot of training to do it well (you need to do it well if you plan on surviving in a hostile environment).Agree with all that -- particularly the last bit as you define that variety of SR -- which it was called back in my time but the S then stood for special and it wasn't talked about openly. I, as you probably guessed, was using SR as in Strategic Recon which used to be LRP to LRS and not SR but then it became SR. So now we can do SR (Type II) with specially trained big army guys but must still use SF for their long held SR (Type I) mission due to are focus etc.. Or Foxes or something... :rolleyes:

Where's Dave Maxwell -- his comments about constant changing of terms is on the money... :wry:
Dayuhan...Your mind is still free of self limiting doctrinal views.Yep, enviably so...

ganulv

08-31-2011, 04:01 PM

Roger Beaumont wrote a book tiled Military Elites […] The book does illuminate the US Army attitude toward such units. Here's a LINK (http://www.ebay.com/itm/MILITARY-ELITES-Beaumont-Special-Forces-Green-Beret-/280253042101). I wouldn't buy it, mildly educational but not that good. A large library will likely have it as will possibly arXiv or other academic databases.

“Worth reading, not worth buying” is one of the better book reviews I’ve ever read. :D Thanks for the recommendation.

taabistan

09-05-2011, 05:30 PM

Adding on to the points, any future strategy in Afghanistan has to include a footnote that strongly urges a reducing of foreign aid.

From a purely humanitarian POV, putting in 145B a year into a third-world country traumatized by poverty and war was always a bad move.

It renders the government useless, because it's preoccupied with the micromanagement of foreign groups and investors with their own goals.

It also creates an enormous disparity in wealth, which drives working class Afghans into poverty and then into the hands of the Taliban.

A teacher in Afghanistan makes, on average, $70/month. A person working for any Ministry in Kabul can make between $10,000-20,000/month. This drives the housing market up, as well as the overall price of products and lowers the purchasing power of the average Afghan citizen.

Funny enough, this is one of those few times where both parties can agree on something.

Bob's World

09-06-2011, 10:15 AM

I Will agree on the need to reduce the aid; but such aid does not create the disparity of wealth, it merely injects vast sums into the existing disparity of GIRoA patronage. The true downside of this is that those segments of the populace most supportive of GIRoA as a whole receive very little, and this is creating major friction as strongmen in the north see their peers in the South and East grow insanely rich. This is creating powerful friction within the former Northern Alliance, where cracks are becoming fissures.

Similarly, in those areas where there is insurgency and the bulk of the aid goes, it goes primarily to the areas and populaces loyal to GIRoA, and through the pockets of the same; enhancing the discontent of those populaces who have been supportive of the insurgency.

The effects of such projects are in many powerful ways the opposite of what is intended or advertised.

On an (largely) unrelated note, as I thumbed through my copy of "Quotable Founding Fathers" this morning, these two quotes regarding Great Britain in 1780 stood out as relevant to our current challenges:

"A change of Generals, like a change of physicians, served only to keep the flattery alive, and furnish new pretenses for new extravagances." Thomas Paine, The Crisis

"When will men be convinced that even successful wars at length become misfortunes to those who unjustly commenced them, and who triumphed blindly in their success, not seeing all the consequences." Benjamin Franklin

(To be fair the British, like the US, quite reasonably believed their cause to be just; it was the recipients of their actions who felt otherwise. Time is the jury who hears such cases; and of course that jury is still out on the second.)

taabistan

09-06-2011, 06:39 PM

I think that you'll find people from the North (Abdullah Abdullah, Yunus Qanuni) benefiting quite well from financial aid. You'll also find people in Helmand, Zabul, etc. not seeing a dime of it, which may be a reason for why they're being driven into Afghanistan.

ganulv

09-07-2011, 02:57 AM

A relevant interview with Edward Girardet (http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/media/july-dec11/girardet_09-05.html) (on a book tour for his recently published Killing the Cranes (http://www.chelseagreen.com/bookstore/item/killing_the_cranes)) from last night’s PBS NewsHour.

Bill Moore

09-11-2011, 05:31 PM

Good article for discussion, hat tip to Steve for posting under the Smart Power thread.

http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/10/opinion/10iht-edstewart10.html?_r=1

When I walked alone across central Afghanistan in the winter of 2001 and 2002, I found Afghan villagers to be hospitable and generous, but also far more conservative, insular and Islamist than foreigners acknowledged. When I returned to the country in 2006, to establish a nonprofit organization, it was clear that their resistance was inflamed by the increasingly heavy presence of Western troops, which allowed the Taliban to gain support by presenting themselves as fighters for Islam and Afghanistan against a foreign occupation. That is obvious to most of us I hope.

In reference to the Carr Center at Harvard: The center’s research fellows collectively had more than a century of experience on the ground in Afghanistan. Research by fellows such as Andrew Wilder, David Mansfield and Michael Semple proved that our aid projects were increasing instability; that we were undermining any chance of political settlement with the Taliban; and that the Taliban-controlled areas were often more secure than the government areas. Their findings explained why our counterinsurgency strategy was empty and the “surge” was counterproductive, but they were often ignored by the military and political establishment, which has remained defiantly optimistic.

At the heart of our irrational persistence are the demons of guilt and fear. Leaders are hypnotized by fears about global security; feel guilty about the loss of lives; ashamed at their inability to honor our promises to Afghans; and terrified of admitting defeat.

Steve the Planner

09-11-2011, 07:06 PM

Bill:

The article is a pass along from Ms. Skye.

The interesting issue for me goes back to the previous comments of transition from "clear" to "hold."

I liken it to a person trying to buy a failing business, under forced sale circumstances, with the expectation that it can be improved.

First, the battle is with the lawyers, current management and financiers (not the customer base). The initial challenge is to get clear title and control.

Second, the fun begins. What was wrong with the prior business that needs to be fixed/can be fixed to serve the customer base? Are the terms of acquisition such that they do not impede the anticipated turn-around? What if the old business owner opens a new improved version across the street, or just takes his original customer base with him?

Clear is one thing, and a fairly straight-forward activity with a limited set of players, opponents.

Hold is like moving from a one-level chess board to an interactive video game that creates its own internal and interactive feedback, response, demand and threat layers.

Each is a completely different problem set with hold being affected by the terms and conditions of clearance.

In Iraq, there was a viable, if disheveled, societal capacity which, despite our handling/mishandling, would someday provide an exit strategy, no matter how rough-and-tumble.

Afghanistan was very different. After the relatively simple clearance effort, we opposed the basic approach of propping up the old King and letting them get on with whatever they were going to get on with, despite serious societal and government damage caused from prior wars.

Here, instead of being the lawyer in the forced sale, we elected to take over the business, with great consequences and challenges, no clear business plan, an unclear customer base and mission, and with the last owner actively competing for his prior customers.

Against that backdrop, we decided to "outsource" our management responsibilities and strategies to a some of the prior employees who, in essence, brought little productive capabilities to the problem.

There is no rocket science to why we are where we are.

The question of "Winning" is arguably not on the table (Stephen Walt, Rory Stewart, etc...) so much as a transition/exit.

The only new buyers for the business as a whole are Abdullah2, the Karzais, and the Mullah. The competitors interested in carving-up some or all of it surrounding nations (Pakistan,Iran, India, China, Russia, etc...), and internal regional lords (with or without backing from nations).

The option of "doubling down" by the US, in terms of increased blood, treasure and troops, is gone, but to open issues remain:

Is there an option to recapture/replace leadership that would allow, for example, a do-over from the failed outsource strategy? (I think not, but....)

In the various "carve-up" scenarios, does an opportunity exist for us to save face, opportunities, a continuing role, or, at the least, to hurt our competitors so that, at the least, our next business efforts will be improved (or not further damaged)?

If it was my problem to solve, I believe that I would look for someone like Ambassador Crocker who can have formal/informal, direct/indirect talks with neighbors and competitors, while undertaking an clear-eyed inventory.

After that, I would make the plan and execute it.

The problems are, however, that our plan is not not in a vacuum since the landscape is under constant change, and that our plan may be a multi-level one attempting (as the SOFA did) to, essentially, do different things on paper than all parties thought they were negotiating.

While not so graphically dramatic as the helos on the roof of the Saigon Embassy, it is pretty obvious that what Ambassador Crocker sought (and reasonably expected with patience and perseverance) from the SOFA was cut short by US domestic political agendas (the election schedule), so much of what could have been reasonably been done for various US parties got left on the negotiation room floor.

Obviously, for the same reasons, this path could occur again with the continuing lament: If only the US had more time and patience.....

omarali50

09-12-2011, 04:54 PM

Only tangentially related, but i have a post about 9-11 at: http://www.3quarksdaily.com/3quarksdaily/2011/09/9-11random-thoughts.html#comments

Ray

09-28-2011, 02:56 AM

Will China Inherit Afghanistan’s War?

Sept. 26 – As the United States continues its preparations to exit Afghanistan, comments made by ex-U.S. forces suggest that an alternative power may have to step into their shoes. Stating recent attacks made by the mafia-styled Haqqani family, Marc Sageman, an ex-CIA officer who served in Pakistan has been quoted in the press as saying “Whoever is in power in Afghanistan will have to make a deal with the Haqqani’s. It won’t be us, we’re leaving and they know it.”

That China and Pakistan enjoy strong diplomatic and economic relations is well known, as are the certainties of a U.S. pullout. But Pakistan, facing a choice between being overrun by Taliban, giving up Afghanistan to India, or pulling in the Chinese, may only have the one viable option – major Chinese involvement, whether China likes it or not. It may also suit a war-weary United States to sit back and watch developments, including whether China can step up to the plate as a global citizen and maintainer of peace.

That China may well have to do so appears increasingly likely........

Squeezed out of the equation Pakistan may well be, and it seems likely that Sino-Iranian deals will start to become much more in favor of Tehran’s bilateral trade with China as a result, as Iran twists the key to obtain concessions from China in return for ceasing to arm militants. Only time will tell if an Iran-Pak-China military triumvirate will succeed where the United States has left an inheritance. Afghanistan could become more stable if Iran ceases its involvement, but this could be ruptured if intent towards Pakistani territory becomes apparent. This is, after all, a country that fought a seven year war with Iraq.

But should violence in Xinjiang start to increase, such support may well lead to a short cut into direct Chinese military involvement in Pakistan and Afghanistan. The Chinese won’t like it. But with the United States watching from the wings, it may now only be a short time before China has to step up, get into Afghanistan, and see what it really means to limit Islamic insurgents on its own borders.
http://www.2point6billion.com/news/2011/09/26/will-china-inherit-afghanistan%E2%80%99s-war-10219.html

A new angle to winning the war.

Bill Moore

09-28-2011, 06:05 AM

This is an interesting article, but not convincing. China does have considerable interest in the region that address both economic and security concerns, but to assume China will enter Afghanistan in a major way because their dysfunctional friend Pakistan asks them to seems like a bit of a reach to me. Did China participate in Afghanistan in a major way after the Soviets left? Why would China risk its international reputation by entering Afghanistan with an Army that isn't as capable as ours? Why does the author think they don't have a choice? We all have choices, sometimes they're all bad, but we do have choices.

Fuchs

09-28-2011, 07:28 AM

Why would China risk its international reputation by entering Afghanistan with an Army that isn't as capable as ours? Why does the author think they don't have a choice? We all have choices, sometimes they're all bad, but we do have choices.

In suppressing violent political opposition? Are you serious? :confused:

Bob's World

09-28-2011, 11:42 AM

omarali50

09-28-2011, 01:48 PM

Robert, you are pushing the "whatever govt is in power" idea further than it can go. Lets all concede that NATO did a terrible job in Afghanistan, but what exactly is your vision of "govt in afghanistan" after they leave (if they do so without securing the current arrangement more firmly)? Here is mine:

Civil war.

And surrounding powers will pick sides. There is no other viable option. If there was, we would have had a govt in 1993. Certainly the Taliban conquered most of it by 2001, but even then the Northern Alliance survived in a small area and was starting to recover rather than going down to zero.
Shocking as it may sound, the current regime is still the best basis (best for the poor people of Afghanistan and Pakistan) for a possible (not probable, but possible) all-Afghan govt in Afghanistan...and its an awful regime. Nothing actually imaginable in the near future will be as good as this gang. Nothing. ALL alternatives are worse.
I guess a lot of these articles are ways to make the current players see the implications of some of their policies and to hopefully get them to change course while there is still a chance. It probably wont work, now that Pakistan's army is fully on board the "NATO has lost" paradigm and NATO has no consensus about what it wants. The likeliest outcome (and not a pleasant one) is that we will tread water for a year or two and then the whole place will go up with a loud bang.
Somewhere out there is a Pakistani analyst who is thinking:
" ... I might, for example, have suggested to the dinosaurs that heavy armor and great size was a sinking ship, and that they do well to convert to mammal facilities — it would not lie in my power or desire to reconvert a reluctant dinosaur. I can make my feeling very clear, Gregory, I feel like I’m on a sinking ship and I want off." (William Burroughs)
I have just enough awareness to dimly realize that you would probably feel comfortable using the quote for any American analyst...and you would probably be right too.
Its a strange world.

Bob's World

09-28-2011, 05:15 PM

The current government is the best answer for the former Northern Alliance. Period.

When one is oppressed or excluded from full participation in the economic or political opportunities of their own country they will oppose that government. That aspect of the populace not represented by the Northern Alliance; those tribes removed from lucrative roles and replaced by rival tribes that jumped on the Northern Alliance band wagon as we carried them to victory provide a natural, and reasonable basis of support to insurgency in Afghanistan.

Too many focus on the negative aspects of the groups that emerge to lead the challenge to such government. There is no question, that when a government acts in such a way as to create broad conditions of insurgency among the populace as GIRoA has that there will be all manner of self-serving and opportunistic challengers who will step forward to lead (As there was when the US showed up and was looking for help in taking out the Taliban).

That is the wrong focus. The Taliban did not create insurgency in Afghanistan, GIRoA did. Pakistan did not create insurgency in Afghanistan, GIRoA did. By our blind support of GIRoA we may help them to suppress the challengers; but we are also enabling them to avoid addressing their problems as well.

Governments naturally blame insurgency on the insurgent. This is a natural, but unhelpful way of viewing and thinking about the problem. GIRoA must either cure themselves or face continued internal challenge. It is their choice, and IMO they resist change quite knowingly and willingly as the Northern Alliance is not shy about their determination to avoid once again becoming subject to Pashtun domination.

Any government that replaces a bad one through insurgency finds itself in its own insurgency the day they take office if they fall into the same bad habits of their predecessor, or if they bring their own bad habits to the fore. This is how the natural process of insurgency works. Best we let nature take its course, as by altering nature by our efforts we serve to perpetuate the instability and violence.

Is 10 years of insurgency perpetuated by the ISAF presence superior to 1 year of violent turnover of government? I think many Afghans are beginning to wonder...

Fuchs

09-28-2011, 05:20 PM

That aspect of the populace not represented by the Northern Alliance; those tribes removed from lucrative roles and replaced by rival tribes that jumped on the Northern Alliance band wagon as we carried them to victory provide a natural, and reasonable basis of support to insurgency in Afghanistan.

For the less than 2% who hold power in non-NA communities; yes. They might have more wealth and power if central state jobs were redistributed.
I am under the impression that they're not the ones who do the heavy lifting for the TB, though.

So what's their motivation for insurrection?
I suspect it's not that political as you make seem it. It seems to me to be more about pay, ideology and misunderstandings.
The TB foot soldiers would be no better off if the TB had won last year. In fact, they would probably now be jobless and worse off.

kotkinjs1

09-28-2011, 07:10 PM

@omarali50,
I'd tend to agree with Bob here; whatever government that would naturally evolve in Kabul is the one we can work with, one way or another, to address national interests. It doesn't matter if that government is a democratic republic, a monarchy, communist, or a theocracy. And frankly, we shouldn't care. Just like we shouldn't have cared what government was in Vietnam in 1965 or Afghanistan in 1979. The world won't end if there's a fundamental Islamic government in Afghanistan just like it was a hyped-up, miscalculated threat that the domino theory said we needed to fight Communism and install Western-leaning governments all across the globe to do so. We don't need a 'perimeter defense' to guard against the Taliban. There's definitely shades of the Kennan vs. Nitze argument here with Nitze again winning which is why we think that only a US-sponsored democracy can protect our interests (yes, I've been reading my Gaddis again lately).

Agree that China won't "have' to work with anyone, but they're politically savvy enough to know that they 'will' work with anyone based on how they think they need to (if they think they need to). The Chinese can make just as much money off a Taliban regime as they could off a Karzai regime. Probably more after all the corruption that Kabul would probably siphon off any deals now. Bottom line: we shouldn't really care who ends up in power after NATO leaves. It's an Afghan issue period. We can ensure we meet vital national interests in the region regardless of whomever's in power.

Robert, you are pushing the "whatever govt is in power" idea further than it can go. Lets all concede that NATO did a terrible job in Afghanistan, but what exactly is your vision of "govt in afghan" after they leave (if they do so without securing the current arrangement more firmly)? Here is mine:

Civil war.

And surrounding powers will pick sides. There is no other viable option. If there was, we would have had a govt in 1993. Certainly the Taliban conquered most of it by 2001, but even then the Northern Alliance survived in a small area and was starting to recover rather than going down to zero.
Shocking as it may sound, the current regime is still the best basis (best for the poor people of Afghanistan and Pakistan) for a possible (not probable, but possible) all-Afghan govt in Afghanistan...and its an awful regime. Nothing actually imaginable in the near future will be as good as this gang. Nothing. ALL alternatives are worse.
I guess a lot of these articles are ways to make the current players see the implications of some of their policies and to hopefully get them to change course while there is still a chance. It probably wont work, now that Pakistan's army is fully on board the "NATO has lost" paradigm and NATO has no consensus about what it wants. The likeliest outcome (and not a pleasant one) is that we will tread water for a year or two and then the whole place will go up with a loud bang.
Somewhere out there is a Pakistani analyst who is thinking:
" ... I might, for example, have suggested to the dinosaurs that heavy armor and great size was a sinking ship, and that they do well to convert to mammal facilities — it would not lie in my power or desire to reconvert a reluctant dinosaur. I can make my feeling very clear, Gregory, I feel like I’m on a sinking ship and I want off." (William Burroughs)
I have just enough awareness to dimly realize that you would probably feel comfortable using the quote for any American analyst...and you would probably be right too.
Its a strange world.

Fuchs

09-28-2011, 07:44 PM

The world won't end if there's a fundamental Islamic government in Afghanistan (...)

That was actually already proved in the late 90's when there was such a government. The U.S. didn't really care.

omarali50

09-28-2011, 07:58 PM

@omarali50,
I'd tend to agree with Bob here; whatever government that would naturally evolve in Kabul is the one we can work with, one way or another, to address national interests. It doesn't matter if that government is a democratic republic, a monarchy, communist, or a theocracy. And frankly, we shouldn't care. Just like we shouldn't have cared what government was in Vietnam in 1965 or Afghanistan in 1979. The world won't end if there's a fundamental Islamic government in Afghanistan just like it was a hyped-up, miscalculated threat that the domino theory said we needed to fight Communism and install Western-leaning governments all across the globe to do so. .

I have no problem with this argument: The US has/had no business trying to build a particular kind of broad-based modern government in Afghanistan. The US could have pressurized the taliban govt and if they failed to cooperate, subjected it to air attack, aided its enemies, even gone in to punish them...and then left..or helped an NA govt capture what it could and let the chips fall where they may. The point, in short, would have been to punish enemies and kill or capture particular people, not create idealized states or start working on unrealistic dreams of central asian oil or whatever it is that people think are the "true justifications" for this adventure.

But I do have a problem with Bob's version of this theory because it goes beyond this and imagines that the insurgency is primarily about political power in an idealized democratic republic of some sort. And because he seems to exaggerate the NA domination of Pakhtun areas to support his argument. And because he privileges a somewhat demented Pakistani "strategic consensus" to support his argument. And because he thinks we could "work with" whatever group finally wins (if any group wins...endless war is also a possibility, as it is in Somalia..sometimes Humpty Dumpty is hard to put together again). And because he thinks current Afghanistan is more violent, more oppressive and generally worse than any likely alternative Afghanistan or the one that existed before 9-11...and so on. Frequently, its a disagreement about emphasis. Such disagreements tend to be more prolonged and wordy than just being on opposite sides of an issue..

Also, I want to make it clear (again) that I am NOT saying the world will end if the US were to leave Afghanistan. I keep saying that as an American, I think we should have left yesterday. Not just Afghanistan but also a lot of the the other intervening the US does in the world (and yes, even the heavy lifting the US does on behalf of Israel, at great expense to its own reputation for fairness etc etc). Its as a Pakistani that I worry that this (poorly planned, poorly executed?) chance to reverse a dangerous course in that region (the systematic growth of the transnational jihadi complex, with some or a lot of ISI support, in the 1990s) is being lost because of various miscalculations by all sides and a poorly executed withdrawal will make things worse.. that what lies ahead for the poor people of Pakistan and Afghanistan may be worse than what came before.

Bob's World

09-28-2011, 11:41 PM

The bulk of the insurgency that we actually fight in Afghanistan is not political. The rural areas are largely apolitical and self-governing. Always have been, and likely will continue to be so into the foreseeable future. That aspect of the insurgency is primarily a Resistance insurgency. The harder we push against it (with guns or butter) the harder it will push back. Such is resistance. We focus our "reintegration" efforts on this group as well, but truth be told most reintegrate every winter and rejoin the fight following the Poppy harvest.

The political aspect of the insurgency that must be resolved if GIRoA wants the fighting to end is the Revolutionary leadership that is largely in the various groups we lump as "Taliban" in Pakistan. Quetta Shura, Haqqani Network, HEK, etc. Reconciliation is indeed the key for this component of the insurgency. Not all of the key leaders per se, but certainly reconciliation of the key issues.

But that is all Afghan business; we really (as the resistance shows) make it worse for our presence. As to AQ? Their primary sanctuary is in the support of the Revolutionary leadership and their populace in Pakistan. If we want AQ evicted, the fastest route is through the Taliban, not either of the Governments of the region.

ganulv

09-29-2011, 12:08 AM

The bulk of the insurgency that we actually fight in Afghanistan is not political. The rural areas are largely apolitical and self-governing. Always have been, and likely will continue to be so into the foreseeable future.

Just curious, but was there any reliable documentation of the hows of governance in rural Afghanistan during the existence of the IEA (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Islamic_Emirate_of_Afghanistan)? Or any post-OEF projects attempting to reconstruct the same?

Dayuhan

09-29-2011, 12:46 AM

China will never inherit the role that the US currently plays in Afghanistan because China understands what the US does not: That their interests there can be addressed through whatever government happens to rise to power, and that they have no need to attempt to shape or preserve any particular government of Afghanistan.

The US used to see the world more as China does in this regard, but as we entered the 20th Century we strove to be like "grown up" Western powers and take on Colonial possesions of our own; and as we surpassed Western powers at the end of WWII we apparently adopted the worst aspects of French and British Colonial policies and practices in our own American approach to exercising economic and containment influence around the globe.

China, who suffered on the receiving end of Western Colonialism, shows little inclination to similarly adopt the worst practices of the West, but will certainly attempt to glean out the best practices to apply as they seek to expand their own economy and influence beyond their current borders.

I'm not sure this is accurate. What China is doing in Africa today is closer to classic colonialism than anything the US got up to in the Cold War.

Like classic European colonialism, Much of China's overseas involvement is overtly about economics: access to resources and economic gain. American involvement in the Cold War had an economic side, but the primary driver was political: the perceived need to contain Communism. Many of the more egregious and destructive American Cold War excesses were in places where the US had no economic interests and no potential economic gain.

I do not think the Chinese will replace the US in Afghanistan: there's no reason why they should, economic or otherwise. I do think it entirely likely that China will eventually find itself sunk in a COIN/FID black hole, probably somewhere in Africa, defending a government that the Chinese believe is necessary to sustain their economic interests. Imagine, for example, the rise of an insurgent movement with a strong anti-Chinese slant, including demands for nationalization of Chinese investment, in, say, Angola. Not at all farfetched, and while the Chinese policy of unabashed bribery wins friends and influences people in high places, it arouses a fair bit of resentment lower down. The policy of buying up farmland and importing Chinese labor to work it seems like it could be a bit inflammatory as well.

We'll see, but I really don't think the Chinese have discovered some better way of dealing with the developing world. Their decisions are just recent enough to have not snapped back in their faces... yet.

Dayuhan

09-29-2011, 12:55 AM

The political aspect of the insurgency that must be resolved if GIRoA wants the fighting to end is the Revolutionary leadership that is largely in the various groups we lump as "Taliban" in Pakistan. Quetta Shura, Haqqani Network, HEK, etc. Reconciliation is indeed the key for this component of the insurgency. Not all of the key leaders per se, but certainly reconciliation of the key issues.

I don't see how the GIRoA can pursue "reconciliation of the key issues", short of stepping down and letting the Taliban take over. The key issues aren't about participation and inclusion, they are about power. The Taliban had it, they lost it, they want it back. As Omar says, sharing is not realistically in the picture. There is going to be a winner and a loser, and the winner will oppress the loser and have to deal with the resulting insurgency. We can no more change that than Canute could reverse the tides. Worldly power has its limits.

But that is all Afghan business; we really (as the resistance shows) make it worse for our presence. As to AQ? Their primary sanctuary is in the support of the Revolutionary leadership and their populace in Pakistan. If we want AQ evicted, the fastest route is through the Taliban, not either of the Governments of the region.

Why would the Taliban cooperate with us to control AQ?

Certainly leaving Afghanistan and seeing the Taliban take over would not be the end of the world. It would be perceived, globally, as defeat for us, but we could survive that. There would likely be problems down the road with further AQ probes and provocations, likely in the form of terrorist attack, but we could survive that.

Maybe next time around our response would be smarter, who knows?

Ken White

09-29-2011, 01:48 AM

Maybe next time around our response would be smarter, who knows?One can only hope... :wry:

omarali50

09-29-2011, 03:02 AM

My fear is that there will be no clean victory or even defeat. Much treasure and blood will be wasted in a muddled policy for a few more years....I am, as you can tell, not delighted by my own predictions and wish they turn out to be wrong.

Dayuhan

09-29-2011, 03:21 AM

Optimist...

I've never been called that before. There's a first time for everything, I guess...

Steve the Planner

09-30-2011, 12:59 AM

Dayuhan

09-30-2011, 01:40 AM

Dahuyan's point about classic colonialism is strong, but why would China want the trouble or bother of managing "Afghanistan." They just want unfettered access and influence over the resources that matter to them (which are not really national, are they?).

I can't imagine the Chinese wanting to manage Afghanistan. There's nothing there they want badly enough to be anywhere nearly worth the trouble.

In Africa, they are not out to control deserts or cities (no governance interest whatsoever)---just the resources.

Resource policy and foreign investment policy are very much governance functions and governance concerns.

The people, within what ever "terms of trade" allow, and protection of China's interests from harm, are free to do what ever they want culturally, socially, religiously, and politically.

We'll see what happens when somebody wants to nationalize Chinese-owned business, or revoke a business agreement on the grounds that it was approved because of a bribe, or take back agricultural land that is being worked by Chinese companies with imported Chinese labor...

We somehow have an interest in dominating an area governmentally and societally which is very bizarre, and has no obvious "resource" purposes, other than drone and landing rights.

It is very bizarre indeed, and there's no even marginally credible economic justification or other hard interest to justify our desire to shape Afghan governance. I think a great deal of it stems from a domestic political imperative: if we're going to intervene and remove a government, we feel obligated to replace it with something our people - not necessarily theirs - will recognize as "democracy", and thus "good". Once that goal is adopted it takes on a life of its own and endures beyond reason.

ganulv

09-30-2011, 01:48 PM

Just curious about all these contradictory frameworks. If Afghanistan is actually a fractured (valleys), regional, or multi-ethnic non-melting pot, what exactly drives and supports the all or nothing framework of "Taliban vs. Non-Taliban."

Why not, for example, just arm the hell out of the other minorities, then get out of the way.

One of the members of the faculty of my graduate program recommended the following course of action in
an article published ten years ago (http://dl.dropbox.com/u/19877909/Shahrani%E2%80%94Not%20%E2%80%9CWho%3F%E2%80%9D%20 but%20%E2%80%9CHow%3F%E2%80%9D.pdf):
It is for this reason that priority should not be given to the question of who will rule Afghanistan. Instead, we must ask how should a post-Taliban Afghanistan be governed? Any attempt to re-impose a strong centralized regime controlled by a single family, clan, tribe, or ethnic group, whether Pashtoon or non-Pashtoon, must be and will be strongly resisted. Strong, centralized regimes in multi-ethnic societies such as Afghanistan tend to breed nepotism, cronyism, and internal colonialism by the ruling clique.

Instead, the international community should encourage and empower a government that builds on and recognizes the crucial role of the self-governing local communities that emerged in the period of anti-Soviet jihad during the 1980s. They should encourage a government which accepts the principles of community self-governance at the village, subdistrict, district, and provincial levels, and is committed to the formation of a broad-based federal structure that reflects the ethnic composition of Afghan society as a whole.

The local autonomy and political integrity of every segment of Afghanistan’s ethnic and sectarian social mosaic must be guaranteed by a new national constitution and a decentralized federal governance structure. Only then will it be possible for the peoples of Afghanistan to begin rebuilding their shattered communities and regain their self-confidence in a democratic, multinational Afghanistan.

And here is his take on things eight years later (http://dl.dropbox.com/u/19877909/Shahrani%E2%80%94Afghanistan%E2%80%99s%20alternati ves%20for%20peace%2C%20governance%20and%20developm ent.pdf).

omarali50

09-30-2011, 03:54 PM

One obvious problem is that people actually DO want to have some trade and travel outside their own valley and some protection from brigands next door. Total anarchy is very tiresome. So tiresome that when the taliban enforced order, it was welcomed in many parts of the country. A broader division into Northern, Herat, Hazara and South-Eastern Afghanistan is possible, but since borders are not defined, will inevitably lead to war. Also, the small but influential educated population does have a notion of "Afghan" identity and some degree of patriotic feeling for a united Afghanistan. Finally, while Islamic solidarity is not enough to solve all problems, its appeal for newly "educated" madressah and school graduates is sufficient to ensure that it too will be used as a basis for a more ambitious program of unity.
A united Afghanistan under a reasonable and not too locally intrusive regime is the best option. The current flawed regime COULD evolve into a workable arrangement although its not an easy job. This difficult job becomes practically impossible if neighbors devote considerable resources to undermining it and provide a safe haven and a viable alternative waiting in the wings...but maybe it cannot be fixed. There is no law saying everything WILL be fixed.

Steve the Planner

10-01-2011, 03:01 AM

Ganulv:

I was involved in an Int'l Reconstruction Forum Last Night---Post-Disaster.

How do you find ways for government to create the minimum framework for reconstruction---in order to empower communities to take it from there.

Too much government will trounce recovery, make people and communities stand aside of bicker over: Where is mine?

Omar:

I think its is the basic concept of economics that drives and supports inter-community relations, that later becomes something recognized as a country, or in the worst case, creates targeted purposes for the basis of a meaningful relationship between nation, community and people.

I grow tomatoes in my valley. Two valleys over is a city that needs my products. How is this going to get worked out?

If the army from some pother city or region comes and plops itself down in the middle of the road, all three valleys could get screwed. What purpose does it serve that supports each community, or meaningfully protects some interest of two from the interference by a third?

That exchange and resolution process is how towns and areas become regions, regions become states, and states devised compacts that equate to nation.

Americans don't understand that in 1950's US, to drive from Washington to Norfolk was impossible: One local speed trap after another; everybody's brother-in-law needed the cash from wary travelers. So you took a Night Boat back and forth on the national waterways.

The compact of federal roads not locally policed was an underpinning of the Interstate system, but was not painless along its route, where many places were bypassed and the old ways collapsed. That system, and the compacts and changes that made it work, did not happen overnight, had an important and valuable purpose, and left some in the dust.

Development and Planning are about choices, which inherently include winners, losers and consequences.

None of this stuff has been broached in Afghanistan (and may never be on a national basis). A federal road, free from local obstructions and bandits (legal and otherwise), let alone an international one, becomes essential at some point for prosperity across Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India (and the points North and South), but the compacts have not emerged yet as locally, nationally or internationally supported venues.

I have actually always been intrigued by the Pashtuns as some of the last of the mohicans---valley warriors with no future and lots of challenges---trying to rely on their intimidating geography, customs and practices to keep the old ways unimpeded, but they have been in constant spurts of confrontations with foreign powers of all varieties.

As more resources are found and exploited, the Hindus River Valley packs with people, the international region presses forward, their gooses are cooked if they don't (a) change to carve out a realistic accommodation; or (b) assimilate into undifferentiated existence. Just the way it is.

21st Century is not the 18th, and they are not fighting Flashman and the sporadic British excursions into their homeland. History, population pressure, economic geography, and resource demands will run them over, but it ain't going to be smooth and easy for anyone.

JMA

10-01-2011, 05:06 AM

Dahuyan's point about classic colonialism is strong, but why would China want the trouble or bother of managing "Afghanistan." They just want unfettered access and influence over the resources that matter to them (which are not really national, are they?).

In Africa, they are not out to control deserts or cities (no governance interest whatsoever)---just the resources.

The people, within what ever "terms of trade" allow, and protection of China's interests from harm, are free to do what ever they want culturally, socially, religiously, and politically.

It seems to me that because the 'western' approach in places like Africa (in general) and Afghanistan is totally insanely incompetent that somehow (mainly seemingly because it is different) the Chinese approach is smarter.

The Chinese approach has not been tested. When the regimes (who have been bought by the Chinese) fail to protect the Chinese 'investments' (which are being more readily seen as the looting of national resources) or the regime changes and the new one also wants a piece of the action we will see how the Chinese react. Of course one would expect western countries to throw the odd spanner in the works to make it more difficult for the Chinese.

I would be cautious in presenting the once isolationist Chinese as savvy international players.

JMA

10-01-2011, 05:38 AM

Fuchs

10-01-2011, 07:02 AM

I'm a bit surprised by a small wave of very optimistic reports from Afghanistan (British area) - by persons who are almost certainly not planted for propaganda (I knew them a bit for a while).

These reports are about how things are turning - not merely because of higher force density, but especially in regard to examples of motivated and capable AN forces and civilians turning their backs on the TB.

Now I do wonder whether these anecdotes represent something larger. After all, there are still more than enough bad news.

davidbfpo

10-01-2011, 08:58 AM

Fuchs,

Could you provide links to:
.. a small wave of very optimistic reports from Afghanistan (British area) - by persons who are almost certainly not planted for propaganda...

davidbfpo

10-01-2011, 09:11 AM

JMA posed an important strategic question, albeit with application beyond Afghanistan:
The Chinese approach has not been tested. When the regimes (who have been bought by the Chinese) fail to protect the Chinese 'investments' (which are being more readily seen as the looting of national resources) or the regime changes and the new one also wants a piece of the action we will see how the Chinese react.

This issue appeared once briefly at an Oxford conference on international terrorism, in the Africa session; remarks were made about the Tan-Zam railway and the social consequences with dual heritage / mixed race children.

We may have a test case in Zambia, where in a democratic election the new President has indicated a different stance on foreign investors:
..he has frequently criticised foreign mining firms - often from China - about labour conditions. While the party has disputed media reports that it is anti-Chinese, his election is likely to shake up the way contracts are awarded, our correspondent says.

Link:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-15039094 For more on the new President: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-15034694

Steve the Planner

10-01-2011, 01:36 PM

David:

Good catches.

I just don't believe that the "Chinese" model is, in fact a development model.

It is a completely gratuitous and self-serving "economic" model intended exclusively to meet Chinese resource objectives (Did I say "purely market-based?).

If they, like our US industries in the 19th Century, need a railroad, they will get one built or more elsewhere. The railroad was not built to promote development outside the context it served. It was not built to win any hearts and minds (COIN), and it had no external purpose, objective or intention.

It did, however, have consequences, positive and negative, across the economic landscape.

To the extent that local and domestic "costs" increase in these resource areas, they will simply move on to other places. It is pure self interest.

The question of whether this tried and true economic model creates significant political consequences, induces or sustains local corruption and bribery, disenfranchises some, eradicates others, and, in the end, is sustainable or desirable, is a completely different matter.

Basic self-interest, as with China, is a negotiated and usually pretty transparent process with a host country, region or area. For them, the equation is simple, but that does not mean that it is for the counterparty,nor that there are not substantially different (or even more important) internalized counterparty issues.

Apples and Oranges cannot be interbred, but they can, sometimes, make a good fruit punch (or go stale).

Steve the Planner

10-01-2011, 01:47 PM

PS:

In the next month, the planning profession has upcoming three interesting talks at the National Building Museum: One on the Legacy of Jane Jacobs; one on recent economic sustainability issues (against ever-changing dynamics); and one on urban sustainability issues. The focus, as always, is on how to effectively engage communities to attempt (always attempting) to tackle their ongoing (they NEVER go away) problems.

Aren't these, somehow, something that COIN should learn to understand and embrace if it is to accomplish its intended goals?

The World really doesn't change just because the Pentagon creates acronyms (and budgets) for it.

JMA

10-01-2011, 08:55 PM

JMA posed an important strategic question, albeit with application beyond Afghanistan:

This issue appeared once briefly at an Oxford conference on international terrorism, in the Africa session; remarks were made about the Tan-Zam railway and the social consequences with dual heritage / mixed race children.

We may have a test case in Zambia, where in a democratic election the new President has indicated a different stance on foreign investors:

Link:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-15039094 For more on the new President: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-15034694

Zambia is a worthy case study to watch in this regard.

This article Thanks China, now go home: buy-up of Zambia revives old colonial fears (http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2007/feb/05/china.chrismcgreal) has some interesting comments:

First the 'Oops' moment (when they realise they jumped from the frying pan into the fire):

"Our textile factories can't compete with cheap Chinese imports subsidised by a foreign government. People are saying: 'We've had bad people before. The whites were bad, the Indians were worse but the Chinese are worst of all.'"

...well as they say in the classics... you make your bed now you must sleep in it.

Then a more cerebral argument:

"The government needs to be very clear about what kind of investment it wants. If it's just shipping out resources and shipping in cheap goods and people that's not to our benefit. We in Zambia need to be very careful of this new scramble for Africa. What's happening is that the Chinese are very aggressive. They have a strategic plan."

For those with a greater interest in this aspect:

China-Africa Economic Relations: The Case of Zambia (http://www.aercafrica.org/documents/china_africa_relations/Zambia.pdf)

ganulv

10-02-2011, 01:03 AM

Ganulv:

I was involved in an Int'l Reconstruction Forum Last Night---Post-Disaster.

How do you find ways for government to create the minimum framework for reconstruction---in order to empower communities to take it from there.

My limited knowledge of the history and current situation in Afghanistan (some of it second hand, most of it from a greater remove) leads me to believe that the average Afghan has good reason to be suspicious of the motives of the national government. If this is indeed the case, I would think that large scale infrastructure programs and extensive training of the ANP are doomed to fail (not necessarily forever, but at least as long as the distrust of the/a national government remains).

In the effort to provide the right answers the asking of the right questions may have been overlooked. There has been so much discussion of Afghanistan as a failed state (a mouthtalk (http://www.jstor.org/stable/3629468) term if ever there were one) that the fact that Afghans seem to do well enough at governance at more local levels seems to be being too often overlooked. Really, does it get much more patronizing than to look at local communities that survived the Red Army and the Taliban and think that government in a box giftwrapped with Western paper is the answer to what ails them? Now, if the fact is that some of us think their societies are broken because of the way women are treated then we are dealing with questions of relative values and that’s a horse of a different color. :rolleyes:

davidbfpo

10-02-2011, 09:56 AM

The issue of 'How will China react to lost investments?' is now in a separate thread as it deserves one and not to be lost within the Afghan conflict. Link to new thread:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=14271

Steve the Planner

10-02-2011, 07:44 PM

ganulv:

Problem definitions are job one: What, exactly is the problem for which resources are to be addressed to obtain progress.

We continue to ask the wrong questions, then provide sometimes weird and changing resources that do not seem to create the progress towards the ever-changing goals.

Here's a simple problem definition/goal statement: eradicated AQ; AQ equals Taliban.

Solution: Nuclear, chemical and biological assault on large swaths of Afghanistan and Pakistan; leave no stone unturned and salt the fields (Carthage).

Another: Segregate the the Taliban from AQ.

Solution: Targeted strategy to make it more trouble than its is worth.

Another: Assist Afghan civil society (primarily sub-national) in limiting the dilatory effects of radical Taliban activities (AQ, international attrocities).

Solution: Incremental, nuances and long-term civil engagement (Strategic patience) in support of sub-national systems while increasing the "costs" and "consequences" (limited military) for those involved in supporting dilatory activities.

Another: Create a new Afghanistan modeled on delusions of nebulous Western goals applied to a different society, place, culture and economy.

Solution: Scratch head, pour in endless resources, change strategy often. Do the same over and over.

Ken White

10-02-2011, 08:57 PM

Go, smite the bad actors mightily, leave, tell the UN to fix it, send money.

:cool:

Far more effective and much cheaper (in all aspects, including human misery and injury) than most PC alternatives. :wry:

omarali50

10-02-2011, 11:38 PM

Ken, a lot of the disagreements are due to difference in opinion regarding who the bad guys are; Are they some crazy arabs who happen to have found a base in Afpak? or are they the entire top-to-bottom network of Islamist warriors who operate with and without state support and patronage? Or are they just the high level ideologues and organizers within the state who operate the network (meaning one can leave the foot soldiers alone and go straight for the head)? or just the particular people involved in plotting and carrying out a particular attack?
In my own view, changing the strategic direction of the Pakistani military was more important than finding and killing any particular crazy Arab (because without state support this is just a minor headache and not worthy of a trillion dollar bondoogle). I also think this was possible...maybe is still possible. In this view, I remain in a minority even on this forum.
Over to Robert sahib ;)

Ken White

10-03-2011, 01:36 AM

Are they some crazy arabs who happen to have found a base in Afpak?White's Apothegm.
...the entire top-to-bottom network of Islamist warriors who operate with and without state support and patronage?With: Diplomacy backed by White's Apothegm, robustly applied -- once or twice, won't have to do it often after the first couple.

Without: Better Intelligence, robust covert action bribed / coerced / somehow obtained -- or not, circumstances dependent -- cooperation / concurrence from the hosting government(s). Again backed by White's Apothegm.

We (the US) are not stupid (though there are pockets of ignorance in high places) but we are hide bound and inflexible. We are also entirely too internally focused politically. We have folks capable of adequate flexibility but the system will not unleash them due to said ignorance, conservatism and it cannot or will not anticipate foreign problems because it is too self involved... :rolleyes:
Or are they just the high level ideologues and organizers within the state who operate the network (meaning one can leave the foot soldiers alone and go straight for the head)? or just the particular people involved in plotting and carrying out a particular attack?Yes and 'C', both of the above...
In my own view, changing the strategic direction of the Pakistani military was more important than finding and killing any particular crazy Arab (because without state support this is just a minor headache and not worthy of a trillion dollar bondoogle). I also think this was possible...maybe is still possible. In this view, I remain in a minority even on this forum.Allow me to join you in that possibly minority position and posit that our big mistook was conflating Afghanistan (Problem B) and Pakistan (Problem A). We also put 'B' before 'A' and that wasn't wise. Pakistan should've been engaged long before we did (another thread, that...) and more cooperatively. Afghanistan should have been hit when it was or even earlier (not like we didn't know there were problems brewing there...) and been clear of US troops by, say, January or February of 2002.