Winning the War in Afghanistan

[Dayuhan]

Problem with Oil/Gas inland/maritime exchange is not about whether it is technically feasible, but which resources were invested in, and the immediate impacts of change.

Right now, there are some pipelines and some tankers going to different markets, with investments in either being substantial and long-term.

There's a fundamental difference between tankers and pipelines... pipelines only go to one place. A country with an oil port, say Saudi Arabia, can load tankers going to a dozen different destinations at the same time. Kazakhstan or Turkmenistan are limited to where the pipelines go. Cuts the options a bit.


Right. If kinks in that hose (now or in the future) occur, they would affect those dependent on that hose--not likely to be US.

One reality of the oil business is that a kink in anyone's hose affects everyone else. If the Chinese hose from Kazakhstan gets kinked, the Chinese won't stop burning oil. They'll buy on the spot market, push the price up, and compete to buy the oil that other buyers are now getting. Because they have lots of money, they can compete quite effectively. Just because Angola sells to China and Nigeria sells to the US doesn't mean Angolan oil is "Chinese supply" or Nigerian oil is "American oil". Either will sell to the highest bidder, like everybody else.

Cutting off oil supply from one country to another is not quite the weapon it's sometimes thought to be. It doesn't starve that country, just pushes the price up for everyone.

[JMA]

The only real reason we stick our nose into a good many conflicts is that accursed and pathetic 'do gooder' mentality. It has done us no favors over the years. :mad:

We have touched this before and IMHO the reason these adventures so often end in tears is because the military plan is conceived by politicians and yes-man generals and then poorly implemented both strategically and tactically.

[Steve the Planner]

Dayuhan:

True tbat the leg bone is connected to the tailbone, but the practical reality is that if anyone affects the supply (with price increases), they also directly affect the income and stability of the country affected.

I understood the issue to be more related to whether potential kinks in the supply chain warrant US military engagement on the old Silk Road.

I'm with Ken's approach---sitting on the sidelines is sometimes beneficial.

[Bob's World]

I submit we shouldn't be concerned with deterring such conflicts in that and several other locations around the world where we really have no interests...

Other than commercial, of course -- but that 'reason' is often ferociously overstated and embellished to appear far more valuable than it actually will be. The only real reason we stick our nose into a good many conflicts is that accursed and pathetic 'do gooder' mentality. It has done us no favors over the years. :mad:

I just mean US deterrence in general, the effect of the end of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union; not the result of any specific program of deterrence so much as just not being anyone out there willing to risk conflict with the US as they do their own Cost-Risk/benefit analysis.

Call it "hegemony" if you will. I think we had about 4-5 years at the end of WWII; and another longer period post Soviet collapse that is probably already over. I point this out to people (not you I suspect) who have bought into the wild idea that the future is all about Irregular Warfare and that major state on state warfare is largely obsolete. My personal opinion is that there are a lot of unresolved issues that have been temporarily set on hold or "frozen" due to US hegemony that will become increasingly active and violent if need be.

I think Central Asia, with its underdeveloped resources, and sitting between a lot of more powerful, resource hungry neighbors is a likely place for conflict. One that I agree we should stay completely out of.

[Ken White]

I just mean US deterrence in general...I point this out to people (sic) who have bought into the wild idea that the future is all about Irregular Warfare and that major state on state warfare is largely obsolete. My personal opinion is that there are a lot of unresolved issues that have been temporarily set on hold or "frozen" due to US hegemony that will become increasingly active and violent if need be. {* added / kw)

I think Central Asia, with its underdeveloped resources, and sitting between a lot of more powerful, resource hungry neighbors is a likely place for conflict. One that I agree we should stay completely out of....also Em-fat-i-cally, absolutely -- and Roger that. :cool:

I'd only add that * denotes a fog bank (defined as an area of apparent grayness...) with which I think we are not prepared to cope -- and I'm afraid a fog horn and full speed ahead aren't the right answers, particularly with our Radar set on the 1 mile range gate...:(

[Bill Moore]

While none of us actually know how the future will unfold, I really can't see how a conflict over energy in Central Asia would be localized. The potential confluence of seller, buyer, middle man interests and then their allies interests "could" result in a wider scale conflict that will effect more than the region. I'm not advocating U.S. involvement in other people's fights, but rather supporting Bob's argument that deterrence is probably in our national interests. Whether deterrence will work or not has always been questionable.

Irregular warfare will remain (as it has for years) a persistent condition globally that will challenge our security interests in some locations, but the greatest threats are still state versus state conflicts, and of course they'll leverage the irregular actors where possible to augment other efforts (just as they did during the two world wars).

The SECDEF was correct IMO when he said we need balanced capabilities, but I suspect we're way out of balance at the moment.

[Bob's World]

Bill,

Information technology advances will continue, so IW will continue as well. States are outside the OODA loop of "controlling" just about everything these days. When I warn of the rise of state on state competition and conflict I do not mean to imply that irregular competition and conflict will wane.

We will soon be enjoying the worst of both worlds, so to speak. Key is to take a major appetite suppressant as to what one convinces them self they must exercise control over. Currently we cast far too wide a net in that regard. "Influence" is the coin of the realm in the emerging competition / conflict ecosystem and that is a fuzzy concept that we have not been managing very effectively of late. Relying too heavily on military might may well earn a certain type of respect, but it can burn a lot of influence as well.

More and more the US must order or bribe or both to form "alliances of the willing" (I believe it is a bit of a Freudian recognition that we know these are not truly willing allies, or we would not feel compelled to mention it in the title). Influential leaders are followed, they they do not drive. This is repairable, but some fundamental changes are in order.

[Ken White]

...supporting Bob's argument that deterrence is probably in our national interests. Whether deterrence will work or not has always been questionable.Noting your "probably" I'm unsure that doing something questionable is in our interest. :confused:

We need to be able to deter -- however, we must determine what we need to deter. I suggest we've erred in trying to 'deter' things that didn't need deterring (Viet Nam, Lebanon) and things that we could not deter (Somalia among others) while we have failed to deter things that we should have (30 years of probes from the Middle East). :(

As we all know, deterrence can take many approaches...

[JMA]

Irregular warfare will remain (as it has for years) a persistent condition globally that will challenge our security interests in some locations, ...

Then I suggest that the US and the Brits (in the main) start to apply themselves to fighting and winning these irregular small wars as an immediate priority.

[Ken White]

Then I suggest that the US and the Brits (in the main) start to apply themselves to fighting and winning these irregular small wars as an immediate priority.Neither we or the British have much reason to participate in large number in many if any of those contests.

Build a strong capability, in a Democracy, and it will cry to be used -- whether it's necessary or not. Better to have slight capability and be able to to adjust if required. A good specialist will beat a good generalist in a specialized effort, a prudent generalist would avoid that by any means, fair or foul. There are other ways to deter, impact, disrupt. It is just stupid to play by the rules of another on his court...

I've asked many times here for someone to name me a successful Small War in the IW arena won by any large force from a big or wealthy bureaucratic nation. I've also asked for someone to name me one that the US really should have been involved with. I'm still waiting.

(Note underlines...)

[Steve the Planner]

Ken:

I thought I had a few, but Wikipedia tells me they were just movies. My mistake.

Steve

[JMA]

Neither we or the British have much reason to participate in large number in many if any of those contests.

Agreed... but you have and you will (thanks to your respective politicians).


Build a strong capability, in a Democracy, and it will cry to be used -- whether it's necessary or not. Better to have slight capability and be able to to adjust if required. A good specialist will beat a good generalist in a specialized effort, a prudent generalist would avoid that by any means, fair or foul. There are other ways to deter, impact, disrupt. It is just stupid to play by the rules of another on his court...

The capability needs to be built because it is going to be used as it has in the recent past.

The US has a 3m man military - half active, half reserve. Take a quarter million from each and prepare them, train them for interventions of an irregular war nature. Let the remainder prepare for the war with Russia or China that will never come... unless you are expecting an invasion from Mexico.

This approach will have a significant benefit for the US military in that it will force the military to attend to the (internationally acknowledged if not locally) weakness in the US military in the inability of companies/platoons/squads ability to operate independently with the specific command skill requirement thereof.

Secondly it will remove the 'tour mentality' that has been applied to war since Korea and at the same time keep the units and their command more constant and stable. 100 times better than right now I would say.


I've asked many times here for someone to name me a successful Small War in the IW arena won by any large force from a big or wealthy bureaucratic nation. I've also asked for someone to name me one that the US really should have been involved with. I'm still waiting.

(Note underlines...)

Its a good question... but its irrelevant. The politicians screw it up all the time and sadly so do the generals. Looking at this little exercise in Libya its hard to believe it but Obama managed to screw that as well (and he is surrounded by military advisors). One notices from the Brit military that at or around Lt Col senior officers need to become politically astute to survive and advance. What that level is in the US I don't know but it will be there. The problem is that these senior officers (many of whom have abundant physical courage) don't have much in the way of the moral courage required to stand up to the politicians even if it means an end to their military careers.

The beauty about these small wars is that they are fought at battalion level and below.

[Dayuhan]

Looking at this little exercise in Libya its hard to believe it but Obama managed to screw that as well (and he is surrounded by military advisors).

How so? MG is out, and without commitment of substantial outside ground forces. The US isn't trying to install or maintain a government, and has a half decent chance of staying uncommitted in the inevitable post-MG mess. Those were the objectives. They were achieved. What's the problem?


The beauty about these small wars is that they are fought at battalion level and below.

Maybe so, but they can be won and lost at the policy level. We screwed up in Afghanistan when we decided to install and maintain an Afghan government. Once that decision was made there was very little that could be done at any level to avoid sinking into the mire.

If winning is achieving your objective, the first and most important step to winning is to select clear, practical, objectives that are realistically achievable with the resources and within the time that you're willing to commit. That's not something the US has done terribly well.

[carl]

I've asked many times here for someone to name me a successful Small War in the IW arena won by any large force from a big or wealthy bureaucratic nation.

(Note underlines...)

How about the Philippines in the early 1900s?

Or how about all the insurrections put down by the Soviets within their empire, the USSR?

I know Malaya won't be accepted but I can never figure out why not.

(I am assuming IW means irregular warfare.)

[Bob's World]

The Philippines have been in a continuous state of low to high level insurgency since the Spanish first landed. No victories there.

Government suppression of those segments of the populace who dare to stand up for themselves are Pyhrric victories at best.

As to Malaya? The Brits finally conceded that they had no legitimacy or right to govern Malaya and finally removed the office of the high commissioner and also ensured that the ethnic Chinese populace had their civil rights issues addressed to the degree that they no longer supported the insurgents. They removed the thorn of external colonial intervention from the paw of the oppressed and aggrieved segment of the populace that the insurgency arose from.

There are always many motivations for why one joins an insurgency, but causation? That almost invariably derives primarily from how government governs and how some or various distinct and significant segments of the populace feel about the same.

True victories are where government evolves to address their shortcomings. So yes, of all your examples, Malaya is the best of good COIN; but not for the reasons found in military accounts of that insurgency.

[Steve the Planner]

Hate to sound like a very broken record, but there is a big difference between using SF for a targeted and localized mission, and building democracy, participatory governance and community engagement-either locally or up through the governance chain.

Back to Dahuyan's comment: A specialist beats a generalist. There is no generalist theory of new governance that has ever shown any enduring value. Soup with knives, cups of tea, hearts and mind, money as a weapon, etc... do not create viable communities or community governances---ground truth shows the opposite. Never worked in any neighborhood any of you ever lived in, and never would. Why should it work anywhere else.

It would be fun sometime to explain to the military why none of this stuff ever works, but it would require a willing organizational audience.

Libya, at present, is a community governance/participation problem for Libyans.

[Bill Moore]

Steve,


There is no generalist theory of new governance that has ever shown any enduring value. Soup with knives, cups of tea, hearts and mind, money as a weapon, etc... do not create viable communities or community governances---ground truth shows the opposite. Never worked in any neighborhood any of you ever lived in, and never would. Why should it work anywhere else.

Are you implying we have such specialists in the military or even the government? Actually I suspect history will support the argument that specialists are academics and very ineffective in the real world. It is very much the generalist, or rather the individual leader who the people either willingly embrace or fear that enables the development of new governments. Most won't be overly effective whether designed by a specialist or a generalist, it is the nature of government to be somewhat ineffective.

[Surferbeetle]

Are you implying we have such specialists in the military or even the government? Actually I suspect history will support the argument that specialists are academics and very ineffective in the real world. It is very much the generalist, or rather the individual leader who the people either willingly embrace or fear that enables the development of new governments. Most won't be overly effective whether designed by a specialist or a generalist, it is the nature of government to be somewhat ineffective.

Hmmm...so let's save the USG (...or Russian Gov, or Egyptian Gov, or...) some cash, wander over to Mickey D's and pick us up some generalists who will function as:

...drone pilots, satcom operators, and sf/d-boy stand-in's for tonights HVT mission. Specialists/academics are not needed...

...folks who will perform tonights emergency room shift and take care of broken bones, gsw, head injuries, internal damage, and follow on icu care. Specialists/academics are not needed...

....folks who can develop an engineering design, cost estimate, work breakdown statement, project schedule, statement of work, quality assurance/quality control plan, negotiate a contract, manage a contract, qualify for a construction bond, run a construction team, and get a country's infrastructure built. Specialists/academics are not needed...

...folks who can operate and maintain a coal-fired, natural-gas fired, oil-fired, or even a nuclear power plant. Specialists/academics are not needed...

...folks who can devise and execute fiscal and monetary policy...

Or, perhaps things are not that simple? ;)

[Ken White]

Agreed... but you have and you will (thanks to your respective politicians).We certainly have; should've learned from Viet Nam that such interventions are foolish. We did, a bit and other than a few little aberrations, we avoided any major commitment along those lines for 30 years. Hopefully, within the next 30 -- and with two strikes to learn from -- we will grow a bit smarter. So there may be no "will."
The capability needs to be built because it is going to be used as it has in the recent past.I don't agree on either count. "It is going to be used" is awfully positive and while you may be correct, I would hope -- as I said above, -- we get a bit smarter. There are other, better ways to handle such situations.

The capability doesn't have to built, it has to available which is not the same thing. Adjustments to training, some underway should be adequate IF they are not halted.
Let the remainder prepare for the war with Russia or China that will never come... unless you are expecting an invasion from Mexico.We've been in several wars that weren't expected. They didn't all come in irregular form, think Korea and Kuwait... ;)
This approach will have a significant benefit for the US military in that it will force the military to attend to the (internationally acknowledged if not locally) weakness in the US military in the inability of companies/platoons/squads ability to operate independently with the specific command skill requirement thereof.We have had a skill deterioration, no question. That is entirely the fault of the training establishment who took decent training programs and tossed them to adopt the atrocious Task, Condition and Standard process, probably so someone could say he brought great change on his watch. We have -- too slowly -- learned that was indeed a mistake and the Army is now groping for a way to fix their problem without admitting they used a flawed process for 30 years. That's the bad news -- the good news is that some units transcend that norm and can and in fact do those things, though there are not enough of them.
Secondly it will remove the 'tour mentality' that has been applied to war since Korea and at the same time keep the units and their command more constant and stable. 100 times better than right now I would say.Maybe, maybe not. Probably not. The tour length is a Congressional issue... :rolleyes:
Its a good question... but its irrelevant.No it isn't. Even dumb politicians eventually learn a little, even dumb American politicians whose egos do not allow the reading of history -- the Army needs to point that out (acknowledging that dumb Generals are another story...).
The politicians screw it up all the time and sadly so do the generals. Looking at this little exercise in Libya its hard to believe it but Obama managed to screw that as well (and he is surrounded by military advisors).As I told you long before it started :D -- and he isn't surrounded by military advisors. By law, he only has one -- the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. He talks to others on occasion but my impression is he talks and they listen...
One notices from the Brit military that at or around Lt Col senior officers need to become politically astute to survive and advance. What that level is in the US I don't know but it will be there. The problem is that these senior officers (many of whom have abundant physical courage) don't have much in the way of the moral courage required to stand up to the politicians even if it means an end to their military careers.Same rank. There's some slight merit in what you say but it's far from totally accurate. It's also far more complex than moral courage -- the degree of military subordination to civilian authority in the US is hard for many from other nations to fathom. It has a very pernicious effect...
The beauty about these small wars is that they are fought at battalion level and below.I can agree with the sentiment and all it conveys but must point out that nowadays those Battalions come from different units, frequently from different nations and small wars are only fought by all those Battalions if their higher headquarters and / or nation allow them to fight and do not otherwise intrude too heavily...

What, Perfesser, is your solution to that little rub? :wry:

[Ken White]

How about the Philippines in the early 1900s?See Bob -- it was never totally quelled, just kept on a low simmer -- and we eventually left...
Or how about all the insurrections put down by the Soviets within their empire, the USSR?Describe today's USSR to me?
I know Malaya won't be accepted but I can never figure out why not.Because the intervening Army was the army of the government of Malaya at that time. The British had total control of ALL aspects of government. That's something no one else has ever had, including us in the Philippines and the Russians in the various SSRs. On Malaya, the distinct and obvious ethnic tilt also was unusual...
(I am assuming IW means irregular warfare.)it does. Not also my emphasis on large forces; a few have been turned by small forces.

My point is that commitment of large conventional forces to such efforts is pretty well a route to failure; certainly to less than stellar success -- there's always a great cost in all aspects to everyone involved for small to no benefit, possibly to detriment...

[Bill Moore]

Steve, you provided a great justification for specialists in general, but tapped danced all around my question and didn't provide an answer. We clearly provided all the specialists you mentioned above and more, what we didn't have was a capable generalist to pull them altogether in a cohesive way. More importantly, the nations we invaded didn't have that person or persons, or perhaps our actions prevented them from achieving power.

[JMA]

We certainly have; should've learned from Viet Nam that such interventions are foolish. We did, a bit and other than a few little aberrations, we avoided any major commitment along those lines for 30 years. Hopefully, within the next 30 -- and with two strikes to learn from -- we will grow a bit smarter. So there may be no "will."

The interventions are only foolish because the generals are not allowed to win. Can't remember anywhere where the US forces were defeated.


I don't agree on either count. "It is going to be used" is awfully positive and while you may be correct, I would hope -- as I said above, -- we get a bit smarter. There are other, better ways to handle such situations.

The capability doesn't have to built, it has to available which is not the same thing. Adjustments to training, some underway should be adequate IF they are not halted.

I said the capability is needed because it is going to be used again and again. You disagree. Your disagreement is based on the hope that this is not true or that despite when you know the need is coming that you should not prepare accordingly?

Politicians get smarter? Individually yes, they are like coyotes but rather than smarter they get more cunning. The problem is that just when a president starts to be in a position to learn from his screw-ups a new one is elected and he brings along a whole entourage of smart guys who have all the answers. When they had a good few thousand soldiers killed and/or maimed they move on and the cycle repeats itself. Its the US electorate that needs to get smart.


We've been in several wars that weren't expected. They didn't all come in irregular form, think Korea and Kuwait...

Then you use the balance of the active and reserve forces (all 2.5m of them - remember I said select and train 0.5m (half active, half reserve) to train for irregular wars).


We have had a skill deterioration, no question. That is entirely the fault of the training establishment who took decent training programs and tossed them to adopt the atrocious Task, Condition and Standard process, probably so someone could say he brought great change on his watch. We have -- too slowly -- learned that was indeed a mistake and the Army is now groping for a way to fix their problem without admitting they used a flawed process for 30 years. That's the bad news -- the good news is that some units transcend that norm and can and in fact do those things, though there are not enough of them.

Come on Ken we live in the ear of the spin doctor. No problem for them to sell change on the basis that with the 21st Century have come new challenges which the military must adapt to. My fear would be that after 30 years there is no one left who remembers how it should be done.


Maybe, maybe not. Probably not. The tour length is a Congressional issue... :rolleyes:

Congress again? Remind me who the enemy is again?


No it isn't. Even dumb politicians eventually learn a little, even dumb American politicians whose egos do not allow the reading of history -- the Army needs to point that out (acknowledging that dumb Generals are another story...).

As I said (above) the politicians rotate so there is always a new crop of guys with big egos who know everything.


As I told you long before it started :D -- and he isn't surrounded by military advisors. By law, he only has one -- the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. He talks to others on occasion but my impression is he talks and they listen...

You were correct with your knowledge of how things work in the US, I was wrong in thinking that because the boys off that carrier could have wrapped it all up over a weekend that would be the preferred option.

I constantly wonder what qualifications are needed for commander in chief. Hitler thought that because he was head of state he somehow inherited the powers of a master military strategist - and see where that got him. The same bloated ego seems to be the problem with US Presidents. I sympathise.


Same rank. There's some slight merit in what you say but it's far from totally accurate. It's also far more complex than moral courage -- the degree of military subordination to civilian authority in the US is hard for many from other nations to fathom. It has a very pernicious effect...

Well it seems the US general staff is full of "yes sir, yes sir, three bags fill sir" types. What happened to the great US warriors who would have replied on Libya as follows: "Mr President we can wrap it up over a weekend but we would be grateful if you would allow us a week so the boys can have some additional live practice while we have the opportunity. Oh yes, and while we are in the area you don't perhaps have any subsidiary targets you would like us to deal with as well? " ;)


I can agree with the sentiment and all it conveys but must point out that nowadays those Battalions come from different units, frequently from different nations and small wars are only fought by all those Battalions if their higher headquarters and / or nation allow them to fight and do not otherwise intrude too heavily...

What, Perfesser, is your solution to that little rub?

Don't complicate it Ken, play to your strengths. All you have to really worry about is what you have control over. Don't concern yourself with the token gesture forces from nations who are just going through the motions.

But remember:

* If the government you are supporting is corrupt or illegitimate or both,

* If the local government's troops are crap or non-existent,

* If your commander's hands and those of his troops are tied by political limitations and RoE,

* If your military deployments lack continuity at all levels,

* If the war is seriously unpopular at home,

... then you have no chance of success!

[Dayuhan]

The interventions are only foolish because the generals are not allowed to win. Can't remember anywhere where the US forces were defeated.

Interventions in support of unpopular, inept, unsustainable governments that have little or no capacity to sustain themselves, without popular support at home are foolish no matter what you allow your generals to do. Even if you manage the temporary "win" of a transient military defeat of the insurgents, you still don't achieve the long term objectives, because those rely on a local capacity that doesn't exist and that you don't have the power to bring into existence.

The only non-foolish thing to do in these cases is to avoid any long-term involvement. If there's something there that really needs to be done, do it and get the hell out. Once you choose to stay, you're in the merde no matter what your strategy and tactics are. Strategy and tactics are the servants of policy and if the policy goals are unachievable (e.g. "install a sustainable western-style democracy" in Afghanistan") no strategy or tactics will make much difference.


I constantly wonder what qualifications are needed for commander in chief. Hitler thought that because he was head of state he somehow inherited the powers of a master military strategist - and see where that got him. The same bloated ego seems to be the problem with US Presidents. I sympathise.

Fortunately our foolish Presidents drag us into survivable conflicts. If we'd had a Hitler we'd have charged off and fought with the Soviet Union and China instead of meddling in little messes, and there would likely not be a United States today.


What happened to the great US warriors who would have replied on Libya as follows: "Mr President we can wrap it up over a weekend but we would be grateful if you would allow us a week so the boys can have some additional live practice while we have the opportunity. Oh yes, and while we are in the area you don't perhaps have any subsidiary targets you would like us to deal with as well? " ;)

That option was of course available, but it would have left the US in the completely unacceptable position of being responsible for the aftermath. Next thing you know we'd be backing an unpopular and unsustainable government with little or no capacity to sustain itself against any number of insurgents, with little or no popular support back home: foolish. Much better to have it the way it went. Of course it's a mess and it will continue to be a mess; post-Daffy Libya was always going to be a mess. It's not our mess, and that was the critical objective that had to be met.

[Ken White]

The interventions are only foolish because the generals are not allowed to win. Can't remember anywhere where the US forces were defeated.Awright. Great! Unbelievable -- but you're finally coming to understand the problem...
I said the capability is needed because it is going to be used again and again. You disagree. Your disagreement is based on the hope that this is not true or that despite when you know the need is coming that you should not prepare accordingly?Don't be snide and condescending, that's unnecessary. Not based on either -- it's based on a broader understanding of US policy and polity than you have or seem willing to accept. We do a lot of stupid things for a variety of good and bad reasons but we aren't therefor necessarily stupid and we do learn, if slowly. ;)

I see glimmers of hope in that direction -- the one potential flaw is the 'do good' mentality. Those squirrels are quite dangerous (see Libya...).
Politicians get smarter?... Its the US electorate that needs to get smart.Not so. They're smart enough -- but they tend to be far too tolerant of well known political foibles. That seems to be happening. Let us pray iot does.
...No problem for them to sell change on the basis that with the 21st Century have come new challenges which the military must adapt to. My fear would be that after 30 years there is no one left who remembers how it should be done.In order, yes but the US Army is absolutely and insanely determined to never admit it makes mistakes. Everyone in the Army knows that's foolish and most Civilians know that also, yet they persist. It's one of their biggest flaws.

That last is more than a valid concern and it is evident that it has already occurred. Too many are reluctant to look at how things were done (or more importantly, why...) but a few are researching. The Army's Asymmetric Warfare Group is a repository of knowledge and good sense due to its wise use of retired persons as contractors and it is trying to affect training. It is moving to TRADOC and that has potential to be beneficial. There are other pockets of rediscovering basics and common sense, we can only hope they are encouraged and grow. Too early to tell but at this point the prognosis is marginal trending to favorable. We'll see.
Congress again? Remind me who the enemy is again?They mean well, really -- but warfighting is WAY down their list of priorities while the happiness of Mom and Pop, the Voters, are way up on that list.
You were correct with your knowledge of how things work in the US, I was wrong in thinking that because the boys off that carrier could have wrapped it all up over a weekend that would be the preferred option.Those days are gone, period / full stop. They have been for over 30 years and you missed it at the time because you were busy. Two important points; that pertains not just to the US; and that reality MUST be a part of planning.
I constantly wonder what qualifications are needed for commander in chief...I sympathise.Thank you, we need all the help we can get on that score. Egos are a terrible thing...:rolleyes:

My personal belief is that there should be no Commander in Chief. The Government should give its order to a Director of Military Operations who must give a minimally directive mission to geographic or type Commander who will design and execute plans to accomplish that mission. Not to be, I don't suppose, we must have bureaucracy...
Well it seems the US general staff is full of "yes sir, yes sir, three bags fill sir" types. What happened to the great US warriors who would have replied on Libya as follows: "Mr President we can wrap it up over a weekend but we would be grateful if you would allow us a week so the boys can have some additional live practice while we have the opportunity. Oh yes, and while we are in the area you don't perhaps have any subsidiary targets you would like us to deal with as well? " ;)The system has always kept those guys (and there are always some stooging about...) under tight control. That control always existed and has since well titled Mad Anthony Wayne retired. It has tightened over the years with only rare exceptions, generally during the Civil War and to a lesser extent in WW II. Since then and particularly since Viet Nam for a variety of both Army and Societal reasons it has worsened, I foresee no major reduction barring an existential war.
...play to your strengths. All you have to really worry about is what you have control over. Don't concern yourself with the token gesture forces from nations who are just going through the motions.I presume the personal pronoun is directed at the US. I agree with you but US consensus on that score is lacking due to an absence of need to focus. Each situation is different and as you know, politics of the day hold sway. It is critical that non-US observer bear in mind that US foreign, defense and military policy is almost entirely driven by American domestic politics. Little -- too little -- attention is paid to the realities internationally.
But remember:
* If the government you are supporting is corrupt or illegitimate or both,
* If the local government's troops are crap or non-existent,
* If your commander's hands and those of his troops are tied by political limitations and RoE,
* If your military deployments lack continuity at all levels,
* If the war is seriously unpopular at home,

... then you have no chance of success!Amazing!!! Absolutely correct (and thus my preference for avoiding such doomed escapades).

After two years you've finally learned the things you blithely ignored that I tried to tell you at the outset... :D

[Steve the Planner]

Bill:

I suppose the issue of specialist and generalist has to do with the task at hand.

I spent enough time in Iraq with the truly magnificent men from Ft. Campbell to know that, within their military tasks, the breadth and depth of their training and expertise made them both capable specialists and generalists.

Where, I believe Dayuhan, Ken and I may differ with you is the nature and purpose of the task.

If, after 2003, Iraq was about transition to civilian control, OR long term administration of a failed state, the SF specializations and generalizations are not the key issue in answering basic next step questions?

How many Americans does it take to change an Iraqi lightbulb?

My guess? About 37. First, a response team to take out the anti-US sniper who shot out the light bulb (plus the ground clearance, air support, TOC oversight, and medevac system). Second, the bulb insertion team (plus all of the above). Last, the logistical chain to deliver the light bulb.

How many Iraqis does it take to change an Iraqi light bulb? One. Either they get it from the government (which might not function), or they buy it on the bountiful black market, then screw it in. Note: Any Iraqi with electricity for a light bulb has already had multiple interactions with the black market to fuel and/or operate his generator. A light bulb is a non-issue.

The inherent problem in this math is not a military one, and little of SF expertise can solve it. Possibly quite the opposite---that failing to solve it induces the need for SF fingers in the dyke that would otherwise not be necessary.

How many Americans does it take to change an Afghan light bulb?

Probably a lot more, especially in places where the theory of a light bulb has yet to become a reality.

Specialists in what?

Generalists in what?

[Surferbeetle]

Bill,

So why no unambiguous, beyond a shadow of a doubt, ‘success’ recognizable to all in Iraq, Afghanistan, the 2008-2009 Financial Meltdown, and the current global fight against The Great Depression # 2?


Has the Mandate of Heaven been bestowed on current leadership (at various levels in our various homelands)?



Does the institution of Democracy, or our daily choices, provide us with regular chances to do better?


Jim Collins’ Level 5 Hierarchy is interesting to think about when observing foreign and domestic leadership at all levels:


Level 1: Capable individual. Make contributions through talent and work ethic


Level 2: Contributing team member. Work effectively with others and contribute to the achievement of group objectives.


Level 3: Competent managers. Organize people and resources to accomplish predetermined objectives


Level 4: Effective leaders. Present clear and compelling vision and lead groups to high performance standards.


Level 5: Executive. Build greatness through a combination of will and humility.


King, W.J., The Unwritten Laws of Business (http://memagazine.asme.org/Articles/2010/October/Unwritten_Laws.cfm), 2007, Profile Books, LTD, London (Originally published in 1944)


However menial and trivial your early assignments may appear, give them your best efforts.


Demonstrate the ability to get things done.


Develop a “Let’s go see!” attitude.


One of the first things you owe your supervisor is to keep him or her informed of all significant developments.


Be as particular as you can in the selection of your supervisor.


Promises, schedules, and estimates are necessary and important instruments in a well‑ordered business.


In dealing with customers and outsiders, remember that you represent the company, ostensibly with full responsibility and authority.

[carl]

Mr. Jones and Ken:

At the risk of you guys hunting me down and killing me while I sleep, for you to reject the 3 examples I gave is sophistry. In the cases of the Philippines and the USSR, you impose a definition of victory that is impossible to achieve and in the case of Malaya, you are quibbling about precise definitions.

In the Philippines, we took over from the Spanish, quashed a rebellion, established authority in all the islands and maintained it until we gave it up as we, eventually, planned. We were not driven out. In fact during the war, the Filipinos fought, pretty hard, on our side. That is a clear and decisive victory...unless you decide that only transformation of the Philippines into Switzerland in the Pacific constitutes victory.

As far as the various components of the USSR go, they were all firmly part of that empire until that empire collapsed from within. They didn't cause that empire to collapse, only took advantage of a dissolution that was caused by other factors. To say "describe today's USSR" is like saying (exaggeration for effect alert!) Rome didn't do so hot because France isn't part of Italy now.

In Malaya, a large army of British people defeated an insurgency by some Malayans. It doesn't matter on whose letterhead the orders were written. The fact that the British had complete control is also irrelevant when judging if their efforts can be judged a success. If anything it is a lesson to be learned.

All 3 fit, wealthy, large forces, bureaucratic.

What concerns me though is to dogmatically state that it can't be done might be used as an excuse to forget about something that is hard to do and hard to think about, like we did after Vietnam. It didn't work out so well for us so we just refused to think about it, actively forgot what we learned and told ourselves that was ok because it would never happen again. It did happen again. "It" will always happen again and we have to keep what we learned from being forgotten.

[Ken White]

However, let me first apologize for my lack of clarity -- as my question was stated, your answers of the Philippines and Malaya count -- I still disagreee about the USSR.
...for you to reject the 3 examples I gave is sophistry.Your opinion, I for one disagree. Let me repeat the question:

"I've asked many times here for someone to name me a successful Small War in the IW arena won by any large force from a big or wealthy bureaucratic nation. I've also asked for someone to name me one that the US really should have been involved with. I'm still waiting."

Notice there are two questions, we're only working on the first. Aside from the fact that the US at the turn of the 19th Century was big but far from bureaucratic, the fact is that the rebellions in the Philippines continued until we handed over total sovereignty in 1946 -- and continue to this day. However, for the reasons you state, you can call that a 'win' and I'll plead guilty (as I did the last time we did this) for not fully stating my question and putting a 'post WW II' limiter on it -- I did that last time but won't this.

I do not concede on the USSR, they kept a lid on it but their dissolution is part proof they did not win.
...and in the case of Malaya, you are quibbling about precise definitions.Not really but then again, yes. Again my lack of properly framing my question which should have read:

"I've asked many times here for someone to name me a successful Small War in the IW arena won by any intervening large force from a big or wealthy bureaucratic nation in another nation since World War II. I've also asked for someone to name me one that the US really should have been involved with. I'm still waiting. (bolded changes to reflect what should've been asked but was not -- my error. :o)

So you're correct on the Philippines and Malaya. However, I will point out that your counter question on Malaya was "I know Malaya won't be accepted but I can never figure out why not." My answer was not a discounting of Malaya as a win but a (poorly worded) attempt to explain why not; you wrote it doesn't matter on whose letterhead orders were written but it does, a great deal -- because as you also say "If anything it is a lesson to be learned." What I attempted to do was turn that around and say it was a bad example for that very reason -- if you aren't THE government, many things become infinitely more difficult.

In the USSR where the Soviets were the government, they still were not totally successful -- though ala your Philippine example, a lot of those folks did fight for the USSR during WW II -- a lot also fought for the Germans...
What concerns me though is to dogmatically state that it can't be done might be used as an excuse to forget about something that is hard to do and hard to think about, like we did after Vietnam. It didn't work out so well for us so we just refused to think about it, actively forgot what we learned and told ourselves that was ok because it would never happen again. It did happen again. "It" will always happen again and we have to keep what we learned from being forgotten.I don't believe either Bob'sWorld or I are being dogmatic. We are simply saying one has to choose one's battles -- and we've made some very dumb choices. We can do better. "It" indeed will always happen again and I know we are both aware of that -- the issue is not whether "It" will happen, the issue is how best to respond to "It."

Historically, intervention with a large military force has not been successful. Historically, intervening with military force for 'humanitarian reasons' has also generally done more harm than good. You and I differ on that and we can continue to do so.

[Bill Moore]

So why no unambiguous, beyond a shadow of a doubt, ‘success’ recognizable to all in Iraq, Afghanistan, the 2008-2009 Financial Meltdown, and the current global fight against The Great Depression # 2?

Why? One could argue we had lost the moral high ground by invading Iraq, and any leader that supported our invasion would never be perceived to be legitimate to the Iraqi people who suffered terribly from the invasion and ill planned follow up from the initital combat successes. Whether you concur or not with the justification for invading Iraq, the Iraqi people with the exception of the Kurds, have been pretty disappointed in the results.

In Afghanistan we didn't (and probably still don't) understand what we were getting into, and in a way we lost the moral high ground again when we shifted from our justifiable efforts to kill of AQ to fighting an insurgency focused on ousting a foreign occupier and what is perceived to be their puppet government.

It isn't simply economics, so the light bulb really doesn't matter, what matters is what the people want, yet we refuse to listen and instead insist on telling them what they want, thus your example of 37 people required to change a light bulb.

Seasoned Special Forces Soldiers do have a specialty that is useful, it's called listening to the locals and trying to understand them, versus the opposite approach of trying to force them to understand us and adapt to our norms.

However, I'm not making an argument for SF to be the lead, even that won't undue the damage of ill conceived policy.

[Bob's World]

Any country where the government is required to "defeat" a violent insurgency or two every generation is a country where the causal roots have never been seriously addressed. Suppression of those who dare to complain is the essence of European/US colonial "COIN." It is time to evolve. Pop-Centric COIN was a stab at such evolution, but the authors and proponents of those tactics never really understood and accepted the roots of insurgent causation in government. They continued to blame the populace, but merely offered softer approaches to bribe rather than suppress revolt. Neither approach is likely to produce enduring effect, and of the two, at least violent suppression has a proven track record of being relatively cheap and good for a decade or generation of relative stability.

This is a good summary of the post-WWII insurgencies in the Philippines, but in truth there has really only been one insurgency, and it has been radiating out from government since the Spanish planted a flag. Swapping that flag for a US flag changed nothing, nor has changing that for a Japanese or now local homegrown elite leadership either.

http://www.historyofwar.org/articles/wars_philippines.html


"Peasant revolt is historically endemic to the Philippines despite the differing nature of the insurrections it is the relationship between the peasants, the elite and the military that remains the main cause of unrest. Luckily for the Philippines governments the nation has remained low on the list for any countries wishing to supply arms to the rebels and luckily for the rebels the US was frightened of any further involvement following Vietnam. Despite the end of the Marcos regime the insurgencies still rumble on and seem to do so unless the social and economic and political structure of the Philippines changes radically. “Philippine history shows that rebellions can be suppressed but rarely eliminated for long “ (Rebellion and Repression in the Philippines, R.J Kessler)"

[Steve the Planner]

Bill:

The first draft of history can sometimes be messy, as can second and third drafts.

Saddam drove the Iran-Iraq War where arguably more than one million people were killed. Then he destabilized the international system by savaging Kuwait, despite some argued legitimate arguments blown far out of proportion. As the sheets rolled back on Iraq, the full body count of Iraqis buried in pits by his regime is well beyond 200,000. What, exactly, is the body count needed to trigger an extra-national response in a nation that, by geography and history, is truly an Armegeddon (a dangerous cross roads) for the world?

Having said that, our Tonkin-like approach to obtaining world support for action against Saddam, improperly driven by the US domestic blood of 9/11, and our lack of understanding for What comes next, created a profound and disturbing basis for the entire affair.

Afterwards, while we can ###-for-tat various faults and failures (Bremer did it, de-Baath was a disaster, etc...), the bottom line os that our "Failed State" strategy of US colonialization was catastrophic. Especially in light of profound Iraqi history of opposing foreign intervention.

How that post-conflict administration did or did not open the gates of hell are another ###-for-tat argument given the open civil war and US opposition that followed.

Then came the 2007/2008 surge which I believe is, today, still little understood, especially by those of us on the ground who could not see the forest for the trees in front of us. Regardless, by the end of that Surge, Iraqi will for self-determination returned, together with the minimum capacity to pursue, obtain and enforce it via their SOFA terms. We were "unfriended" so that they could get on with their own history.

Each of these things--- underlying justification, false pretexts, delusional "Failed State" administration strategies which undermined Iraqi self-determination, civil war and opposition to colonialization, the path to the end (2007/2008 Surge), the end itself (SOFA and SOFA implementation), and what comes next---are all, in many ways, linked but independent components for analysis.

Where, exactly, military specializations played, or could have played different roles, is an open question.

I personally believe that the end really began in mid-2008 when the Gates Pentagon, Big Army and Petreaus understood and embraced the imperative of Iraqi self-rule, overriding the failed neo-colonial program.

SF, and the targeted killings of bad actors, was a huge (if not decisive) factor in 2008---all happy talk and window-dressing about COIN aside. Note: Decisive given many other factors already played out (Ethnic cleansing, power politics, etc...).

Given the past, I rejoice in the end (at last) so that the rest can be reconciled to arm-chair analysis and the subsequent drafts of history, recognizing that the final drafts may look very different when the dust settles.

There are many lessons for Afghanistan, despite that the problem sets and solutions are very different.

SF is a great tool---where it fits.

[Fuchs]

OMG, Americans.
Censoring "###", but nine year olds shoot with assault rifles.

:D

Test:"boob for tat"

:D:D

[Ken White]

OMG, Americans.
Censoring "###", but nine year olds shoot with assault rifles.Jeez -- I got my first rifle for my eighth birthday. Are we slipping or what... :D

[Steve the Planner]

Fuchs:

Apparently it was automatic. One slip on your name and, ooops!

[Bill Moore]

SF, and the targeted killings of bad actors, was a huge (if not decisive) factor in 2008---all happy talk and window-dressing about COIN aside. Note: Decisive given many other factors already played out (Ethnic cleansing, power politics, etc...).

We actually did more of that in 2007, and while highly effective at suppressing the enemy, in what way was it decisive? We created space, but what was done with the space in a political sense that consolidated Iraq as a nation? Decisive is a misleading term in our doctrine at the operational and strategic level. As you said,


Note: Decisive given many other factors already played out (Ethnic cleansing, power politics, etc...).

It isn't history until the event has passed, and in the case of the Iraq war it has not passed. Although major U.S. military forces are no longer a direct factor, Iraq is still adapting to the new reality.

The Arab Spring is not history, the nations are still adapting to a rapidly changing reality.

Afghanistan is not history, it is still on a continuum of chaos since the USSR invaded.

You're sadly right that many of us are now sitting back in our arm chairs reflecting on the conflicts we were involved in (and all of us are limited to seeing the trees, despite our claims of seeing the forest), while those afflicted are still suffering terribly and we're wondering what objectives we achieved that were truely in our national interests outside of putting a major hurt on AQ in Afghanistan in the early years.

We can all come up with reasons, such as geopolitical depth, influence in a strategically important region, etc. that in the end may be the best we can hope for. The grand political-social experiment has largely failed.

[Steve the Planner]

Bill:

Right. Terminologies.

One way or another, this Iraq war ends when there is no longer a US troop presence. No soldiers, no war.

Iraq has been the site of many wars, and the facts and factors that have driven them in the past are still a continuing risk.

My take is from one who's sole mission, as a civilian, was to end US engagement, and my cohort left shortly after the SOFA was executed.

SOFA was the definitive Iraqi historical document by which that country acted to end US troop presence, and return to it's long and dangerous path of self-determination.

On a list of ten decisive factors that supported the SOFA, without SF in the north (Right, 2007 & 2008), the cascading effect of continuing instability, lack of effective government control raises doubt about whether the SOFA may have been executed when it was, or whether we might still be arguing about troop assignments for next year. To me, that is decisive.

What actually occurred during the Surge, for my purposes, was that Iraqi confidence in self government, or exhaustion of continuing conflict and US involvement (makes no difference to me how it is characterized), got the job done.

My take on what it was about is probably very different from that of the units that were in motion, but, I think that is just a few more trees, rather than the whole forest.

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/10/05/peter_van_buren_iraq_prts_stephen_%20donnelly

I spend a lot of time, for example, reading US focused articles on the KRG issue, and the failure to resolve the disputed boundaries issues, held to be decisive.

As one directly involved in that matter, I knew there were many more issues than all were free to discuss.

Wikileaks, for example, provided the Crocker Memos describing the internal UN efforts (through New York via neighboring countries) to remove De Mistura because of his efforts in that area, and to halt all UN activities in that field. So that is in the public domain now (with very mixed emotions).

These were very complicated issues with many backfields in motion, and far more competing interests than many understand. Much of that competition, however, focused on internal Iraqi politics---they did not want the US and UN dictating the structure of their country anymore.

This, and many other comparable national and ministerial signals at the same time sent a clear signal that Iraq was on its own path, and that further US involvement would be detrimental. That was the SOFA driver.

Crocker's point about long-term strategic engagement is not the same continuing to do what we were doing.

How could these clear marks of Iraqi self-determination have credibly emerged if Sadr City was little more than a launching ramp for mortars, and no national control could be exercised north of Taji?

My guess is that six of the decisive factors on my list will never make it on ones being debated in the foreign policy and military communities----including that the Gates/Petreaus military in 2007/8 became much more effective (and decisively valuable) in civilian transfer (getting the US out of the neo-colonial administration business).

The collapse of US delusions of neo-colonial control happened sometime in there. That was another decisive event.

That's my take.

[Steve the Planner]

PS:

There was a large Iraqi Budget and Finance Conference at Al Rasheed in June 2008 for the 2009 Iraqi Capital Budgets. Two UN and two DoS attendees (by invitation).

Those DoS folks (one of which may or may not have been me) made the mistake of inviting a US officer heavily involved in the budget execution process so that he could understand what was to come.

A senior Iraqi official stopped the officer, and with great courtesy, explained that the US had done many great things for Iraq, but this conference had to be by and for Iraqis. He was set up in great style with a listening device and coffee, but not allowed in.

As the regular budget bickering began (as in Wisconsin, Maryland or DC), the Iraqi budgeteers and planners began arguing over the standards and procedures for project ranking and evaluation----and they all decided to use the federal project submittal standards and procedures from the pre-Baath period, which many were familiar with (and still had copies of). Arrangements were made to republish them for the new folks.

It was at that point that I knew the US involvement in Iraq had substantially turned a corner which would lead directly to the SOFA. (Yes, I wrote one of those papers that is, like the Lost Ark, somewhere in the bowels of government records). But the paper only reported what occurred; the subject event is what was important.

Iraq was it's own country for better or for worse, and after all the formal project submittals were made, with technical racking and stacking, they would then be torn to shreds by the politicians just as they are in the US---but on TV for all Iraqis to see. Dangerous or not, Iraq was ready to go on its own.

As one of the last residents of the Republican Palace (they were literally pulling the CHUs all around us during my last three weeks there while the pallets made a nice, but lonely, bonfire at the old Cigar Club fireplace, I remembered that June day when I knew we were done.

As a former Tank Commander, I really do understand something about the role and purpose of the military, but the end of our Iraq War required civilian transitions for which military matters were supporting.

How many more people like me have their personal and individual trees that have not even surfaced yet. Sooner or later, we might have the parameters of the whole forest.

[ganulv]

The idea of a silk road revival has been trumpeted here and there, but I really don't see much in it.

I see something in not reviving it. The Wakhan Corridor was created with the idea that good fences make good neighbors.* So where the Silk Road connected the world two thousand years ago you now find one of the more inaccessible places on the planet (http://www.zygmontek.com/wakhan/wakhan.html). I get the sense that as with the Darién Gap, folks are well aware that infrastructure improvement would facilitate movement of some less-than-desirable goods, services, and people.

http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/2/2f/Wakhan.png

*Chad Haines, Colonial routes (http://dl.dropbox.com/u/19877909/Haines%E2%80%94Colonial%20routes.pdf), Ethnohistory 51 (Summer 2004): 548.

[Surferbeetle]

You're sadly right that many of us are now sitting back in our arm chairs reflecting on the conflicts we were involved in (and all of us are limited to seeing the trees, despite our claims of seeing the forest), while those afflicted are still suffering terribly and we're wondering what objectives we achieved that were truely in our national interests outside of putting a major hurt on AQ in Afghanistan in the early years.

Agree.


The grand political-social experiment has largely failed.

No; this I do not agree with.

Bill,

Not enough lifetimes have passed to make a call one way or another.

What about the competition between the Morgenthau Plan (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Morgenthau_Plan) and the Marshall Plan (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marshall_Plan) versus what is starting to take shape with the European Union (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Union)?

Who knows where the Arab Spring (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arab_Spring) will lead, but I hope that one positive outcome will be greater participation in the free market of ideas.

Although it sounds trite, I wonder if the concept of creative destruction (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Creative_destruction) applies?

[omarali50]

Pakistan is the main show, not Afghanistan. And its going downhill: http://www.brownpundits.com/2011/10/10/mumtaz-qadri-and-his-defenders/

[Bill Moore]

Steve the Planner, those are some great insights and I hope others contribute their own over time. Being a grunt in 03 and a find, fix, finish dude in 07 I was constantly wondering where those civilian leaders/problem solvers were. It was clear from my optic that the military was unintentionally impeding progress, because the people sat and stewed waiting for the conquerors to lead, and for a while we didn't because we didn't know who was in charge or what direction to go in, and then spontaneously most units starting doing reconstruction work on their own learning a lot of hard lessons over the years. I don't blame the players at the tactical level (either military or civilian), but some of the players at the national level should have known better (we have ample history to draw from).

Surferbeetle, in time a new, more liberal Middle East may emerge, but I doubt it will be the result of our invasion of Iraq. Rather it will be result of our ideas being shared and embraced through diplomacy, education, trade, etc. that ultimately will weaken the current oppressive regimes. It will be their revolution, not ours. Perhaps I'm not given certain strategists enough credit for their vision, but it appears to be that they thought we could rather easily impose political, social and cultural change in Iraq, or worse they just assumed it would naturally blosom after Saddam fell, and it would create a domino effect. That social-political experiment failed. Other things may work out in our favor over the long run.

Sadly the news coming out of Egypt is mixed, and there remains a good (perhaps strong) possibility that the Islamists will ultimately rule, start killing off the Coptic Christians and declare the Peace Treaty with Israel void. I remain neutral, not optimistic or pestimestic at this point.

[Dayuhan]

This is a good summary of the post-WWII insurgencies in the Philippines, but in truth there has really only been one insurgency, and it has been radiating out from government since the Spanish planted a flag. Swapping that flag for a US flag changed nothing, nor has changing that for a Japanese or now local homegrown elite leadership either.

http://www.historyofwar.org/articles/wars_philippines.html


"Peasant revolt is historically endemic to the Philippines despite the differing nature of the insurrections it is the relationship between the peasants, the elite and the military that remains the main cause of unrest. Luckily for the Philippines governments the nation has remained low on the list for any countries wishing to supply arms to the rebels and luckily for the rebels the US was frightened of any further involvement following Vietnam. Despite the end of the Marcos regime the insurgencies still rumble on and seem to do so unless the social and economic and political structure of the Philippines changes radically. “Philippine history shows that rebellions can be suppressed but rarely eliminated for long “ (Rebellion and Repression in the Philippines, R.J Kessler)"

Two insurgencies, actually... the one in Central/Western Mindanao really doesn't derive from "the relationship between the peasants, the elite and the military" and has fundamentally different causative factors.

The assumption that all derives from governance can obscure the reality that governance and patterns of governance often derive themselves from culture and history. When incompatible populations are combined by quirks of post-colonial borders into "nations" with implicit potential for conflict, it's only natural for governance to reflect the inherent conflicts. Of course in theory you could expect governments to transcend these issues, but in reality governments reflect these implicit divisions and it's not realistic to expect them to do otherwise.

The "governance-centric" approach, whether in Afghanistan or elsewhere, has virtues and does help to understand why insurgency emerges. The risk, of course, is that from the conclusion that all emanates from governance, we may deduce a need to run around changing the way other countries are governed, which is likely to get us into an even deeper pile of scheisse. Understanding the role that governance plays in generating insurgency has to be matched by an understanding of the challenges and general undesirability of attempts to dictate, impose, or attempt to generate changes in the way other nations are governed.

[Steve the Planner]

Bill:

My guess is that each of us will have a different story, and none of us will have the whole picture until they are all told. There were so many different Iraqs and so many different US's in Iraq.

Back to the Afghan topic, Omar does the Tent Maker thing, reminding us that the solutions are across the border(s), and very much more complicated than anything solvable within any forest we could be dropped into.

Years of scratching my head keeps coming back to the same problem-solving steps that Beetle and I have used too many time. Problem is that we do not know the whole picture, including what appears illusive to even the Administration. What are our objectives?

[Bill Moore]

Years of scratching my head keeps coming back to the same problem-solving steps that Beetle and I have used too many time. Problem is that we do not know the whole picture, including what appears illusive to even the Administration. What are our objectives?

GEN McCrystal recently said we didn't understand the history and complexity of Afghanistan, and that we didn't even understand the last 50 years of history there (himself included). Davidbfpo posted a link to an interesting article/book summary that pointed out several myths regarding Afghanistan to include the myth that the Stinger was what convinced the Soviets to leave, and that the Taliban didn't have popular support (initially), etc (Inserted link : http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/sep/27/10-myths-about-afghanistan. We created a plan based on our own warped sense of reality, and then wonder why it isn't working?

The problem with Afghanistan is that is is several problems and "we" decided to solve all of them inn hopes of (objective) denying a future safehaven for AQ, not realizing, or refusing to acknowledge, that AQ has developed plenty of safehavens since we squeezed the ballon in Afghanistan. In some respects it seems that an AQ safehaven in parts of "remote" Afghanistan is better for us strategically than in other locations as long as we have the political will to strike it as needed. That point can be argued, but the most counterproductive result of our occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan is that by occuppying Muslim lands we gave new energy for the global jihad propaganda and grew the movement, which not only grew but adapted well to our current strategy of exhausting ourselves in the wrong location. This reminds me of watching my dog as kid dig furiously to chase a burrowing creature that already escaped out of another hole. She didn't lift her head and look, she was simply going by smell and was fixated on that hole.

Most of the world would have accepted (not necessarily liked) a harsh response (punative attack) to the 9/11 attacks, and the continued right for self defense, but that is entirely different than occuppying a nation.

I think part of our ambition is based on a collective guilt by certain government agencies that felt we dumped on the Afghan people after the USSR left, but that isn't entirely true either. Collective guilt drives a lot of bad policies, to include our own welfare state, and once the decision is made and implemented it is even harder to back out of it (creates more guilt).

[Steve the Planner]

I think that the big piece that is missing from many of the military analyses is the background issue of occupation, and the government's externalized beliefs in half-construed concepts of failed state managements through various international protectorate structures.

It was these delusional and/or half-constructed efforts that frustrated military intentions in an ever expanding cascade of problems, many of which you referenced.

The weapon with the greatest power is civilian engagement, but it is a very tricky and dangerous sword, especially when wielded in a foreign land by what are perceived to be occupiers.

Back to terminologies: Influence vs. control.

[Dayuhan]

I think that the big piece that is missing from many of the military analyses is the background issue of occupation, and the government's externalized beliefs in half-construed concepts of failed state managements through various international protectorate structures.

It was these delusional and/or half-constructed efforts that frustrated military intentions in an ever expanding cascade of problems, many of which you referenced.

The weapon with the greatest power is civilian engagement, but it is a very tricky and dangerous sword, especially when wielded in a foreign land by what are perceived to be occupiers.

Back to terminologies: Influence vs. control.

If you go back to Iraq before the operation, it was of course impossible for the US to wield influence or pursue civilian engagement without first achieving control through military means. The transition form one to the other proved far more difficult than many expected, and I'd put that down largely to irrationally optimistic expectations.

It's hard for me to look at these questions without remembering the absurd discourse that went on before the invasion... all the talk about "installing" a democracy, about how Iraq was such a good candidate for a democratic transition, how the educated westernized exiles would all return and lead the country to progressive prosperity, how other Arab states would flock to democracy once presented with Iraq's transcendent example.

Far too much of our planning and preparation was built around expectations that were impossibly unrealistic, and when the predictable problems emerged, we were unprepared.

I'd hope that our faith in those "half-construed concepts of failed state managements through various international protectorate structures" has gone through a major reality check, but I suspect that those concepts may spring back into life at some point, with predictable consequences.

[carl]

Historically, intervention with a large military force has not been successful.

We disagree on this and matching historical point vs. point would be great fun but historical accuracy is not the main reason I don't like a catagorical (sic) statement like that. I'll get to the reason next.


I don't believe either Bob'sWorld or I are being dogmatic. We are simply saying one has to choose one's battles -- and we've made some very dumb choices. We can do better. "It" indeed will always happen again and I know we are both aware of that -- the issue is not whether "It" will happen, the issue is how best to respond to "It."

I well trust that neither you nor Bob'sWorld would BE dogmatic in the event no matter how I interpret your statements. I do not trust Big Army to be anything but dogmatic. That is the danger in stating that this or that can't be done, Big Army will believe it and never bother thinking about it again. I don't think that is good for the country in the long run. Even if we haven't done it yet, doesn't mean that it can't be done or that it might not have to be done. The corporate monster will use a dogmatic statement to be dogmatic, come hell or sandstorms.

I've tried to explain this idea as best I can. Forgive me if I am unclear.

[Surferbeetle]

Bill:

My guess is that each of us will have a different story, and none of us will have the whole picture until they are all told. There were so many different Iraqs and so many different US's in Iraq.

Back to the Afghan topic, Omar does the Tent Maker thing, reminding us that the solutions are across the border(s), and very much more complicated than anything solvable within any forest we could be dropped into.

Years of scratching my head keeps coming back to the same problem-solving steps that Beetle and I have used too many time. Problem is that we do not know the whole picture, including what appears illusive to even the Administration. What are our objectives?

Hey STP,

Lots of history out there. Difficult to put it into context but here is a quick drive by:
Sumer, 4500-2340 BCE
Akkad, 2340-2000 BCE
Elamites, 2000-1760 BCE
Babylonians, 1760-1595 BCE
Assyrians, northern Iraq, 3000- 1830 BCE and 827-612 BCE
Neo-Babylonians, 792-595 BCE
Medes and Persians, 539-330 BCE
Macedonians, 331-129 BCE
Parthians, 129 BCE - 234 CE
Sassanids, 224-636 CE
Muslims, 638-661 CE
Umayyads, 680-750 CE
Abbasids, 750-1258 CE
Ilkhanids, 1258-1334
Jalairids, 1334-1410
Black Sheep, 1410-1467
White Sheep, 1467-1509
Safavid, 1509-1534
Ottomans, 1534-1915
Brits, 1914-1932

...and you and Bill and I and others lived through some of the rest.

To be crude, our moment in time is equivalent to a gnats fart in a hurricane. We will see what history brings ;)

[Bill Moore]

To be crude, our moment in time is equivalent to a gnats fart in a hurricane. We will see what history brings

True, but it was smelly and persistent fart.

[Ken White]

I do not trust Big Army to be anything but dogmatic. That is the danger in stating that this or that can't be done, Big Army will believe it and never bother thinking about it again.We can also disagree on that. The Army put itself through a bad patch from 1975 until 2005 or so. It did that for a variety of reasons, some good, most not so good -- basically it hunkered down and tied to rebuild. It did a great job in many respects but it also erred in others. It was helped in erring by USSOCOM who were more flexible and saw an opportunity to get missions (money, spaces) and the Army did not realize what was happening -- or many in the Army did not. It was also not aided by Congress who passed a number of restrictive and counterproductive laws in the interests of fairness, objectivity and guarding the taxpayers dollars. In any event, that was then, this is now and that the Army will not learn from the last ten years -- and adapt -- is not only far from certain, indications thus far are that it is trying hard to change a good many things.

The last regime on E-Ring would have emulated -- did try in may respects -- the 75-05 processes. My belief is the new one will not do that. We'll have to wait and see but in the interim, being convinced the system will invariably take actions of which you disapprove might be considered a teeny bit dogmatic... ;)
I don't think that is good for the country in the long run. Even if we haven't done it yet, doesn't mean that it can't be done or that it might not have to be done. The corporate monster will use a dogmatic statement to be dogmatic, come hell or sandstorms.Much truth but no certainty. The real issue is not the Army, it's the Politicians. The Army will do what it's told, it may sluff and cheat a bit but it will do the job. The important thing is that Politicians -- and the broader electorate -- really need to know far more about the capabilities and limitations (because there are both and they are fairly finite...) of military force than most do at this time. Armed force is destructive, attempts to use it peace or nation building are likely to be unsuccessful; if one wishes to do that sort of stuff, a different force, one not specializing in violence should be formed -- if one can afford to do that and wait for a chance (or look for one...) to employ it. Sounds awfully expensive to me but the electorate can decide on that.
I've tried to explain this idea as best I can. Forgive me if I am unclear.Not unclear. I as always applaud your intent even if I disagree with it. The Army isn't nearly as monolithic as many seem to think. It is conservative, it is self protective, it is bureaucratic -- but it plays in the political mess that is Washington; for better or worse it is a reflection of the nation.

[carl]

We'll have to wait and see but in the interim, being convinced the system will invariably take actions of which you disapprove might be considered a teeny bit dogmatic... ;)

Ok, guilty as charged. You actually know the Army, I only know what I read here and see in the chow hall.

I was very glad to read the following.


In any event, that was then, this is now and that the Army will not learn from the last ten years -- and adapt -- is not only far from certain, indications thus far are that it is trying hard to change a good many things.

[Steve the Planner]

It's hard for me to look at these questions without remembering the absurd discourse that went on before the invasion... all the talk about "installing" a democracy, about how Iraq was such a good candidate for a democratic transition, how the educated westernized exiles would all return and lead the country to progressive prosperity, how other Arab states would flock to democracy once presented with Iraq's transcendent example.

Far too much of our planning and preparation was built around expectations that were impossibly unrealistic, and when the predictable problems emerged, we were unprepared.

Dayuhan:

You are pointing into the whole that I travelled to the bottom of and saying the obvious: That sure is deep!

The military had studied Iraq a lot during Iraq I, and, apparently, everything they learned then had gone the way of retirements, reassignments, or just plain lost. As a friend once said, "The government has no mind," nor, as it were, any repository of knowledge. Every event is a new one, and every place a new discovery.

After inventorying the chaotic and crumbling infrastructure and systems of Northern Iraq in early 2008, it was clear that what Iraqis often said later was true: Everything had crumbled under Saddam---power, water, sewer, whatever. By 2003, the enfeebled Iraqi systems were on their last legs.

Must have been frustrating for Hans Blick, etc... trying to explain to the world that Iraq hardly had functional electricity and running water, let alone an advanced industrial capacity to operate any weapons of mass destruction. A land where people sold gasoline in small black market containers on the street side was hardly a technological threat.

Looking to the State Department's Exile Study Group was a complete waste of time, like asking a bunch of eastern european exiles living in LA for twenty years to describe the problems of their home country now---- a lot of myths and legends, a lot of old memories and re-memories, but nothing useful. Mostly about politics or strife, nothing about the mechanics or structure of a society.

We plunged into a dark whole with nothing, at least on the civilian side.

Could have, instead, knocked the whole regime and society over with a few well-waived feathers---it was that bad. But only if you understood the structure, how to effect it, and how to re-direct it. Out with the old, in with... (let's figure it out when we get there).

Great, lets take over that country, then create a new one from scratch. Pretend there is a New England-style town hall democracy. No, have no idea what we are talking about, have no pencils or desks, let alone fire trucks and schools. Let's all play along.

Serious analysis (which never took place) could have routed Saddam by a carefully measured and targeted civilian approach for which little to no military efforts (beyond NFZs and embargoes) were required, and the homegrown replacements would have been no less unstable than today---better they did it themselves than we do anything for them (especially doing it badly).

I rest in the comfort that we have learned nothing, and never will. Just more stuff to fix after it is screwed up.

[Surferbeetle]

Don't agree that we have learned nothing, or that the 'sociology-political experiment' has failed.

I find it very interesting that instead of limiting the free flow of ideas by burning down the Baghdad Library (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Siege_of_Baghdad_%281258%29) or the Alexandria Library (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Library_of_Alexandria) we, a small band of mil/civ folks, have instead helped in opening 'space' for ideas to flow and compete upon their own merits via digital libraries and conduits.

While my team (inside & outside the wire) and I developed relationships, surveyed infrastructure, prioritized repairs, and advocated for resources in '03 ;) I was often struck by the many hand drawn engineering maps, hand written records, and the need to have physically stamped documents hand delivered to various people across the country.

The massive tidal inflows of computers, cell phones, fiberoptic cables, and air conditioners were amazing to watch in '03. The results on display from having a functioning free market of ideas in '10 was very different from my baseline '03 experiences.

We have 'encouraged' and 'incentivized' the flow of ideas in various anticipated and unanticipated ways. The Arab Spring, in part, results from our actions in that part of the world. Nothing is perfect, but IMO there is forward movement. I would also say that something is starting to take shape in Afghanistan...we will see.

Our efforts, although perhaps timely, are only a tiny sliver of the whole.

[Ken White]

I was very glad to read the following.is that some changes the Army must make are embedded in Title 10, USC (and others...) -- laws are hard to change; Congress is loth to admit errors and reluctant to grant too much authority to its vassals... :mad:

Prognosis is good but it ain't gonna be easy. :wry:

[Entropy]

The assumption that all derives from governance can obscure the reality that governance and patterns of governance often derive themselves from culture and history. When incompatible populations are combined by quirks of post-colonial borders into "nations" with implicit potential for conflict, it's only natural for governance to reflect the inherent conflicts. Of course in theory you could expect governments to transcend these issues, but in reality governments reflect these implicit divisions and it's not realistic to expect them to do otherwise.


That's a great quote that bears repeating. Couldn't agree more.

[Steve the Planner]

Entropy:

Great quote. Looking back to Beetle's abridged list of by-gone empires/conflicts, one would expect a great deal of underlying turbulence, as was the case in Iraq and Afghanistan, with or without US involvement.

Sometimes, it does pay to create a valid yardstick: What would have happened if we had not....

In Iraq, as 800 and 900 person pits continue to be discovered (arguably 2-4 hundred thousand Iraqis killed by Iraqis, it is a little bit disingenuous to say that the underlying turbulence was not substantial.

If, as some contend with various foundations, several hundred thousand Iraqi civilians were killed during our time, it remains an open question as to what that may have been in an alternative approach 9including doing nothing).

Example: An enhanced no fly/no drive action (as in Libya) might have helped a southern Shia uprising, while Kurds pressed from the North. An Iraqi coup with no US troops. What would the civilian death toll have been? How long would it have gone on? Would Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey have become engaged?

Still believe it will be a long time before the complete picture emerges for any of us.

[davidbfpo]

Back to reality readers and hat tip to Circling The Lion's Den:
A new report from the Afghanistan Analysts Network on ISAF capture/kill operations, written by Alex Strick van Linschoten and Felix Kuehn, shows a significant fall-off in such operations from June 2011, possibly due to the departure of General David Petraeus, whose command saw an increased emphasis on such actions.

Commentary:http://circlingthelionsden.blogspot.com/2011/10/isaf-capturekill-operations-decline.html

Report itself, which is twenty-five pages long and full of stats, graphs etc:https://www.afghanistan-analysts.net/uploads/AAN_2011_ISAFPressReleases.pdf

Graphics by categories:http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/datablog/interactive/2011/oct/12/afghanistan-kill-capture-raids-map?intcmp=239

[omarali50]

Dr Taqi, good as usual: http://t.co/e7fHaphs

[Bob's World]

Pakistan is the main show, not Afghanistan. And its going downhill: http://www.brownpundits.com/2011/10/10/mumtaz-qadri-and-his-defenders/

More accurately, Pakistan is the main Metric of the effectiveness of our operational design and engagement in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

As you note, the indicators are that we have mis-diagnosed the nature of the problem severely and that our approaches to date are inappropriate.

[Ray]

Pakistan knows it onions.

It is not going down that easily, or is it?

There is news report that their Senate has refused to go the Army HQ for a Briefing.

Instead, they have asked the Army to come to them and give the briefing.

There is still some hope!

[carl]

More accurately, Pakistan is the main Metric of the effectiveness of our operational design and engagement in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

As you note, the indicators are that we have mis-diagnosed the nature of the problem severely and that our approaches to date are inappropriate.

I agree, but the crux of our mis-diagnosis is that of the man who is convinced he can't be fooled being the easiest to put one over on; our "Great White Father" type of attitude, at the same time arrogant and silly. We may have erred in every way possible but the primary cause of Pakistan's woes is to be found in Pakistan. And the Pakistani's responsible for the mess are in the Pak Army/ISI. They are not a group of naive, innocent little children looking at us through their eyebrows, trusting the revered uncle to lead them well. To the contrary, we've been played by Fagin's crew and the naive children wandering around are our blind rats inside the beltway, the ones with the triple digit GS numbers and the stars on their shoulders.

[omarali50]

Pakistan knows it onions.

It is not going down that easily, or is it?

There is news report that their Senate has refused to go the Army HQ for a Briefing.

Instead, they have asked the Army to come to them and give the briefing.

There is still some hope!

There is always hope. Pakistan is a potential smaller BRIC but its "strategic thinkers" are sabotaging its potential instead of building it up. And they are doing so because they lack the imagination to move beyond a narrowly "India-centric" notion of the identity of Pakistan. The so-called "ideology of Pakistan" is more than usually lethal. It is held in check by all the pressures of real life economics (which still operate in Pakistan as they do in all countries) but the generals never waste an opportunity to waste an opportunity. The impending failure of NATO in Afghanistan is going to provide them yet another chance to go back to their stupid games and they look like they will take that chance.
But there is always hope. If the US stops enabling their "strategic worldview" and lets China pick up the tab (forcing them to also make the hard decisions), who knows, they may yet sneak out of this cul-de-sac. Its not like they have NO clue. They have a clue, but just short of enough of a clue....a little help from their friends will push them this way or that. This way would be better than that.
But its not going to be easy either way.
"THis way" means the crazier Islamists will all figure out that the "Sulah e Hudaybia" phase (the temporary truce with the infidels) is not a temporary ruse, its a permanent state and they are the ones being taken for a ride. When they figure out such things, they tend to explode. Literally. It will be tough.
"That way" means the rest of the world (including the "good infidels" in China) will figure out that sulah e hudaybia was indeed a ruse and the Islamic revolutionary network has a safe haven and intends to use it, at a minimum in the local region. Even in the best case scenario, some upset infidels will try to throw a spanner in the works. That too is not going to be easy.

[davidbfpo]

Hat tip to the Australian think tank, the Lowry Institute, for this article on an attack I'd noted and not fully appreciated - a Taliban attack in the Panjshir Valley:http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2011/10/17/Taliban-cracks-Afghanistans-fortress.aspx


Panjshir is effectively Afghanistan's charter province: a place where improving security and living standards have shown that the ISAF campaign can work....

Despite the relatively low loss of life and infrastructure, this attack provides enormous strategic value to the Taliban. It demonstrates that its claim that 'NATO is no longer safe anywhere in the country' is essentially true.

...This attack takes away the one success story that ISAF and the Afghan government had, and the Taliban propaganda machine has been quick to text Western journalists to point that out.

Since the thread's title is 'Winning the War in Afghanistan' it made me wonder if the Taliban and allies (no names) strategy of reducing the confidence of it's opponents is winning.

Having read elsewhere 'Red Rat' contention is that in Helmand the Taliban have had a bad time: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=14285&page=4, Post No.64:
In Helmand the evidence would tend to support the counter-proposition; the the Taleban are playing catch-up to ISAF at the tactical and operational level. They are heavily attrited, have comprehensively lost influence, lost control of ground, and their ability to prosecute successful attacks has declined markedly as well. We have now seen over 12 months of steady decline in violence in Helmand, no summer campaign season in the traditional sense and winter season which has seen ISAF move from consolidation to offence. Part of the reason that so few insurgents are being killed now is that there are far fewer of them left - attrition still plays a role in campaigning.

From my faraway armchair the campaigning in Helmand is peripheral to the high impact, public attacks approach to reducing confidence in important locations and as in Panjshir iconic places.

[Red Rat]

I am more focused on the UK Army's bewildering change programme then I am on Afghanistan at the moment ;)

From my albeit limited perspective.


1) In Helmand the insurgencies are on the tactical defensive.

2) In the eastern provinces the insurgencies are under pressure and ISAF appears to be increasingly focusing its efforts in the east and on the border.

3) The various insurgent groups realise that the issue now is not whether or not the Coalition will withdraw, but the shape of Afghanistan after withdrawal. That is why we are seeing more high profile attacks and attacks on what are for them High Value Targets. They are conducting shaping operations for post-ISAF Afghanistan, aiming to increase their power and prestige in ongoing negotiations and within their own constituencies.
My tuppence worth; I could be entirely mistaken! :D

[taabistan]

Optimism is in the DNA of the military.

[Red Rat]

Optimism is in the DNA of the military.

Unless you equate limited tactical success with guaranteed strategic success (which I don't ;)) then I am not sure that my posts could be described as optimistic. :wry:

To clarify:

In Helmand the insurgencies do appear to be on the backfoot. That does appear to be a tactical success, but it is limited geographically and I am not sure if the political gains match the tactical gains locally.

In the East the insurgencies are coming under pressure - I am not in a position to say what that means in terms of outcomes or likely outcomes or even if they are on the defensive or constrained significantly in the East; they are simply coming under pressure.

At the strategic level a different game is being played out. I remain somewhat confused by our (the UK's) strategic goals and accompagnying strategy so I refrain from comment on the likely outcomes; but it looks to me like the Afghans (and other regional non-Western) players are now playing for the post-withdrawal outcomes and in that game the West is increasingly peripheral.

[taabistan]

The problem is, Red Rat, I don't disbelieve you or any one else when you say the US/UK military win in tactical battles. I would be extremely surprised if you didn't.

My question is, how are you going to sort out the Afghan government? I asked this question to General Stanley McChrystal when I was in Afghanistan, and all I could hear was military jargon.

In Iraq, there was a dynamic, strong government. Maliki was seen as an independent figure, and people saw supporting it as being a way for getting US troops out but also not avoid being mired in horror.

Karzai is a joke in everyone's eyes. For the Taliban, they see losing in the battlefield as only a short term inconvenience because they know no one trusts the man to lead the country.

[Dayuhan]

Many years ago when all this was still beginning, I wrote that the worst possible outcome in Afghanistan would be to find ourselves harnessed to a government that cannot stand, but that we believe we cannot allow to fall. It's starting to look like we've found our way to that place, or something very much like it.

[jmm99]

But the King has no clothes, says the boy. Long live the King, say the rest.

The "happy-ending" version is the fairy tale.

Peter Fuller removed from duty as a top Afghanistan commander for remarks to POLITICO (http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1111/67653.html)


Major Gen. Peter Fuller, a top U.S. commander in Afghanistan, was relieved of his duties Friday after comments he made to POLITICO disparaging Afghan President Hamid Karzai and calling the government’s leaders “isolated from reality.”

Regards

Mike

[Bill Moore]

Nothing wrong with the truth, but the comments they attributed to him weren't useful. Of course people who live an isolated society struggling to survive don't understand the sacrifices our nation is making, but does it really manner if they do or not? There are a lot of national leaders who aren't articulate in public, but does that reflect on their character and ability to lead? I'm sure most can emphasize with MG Fuller's frustration, but I think he went over the top when he made these thoughts public.

[Ray]

Let us say that the US made a mistake in invading Afghanistan.

Now, if that be so and the situation difficult, what is the answer?

May see Post 13 of this link

http://www.arrse.co.uk/current-affairs-news-analysis/172030-us-general-fired-afghanistan.html

I wonder if it is a comfortable feeling to hear/read and then endure the rumblings forever (as it is for the never ending reminder on Vietnam)!

I wonder if one can give up the ship!

I, for one, would feel that the Army has to obey the orders of the civilian democratically elected government, and it is not for the army to comment. Indeed, if one feels strongly about an issue contrary to the policies of the govt, he should settle it in house or resign and then speak his mind.

At the same time, if seen from the Afghan point of view (as mentioned in Post 13 of the link), one could mull over the issue (on its morality) that the General should have also known that Afghanistan did not request the US to come to their aid (invade, if you will) and so are under no obligation to feel obliged or otherwise.

[Dayuhan]

I wonder if one can give up the ship!

Not as if it's our ship, or a ship of any great significance.

[jmm99]

of postman twit (http://www.arrse.co.uk/current-affairs-news-analysis/172030-us-general-fired-afghanistan.html) and JMM99 run in the same channel (the common sewer perhaps) on this one - and independently of each other. Love it. :D

First off, the US did not make a mistake to invade Astan, co-engaging with the Northern Alliance against the AQ and their Taliban allies in an unconventional war, largely limited to advisement, airstrikes and direct actions. We missed at Tora Bora - much later rectified.

Our (US) mistake was then to engage in state-building - full stop. That COA was slated to fail politically regardless of what Constitution was written and who was selected to be the government. That Karzai seemed to be the best option at the time, simply proves the fundamental flaw in the political strategy.

Nor, do I expect "gratitude" from Karzai or his government - any more than I expect any "gratitude" from the Pstan government, despite the several billion per year the US spends on Pstan (a small cost and a cheap date compared to Astan).

They know that, in the long run, the US (as a prickly nationalistic, complex democracy) is likely to side up with the other prickly nationalistic, complex democracy in South Asia - which is India. For Astan and Pstan, they can be expected to milk the milkman as long as they can.

If MG Fuller did not see the probable outcome, he is a very naive man. Pointing out the king's nudity usually leads to an unhappy ending in real life.

Regards

Mike

[Ray]

Not as if it's our ship, or a ship of any great significance.

Then whose is it?


of postman twit (http://www.arrse.co.uk/current-affairs-news-analysis/172030-us-general-fired-afghanistan.html) and JMM99 run in the same channel (the common sewer perhaps) on this one - and independently of each other. Love it. :D

First off, the US did not make a mistake to invade Astan, co-engaging with the Northern Alliance against the AQ and their Taliban allies in an unconventional war, largely limited to advisement, airstrikes and direct actions. We missed at Tora Bora - much later rectified.

Our (US) mistake was then to engage in state-building - full stop. That COA was slated to fail politically regardless of what Constitution was written and who was selected to be the government. That Karzai seemed to be the best option at the time, simply proves the fundamental flaw in the political strategy.

Nor, do I expect "gratitude" from Karzai or his government - any more than I expect any "gratitude" from the Pstan government, despite the several billion per year the US spends on Pstan (a small cost and a cheap date compared to Astan).

They know that, in the long run, the US (as a prickly nationalistic, complex democracy) is likely to side up with the other prickly nationalistic, complex democracy in South Asia - which is India. For Astan and Pstan, they can be expected to milk the milkman as long as they can.

If MG Fuller did not see the probable outcome, he is a very naive man. Pointing out the king's nudity usually leads to an unhappy ending in real life.

Regards

Mike

Mike,

The bottom line is that it is a Mistake.

India assisted in creating Bangladesh and she quit when the going was good.

And yet.........

the going is now not too good!

Yet, India can still handle the issue!!

[Dayuhan]

Then whose is it?

Theirs. The Afghans. For better or worse... most likely worse, but that needn't be an American problem.

[jmm99]

if the "it" in this:


The bottom line is that it is a Mistake.

refers to US involvement in Astan state-building, you'll get no argument from me.

On the other hand, Operation Enduring Freedom (viewed as part of the larger action against AQ leadership) was no mistake; had to be done; and all considered, has been a success in Astan, Pstan and in several other theaters.

Regards

Mike

[Bill Moore]

Mike,

We had this discussion and we're in agreement you need to separate the two issues, fighting AQ and nation building. Strong agreement the fight against AQ is just and over due, and nation building (at least the way we're pursuing it) is draining our national resources and showing little in the way of return.

[Wargames Mark]

...need to separate the two issues, fighting AQ and nation building. Strong agreement the fight against AQ is just and over due, and nation building (at least the way we're pursuing it) is draining our national resources and showing little in the way of return.

Hallelujah!!!

Amen!!!

:):):):)

Finally!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! (http://youtu.be/HagzTRmUBIE?t=6s)

Are you available to take over the national security strategy??

[Ray]

If AQ is the problem that brought the US into Afghanistan, then has the threat of the AQ really been solved?

AQ is merely a 'front' for a whole lot of loosely knit terrorist organisation aiming at the creation of a worldwide Islamic Caliphate.

OBL had said

"...this matter isn't about any specific person and...is not about the al-Qai`dah Organization. We are the children of an Islamic Nation, with Prophet Muhammad as its leader, our Lord is one...and all the true believers [mu'mineen] are brothers. So the situation isn't like the West portrays it, that there is an "organization" with a specific name (such as "al-Qai`dah") and so on. That particular name is very old. It was born without any intention from us. Brother Abu Ubaida... created a military base to train the young men to fight against the vicious, arrogant, brutal, terrorizing Soviet empire... So this place was called "The Base" ["Al-Qai`dah"], as in a training base, so this name grew and became. We aren't separated from this nation. We are the children of a nation, and we are an inseparable part of it, and from those public demonstrations which spread from the far east, from the Philippines, to Indonesia, to Malaysia, to India, to Pakistan, reaching Mauritania... and so we discuss the conscience of this nation."

[Bill Moore]

Ray,

You're right, but I think the question should be will staying in Afghanistan facilitate resolving the problem, or make it worse by serving as a reason to motivate more and more young men to join the jihad? The problem is wide spread, and Afghanistan is no the geographical center of gravity for the movement. By staying, I mean staying with large numbers of conventional combat forces. I suspect smaller numbers of conventional forces and some SOF will stay for years to continue the struggle.

[Ray]

Bill,

I agree that there is hardly any solution in sight and hanging around will not really give any result in the near future.

My point is that the withdrawal should be such that it is an honourable one.

Yet, at the same time, since many lives have been lost in Afghanistan, some presence is left to ensure that none feel that those who came just cut and ran! The terrorists should be kept guessing and left with a Hamlet like situation - To act or not to act!

There should not be the feeling left with the terrorists and their allies that they defeated two superpowers! I believe that this sentiment is growing amongst their supporters that it is a matter of time that the second superpower will get at mauling at the hands of the soldiers of Islam!

If that feeling permeates amongst the terrorists, then they will be more embolden and will be encouraged to act in such a manner that 9/11 will only appear as a test run!

And then it will be back to Square One!

Catch 22!

[omarali50]

Indeed, Aslam Beg is already announcing victory.
In case you ever wondered where GHQ gets its ideas: http://www.brownpundits.com/2011/11/08/general-aslam-beg-explains-the-patterns-of-history/

The problem with this posting is that it is information anyone can find by just asking Aslam Beg or reading his articles. Its not CIA-level stuff. I assume that is why it never seems relevant to most American think-tankers..

[omarali50]

this one is more confused, but may be even more enlightening: http://www.asiantribune.com/news/2011/11/08/need-rework-us-centric-foreign-policy

[jmm99]

even the "dovish" Obama Administration will not withdraw from Astan anytime soon. From Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Michele Fluornoy, "2014 Is Not a Withdrawal Date; It's an Inflection Point." (http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-skeptics/2014-not-withdrawal-dateits-inflection-point-6131) (video here (http://www.cfr.org/afghanistan/progress-toward-security-stability-afghanistan-video/p26416)):


The plan was laid out at the NATO summit in Lisbon, and what it calls for is the transition process for transferring lead responsibility for security to the Afghans, to be completed by the end of 2014, and we believe we're on track to do that.

That said, the Afghan forces at that time will be largely infantry battalions, police, and so forth. They are still going to need support from the international community in terms of enablers, such as mobility, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and so forth, so it will take some time before they have all the enablers necessary.

They're going to need some continued support, and they're also going to need some advising and assisting. And so we, and NATO also, have been negotiating a strategic partnership agreement with the Afghan government that would lay out an enduring strategic partnership far into the future.

Obviously that will have economic dimensions, diplomatic, other dimensions, but one of the dimensions on the security side is, at the invitation of the Afghan government, we will continue to have a partnership force in place that really provides advising, assisting, continued support to the Afghan National Security Forces for quite some time. So 2014 is not a withdrawal date; it's an inflection point where we put Afghans firmly in the lead and we step back into a consistently supporting role, but with much lower numbers of troops.

The US has had a strategic partnership agreement with Astan (a presidential executive agreement between Karzai and Bush II; then renewed by Obama). Any number of Republicans (including most of their present presidential candidates) are more "hawkish" about state-building in Astan than Ms Fluornoy.

My own personal view is that the focus (of both Democratic and Republican state-building) has been primarily one of dealing either militarily and / or diplomatically with the local AQ "affiliate" (the Taliban), rather than that part of the primary problem (AQ leadership) which resides in Astan and Pstan. To that extent, I agree with Bob Jones that we chase after local insurgents too much.

Both the Democratic and Republican power elites disagree with me since my belief is that the US has more than performed its reasonable obligations under the current strategic partnership agreement - and pulling the plug on state-building is overdue.

Regards

Mike

[Ray]

JMM,

Thanks.

If disagreeing with you means being elected to the Congress, be it as a Republican or Democrat, then I presume I am elected. :)

State building is important. It will never be ideal, but like it or not, the locals do appreciate anything that is done by anyone to improve their life. However, what matters is that it does not impinge on their customs, traditions or religion. That is why the Indians, though initially attacked by the Talibans from Pakistan, were not attacked thereafter and could complete the 215-km long Delaram-Zaranj highway and hand it over to Afghanistan.

It is the same revulsion as the West feels over the 'burqa' swarming their neighbourhood! It is alien and unacceptable. Likewise, is the feeling when local customs, traditions and religious practices are violated in countries where the West is sincerely wanting to help!

[Dayuhan]

State building is important. It will never be ideal, but like it or not, the locals do appreciate anything that is done by anyone to improve their life. However, what matters is that it does not impinge on their customs, traditions or religion. That is why the Indians, though initially attacked by the Talibans from Pakistan, were not attacked thereafter and could complete the 215-km long Delaram-Zaranj highway and hand it over to Afghanistan.

Road building isn't state building. If you try to install, cultivate, or protect a government in another country, especially one where control of patronage is a major source of individual prosperity and power, you are going to upset people and generate opposition, no matter what you do.

[Bob's World]

State building as COIN is a derivative of the inaccurate COIN "old wives tale" of "effectiveness of government cures insurgency." Frankly that is a concept that belongs in the dust bin of other COIN half-right, but widely held beliefs, such as "sanctuary is an ungoverned space" or that a government must "control the populace" or "separate the populace from the insurgent" to win.

I grow weary listening to those who can rattle off a half dozen of such phrases, yet have no contextual understanding of the nuanced aspects of where and why they ring true, and where and why they can equally lead to very flawed, and counter productive approaches.

US AID does development, and as an institution they (not surprisingly) tend to see effectiveness and development as paths to stability.

US State does governance, and not surprisingly, they tend to see democracy and rule of law as paths to stability.

US Defense does security, and not surprisingly, they tend to see reduction of threats and clearing of secure space as the path to stability.

"3D" proponents typically say "no, you must do all of these in concert, and they one achieves stability."

All of this scratches at the obvious symptoms of the problem, and may well create some temporary window of stability, and may even facilitate over long hard effort actual progress to be made in a very indirect, "even a blind squirrel finds a nut" kind of way.

But at some point the West will need to set the lessons of "how to sustain a colony" aside as the basis for COIN doctrine and look instead to "why colonized people revolt and how to avoid creating, or if created, best repair such conditions."

The primary source of causation radiates out from government, and the fastest way to ramp up such causation is for a powerful external force to either adopt and prop up some weak regime, or to replace some problematic regime with one that will better answer to their interests in exchange for their support. It does not matter how "ineffective" or "undemocratic" the previous regime was. It also does not matter how pure or justified the powerful external party justifies their actions. Any replacement government provided in such a way will meet some degree or resistance; and no amount of hard effort scratching at the symptoms of such resistance is apt to truly resolve the matter.

Hopefully the new FM3-24 starts with the goal of taking the "war" out of insurgency, and the colonial context as well. Only then can we get to an effective doctrine. Oh, and they also need to not call it a COIN manual, but rather a FID manual. COIN is done at home, when on the road one does FID.

[Ray]

Mod's Note

Due to the amount of details re India's role I have copied this post to the thread on India's role in Afghanistan.


Road building isn't state building. If you try to install, cultivate, or protect a government in another country, especially one where control of patronage is a major source of individual prosperity and power, you are going to upset people and generate opposition, no matter what you do.

I mentioned the Road building project since anyone conversant with Counter Insurgency operations would know that while it is comparatively easy to defend point targets, it is not easy to defend a widely dispersed area target like constructing a highway where the engineering assets and manpower is widely spread without fortifications. Further the construction had to be done against a timed target and so were constructed in various segments and then linked up.

That the Indian construction team did not have the protection of any Army or air assets since it was not permitted by the US, lest it upset Pakistan and yet could construct with minimal initial casualties because of Pakistani based terrorists, I think would elicit praise being remarkable.

That the attacks by the terrorist were not mounted thereafter does indicate the goodwill and rapport that the Indian team had built up with the locals.

In passing the road is not the only thing done by the Indians. And it must be remembered that India had no stake in the invasion of Afghanistan wherein they would be burdened with some obligations to set right things.

Since it appears that you are not aware India's contribution, if one goes by your posts, I take this opportunity to inform you that India has played a significant role in the reconstruction and rehabilitation of Afghanistan.

The annual assistance is over US$ 100 million and, in addition, has pledged recently an additional assistance of US$ 100 million, thus, making the total amount of our assistance over US $ 750 million. Of this, US$ 400 million have already been disbursed so far.

India has undertaken projects virtually in all parts of Afghanistan, in a wide range of sectors including hydro-electricity, power transmission lines, road construction, agriculture and industry, telecommunications, information and broadcasting, capacity development, humanitarian assistance, education and health, which have been identified by the Afghan government as priority areas for development.

All the projects are undertaken in partnership with the Government of Afghanistan (GoA), and in alignment with the Afghanistan National Development Strategy and with focus on local ownership of assets.

Major projects include: Construction of Transmission Line from Pul-e-Khumri to Kabul and a sub-station at Kabul under the North-East Power System project which will bring power from neighbouring countries to Kabul; humanitarian food assistance of 1 million tons of wheat in the form of high protein biscuits under School Feeding Programme in Afghanistan supplied through World Food Programme; construction of 218 km road from Zaranj to Delaram that will facilitate movement of goods and personnel from Afghanistan to Iranian border; reconstruction and completion of Salma Dam Power Project (42 MW) in Herat province; construction of Afghanistan’s Parliament Building; reconstruction of Indira Gandhi Institute for Child Health in Kabul in various phases including reconstruction of surgical ward/ polyclinic/ diagnostic centre; reconstruction of Habibia School; digging of 26 tube wells in north west Afghanistan; gifting of vehicles (400 buses, 200 mini-buses, 105 municipality and 285 army vehicles); setting up of 5 toilet-cum-sanitation complexes in Kabul; telephone exchanges in 11 provinces to connect them to Kabul; national TV network by providing an uplink from Kabul and downlinks in all 34 provincial capitals; rehabilitation of Amir Ghazi and Quargah Reservoir dams, solar electrification of 100 villages, etc

Skills development and capacity building has been identified as another key area of priority, expected to become the vanguard in tackling the mammoth challenge of institutional building in Afghanistan. In furtherance of this, the Government of India (GoI) has offered 500 Indian Council for Cultural Relations (ICCR) long-term university scholarships and 500 short-term Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC) training programmes for Afghan nationals annually from 2006-07 onwards. 30 Indian civil servants are also being deputed under the GoI/GoA/UNDP Tripartite MoU for Capacity for Afghan Public Administration programme envisaged to build capacity in various Afghan Ministries. Other major skills development projects include CII project for training 3,000 Afghans in the trades of carpentry, plumbing, welding, masonry and tailoring, as well as SEWA project for technical assistance to Women’s Vocational Training Centre in Bagh-e-Zanana. Since 2002, around 2215 Afghans have trained/studied in India under the various GoI sponsored training programme. India is training the Afghan police and the army.

India is also implementing numerous community-based, small development projects in the fields of agriculture, rural development, education, health, vocational training, water and sanitation etc. These projects, with short gestation periods, have direct and visible impact on community life, and focus on local ownership and management

On the issue of patronage in Afghanistan, I daresay neither the US nor anyone is there as missionaries who are bringing civilisation to the savages! In other words, it is the first mistake - superimposing western ethics in a hurry, as if it were Instant Coffee being served!

While I am not condoning corruption, but ‘patronage’ as you see it, is a historical convention, even practised in ancient West. It is bringing gifts to the ruler! It was also prevalent with the British in India, who used to get dolis which they accept with élan. If you are conversant with British Indian history, you will recall the rationale for the impeachment of the Governor General Warren Hasting of India. Education in India over about 300 years of colonial rule inculcated British ethics and hence the custom of Mughal nazrana fell by the way and was taken to be bribes............. but then Afghanistan never had the benefit of English education and customs or ethics since they were never conquered.

Neither are they aware of the English phrase Beware of Greeks bearing gifts.

[Ray]

Bob,

US AID would be very effective if the 'missionaries bringing civilisation to the savage' attitude is forsaken.

Just step back into the Cold War days.

How is it that the USSR could worm their way into most countries of Asia and Africa?

How is it that the Chinese are more welcome than the US, who shovel in more money than all, in many parts of the world (even though they are now being disliked since they possibly remind that they are adopting the old imperialist ways!)

The reason is simple.

The Soviets were peasants, atheists and classless and they had no airs or agenda to change people to their ways or ideology. They had no hang up about race or colour!

The West had. They only associated with the elite, the chatterati and the cocktail circuit! (Though that is not so now and the last Consul General of the US in Calcutta, a lady, was so loving that she became the toast of even the Marxist Govt of Bengal! Things are changing!)

So long as one pushed their agenda in a subtle way wherein it is not understood publicly, none cares.

Impose and tell me that they are savages or they have no idea of reality or life, or act condescending and patronising, you have a riot!

The live example is the Indians. Great supporters of the USSR and now they cannot stop praising even the fast food chains of the US, let alone other things, even though the US is now warning of the health hazards of fast food!

I mean no offence to anyone's sensibility, all I want to say is don't superimpose your culture, ethics, customs and you will find you are in a better position to be winning and you will not have to work so hard and waste so much of money to achieve what you want.

I assure you that living a few years in the Orient alone, does not make one an expert. You can never understand it all unless it is in your system, and better still in your genes!

Even I, with my public school education and Christian education, cannot claim I am thinking the same way as the rest of India, even if my heart ardently and honestly beats for India!

As an aside, in general I pass this comment:

I find it humorous when foreigners to the Orient assume they represent the Oriental mindset because they have touched the shore of the Orient and hobnobbed with the savages for a short while!

[Ken White]

This in particular:
I assure you that living a few years in the Orient alone, does not make one an expert. You can never understand it all unless it is in your system, and better still in your genes!
...
I find it humorous when foreigners to the Orient assume they represent the Oriental mindset because they have touched the shore of the Orient and hobnobbed with the savages for a short while!Having spent time in several Oriental nations, hobnobbing with the great unwashed as opposed to the chatterati and the cocktail crowd and having explored places where most westerners did not go, I realize how little I or any westerner will know or understand. I learned just enough to continually warn others here and elsewhere, with reference to something transpiring in East Asia, South Asia or the Middle East (three quite different places...), they are "thinking in western terms, bad mistake."

Also learned that in the orient, very little is as it seems.

Interestingly, much the same can be said of the U.S. We are basically of the European hearth in many respects -- but we are emphatically not Europeans... ;)

Here too, much is often not what it seems...

[Dayuhan]

How is it that the Chinese are more welcome than the US, who shovel in more money than all, in many parts of the world (even though they are now being disliked since they possibly remind that they are adopting the old imperialist ways!)

The Chinese are welcomed by leaders because they shovel money directly into the bank accounts of those leaders without hesitation or restriction. The Chinese are rapidly making themselves as hated as westerners in much of the world, largely due to bribery (always hated by those who don't get the bribes) and racism.


The Soviets were peasants, atheists and classless and they had no airs or agenda to change people to their ways or ideology. They had no hang up about race or colour!

What I hear from the Vietnamese is that the Russians were arrogant, condescending, racist, and epically malodorous. Their help was accepted only because it was needed and there was nowhere else to get it, and relations broke down quickly once the help was no longer required.

[jmm99]

This is the inverse of - I'm for that type of project, except when it's placed in my neighborhood. ;)

So, state-building by the US should be logically limited to areas where we (US) have a reasonable opportunity to succeed. An example area would be Latin America. The US has a huge pool (military and civilian) of Spanish speakers familiar with the traditions and cultures of that area. Latin America has a colonialized background and governmental institutions similar to those of the US.

Regards

Mike

[Ray]

Check this video out on how little things touch the people.

Bunker Roy: Learning from a barefoot movement

http://www.ted.com/talks/bunker_roy.html

Little drops of water,
little grains of sand,
make the mighty ocean
and the beauteous land.

[Ray]

This is the inverse of - I'm for that type of project, except when it's placed in my neighborhood. ;)

So, state-building by the US should be logically limited to areas where we (US) have a reasonable opportunity to succeed. An example area would be Latin America. The US has a huge pool (military and civilian) of Spanish speakers familiar with the traditions and cultures of that area. Latin America has a colonialized background and governmental institutions similar to those of the US.

Regards

Mike

I would say the approach should be in the manner of the British, who built a huge Empire that was administered willingly by the very people they conquered.

[Bill Moore]

Posted by JMM99


So, state-building by the US should be logically limited to areas where we (US) have a reasonable opportunity to succeed.

Most have learned from our recent failures, Sec Clinton in her recent article in FP said responding to crisis is not a strategy, and we need to start investing where it reinforce and strengthen U.S. interests, and that isn't in Astan, but it is beyond Latin America.

[Dayuhan]

I would say the approach should be in the manner of the British, who built a huge Empire that was administered willingly by the very people they conquered.

Wasn't that the same empire that dissolved when the conquered folks who were doing the administering decided that they'd rather administer it themselves, and got less willing? Not likely anyone's going to fool them again. Besides, why on earth would the US want to conquer anyone or build a huge empire? Seems pointless, anachronistic, and horribly expensive...

[jmm99]

The US has been a lousy imperial conqueror outside CONUS. It administered Cuba and the PI with no intent to hold them as permanent colonies. It annexed Hawaii, Guam and PR. Beyond them, it has had a few military occupations - some that have worked out fairly well; others that haven't. The British model is a part of our history; but only in the sense that we rebelled against it.

Bill:

This is a decent basic concept: "...we need to start investing where it will reinforce and strengthen U.S. interests ...." One question is what sort of bounds should be placed on the concept if the investment is to be public.

Regards

Mike

[Ray]

Wasn't that the same empire that dissolved when the conquered folks who were doing the administering decided that they'd rather administer it themselves, and got less willing? Not likely anyone's going to fool them again. Besides, why on earth would the US want to conquer anyone or build a huge empire? Seems pointless, anachronistic, and horribly expensive...

I think you are reading issues much more than what is stated.

No one is saying that the US is out to conquer anyone. In the contemporary world, it would be laughable and totally ridiculous to believe Empires could be created.

It requires another thread and some other time to understand why the British quit the Empire, but that is not the aim of this thread nor was it the aim of my post. I fail to understand why you have brought that up, unless you wish to make it a debating point, though I find no connection.

The aim of my post to which you have replied was to indicate to put it, hopefully, easier for comprehension and briefly is:

1. Even though the British initially had no idea of the culture of the people they conquered, nevertheless could control and administer the locals, whose population was much greater than the British in each colony. Does speaks volumes for the British colonial philosophy .

2. It speaks volumes for the manner in which they learnt the culture etc of the country and set to rest any misgivings of the locals.

Therefore, others could learn their ways and adjust it to the modern contemporary situation!

Indeed, the locals wanted to administer themselves. The reason is not that hard to find - they had got education and the world had changed! Democracy, universal suffrage, revolutions etc were taking place and there was a greater interaction between peoples of the world taking place. People, thus, realised their rights!

Yet, give it to the British what is their due - there was no revolution against the British that forced them to leave their colonies; and they had a whole lot of them! Not one revolution!!!!!

They left with honour and what is more the erstwhile British colonies have no bad blood with what was called the 'Mother Country' and that is why we still have the Commonwealth and still have our ties with Britain. It was but a few days ago, the last Commonwealth Head of Govt Meeting (CHOGM) concluded in Australia!!

The Queen of UK remains the head of the Commonwealth.

http://www.abc.net.au/lateline/content/2011/s3351123.htm

Much to learn from the British, if one wants to rule the waves!!

[Ray]

JMM.

The US was never an imperialist power.

In fact, the US supported Indian Independence Movement and showcased it to the extent feasible!

This is known to all Indians, including the rural illiterates!

That is why we feel sorry that there was a man called John Foster Dulles, who soured our admiration for the US.

Thank God, it is history and we are back to admiring the US! We share the agony every time the US falters.

Quit Afghanistan, if you can do nothing about it.

But quit with Honour.

No second Vietnam.

No second superpower defeated by the soldiers of Islam!

[jmm99]

Very curious why John Foster Dulles ruffled Indian feathers - or at least yours. Definitely off topic to this thread. Please send me a PM.

As to Astan, I'm afraid the "hangers on" will cause a chopper on the embassy roof situation.

Withdrawal is a tricky thing. Since it's the USMC's birthday today, consider the Marines' "retrograde assault" in Eastern North Korea and the Army's running of the gauntlet in Western North Korea at the same time in 1950.

Regards

Mike

[davidbfpo]

There is a 2011 thread 'End of Empires: who and what was responsible? (post WW2)', which has gone over the issues of imperial demise:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=13335

Ray,

You may enjoy that thread, especially after reading your last couple of posts on Indian feelings towards the "old country".

[Ray]

JMM

He was the original -either you are with us or against us man!

We had just emerged from many years of suppression - Islamic and British and we wanted no more!

[Ray]

There is a 2011 thread 'End of Empires: who and what was responsible? (post WW2)', which has gone over the issues of imperial demise:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=13335

Ray,

You may enjoy that thread, especially after reading your last couple of posts on Indian feelings towards the "old country".

Thanks.

I just had a quick look.

Too many heavyweights around and so it will require time lest they misunderstand what I am saying as some are doing already! ;) :eek:

[Steve the Planner]

Bob:

You are rapidly becoming my hero.

US AID does development, and as an institution they (not surprisingly) tend to see effectiveness and development as paths to stability.

US State does governance, and not surprisingly, they tend to see democracy and rule of law as paths to stability.

US Defense does security, and not surprisingly, they tend to see reduction of threats and clearing of secure space as the path to stability.

"3D" proponents typically say "no, you must do all of these in concert, and they one achieves stability."

All of this scratches at the obvious symptoms of the problem, and may well create some temporary window of stability, and may even facilitate over long hard effort actual progress to be made in a very indirect, "even a blind squirrel finds a nut" kind of way.

But at some point the West will need to set the lessons of "how to sustain a colony" aside as the basis for COIN doctrine and look instead to "why colonized people revolt and how to avoid creating, or if created, best repair such conditions."

The core problem is the failed "Failed State" construct that has been undermining our efforts in these places for years.

If only the plumber can fix the toilet, the divorce will not happen.

These are real people in these places who, like Ken suggested, have their own way of doing things.

We are a foreign power, and always viewed as such, whether for good or bad.

We overwhelm domestic government and its legitimate connections, whether intentionally or inadvertently, by our presence, force and wealth.

The entity and theory that is lacking is one that can understand and influence relevant changes in the areas that legitimately concern us---whether by force (at times) or more subtly.

Our current approaches have been less than effective, and a new theory of effective non-US engagement has yet to emerge---probably drowned out by the bureaucratic dominance of the debate by the parties that have been mis-assigned to the tasks, and lack any effective tools and theories.

The legitimate debates are place and people specific, and there are no one size fits all external models.

It is just hard.

[jmm99]

has much materiality to this thread - Finding Petraeusism in Naglandia (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/finding-petraeusism-in-naglandia) (heavily annotated with 58 footnotes); and subtitled "The U.S. Military’s Hyper-American “Can-do” Spirit and Utopian Ideals Found in Afghanistan". The subtitle pins too much blame on the military. It could be reduced to "The Hyper-American “Can-do” Spirit and Utopian Ideals Found in Afghanistan".

The author's (Anon's) BLUF:


We can’t turn Afghanistan into a progressive European-like society. We shouldn’t build an exact replica of our own Army for them, and we shouldn’t attempt to establish a Western-style police force. We definitely don’t need to be fighting their insurgents for them. Let’s train some of their army and police as the local conditions merit for a few years, and that’s all. We can concentrate the rest of our power in that region towards Pakistan, knowing that we’ll have to play a little dirty, build up our intelligence capabilities and grow some more diplomats. And we can still be “population-centric”, but let us redefine that to mean that we understand the people better, not that we are attempting to protect them from something they might not wish to be protected from even if some of them sometimes say they want to be. Surely we must be as unconventionally savvy in our thinking and dealings with people in an unconventional environment as we talk about needing to be in a tactical manner. In other words, instead of trying to get everyone to enjoy cookies and milk while watching Leave it to Beaver, let’s play some poker.

Regards

Mike

[Bob's World]

The only thing worse than the current Northern Alliance government or the previous Taliban government to the future stability of Afghanistan would be to force upon them some highly Westernized concept of governance and expect it to work.

The Taliban government was in synch with a portion of the populace, so had stability with them, but was out of synch with an equally large portion of the populace is so significant of a way that that portion felt compelled to fight for change. It was a stalemate.

The Northern alliance government of today is equally in synch with one portion of the populace (though one sees fractures within the Northern Alliance as well...) so has stability with them, but is so out of synch with the still equally large segment of the populace that supported the Taliban government so the fight continues.

(A side lesson the US should learn from this is that it was relatively easy to conduct UW to tip the balance of power and enable the challenging party to prevail with relatively low cost, small numbers, over short time; but that when that new solution is every bit as out of synch with the populace as what it replaced that virtually NO amount of money, troops, or time can force a true stability where the situation is inherently out of balance.

The only true path to stability is for a new government to form that merges and balances the equities of the entire populace. GIRoA has no interest in such compromise, and has no necessity to act so long as we subsidize and protect their failure to do so.

We have two choices.

1. Stay and force such compromise and drive a reconciliation process and the formation of a new constitution that creates the mechanisms of trust required for such a reconciliation to work. (This shifts the impossible task from the military back to the civil aspects of our intervention where it has always belonged);

or

2. We simply recognize that we really have few interests in the region, and even fewer risks of any real threat from the region, and pack up and leave an let a self-determined naturally selected process take its course. (Yes, of course Iran and Pakistan would employ agents to shape events, why would they do otherwise?)

But to simply stay and attempt to force the illogical, the inappropriate and the impossible is not our best course. We have fallen prey to a false perspective of the nature of the problem and the risks due to the flawed context in which we view the situation.

Either solution would have to be tempered to the will and culture of the collective populace, so would not look much like any form of modern Western democracy, and to attempt to make it such only creates new and equally dangerous conditions of instability. This must be a government designed for this complex populace, not one designed for ours. We have no corner on what "right" looks like, and in fact the secret of our success is that we designed a system that the populace could continually tweak or kick the government as necessary to where they wanted it to go. Where we are now is ok for us (though many Americans are ready to give the system another kick or two), but is highly unlikely to be right for anyone else.

We need to change our context for how we view the "problem" of Afghanistan first, and then the rest will follow.

[Bill Moore]

Posted by Bob's World,


(A side lesson the US should learn from this is that it was relatively easy to conduct UW to tip the balance of power and enable the challenging party to prevail with relatively low cost, small numbers, over short time; but that when that new solution is every bit as out of synch with the populace as what it replaced that virtually NO amount of money, troops, or time can force a true stability where the situation is inherently out of balance.

I disagree that it was UW that overthrew the Taliban, you had two rather conventional armies (who weren't well dressed) with well established battle lines. The fight that ousted the Taliban was largely conventional (a war of movement) enabled by SF and the CIA who integrated know how, $$$, and technology in way that quickly tipped the odds in favor of the NA. The UW campaign started after that, and we weren't the ones doing it, Pakistan was and is.

None the less the jist of your argument is true, which is why real UW just like conventional war must begin with the end in mind, and the plan must support achieving that the political end. Victory on the battlefield is always good, but never sufficient. We had the same problem in Iraq, where were blinded by our battlefield victory euphoria, and then quickly realized that those were only battle victories, not strategic victories. We didn't do much better in Latin America with all the regime changes we facilitated there, but at least we didn't commit conventional troops, which almost always leads to a quagmire, since it is a very hard political decision to pull conventional forces out and accept less than a win.

Of course one would hope that "end state, or desired state" were trying to get to is based on a realistic assessment of the society we're impacting, and that we're not stupid enough to impose a completely foreign system upon them. We should also consider if it is really in our interest to change a regime versus detering specific behaviors (when possible). All water under the bridge now for the current fight, but hopefully we have learned the right lessons for the future.

[Bob's World]

It's never too late to kill a bad program, and it's never to late to abandon a failed strategy.

That's a sign that needs to be posted over the main entrance at the Pentagon.

[Dayuhan]

The only true path to stability is for a new government to form that merges and balances the equities of the entire populace. GIRoA has no interest in such compromise, and has no necessity to act so long as we subsidize and protect their failure to do so.

Worth noting that the Taliban also have no interest in compromise. Even if we stop subsidizing and protecting the GIRoA, compromise is unlikely at best: neither side is interested and there's nothing even close to a level of trust that would support compromise.

At this point the interests of the various components of the populace are probably too divergent to merge. It's not a question of finding some magic formula of balance: the parties involved have to reach a point where they see some basis for compromise. That process will involve violence, probably a lot of it. It's true that a path to stability would involve either dissolution into more sustainable parts or the emergence of some more inclusive mechanism, but either would have to emerge through a fair bit of evolution. No way to impose a deus ex machina solution.


We have two choices.

1. Stay and force such compromise and drive a reconciliation process and the formation of a new constitution that creates the mechanisms of trust required for such a reconciliation to work. (This shifts the impossible task from the military back to the civil aspects of our intervention where it has always belonged);

That's a very hypothetical choice, since we have no way to force compromise or reconciliation, and even if we did any compromise or reconciliation that we forced would be artificial and unsustainable. The "impossible task" would remain impossible, and "the civil aspects of our intervention", which are in no position to "force" anything, are no better equipped to do the impossible than the military ones.


or

2. We simply recognize that we really have few interests in the region, and even fewer risks of any real threat from the region, and pack up and leave an let a self-determined naturally selected process take its course. (Yes, of course Iran and Pakistan would employ agents to shape events, why would they do otherwise?)

True enough, though we do have to recognize that the Taliban and their Pakistani backers have to a large extent adopted a global Islamist narrative: they aren't just good nationalists that are being worked. It is very likely that they will end up supporting and protecting people who want to kill Americans. That's not necessarily a reason to stay, just means there's a good chance we'll have to do it all again, hopefully smarter.


Either solution would have to be tempered to the will and culture of the collective populace

Wouldn't that automatically exclude any attempt to force compromise and reconciliation?

What's a "collective populace"?


This must be a government designed for this complex populace, not one designed for ours.

Again, the use of "this complex populace" imposes the construct of a singular populace, which is a distortion from the start.

I don't think anyone could possibly "design" a government for anyone else's populaces. I doubt that even the populaces involved could design one at this point. It has to evolve, not to be designed, and that evolutionary process isn't going to be pretty. Best we find ways to stay out of it.

[Bill Moore]

Posted by Dayuhan,


True enough, though we do have to recognize that the Taliban and their Pakistani backers have to a large extent adopted a global Islamist narrative: they aren't just good nationalists that are being worked. It is very likely that they will end up supporting and protecting people who want to kill Americans. That's not necessarily a reason to stay, just means there's a good chance we'll have to do it all again, hopefully smarter.

Agree with the jist of your comment, but what exactly will we have to do all over again?

First, we're not leaving, we're downsizing/rightsizing, but I guess you could make the same argument that we said that about Vietnam also.

I still don't think we'll have to occupy the nation again, we may very well have to conduct large scale raids to wipe out terrorist nests if they're stupid enough to consolidate forces. That is a lot cheaper and more effective than trying to change a society, an activity that seems to be generating as much resentment towards us as good will.

[Dayuhan]

Agree with the jist of your comment, but what exactly will we have to do all over again?

First, we're not leaving, we're downsizing/rightsizing, but I guess you could make the same argument that we said that about Vietnam also.

That was a response to Bob's World's option #2:


We simply recognize that we really have few interests in the region, and even fewer risks of any real threat from the region, and pack up and leave an let a self-determined naturally selected process take its course.

I meant to suggest that if we follow that course there's a good chance we'll find ourselves responding to a similar provocation in the future.

I see downsizing/rightsizing as a prelude to leaving: the basic problem of propping up a government that can neither govern nor stand on its own doesn't seem likely to change with downsizing.


I still don't think we'll have to occupy the nation again, we may very well have to conduct large scale raids to wipe out terrorist nests if they're stupid enough to consolidate forces. That is a lot cheaper and more effective than trying to change a society, an activity that seems to be generating as much resentment towards us as good will.

That's about what I meant by "doing it smarter".

[jcustis]

During a search for the posts on the Dutch role I found this thread: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=923&highlight=dutch


I have just finished reading those two pages of posts and linked-in articles. Stunning...just plain stunning, when one looks at the proclamations five years ago, and what has transpired since then. I know it's a lot more than just this quote, but reading this takes me way back, to a time when I was just coming off my second Iraq deploy and thinking about my third. Afghanistan was a distant blip on my radar. And then, there it was.


NATO's commander here has set a six-month deadline to reverse a Taliban insurgency terrorizing southern Afghanistan or risk alienating Afghans undecided about whom to support.

British army Lt. Gen. David Richards said his troops must prove to Afghans in the south that the fundamentalist Islamic militia won't be able to undermine the democratically elected Afghan government or stop efforts to rebuild the shattered country.

Only 10% of the south's population supports the Taliban, Richards said, citing Afghan government surveys. In an interview, he said 70% won't declare their loyalty until they “see which side will win. They can't wait forever. We've got to show them we will win.”

Nearly five years after a U.S.-led campaign ousted the Taliban government that had sheltered al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden, Richards' troops have launched “Operation Medusa” in Panjwayi district in Kandahar province. The campaign aims to quell the Taliban's aggressive new offensive. NATO reported that more than 200 Taliban fighters were killed in the first two days of Medusa, which began Saturday.

The fighting also has brought NATO casualties. Monday, two U.S. warplanes mistakenly strafed NATO troops in Panjwayi district. A Canadian soldier was killed, said Maj. Scott Lundy, a NATO spokesman. A British soldier was killed in a suicide bombing in Kabul, the British Defense Ministry said. More than 130 NATO and coalition troops have died this year, the Associated Press reported, more than in all of 2005.

NATO took over responsibility for southern Afghanistan from the United States on July 31. As early as this month, NATO will take over for the U.S.-led multinational coalition in eastern Afghanistan...

This ties in to the recent postings about the grim NIE, and I think we'd all stand to gain something from re-educating ourselves about what was going on during the 2006-2008 window.

[Bill Moore]

This ties in to the recent postings about the grim NIE, and I think we'd all stand to gain something from re-educating ourselves about what was going on during the 2006-2008 window.

While I am generally negative towards our strategy or lack of one for Afghanistan, there is still a possibility that we'll eventually stumble into something that looks like success over time (assuming we lower our ambitions on what success means). We're not the only ones subject to exhaustion. We're not leaving in 2014, we're just pulling out most of the conventional combat forces, which may allow us be successful (or more accurately allow the Afghans to be successful). We'll still be pumping money in, training Afghan security forces, and special operations will still be putting pressure on the Taliban until we get tired, and since that is affordable option it may last a while.

The Taliban must be confused about all this, at least the senior ones. In the mid 90s we reached out to them. I doubt that we liked them, but they were useful partners to pressure Iran and for suppressing the narcotics trade. And reportedly supported a joint U.S./Saudi venture to develop a pipeline there. I can see why Pakistan feels betrayed, but even they should understand that 9/11 changed everything, but it does seem like we may over conflated the Taliban with Al Qaeda. Providing protection is not the same as supporting transnational terrorist activity. None the less, 10 plus years later everything has changed, and if they weren't a direct enemy before (rather just a friend of our enemy) they definitely are now.

If we live long enough, and get to read a more dispassionate and accurate history of this war decades down the road it may start making sense. I'm not sure there were any particular turning points during our war, I think they happened prior to the war.

[jcustis]

If we live long enough, and get to read a more dispassionate and accurate history of this war decades down the road it may start making sense. I'm not sure there were any particular turning points during our war, I think they happened prior to the war.

I don't think we are going to gain a more accurate appreciation down the road, but rather revisionism, slanted to support politics, ego, and to protect folks' necks.

We gained a more nuanced understanding of Vietnam through the Pentagon Papers and other reams of classified paperwork from the war years. The history is more delicate and fragile nowadays. The number of operation orders, emails, and briefings hanging out on classified servers is mind-boggling, and chunks of it get lost every day. Blow an external teradrive or two, and three years and five unit rotations are gone like so many candles blown out.

Some serious questions need to be asked though, about what could have been if NATO wasn't forced to slug it out pretty much on its own for so long, and we had simply committed the forces earlier, or said to hell with troop ceilings, or had a totally different approach once Karzai's aims came into focus.

[Entropy]

During a search for the posts on the Dutch role I found this thread: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=923&highlight=dutch


I have just finished reading those two pages of posts and linked-in articles. Stunning...just plain stunning, when one looks at the proclamations five years ago, and what has transpired since then. I know it's a lot more than just this quote, but reading this takes me way back, to a time when I was just coming off my second Iraq deploy and thinking about my third. Afghanistan was a distant blip on my radar. And then, there it was.



This ties in to the recent postings about the grim NIE, and I think we'd all stand to gain something from re-educating ourselves about what was going on during the 2006-2008 window.

Welcome to my world. Afghanistan has always been my theater and my cynicism is fueled by the strong sense that Afghanistan policy is just like the movie "Groundhog Day" except we don't get a clean start at each iteration yet we still forget everything we've done before.

[davidbfpo]

A short comment on KoW blog by a Human Terrain analyst who has been in Helmand Province for the Spring and Summer, which opens with:
I spent my spring and summer in southern Helmand conducting research. The population’s prescience was unnerving.

Right or wrong, unfounded or founded, the locals overwhelmingly saw the war with the Taliban as yet to come. The tired and sometimes clumsy argument in London and Washington that the Taliban will pour over the Afghan borders upon NATO withdrawal is alive and well around the town centers, wells, and mosques of Marjah and Garmsir. The locals truly believe that Pakistani Taliban—madrassa students and patient trainees ready to die—will storm across NATO-built highways in civilian trucks wave after wave, undaunted by death.

Which ends with:
...NATO should focus precious assets on countering-radicalisation to stave off the effects of impending Taliban expansion. Empower indigenous resiliencies. The ideological Taliban will probably return again strongly. Afghans at every level of society—not just in the security services—must be ready.

Link:http://icsr.info/blog/Counter-Radicalisation-in-the-War-to-Come

From this faraway armchair I do wonder if the legend or customary dislike of all Pakistanis by Afghans has changed. Secondly, whatever local or national security forces are in place say by 2014 they will carefully observe which "way the wind is blowing" and decide what they will do. Empowering indigenous resiliencies could be very temporary.

[Ray]

Here is one of the way to win:http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uVuI4A1ka6U

Sanjit 'Bunker' Roy (born 2 August 1945) is an Indian social activist and educator. In 1972 he founded the Barefoot college in Tilonia, Rajasthan. The Indian non-governmental organization was registered as the Social Work and Research Centre.

Bunker Roy was born in Burnpur Bengal, present-day West Bengal. His father was a mechanical engineer and his mother retired as India's trade commissioner to Russia.

He went to the Doon School from 1956 to 1962 and attended St. Stephen's College, Delhi from 1962 to 1967. Both institutes are the Ivy League of India.

He earned his master's degree in English. He then decided to devote himself to social service, to the shock of his parents.

He has trained Aghan and even African illiterate women to electrify their villages with solar energy and other village help amenities!

[Bob's World]

JMM.

The US was never an imperialist power.

In fact, the US supported Indian Independence Movement and showcased it to the extent feasible!

This is known to all Indians, including the rural illiterates!

That is why we feel sorry that there was a man called John Foster Dulles, who soured our admiration for the US.

Thank God, it is history and we are back to admiring the US! We share the agony every time the US falters.

Quit Afghanistan, if you can do nothing about it.

But quit with Honour.

No second Vietnam.

No second superpower defeated by the soldiers of Islam!


This is not a US war. Sure, we were the power that put the Northern Alliance on top of the heap, and yes, sadly we have dedicated ourselves for over a decade to artificially sustain them there. But the failure to evolve and extend governance to those vanquished belongs to the Government of Afghanistan.

Not only has the Government of Afghanistan proven itself to be a complete failure at doing anything other than working to protect their Northern Alliance monopoly, they have made no effort to do so and are rather shameless in that fact. This is an "all or nothing" culture, and currently they are the ones that have it all and are quite happy to have ISAF out holding off the rest of the populace while paying GIRoA Billions for the opportunity to do so.

The US has many reasons to feel stupid for the past 10 years, but no reason to feel "defeated."

[davidbfpo]

I found this CSIS analyst's report via the Lowy Institute, it is rather a long read and so I went to the concluding paragraph:
In short, the most probable result of result of “transition” will not be what some US policymakers have come to call “Afghan Good Enough” – a stable democratic state -- nor will it be a stable Pakistan. It will be an unstable form of “Afghan Muddle Through,” coupled to an unstable Pakistan still driven largely by its internal problems and tensions with India.

Link:http://csis.org/publication/transition-afghanistan-pakistan-war-how-does-war-end

[Ken White]

Ten and more years ago. Surprise, surprise...:rolleyes:

(I think Rudyard Kipling sort of predicted it even earlier... :D )