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William F. Owen
04-20-2009, 06:51 AM
Winning the War in Afghanistan (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2009/04/winning-the-war-in-afghanistan/)



This paper offers a plan for victory that builds on classic COIN--the oil spot or ink spot strategy--customized to address the unique challenges of the Afghan area of operations (AO).

I agree with the ink spot strategy. Make sense if you have enough troops and enough resources, and another 10-15 years.

EG, if the UK is serious about Helmand, it needs to deploy a Division of about 3 Brigades. The need is for about 16-20,000 men plus the attendant support. ... so 24 Apaches makes more sense than 6-8.

The Taliban can be defeated, but their just isn't the Political will to commit the resources necessary to do it. That's the problem. There isn't even the political will to try and close the boarder with Pakistan.

Bob's World
04-20-2009, 12:17 PM
First thing we need to do is determine what is "victory" for the US in this country in terms of our national interests (i.e. "victory" for the Afghans may be a very different thing, and good on them for that. We just don't need to confuse their victory for our victory and actually put our self at risk of a strategic setback because we pushed for the wrong end zone down at the operational level).

This then needs to be balanced in the larger global context of what the U.S. wants to redefine its role as in this new, post-Cold War, post-Bushesque GWOT, globalized world. This will give us the context to know how much to ask of our allies, to better understand who are allies and enemies really are these days (applying old logic to that analysis is leading us to dangerous conclusions IMHO), and what reasonable schemes of engagement are for any given state balanced within the much broader context of how they impact the U.S.'s endeavors around the region and the world.

To simply debate COIN tactics (or more accurately, how the US and coalition forces support the host nation's COIN) against one particular insurgent group in one particular state is something we need to let the commander's on the ground sort out. What the Generals and the Policy wanks need to do is get out of our tactical commander's lanes and start doing the hard work of sorting out the big picture in their own. Afterall, that's what they get paid to do.

Ken White
04-20-2009, 04:47 PM
a COIN or Stability Operation is either deluded or not thinking clearly. Lacking a scorched earth, there will be no victory. Since we are not going to play G.Khan, the best that can be hoped for is an acceptable outcome. I have seen no evidence the US has yet determined what such an out come might be in its view. There is even less evidence that there is a consensus in Afghanistan that can provide an Afghan view of what such an out come might be.

As Eden has said several times, I suspect the Afghan view is a loose, sort of Federal national government that can preclude foreign interference and control the war lord factor -- other than , it will leave people alone.

That doesn't accord well with western thought.

Bob's World says:
This then needs to be balanced in the larger global context of what the U.S. wants to redefine its role as in this new, post-Cold War, post-Bushesque GWOT, globalized world.Two thoughts -- it's a Post Clinton-Bushesque world. One led to the other as sure as day leads to night.

Secondly, good plan -- however, given that this is the USA, my bet is that (a) It will not happen in the sense you wish; (b) the sheer number of players that will wade in on what that role might be will preclude any except a poor compromise solution being proffered; (c) as soon as that new role is determined by said poor compromise, there will be a concerted and successful effort, domestically and internationally to change it.
...This will give us the context to know how much to ask of our allies, to better understand who are allies and enemies really are these days (applying old logic to that analysis is leading us to dangerous conclusions IMHO)...Ask and ye will not receive -- other than from a very few and that will be reduced in supply and come with caveats. We have no allies, other than temporary accommodations. I'm unsure why people cannot accept and understand that. Our size, wealth, global power projection capability and selfishness all conspire to insure we can be respected (but are not now to the extent possible and desirable due to misuse of our power and flawed domestic choices) but we are not going to be liked, not at all. Nor are we going to have any allies other than those who see their own temporary advantage in allying with us. They will be fickle. OTOH, we have a slew of enemies and are likely to have more.

None of that is meant to be gloomy; it's cool. Been that way in the world ever since I first went overseas in 1947; hasn't changed much in the intervening years and is unlikely to change in the future -- until we go into real and major decline. Then the Jackals and Hyenas will appear, the latter laughing... ;)
... What the Generals and the Policy wanks need to do is get out of our tactical commander's lanes and start doing the hard work of sorting out the big picture in their own. Afterall, that's what they get paid to do.True, hopefully the will not waste time trying to develop a national strategy for a nation with a short attention span.

George L. Singleton
04-20-2009, 05:04 PM
Folks, closing the Afghan-Pakistan Border is like trying to count the sands in front on one condo at Gulf Shores, Alabama from the back steps used to access the beach down to the every changing waterline.

Border is too vast and rugged for a conventional closing.

However, using satellites and infra red technology we can bomb the hell out of much of the border but that takes a lot of resources to do.

William F. Owen
04-20-2009, 05:41 PM
Border is too vast and rugged for a conventional closing.

However, using satellites and infra red technology we can bomb the hell out of much of the border but that takes a lot of resources to do.

I'm not a technophile, but GSR, LOROPS and UGS can certainly make huge strides in making sure that a significantly more of the traffic is interdicted. Making the border difficult for the bad guys is not a tall order.... given the resources.

Bob's World
04-20-2009, 05:58 PM
The "border" is not now, nor ever was the issue. In fact the current line drawn on Western maps is no more than that; simply a line drawn by westerners for westerners. It helps us feel that there is order in the world and that our western concepts of state sovereignty codifed at Westphalia hold equal sway everywhere.

To focus on making this border mean more than that is to virtually ensure defeat by creating a task too large to accomplish that even if somehow accomplished serves solely to drive a wedge through the heart of the very populace who's support the governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan need to attain some degree of stability.

We need a new model, the old one won't work here.

Perhaps a broad "Pashto zone" that encompasses their traditional tribal homeland as a "border" instead of a thin line so comforting to us?

Dual citizenship for all within, and governed with a system rooted in their historic tribalism?

What about the Taliban you ask? Those guys work for the government of Pakistan, I suspect they will drop their papers and quit that arrangement if given a better option.

What about AQ you ask? I suspect if we made the PNG of AQ as the condition precedent for such an arrangement they would be out on their little Arab backsides within a week. Sanctuary lies within a poorly governed populace, take away the poor governance and the sanctuary goes with it.

Regradless of what bold new COA is adobted, to simply work harder and faster at the old one won't do the trick, it'll just wear us out sooner.

Entropy
04-20-2009, 06:03 PM
I pretty much agree with Ken's comments.

On the border, we can probably do a better job of interdiction, but one complicating factor is that a lot of people besides insurgents use the border. Some are insurgents, some are smugglers, some are doing legitimate trade, some are visiting family, etc. Even if it were possible "closing" the border is going to have some significant negative effects. Sorting legitimate border crossings from insurgent use is going to be difficult given the terrain and all the other complicating factors.

Ken White
04-20-2009, 06:20 PM
Perhaps a broad "Pashto zone" that encompasses their traditional tribal homeland as a "border" instead of a thin line so comforting to us?

Dual citizenship for all within, and governed with a system rooted in their historic tribalism?Since you use the word 'within' that raises the question; does this "Pashto zone" have a border?
What about the Taliban you ask? Those guys work for the government of Pakistan, I suspect they will drop their papers and quit that arrangement if given a better option.Actually, I didn't ask -- and I strongly question the validity of your last two statements and ask, if they are true, what is your better option?
What about AQ you ask? I suspect if we made the PNG of AQ as the condition precedent for such an arrangement they would be out on their little Arab backsides within a week. Sanctuary lies within a poorly governed populace, take away the poor governance and the sanctuary goes with it.Good plan -- with what, if anything, do you propose to replace the poor governance?

You continually tell us what is wrong but I've seen few concrete solutions that can realistically be expected to be applied, surely you have some specific and achievable fixes that we can use to start toward if not reach this nirvana of a 'new America' that returns to its original values.

Bob's World
04-20-2009, 08:33 PM
Ken,

Short answer is I don't think we need to "fix" Afghanistan or Pakistan, just to stop breaking them would be a good first step.

Next I would move our manhunting efforts back into the shadows and tailor it to focus on taking down those individuals critical to the functioning of critical nodes instead of those in senior leadership. This then frees up SOF and the rest of our military to doing what we should have focused on from the outset: Getting a self-determined government of Afghanistan up and functioning on their terms and standards and getting out.

I would then stop using NATO to coerce our European allies to act against their own national interests in order to support ours. I suspect for most the only national interest they serve by going to Afghanistan is the one of sustaining a civil relationship with the U.S. and keeping us on the hook for funding a large portion of European defense by staying in NATO.

I would stop forcing the Pakistani government to exert itself in the Pasto tribal areas. We see it as them executing their duties as a government, the Pashto see it as an incursion on their tribal sovereignty. We press for it because we think it will bring stability and weaken the Taliban, instead it has brought instability and has strengthened the Taliban.

Borders are overstated. The Pashto zone I suggest could be defined in historic terms of where people live not where lines are drawn. Other COAs could achieve a simiar effect, but the main idea is that we need to adopt new views of what sovereignty means that are more adaptive to the emerging world. I suspect more wars have been fought because of borders than from the lack of them in recent times.

I would not just abandon, but ban all metrics of "effectiveness" of governance and instead use simple local polling to determine "goodness" of governance. If the populace is satisfied it is good enough no matter how ineffective; if the populace is dissatisfied it is not good enough no matter how effective. Goodness would become our standard (I.e., the populaces standard becomes ours, not the other way around).

I would make "legitimacy" CCIR item. Any perceptions of US as being the source of legitimacy of a host nation governance would be identified and addressed immediately. All engagement would be designed with a primary focus of ensuring that anything we did to assist in enabling good governance was designed to avoid any perceptions of legitimacy over the same. In that vein I would identify and extricate ourselves from every such perception around the world, beginning in the Middle East. This would requrie significant policy changes in our relationships with Saudi Arabia, Israel (top 2) and several other states.

Obviously this is jsut the tip of the iceberg, there is a lot below the surface that is not visible in this small space.

Ken White
04-20-2009, 09:14 PM
In fact, I strongly agree with virtually all of it. However, (he said, clearing throat), Uhhmm, are we being realistic in what we both agree would be beneficial. Seems to me:

Your first two paragraphs are not only beneficial but easily achievable -- we really ought to get started on both those things. Today.

The issues of not pressing Pakistan and local satisfaction with governance -- regardless of international desires or 'standards' are possible. Difficult but possible. The biggest problem with both would be, I think, getting the consensus required. That said, we should certainly try.

However, with respect to not using NATO, recognition of the fact that borders are really becoming passe, the Pashto zone and the "legitimacy" issue, I suspect we can wish but are unlikely to see in our lifetimes. Unfortunately -- because those three and a half are quite important. The good news is that they are not necessary for the other issues to be pursued.

You're of course correct about borders and wars. The British and the French have much to answer for in that respect. I suppose they can be forgiven to an extent as they just did what seemed right at the time but those fault lines they built have been problematic for many years -- and likely will be in the future...:(

Thanks for the considered response; I'm old and retarded, all I can do is say Attaboy and agree -- you can push for those things as policies and I'm sure you are doing that. I wish you success.

But I still don't think we can truly do a national strategy... :D

davidbfpo
04-20-2009, 09:27 PM
The 'ink spot' paper reads well and fits COIN theory and practice. The first place to try it in Afghanistan are not "the usual suspect" provinces along the Durand Line, but the northern and other provinces where the local and national Afghan government has some impact. Maybe - from faraway - this is shoring up safer areas and not where the fighting is. Better try up north where there is a chance of success IMHO.

Controlling the border with Pakistan is a seperate, related issue and simply unlikely to happen. All the high-tech tools sound grand and can we distinguish between traders in civil goods from arms carriers or refugees with personal weapons? No.

davidbfpo

slapout9
04-20-2009, 11:53 PM
The article has a lot of systems thinking in it and should be viable if we choose to do it......but as Wilf said..... do we have the Political will to do it for X number of years.

In "General Systems Theory" (cain't spell the guys name) the first popular book on the subject you will find that the first question to ask when analyzing a system is what is inside the system...then what is outside the system...then what is the material (boundary) that separates them. Pretty much all successfully COIN strategies I have seen follow this pattern whether by design or by default. The Perimeter/Boundary/Filter/Access Point and being able to control what or who comes in or out is the key IMHO.

William F. Owen
04-21-2009, 04:51 AM
To focus on making this border mean more than that is to virtually ensure defeat by creating a task too large to accomplish that even if somehow accomplished serves solely to drive a wedge through the heart of the very populace who's support the governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan need to attain some degree of stability.



OK, the use of the word border seems to be causing problems. Fact is we are not going to convince the Taliban that their military success is impossible, if they have freedom of action to move back and worth to their safe areas.

Yes, "closing" the border is probably impossible. Making it 90% more difficult to cross, than it currently is, is not.

Eden
04-21-2009, 05:19 PM
In 2006, after NATO's Allied Rapid Reaction Corps took over as ISAF headquarters, an ink spot strategy was seriously discussed and half-way implemented. It was classic COIN stuff, just as described in the piece that kicked off this thread, and we planners pushed it hard.

Here is why it was never fully adopted:
1. The Afghans didn't like it. It meant abandoning some areas, and that just upset too many special interests within the Afghan mafiocracy that passed for a national government.
2. The Americans didn't like it. It meant abandoning the operational design for victory they had already worked out and were halfway through implementing. They assumed it was just a fig-leaf strategy which would allow the NATO allies to hide behind the wire; they much preferred chasing insurgents around RC-East, building roads to nowhere, and pursuing a quasi-French Indochina program of placing outposts in regions of no particular worth.
3. Many NATO allies didn't like it. It meant, in several cases, moving out of their selected provinces - which they thought would look like defeat and reflect badly on them - into areas they had avoided in the first place because of high levels of violence. They much preferred to pursue their individual 'wars' using the tactics they thought best.

Here is why it probably wouldn't have worked anyway:
1. Oil spots need to be dropped in either areas of high enemy activity, or in places of exceptional and/or inherent worth. There are none of the latter in Afghanistan, and we did not have the combat power to do the former.
2. To sustain themselves, the insurgents in Afghanistan do not really need prolonged access to the population; they simply need to be able to strike at it. You can't prevent suicide attacks through heightened security, you can only reduce their effectiveness, and effectiveness isn't really what the insurgents are after. Activity begets support in this strange corner of the planet, and oil spots simply give the bad guys more room to maneuver.
3. It would have been a free pass to the drug lords.
4. Oil spot theory presupposes active and effective development of the secured terrain. In 2006/7/8, that was not a realistic prospect. Except for road-building, pretty much all development efforts during this period were abject failures.

Bottom line is that absent unity of command or unity of effort or adequate resources, pretty much any strategy will do as well as any other.

Entropy
04-21-2009, 05:54 PM
Great comment Eden, thanks!

Surferbeetle
04-21-2009, 06:25 PM
Second the attaboy for Eden..

A datapoint to consider, as we kick this can around, from the NATO website (http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/treaty.htm)


The Parties to this Treaty reaffirm their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments.

They are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilisation of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law. They seek to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area.

They are resolved to unite their efforts for collective defence and for the preservation of peace and security. They therefore agree to this North Atlantic Treaty :


WSJ Opinon piece by Josef Joffe (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Josef_Joffe); Obama's Popularity Doesn't Mean Much Abroad (http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124000916299330597.html)


The point here is an old one, variously ascribed to Talleyrand, Palmerston or De Gaulle, about nations having everlasting interests rather than eternal friends or enemies. In today's language: interest beats affection any time. Mrs. Merkel surely knows how enthralled her country is with Mr. Obama. But that's not enough to place German soldiers in harm's way in Afghanistan, or to run up the national debt in a country that is traumatized by inflation.

Ken White
04-21-2009, 07:44 PM
Great comment Eden, thanks!I'm old and slow, thus late, okay...:cool:

Ken White
04-21-2009, 07:47 PM
...WSJ Opinon piece by Josef Joffe (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Josef_Joffe); Obama's Popularity Doesn't Mean Much Abroad (http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124000916299330597.html)That one in particular has some timeless truths that are too often forgotten. National interests trump all sorts of enmity or friendliness -- and righteousness...

Surferbeetle
04-21-2009, 08:08 PM
From this weeks Economist: There was a lawyer, an engineer and a politician... (http://www.economist.com/world/international/displaystory.cfm?story_id=13496638)


Why do different countries favour different professions? And why are some professions so well represented in politics? To find out, The Economist trawled through a sample of almost 5,000 politicians in “International Who’s Who”, a reference book, to examine their backgrounds.

As a side bar the term hydraulic empire (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hydraulic_empire) might be of interest as well.

William F. Owen
04-22-2009, 05:44 AM
Great comment Eden, thanks!

Slow old and in the a very different time zone. Good information Eden. Thanks again.

Surferbeetle
04-23-2009, 03:09 AM
From this month's Atlantic, by Robert D. Kaplan (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_D._Kaplan), Pakistan’s Fatal Shore (http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200905/kaplan-pakistan)


The next people to set their sights on Gwadar were the Russians. Gwadar was the ultimate prize denied them during their decade-long occupation of Afghanistan in the 1980s—the fabled warm-water outlet to the sea that formed the strategic raison d’être for their Afghan adventure in the first place. From Gwadar, the Soviet Union could have exported the hydrocarbon wealth of Central Asia. But Afghanistan proved to be the graveyard of Soviet imperial visions. Gwadar, still just a point on the map, a huddle of fishermen’s stone houses on a spit of sand, was like a poisoned chalice.

Yet the story goes on. In the 1990s, successive democratic Pakistani governments struggled to cope with intensifying social and economic turmoil. Violence was endemic to Karachi and other cities. But even as the Pakistani political elite turned inward, it remained obsessed with the related problems of Afghanistan and energy routes. Anarchy in the wake of the Soviet withdrawal was preventing Pakistan from establishing roads and pipelines to the new oil states of Central Asia—routes that would have helped Islamabad consolidate a vast Muslim rear base for the containment of India. So obsessed was Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto’s government with curbing the chaos in Afghanistan that she and her interior minister, the retired general Naseerullah Babar, conceived of the newly formed Taliban as a solution. But, as Unocal and other oil firms, intrigued by the idea of building energy pipelines from the Caspian Sea across Afghanistan to Indian Ocean energy hubs like Gwadar, eventually found out, the Taliban were hardly an agent of stability.

Then, in October 1999, after years of civilian misrule, General Pervez Musharraf took power in a bloodless coup. In 2000, he asked the Chinese to fund a deepwater port at Gwadar. A few weeks before 9/11, the Chinese agreed, and their commitment to the project intensified after the U.S. invaded Afghanistan. Thus, with little fanfare, Gwadar became an example of how the world changed in the wake of the World Trade Center attacks in ways that many Americans and the Bush administration did not anticipate. The Chinese spent $200 million on the first phase of the port project, which was completed on schedule in 2005. In 2007, Pakistan gave PSA International of Singapore a 40-year contract to run Gwadar port.

William F. Owen
04-25-2009, 09:25 AM
Writing at Small Wars Journal, Bernard Finel, a senior fellow at the American Security Project, accepts neither the consensus about the worthiness of the war in Afghanistan nor the logic inferred by Petraeus. In his essay, Finel argues that keeping the Taliban out of power in Afghanistan does nothing to prevent another 9/11-type attack on the United States -- the 9/11 attack was simple to plan, inexpensive to fund, and required no sanctuary in Afghanistan to organize. Thus, counterterrorism is not a logical justification for the war in Afghanistan. Finel sums up his conclusions with this passage:

[W]e need to acknowledge that there is virtually no compelling evidence that military occupation of Afghanistan provides any significant protection against terrorist plots, even those arising from Afghanistan itself.

Regime change and military occupation can control the development of conventional military capabilities and of WMD programs that require a large physical plant to implement (notably nuclear programs). However, these sorts of interventions have minimal counterterrorism benefits because terrorist attacks rarely require state-level support to be effective.

Can't argue with much of that and it's another nail in the coffin of the supposed rational approach to strategic studies and political science. After 911 99% of the US population wanted vengeance. That needs to be admitted.

jmm99
04-25-2009, 06:43 PM
should determine the course of action taken in the war; subject to morphing during that course of action (which may lose the thread of the initial reason) - my perception.

I don't see any problem in admitting the following as the reason for going to war in Astan (and for DAs in Pakistan) ...


from Wilf
After 911 99% of the US population wanted vengeance. That needs to be admitted.

since that is what I believed in 2001 and still do.

Finel's article (http://smallwarsjournal.com/mag/docs-temp/228-finel.pdf) attacks the logic of the syllogism laid out below - albeit getting somewhat tied up in comparing the simplicity of using airliners as cruise missiles with the complexity of using IEDs on a large scale (Wilf's AO on both; not mine).

Here is the syllogism:


We were, after all, attacked on 9/11 by al Qaeda which at the time was operating with impunity under the protection of the Taliban in Afghanistan. Given that history, allowing the Taliban to reestablish itself in Afghanistan seems self-evidently unacceptable.

Not necessarily. The real question to be asked is whether Taliban support of AQ was necessary to the 9/11 plot, or whether it was simply convenient. The bottom line of Finel's article is that it was not necessary, but convenient (e.g., from a BBC link by David today, the Afghan camps were very convenient).

Moving then to the question of revenge - payback to AQ, which in its simplest form involves killing the people involved in 9/11 (the lower echelon spared us that problem). If you do not accept revenge-payback as a valid reason to make war on these folks, then you have a different perception from me - many do.

In applying the formula "find, fix and kill AQ" (end goal) , the question to be asked is whether a military occupation (and nation-building) is a necessary component of obtaining payback, or whether that course of action is likely to be inconvenient for realization of that end goal. Again, answering that question is not my AO - legally, almost any course of action will stand scrutiny.

--------------------

This formula is not suggested as the end-all, be-all solution to preventing future acts of "terrorism" (or, expressed another way, acts of violence by Transnational Violent Non-State Actors). It is simply the logical formula to have our revenge (or in more legalistic terms, our retribution).

davidbfpo
05-02-2009, 07:36 PM
With almost no media coverage the UK appears to have refined its policy, if this article is correct: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/columnists/christopherbooker/5263569/Battle-rages-over-our-tragic-failure-in-Afghanistan.html

'The first fruit of this was last week’s lucid and thoughtful strategy paper on Afghanistan and Pakistan, tellingly published not by the MoD but by the Cabinet Office. It lays out the framework of a wholly new approach, calling for much greater effort to be given to building up the rural Afghan economy, through new roads and other infrastructure, to give local farmers a positive alternative to the present chaotic and murderous stalemate. Unless they can earn their living from crops other than opium, they will remain in terrified semi-thrall to the Taliban'.

The UK cabinet Office paper is: http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/media/204173/afghanistan_pakistan.pdf . IMHO a very odd document, with lots of objectives and steps to achieve success.

I normally rely on the caustic comments on: http://defenceoftherealm.blogspot.com/

The latest article cites a very odd Reuters article, with a UK brigadier being cited: http://uk.reuters.com/article/homepageCrisis/idUKISL158029._CH_.2420


davidbfpo

Ken White
05-02-2009, 07:57 PM
"As long as we have the patience to stay they can never defeat us."

Custer? Percival? Not that either of them said that but the arrogant westerner being superior to the inferior types is bad ju-ju, methinks. Never is such an emphatic word... :wry:

George L. Singleton
05-05-2009, 11:38 AM
With almost no media coverage the UK appears to have refined its policy, if this article is correct: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/columnists/christopherbooker/5263569/Battle-rages-over-our-tragic-failure-in-Afghanistan.html

'The first fruit of this was last week’s lucid and thoughtful strategy paper on Afghanistan and Pakistan, tellingly published not by the MoD but by the Cabinet Office. It lays out the framework of a wholly new approach, calling for much greater effort to be given to building up the rural Afghan economy, through new roads and other infrastructure, to give local farmers a positive alternative to the present chaotic and murderous stalemate. Unless they can earn their living from crops other than opium, they will remain in terrified semi-thrall to the Taliban'.

The UK cabinet Office paper is: http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/media/204173/afghanistan_pakistan.pdf . IMHO a very odd document, with lots of objectives and steps to achieve success.

I normally rely on the caustic comments on: http://defenceoftherealm.blogspot.com/

The latest article cites a very odd Reuters article, with a UK brigadier being cited: http://uk.reuters.com/article/homepageCrisis/idUKISL158029._CH_.2420


davidbfpo

David:

The problem remains that it is very difficult to build and run schools, to be specific, when the terrorists are blowing schools up at an almost equal pace as you build them and then the terrorists murder the teachers as well.

There has to be a concurrent and effective, acceptible to the locals, too, law and order security presence where such activity is going on...construction, reconstruciton, etc, which needs to be manned by locals and Afghan national Army forces who are based in communities permannetly, not just "passing through."

NATO cannot in terms of numbers ever expect to be the security manning force or supply of peace keepers, only the interim trainers of locals and national Afghans who we would hope then keep the peace as the old phrase goes "forever and ever."

Very stormy, rainy, and 70s to low 80s temperatues over here rest of this week. Europe seems much cooler than here just now.

William F. Owen
05-05-2009, 01:05 PM
The problem remains that it is very difficult to build and run schools, to be specific, when the terrorists are blowing schools up at an almost equal pace as you build them and then the terrorists murder the teachers as well.

There has to be a concurrent and effective, acceptible to the locals, too, law and order security presence where such activity is going on...construction, reconstruciton, etc, which needs to be manned by locals and Afghan national Army forces who are based in communities permannetly, not just "passing through."

It amazes me that folks can't get this logic into their heads. I was at a UK pre-deployment A'Stan workshop last year and no one really wanted to talk about the elephant in the corner


Very stormy, rainy, and 70s to low 80s temperatues over here rest of this week. Europe seems much cooler than here just now.

You're blessed. Mid-80s and a full blown sand storm yesterday. At least we don't get snow... well Jerusalem does, but that's Jerusalem for you!

slapout9
06-10-2009, 06:27 PM
How accurate is this assessment?


http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BAjp6PqDj_M&feature=channel

Presley Cannady
06-11-2009, 03:23 AM
First thing we need to do is determine what is "victory" for the US in this country in terms of our national interests (i.e. "victory" for the Afghans may be a very different thing, and good on them for that. We just don't need to confuse their victory for our victory and actually put our self at risk of a strategic setback because we pushed for the wrong end zone down at the operational level).

I hear that phrase ("we need to define 'victory'") or variants of it a lot, along with the caveat that victory for the US may not coincide with the host population's idea of the preferred end state. I maybe wrong here, but I thought it clear from the outset that drying up Af-Pak of the people, means and/or will to source terrorist attacks against the West was the Coalition's overriding objective. I've never seen a survey indicating that Western electorates really gave a rat's behind about anything else. Even if there the aspirations of the host populations--shifting they may be--mismatched with all other concerns eminating from our great centers of strategic thought, doesn't achieving that one goal mean...well...the Coalition wins?

davidbfpo
06-25-2009, 04:19 PM
What is going on? A short BBC News clip, note interview with ex-Taliban Amabassador to Pakistan at the end, commenting on talking to the Taliban: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/8119110.stm

Apologies for those who cannot view.

davidbfpo

davidbfpo
06-25-2009, 04:21 PM
A review of the provinces on either side of the Durand Line (no video clips) and a useful summary: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/7601748.stm

davidbfpo

davidbfpo
06-25-2009, 04:27 PM
A long (73 mins) sound only interview of the ex-CIA Station Chief in Kabul, thirty years ago, which is interesting and not listened yet to fully: http://www.electricpolitics.com/podcast/2009/06/the_great_terror_bazaar.html

A summary appears in this article: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/graham-e-fuller/global-viewpoint-obamas-p_b_201355.html

Note he is multi-lingual (a point that has appeared here before) and has visited Pakistan more recently with RAND (no details).

davidbfpo

davidbfpo
06-25-2009, 04:33 PM
A non-Western contact having visited Kabul recently observed that:

a) The war was increasingly difficult and the Taliban could just wait for the Western presence to end;
b) No-one in Kabul, especially Afghans, thought the West would stay and the latest adjustments were an exit strategy. The one exception a Russian whose views was a new US encirclement strategy.

davidbfpo

slapout9
06-25-2009, 10:24 PM
Have know idea how accurate this is, but very disturbing if true.


http://therealnews.com/t/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=31&Itemid=74&jumival=3511

davidbfpo
07-09-2009, 02:42 PM
Amidst all the media reporting on USMC operations in South Helmand, the link is a BBC report, with five mins video, on the UK operation and note the Taliban are not retreating, whatever firepower is delivered: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/8142229.stm

(Apologies if clip will not work).

davidbfpo

Schmedlap
07-09-2009, 03:57 PM
The Long War Journal (http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2009/07/video_taliban_execut.php) posted a video that was shot on a cell phone camera, showing the dead body of Pir Samiullah and the decapitated bodies + heads of two of his lieutenants (not recommended for viewing if you have kids around). The story explains that,

"Samiullah was the first tribal leader in Swat to raise a lashkar, or tribal army, to oppose the Taliban. Samiullah claimed to have organized more than 10,000 tribesmen to oppose the Taliban and protect 20 villages.

He did so when Swat was at its darkest and the Taliban seemed unstoppable. The military offensive was stalled and the government and military had lost the will to fight. Just three months after Samiullah was killed, the government ceded Swat and much of the northwest to the Taliban in the infamous Malakand Accord.

The Pakistani government touted Samiullah's resistance to the Taliban, but refused to provide meaningful support to keep the tribal leader and his followers alive."
The killing is old news - occurrred in Dec 2008 - the story was simply posted because the video apparently just surfaced. But what stuck out to me was the quote above, explaining that this guy stood up to the Taliban even though he got no outside support (as far as we know) and the Taliban seemed too powerful to resist. Do we know what prompted this guy to rally a bunch of tribesman (I don't know how accurate that 10K number is) to oppose the Taliban, in the absence of government support, in spite of the perceived strength of the Taliban, and in spite of overwhelming odds? This seems like it would be a very valuable lesson to learn. It also seems somewhat counterintuitive to our general assumptions that we need to provide security before people will rise up like this (or maybe it's just an exception to the rule).

davidbfpo
07-09-2009, 10:18 PM
Col. Stuart Tootal, ex-3 Para, commenting on the war in Afghanistan, after a tour to Helmand in 2006, including media relations, ANA, ANP and more before he resigned from the UK Army in November 2007, in protest at what was happening: http://frontline.headshift.com/events/2007/10/insight-with-lt-col-stuart-tootal-and-patrick-bishop-can-the-british-win-in-afghanistan.html

Hat tip to Kings of War website.

Having listened to the interview some of his comments are now dated and speaking officially optimistic on what the comprehensive approach was achieving. He has a book on his experience due out soon: http://www.amazon.co.uk/Danger-Close-Commanding-PARA-Afghanistan/dp/1848542569

davidbfpo

davidbfpo
07-10-2009, 02:24 PM
A short interview by a Chinese journalist: http://www.globaltimes.cn/www/english/top-news/2009-07/444968.html

Interesting passage about relationships with non-Afghan jihadists.

davidbfpo

Valin
07-11-2009, 03:20 AM
Since you use the word 'within' that raises the question; does this "Pashto zone" have a border?

Google Images Pashtunistan (
http://images.google.com/images?hl=en&ei=qAJYSoygJqG_twfGj_ndCg&resnum=0&q=Pashtunistan&um=1&ie=UTF-8&ei=sAJYSvnHBoSXtgf69rjdCg&sa=X&oi=image_result_group&ct=title&resnum=4)

H/T David Kilcullen for introducing to the word.

Valin
07-11-2009, 03:32 AM
A short interview by a Chinese journalist: http://www.globaltimes.cn/www/english/top-news/2009-07/444968.html

Interesting passage about relationships with non-Afghan jihadists.

davidbfpo

Thanks


GT: Did you have anything to do with the attacks in Mumbai? What do you think about the Kashmir and Pakistan issues?

Nageer: My jihad brothers blasted Mumbai, but I can’t tell you who did it. We had cooperation with Pakistani Inter-Service Intelligence but they sold us down the river. We are related to the Indian Muslim military, but we are more ambitious and brave than they are.

Pakistani president Asif Zardari admits creating terrorist groups (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/pakistan/5779916/Pakistani-president-Asif-Zardari-admits-creating-terrorist-groups.html)
Pakistan's president has admitted his country created terrorist groups to help achieve its foreign policy goals.
08 Jul 2009

Ken White
07-11-2009, 05:06 AM
Google Images Pashtunistan...H/T David Kilcullen for introducing to the word.Your link doesn't work (when you do one, if it isn't automatically underlined, it isn't a link) but I've been there before. One of the Pashtun problems is that I'm not at all sure the Baluchis will go along with some of the depicted versions... :wry:

I was probably aware of Pashtunistan about two years after D. Kilcullen was born. That name was around long before he was, many thing were around long before he was. In any event, I'm still aware of it. My question was "...does this "Pashto zone" have a border?"

A line on a map is not necessarily a border in the sense of a legal, internationally recognized border or even one accepted by many. See 'Kurdistan' (or Baluchistan) for an example of the problems with the construct of Bob's World's 'Pashto Zone' or your (and many others) 'Pushtunistan.' ;)

So my question stands, all alone and broken hearted...

Jayhawker
07-11-2009, 07:07 AM
If folks are interested, the link should take you to a relatively brief history of the Durand Line and some proposals for a way ahead. In short, its a mess.

http://www.hollingscenter.org/Reports/07-2007_Durand_Line.pdf

davidbfpo
07-11-2009, 03:28 PM
On the ground with the Australian / Dutch presence in Oruzgan Province, Afghanistan, this tale of treachery and confusion rightly illustrates the problem with the campaign, entitled 'Zoom in to this small tale that spells defeat': http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/columnists/matthew_parris/article6684516.ece

davidbfpo

Ken White
07-11-2009, 03:32 PM
the KGB / MVD / NKVD / Agitprop, diligently exploited that line and many others the British and French drew on the map...:(

We're still paying the price for those strokes of a pen but at least we're giving all the KGB retirees a chuckle. :wry:

Rex Brynen
07-11-2009, 05:15 PM
On the ground with the Australian / Dutch presence in Oruzgan Province, Afghanistan, this tale of treachery and confusion rightly illustrates the problem with the campaign, entitled 'Zoom in to this small tale that spells defeat': http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/columnists/matthew_parris/article6684516.ece

davidbfpo

Excellent piece. Making sense and influencing it almost seems like... armed social science :D

(Yes, I'm not above stirring it up before I head out the door to the airport.)

marct
07-11-2009, 05:38 PM
Excellent piece. Making sense and influencing it almost seems like... armed social science :D

(Yes, I'm not above stirring it up before I head out the door to the airport.)

Bah! You're just cribbing from this thread (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=7776) and then pulling a duck and run :p:D! Have a great trip, Rex.

Ken White
07-11-2009, 05:39 PM
arms doing as more harm than good...

davidbfpo
07-12-2009, 05:10 PM
Needless to say the First Afghan War was between Imperial India and Afghanistan, wayback in 1842 and with a disasterous retreat from Kabul. Taken from: http://www.britishbattles.com/first-afghan-war/kabul-gandamak.htm

The First Afghan War provided the clear lesson to the British authorities that while it may be relatively straightforward to invade Afghanistan it is wholly impracticable to occupy the country or attempt to impose a government not welcomed by the inhabitants. The only result will be
failure and great expense in treasure and lives.

The British Army learnt a number of lessons from this sorry episode. One was that the political officers must not be permitted to predominate over military judgments.

To read more on this war use the link; Imperial India took revenge the next year!

davidbfpo

George L. Singleton
07-12-2009, 05:56 PM
David:

Your history is quite good, having served over there in the mid-1960s (Pakistan and side trips to Kabul from our base at Peshawar/Badabur).

It is too early to evaluate the latest strategy and accompanying tactics now being employed in Afghanistan, but I can say from this side of the Pond that use of "pincer" movements in Helmud Province in Afghan while Pak military operates to bottle up fleeing Taliban on their side of the border is current paying great benefits or dividends in enemy KIA.

We are now getting full statistics but my off line info feed from native e-mail correspoondents over there is that we are taking out Taliban, and al Qaida, in the thousands, not the few here and there being reported in the media.

Several thousand more Taliban still over there, much lesser number of al Qaida, but hammering them daily is helping.

The follow on strategy and tactics are being already premature attacked in the Pak media, and by closet Taliban on sites like GLOBAL HUJRA ONLINE whose nasty, convoluted, and lying comments reveal how well the war is now going.

I can assure you that some Taliban and Taliban sympathesizers over there, in Europe, Canada and in the US will read this posting, and one or two may even attempt to comment on SWJ. One of two are likely now Registered Users of SWJ.

gute
07-12-2009, 06:59 PM
We, the U.S. need to train-up a bigger Afghan army and police force, make Dostum President and get the hell out! Of course our allies need to agree. Once we asked everyone else for help that gave em a say.

How long are we gonna keep losing guys and spending money on this crap-hole country. At least Iraq has oil and an educated population. I never quite understood the nation building thing. Different people, mindset, etc. They understand force - you kill us then we kill a lot more of you. They plot, you harbor then you get Carthage.

I was disgusted after reading Kill Bin Laden: A Delta Commander's Account of the World's Most Wanted Man. Also, the book Not A Good Day to Die. I think 60 Minutes/Dan Rather has a segment on tonight about Tora Bora. I'm a little suspicious of Dan Rather.

Schmedlap
07-12-2009, 08:33 PM
How long are we gonna keep losing guys and spending money on this crap-hole country. At least Iraq has oil and an educated population. I never quite understood the nation building thing. Different people, mindset, etc. They understand force - you kill us then we kill a lot more of you. They plot, you harbor then you get Carthage.

That is a good characterization of what helps to fuel the ideology of our adversaries. It is precisely how many view America: exerting inordinate influence, attempting to nation build, only interested in helping those who are willing to make us richer, and consciously choosing to disregard the welfare and concerns of those who are not.

Our challenge still remains, imo, the message that others are receiving. That message but not be "do as we say" but rather "take some responsibility." We have a difficult time sending that message to many of our own citizens. Ensuring that it is received by those outside of our country won't be quick or easy.

gute
07-12-2009, 09:20 PM
"That is a good characterization of what helps to fuel the ideology of our adversaries. It is precisely how many view America: exerting inordinate influence, attempting to nation build, only interested in helping those who are willing to make us richer, and consciously choosing to disregard the welfare and concerns of those who are not".

Our Islamic adversaries are fueled by the Koran. Hugo Chavez is fueled by the same anti-American rhetoric that socialists have been spewing for years. Every country makes decisions based on national interest. We are not getting rich of Iraq's oil or Afghanistan's oil - wait, Afghanistan does not have oil - then why are we nation building. We gave 15 billion to Africa for AIDS - we did not get anything out of it. We responded and helped with disaster relief after the Tsunami - there was nothing to gain. We still have troops in Bosnian and Kosovo - why, wheres the money in it. What about South Korea? Thousands of American missionaries go around the world every year to help others. The Peace Corps has nothing to gain.

Many who view America in the way you suggest should take a second and reflect on their countries deeds. Quite blaming us for their failures and take responsibility.

George L. Singleton
07-12-2009, 10:16 PM
Many who view America in the way you suggest should take a second and reflect on their countries deeds. Quite blaming us for their failures and take responsibility.

Amen!!!!

Ken White
07-12-2009, 10:22 PM
Many who view America in the way you suggest should take a second and reflect on their countries deeds. Quite blaming us for their failures and take responsibility.Not likely to change. As a columnist in the London times said about a year ago:

""What makes America the indispensable power (and even more indispensable in the era of the new China), is precisely what makes anti-Americanism inevitable."" LINK (http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/columnists/david_aaronovitch/article4374704.ece).

Get used to it. I did, long time ago. A number of guys from various countries who were also on R&R from fighting in Korea alongside the US all telling me how evil America was. Recall, they were 'Allies.' I've heard and read it ever since and we keep plugging along, doing our thing. some bad stuff, mostly good stuff. The carping can be mildly annoying, no sense letting it be more than that -- like the man said, it isn't going away soon...

Schmedlap
07-12-2009, 11:26 PM
Many who view America in the way you suggest should take a second and reflect on their countries deeds. Quite blaming us for their failures and take responsibility.

I agree. That is basically what I typed above (sorry for the typo - change "but" to "must"): "That message [must] not be 'do as we say' but rather 'take some responsibility.' We have a difficult time sending that message to many of our own citizens. Ensuring that it is received by those outside of our country won't be quick or easy."

Identifying the problem is the easy part. How do we get them to do it? How do we get other countries/nations to take responsibility?

tequila
07-14-2009, 01:28 PM
CEIP: The Taliban's Winning Strategy (http://www.carnegieendowment.org/experts/index.cfm?fa=expert_view&expert_id=435) by Gilles Dorronsoro. H/T to the invaluable Registan.


The Taliban’s clear strategy and increasingly coherent organization have put the International Coalition on the defensive, marginalized the local Afghan government, and given the Taliban control of southern and eastern Afghanistan. Rather than concentrating limited troops in the South and East where the Taliban are firmly entrenched, the International Coalition should prioritize regions where the Taliban are still weak but making alarming progress: in the North and around Kabul.

Far from a loose assortment of local groups, the Taliban are nationally organized, with coherent leadership and a sophisticated propaganda operation. The Coalition, on the other hand, lacks clear direction, largely due to its underestimation of the Taliban. Following a month-long trip through Afghanistan, Gilles Dorronsoro assesses the insurgency and proposes a strategy for the coalition based on a comprehensive understanding of the Taliban’s capabilities and goals.

Key points:

The Taliban have built a parallel government in areas they control to fulfill two basic needs: justice and security. An almost nonexistent local government and the population’s distrust of the international coalition allowed the Taliban to expand their influence.

Focusing resources in the South and East, where the insurgency is strongest, is risky, especially since the Afghan army is not ready to replace U.S. forces there.

The Taliban have opened a front in the northern provinces, having consolidated their grip on the South and East. If the International Coalition does not counter this thrust, the insurgency will spread throughout Afghanistan within two to three years and the coalition will not be able to bear the financial and human costs of fighting.

The insurgency cannot be defeated while the Taliban retain a safe haven in Pakistan. The Taliban can conduct hit-and-run attacks from their refuge in Pakistan, and the North remains open to infiltration.

The United States must pressure Pakistan to take action against the Taliban’s central command in Quetta. The current offensive in Pakistan is aimed at Pakistani Taliban and does not indicate a major shift in Pakistani policy toward Afghanistan.


Dorronsoro's book (http://www.amazon.com/Revolution-Unending-Afghanistan-Comparative-International/dp/0231136269) is required reading for Afghanistan. An excellent primer.

Rex Brynen
07-17-2009, 03:07 PM
Conventional Wisdom Won't Work in Afghanistan (http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/article.aspx?id=4086)
JOSHUA FOUST | 17 JUL 2009
WORLD POLITICS REVIEW


The cliché that you must "protect the population" in order to win a counterinsurgency has now become entrenched in conventional wisdom. This is especially so of the war in Afghanistan, where civilian casualties have become a deeply polarizing issue. It has become so important that, during a recent trip to Helmand Province, Gen. Stanley McChrystal, the new commander of U.S. and NATO-led troops in Afghanistan, declared that Coalition forces must make a "cultural shift" in Afghanistan, away from their normal combat orientation and toward protecting civilians.

But protecting the population requires knowing where it lives. Here, the Army's conventional wisdom fails.

In Iraq, the population was heavily urbanized, so spreading out into the cities made sense. The Surge, for example, was almost entirely focused on Baghdad. Now the consensus seems to be that the Army should focus on securing Afghanistan's major cities as well.

Pretending that Afghanistan is an urban culture clashes with reality. According to the Central Statistics Office, around 10 percent of Afghanistan's population is still nomadic. Afghanistan's 10 largest cities hold less than 20 percent of its people, and the rest of Afghanistan lives in small rural communities.

Ken White
07-17-2009, 04:19 PM
tried to point out that Afghanistan was not Iraq; that the far more rural Afghans were not Arabs; that the terrain in Afghanistan made it a totally different game; that MRAPS were not a good buy and a few other things. We may have been on to something.

Still, not necessarily a doomed operation. All those items are easily addressed. We'll see how smart and adaptable the the new Command crowd is...

AmericanPride
07-20-2009, 04:07 PM
wait, Afghanistan does not have oil - then why are we nation building. We gave 15 billion to Africa for AIDS - we did not get anything out of it. We responded and helped with disaster relief after the Tsunami - there was nothing to gain.

We've had a developing economic interest in Afghanistan since the 1990s under Clinton, not only for its limited resources, but also as a transit country for access to the rest of Central Asia's resources, most importantly natural gas. Afghanistan is the only alternative other than Turkemenistan via the Caspian Sea. We give billions of dollars of AIDS money to Africa because those countries in turn buy our patented drugs that we protect by sanctioning the countries if they decide to produce them generically (and cheaper). We give aid elsewhere because typically that aid is tied to an understanding that they will use the funds to purchase American products.

Ken White
07-20-2009, 04:36 PM
you neglected to mention that US non-governmental aid generally is far in excess of governmental aid to most nations -- and it mostly goes with no strings...

Private giving for developing nations is $71B of which $47B are personal remittances to said developing nations; subtracting those (which BTW, are an economic loss to the US but are accepted here with virtually no limitations), there's still $26B in aid compared to the $25B of official USG aid, about a third of which is military aid (and over half of that in the bribes to Egypt and Israel thanks to James Earl Carter). So in non military aid, that's about one and a half times as much no string aid as that with the expectation -- but rarely a demand -- of purchasing US goods.

People can be and are altruistic; governments by and large are not -- they generally act in their interests. Which is what they're supposed to do...

goesh
07-22-2009, 12:37 PM
http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2009/07/21/obama-considers-paying-afghan-farmers-eradicate-talibans-poppy-contracts/?test=latestnews

"U.S. Debating Payoffs to Afghan Poppy Growers
Obama administration is considering whether to pay off Afghan farmers to stop them from growing heroin poppies on contract for the Taliban, senior officials told the Associated Press. "

The article goes on to express concern that farmers will take the cash and still grow their poppies. It would be stupid to grease their palms with cash and ask them not to grow, rather let them plant and before the crops near maturity, pay them high market value then destroy the crop(s). The taliban then has to extort money from the farmers and that makes them like us.

Entropy
07-22-2009, 01:56 PM
I think Afghanistan's rural character makes our job much more difficult. We do not have the forces to have a permanent presence in every village and despite our many attempts, Afghan forces are inadequate for the task as well. IMO we were able to do more with less in Iraq because populations were concentrated and so one COP, for example, could impact a large number of people. That isn't the case in Afghanistan - a lower population density, a much larger geographic area mean the same number of COP's will impact fewer people. We have fewer troops overall, so that probably means fewer COP's and less impact from a pop-centric strategy. Then there is the enemy, who is more tactically proficient, better organized and able to mass and carry out complex attacks if given the chance. Added to that are a host of other tactical and operational headaches. Then there is the border and the troubles in Pakistan which are fundamental problems that pop-centric advocates have yet to address in any practical manner in my opinion.

Entropy
07-22-2009, 05:51 PM
Oh, and some additional complications (http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/22/world/asia/22pstan.html?_r=3&ref=world):


Pakistan is objecting to expanded American combat operations in neighboring Afghanistan, creating new fissures in the alliance with Washington at a critical juncture when thousands of new American forces are arriving in the region.

Pakistani officials have told the Obama administration that the Marines fighting the Taliban in southern Afghanistan will force militants across the border into Pakistan, with the potential to further inflame the troubled province of Baluchistan, according to Pakistani intelligence officials.

Pakistan does not have enough troops to deploy to Baluchistan to take on the Taliban without denuding its border with its archenemy, India, the officials said. Dialogue with the Taliban, not more fighting, is in Pakistan’s national interest, they said.

IntelTrooper
07-22-2009, 05:58 PM
Oh, and some additional complications (http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/22/world/asia/22pstan.html?_r=3&ref=world):
It seems the Pakistani representative misspoke. What he/she meant to say was:

A weak Afghanistan run by ISID-controlled Taliban, totally dependent on Pakistan for all its goods, services, and skilled labor, is in Pakistan’s national interest, they said.

Fuchs
07-23-2009, 12:07 AM
you neglected to mention that US non-governmental aid generally is far in excess of governmental aid to most nations -- and it mostly goes with no strings...

Private giving for developing nations is $71B of which $47B are personal remittances to said developing nations; subtracting those (which BTW, are an economic loss to the US but are accepted here with virtually no limitations), there's still $26B in aid compared to the $25B of official USG aid, about a third of which is military aid (and over half of that in the bribes to Egypt and Israel thanks to James Earl Carter). So in non military aid, that's about one and a half times as much no string aid as that with the expectation -- but rarely a demand -- of purchasing US goods.

People can be and are altruistic; governments by and large are not -- they generally act in their interests. Which is what they're supposed to do...


Altruism is just a method of making yourself feel better - and therefore still self-centered and rational. Altruists just have a different set of preferences.
The only really selfless actions (if there are any) are based on social instincts.
Most humans sanction antisocial behaviour of others even at their own disadvantage, for example.

- - -

Are private transfers of this kind really fully private?
I can reduce my income tax by donating to accredited non-profit organizations. This means that the state bears a part of the burden.

Ken White
07-23-2009, 03:24 AM
Are private transfers of this kind really fully private?
I can reduce my income tax by donating to accredited non-profit organizations. This means that the state bears a part of the burden.They take far more than they need so if the bear a small burden, that's perfectly acceptable.

Nothing today is fully private... :D

Old Eagle
07-23-2009, 02:46 PM
http://csis.org/publication/afghanistan-campaign

davidbfpo
07-24-2009, 11:00 AM
I'd heard the name before, perhaps from her days reporting in Afghanistan for NPR and she appeared in May 2009 on the Charlie Rose show: http://www.charlierose.com/view/interview/10289

An excellent summary of where we were and the route ahead - governance being the theme. Plus some cautionary remarks on whether Obama's strategy is right. Her comments on Pakistan are less firmly based.

I noted elsewhere she has been retained as an adviser to General McCrystal.

davidbfpo

William F. Owen
07-30-2009, 04:21 PM
Cordesman (http://www.voanews.com/english/2009-07-29-voa61.cfm) seems to have much the same concerns as many others, including me.


"If you don't provide those resources and additional brigade combat teams, if you do not, I think, effectively move the Afghan security forces toward doubling them. I think unless we're prepared to commit those resources. If we somehow believe that a civilian surge of 700 people and tailoring our force posture to the views of a completely different set of strategic priorities, this is going to win, the answer is no, it's going to lose."

davidbfpo
07-31-2009, 04:22 PM
Almost a title to avoid here Security Sector Reform; anyway the link goes to a Canadian think tank on Afghanistan and SSR: http://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/SSRM%20-%20Afghanistan%20v1.pdf

Nothing startling, covers security forces, legal system etc and the main author appears to be an Afghan.

davidbfpo

William F. Owen
07-31-2009, 04:23 PM
All slightly depressing

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/8177935.stm

jmm99
07-31-2009, 06:45 PM
is directly linked here (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=75449&postcount=115) and here (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=76028&postcount=45). It had an impact on the modified ROE/RUFs. The incidence of civilian (non-combatant) casualties seems to cluster - that is, a few incidents with large casualties tend to skew the picture.

I haven't seen any metrics (tables or charts) breaking down the civilian casualties by number per incident - e.g., 1-5, 6-10, 11-15, 16-20, 21-25, 25+, etc. Based on the anecdotal incidents sidebarred in the UNAMA report, if one brings in heavy stuff, civilian casualties mount rapidly.

davidbfpo
08-13-2009, 09:38 PM
Discovered via a Pakistani-American blogsite: http://watandost.blogspot.com/

A typically detailed paper by Anthony Cordesman on 'The New Metrics of Afghanistan: The Data Needed to Support Shape, Clear, Hold, and Build', which appeared 7th August 2009 (or last month, very confusing): http://csis.org/publication/new-metrics-afghanistan


CSIS has been tracking the data that are made available by NATO/ISAF, the US, other allied countries, the UN, available for several years. A survey of the key maps, graphics, and other data that are now provided is available on the CSIS web site at :

http://csis.org/publication/dynamics-afpak-conflict-metrics-and-status-reportWhich alas does not take you to anything but prose.

A review of these data reveals critical problems that call the integrity of most public Western reporting on the Afghan conflict into question. It also shows that clear needs exist for more objective reporting and measures of effectiveness

I recollect Metrics had it's own thread sometime ago: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=3895

davidbfpo

Bernard Finel
08-20-2009, 12:39 AM
I think the metrics argument puts the cart before the horse. Yes, we need better metrics to assess the situation on the ground. But the problem is that in the absence of a solid strategic framework the metrics become the strategy -- maximizing the "good" stuff you choose to count becomes progress, minimizing the "bad" becomes a cause for concern.

Now, in truth, an a priori determined set of metrics would be better than what we were doing in the early days of Iraq, which was essentially letting ideology determine whether we were winning regardless of facts on the ground.

But nevertheless, until we can get the administration to do better than define success in Afghanistan as "we'll know it when we see it." Any exercise at developing metrics is premature.

--BF

Valin
08-20-2009, 01:22 PM
National Post (http://network.nationalpost.com/np/blogs/fullcomment/archive/2009/08/20/national-post-editorial-board-afghanistan-s-imperfect-democracy.aspx)
8/20/09

We wish Afghanistan's society were more like our own. We wish that there weren't so much corruption, that the domestic military and police were more competent and professional, that death sentences were no longer issued for Muslims who convert to other faiths and that laws permitting wife-beating weren't passed.

Then again, if Afghanistan already were a stable, humane and modern democracy, there would have been no need for our troops to deploy there in the first place.
(snip)

davidbfpo
08-20-2009, 04:07 PM
Steve Coll's taut piece on the arguing over Afghanistan: http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/stevecoll/2009/08/arguing-about-afghanistan.html#entry-more

Note the links to General McChrystal's guidance -v- Rory Stewart's critique.

davidbfpo

Dayuhan
08-22-2009, 07:56 AM
The president of the Council on Foreign Relations, writing in the NYT, declares Afghanistan operations to be "a war of choice"...

http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/21/opinion/21haass.html



If Afghanistan were a war of necessity, it would justify any level of effort. It is not and does not. It is not certain that doing more will achieve more. And no one should forget that doing more in Afghanistan lessens our ability to act elsewhere, including North Korea, Iran and Iraq. There needs to be a limit to what the United States does in Afghanistan and how long it is prepared to do it, lest we find ourselves unable to contend with other wars, of choice or of necessity, if and when they arise.

Not really a revolutionary opinion, but perhaps an indication of where the foreign policy establishment may be looking.

Rex Brynen
08-22-2009, 03:56 PM
... that if you were going to organize elections with so much potential for stabilizing or destabilizing a country, you would work out this little issue in advance:

Reporter's diary: Afghan elections (http://english.aljazeera.net/focus/afghanistanelections2009/2009/08/2009814102536920878.html), al-Jazeera English, 21 August 2009.


News focus instead steered toward the issue of potential fraud. It seemed the supposedly indelible ink that voters dipped their fingers into to prevent voting a second time, had washed off in certain cases.

One of those who cried foul was Ramazan Bashardost, number three in the presidential race.

President Karzai has responded by saying he tried to wash the ink off his finger several times and that it was still there.

Three of our Afghan staff went to vote, at three different polling stations - all of them washed the ink off.

Inkygate could be here for some time. It would be funny if it weren't so potentially serious.

Ken White
08-22-2009, 04:01 PM
If the foreign policy establishment is looking in one direction, it behooves someone to look in several others. Their track record isn't too good...

Actually, the war in Afghanistan is of course a war of choice. That, however, does not preclude it also being a war of necessity. It need not have been but it became and it is now necessary. Contrary to what Haas says, it was not necessary in the first place -- Foreign Policy errors led to the attack that led to Afghanistan -- but it is now necessary. So he has it exactly backwards.

Haas says that the Korean War and the Persian Gulf war were wars of necessity. Went to the first, stepped back and allowed a son to go to the second -- neither was a war of necessity in any sense until we committed to them. Then they also became necessary. Same Son has also been to the current two and seems to think they were wars of choice that became necessary. As he said to me once "We either finish it now or we'll be back in ten years." I made much the same comment about the 1991 war -- pillars of the foreign policy establishment didn't agree...

Haas misses the point that the secret is to not commit to such wars unless they are truly necessary lest such commitment become a matter of displaying national integrity and responsibility in finishing what one started. Prating about the national interest should consider that it is in our interest to avoid unnecessary conflicts but if engaged we must do our very best.

I am reminded of one pillow (sic) of our Foreign Policy Establishment and her asinine quote leading to the foolishness that was Kosovo. “What is the point of having this superb military you're always talking about if you can't use it?”

Haas also says this:
"...no one should forget that doing more in Afghanistan lessens our ability to act elsewhere, including North Korea, Iran and Iraq. There needs to be a limit to what the United States does in Afghanistan and how long it is prepared to do it, lest we find ourselves unable to contend with other wars, of choice or of necessity, if and when they arise."While certainly a case of stating the obvious -- to an extent that is both inane and patronizing, a difficult feat -- it also shows the banal and short sighted outlook of that foreign policy establishment.

Bob's World
08-22-2009, 09:16 PM
I think the metrics argument puts the cart before the horse. Yes, we need better metrics to assess the situation on the ground. But the problem is that in the absence of a solid strategic framework the metrics become the strategy -- maximizing the "good" stuff you choose to count becomes progress, minimizing the "bad" becomes a cause for concern.

Now, in truth, an a priori determined set of metrics would be better than what we were doing in the early days of Iraq, which was essentially letting ideology determine whether we were winning regardless of facts on the ground.

But nevertheless, until we can get the administration to do better than define success in Afghanistan as "we'll know it when we see it." Any exercise at developing metrics is premature.

--BF

...any metric you can measure change in within a 4-year period IS NOT STRATEGIC.

Perhaps this is why we muck around in strategy-less tactics; they may not be taking you anyplace you want to be, but at least you can measure how fast you are getting there!

Bill Moore
08-22-2009, 09:48 PM
Posted by BW, any metric you can measure change in within a 4-year period IS NOT STRATEGIC.

I would like to see some examples of strategic metrics that don't change within 4 years. I think you are referring to the metric, not the content.

For example, the cost of oil is a strategic metric, but it changes daily (the price of oil impacts almost everything else such as food prices, ability to sustain economic growth, political stability, etc., and of course all these factors impact international relationships).

If the argument is to develop the strategy first (and associated metrics), and then determine how you're going to actualize it (operational and tactical approaches and associaed metrics), then I agree.

Ken White
08-22-2009, 11:33 PM
I'll go a step further than Bob's World. Strategy does not lend itself to metrics.

Metrics of many types -- oil prices, tonnages, number of personnel or opposing organizations, availability of food, miles or efforts passed and hundreds more -- affect strategies but the strategy itself is rarely amenable to measurement other than subjectively. Metrics can be applied to Operational and Tactical efforts and they may or may not indicate anything of value pertaining to the mission.

I have watched attempts to apply metrics to strategy and to warfare for a number of years. If anyone can provide me with truly useful metrics in an all encompassing sense of indicating results at the strategic, operational or tactical levels, I'll be most appreciative.

Surferbeetle
08-23-2009, 12:23 AM
Like many, 98% of my experience has been at the tactical level and as far as I know the rest was at an operational level...my armchair is also far, far away from Afghanistan...but I'll take a crack at this one nonetheless.

In our SWJ thread entitled Interagency Assessment of Afghanistan Police (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=1584&highlight=police) we covered a lot of ground and perhaps we can pick out some tactical, operational, and strategic metrics.

Tactical Metrics:


Mr. Mohammad had no rank, no money for food and not enough clothing or gear to operate in cold weather. Two of his six trucks were broken. The ammunition the Pentagon provided him came in cardboard boxes that immediately crumbled, exposing cartridges to the elements on his storeroom’s dirty floor.

Operational Metrics:


As an aside, I'd suggest that given what I know of Afghanistan, they'd be better off with one National Gendarmerie and having the normal police functions at Province and city level -- but that's in the too hard box at this time.

Strategic Metrics


The strategy of the major U.S. and British military offensive in Afghanistan's Helmand province aimed at wresting it from the Taliban is based on bringing back Afghan army and police to maintain permanent control of the population, so the foreign forces can move on to another insurgent stronghold.

Robert Kaplan covered this in the Atlantic: Saving Afghanistan (http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200903u/saving-afghanistan)


While the coalition builds an army from the top down, they hope to improve security in the countryside from the bottom up through the Afghan Public Protection Program or AP3. As described by American Brig. Gen. Mark Milley, the AP3 recruits, trains, and arms locals across tribal and ethnic lines, making them answerable to provincial governors who are, in turn, appointed by the democratically elected president.

And I linked to a cost estimate of the security strategy (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=61674&postcount=39) from Foreign Affairs


Afghanistan needs larger and more effective security forces, but it also needs to be able to sustain those security forces. A decree signed by President Karzai in December 2002 would have capped the Afghan National Army at 70,000 troops (it had reached 66,000 by mid-2008). U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has since announced a plan to increase that number to 122,000, as well as add 82,000 police, for a total of 204,000 in the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). Such increases, however, would require additional international trainers and mentors -- which are, quite simply, not available in the foreseeable future -- and maintaining such a force would far exceed the means of such a destitute country. Current estimates of the annual cost are around $2.5 billion for the army and $1 billion for the police. Last year, the Afghan government collected about 7 percent of a licit GDP estimated at $9.6 billion in revenue -- about $670 million. Thus, even if Afghanistan's economy experienced uninterrupted real growth of 9 percent per year, and if revenue extraction nearly doubled, to 12 percent (both unrealistic forecasts), in ten years the total domestic revenue of the Afghan government would be about $2.5 billion a year. Projected pipelines and mines might add $500 million toward the end of this period. In short, the army and the police alone would cost significantly more than Afghanistan's total revenue.

Bob's World
08-23-2009, 12:31 AM
I would like to see some examples of strategic metrics that don't change within 4 years. I think you are referring to the metric, not the content.

For example, the cost of oil is a strategic metric, but it changes daily (the price of oil impacts almost everything else such as food prices, ability to sustain economic growth, political stability, etc., and of course all these factors impact international relationships).

If the argument is to develop the strategy first (and associated metrics), and then determine how you're going to actualize it (operational and tactical approaches and associated metrics), then I agree.

So, if the number one US Strategic objective is, say, "Secure the homeland,"
and you are designing operations to deal with AQ. This means that any operational metric you have for AQ must be subordinate to any strategic metric you have for defending the homeland.

What I see is a fixation on the operational metrics for defeating AQ, and because we have not adequately designated and prioritized strategic priorities for "securing the homeland" we end up pressing too hard for an intermediate objective and totally missing the fact that excessive pursuit of an operational objective may in fact be creating a strategic vulnerability.

I will not say that one should never risk strategic defeat in pursuit of an operational or tactical victory; but I will say unequivocally that to do so must not only be knowingly, but also a CCIR that is laid on some 4-stars, or even the President's desk for decision first.

Bob's World
08-23-2009, 12:40 AM
Surfer: Personal opinion, I'm not sure if there are any strategic objectives to pursue in Afghanistan. Pride is important, but pursuit of pride may well be what has led to the fall of many, but that is no reason to follow in their footsteps.

You can't look at Afghanistan and derive strategic objectives. You must look at yourself and the entire globe, and then ask "is there anything in Afghanistan that contributes to my strategic priorities?"

Never ask the guy in the fight what the most important objective is, because it will invariably be the guy he is fighting. Strategy must be derived by those removed from the current fight, otherwise it will likely be skewed more by "urgency" rather than "importance."

Clearly the fight in Afghanistan is urgent. The strategic question should look to how important it is as well.

Surferbeetle
08-23-2009, 12:56 AM
Surfer: Personal opinion, I'm not sure if there are any strategic objectives to pursue in Afghanistan. Pride is important, but pursuit of pride may well be what has led to the fall of many, but that is no reason to follow in their footsteps.

You can't look at Afghanistan and derive strategic objectives. You must look at yourself and the entire globe, and then ask "is there anything in Afghanistan that contributes to my strategic priorities?"

Never ask the guy in the fight what the most important objective is, because it will invariably be the guy he is fighting. Strategy must be derived by those removed from the current fight, otherwise it will likely be skewed more by "urgency" rather than "importance."

Clearly the fight in Afghanistan is urgent. The strategic question should look to how important it is as well.

BW,

Fair enough.

I believe that you are correct in identifying the Pride/Honor/My-Word-is-My-Bond component and potential pitfalls...we have also discussed the effort assigned to the Democracy Strategy (Jeffersonian vs. Pragmatic versions) in other threads.

Here is a view (and quick read) on Turkey: Crescent & Star - Turkey Between Two Worlds (http://www.amazon.com/Crescent-Star-Turkey-Between-Worlds/dp/0374528667) by Stephen Kinzer that might be of interest and which echos some of the Democracy Strategy efforts/costs/benefits that I believe are visible in the Afghanistan reporting we see...

Ken White
08-23-2009, 01:20 AM
Tactical Metrics:

I said in that post that I was aware that many metrics can affect a sistuation at the strategic level (or any level for that matter). I fully acknowledge the quote you provide is a metric that affects the tactical situation however my request was for truly useful metrics in an all encompassing sense of indicating results at the strategic, operational or tactical levels.

Operational Metrics:

My comment above applies with respect to the Operational level as well.

Strategic Metrics

As it does to the Strategic level.


Robert Kaplan covered this in the Atlantic: Saving Afghanistan (http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200903u/saving-afghanistan)

And I linked to a cost estimate of the security strategy (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=61674&postcount=39) from Foreign AffairsKaplan adds nothing. Regrettably, in my view your quote adds yet more data on the effects or on items that affect the war in Afghanistan -- but not an ounce of metrics indicating a result of tactical, operational or strategic action.

Ken White
08-23-2009, 01:51 AM
So, if the number one US Strategic objective is, say, "Secure the homeland,"... any operational metric you have for AQ must be subordinate to any strategic metric you have for defending the homeland.Desirable, yes. 'Must' possibly, in some cases even probably -- but not always. Not least because one can pursue multiple lines of operation in the process of attaining a strategic goal. Why must that be so?
...totally missing the fact that excessive pursuit of an operational objective may in fact be creating a strategic vulnerability.I don't really think anyone has 'missed' that issue and I'd also say that both Afghanistan and Iraq were strategic issues as well as operational issues. You may not agree with the strategy but that doesn't mean it was or is nonexistent. In any event, if not initially strategic, is either now a strategic issue?

Second question on the topic; are we missing it or taking a calculated risk?
I will not say that one should never risk strategic defeat in pursuit of an operational or tactical victory; but I will say unequivocally that to do so must not only be knowingly, but also a CCIR that is laid on some 4-stars, or even the President's desk for decision first.I would tend to go with the President's desk since we're talking national stuff here and I have no reason to believe nor an indication in any way that was not done. I also suggest that the document required in such a case is not only a CCIR, which is simply information on which to base a decision (but a fair CYA tool if the right people initial it...) but a NSPD (or a PPD, depending on which administration you're addressing), an action directive. Would that not be necessary?

Dayuhan
08-23-2009, 03:37 AM
If the foreign policy establishment is looking in one direction, it behooves someone to look in several others. Their track record isn't too good...

Agreed. I do take note when they speak though, not for any inherent virtue in what is said, but because it can serve as a sort of turn signal... in this case, building a case for withdrawal regardless of whether objectives are achieved.


Contrary to what Haas says, it was not necessary in the first place -- Foreign Policy errors led to the attack that led to Afghanistan -- but it is now necessary. So he has it exactly backwards.

Haas says that the Korean War and the Persian Gulf war were wars of necessity. Went to the first, stepped back and allowed a son to go to the second -- neither was a war of necessity in any sense until we committed to them. Then they also became necessary. Same Son has also been to the current two and seems to think they were wars of choice that became necessary. As he said to me once "We either finish it now or we'll be back in ten years." I made much the same comment about the 1991 war -- pillars of the foreign policy establishment didn't agree...

It is possible that a different set of policies might have prevented the 9/11 attacks, just as a different set might have avoided the choice to return to Iraq. Any time we discuss where the road not taken might have led we are on very speculative ground.

Seems to me that we are defining objectives in Afghanistan by what we want to avoid, not by what we want to achieve. What we want to avoid is Omar and Osama strolling into Kabul hand in hand while the last helicopter leaves the embassy roof. What we want to achieve - in any sense that is both achievable and acceptable - is a lot less clear.

Ken White
08-23-2009, 04:40 AM
... in this case, building a case for withdrawal regardless of whether objectives are achieved.Almost certainly true and I agree they bear considerable watching for the predictive value. For the sake of foreign relations it would be nice if they were slightly less predictable...:rolleyes:
Any time we discuss where the road not taken might have led we are on very speculative ground.Certainly true. Yet patterns can be discerned. By others as well as by me or us.
What we want to achieve - in any sense that is both achievable and acceptable - is a lot less clear.I'm not sure we ever knew -- other than W. who simply wanted to send a couple of messages and then I think got caught up in the moment and decided to hang around and 'fix' things. :wry:

Surferbeetle
08-23-2009, 05:43 AM
Tactical Metrics:

I said in that post that I was aware that many metrics can affect a sistuation at the strategic level (or any level for that matter). I fully acknowledge the quote you provide is a metric that affects the tactical situation however my request was for truly useful metrics in an all encompassing sense of indicating results at the strategic, operational or tactical levels.

There are always questions concerning the validity and or applicability of marketing/metrics methodologies…and that’s a good thing, because it leads to interesting conversations and highlights that there are always more than one way to skin a cat.

Lets keep in mind the services we are targeting in our COIN/GWOT/OIF/OEF fight can be grouped in three main areas: security, economics, and governance. A way to analyze our effectiveness in these areas might include a marketing-style analysis of ‘three key environments’ (internal, customer, and external) at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels.

An analysis of the internal environment of our organization could include:
Availability and deployment of human capital (demographic breakout)
Availability and capacity of equipment and technology
Availability of financial resources
Power struggles within the organization
Current marketing objectives and performance

An analysis of the environment of our customer could include:
Customer demographic breakout?
Service/Product segment breakout?
What do our customers do with our products?
Where do our customers receive our products?
When do our customers receive our products?
How & why do our customers receive our products?
Why do potential customers not select our products?

An analysis of the external environment in which our organization works:
Competitor’s demographic breakout?
Competitor’s product segment breakout?
Economic growth and stability?
Political trends?
Legal and regulatory issues?
Technological advancements?
Sociocultural trends?

We could also hop in a HMMWV and go for a look-see to check the staffwork...;)

Ken White
08-23-2009, 06:30 AM
We could also hop in a HMMWV and go for a look-see to check the staffwork...fuel and hours of Power Point time by selecting the right people for the job, training them fairly well and telling them what's expected, letting them get on with it and accepting their reports without insisting on a lot of numbers that tell us many, many things -- but not simply how well or badly we're doing... :D

That way we ignore all the staff work, concentrate on results -- sort of on the goals rather than getting mired in the processes -- and can take the HMMWV or a bird out just to tell 'em 'Good job!' :cool:

Or we can continue to let the pipeline provide some right and some wrong people, marginally train them and produce a a lot of metrics to tell us what we're doing -- if not how we're doing... ;)

I did like your list, particularly these two:

- Power struggles within the organization. From 'An analysis of the internal environment of our organization.' That one is sorta poignant...

- Why do potential customers not select our products? From 'An analysis of the environment of our customer.' My suspicion is that religion and a different moral code may have a great deal to do with that. I'm sure we can quantify that in some fashion...

This one drawn from 'An analysis of the external environment in which our organization works' I'll turn over to JMM:

- Legal and regulatory issues? I know they apply to us, perhaps to some customers in some forms -- but I'm deeply suspicious that our competitors are not so bound....:eek:

William F. Owen
08-23-2009, 06:56 AM
I've held off comment on metrics because, while I believe you cannot improve what you cannot measure, choosing what to measure does to some extent define how you want to see the problem. Plus their are political aspects to the metrics used (obviously)

Personally would focus on a reduction in violence as in a Lowering of the number of civilian dead, versus a counter of the numbers of attacks on ISAF Forces. The persistence of ISAF in theatre is a given, as is freedom of action to move anyway within A'Stan.

Progress might be low/no dead civilians with no/low number of attacks. Failure might be any variation of the above.
I suggest the test being, no attacks and dead = peace. High attacks and dead = not some thing good.
Yes this defines the problem in military terms, because that is the nature of the problem.

I'd also be a bit careful of defining TAC, OP and STRAT objectives, in terms of metrics. Point being that successful TAC actions are irrelevant unless, their "synergy" is felt at the operational level. Point being we have to move on from defining things as "Tactical success" when they produce no operational benefit. Irrelevant success is not success.
I know this is VERY obvious, but I'm not comfortable with "tac success" being "success" unless it gets you somewhere.

Surferbeetle
08-23-2009, 03:02 PM
I've held off comment on metrics because, while I believe you cannot improve what you cannot measure, choosing what to measure does to some extent define how you want to see the problem. Plus their are political aspects to the metrics used (obviously)

Very much agree.


Personally would focus on a reduction in violence as in a Lowering of the number of civilian dead, versus a counter of the numbers of attacks on ISAF Forces. The persistence of ISAF in theatre is a given, as is freedom of action to move anyway within A'Stan.

Progress might be low/no dead civilians with no/low number of attacks. Failure might be any variation of the above.
I suggest the test being, no attacks and dead = peace. High attacks and dead = not some thing good.
Yes this defines the problem in military terms, because that is the nature of the problem.

Agree with much here as well, however I would add that in addition to the Security considerations the inseparably intertwined Economic and Governance considerations need to be acknowledged and addressed as well; Mr. Kaplan (http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200903u/saving-afghanistan) addresses this point more eloquently than can I:


And yet set against this whole legacy is another tendency, equally as compelling. Throughout the mid-part of the 20th century, Afghanistan had a credible central government under King Zahir Shah that boasted many accomplishments from eradicating malaria to overseeing the construction of a ring road uniting the major cities. Following the chaos of the early- and mid-1990s that came with the collapse of the Soviet puppet regime of Mohammed Najibullah, Afghans yearned so much for a central government that they initially welcomed the tyranny of the Taliban. And today, all polls indicate that Afghans want strong national leadership emanating from Kabul. Indeed, there is a hue and cry for roads, wells, culverts, dams, and other infrastructure that can help with farming. The problem is that decades of strife, in which central authority went from monarchy to communism, to anarchy, to theocracy, to enfeebled democracy, have left tribal affiliations as the only constant.

While the American-led NATO coalition is holed-up in a network of heavily fortified bases, surrounded by HESCO barriers and living off food supplied by Kellogg Brown and Root, the Taliban are masters of isolation, quick as they are to make deals with local tribes and to threaten villagers with hideous retribution through “night letters.” The population by all measures genuinely wants to be rid of the Taliban, even as Afghans are usually too afraid to cross them. The side that wins here will be the one that emerges in the eyes of the rural inhabitants as the strongest tribe—NATO or the Taliban and its affiliates.


I'd also be a bit careful of defining TAC, OP and STRAT objectives, in terms of metrics. Point being that successful TAC actions are irrelevant unless, their "synergy" is felt at the operational level. Point being we have to move on from defining things as "Tactical success" when they produce no operational benefit. Irrelevant success is not success.
I know this is VERY obvious, but I'm not comfortable with "tac success" being "success" unless it gets you somewhere.

We all dislike putting our heart and soul into efforts that do not move us towards where we need to be. Do you know of any case studies/historical vignettes worth sharing (I would imagine them to be CvC based ;) ) that would exemplify this idealized nesting of tactical, operational, and strategic with regards to Afghanistan?

By the way, I am still working my way through your recommendation: Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought (http://www.amazon.com/Masters-War-Classical-Strategic-Thought/dp/0714681326) by Michael I. Handel...I find it to be a good book. The Bob Dylan song that pops up when one does the abbreviated 'Masters of War' Google search is interesting as well :eek: The book was first published in 1992 and the song written in 1963 for those of you who enjoy chasing the dialectic metrics :wry:

Ken White
08-23-2009, 05:20 PM
From Surferbeetle's quote of Kaplan in the full post just prior to this from me:
While the American-led NATO coalition is holed-up in a network of heavily fortified bases, surrounded by HESCO barriers and living off food supplied by Kellogg Brown and Root, the Taliban are masters of isolation, quick as they are to make deals with local tribes and to threaten villagers with hideous retribution through “night letters.”"Doing the same thing over and over and hoping for a different result..."

For the record, I know some are getting out and about -- still, when they are out they're in large bodies and a lot of protective gear; when they aren't out, they're too comfortable and too expensively 'secure.' Won't work.

ODB
08-23-2009, 06:10 PM
Been out of the net for a while and catching up. I have had a thought swirling in my head for months now that I just could not pin down. I think I have finally pinned it down. This might not apply to just here but a very broad stroke across the board. In my own mind it all interlinks at various levels. Comfort vs basic needs. Risk acceptance vs adversion. Technology vs individual skills.

First I want to address the creature comforts of deployments. The "Super FOBs". If we are trying to root out a problem how do we do it from the safety of a FOB? When we rely on creature comforts and safety through technology and structures how does one make a difference? Add in the sprinkle of big brains who think of some new way to measure what is happening and new fancy words for what we are doing and we get to where we are today...absolutely no where. Conventional thought of keeping statistics (how many IEDs went off this week) and how to prevent those attacks does not solve the problem. How about looking at why are those attacks happening? But when you only stay in one place and leave that place occasionally all you can do is attempt to counter those attacks and never get to the way are they happening. Give me enough ammo to protect myself, enough money to buy/secure my basic needs (water, food, shelter and yes that order) along with living off the populace/land and let me live in the little villages/towns. One who lives, sleeps, eats with the people will finally be able to influence the people. When you only show up once a week if that; how much are you truly learning about the people? influencing them? securing them? News flash it is war, risks have to be accepted.

I have been toying with the thought for some time now that the more technology we add to the fight the worse are Soldiers skills get. My main example of this is shooting. If I can shoot with iron sights then when you give me optics my shooting should enhance. If I was a betting man, I'd bet most in service today could not shoot very well without optics. Another prime example is land navigation. Pretty much speaks for itself. Blue force trackers, the war TV (UAV), that leads to so much micro management that junior leaders today are afraid to make decisions. This leads into another interesting thought. With the communications capabilities in the world today, many are being brought up without the ability to make their own decisions. You have a question you pick up your cell phone and make a call to find out what to do, instead of using your decision making skills to come up with the answer. I have experienced this a lot lately with junior officers and NCO's. Maybe I'm just getting too old for this man's Army.

The levels of approval to conduct operations these days can be directly linked to the above. If junior leaders are not given the opportunity to develop, then they cannot be intrusted to make the right decisions on the ground. I know how many will say "We allowed our leaders to make those decisions." I want those to take a hard look at what those decisions truly were. Were they learned responses or truly something different, something they came up with on their own? When Infantry 1SG's and below are wondering and asking how to train their Soldiers there is a huge problem. Then when you get them on the range to train them, they have been dictated from higher that they will learn with body armour on, even bigger issue. Yes I know I'm digressing....... sorry on a roll and finishing my final thoughts. I get these guys out on the range with more ammo than their yearly allotment only to find that they have been dictated by higher that they must train in body armor. Let me guess "Train like you fight" right? Wrong. When teaching fundamentals teach them with least amout of stress. Muscle memory takes 10,000 repetitions. Once you have the fundamentals down then add the stress of body armor. The key is to not let the body armor influence your fundamentals, not change your fundamentals to reflect wearing body armor. Unfortunately for these guys there "higher" leadership does not allow for individual thought and solutions.

The last point I will make in regards to risk management. I get told the other day that for me to conduct a flat range my risk assessment has to be moderate. It has been determined by the CG that all flat ranges on post are a moderate risk level. So, me being me I ask one question. If the risk level has been determined why do I need to do a risk assessment? Is not the risk assessment for me to determine what the risk level is by identifying the risks, controls, and implementation? This all fosters junior leaders who cannot and will not make decisions for themselves.

Again sorry for the rant, IMO all of these things with many others are linked into what is happening today or maybe I'm just too close minded to see the benefits of what is happening. Unfotunately learn early on; Keep it simple, stupid. Might just turn this into it's own thread; MODS if you think it wise feel free to do so.

AmericanPride
08-23-2009, 06:32 PM
ODB,

Given the problems you cite, and the general nature of COIN that requires decisions at the lowest level possible, I think new officers should commission at O4 or above, and as they gain experience, fill in the O1-O3 slots where the rubber really meets the road. Some might disagree, but given the absence of a strategic framework, I don't think junior officers could do much worse up there anyway.

Whatcha think? :p

Ken White
08-23-2009, 08:34 PM
without causing ulcers for worrywarts and CSMs, I used to have a "Fall Out One" day about once a quarter. The NCOs would be peons for the day and the Troops would take charge. I managed to convince most of my Platoon Leaders to go along with this, only had one who wouldn't go for it (OCS type who'd 'risen above' that :rolleyes:). Had two Co Cdrs and several 1SGs that were willing to play over the six years or so I was a PSG. You wouldn't believe how a CPT 18 years in the Army commanding his third company can screw with minds...

Everyone learned a lot -- the troops who got to be 'in charge' learned it wasn't as easy as they thought and shared that knowledge with their fellow troopies. The Officers and NCOs got a reminder that life as Joe wasn't quite like their life. Did it in garrison occasionally but mostly in the field; it worked really well on exercises; that steepens the learning curve. Also provided some good entertainment on occasion. :wry: :eek:

When LTG Walter Ulmer was the III Corps Cdr in '82-83, he caught both Divisions headed back in to garrison after a big exercise, told them to halt in place, bring all the Officers in to the Post theater for an Officers Call and that the NCOs were to bring in the units and commence accountability and cleanup routines. He did that ti make the point that those guys could be trusted. A Colonel who had participated in that as a Major told the tale to several people in 1993 stating that it had worked out well -- and a LTC and two CPTs who heard all said that no LTG would do that and that if one did, they'd refuse the order. Fascinating.

Back to my PSG days, in almost seven years I had only five PLs, nine(?) (or none) for longer than six months. Ran a platoon as the APL in Viet Nam for seven months and at that time, there were seven other NCOs including two SSGs serving as acting PLs in the Bn; eight out of 19 Platoons and the S2 was an SFC -- did a good job but the MI guys hated him cause he'd consistently embarrass 'em. This stuff isn't rocket science...

Long way of getting to the point that I think American Pride is on to something. :D

And I can REALLY sympathize with ODB's rant...

omarali50
08-24-2009, 07:22 PM
Some things I have trouble understanding:
1. What the hell is the Quetta shura? If the US knows that taliban HQ is operating in Quetta, what is stopping them from doing something about it? If they dont think the shura is in quetta, then why keep up this charade?
2. Many of my (leftwing) friends from Pakistan suspect that the US is actually trying to get the ISI to help them get out of Afghanistan without it being a PR disaster and is basically waiting for the ISI to make some sort of livable deal with the Taliban. And my Indian friends suspect that in return ISI gets to keep the kashmir jihad going. Is this conspiracy mongering or could it be true? If its not true, I suggest that the widespread existence of these theories is a sign that the US is not able to communicate effectively. If its true, then a lot of people are being killed for PR purposes, which seems immoral.
3. Whats the plan?
I think that the US is not winning in Afghanistan, not because the war is so "complex". Its because at one level its really simple. As Bin Laden said: people will bet on the stronger horse. In this case, far too many people are betting that the taliban will win. Unless there is a decisive change in that assessment, its a self-fulfilling prophecy. It may be that in war nobody will tell you their whole plan, but its also true that in this case not seeing a plan keeps a lot of fence-sitters on the fence. I look forward to being enlightened.

davidbfpo
08-24-2009, 10:47 PM
Some things I have trouble understanding:
1. What the hell is the Quetta shura? If the US knows that taliban HQ is operating in Quetta, what is stopping them from doing something about it? If they dont think the shura is in quetta, then why keep up this charade?

The Quetta shura regularly features in open source meetings and is seen as a gathering in one city of many of the Taliban shura. The Pakistani's do not deny they live there, but strongly indicate there are no regular meetings and then fall silent. All the stranger as the Army Staff College is in Quetta, alongside being the local Army HQ and provincial capital.


2. Many of my (leftwing) friends from Pakistan suspect that the US is actually trying to get the ISI to help them get out of Afghanistan without it being a PR disaster and is basically waiting for the ISI to make some sort of livable deal with the Taliban. And my Indian friends suspect that in return ISI gets to keep the kashmir jihad going. Is this conspiracy mongering or could it be true?

Given the history of relations between Pakistan and USA I am not surprised at such views. Currently relations are better, but their precarious nature has not changed - a point covered in other threads. ISI is reportedly a different institution, less Islamic and less independent. Pakistanis often refer to the 'strategic depth" Afghanistan gives them (rather implausible to outsiders to be mild).

The important point is that a few years ago, under Musharraf, IIRC after the Kargil crisis (another older thread), Pakistani stopped the bulk of cross-border activity. Who was the principal agent for this action? ISI. Some Kashmiri groups remain local and in supervised camps; others have moved away to fight elsewhere - notably LeT.


If its not true, I suggest that the widespread existence of these theories is a sign that the US is not able to communicate effectively. If its true, then a lot of people are being killed for PR purposes, which seems immoral.

Blaming the failure to communicate the "truth" on the USA, is far from accurate and not just a communication issue. Some people don't want their own "truths" disturbed, locally I'd say the supposed inevitability of Indian-Pakistani conflict is a bigger problem.

Only a part answer and No.3 left well alone.

davidbfpo

Bill Moore
08-25-2009, 09:07 AM
Posted by BW: Never ask the guy in the fight what the most important objective is, because it will invariably be the guy he is fighting. Strategy must be derived by those removed from the current fight, otherwise it will likely be skewed more by "urgency" rather than "importance."

Concur 100%, but I remain doubtful that cold logic will override passion in our national decision making strategy. You can't win elections based on the merit of your sound ideas, you have to drum up emotions and let the media fan the flames. When it gets difficult to maintan the emotional high about a particular course of action, then the counter movement whips into action and gradually builds momentum. We should have listened to George Washington and avoided the party system, it is most irrational system for governing ever designed next to communism.


posted by omarali50: I think that the US is not winning in Afghanistan, not because the war is so "complex". Its because at one level its really simple. As Bin Laden said: people will bet on the stronger horse. In this case, far too many people are betting that the taliban will win. Unless there is a decisive change in that assessment, its a self-fulfilling prophecy. It may be that in war nobody will tell you their whole plan, but its also true that in this case not seeing a plan keeps a lot of fence-sitters on the fence.

Please explain why "many" people think the Taliban is the stronger team? This somehow escapes the limits of my admittedly western bias towards relative combat power. Do people really see the Taliban as the stronger team or the team with the most endurance? Have the Taliban won any fights against coalition forces? I actually understand what you're writing, but please further explain what you mean by stronger team.

omarali50
08-25-2009, 03:01 PM
Bill, first of all, I personally dont think the Taliban are stronger. I think their strength has always depended on Pakistani support (providing the skills they lacked and an international long term view) and a particular set of favorable circumstances and without that support, and in today's changed circumstances, they cannot conquer or hold afghanistan EVEN IF foriegn forces withdraw.
About why "many people" think the taliban is going to win (stronger was perhaps the wrong word), I think its as you said: people expect they will out-endure the US forces. The US has less of a permanent interest in Afghanistan and will eventually say 'f..k it" and leave after one last burst of bombing. The Jihadis in Pakistan (and they are the ones with international ambitions, the taliban themselves would be just a rural pakhtun phenomenon without their input) take a very long view of things and in their own opinion, they will always have more people willing to die than the US or any other infidel power. Once the US leaves, US agents like Zardari and the ANP will leave on the next plane (if they are lucky) and things will be back to status quo ante. I personally think they are wrong because they overestimate their own strength and unity and underestimate how much resistance there will be. Mostly, I think they overestimate their own unity. The army will not have the region back in their grip like they imagine and the jihadis will not have the army back in their grip like they used to. Instead, the US would leave behind an endless and extremely messy civil war in which Jihadi victory is by no means assured. Their extreme ruthlessness and clarity of purpose is not matched by any deep organizational unity. THEY will kill each other more efficiently than any infidel could (and the infidels will help). And their ideology has absolutely no section about how to be a modern state.....that part was a gift of the British raj and this time around it will depart with the infidels. But that is another story.
Some of the fence sitters have an idea about the mess that would result if the US leaves, but again, they are not sure the US can stick around, so mess or not, they have to place their bets on what will follow. On the other hand, if the US looks like it has a winning plan, then everyone else will start calculating differently. btw, "winning plan" does not mean plan to make a deal with the taliban and scoot. In that case, everyone knows who will be cutting heads next year in Kabul stadium and plans accordingly.

omarali50
08-25-2009, 03:08 PM
David,

You are buying into the supposed "eternal india pakistan conflict" too easily. Which probably means you get your Pakistan from Pakistani army mess halls. The "eternal conflict" is used by the army to have its way within Pakistan. But when the army changes its mind about some aspect of the conflict, miracles happen and suddenly that issue is not intractable anymore. Its not public opinion that is driving the conflict. Its the army (and its well lubricated psyops division) that is driving the public opinion. I am not saying India and Pakistan would suddenly be all kumbaya if the army changd its mind, but I must insist that given half a chance, the mainstream politicians (nawaz sharif, zardari, altaf, etc) would make deals and allow trade and travel and wrap up the jihad in no time...Pakistanis and Indians would still insult each other (like British and German footbal fans do) but that is an entirely different matter..

George L. Singleton
08-25-2009, 04:23 PM
The Taliban can be defeated, but their just isn't the Political will to commit the resources necessary to do it. That's the problem. There isn't even the political will to try and close the boarder with Pakistan.


The British experience in Malayia did not happen in a few years.

We are up against essentially a non-existant society in Afghanistan, weaker even than the original US Articles of Confederation that governed while the US Revolutionary War dragged on due to lack of the strongest support needed but not then possible from the original Congress in Philadelphia.

I still think a return to the monarchy for Afghainsitan, with tribal jiirgas working under same is more likely to work...although a modified weak Parliamentary system able to veto or check and balance a King might work, too?

davidbfpo
08-26-2009, 08:55 AM
My original remark
Some people don't want their own "truths" disturbed, locally I'd say the supposed inevitability of Indian-Pakistani conflict is a bigger problem.

Omerali's part response
David, You are buying into the supposed "eternal india pakistan conflict" too easily. Which probably means you get your Pakistan from Pakistani army mess halls. The "eternal conflict" is used by the army to have its way within Pakistan.

I do not buy into the 'eternal conflict', a conflict that has been used by both countries for too long and has changed recently for the better. Pakistan does not need to spend so much on its military, largely for conventional warfare and not COIN etc. Yes, the Pakistani Army then claims more than the budget, but to decide on national security issues. Never been to a Pakistani Army mess hall, I have spoken to two Pakistani officers briefly on the subject, most of my viewpoint comes from reading and listening. One concern I have, shared by many here, is how effective is the Pakistani national response? Secondly, what is the true extent of Islamist power within the Army and ISI?

davidbfpo

Entropy
08-26-2009, 03:24 PM
The Taliban can be defeated, but their just isn't the Political will to commit the resources necessary to do it. That's the problem. There isn't even the political will to try and close the boarder with Pakistan.

There are some things that no amount of "political will" can accomplish.

omarali50
08-26-2009, 04:32 PM
My original remark

One concern I have, shared by many here, is how effective is the Pakistani national response? Secondly, what is the true extent of Islamist power within the Army and ISI?

davidbfpo

David, I run an email discussion group called Asiapeace. We have 650 or so members, mostly Indian and Pakistani, mostly journalists and academics. A lot of our discussions would be of interest to you (http://groups.yahoo.com/group/asiapeace/). Anyway, to answer your questions:
Pakistan's "national" response is likely to be a bit confused. For a very long time, the army has been dominant in domestic politics. GHQ makes and breaks political parties, manipulated elections, set up a parallel system of monitoring via intelligence agencies that was not accountable to any civilian authority. But they dont have (and did not have) perfect control. There was always resistance from various political groups. But they managed to keep "national security" as their own preserve for a long time. Their version of "national interest" was not questioned (and questioners faced very real consequences) and most politicians (mostly corrupt, and interested in bread and butter issues like pols all over the world) tended to avoid getting tangled up in that area. The army's own vision came out of their academies and NDC (or so they thought) but was actually heavily influenced (almost completely controlled, some would say) by the jihadi faction of the army. This jihadi faction had a clearer view of what they wanted and were able to use people like Pervez Musharraf and all the other so-called "secular" officers because they (the jihadis) used terms like "strategic depth" and "national security parameters" and "Indian threat assessment" and other such bull#### and the low intellectual level of the army high command meant they never figured out what this policy would lead to. As a result, the relatively small jihadi faction was able to pursue an almost insane policy of training and arming half a million jihadis in full view without anyone every asking them what would happen when this vast jihadi army got to work..I am summing up a long story very briefly but will be happy to elaborate in future discussions. Anyway, GHQ has sort of figured out that some readjustment is needed, but its a work in progress, nowhere near done. Civil society is well beyond GHQ in rethinking these policies, but still has less power than the army does. Islamists (who were always in a minority but able to use the army to make up for that) are still around but even they are not clear about what end is up anymore. Some of them are clearly scared of the jihadis they have nurtured for so long. So, long answer and incomplete, but "national response" is still a bit confused, but is moving away from the jihadis and is beginning to question the army's role in this mess. At the same time, this is the army we have, so some people are willing to cut them a lot of slack if they start to fight at least some of the jihadis. Personally, I think that someone has to keep a very close eye on the army otherwise its going to just kill some random poor sods and keep the hardcore intact for future use in Kashmir and Afghanistan and we will be back to square one. Their mouthpieces like "paknationalists.com" are still distinguishing good jihadis and bad ones and promoting an anti-indian hysteria that will allow the army to maintain its position in society. Unless this is some sort of very sophisticated psyops operation by the CIA (I doubt it) this propaganda does not suggest that they have changed their ways too much...
got to run, but more later..

bigdukesix101
08-27-2009, 01:41 AM
The UK can barely maintain 8,900. Don't look for any more they are not resourced to do it.

davidbfpo
08-28-2009, 10:00 PM
Bigduke,

Yes, the UK commitment of around 9k troops is unlikely to grow much. The commitment, ostensibly one brigade is in fact really two brigades and accounts for 10% of the entire regular UK Army (my estimate). There are a number of reservists called up, as individuals not units IIRC and of course both the Royal Navy (includes Royal Marines) and Royal Air Force are there too.

I suspect comparison figures are available for European NATO contributors. Is the US commitment to Afghanistan and Iraq of a similar proportion?

Apart from the apparent inability of the UK military to generate additional resources there is the far wider political and public unease with the role. Add in our economic slide too.

Have a look at this critical UK-based blogsite for more: http://defenceoftherealm.blogspot.com/

Note the main contributor now says we should not be there.

davidbfpo

davidbfpo
08-28-2009, 10:03 PM
A Canadian think tank paper 'Afghanistan’s Alternatives for Peace, Governance and Development: Transforming Subjects to Citizens & Rulers to Civil Servants', by what appears to be an Afghan scholar in exile in the USA: http://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/Afghanistan%20Paper%202.pdf

Yet to read fully, but as the civil aspects are getting more prominence worth a peek.

davidbfpo

davidbfpo
08-29-2009, 11:16 AM
Michael Yon has been embedded with UK troops in Sangin, for fiev weeks and has written an excellent first-hand account: http://www.michaelyon-online.com/bad-medicine.htm Yon is now en route to embed with USMC.

For murky reasons his embed has ended and neither side agrees why.

Stephen Grey, a UK journalist, has written a wide ranging article on the campaigning and whether the local strategy is correct: http://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/wp-content/cache/supercache/www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/2009/08/cracking-on-in-helmand/index.html

davidbfpo

Bob's World
08-29-2009, 11:33 AM
Concur 100%, but I remain doubtful that cold logic will override passion in our national decision making strategy. You can't win elections based on the merit of your sound ideas, you have to drum up emotions and let the media fan the flames. When it gets difficult to maintan the emotional high about a particular course of action, then the counter movement whips into action and gradually builds momentum. We should have listened to George Washington and avoided the party system, it is most irrational system for governing ever designed next to communism.



Please explain why "many" people think the Taliban is the stronger team? This somehow escapes the limits of my admittedly western bias towards relative combat power. Do people really see the Taliban as the stronger team or the team with the most endurance? Have the Taliban won any fights against coalition forces? I actually understand what you're writing, but please further explain what you mean by stronger team.


Bill, when you get a chance send me an email. I'd like to get your thoughts on a concept. It's just powerpoint, so there is some "reading between the lines" required, but I know you'll be able to keep the trail.

Surferbeetle
08-29-2009, 01:30 PM
A Canadian think tank paper 'Afghanistan’s Alternatives for Peace, Governance and Development: Transforming Subjects to Citizens & Rulers to Civil Servants', by what appears to be an Afghan scholar in exile in the USA: http://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/Afghanistan%20Paper%202.pdf

Yet to read fully, but as the civil aspects are getting more prominence worth a peek.

davidbfpo

...for the link. Interesting reading this morning, his sketch of various parallel governments in particular. This one calls for another cup of coffee.

By the way, this might be of general interest to the water-centric folks: Water resource development in Northern Afganistan and its implications for Amu Darya Basin (http://books.google.com/books?id=eWiReSL6D6YC&source=gbs_navlinks_s)


This publication examines increased water use by Afghanistan and its implications for other water users in the basin, including the Aral Sea, both in the short and long term. Topics discussed include: the amount of Amu Darya flows generated in northern Afghanistan; the amount of water presently used in northern Afghanistan, prospective use in the near future, and possible impact of the increased use on the riparian states and the Aral Sea; existing agreements between Afghanistan and the neighbouring Central Asian states on the use of waters in the Amu Darya Basin, their relevance and applicability in the present and in the future; and future directions for water resources development and improved water management in the basin.

Valin
08-31-2009, 12:19 PM
Michael Yon has been embedded with UK troops in Sangin, for fiev weeks and has written an excellent first-hand account: http://www.michaelyon-online.com/bad-medicine.htm Yon is now en route to embed with USMC.

For murky reasons his embed has ended and neither side agrees why.

Stephen Grey, a UK journalist, has written a wide ranging article on the campaigning and whether the local strategy is correct: http://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/wp-content/cache/supercache/www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/2009/08/cracking-on-in-helmand/index.html

davidbfpo

Thanks for the links


Cracking on in Helmand (http://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/wp-content/cache/supercache/www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/2009/08/cracking-on-in-helmand/index.html)

(snip)

The public debate has rarely reflected the mixed-up reality of the war. In July, when the number of dead since 2001 overtook the total in Iraq, the debate was couched as politicians versus generals. Our troops demanded more helicopters, reinforcements and money. All of that was true—when Sergeant Johnson’s comrades kept vigil over his body for 24 hours, it was because no helicopter was available to take him off the hill. And a day earlier, many Afghan civilians had died because there were no helicopters to ferry the injured to hospital. But more men and more choppers are not going to win this war, still less address its purpose.
While this may be true, it must be asked if more men and equipment would not have provided the time needed to get the correct strategy?


Neither the air cavalry nor legions of fresh troops defeated the Vietcong.

The writer shows a real lack of knowledge about that damn war by saying this.

davidbfpo
08-31-2009, 12:46 PM
Writing in The Guardian, an ex-UK Army officer, with an opening passage
Afghanistan: a question of stamina. We must finish the job in Afghanistan – the geopolitical alternative is too terrible to consider
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2009/aug/30/afghanistan-worst-case-scenario

Ands ends with
Not for us perhaps, at least not initially, but for so many others. Now the fight has started we need to finish it. We have promised to help create something better and must deliver it. We just have to have the stamina and courage, both physical and moral to do so.

As expected there is a commentary here: http://defenceoftherealm.blogspot.com/2009/08/question-of-strategy.html

davidbfpo

Valin
08-31-2009, 12:56 PM
Writing in The Guardian, an ex-UK Army officer, with an opening passage
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2009/aug/30/afghanistan-worst-case-scenario

Ands ends with

As expected there is a commentary here: http://defenceoftherealm.blogspot.com/2009/08/question-of-strategy.html

davidbfpo

Exactly! The question is, do our political leaders have the guts(?) to stand up to the anti-war forces. Secondly, can they explain to people why we must stay there and win and the consequences of leaving.

How long does it take to fly from Kabul to Leeds or Denver Co.?

"Shrink The Gap"
Thomas PM Barnett

William F. Owen
09-06-2009, 09:57 AM
This (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=8335)'The Afghanistan Abyss' on SWJ Blog takes some time to make sense of.

So apparently the Pashtun opposition is a function of absolute numbers. The average man living in the village will suddenly notice a extra 21,000 troops?

Really, how will another 21,000 have any perceptual impact at all? For those against the US, it matters not if it is 10,000 or a 100K.

Bob's World
09-06-2009, 11:12 AM
Concur 100%, but I remain doubtful that cold logic will override passion in our national decision making strategy. You can't win elections based on the merit of your sound ideas, you have to drum up emotions and let the media fan the flames. When it gets difficult to maintain the emotional high about a particular course of action, then the counter movement whips into action and gradually builds momentum. We should have listened to George Washington and avoided the party system, it is most irrational system for governing ever designed next to communism.



Please explain why "many" people think the Taliban is the stronger team? This somehow escapes the limits of my admittedly western bias towards relative combat power. Do people really see the Taliban as the stronger team or the team with the most endurance? Have the Taliban won any fights against coalition forces? I actually understand what you're writing, but please further explain what you mean by stronger team.

If you get a chance, read Sarah's "Punishment of Virtue," there are some great insights there from a non-military perspective of someone who spent a great deal of time within the populace and working the problem; in fact as I listened to the CD during my commute I was struck that this is a perspective that our SF guys should be bringing as well.

But, with growing frustration with the Karzai government's failure to deal with those aspects of governance that they found the most intolerable (i.e., poor governance) that they had no recourse to address through the men he allowed to stay in official positions, which the exploited for their own gain; many were beginning to yearn for the "good old days" of when the Taliban were in power. For all their faults, there was much that was good as well.

Few want the Taliban in power; but most want things to be better than they are now. It provides a crack in the social will for the Taliban to pry on. And remember, in a Taliban ran state there will be no more foreign military presence; and we cannot underestimate how powerful of a message that must be given the history of these people.

For the US we should remember that we did not go to AFG to wage war on the Taliban, if they would have agreed to deny AQ sanctuary we would probably be working with them right now, with very little presence in this country. Mission Creep is a dangerous thing. There is enduring value in Colin Powell's principles for these types of expeditions.

Our problem is that we assess Taliban governance from OUR perspective. The simple fact is that as the information age continues to bring light to the darkest corners of the globe, the harsh, dark age policies of the pre 9/11 Taliban are unsustainable. Either they would evolve or become quickly obsolete.

I look at American history and we idolize the image of the Pilgrims that settled New England. Harsh, men in black, who were uncompromising, intolerant religious extremists that held a fringe ideology of Christianity. They tortured their women and exiled any who dared to hold different religious beliefs to their own. (Thank God for the liberal Dutch colony in New York, which attracted people from all walks, nations, and ideologies; and which was the birthplace of many of the concepts that ultimately came to be thought of as "American.") But the Pilgrims evolved.

The Taliban, if successful, will evolve as well; and it will be on a far more compressed timeline than what the Pilgrims ran on. We just need to go back to our going in position. Deny sanctuary to AQ and groups like them, allow civilian aid organizations access and security, and don't violate international law.

I may not like the way my neighbor talks to his wife, or treats his kids. But if he isn't violating the law I have no legal right to confront him. Certainly there are moral imperatives, but "imperative" is the operative word, and "not like" does not raise to that level.

BL, we in the US do not need to fear the Taliban, lets focus on the real issue. We get off track and make the problem worse when we keep expending the "threat" list and attacking more and more of these organizations. We conflate them in our minds; and then unite them against us by our actions.

Bob's World
09-06-2009, 11:24 AM
The UK can barely maintain 8,900. Don't look for any more they are not resourced to do it.

They would take 8,900 KIA and spit in the enemy's eyes; and have a million men on the ground.

Again, while the metrics guys are looking for indicators, we should apply a couple of metrics to the approach of our NATO allies to this sticky mess.

They come primarly to service the national interest of maintaining good relations with the US; not for any national interests they feel are at stake in Afghanistan. I suspect, that many, like the Pakistanis, realize that supporting the American approach to this problem to date too fully is far more likely to create instability at home, rather than the opposite.

Sometimes your friends are the last ones to tell you when you're being a jackass.

marct
09-06-2009, 02:30 PM
Sometimes your friends are the last ones to tell you when you're being a jackass.

Yup. Of course, sometimes we do and you don't listen ;).

Bob's World
09-06-2009, 02:59 PM
Yup. Of course, sometimes we do and you don't listen ;).

:)

Those who are the busiest telling others what to do and how to do it are rarely the best listeners as well. Particularly when they are so damn certain in their "rightness."

max161
09-06-2009, 03:57 PM
:)

Those who are the busiest telling others what to do and how to do it are rarely the best listeners as well. Particularly when they are so damn certain in their "rightness."

We should all heed those wise words especially here on the SW Council!!!

I think it would be a great graduate student project for someone to analyze the national security debate since about 2006 to the present and try to assess the major protagonists (and antagonists)and their actual contributions to the debate and discern whether their outspoken positions on everything from the success or lack of success of the "Surge" to the American Way of COIN to the so-called "lily pad" "strategy" has really contributed to our ability to protect US national security. Or are they just peddling their own pet ideas and projects?

Debate is healthy and important but so is the ability to listen, learn, and discern, so that we can prevent the three major failures of all military operations - failure to learn, failure to adapt, and failure to anticipate (Cohen and Gooch in Military Misfortune)

Fuchs
09-06-2009, 04:11 PM
Krulak letter to George Will

http://abcnews.go.com/images/ThisWeek/Krulak_letter2.pdf

He's not about winning, but about accomplishing the real mission.

Surferbeetle
09-06-2009, 04:13 PM
SWJ attracts excellent minds and acts as a digital salon (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Salon_%28gathering%29) which allows for the critical examination of many facets of the complex problems we face. I greatly appreciate the opportunities to visit because of the reasoned discourse shared by experienced people.

Marc, Dayuhan, Ken, Bill Moore, ODB, Omarali50, Wilf, and many others to include BW have valued insights to share however we all, to include myself, need to regularly fight the tendency to conflate our egos with the issues at hand....:wry:...this is much bigger than just one mans opinion...

slapout9
09-06-2009, 04:25 PM
Yup. Of course, sometimes we do and you don't listen ;).

I am a Wardenfile but Bob is a "Missionary Man" for your listening pleasure and cultural enhancement.http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7RMEDBhXh-w

jmm99
09-06-2009, 07:09 PM
Mr Will's article I read, but GEN Krulak's letter (linked by Fuchs) got my attention. The pdf doesn't allow cut & paste - so his 5 points are attached. I think they deserve some discussion here.

Buggered up my hand this weekend (so, one finger typing which does the hand no good) - in Internet terms, the lawyer is effectively silenced. :D

Ken White
09-06-2009, 09:02 PM
Not being a Lawyer but able to use two fingers on the keyboard and being always willing to share my opinions, I'll take a shot at it.

General Krulak is as usual, pretty well on the money -- though I think he missed one critical issue. By the numbers:

1. He's right, of course -- that does not change the fact that we should be able to get DoD and DoS on the same page and it would behoove us to do so to preclude or at least diminish future stupidity on this scale. Depart too soon and the impetus to fix that disconnect will be diligently allowed to dissipate with the connivance of both Departments.

2. True, no question -- we do not have the troops to do the COIN trick. So any idea of 'fixing' Afghanistan before we depart should be DOA. We can leave it better than we found it and we can do as best we can what we said we would do and not just abandon them as we had before. Pakistan would appreciate that. So would Russia. So will the Afghans. So will we in the long term -- one of those pay now or pay more later things...

3. He's right again. We cannot defeat their ideas in spite of eight years trying. Will we -- can we -- come up with better ideas in the near term? Perhaps, perhaps not. Long as we're there, no harm in trying.

4. Still right -- But:

Afghanistan's structure is not a vital US national interest, nor, in a sense is that of Pakistan -- however, reasonable performance by both is in the interest of the world -- and thus, ultimately, in our interest to at least some degree.

What is in our national interest is finishing the commitment we launched eight years ago. It is not a 'vital' interest in the existential category however it is a critical issue that can have long term deleterious effects on the existential bit if not properly handled -- as we have seen over the past 30 years.

Whether we should have launched and made such a commitment is irrelevant. We did and we're there. In the view of most in the West, obviously including General Krulak and George Will, that is not a pressing or non-negotiable commitment; we should be able to say "we're tired now and the Troops are being run ragged by this and we need the money spent here at home so we plan to pack up and go home." We can say that.

However, the rest of the world will know we reneged on a commitment that we freely made. Even if we elect to go into denial over the issue, others will not. They will add one more item to the "America can be worn down" list which already has too many entries.

His suggestion about Hunter Killer Teams is reasonable and can be done. Unfortunately, it will not stop the slide of Afghanistan into chaos and will get a lot of good guys killed for very little benefit. I've done what he suggests as did many in the 1st MarDiv and the Army's 5th RCT in Korea in early 1951. It is effective, it cleared out the Guerrilla remnants of the North Korean Army (who were not well trained but were very dedicated -- as are others) around Masan and Pusan in a matter of weeks. It also killed a helluva lot of civilians and created one of today's hotbeds of anti-US sentiment in South Korea, That's 58 years ago -- and they still remember. Most of the world has a far longer memory (and attention span) than Americans seem to possess. I think he and Will both forgot that as well... :D

I also strongly doubt that we have adequate forces trained in numbers to support the idea; I doubt that Congress would go along with it -- certainly not after the first couple of H-K Teams got totally wiped out by the opposition -- or a Wedding Party proven innocent is killed to the last baby.

His suggestion entails a bunch of support and airplane people in Afghanistan. Due to distances involved, at least some would have to be there; the other 'Stans can and might take a few but no one will take many Americans because the Russians don't want that -- either way, those become targets as do their resupply convoys. Of course, we could use Contractors or get the Afghan Police to provide security. In short that's one of those idea that looks great on paper but a closer look reveals problems of capability -- and will. And little real change...

In summary, lot to agree with. However, he totally ignores the non-western idea of humbling the Great Satan as an activity for fun and profit. Surprising given Beirut and a Marine plus the hard fact that the humbling bit is exactly why we are in Afghanistan and Iraq. That's the goal they have, humbling -- death by a thousand grains of sand -- and our early departure from Afghanistan would aid them in achieving it.

We may not have a clearly defined goal in the eyes of many but I submit that goal should simply be to finish what we started, get a minimalist government in place that most Afghans can and will support -- then make sure we don't get stuck on stupid and try to do stuff like this in the future -- because regardless of what many like to think, we don't have that many friends out there and there are a great many who do not wish us well. Faltering performance is seen by many as an invitation to kill the weak who cannot keep up. Or to help others do that...

Surferbeetle
09-07-2009, 02:40 AM
From Business Week by Amb. Ryan Crocker (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ryan_Crocker): The Ambassador on the Front Lines (http://www.newsweek.com/id/214988)


Americans tend to want to identify a problem, fix it, and then move on. Sometimes this works. Often it does not. Of course, imposing ourselves on hostile or chaotic societies is no solution either. The perceived arrogance and ignorance of overbearing powers can create new narratives of humiliation that will feed calls for vengeance centuries from now. What's needed in dealing with this world is a combination of understanding, persistence, and strategic patience to a degree that Americans, traditionally, have found hard to muster.

From London Review of Books by Amb. Rory Stewart (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rory_Stewart) The Irresistible Illusion (http://www.lrb.co.uk/v31/n13/print/stew01_.html)


The fundamental assumptions remain that an ungoverned or hostile Afghanistan is a threat to global security; that the West has the ability to address the threat and bring prosperity and security; that this is justified and a moral obligation; that economic development and order in Afghanistan will contribute to global stability; that these different objectives reinforce each other; and that there is no real alternative. One indication of the enduring strength of such assumptions is that they are exactly those made in 1868 by Sir Henry Rawlinson, a celebrated and experienced member of the council of India, concerning the threat of a Russian presence in Afghanistan:

In the interests, then, of peace; in the interests of commerce; in the interests of moral and material improvement, it may be asserted that interference in Afghanistan has now become a duty, and that any moderate outlay or responsibility we may incur in restoring order at Kabul will prove in the sequel to be true economy.

Rex Brynen
09-07-2009, 03:57 AM
We may not have a clearly defined goal in the eyes of many but I submit that goal should simply be to finish what we started, get a minimalist government in place that most Afghans can and will support

...this is becoming harder by the day, if the latest reports on the scale of voter fraud in the elections are accurate:

Fake Afghan Poll Sites Favored Karzai, Officials Assert (http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/07/world/asia/07fraud.html?hp), New York Times, 6 September 2009


KABUL, Afghanistan — Afghans loyal to President Hamid Karzai set up hundreds of fictitious polling sites where no one voted but where hundreds of thousands of ballots were still recorded toward the president’s re-election, according to senior Western and Afghan officials here.

The fake sites, as many as 800, existed only on paper, said a senior Western diplomat in Afghanistan, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because of the political delicacy of the vote. Local workers reported that hundreds, and in some cases thousands, of votes for Mr. Karzai in the election last month came from each of those places. That pattern was confirmed by another Western official based in Afghanistan.

“We think that about 15 percent of the polling sites never opened on Election Day,” the senior Western diplomat said. “But they still managed to report thousands of ballots for Karzai.”

Besides creating the fake sites, Mr. Karzai’s supporters also took over approximately 800 legitimate polling centers and used them to fraudulently report tens of thousands of additional ballots for Mr. Karzai, the officials said.

The result, the officials said, is that in some provinces, the pro-Karzai ballots may exceed the people who actually voted by a factor of 10. “We are talking about orders of magnitude,” the senior Western diplomat said.

...

Most of the fraud perpetrated on behalf of Mr. Karzai, officials said, took place in the Pashtun-dominated areas of the east and south where officials said that turnout on Aug. 20 was exceptionally low. That included Mr. Karzai’s home province, Kandahar, where preliminary results indicate that more than 350,000 ballots have been turned in to be counted. But Western officials estimated that only about 25,000 people actually voted there.

slapout9
09-07-2009, 04:32 AM
Link to website on some history Oil and Violence in A'stan.


http://www.ringnebula.com/Oil/Timeline.htm

Ken White
09-07-2009, 05:09 AM
My definition of 'minimalist' government is probably far more minimal than most...:wry:

I also believe that virtually anyone who ascends to the Presidency of Afghanistan is going to be tainted much like Karzai. I pointed out to a friend the other day that our politicians are not a great deal better, they just have a few more social constraints. :rolleyes:

We are not going to 'fix' Afghanistan; not least because the social constraint process there is quite different and those pertaining to good government we have developed over centuries (heh!) imply time they do not have. However, we did say we would 'fix' it. That was regrettable political hype or abysmal stupidity -- probably a bit of both. We cannot foster the establishment of a decent government there for three reasons; the Afghans don't want one; we don't have the time or money to do that; and the Afghans don't want one...

So we need to acknowledge that reality. Will and Krulak are both correct on the practicalities and all the reasons to say 'we tried' and just depart except for two that neither addressed: We have not really tried thus far. We said to the world that we would not again abandon Afghanistan.

For those reasons, I'm pretty firmly convinced that we should give it a bit longer and really try to do the 'fix' thing -- my perception is that is in process with State taking ownership of many things they should've had six years ago -- and we need to depart fairly soon, couple of years or so, with the fond blessings of a nominal Afghan government much as we are departing Iraq. That means a continuing but far lower key engagement. My perception is that also is in process (couple more Fuel Tank Trailers may speed that up a bit... :( ). It'll take a bit.

The COIN view of ten years or more engagement is unlikely (and highly undesirable IMO) and departing abruptly presents many difficulties. A moderate approach between those poles with acknowledgment that Afghan government will be an Afghan construct and thus unpalatable to many in the west. :cool:

The alternative, Krulak's Hunter Killer Teams would require probably about 2-300 well trained platoon sized elements, around 10K troops plus about half that for support (X3 to allow for rotation) to decently cover the 936km Iranian border and the 2,430km Paksitani border -- both in some really bad terrain. You could provide fewer but that is really not an economy of force mission if you expect any success at all.

To leave and "go back punitively" is a pipe dream. May work in bong reality but on the ground, there is no infrastructure there to damage and no cohesive force to be punished. IOW, it would be late 2001 all over again. We could easily do it. Then what?

Hopefully we'll have learned from this to avoid such arrant stupidity in the future. We can and should assist the UN and others in nation building; we should assist internal development diplomatically and with USAid -- and even commit police trainers and SF where appropriate -- but we need to realize that commitment of a mass of US Forces will change the dynamics in generally unpredictable but most always adverse ways.

jmm99
09-07-2009, 06:32 AM
One finger, hurty typing - so, briefly.

Convert the mission to true peace enforcement (note, I did not say peacekeeping) - separation of Pashtun forces south of trans-Astan highway (Hwy 1) from Karzai forces north of highway. Continue FID to Karzai security forces, but no combat support unless Pashtun armed forces cross highway.

We (international community under German lead at Bonn) created a constitutional and statutory framework for Astan govt. It's up to them to implement it by negotiation between Karzai and Pashtuns.

GEN Krulak's point 4 - decide who is US enemy for direct action. AQ - yes (take them out); Taliban - no, unless they get in the way. Krulak's HK teams (and your estimate of force requirements) would be aimed at AQ groups.

We cannot continue fighting the Pashtun nationalists unless we are willing and able to commit the 100s of 1000s of troops that GEN Krulak cited. There are more Pashtuns in Astan and Pstan (42 million (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pashtun_people)) than there were Vietnamese in 1965, N & S (38 million (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demographics_of_Vietnam)).

Bob's World
09-07-2009, 11:27 AM
Krulak basically said what I have been saying, but I would not commit anywhere near the 2-300 platoons Ken suggests. Like the General asks "who is the enemy"? We don't want to build and sustain a string of fortified patrol bases to enforce a border that means nothing to the people of the region to kill those same people. I think more a size element with CIA and full support of both Af and Pak intel; to work from the shadows, not bases; to go after the 2-300 specific men we are after to keep them in the shadows as well.

I also think this is a great place to test some new political concepts of sovereignty. We say the Westphalian system is under attack and evolving, yet we do little proactive to shape that evolution. I like my concept of a lesser included form of sovereignty for the Pashtun people that grants them special rights and self-governance within an area marked by their traditional tribal homelands, but not removed from the states it exists within. Like if we had a huge Indian reservation that straddled the Canadian border. Unique rights and privileges for those of the tribes, but full rights of citizenry from the states that have emerged around them. Use that as a start point, devil in the details as usual, but have the moral courage to try something new!

If it worked, then we could look if the States that contain the Kurds would be open to a similar approach; It could be a pressure valve, I suspect, to many African states as well.

Royalties for mineral rights, easements, etc all need to be worked in advance. We are still pulling tons of gold from the Black Hills, and the Sioux got nothing. How different their experience would have been if granted even a 10% take.

Bottom line, is if we do what we've always done, but the conditions have changed, we won't get what we've always got. We'll get failure and conflict. We must evolve with the times. The top dog loves the status quo, and the trail dogs embrace change. We need to embrace change as well.

jmm99
09-07-2009, 01:13 PM
BW: As to your first paragraph, that's between Ken, you and whoever else military wants to chime in on bases and force structure.

As to your second paragraph, specifically..


I like my concept of a lesser included form of sovereignty for the Pashtun people that grants them special rights and self-governance within an area marked by their traditional tribal homelands, but not removed from the states it exists within. Like if we had a huge Indian reservation that straddled the Canadian border. Unique rights and privileges for those of the tribes, but full rights of citizenry from the states that have emerged around them.

that is one possibility. But, what results is not what we like, but what can be negotiated by Karzai govt, Pashtuns and Pakistan.

We don't negotiate, but only establish an arbitrary Tripwire Line (in orange on revised map from Khyber Pass to Turkmenistan) to separate the warring parties in Astan - peace enforcement (Joint Pub 3-07.3 (http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/jp3073.pdf), Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peace Operations, Chap III, as updated by more recent operations).

The trans-Astan highway is symbolic - do these folks want a united Astan or not ?

PS: The peace enforcement operation (basically NATO + US FID) would be separate from the direct action operations vs AQ (OEF mandated under the 2001 AUMF), continued under SOCOM C&C.

Ken White
09-07-2009, 05:33 PM
In the east it's called surrendering. Really. They do not do compromise other than as a tactical ploy.

That's the issue -- all this is based on western perceptions and would be possibly good ideas were we but fighting other westerners. We are not.

JMM
GEN Krulak's point 4 - decide who is US enemy for direct action. AQ - yes (take them out); Taliban - no, unless they get in the way. Krulak's HK teams (and your estimate of force requirements) would be aimed at AQ groups.Aside from the difficulty of determining the difference between the uninvolved, the AQ type and the Talibs -- that's two out of three to be not fired up; preponderence of evidence goes to 'don't shoot' -- and, Krulak not withstanding, that will affect the ROE and, more importantly, it will affect the outlook of the teams on the ground.

I was looking at interdiction to keep the majority of the Talibs in Pakistan from whence they come to allow that government to take care of them and the Afghan government to try to insinuate itself. Others appear to see it as a HVT takeout option, an option that IMO is not nearly as successful as many seem to believe. Leaders can be and are replaced, often one takes out an ineffectual opponent only to have him replaced with a guy who knows what he's doing and is terribly effective...
We cannot continue fighting the Pashtun nationalists unless we are willing and able to commit the 100s of 1000s of troops that GEN Krulak cited. There are more Pashtuns in Astan and Pstan (42 million) than there were Vietnamese in 1965, N & S (38 million).We are not fighting Pashtun Nationalists. We are in conflict with less than 2% (plus the people they hire to fight for them who are not nearly so committed) of the total Pashtun demographic who want to impose a rigid Islamic code that is actually alien to the Pashtun tradition and is not really wanted by most. You forgot to mention that Afghanistan is also four times larger in area than Viet Nam and has much more difficult terrain, militarily a far greater problem than the population herring.

Bob'sWorld
Krulak basically said what I have been saying, but I would not commit anywhere near the 2-300 platoons Ken suggests. Like the General asks "who is the enemy"? We don't want to build and sustain a string of fortified patrol bases to enforce a border that means nothing to the people of the region to kill those same people. I think more a size element with CIA and full support of both Af and Pak intel; to work from the shadows, not bases...The term Hunter Killer teams implies mobile teams with no bases, thus the shadows are a given. However, those teams do need support so there will be bases somewhere in the vicinity. Those and the Air support that GEN Krulak suggests will be targets of intent for the bad guys, they will require security. My point was and is that there will be only a small footprint reduction with Krulak's admittedly different plan..

I'm looking forward to learning how you will obtain the unbiased and unstinting support of Afghanistan and Pakistan Intel elements...
...to go after the 2-300 specific men we are after to keep them in the shadows as well.Why, Bob, you old kidder -- and I thought you wanted a change to the way we the USA do business -- you just want to continue using the Tampa approach and go for the HVTs...

How's that going for us? Not in numbers -- in actual effect?

How does that proposal by you square with this:
...We must evolve with the times. The top dog loves the status quo, and the trail dogs embrace change. We need to embrace change as well.:confused: :D

Seems to me you're supporting the intent and hoped for effect of a program with which I once worked long ago in an galaxy far away. That one, BTW, did not get too far in achieving the desired effect -- it also imposed a cost on us.

As an aside on the HK Teams and options to field such an effort -- I'd agree that if we did that, the Agency should have the job with local hires. That would entail Congressional approval and funding. It would entail SOCOM backing out of the picture in large measure. Good luck with that effort on either count.
I like my concept of a lesser included form of sovereignty for the Pashtun people that grants them special rights and self-governance within an area marked by their traditional tribal homelands, but not removed from the states it exists within.Have you spoken to the Pakistanis, the rest of Afghanistan, the Russians, the Tajiks or the Indians to get their sensing on this? Or the Chinese with their little training mission in Qal'eh e Panjeh? Or even the bulk of the Pushtuns?

I thought you were opposed to pushing our solutions off on others... ;)

Fuchs
09-07-2009, 05:43 PM
In the east it's called surrendering. Really. They do not do compromise other than as a tactical ploy.

That's B.S. Compromise is no Western concept and compromise isn't the same as surrender anywhere.*

Total War/war goal "(unconditional) surrender" is ingrained in Western minds more than anywhere else.
Others do limited warfare and accept unclear war outcomes much more readily than Westerners do (averages/medians each).

Or do you want to assert that India surrendered to Pakistan? Pakistan to India? PR China to Vietnam?


Besides; I've seen "surrender" being mis-used in so many political discussions among Americans that were pure B.S. that I abstain from throwing the word into discussions altogether.

---------------------------------------------------------
*: Except in American right wing speeches and comments that I won't give a rating here for reasons of netiquette.

Ken White
09-07-2009, 06:09 PM
That's B.S. Compromise is no Western concept and compromise isn't the same as surrender anywhere.*It's not B.S. -- it's hyperbole; an overstatement to make a point. The population of the Middle East and South Asia are great hagglers and bargainers -- it's an effort at which they excel. In such bargaining, things that to a westerner might seem as compromises are taken by the locals as concessions.

That obviously cannot correlate to all activity but there is enough correlation for me to have made the point the way I did -- so not B.S. as you so nicely put it due to your failure to understand, simply hyperbole.

The statement by me that "they do not compromise other than as a tactical ploy" OTOH is accurate for most dealings with locals in that area. That's then obviously not B.S. in any way.
Total War/war goal "(unconditional) surrender" is ingrained in Western minds more than anywhere else...Others do limited warfare and accept unclear war outcomes much more readily than Westerners do (averages/medians each).Thank you for reinforcing my point. That's exactly what I meant. They are extremely pragmatic and they know that as well as you and I do, thus they will accept our departure too soon with equanimity if not glee and immediately turn it to their psychological and media advantage. Their advantage is our disadvantage; not ruin, just disadvantage, not significant even perhaps -- but one that it is not necessary or desirable to have occur.
Besides; I've seen "surrender" being mis-used in so many political discussions among Americans that were pure B.S. that I abstain from throwing the word into discussions altogether...*: Except in American right wing speeches and comments that I won't give a rating here for reasons of netiquette.Thank you for the netiquette. Might I suggest you lay off the "B.S." tag as well -- particularly when you do not know what was in the mind of the writer toward whom you sling that phrase. You do that all too often. Attack dogs have their place but a discussion board isn't one of them, a growl can come across as a bite.

You might recall that I've often said that the words 'win,' victory,' 'defeat' and 'lose' have no place in wars of this type; all that can be hoped for is an acceptable outcome. By extrapolation, that applies as well to 'surrender' so your comment on that score doesn't apply to me, it's a generic comment that adds nothing to the thread and was superfluous to your erroneous B.S. call. You do that all too often as well.

Fuchs
09-07-2009, 06:17 PM
I slinged "B.S." at your writing, not at your mind - and I stick with it.

Ron Humphrey
09-07-2009, 06:19 PM
tough to keep up with but trying none the less

On a side note Everyone like to talk about Westphalian or western constructs as disconnect points

Am I following that reasoning if I ask myself the question how would China do what I 'm trying to do

(Especially when the answer there seems much more straightforward-
{Outbid the bad guys and not care who gets hurt doin it}):confused:

Bob's World
09-07-2009, 06:31 PM
I never profess to have "the answer," I am however, able to look at something that is not working, think about it, and offer "an answer," that is both more likely to succeed than "do the same old crap, except more of it," and more constructive than "this sucks."

Its a start point.

Populaces are rebelling in the middle east for a reason. That reason is not "ideology," it is not about religion, and it is not "because they hate us." It is about politics, and human nature, and man's natural tendency to prefer a hell of his own making than a paradise forced upon him by another. Bin Laden and AQ are born of their time. If not him, it would be someone else. If not AQ it would be some other organization. They may be the enemy, but they are not the threat. The threat is the conditions that gave rise to them. To ignore the conditions to attack the symptoms is to make the conditions worse while weakening our ability to resist the real threat at the same time. To me, that is high order short-sighted foolishness.

So here we are. We can keep working to force people to accept what they reject and foment the perpetual conflict of "irregular warfare;" or we can help enable populaces to seek new governmental constructs of their own making, and perhaps allow for more evolution than revolution as these changes work out.

In the end, there is no end. No option is perfect, and there will always be conflict. The real question is what role do you want the United States to play in all of this? Personally I prefer what Marc call the "Myth" of our idealistic history over the reality of our current role as enforcer of the effort to sustain an out of date status quo.

Ken White
09-07-2009, 06:54 PM
I never profess to have "the answer," I am however, able to look at something that is not working, think about it, and offer "an answer," that is both more likely to succeed than "do the same old crap, except more of it," and more constructive than "this sucks."of those things -- but I do think with respect to the application of HK teams and your "to go after the 2-300 specific men we are after to keep them in the shadows as well." is doing the same old thing...
...The threat is the conditions that gave rise to them. To ignore the conditions to attack the symptoms is to make the conditions worse while weakening our ability to resist the real threat at the same time. To me, that is high order short-sighted foolishness.While that may be true, if you want to change it you have to have concrete and achievable methods to achieve the desired change. I do not disagree with your goal but you have yet to produce a method. To identify a problem is easy, to propose achievable solution is the trick. It is not easy...
Personally I prefer what Marc call the "Myth" of our idealistic history over the reality of our current role as enforcer of the effort to sustain an out of date status quo.Myths are always preferable to reality. :wry:

Reality is harsh, however, I'm not all sure you're correct is saying that we are trying to serve as enforcer of the effort to sustain an out of date status quo. I really do not see that. I think we're trying to sort out the oncoming status and it's too murky to discern so we're casting about, looking at alternatives and I believe it'll take another ten to twenty years to do that. Major change is always incremental and difficult to predict accurately. We'll work it out. Probably won't be your way or the ways I'd propose but our track record is more good than bad...

Ken White
09-07-2009, 07:28 PM
I slinged "B.S." at your writing, not at your mind - and I stick with it.That would be 'slung,' the past tense of sling in that sense. As long as I'm giving free English pointers -- not lessons, you're English is really good -- another relates to use of the term B.S. The usual meaning in English (as I recall the German equivalent is less pejorative but still not for polite company) is that the originator of the statement is deliberately lying or that the issue itself is totally illegitimate. It is generally considered to be insulting -- and low grade insulting at that. Since you say you're attacking what I wrote and not my mind, then you are saying that, in your opinion, that statement I made was wrong but instead of simply saying that or inquiring about it, you decided to render a low grade or cheap insult. :eek:

As I agreed that it was wrong, incorrect or whatever but that is was so worded as a deliberate overstatement to make a nonetheless very valid point -- which I note you do not deign to address or attempt to refute -- then for you to reiterate using the phrase with no discussion can only be construed as a deliberate insult -- which as previously stated "I wouldn't have expected anything else." That out of the way, are you just going to growl for your daily confrontation with the scheiße Amis or do you have anything to contribute to the thread? :D

Fuchs
09-07-2009, 08:09 PM
That would be 'slung,' the past tense of sling in that sense. As long as I'm giving free English pointers -- not lessons, you're "your" English is really good -- another relates to use of the term B.S. The usual meaning in English (as I recall the German equivalent is less pejorative but still not for polite company) is that the originator of the statement is deliberately lying or that the issue itself is totally illegitimate. It is generally considered to be insulting -- and low grade insulting at that. Since you say you're attacking what I wrote and not my mind, then you are saying that, in your opinion, that statement I made was wrong but instead of simply saying that or inquiring about it, you decided to render a low grade or cheap insult. :eek:

As I agreed that it was wrong, incorrect or whatever but that is was so worded as a deliberate overstatement to make a nonetheless very valid point (...)

See, to me this point is utter nonsense, wrong, misleading and almost indicative of prejudices, hypocritical tunnel vision and over-generalization.

The West is the cultural sphere that unduly emphasizes extreme war goals (since Napoleon) as opposed to limited war goals. (Exceptions as Imperial Japan existed, of course.)
Accordingly, the notion that accepting an outcome short of the annihilation of unconditional surrender of the enemy would be a surrender itself is quite specific Western right-wing B.S..

Some people may emphasize the fact that accepting limited objectives is a sign that one lacks omnipotence, but that's not the same as the assertion that such a behaviour is "surrender" in "the East".

Your "exaggeration" remark is just an excuse to me, for I consider your statement as factually very wrong. It was also very, very misleading - those who believe your statement would be on a completely wrong track in my opinion, and that justifies the term "B.S.".

I could go on about the "wrong track", but let's just says that there's too much delusional talk floating around the word "surrender" in English discussions about war (and especially GWOT) that I feel compelled to intervene before it gets too ugly.

Bob's World
09-07-2009, 08:17 PM
of those things -- but I do think with respect to the application of HK teams and your "to go after the 2-300 specific men we are after to keep them in the shadows as well." is doing the same old thing...While that may be true, if you want to change it you have to have concrete and achievable methods to achieve the desired change. I do not disagree with your goal but you have yet to produce a method. To identify a problem is easy, to propose achievable solution is the trick. It is not easy...Myths are always preferable to reality. :wry:

Reality is harsh, however, I'm not all sure you're correct is saying that we are trying to serve as enforcer of the effort to sustain an out of date status quo. I really do not see that. I think we're trying to sort out the oncoming status and it's too murky to discern so we're casting about, looking at alternatives and I believe it'll take another ten to twenty years to do that. Major change is always incremental and difficult to predict accurately. We'll work it out. Probably won't be your way or the ways I'd propose but our track record is more good than bad...

Always best to have your thick skin on if you are going to be throwing out any new ideas...and as such I have developed a bit of a Rhino hide over the years. :)

But as to hunting and same ol', same ol', you know it is all in HOW one does things, not so much what they do. As a kid growing up I would see the occasional story in the news where some long forgotten Nazi got himself rolled up by a relentless, low drama, low visibility effort attributed to Israel. I think that makes a good model for rightsizing our man-hunting efforts. I would like to explore that idea; but we'll never get there if we keep expanding the target list and declaring war on every disgruntled dissident/insurgent organization in the world. Put away the circus tent stake driving mallet and get out the scalpel.

Ken White
09-07-2009, 08:38 PM
Put away the circus tent stake driving mallet and get out the scalpel.I totally agree and have been saying that for years but I've never been able figure out how to convince the US Congress to do that; they -- not the elected and appointed Executive branch types, not the Army, not SOCOM, not budget and space battles all of which have minor impacts -- are the big pole in that tent...

Ken White
09-07-2009, 09:14 PM
Re: the 'your.' Good one. Got me cold. So that's a Yea. :cool: However...

See, to me this point is utter nonsense, wrong, misleading and almost indicative of prejudices, hypocritical tunnel vision and over-generalization.To you, perhaps. You seem to have a distressing tendency to see such errors in a good many things and then attempt to refute them with statements like this:
The West is the cultural sphere that unduly emphasizes extreme war goals (since Napoleon) as opposed to limited war goals. (Exceptions as Imperial Japan existed, of course.)Accordingly, the notion that accepting an outcome short of the annihilation of unconditional surrender of the enemy would be a surrender itself is quite specific Western right-wing B.S.Which while true have little to do with the point at hand. That point is that those from the Middle East and South Asia do not look at compromise in the same way we in the west consider it; they of course accept compromise but the view of what has occurred can and usually will differ. It has nothing to do with limited objectives. So that's a big Nay.
Some people may emphasize the fact that accepting limited objectives is a sign that one lacks omnipotence, but that's not the same as the assertion that such a behaviour is "surrender" in "the East".Not to one who is overly literal, that's for sure...:wry:

OTOH, if one accepts that the follow on to that word was "They do not do compromise other than as a tactical ploy." the intent of the statement is thus modified and nuanced and not as clearcut as was your interpretation but you seem to have missed that .
Your "exaggeration" remark is just an excuse to me, for I consider your statement as factually very wrong. It was also very, very misleading - those who believe your statement would be on a completely wrong track in my opinion, and that justifies the term "B.S.".We disagree. You can home in on the on statement that you fired at and then aimed toward but missed however, it's sheer opinion; Neither of us has one that's any better than the other. Anyone who believed my statement would be better served than would those who got all wrapped up in your "limited objective" and "right wing" foolishness which has nothing to do with what I said. So that's another Nay.As for what a difference of opinion justifies, we can differ on that as well.
I feel compelled to intervene before it gets too ugly.I've noticed. Ugly is also an opinion thing, isn't it? Compulsions are terrible things... ;)

marct
09-07-2009, 09:36 PM
Hi Bob,


I never profess to have "the answer," I am however, able to look at something that is not working, think about it, and offer "an answer," that is both more likely to succeed than "do the same old crap, except more of it," and more constructive than "this sucks."

I've been operating on the assumption that this thread, and some of the others that you've started, are like discussions at the grad pub - a free for all on ideas. To me, the key thing you bring to the table (outside of yourself ;)) is a model for us to use for a base for discussion. It let's us look at the questions we have asked and think about reformulating them since, maybe, they just don't work anymore. The key is in new questions, not new answers :D!


Populaces are rebelling in the middle east for a reason. That reason is not "ideology," it is not about religion, and it is not "because they hate us." It is about politics, and human nature, and man's natural tendency to prefer a hell of his own making than a paradise forced upon him by another. Bin Laden and AQ are born of their time. If not him, it would be someone else. If not AQ it would be some other organization. They may be the enemy, but they are not the threat. The threat is the conditions that gave rise to them. To ignore the conditions to attack the symptoms is to make the conditions worse while weakening our ability to resist the real threat at the same time. To me, that is high order short-sighted foolishness.

Don't disagree at all with that. Bin Ladin and the Boyz are just a rehashing of a type of movement we have seen time and time again. You have similar types of movements in the US (the various Militias, White Supremacists, etc), and we have them in Canada too.

Where the really interesting part is, IMO, is in the models we assume give rise to these movements, and why some go kinetic and others do not. This means that we have to stop looking at questions derived on the flawed assumption that the State is the primary level of analysis, and dig into other areas.


So here we are. We can keep working to force people to accept what they reject and foment the perpetual conflict of "irregular warfare;" or we can help enable populaces to seek new governmental constructs of their own making, and perhaps allow for more evolution than revolution as these changes work out.

There's an interesting lesson from the Malaysian Insurgency that not many people mention: Malaysia got its independence a couple of years after the insurgency was defeated. Worth thinking about in some depth...


In the end, there is no end. No option is perfect, and there will always be conflict. The real question is what role do you want the United States to play in all of this? Personally I prefer what Marc call the "Myth" of our idealistic history over the reality of our current role as enforcer of the effort to sustain an out of date status quo.

"Creation Myth", please, Bob - it's a technical term :D. More seriously, you can tell a lot about a people by looking at their foundation myths (creation myth and key, mythologized events). People also get uncomfortable working outside of the normal sheaf of possibilities inherent in those myths. Again, something to think about and see if some new questions are required.

slapout9
09-07-2009, 10:15 PM
Always best to have your thick skin on if you are going to be throwing out any new ideas...and as such I have developed a bit of a Rhino hide over the years. :)



Being a former prosecutor helps to:wry: have stuff to say but have to go grill Labor Day....later.

slapout9
09-08-2009, 01:22 AM
In the east it's called surrendering. Really. They do not do compromise other than as a tactical ploy.


That is correct.... Gangs understand this and that is why they can actually coexist next to each other. I would modify it to say you can not negotiate from weakness. Example if you go to the Talliban and say hey lets negotiate a peace agreement I think they would either laugh at you or try to kill you. At a different level it would be seen as weakness and like all predators they would be required to attack a weakness not give in to it. In contrast after you gave them a good thumping maybe several times in a row and said to them you guys are great but so are we, lets make a deal where we can build this pipeline and your family will prosper and in exchange you get rid of the poppies or what ever. There is no guarantee this would work but you would stand a better chance IMO. You have to get respect first....then maybe you can talk. It is the same way about clear,hold and build. Bob's right about shelving that plan. At least for a while. A lot of the time I think they are just playing us for fools....they think just get their money....we can kill the invaders later. My 2 cents worth anyway.

slapout9
09-08-2009, 01:30 AM
In the end, there is no end. No option is perfect, and there will always be conflict.

Yep, as I have said before this whole Ends,Ways,and Means thing just garbs my Gamma-Goat (Ask Ken what that is:) it is time for M.O.M. Motive,Opportunities and Methods. ;)

Ron Humphrey
09-08-2009, 01:43 AM
Could you expound a little on what you said above. I can't count the number of conversation's I've had that seem to end unproductively exactly because of the questions or better yet the format in which they are presented.

Are you mainly pointing to the inherent bias each actor brings into the conversation or more deeply at the sub-conscience level where their primary guidelines are found which tend to limit the possibilities they can actually consider.

Ken White
09-08-2009, 02:20 AM
I would modify it to say you can not negotiate from weakness. Example if you go to the Talliban and say hey lets negotiate a peace agreement I think they would either laugh at you or try to kill you. At a different level it would be seen as weakness and like all predators they would be required to attack a weakness not give in to it.what you said...

That's a good word for the ME and south Asia, Predatory -- they are that -- but only if you appear weak. Thanks.

It's not that I'm lazy, you understand...:o

Bill Moore
09-08-2009, 06:39 AM
Yep, as I have said before this whole Ends,Ways,and Means thing just garbs my Gamma-Goat

Slap, you just resurfaced painful memories, that had to be the worst vehicle the Army ever purchased. It was sweet revenge when I saw a gamma-goat on top a tree (tree ran through it) after a mass tactical airborne assault. I wanted to stay and watch them cut the tree and watch that vehicle slam into the ground, but we had an objective time, so we had to move out.


Where the really interesting part is, IMO, is in the models we assume give rise to these movements, and why some go kinetic and others do not. This means that we have to stop looking at questions derived on the flawed assumption that the State is the primary level of analysis, and dig into other areas.

Marc, where are you going with this? I hate models (and Slap I still hate systems :D), but this sounds interesting.

Valin
09-08-2009, 01:49 PM
I never profess to have "the answer," I am however, able to look at something that is not working, think about it, and offer "an answer," that is both more likely to succeed than "do the same old crap, except more of it," and more constructive than "this sucks."

Its a start point.

Populaces are rebelling in the middle east for a reason. That reason is not "ideology," it is not about religion, and it is not "because they hate us." It is about politics, and human nature, and man's natural tendency to prefer a hell of his own making than a paradise forced upon him by another. Bin Laden and AQ are born of their time. If not him, it would be someone else. If not AQ it would be some other organization. They may be the enemy, but they are not the threat. The threat is the conditions that gave rise to them. To ignore the conditions to attack the symptoms is to make the conditions worse while weakening our ability to resist the real threat at the same time. To me, that is high order short-sighted foolishness.

So here we are. We can keep working to force people to accept what they reject and foment the perpetual conflict of "irregular warfare;" or we can help enable populaces to seek new governmental constructs of their own making, and perhaps allow for more evolution than revolution as these changes work out.

In the end, there is no end. No option is perfect, and there will always be conflict. The real question is what role do you want the United States to play in all of this? Personally I prefer what Marc call the "Myth" of our idealistic history over the reality of our current role as enforcer of the effort to sustain an out of date status quo.

Thank you. Well put!

marct
09-08-2009, 01:49 PM
Hi Ron,


Could you expound a little on what you said above. I can't count the number of conversation's I've had that seem to end unproductively exactly because of the questions or better yet the format in which they are presented.

There's an interesting thing about how humans, as a species, think: the answers to our questions are frequently inherent in how we pose them. Questions, as a class, rely on certain presuppositions about concepts, things and relationships, and one of the key things we know coming out of cultural Anthropology is that "concepts", "things" and [perceived] "relationships" vary from group to group, making communications problematic and questions even more so.

Let me give you an example from some of our recent threads. When Bob's World originally started talking about his model, I was asking about corporations. He assumes that they can be controlled through legislation, while I pretty much laughed at the idea. The key difference between our positions comes from the perceived relationship between corporations and government; he perceives them as being in a controllable state (a variant on an authority ranking system), while I perceive them as being in a symbiotic state with governments (especially the US corporations and government). As a result of these perceptual differences, he tends to exclude them and classify what I would consider to be much of the "normal" operations, as rogue and controllable, while I view them as predictable destabilizing agents.

Let me get back to this species level stuff for a minute. We tend to react (see Bill's comment here (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?p=82099#post82099) on energy crises, it's a classic) rather than act. We also have situational epistemologies, which is just a fancy way of saying that we can believe, and act on, different assumptions depending on specific situations. These are evolutionary survival pluses that we inherited from our 5 million or so years on the Savannah, along with a bunch of other mental tricks like lying and detecting people who cheat on social contracts.

Now, for me, the interesting thing is that while many of these relationships are hardwired (like prototype social relations, detection of cheaters, etc.), the content of those systems isn't, although we act as if it was. When we ask most questions, we are assuming that the content that underlies the situating of the question is "true". But there are several types of questions that don't make this assumption, and those are the questions we need to be asking when we are building new models. These are the really "hard" questions, not because they are particularly hard to answer, but because they challenge basic assumptions - think about a 2 year old asking "Why?" and how grating that can be.

Let me give you an example


Are you mainly pointing to the inherent bias each actor brings into the conversation or more deeply at the sub-conscience level where their primary guidelines are found which tend to limit the possibilities they can actually consider.

Now, let's pull your question apart a bit.

Inherent bias: which bias is that, the situational bias? The lived experience bias? The bias caused by stance? Even stating the question this way assumes that a) there is a bias, and b) it is of a certain specific type (NB: you used "the" in place of "an" and singular in place of plural).

Actor: what is an "actor"? In one universe of discourse, it is someone or some group that has a capability for action, while in another universe of discourse it is a person who mindlessly follows the scripts they have been given by their cultures and lives. There's a whole range of variants between these two, but I thought I would toss out some of the biggies. In the case I was mentioning earlier, Bob assumed that corporations were closer to the latter type - actors, but required to follow scripts (legislation). The way you appear to be using it also places it much more on the level of individual as opposed to group.

Brings into the conversation or more deeply at the sub-conscious level: This makes so many assumptions, I'm not sure where to begin :wry:. For a start, it presupposes only two "levels" of "perceptible reality": individual consciousness and sub-conscious. Then it presupposes that the "guidelines and limits" are found only at the sub-conscious level. It's very Freudian of you, Ron ;)!

Now, I'll freely admit that this type of a model has around a 60-70% validity for ~60% of the population, at least in North America at the moment. But it also has some very major flaws that are biting people in the butt who use it. For one thing, the conscious mind is not unitary - remember that situational epistemology thing I mentioned earlier? For another thing, the conscious level also needs to be split into at least two if not more sub-forms: what I "know" about myself and what I communicate about myself (which varies by situation). Marketers are finally starting to get a (small) grasp of this but most of them still don't truly "get it" (they confuse the image with the reality).

Next point, the "sub-conscious level", a la Freud, has some major flaws in it as a model - it's why I tend to split it into sub-conscious levels and semi-conscious levels (think about the concept of reflexivity here). We can access semi-conscious levels including our symbolic programming, but it is often a painful process and our culture doesn't support most of the technologies for doing so; indeed, much of current North American cultures oppose our doing so. But this has created a situation where our cultures have a blind spot when it comes to looking at cultures that do have and use such technologies. BTW, if you want an example of such a technology, look at how stories are created and told - that's one of the simpler ones that has some amazingly profound implications.

So, when I talk about questions, one of the things I am talking about is questioning our assumptions about "reality", how we can communicate with people who have different assumptions, and how we go through the process of making sense of our lived experience when our assumptions prove false.

marct
09-08-2009, 02:08 PM
Hi Bill,




Where the really interesting part is, IMO, is in the models we assume give rise to these movements, and why some go kinetic and others do not. This means that we have to stop looking at questions derived on the flawed assumption that the State is the primary level of analysis, and dig into other areas.

Marc, where are you going with this? I hate models (and Slap I still hate systems :D), but this sounds interesting.

I gave some of the answer to this in my response to Ron. In general where I'm going with it is an attempt to search for models that transcend culture and are based around our how our mental processes, as a species, actually work. Let me just say that it is a tricky thing to do :D!

At its simplest level, AQ and other, similar, groups are following a process that Wallace called a Revitalization Movement (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Revitalization_movement). What's missing from the concept, however, is a conceptual "pulling apart" that shows how it links to communications, lived experience, and choices of going kinetic. That's part of what I am looking at right now - trying to update his model.

Part of the basis of it is that, unlike Bob's model, it does not presuppose the existence or primacy of States, which are a pretty recent invention of ours. Now, the entire "good governance" model that underlies Bob's suggestions assumes the primacy and existence of States, but I don't think that it has any more validity than any other situationally specific model: think about the links between, say, Newton's model of "reality" and Einstein's. Newton's "works" quite nicely in a certain range (e.g. speeds under .3C), but starts to break down miserably after that, while Einstein's works pretty well (albeit with problems).

Which model you base things on has some pretty serious implications at the strategic, operational and tactical levels. So, if "good governance" is the key - the centre of gravity leading to insurgencies - then strategically, we should be aiming our resources at bettering governance. But what if it isn't they centre of gravity? What if the centre of gravity is the perception of a satisficing social environment? Then that changes how we approach things dramatically.

Bill Moore
09-08-2009, 03:14 PM
Which model you base things on has some pretty serious implications at the strategic, operational and tactical levels. So, if "good governance" is the key - the centre of gravity leading to insurgencies - then strategically, we should be aiming our resources at bettering governance. But what if it isn't they centre of gravity? What if the centre of gravity is the perception of a satisficing social environment? Then that changes how we approach things dramatically.

Marc, I couldn't agree more with your comment and wish you luck in developing that model. We are coming into every conflict with a good goverance approach without really thinking about it, because we just assume it will work despite the record to the contrary. Of course the challenge is how does a nation-state (like the United States) help resolve (assuming we even should) an internal conflict in another State? All the elements of our national power are state focused. You're thinking in revolutionary terms. I love it.

It is unfortunate that you're starting to pick up military terms (center of gravity), because eventually it will warp your thinking :D.

MikeF
09-08-2009, 03:27 PM
This paper argues that the Russians failed in Afghanistan through its own mis-managed attempts at COIN and nation-building, not repressive population control techniques and tactical losses of helicopters.

Afghanistan is the New Afghanistan (http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/09/04/afghanistan_is_the_new_afghanistan?page=0,0&%24Version=0&%24Path=/&%24Domain=.foreignpolicy.com,%20%24Version%3D0)
Artemy Kalinovsky
Foreign Policy


In practice, of course, things did not quite work out that way. Much like the efforts of the United States and its allies -- building schools without teachers to man them and promoting farming in desertlike areas where nothing grows -- the Soviet attempt at nation-building suffered from poor coordination, ill-planning, and a misunderstanding of indigenous culture. Moscow informed soldiers they were not in Afghanistan to spread communism, but to help people feel the tangible benefits of a working government. Still, enthusiastic party workers drew on Soviet propaganda and organizing principles, often alienating the local population.

These problems were compounded by rivalries among various Soviet agencies and institutions operating on the ground. Aid sometimes did not reach its destination because military commanders refused to relinquish the necessary transport vehicles or provide security. In other cases, Soviet representatives found that their Afghan "clients" had no intention of playing along with their nation-building plans. On one occasion, the KGB cultivated and promised protection, money, and a house to the leader of an insurgency group. The local governor, in turn, promptly denied the insurgency leader the promised housing and seized the cell's weapons


Likewise, though the Afghan military looked strong on paper, with more than 300,000 men and a generous supply of Soviet weaponry, it proved incapable of leading offensive operations. Within several months Soviet troops were fighting the insurgency directly, while Afghan forces did not take the lead in an operation until 1986. The complaints of Soviet officers working with Afghan troops would sound familiar to U.S. and NATO officers today. Recruitment proved difficult. Desertions were rife. Corruption was widespread. Troops avoided going into battle for fear of retribution against their families.

The broader security and occupation dilemma was familiar as well. The Soviet military was perfectly capable of clearing an area of insurgents, albeit not without significant collateral damage. But Moscow never sent enough troops to keep those areas free of insurgents once an operation was completed. There were never more than about 108,000 Soviet troops operating in Afghanistan at any given time

v/r

Mike

marct
09-08-2009, 03:33 PM
Hi Bill,


Marc, I couldn't agree more with your comment and wish you luck in developing that model. We are coming into every conflict with a good goverance approach without really thinking about it, because we just assume it will work despite the record to the contrary. Of course the challenge is how does a nation-state (like the United States) help resolve (assuming we even should) an internal conflict in another State? All the elements of our national power are state focused. You're thinking in revolutionary terms. I love it.

Thanks - we'll see how it goes :wry:. Historically, you folks had a great model in US Aid and the Peace Corps, both of which tended to work at sub-state levels. May be time to reinvigorate them....


It is unfortunate that you're starting to pick up military terms (center of gravity), because eventually it will warp your thinking :D.

LOL - Well, St. Carl stole the term from Newtonian physics.... I'm just returning the complement :D!

Bob's World
09-08-2009, 04:59 PM
I always use "good governance" rather than "good government for a very specific reason. As Marc points out, governance may not in fact come from some government that may well lack legitimacy in the eyes of much of the populace. This governance may come from a tribal construct, or even from some industrial/corporate construct.

Point is, that whatever construct it is that the populace recognizes, that is where issues of goodness must be addressed.

This is one reason I have a real hard time with much of the current vogue talk of "failed" and "failing" states; when the criteria to measure success are pure Westphalia; and those that are deemed the most failed are often those with the least in common with western europe and may well have very good governance in place, just not of the westphalian variety.

These things must always be measured with a local ruler. To go around the world with a western ruler and assess whether or not everyone measure up is as arrogant as it is ignorant.

Ken White
09-08-2009, 05:37 PM
Either way, Marc has hit on one of my two major disconnects with Bob's World's model. I knew and have said that I applauded his ideas and idealism but doubted the achievability. IOW, worthwhile thoughts but probably not reachable in the near term, the political process isn't ready for that. Still, nothing wrong with planting seeds and it is a decent goal...

There was another concern that I couldn't put my finger on immediately and, while I strongly suspected it was the good governance issue, I wasn't certain until one of Marc's comments crystallized it:
As a result of these perceptual differences, he tends to exclude them and classify what I would consider to be much of the "normal" operations, as rogue and controllable, while I view them as predictable destabilizing agents.Exactly. The world is full of destabilizing agents and most are predictable. Government is necessary, no question but it is also generally inefficient and can never be the ultimately reliable entity that many wish and most people, even if they wish it were not so, realize this. Thus government itself is a predictable destabilizing agent even though its nominal purpose is to provide stability. Governance OTOH is more inherently stabilizing but it also is less predictable and generally less capable of resisting destabilization.

Someone once mentioned that people in the west accrue money to influence power; those in the East accrue power to get money. Lot of truth in that, enough so that it becomes a predictable item but it can focus attention on the 'governance' issue rather than on the actual root -- criminality.

I believe there is a tendency to focus on governmental/governance milieus in the Intelligence arena for both the predictive and / or the 'fix' phases and thus misses other indicators, generally economic and very frequently criminally related, which are far more important as catalysts. Witness the problems in southern Thailand or Afghanistan, in both cases the even the touted religion and ideology motives really are secondary to power and thievery from that power. Or the smugglers of Anbar.

There is little question that poor governance allows an insurgency to develop and will contribute little to containing an insurgency. However, I tried to recall a single insurgency that really began due to poor governance.

Couldn't really think of one -- including the American Revolution -- but I'm sure there's one out there somewhere, probably obvious and I just missed it. Someone may be able to educate me...

Rex Brynen
09-08-2009, 05:45 PM
This is one reason I have a real hard time with much of the current vogue talk of "failed" and "failing" states; when the criteria to measure success are pure Westphalia; and those that are deemed the most failed are often those with the least in common with western europe and may well have very good governance in place, just not of the westphalian variety.

These things must always be measured with a local ruler. To go around the world with a western ruler and assess whether or not everyone measure up is as arrogant as it is ignorant.

There's a certain paradox here, however. Just at the local population may be resentful of external attempts to impose a certain (Western) model of governance, they may be equally resentful of an apparent double standard whereby the West fails to hold local clients and allies to broader human rights and governance norms.

Let's take Egypt as an example. While the Mubarak regime certainly receives substantial foreign aid, in no way can the current system of governance be considered a foreign imposition. Rather, it has an evolutionary authoritarian lineage stretching back to the 1952 coup against the (pro-Western) monarchy. US development aid and FMA (totaling around $1.5 billion a year) is only around 1% of GDP--helpful, but certainly not critical, to regime survival.

What is the "local ruler" to be used in measuring this case? How do we know? If we press Mubarak hard for reform, are we imposing alien values on an indigenously-developed political system? Or are we supporting the local population?

Many of the local elites will argue that you need to use a Middle Eastern ruler--and that a moderate authoritarian Mubarak government is better than the chaos that would follow any efforts at full-scale democratization. Don't rock the boat, they'll say--let us evolve on our own.

Conversely, much of the public, and most human rights and reforms advocates, complain that the US isn't rocking the boat enough. They complain that universal human rights norms aren't being applied in the Egyptian case, and argue that the West is being hypocritical in failing to press Egypt harder. Polls suggest that--contrary to elite opinion--the vast majority of Egyptians want a democratic politic system of some sort.

This is not to say that Western reform efforts don't involve a great deal of ethnocentrism--they do. Indeed, they often betray a remarkable ignorance of our own political evolution (case in point: most Western countries weren't properly democratic, in terms of enfranchising the female half of the population, until the early or even mid-20th century). On the other hand, how do we avoid the moral relativism of accepting "local" governance solutions that themselves may be repressive or unpopular, or allowing ourselves to manipulated by authoritarian elites who use supposed cultural values to defend their own narrow political and economic interests?

Bob's World
09-08-2009, 05:55 PM
Either way, Marc has hit on one of my two major disconnects with Bob's World's model. I knew and have said that I applauded his ideas and idealism but doubted the achievability. IOW, worthwhile thoughts but probably not reachable in the near term, the political process isn't ready for that. Still, nothing wrong with planting seeds and it is a decent goal...

There was another concern that I couldn't put my finger on immediately and, while I strongly suspected it was the good governance issue, I wasn't certain until one of Marc's comments crystallized it:Exactly. The world is full of destabilizing agents and most are predictable. Government is necessary, no question but it is also generally inefficient and can never be the ultimately reliable entity that many wish and most people, even if they wish it were not so, realize this. Thus government itself is a predictable destabilizing agent even though its nominal purpose is to provide stability. Governance OTOH is more inherently stabilizing but it also is less predictable and generally less capable of resisting destabilization.

Someone once mentioned that people in the west accrue money to influence power; those in the East accrue power to get money. Lot of truth in that, enough so that it becomes a predictable item but it can focus attention on the 'governance' issue rather than on the actual root -- criminality.

I believe there is a tendency to focus on governmental/governance milieus in the Intelligence arena for both the predictive and / or the 'fix' phases and thus misses other indicators, generally economic and very frequently criminally related, which are far more important as catalysts. Witness the problems in southern Thailand or Afghanistan, in both cases the even the touted religion and ideology motives really are secondary to power and thievery from that power. Or the smugglers of Anbar.

There is little question that poor governance allows an insurgency to develop and will contribute little to containing an insurgency. However, I tried to recall a single insurgency that really began due to poor governance.

Couldn't really think of one -- including the American Revolution -- but I'm sure there's one out there somewhere, probably obvious and I just missed it. Someone may be able to educate me...

All began with poor governance, none due to ineffective governance. I will expand later, but have defined on here a few times. Its a two step process:

1. The existence of some issue, real or perceived, that is so important to some distinct segment of the populace that they are willing to fight over it. Usually some issue high on Maslow's chart, that sparks "injustice" or "outrage" or "disrespect." Coupled with

2. The perception that there is no legitimate and certain means to address the same.

Governance itself may be extremely effective and trip this trigger; or extremely ineffective and not trip this trigger.

marct
09-08-2009, 05:57 PM
Hi Folks,


I always use "good governance" rather than "good government for a very specific reason. As Marc points out, governance may not in fact come from some government that may well lack legitimacy in the eyes of much of the populace. This governance may come from a tribal construct, or even from some industrial/corporate construct.

Point is, that whatever construct it is that the populace recognizes, that is where issues of goodness must be addressed.

Now that I agree with :D! Of course, tribal constructs, corporations and other options for governance tend not to be recognized as "valid" within the post-Westphalian model, which is where a lot of the problems come from.


Either way, Marc has hit on one of my two major disconnects with Bob's World's model. I knew and have said that I applauded his ideas and idealism but doubted the achievability. IOW, worthwhile thoughts but probably not reachable in the near term, the political process isn't ready for that. Still, nothing wrong with planting seeds and it is a decent goal...

Maybe I'm seeing his model through my own "Grad Pub" lens, but I do think that some forms of it are achievable. I'm actually hammering away at his lexicality (the words he uses and the concepts and ontologies they imply) rather than at his desired (idealistic ;)) end state.


There was another concern that I couldn't put my finger on immediately and, while I strongly suspected it was the good governance issue, I wasn't certain until one of Marc's comments crystallized it:
Exactly. The world is full of destabilizing agents and most are predictable. Government is necessary, no question but it is also generally inefficient and can never be the ultimately reliable entity that many wish and most people, even if they wish it were not so, realize this. Thus government itself is a predictable destabilizing agent even though its nominal purpose is to provide stability. Governance OTOH is more inherently stabilizing but it also is less predictable and generally less capable of resisting destabilization.

Interesting, Ken. Hmmm, personally, I don't think "government" is necessary at all - it is, after all, quite a recent invention within the last, say 12,000 years. On the flip side, some form of "governance" does appear to be necessary, and the forms of governance do appear to have positive and negative selection criteria surrounding them based on population density, technology, environment, communications and a whole slew of other factors.


Someone once mentioned that people in the west accrue money to influence power; those in the East accrue power to get money. Lot of truth in that, enough so that it becomes a predictable item but it can focus attention on the 'governance' issue rather than on the actual root -- criminality.

Well, I could argue that all governments are criminal conspiracies that have gained control over the means of inculcating a cultural acceptance of their criminal activity. Naw, I think I'll just point out that "criminality" is a social construct that varies dramatically by culture, society and time period and is, in the final analysis, a pretty useless construct :D.


I believe there is a tendency to focus on governmental/governance milieus in the Intelligence arena for both the predictive and / or the 'fix' phases and thus misses other indicators, generally economic and very frequently criminally related, which are far more important as catalysts. Witness the problems in southern Thailand or Afghanistan, in both cases the even the touted religion and ideology motives really are secondary to power and thievery from that power. Or the smugglers of Anbar.

Actually, I agree with you on this - it is a distressing tendency that, IMO, causes more harm than good. BTW, when i said that "criminality" was a pretty useless construct, I meant it as an in being used as an explanatory construct (works rhetorically, but it crappy in other ways). "Criminality", however, is an excellent indicator of the populations perceptions of the legitimacy of a governance construct (i.e. government, clan "law", etc.).


There is little question that poor governance allows an insurgency to develop and will contribute little to containing an insurgency. However, I tried to recall a single insurgency that really began due to poor governance.

Couldn't really think of one -- including the American Revolution -- but I'm sure there's one out there somewhere, probably obvious and I just missed it. Someone may be able to educate me...

Well, I sometimes think of governance as the gel in a petrie dish; it doesn't necessarily cause something, but it can hinder or help its growth.

slapout9
09-08-2009, 05:59 PM
This is one reason I have a real hard time with much of the current vogue talk of "failed" and "failing" states; when the criteria to measure success are pure Westphalia; and those that are deemed the most failed are often those with the least in common with western europe and may well have very good governance in place, just not of the westphalian variety.



That is why I push Systems Theory. There is no such thing as a "failed state":eek:except in some politicians mind.... The System is not failing it is "changing" often violently, which can be a really big problem for the larger system it connects to. When we begin to understand that we may start making some headway. It's like Bob said all countries (live political systems) are in various sates of Insurgency(change) the degree of that change and the method used to cause the change will often determine if we will intervene or not.

Systems Music by Billy Joel..."We didn't light it but we tried to fight it"
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RjKLNSOiIZU&feature=related

UrsaMaior
09-08-2009, 06:07 PM
This paper argues that the Russians failed in Afghanistan through its own mis-managed attempts at COIN and nation-building, not repressive population control techniques and tactical losses of helicopters.

Afghanistan is the New Afghanistan (http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/09/04/afghanistan_is_the_new_afghanistan?page=0,0&%24Version=0&%24Path=/&%24Domain=.foreignpolicy.com,%20%24Version%3D0)
Artemy Kalinovsky
Foreign Policy



v/r

Mike

With all due respect does Mr Kalinovsky really believes what he writes? All the soviets wanted was another puppet state. Kinda 'istans they already had.
In my humble experience KGB was above everything. Party members, military officers everything. There may have been ONE occasion where a governor fouled up KGB plans but it was probably his last.

It may be hard to accept for some but the mighty Red Army lost to barefoot partisans. With the equipment and the training the average soviet officer and the enlisted personnel had it was an impossible task, and the nature of the soviet state made it unacceptable for the population. In this order.

There is a german journalist Siegfried Kogelfranz) who made interviews with all the survining eastern tyrants (dictators). In his book called Diktatoren im Ruhestand, Berlin, 1997 he wrote about KGB chef Kryuchkov speaking with hungarian dictator Karoly Grosz in 1988. He said, they are destabilising us using the bandits in Afghanistan and on the top the islam, we are about to loose all our southeastern region.

Rex Brynen
09-08-2009, 07:02 PM
2. The perception that there is no legitimate and certain means to address the same.


The issue of legitimacy is a tricky one--how do we know it when we see it? Do populations accept political processes as "legitimate" on normative/cultural grounds, or is legitimacy also shaped by perceptions of the availability of alternatives, or lack thereof?

(On an unrelated side note, when I started teaching political science in Calgary I used to illustrate the concepts of authority and legitimacy by reference to why, on an empty road at 2am, we nonetheless stop at a traffic light. When I first used that example here in Montreal, my class burst into laughter. Few here would consider stopping at a red light if there was no other traffic around. :D)

omarali50
09-08-2009, 08:01 PM
I see too much emphasis on nation building, governance and whatnot and not enough on finding and killing the leadership of the enemy. The Afghan people can get by with very minimal governance (and will probably resent too much governance) but they are caught in the middle between two armies and are not sure which one is going to win. There is no concievable way of delivering "good governance" without changing the calculation of "who is winning". Show them that the US/ANA is winning (not "has won", just "winning") and most of the governance issues will disappear because local bosses will rule themselves as before and will side with the winning side. Actual governance will spread out slowly from the cities and it can take decades and that would still be OK. The real reason no one turns in the taliban is because no one is sure the US is likely to stay and win and nobody wants their head cut off for collaborating with the infidels after the infidels leave. On a related note, a successful regime does not have to deliver too much education and healthcare if it can deliver retribution for major crimes against the regime. Again, its not necessary to solve every attack. But the impression has to be established (over time) that attacks lead to determined and very PERSISTENT efforts to find out who came, where they came from, who harbored them, etc. Again, you dont need to be perfect, but you need to have a reputation for determined and tenacious enforcement, NOT wild and over the top punitive retribution...

Bob's World
09-08-2009, 09:06 PM
The issue of legitimacy is a tricky one--how do we know it when we see it? Do populations accept political processes as "legitimate" on normative/cultural grounds, or is legitimacy also shaped by perceptions of the availability of alternatives, or lack thereof?

(On an unrelated side note, when I started teaching political science in Calgary I used to illustrate the concepts of authority and legitimacy by reference to why, on an empty road at 2am, we nonetheless stop at a traffic light. When I first used that example here in Montreal, my class burst into laughter. Few here would consider stopping at a red light if there was no other traffic around. :D)

Half of America was outraged by the Bush Administration; and similarly we will probably achieve half of America being outraged at the Obama administration; yet there is no risk of insurgency, why??

For me, I try to capture this in my second component of "poor governance." Every American believes with absolute certainty that the system will work. That no matter how much they disagree with the current office holders that they can vote and their vote will count, and that no matter what, in 8 years the President they despise will be gone. It is this confidence in the process that they have a legitimate (legal) means of redress that prevents them from taking illegal means.

It is a two step process. So one must seek to understand both the issues that give rise to this level of dissatisfaction, as well as the points of distrust or total lack of, process to address them. Good FID should work at then targeting both of these aspects of governmental failure to take away the casuation for insurrection and insurgency. BUT, we must also do so in a way that we do not assume a perceived role of inappropriate legitimacy ourselves over that same government, or we risk adding our names to the target list of the insurgency.

Bob's World
09-08-2009, 09:12 PM
I see too much emphasis on nation building, governance and whatnot and not enough on finding and killing the leadership of the enemy. The Afghan people can get by with very minimal governance (and will probably resent too much governance) but they are caught in the middle between two armies and are not sure which one is going to win. There is no concievable way of delivering "good governance" without changing the calculation of "who is winning". Show them that the US/ANA is winning (not "has won", just "winning") and most of the governance issues will disappear because local bosses will rule themselves as before and will side with the winning side. Actual governance will spread out slowly from the cities and it can take decades and that would still be OK. The real reason no one turns in the taliban is because no one is sure the US is likely to stay and win and nobody wants their head cut off for collaborating with the infidels after the infidels leave. On a related note, a successful regime does not have to deliver too much education and healthcare if it can deliver retribution for major crimes against the regime. Again, its not necessary to solve every attack. But the impression has to be established (over time) that attacks lead to determined and very PERSISTENT efforts to find out who came, where they came from, who harbored them, etc. Again, you dont need to be perfect, but you need to have a reputation for determined and tenacious enforcement, NOT wild and over the top punitive retribution...

There is always someone else to step up, and often they may be much more qualified than the guy you just took out of their way. Also, it tends to validate insurgent propaganda and expand their influence in the populace, particularly if you are sloppy in your engagement methods. Not saying there is no place for it, but I always recommend using a solid nodal analysis to ID the right guys to take out. Go to any HQ and you can take out 30 guys by date of rank with no negative effect on efficiency. Now, do an analysis of key nodes as to what makes that HQ function and take out the 30 guys who really make the place work, the IT guy, the comms guy, the one who keeps the power running, etc and you can shut it down. Work smarter. Just going after senior leaders is not smart targeting.

omarali50
09-08-2009, 09:29 PM
I suggest that the bar for "the system will work" can be set even lower. In the 19th century Ranjit Singh conquered what is now the NWFP in Pakistan. After the conquest, some Yusufzais erupted in rebellion and looted villages and created mayhem. Ranjit Singh force marched his army back across the Indus, smashed the rebels, appointed an Italian governor and went back...and have very little trouble for the next few years. My point is: in an underdeveloped country with no functioning modern institutions (rural afghanistan), the bar is really really low. People will rebel when they think rebellion pays better or when the rulers are too exploitative and are actively bothering them. They will not rebel when they think the price is too high and the gains too small...that is the calculation you have to move in your favor. Now, I know this is not the 19th century and in urban afghanistan the standards are going to be different, but for most of the country, the bar for good governance is basically "minimal exploitation and botheration and maximum targeted retribution for overt violent rebellion". The US either does not impose costs, or imposes them unjustly (like bombing wedding parties). ..

Ken White
09-08-2009, 09:35 PM
Well, I could argue that all governments are criminal conspiracies that have gained control over the means of inculcating a cultural acceptance of their criminal activity. Naw, ...Don't back off, you were on a roll. Accurate one, I might add... :D
when i said that "criminality" was a pretty useless construct, I meant it as an in being used as an explanatory construct (works rhetorically, but it crappy in other ways). "Criminality", however, is an excellent indicator of the populations perceptions of the legitimacy of a governance construct (i.e. government, clan "law", etc.).Agreed but it was easier to type than "the innate selfishness of humans that requires some sort of restraint to preclude excessive brutality in grasping and prevent the retardation of community growth by some individuals at the expense of others and most of whom are opposed to governance or government in any form as it intereferes with their takings unless of course said governances support the takings." Or something along that line... :wry:

slapout9
09-08-2009, 09:53 PM
Half of America was outraged by the Bush Administration; and similarly we will probably achieve half of America being outraged at the Obama administration; yet there is no risk of insurgency, why??

For me, I try to capture this in my second component of "poor governance." Every American believes with absolute certainty that the system will work. That no matter how much they disagree with the current office holders that they can vote and their vote will count, and that no matter what, in 8 years the President they despise will be gone. It is this confidence in the process that they have a legitimate (legal) means of redress that prevents them from taking illegal means.

It is a two step process. So one must seek to understand both the issues that give rise to this level of dissatisfaction, as well as the points of distrust or total lack of, process to address them. Good FID should work at then targeting both of these aspects of governmental failure to take away the casuation for insurrection and insurgency. BUT, we must also do so in a way that we do not assume a perceived role of inappropriate legitimacy ourselves over that same government, or we risk adding our names to the target list of the insurgency.


That is not completely accurate. Everyone that hated Bush go could to the mall after they got off work for 8 years. That is no longer true and is likely to get worse. That is when you will see the Insurgency scale start to tip in America. What would make this even worse is if things start getting better in A'stan but worse at home. How good a government is that follows a policy like that will be questioned and not only at the poles.

Rex Brynen
09-08-2009, 10:18 PM
Don't back off, you were on a roll. Accurate one, I might add...

Then you'll enjoy Charles Tilly's influential classic, War Making and State Making as Organized Crime (https://netfiles.uiuc.edu/rohloff/www/war%20making%20and%20state%20making.pdf). :D

marct
09-08-2009, 10:20 PM
Half of America was outraged by the Bush Administration; and similarly we will probably achieve half of America being outraged at the Obama administration; yet there is no risk of insurgency, why??

For me, I try to capture this in my second component of "poor governance." Every American believes with absolute certainty that the system will work. That no matter how much they disagree with the current office holders that they can vote and their vote will count, and that no matter what, in 8 years the President they despise will be gone. It is this confidence in the process that they have a legitimate (legal) means of redress that prevents them from taking illegal means.


That is not completely accurate. Everyone that hated Bush go could to the mall after they got off work for 8 years. That is no longer true and is likely to get worse. That is when you will see the Insurgency scale start to tip in America. What would make this even worse is if things start getting better in A'stan but worse at home. How good a government is that follows a policy like that will be questioned and not only at the poles.

You know, this captures a few key points that your model needs to address, Bob. First off, Slap is, IMO, understating it when he says it "is not completely accurate". You (the US) has had a low level "insurgency" running for at least 30 years - look at the gangs (and Cartels) operating, to say nothing about the militias. Saying that "Every American believes with absolute certainty that the system will work" is, IMO, not just inaccurate, it's wrong, otherwise you wouldn't have areas of you major cities that are not safe to enter.

What you do have is enough people sharing that perception that the system "works".

marct
09-08-2009, 10:21 PM
Then you'll enjoy Charles Tilly's influential classic, War Making and State Making as Organized Crime (https://netfiles.uiuc.edu/rohloff/www/war%20making%20and%20state%20making.pdf). :D

Cool ref, Rex. One of my students has been using Tilly's work a lot.

Ken White
09-08-2009, 11:01 PM
Then you'll enjoy Charles Tilly's influential classic, War Making and State Making as Organized Crime (https://netfiles.uiuc.edu/rohloff/www/war%20making%20and%20state%20making.pdf). :DTwo keepers:
Lane, a superbly attentive historian of Venice, allowed specifically for the case of a government that generates protection rents for its merchants by deliberately attacking their competitors.Smedley Butler would agree... :wry:

As would FDR and some current political types.
First, popular resistance to war making and state making made a difference. When ordinary people resisted vigorously, authorities made concessions: guarantees of rights, representative institutions, courts of appeal. Those concessions, in their turn, constrained the later paths of war making and state making.Still true, I believe but the process of buying compliance or acceptance ala A. Krupp certainly and regrettably works. To an extent. I look forward to seeing just how great an extent...

Thanks again.

slapout9
09-08-2009, 11:42 PM
You (the US) has had a low level "insurgency" running for at least 30 years - look at the gangs (and Cartels) operating, to say nothing about the militias. Saying that "Every American believes with absolute certainty that the system will work" is, IMO, not just inaccurate, it's wrong, otherwise you wouldn't have areas of you major cities that are not safe to enter.

What you do have is enough people sharing that perception that the system "works".

Hi marct, it is getting worse, just look at the people that kept their kids home so they could not hear the President of the United States make a speech about staying in school:eek: My informal indicators say we are heading in the wrong direction and it is still slow but it is accelerating. Things are popping:eek:

Bob's World
09-09-2009, 12:19 AM
You guys are a tough crowd.

First, crime and political uprisings are two very different things. Just like state vs state warfare is very different than warfare between a state and its own populace. I do not pretend to offer any insights as to how to make crime go away, that is a different topic for another forum.

Next as to militias, and McVeigh-like malcontents. Look to the first component of my definition of poor governance:

1. The existence of some issue, real or perceived, that is so important to some distinct segment of the populace that they are willing to fight over it. Usually some issue high on Maslow's chart, that sparks "injustice" or "outrage" or "disrespect." Coupled with

Ok, I was dashing out the door, and could have been more precise, but while you certainly do not have to have anything close to a majority of the populace in this distinct group that is dissatisfied to have insurgency, it does have to be significant. What does that equate to? It would depend on degree of motivation, terrain, amount of external support, weakness of government, etc, etc, but probably at least 10% of the pop to really get trouble going. Not a few wingnuts in Montana or the mountains of SW Oregon.

As to Slap, it always seems more oppressive when it is your team on the outs, doesn't it? Liberals felt the same way a year ago. Breathe deeply, and no matter what, 8 years from now someone else will be President. I guarantee it.

marct
09-09-2009, 12:33 AM
Hi Bob,


You guys are a tough crowd.

Hey, it's a tough job, but someone has to do it :D!


First, crime and political uprisings are two very different things. Just like state vs state warfare is very different than warfare between a state and its own populace. I do not pretend to offer any insights as to how to make crime go away, that is a different topic for another forum.

Hmm, is it? Take a look at the concept of fuzzy sets (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fuzzy_set), and you'll see why both slap and I are talking about it. The problem is that there really is no strick dividing line between "crime" and "insurgency".


Next as to militias, and McVeigh-like malcontents. Look to the first component of my definition of poor governance:

1. The existence of some issue, real or perceived, that is so important to some distinct segment of the populace that they are willing to fight over it. Usually some issue high on Maslow's chart, that sparks "injustice" or "outrage" or "disrespect." Coupled with

Ok, I was dashing out the door, and could have been more precise, but while you certainly do not have to have anything close to a majority of the populace in this distinct group that is dissatisfied to have insurgency, it does have to be significant. What does that equate to? It would depend on degree of motivation, terrain, amount of external support, weakness of government, etc, etc, but probably at least 10% of the pop to really get trouble going. Not a few wingnuts in Montana or the mountains of SW Oregon.

If memory serves me correctly, the totally percentage of the population involved in the Algeria insurgency was under .1% at the start of it. My point, here, is that the line between "crime" and "insurgency" is really tricky and "fuzzy".

As to occasional wingnuts, I'll ask Slap to post the numbers of gang members in the Bloods, Crips and other groups that are acting as "local governance". My gut guess would be that it is well over 100k.

As to Slap, it always seems more oppressive when it is your team on the outs, doesn't it? Liberals felt the same way a year ago. Breathe deeply, and no matter what, 8 years from now someone else will be President. I guarantee it.[/quote]

Ken White
09-09-2009, 01:02 AM
First, crime and political uprisings are two very different things. Just like state vs state warfare is very different than warfare between a state and its own populace. I do not pretend to offer any insights as to how to make crime go away, that is a different topic for another forum.I don't think you can dismiss it that lightly. As Marc said:
The problem is that there really is no strick dividing line between "crime" and "insurgency".That says it better and more succinctly I did above:

""I believe there is a tendency to focus on governmental/governance milieus in the Intelligence arena for both the predictive and / or the 'fix' phases and thus (one) misses other indicators, generally economic and very frequently criminally related, which are far more important as catalysts. Witness the problems in southern Thailand or Afghanistan, in both cases the even the touted religion and ideology motives really are secondary to power and thievery from that power. Or the smugglers of Anbar.""

You also said:
Look to the first component of my definition of poor governance:1. The existence of some issue, real or perceived, that is so important to some distinct segment of the populace that they are willing to fight over it. Usually some issue high on Maslow's chart, that sparks "injustice" or "outrage" or "disrespect." Coupled withMaslow's first two needs are: Survival (Breathing, thirst, hunger, sex) and Security (Physical safety, freedom from attack). If one subscribes to that, then only e.g. hunger would drive one to fight and thus relinquish safety. ;)

Maslow is suspect on many counts but in this case a look at most insurgencies will show that the insurgents did not operate in tune with his heirarchy at all -- they went hungry (usually enduring injustice and disrespect in the process) for a cause and 'good governance was not the cause; their government or power or continued profit was the cause.

In any event, if as you say "crime and political uprisings are two very different things." then perhaps you can answer my query:

""...However, I tried to recall a single insurgency that really began due to poor governance.

Couldn't really think of one -- including the American Revolution -- but I'm sure there's one out there somewhere, probably obvious and I just missed it. Someone may be able to educate me...""

raptor10
09-09-2009, 01:19 AM
Actually I would like to disagree with the notion that there is not a clear line of demarcation between crime and insurgency. I think once we look at all the salient features that distinguish insurgency we can see that it takes on a sufficiently different character from that of gang warfare to merit completely different modes of thought.

First off the United States Department of Defense (DOD) defines insurgency as "An organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict." 1 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Insurgency)

The two main aspects of the definition insurgency that we should consider are that it is politically motivated and to attain it's political ends it resorts to warfare - as opposed to organized movements that use peaceful processes to engender a bloodless coup.

Warfare must neccessarily be thought of "as an actual, intentional and widespread armed conflict between political communities." 2 (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/war/)

This political aspect is such a defining characteristic of an insurgency that it is a sufficient and neccessary condition of it.

The activities of these Bloods and Crips generally does not resemble the activites of insurgents in any meaningful way to warrant an analogy, it is the difference between Latrunculi and Legitimus hostis.

raptor10
09-09-2009, 01:38 AM
""...However, I tried to recall a single insurgency that really began due to poor governance.

Couldn't really think of one -- including the American Revolution -- but I'm sure there's one out there somewhere, probably obvious and I just missed it. Someone may be able to educate me...""

Hows about the battle of Adrianople?

I know, I know, I'm reaching pretty far back but it's the first that comes to mind.

slapout9
09-09-2009, 02:29 AM
Folks, I have a detail that was just assigned to me:) that I have to take care of so I will respond with a little more detail later.

1-But my short answer is Gangs are Governments!!! They essentially perform the same functions and are formed for the same reasons.

2-When 2 systems engage both are changed. Meaning what happens in A'stan has a lot to do with what happens in America, most people just don't think the way.

3-When marct talks I always listen.

More when I can.

Ron Humphrey
09-09-2009, 03:05 AM
Seems to me I remember reading about many of the problems which led to the downfall of both the Ottoman and Persian empires had quite a bit to do with "bad Governance"

kids with no clue and what not

Picking the wrong fight for little cause, and reckless abandon with treasuries also pretty high on the list

Ken White
09-09-2009, 03:20 AM
Actually I would like to disagree with the notion that there is not a clear line of demarcation between crime and insurgency. I think once we look at all the salient features that distinguish insurgency we can see that it takes on a sufficiently different character from that of gang warfare to merit completely different modes of thought.First note that no one said a thing about gang warfare, so that should not be an issue.
First off the United States Department of Defense (DOD) defines insurgency as "An organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict." 1 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Insurgency)Yes they do -- and if you believe the US Government's definition's of things are invariably correct, you haven't spent much time in the doctrine development arena and been in 20 person meeting where the most intransigent had his way and the proverbial squeaking wheel got oiled.

That is a convenient definition because I hope you can picture the furor is we were said to be aiding the Thais halt the mostly Muslim smuggling rings in the south that do business with Malaysia -- or that we're really still in Afghanistan due to the large scale Poppy cultivation and resultant smuggling out of southern Afghanistan. Those are criminal activities-- not gangs in the US sense but still criminal.
The two main aspects of the definition insurgency that we should consider are that it is politically motivated and to attain it's political ends it resorts to warfare...Is it politically motivated or, are they like FARC in Colombia or the MLF or Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines all of which say they are politically motivated movements opposing a corrupt government -- when the truth is far different. I also mentioned the smugglers in Al Anbar.
Warfare must neccessarily be thought of "as an actual, intentional and widespread armed conflict between political communities." 2 (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/war/)That's patently ridiculous. It would be nice of that were so -- then we wouldn't have to fight Al Qaeda or Taliban neither of whom is a political community in the sense that Plato probably understood or meant. Regardles,, I suspect that if you were in a major fire fight with an unorganized group of drug runners in Mexico, you'd probably think you were in a war...
This political aspect is such a defining characteristic of an insurgency that it is a sufficient and neccessary condition of it.We can disagree on that. Life just isn't that simple.
The activities of these Bloods and Crips generally does not resemble the activites of insurgents in any meaningful way to warrant an analogy, it is the difference between Latrunculi and Legitimus hostis.Your erudition is impressive. Whatever you wish to believe but allow me to remind you that you're the one who brought US Gangs into the picture, no one else has suggested that aspect at all -- though I did say the Mexican drug gangs seem to be at war with the Mexican Army. Insurgency or not? :wry:

The issue was the blending of criminal activities with an insurgency. Activities which can include kidnapping, smuggling, extortion, embezzlement -- a host of thing NOT involving Gangs but those in power or who want power. I named seven specific instance of so-called insurgencies that actually are criminal operations using politics as cover. There are many more -- including tax evasion by 13 colonies... :D

As for Adrianople; "However, once across the Danube (and in Roman territory), the dishonesty of the provincial commanders Lupicinus and Maximus led the newcomers to revolt after suffering many hardships." (emphasis added / kw) LINK (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Adrianople). That's a Wiki Quickie, dig into the Goths in more detail and you discover a lot of criminality on both sides.

It would be nice if it was as clear cut as you say. Regrettably it is not.

Ken White
09-09-2009, 03:27 AM
Seems to me I remember reading about many of the problems which led to the downfall of both the Ottoman and Persian empires had quite a bit to do with "bad Governance"whipped in war. They had plenty of insurgencies in their long lives, so which of them were the result of that poor governance?

The issue was not bad governance, there's plenty of that about -- then and now -- or who won, the question was name an insurgency that really began due to poor governance.

Ken White
09-09-2009, 03:30 AM
2-When 2 systems engage both are changed. Meaning what happens in A'stan has a lot to do with what happens in America...More. Much more with what happens here... ;)

Bob's World
09-09-2009, 11:59 AM
"An Insurgent, A Ranger, and a Gang member walk into a bar..."

I'm sure there is a joke in there somewhere, but I'm not laughing. Many things look similar on their face, many of these things also perform similar functions. If you want to somehow employ these things to do some similar task, then that may well work out.

But, and this is the critical element I suspect of BW analysis: If you want to make one of these things either go away or become unnecessary/irrelevant you must focus on why they exist and target that causation.

We recognize that as part of the empowering of non-state actors and populaces in general by the new information age that we are in; that criminal non-state actors are increasing in their resilance and ability to compete with formal governemmts in meeting needs of the populaces they emerge from; just as politcially motivated non-state actors are. On their face, this is a very similar phenom; and they both create major challenges to the formal governances that they challenge and compete with.

However, I have not been swayed by brothers Slap and Marc that becasue a criminal gang often looks and acts much like a political insurgency that they should be engaged with the same solution set any more than I have been swayed by brother WILF that because the same similarities exist between interstate military forces and intrastate insurgents that they should be addressed similarly as well.

I recognize why those beliefs are logical, I just believe they are flawed as they focus on capability and function over causation and purpose.

marct
09-09-2009, 12:22 PM
Hi Bob,


But, and this is the critical element I suspect of BW analysis: If you want to make one of these things either go away or become unnecessary/irrelevant you must focus on why they exist and target that causation.

I'm not necessarily disagreeing with you on this point so much as I am disagreeing with you on causation. Despite Raptor10's stated belief that


This political aspect is such a defining characteristic of an insurgency that it is a sufficient and neccessary condition of it.

I totally disagree; monocausality, in this case "politics", is completely at odds with the historical record.


We recognize that as part of the empowering of non-state actors and populaces in general by the new information age that we are in; that criminal non-state actors are increasing in their resilance and ability to compete with formal governemmts in meeting needs of the populaces they emerge from; just as politcially motivated non-state actors are. On their face, this is a very similar phenom; and they both create major challenges to the formal governances that they challenge and compete with.

Agreed, but I see this as a continuing process where the "formal governments" you refer to are merely a phase. From my viewpoint, the crucial processes to examine are group formation, group dynamics and group interaction - institutional "crystallization" to use a term from theoretical sociology. As such, "causation" is an emergent property of these processes, and groups slip and slide between interactive states.

Coming from this viewpoint, what I want to know is the process whereby a group decides to move into one of the several states that might be termed as "insurgent". This could be an isolation state ("Independence"), a revolutionary state (taking over the governmental institutions), a state of acting outside the social institutions (sometimes called "criminality"), or any number of other states that delegitimize the governance status of the "formal" system.


However, I have not been swayed by brothers Slap and Marc that becasue a criminal gang often looks and acts much like a political insurgency that they should be engaged with the same solution set any more than I have been swayed by brother WILF that because the same similarities exist between interstate military forces and intrastate insurgents that they should be addressed similarly as well.

I wouldn't say that they are in the same relational states, but I would argue that the difference between those states is fairly shallow, and it is quite possible to move between them. Should they be engaged with "the same solution"? Nope, but that is neither here nor there when it comes to the issue of developing a theoretical model of group interactions and dynamics. Limiting your model to the solutions you currently have available is, IMO, quite dangerous since it means that you have a large blind spot where you can be attacked with impunity because "it's not [my] problem".


I recognize why those beliefs are logical, I just believe they are flawed as they focus on capability and function over causation and purpose.

I suspect that you are ascribing purpose rather than analyzing it :wry:. As to causation, I'm still not sure why you rely on a sui generis taxonomy if you are interested in actual causation.

Bob, let me reiterate that I am treating this like a grad pub discussion - I'm playing with the ideas and models with a desired goal of co-creating a model that can actually match all available data. That's an academic style focus, and I recognize that it is quite different from what you are looking for. I even recognize that the type of model I would like to see developed would be hard to apply given today's institutional blinders :D.

Bob's World
09-09-2009, 01:52 PM
Its all good discusion. Far better than I often get with people who are actually "in the business" so to speak.

We look at what we describe as the "nexus of Crime, Migration, and Extremism" in the context of what we see as "a competition for sovereignty." here in my shop. Those are the headlines, and there is much behind those comments, and the comments themselves are often intrepted in ways we don't intend by those who hear them in isolation.

The world is in a period of accelerated change. Its fascinating. Old instituions and "truths" are being challenged by newly empowered individuals and organizations. I agree completely that what most see as "governance" today will look very different to our grandchildren. Count on it. But what to fear and what to embrace? Not all change is bad, even if it is changing what we see as "good" currently.

But I just caution (myself as well as others) that we don't become so blinded by what we know that we fail to understand. My personal quest is one of understanding and constraint in a community that is far more impressed by and rewarding of knowledge and action. I'm ok with that. I have a role.

marct
09-09-2009, 02:04 PM
You know, Bob, you should really get your shop to host a symposium and get us all together in person :D.

On a (slightly) more serious note, one of the things that's happened in academia is we have specialized so much that we often don't have people with similar interests in our home universities. The development of COI's such as SWJ has really allowed us to get out and talk shop with people who are looking at the same "events" but from radically different perspectives.

Fuchs
09-09-2009, 02:26 PM
I unleashed some cruelty on this thread; I used the "Search this thread" function with the word "definition".

It was used in the past 20 hrs, but never in regard to the word "victory".

SWC has a feel of near-scientific, serious debate - shouldn't we look at the definition of the most important term?

I ask because "mission accomplished" isn't the same as victory". In fact, it's not even necessarily "success" (except with a tunnel vision on the mission).


I'd say a war is "won" if it was the better alternative to peace.
To defeat an enemy but to sustain higher net damage than would have occurred without the war is no success and no victory to me - it's rather a failure.

So let's not just look at mission accomplishment and defeating an enemy - let's also take into account the damages that the West accepts by waging war.

I never got why many people value the life of a civilian higher than the life of a soldier. I'd rather sustain 100 dead civilians in a terror strike than to sustain 200 KIA in a WOT.
And I'd certainly favour spending money on actual defence over spending money on offence as long as the offence doesn't seem to live up to the hype of protecting us.


It doesn't matter whether you disagree - I think we can agree that it's no good idea to spend resources and lives on an approach if we know a better approach.
A discussion of an approach and how it could succeed should therefore take into account what else could be done (or at least hint at it).

Ken White
09-09-2009, 03:53 PM
"An Insurgent, A Ranger, and a Gang member walk into a bar..."Look at the Insurgent -- but don't forget there are really only a few Rangers on a per capita basis (this is a good thing... ;) ) and that all -- most -- criminality is not based on being a Gang member. Most criminality is in fact NOT gang related any more than most Soldiers are Rangers or everyone in a bar that doesn't agree with governmental policies is an insurgent. One could say the wealthiest Criminals have risen above gang membership to an executive level and thus seek to broaden their powers by tucking the government under their wing. :D

Gangs are not the point; the point is that criminal activity fuels the origin of many so called Insurgencies which adopt the mantra of "the government is oppressive" simply because it sells well in the western press. As it apparently does among people who should be willing to look a little deeper...

As you say:
you must focus on why they exist and target that causation.Couldn't agree more. I'm merely suggesting that if one gets target fixation one can focus on the wrong causation and thus apply a not totally appropriate fix.

Seven current 'insurgencies' were cited above. All are nominally opposed to 'poor governance' in the telling. All are in fact criminal operations touting insurgency as a cover.

Bob's World
09-09-2009, 04:11 PM
What we need is some bold new concept of Full-Spectrum Deterrence that helps us to balance our enagement, pro and con, across this enhanced range of players so that we can better achieve the effects we seek, without inadvertantly provoking effects we'd rather avoid.

I'll need to get on this...:)

jmm99
09-09-2009, 05:22 PM
I agree with this in theory:


To defeat an enemy but to sustain higher net damage than would have occurred without the war is no success and no victory to me - it's rather a failure.

but, in practice, it is impossible to balance the books. Positing that we have a war which ends, we can tally up the costs, tangible and intangible. Tallying up the costs, tangible and intangible, if we had not the war in the first place, is speculative because there are too many variables involved.

Alternative history is fun, but it is speculative. My take.

Fuchs
09-09-2009, 05:51 PM
Philosophy and science will probably evolve to the point where the net benefit or loss can be known.

So long we should at the very least acknowledge the components of victory and not allow the costs to be lost out of sight.

We should also be aware that reaching a (possibly evolved) war goal doesn't necessarily mean to be successful (at the national level) or to have won.

Sometimes it's best to acknowledge that further action is likely to hurt more than to help - and to stop dreaming about potential benefits and accept the hardships of reality 'like a man'.

marct
09-09-2009, 05:55 PM
Hi Fuchs,


Philosophy and science will probably evolve to the point where the net benefit or loss can be known.

Actually, we can "know" them right now. The problem isn't in the knowing, it's in a) the way of knowing (it's a probabilistic sheaf of potential costs) and b) the communicating (most people have a really hard time thinking in probabilistic sheafs).

jmm99
09-09-2009, 06:35 PM
You can estimate the costs-benefits of two (or more) courses of action before you decide on which one to follow. Basically, in law or military matters, that is a "fuzzy logic (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fuzzy_logic)" problem, with some neural networking (real (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Biological_neural_networks) and artificial (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Artificial_neural_network)) tossed into the mix.

Once the course of action is excuted (and it may change in plan over the course of its execution), the situation has been changed by the course of action. So, merely resurrecting the alternative course of action (and its costs-benefits ab initio) could be very far off what would have happened if that course of action would have been pursued.

I suppose that experience might suggest a ballpark solution, but any exact comparison is at best "fuzzy". As is said, the essence of law is experience, not logic - and military decisions are probably similar.

slapout9
09-09-2009, 07:06 PM
More. Much more with what happens here... ;)

Yes there is a lot more. For a system to survive it must accurately understand reality and adapt to it. So where to start? Since we are approaching the anniversary of 911 and AQ was the original enemy I will begin there. We have never understood AQ as a system and we are hurting ourselves by not doing so. AQ is a system... an organization and before you can really begin to change it you have to understand how it really operates.

What is often missed is that AQ is TERRAIN independent. You can invade A'stan and stabilize A'stan but in the end you have not done much to remove AQ as a threat because they do not need A'stan to do what they do. A large part of their Attack was planned in Germany and The United States:eek: should we invade Germany and the US....do we need to stabilize these countries:eek:

AQ operates very much like the Mafia which was an Italian Organization based on kinship that was camped out in the United States.....right in the middle of all that democracy and infrastructure and modernization. None of which stopped them from doing what they do. None of that will stop AQ either. When we begin to attack AQ as an Organization and the "whole organization" we will start making some headway.

As for A'stan there is no rational reason for staying there but there is a moral reason. We broke it.... we need to fix it to the bare minimum... as in put it back like it was before (kinda like what Ken said earlier) no multi-million dollar electric plants, that is for them to do. Get over demonizing the Talliban. The Talli-Banksters on Wall Street are a far more serious threat to the US.

Fuchs
09-09-2009, 08:21 PM
Hi Fuchs,
Actually, we can "know" them right now. The problem isn't in the knowing, it's in a) the way of knowing (it's a probabilistic sheaf of potential costs) and b) the communicating (most people have a really hard time thinking in probabilistic sheafs).

There's no widely accepted philosophical model for valueing human life in material (or monetary) terms, so how would we be able to already know the net sum of a this complex equation?

Bob's World
09-09-2009, 09:05 PM
Actually, we didn't break Afghanistan, so the Iraq arguement does not play. We enabled the Northern Alliance, what the Northern Alliance then decides to do with the country is really between them and the Afghan people.

BL, this country was hard broke and in Civil War when we arrived; its far better off in that regard now. Also, once we leave, the majority motivation for resistance to the government goes with us; as it is largely a resistance movement more than a revolutionary one.

Thoughts?

marct
09-09-2009, 10:03 PM
Hi Fuchs,


There's no widely accepted philosophical model for valueing human life in material (or monetary) terms, so how would we be able to already know the net sum of a this complex equation?

Quite correct that there is no widely accepted philosophical model for this, but that wasn't what you asked. You stated


Philosophy and science will probably evolve to the point where the net benefit or loss can be known.

And I replied that we had one - we do, it just isn't "widely accepted" since most people can't understand it. And, BTW, the "value of human life" is just one of the variables in the probability sheaf I was talking about. Oh, yes, and don't think of it in the sense of a f(x)=Y+2 type equation - it is one Hades of a lot more complex.

Just to address JM's point, absolutely correct ol' buddy - all you can do is something approximating a post facto probabilistic reconstruction of costs; better to work off your initial guesses :wry:.

marct
09-09-2009, 10:26 PM
Hi Bob,


BL, this country was hard broke and in Civil War when we arrived; its far better off in that regard now. Also, once we leave, the majority motivation for resistance to the government goes with us; as it is largely a resistance movement more than a revolutionary one.

Thoughts?

Tricky. My gut guess is that a general withdrawal of NATO / US troops would lead to a complete destruction of the current government and its replacement by a more autocratic form of the old Taliban regime. Again, pure gut guessing would put the DP population at 2+ million followed by a renewal of the older civil war and ~i1 million+ casualties over the next 5 years. The propaganda effect would be on the same order or higher as the retreat from Vietnam (probably higher).

Secondary effects would include increasing attacks against US / Western presence in the Horn of Africa, Nigeria and several other places, with a growing civil unrest in Western Europe and an increasingly radicalized youth population there. Back home in the States, I would expect an increasing amount of isolationism as well as an increased assault on individual civil liberties.

Then again, some people do consider me to be a pessimist ;).

slapout9
09-09-2009, 11:05 PM
Actually, we didn't break Afghanistan, so the Iraq arguement does not play. We enabled the Northern Alliance, what the Northern Alliance then decides to do with the country is really between them and the Afghan people.


Bob,I agree thats how it started but then we did break it, I don't think the first elections would have ever happened if we hadn't tired to fix A'stan with democracy? Yes they were broke when we went in. So it should be fairly cheap to put it back to how it was when we first went in. Then let them figure out how they want to develop including how to pay for it. Or if they want the US to develop A'stan then what do we get out of it. None of the above fixes the AQ problem which was the original reason we went there in the first place.

Entropy
09-09-2009, 11:20 PM
BL, this country was hard broke and in Civil War when we arrived; its far better off in that regard now. Also, once we leave, the majority motivation for resistance to the government goes with us; as it is largely a resistance movement more than a revolutionary one.

Thoughts?

The Quetta Shura Taliban is not really a resistance movement in my estimation. Their motivation is to take control of Afghanistan and I don't believe that is going to disappear if/when the coalition leaves. HiG, Haqqani and some of the other groups are a different story.

Ken White
09-10-2009, 02:45 AM
Actually, we didn't break Afghanistan, so the Iraq arguement does not play...

Thoughts?Doubled.

No we didn't break it, it was broken before we got there -- and we contributed to that, if indirectly. That's irrelevant, regardless, the Northern alliance would not have toppled anything without a few boys from Langley with Duffle Bags full of Franklins, plus 5th Group, a slew of US Aircraft and Pakistani connivance simply because we thought we ought to do 'something.'

That was probably a poor decision on several counts but that is now immaterial; it was made and the actions followed have been made a part of history; they cannot be undone.

Two US Presidents from both parties since that toppling have for eight years said publicly we will 'fix' it. You may not see a moral obligation there but if you do not, that raises questions about your purported adherence to and desire for moral solutions. You may casually dismiss the Presidential statements if you wish but if you think the rest of the world will overlook yet another case of US arrogance and looking out for number one, you're not as smart as I think you are -- and if you think they will note and scream but will get over it or we're big enough to ignore them, then you are as arrogant as you accuse others of being.

I realize that all you city sophisticates don't think this way but as Slap will understand and my Uncle Bud used to say "You can kick a pack of mangy, hungry Chihuahuas a buncha times and they'll yip and run -- but sooner or later they're gonna turn on you and bite ya..."

You cannot have it both ways.

Ken White
09-10-2009, 02:52 AM
... The propaganda effect would be on the same order or higher as the retreat from Vietnam (probably higher)... Back home in the States, I would expect an increasing amount of isolationism as well as an increased assault on individual civil liberties.

Then again, some people do consider me to be a pessimist ;).pessimism. I'm a total optimist and I think you're probably being a bit conservative on the two issues I quoted...

Definitely higher -- due to that wired world communication effect of today that someone frequently cites... ;)

Rex Brynen
09-10-2009, 03:14 AM
Two US Presidents from both parties since that toppling have for eight years said publicly we will 'fix' it. You may not see a moral obligation there but if you do not, that raises questions about your purported adherence to and desire for moral solutions. You may casually dismiss the Presidential statements if you wish but if you think the rest of the world will overlook yet another case of US arrogance and looking out for number one

Ken, this is an absolutely essential point, and one that often gets lost in the debate. Starry-eyed romantic that I am, I would like to think that moral obligations do count for something, and that as a consequence its not appropriate to walk away and leave the Afghans to deal with the aftermath. It especially troubles me because my starry-eyed romanticism is combined with an odd admixture of cynical realism, and I'm fully aware that the "walking away" alternative likely involves more than this, an implicit contingency plan of sorts. If we depart and it looks like the Taliban are getting the upper hand, we'll start throwing resources at whoever will fight them, whatever local forces will keep them off balance and unable to consolidate, and add in the occasional covert op or airstrike against AQ type targets based on increasingly spotty intel. It will look much like the last Afghan civil war did, but with even more external interest and involvement, and likely an even bigger price for the Afghan population.

I suppose my aversion to this is rooted in the fact that I've been a scholar of the Lebanese civil war, another case where regional powers all used local proxies to strike at their opponents and destabilize threats. It is very nasty stuff.

The alternative is the one that Rory Stewart makes (http://www.lrb.co.uk/v31/n13/stew01_.html): we can't really promote stable governance, and our presence doesn't, in the end, contribute to the goal we seek, and so we need to scale back on our engagement. He may well be right, but I don't think (as incredibly sharp as Rory is) that he's fully thought through what will happen to the country--and what we'll contribute to that chaos--if a lighter footprint results in the risk of Taliban victory and the perceived risk of a resurgent AQ.

wm
09-10-2009, 11:59 AM
It has been asserted on this thread that Afghanistan was broken before our intervention so we don’t need to fix it before we leave. Let me just say this about that. I had a friend whose car’s automatic transmission was screwed up, aka broken—it would get stuck in second because of a vacuum issue (we thought). A shade tree mechanic replaced the automatic transmission with a manual tranny. In the process, he screwed things up on the new one: that the shift lever would not always stay in the forks, thus making it impossible to shift up or down at times without using a big old screwdriver to reseat the shift lever. So, sometimes the car would get stuck in second. The car had the same problem—getting stuck in second--but it wasn’t really the same problem now, was it? The original problem existed but due to a different cause. My friend still had a car that was screwed up, and he still need help to get it out of 2d gear. Seems to me Afghanistan is similar to my friend’s car and the US/ISAF is the analog of the shade tree mechanic. Sure, we can leave, but we (or someone else) will have to keep coming back to do the job of that big old screw driver.

I think a couple of lessons can be learned.

First, folks keep talking about winning and victory in Afghanistan. Ken White and some others, have been at pains to point out that those terms are not really operative in the kind of affair in which we are embroiled in Afghanistan. I submit that our role is more like a doctor trying to help a sick patient get well. I don think we talk about doctors winning or being victorious when their patients recover, do we? We may note that the patients succeeded in fight off a cold or that they have won their battle against cancer. But we don’t normally say the doctor who treated them won. So let’s stop trying to define victory for us because it isn’t about us. It's about the people who populate Afghanistan. The lesson to learn is to let our patient define what the victory ought to be and ask us for help in achieving it.

Second lesson: Rex among others made the point that we seem to be in a no win situation. If we stay in Afghanistan, we, and whatever faction we support, are the locus for continued hostility. If we depart from Afghanistan, we will still be the locus of hostility because we didn’t fix what we broke (and we did break something in the process of trying to fix something else that was broken). So it goes. Once we start intervening in places where we weren’t invited, I suspect we will always be doomed to such a result. Lesson to learn—don’t intervene where one isn’t wanted/invited, especially if the intervention is unilateral. (Actually this a variation on the first lesson—doctors tend not to go out on uninvited house calls. They wait until a patient comes to see them before they diagnose and propose a cure.)

Ken White
09-10-2009, 03:26 PM
stands for Wise Man...:D

MikeF
09-10-2009, 04:15 PM
As I'm reading through this thread, I was struck by an article by Krugman on economic theory and practice. The theory assumes 1. perfect communication and 2. fair competition. In practice, the assumptions are often wrong. Throughout the last two decades, economists thought their theories had finally described and evolved to a point where capitalism was perfect and the marketplace could run itself without any regulation. Obviously, that did not happen. Capitalism is not dead (as some suggest) nor is it evil (as Michael Moore is attempting to promote). It is a human endeavor- one that will continue to ebb and flow with (self and outside) corrections.

In the same way, COIN is a study of war that is heavily influenced by social scientist b/c it involves people. Social science produces theories, not laws. I would suggest that we take a closer look at some of our assumptions in our own theories on COIN, and learn a little bit from the mistakes of the economists. I really don't want to read articles/books ten years from now about how CNAS or SWJ or whoever got it wrong. I think we can still get it right. BW, Slap, Marc, and Ken are on the way towards that path.

Thoughts? More directly, what assumptions in our present constructs should be challenged?

v/r

Mike

How Did Economists Get It So Wrong? (http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/06/magazine/06Economic-t.html)
Paul Krugman
NY Times


It’s hard to believe now, but not long ago economists were congratulating themselves over the success of their field. Those successes — or so they believed — were both theoretical and practical, leading to a golden era for the profession. On the theoretical side, they thought that they had resolved their internal disputes. Thus, in a 2008 paper titled “The State of Macro” (that is, macroeconomics, the study of big-picture issues like recessions), Olivier Blanchard of M.I.T., now the chief economist at the International Monetary Fund, declared that “the state of macro is good.” The battles of yesteryear, he said, were over, and there had been a “broad convergence of vision.” And in the real world, economists believed they had things under control: the “central problem of depression-prevention has been solved,” declared Robert Lucas of the University of Chicago in his 2003 presidential address to the American Economic Association. In 2004, Ben Bernanke, a former Princeton professor who is now the chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, celebrated the Great Moderation in economic performance over the previous two decades, which he attributed in part to improved economic policy making.

Last year, everything came apart.

Bob's World
09-10-2009, 04:31 PM
It has been asserted on this thread that Afghanistan was broken before our intervention so we don’t need to fix it before we leave. Let me just say this about that. I had a friend whose car’s automatic transmission was screwed up, aka broken—it would get stuck in second because of a vacuum issue (we thought). A shade tree mechanic replaced the automatic transmission with a manual tranny. In the process, he screwed things up on the new one: that the shift lever would not always stay in the forks, thus making it impossible to shift up or down at times without using a big old screwdriver to reseat the shift lever. So, sometimes the car would get stuck in second. The car had the same problem—getting stuck in second--but it wasn’t really the same problem now, was it? The original problem existed but due to a different cause. My friend still had a car that was screwed up, and he still need help to get it out of 2d gear. Seems to me Afghanistan is similar to my friend’s car and the US/ISAF is the analog of the shade tree mechanic. Sure, we can leave, but we (or someone else) will have to keep coming back to do the job of that big old screw driver.

I think a couple of lessons can be learned.

First, folks keep talking about winning and victory in Afghanistan. Ken White and some others, have been at pains to point out that those terms are not really operative in the kind of affair in which we are embroiled in Afghanistan. I submit that our role is more like a doctor trying to help a sick patient get well. I don think we talk about doctors winning or being victorious when their patients recover, do we? We may note that the patients succeeded in fight off a cold or that they have won their battle against cancer. But we don’t normally say the doctor who treated them won. So let’s stop trying to define victory for us because it isn’t about us. It's about the people who populate Afghanistan. The lesson to learn is to let our patient define what the victory ought to be and ask us for help in achieving it.

Second lesson: Rex among others made the point that we seem to be in a no win situation. If we stay in Afghanistan, we, and whatever faction we support, are the locus for continued hostility. If we depart from Afghanistan, we will still be the locus of hostility because we didn’t fix what we broke (and we did break something in the process of trying to fix something else that was broken). So it goes. Once we start intervening in places where we weren’t invited, I suspect we will always be doomed to such a result. Lesson to learn—don’t intervene where one isn’t wanted/invited, especially if the intervention is unilateral. (Actually this a variation on the first lesson—doctors tend not to go out on uninvited house calls. They wait until a patient comes to see them before they diagnose and propose a cure.)

As I say, insurgencies happen when governments fail, and COIN often fails because governments (politicians) aren't particularly good are admitting their mistakes and focusing their efforts on fixing those mistakes rather than "fixing" those who dare to complain about them.

Similarly the same conditions that cause smart people to wrongly (and I would even say "ridiculously") assess that we are confronted with a "global insurgency" should be saying that if we are the "global counterinsurgent" what failure of ours has contributed to this unrest, and what can we change about ourselves to mitigate this effect?

I'm all for moral obligations; but make sure they are the right ones.

1. We have a moral obligation to support and defend the Constitution of the United States.

2. The United States has a moral obligation to pursue its national interests in a manner that does not unnecessarily trample upon the interests or constitutions of others.

The world is changing, and we are not, what once was ok within the parameter of the 2 guidelines laid out above, now in many ways is not. It happens. Plot a new location, shoot a new azimuth, and move out.

No moral obligation incurred in Afghanistan outweighs the moral obligations to our nation at home. To knowingly put the latter at risk in pursuit of the former is misplaced honor; to unwittingly do so is misplaced pride at best.

No number of tactical victories in Afg or Pak by US forces will stabilize either country; nor will they alleviate the strategic risk to the homeland that brought us here in the first place.

wm
09-10-2009, 05:35 PM
The world is changing, and we are not . . . . It happens. Plot a new location, shoot a new azimuth, and move out.
Hear, Hear


No moral obligation incurred in Afghanistan outweighs the moral obligations to our nation at home. To knowingly put the latter at risk in pursuit of the former is misplaced honor; to unwittingly do so is misplaced pride at best.

No number of tactical victories in Afg or Pak by US forces will stabilize either country; nor will they alleviate the strategic risk to the homeland that brought us here in the first place.

I'd like someone to help me out here.

I'm not clear what moral obligation the USA has incurred in Afghanistan. I'd like to see some argumentation that identifies what moral duty we've saddled ourselves with by being stupid with the decision to "get even" for 9/11, followed up with the decisions to be missionaries for American democracy and forcibly baptize the Afghan people with a "democraticly elected" government. What the country's leadership did was to exacerbate an already existing poor international relations situation. I submit that America finds itself in this predicament because of what Bob describes in the quoted excerpt above as "misplaced pride" and what I prefer to consider as extreme hubris by those who ostensibly lead this nation. What ever happened America's espousal of the principle of self-determination as expressed in the Declaration of Independence and the Monroe Doctrine?

I'd also like Bob or someone else to cash out for me what grave strategic risk to the homeland necessitated US involvement in Afghanistan. It isn't clear to me that the Taliban or some AQ training camps in Afghanistan from which apparently were spawned the 9/11 activities and the prior attempt to blow up the WTC towers constitute grave threats to the US's territorial integrity or its ability to exercise political sovereignty within that territory. But, I don't think Pancho Villa's incursions crossed that threshold either. Maybe I just have a higher tolerance for risk :rolleyes:.

MikeF
09-10-2009, 05:45 PM
What ever happened America's espousal of the principle of self-determination as expressed in the Declaration of Independence and the Monroe Doctrine?

Those principles are always in deep conflict with our Puritan ethics, Manifest Destiny, and utopian hopes of expanding "The Great Society."

v/r

Mike

Ken White
09-10-2009, 06:01 PM
As I say, insurgencies happen when governments fail, and COIN often fails because governments (politicians) aren't particularly good are admitting their mistakes and focusing their efforts on fixing those mistakes rather than "fixing" those who dare to complain about them.That's true but I fail to see the relevance to the issue you raise below.
Similarly the same conditions that cause smart people to wrongly (and I would even say "ridiculously") assess that we are confronted with a "global insurgency" should be saying that if we are the "global counterinsurgent" what failure of ours has contributed to this unrest, and what can we change about ourselves to mitigate this effect?Also true and far more relevant than the remark above. Definite applicability to the future but not totally pertinent to the Afghanistan. That problem existed before you arrived at your current location and should be fixed on its own merits and not necessarily tied to future efforts.
I'm all for moral obligations; but make sure they are the right ones.If it's a moral obligation, how can it be right or wrong; it either exists or does not. If it does exist, then it can certainly be placed in a heirarchy of needs ala Maslow and thus may well be low enough in priority to be disavowed -- but you have not made such a case nor have you addressed the cost of such disavowal.
1. We have a moral obligation to support and defend the Constitution of the United States.

2. The United States has a moral obligation to pursue its national interests in a manner that does not unnecessarily trample upon the interests or constitutions of others.The first item is correct; I think the issue revolves around both the methodology of doing that and the current status versus a desired future state. The second item is desirable but one we have not always followed in the past. While I agree that is an excellent future goal I believe you think shifting directions is more simple and less time consuming than it is likely to be. Regardless, you have not made any case that Afghanistan as a moral obligation fits at a place on a scale of priorities that we can or should discount or disavow that moral requirement in preference to other things though you have hinted to that effect.
No moral obligation incurred in Afghanistan outweighs the moral obligations to our nation at home. To knowingly put the latter at risk in pursuit of the former is misplaced honor; to unwittingly do so is misplaced pride at best.I disagree on all counts:

While your first point is correct as stated, it implies that we are in fact unable to address obligations to both Afghanistan and to selves. I do not think that is correct; I believe that such judgments are an individual construct and while that statement may be true in your view, it is not true in mine -- you and I are not important; the real issue is the balance in the minds of most Americans and more specifically the balance in the minds of our elected Executive and Legislative wizards. We can certainly state opinions and we are doing that but you have really not said what specific obligations are more important nor have you offered any suggestions for what should be done to preclude or diminish any adverse impacts of or from leaving Afghanistan...

There is no movement without risk; we all knowingly place ourselves and our loved ones at risk on a daily basis. Nations do the same thing. Life is risk and the balancing of that risk. You have also not made a case for the risk of Afghanistan versus the risk(s) elsewhere, specifically what is gained in the way of gross risk reduction by leaving.

Unwittingly means without knowledge or intent. I believe we had knowledge of the risk and we had intent to take that risk in going to Afghanistan; it seems therefor that your use of unwittingly really means you would not have taken that risk. I might not have either; we weren't in charge and others elected to do so. Again, we're there, we said we'd stay a bit. Staying that bit is not a case of misplaced pride -- it is a case of being aware of the impact of ones actions on the opponents one faces. Opponents of the US are vastly more in number and complexity than a few Islamist terrorists; those guys are in fact, the easy, readily identified problems. The far more subtle large body of nations that do not wish us well appreciates each of our stumbles and would be gleeful were we to depart Afghanistan precipitously.

In your view, perhaps, in mine certainly, saying we would stay in Afghanistan was unwise. However, say it we did and we will recant on that only at some cost -- a cost that you do not address in you discussions other than dismissively. Your certitude is noted but others disagree with that dismissive approach. Thus it is not 'pride' but common sense that says we can't leave just yet; you can do the cost-benefit business but do not forget the intangibles.
No number of tactical victories in Afg or Pak by US forces will stabilize either country; nor will they alleviate the strategic risk to the homeland that brought us here in the first place.That's true. very true -- and is a great case for the fact that we should not now be there. It does not change the fact that we are there Nor does it change the fact that a too precipitous withdrawal will likely have impacts more adverse than doing what we -- rightly or wrongly -- said we would do. We did not have to say that; we probably should not have -- but we did. Nations get judged by their credibility. Ours is in disarray on several counts -- and you want to shred it even more and believe this to be helpful?

Finish what you started then select a new route -- following azimuths, on most of the earth, by the way, is to smart. Use the terrain to your advantage, don't fight it. ;)

jmm99
09-10-2009, 06:26 PM
The courses of action are summed by Ken, who presents a middle ground COA, in post #131 (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=82033&postcount=131):


We are not going to 'fix' Afghanistan; not least because the social constraint process there is quite different and those pertaining to good government we have developed over centuries (heh!) imply time they do not have. However, we did say we would 'fix' it. That was regrettable political hype or abysmal stupidity -- probably a bit of both. We cannot foster the establishment of a decent government there for three reasons; the Afghans don't want one; we don't have the time or money to do that; and the Afghans don't want one...

So we need to acknowledge that reality. Will and Krulak are both correct on the practicalities and all the reasons to say 'we tried' and just depart except for two that neither addressed: We have not really tried thus far. We said to the world that we would not again abandon Afghanistan.

For those reasons, I'm pretty firmly convinced that we should give it a bit longer and really try to do the 'fix' thing -- my perception is that is in process with State taking ownership of many things they should've had six years ago -- and we need to depart fairly soon, couple of years or so, with the fond blessings of a nominal Afghan government much as we are departing Iraq. That means a continuing but far lower key engagement. My perception is that also is in process (couple more Fuel Tank Trailers may speed that up a bit... ). It'll take a bit.

The COIN view of ten years or more engagement is unlikely (and highly undesirable IMO) and departing abruptly presents many difficulties. A moderate approach between those poles with acknowledgment that Afghan government will be an Afghan construct and thus unpalatable to many in the west.

Thus, the basic choices are:

1. Leave "abruptly" - leaving that way will not realistically be that abrupt - once the decision is made, winding down the mission will take a couple of years. That added time period applies to other solutions as well.

2. The "fix it" solution - couple or more years of "fixing it" + winding down - the middle ground.

3. COIN view of 10 years or more of engagement + winding down.

As to the middle ground, my "Peace Enforcement (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=82034&postcount=132)" suggestion fits into that framework (2 or more years of negotiations by the parties based on historical precedents). And Ken, in post #134 (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=82040&postcount=134), I specifically said "We don't negotiate..."; any deal and compromises would be "negotiated by Karzai govt, Pashtuns and Pakistan". Since there was no large cheering section for that suggestion, I'll posit it DOA.

So, moving to the "fix it" proposition or propositions, what do they look like - more details please on what do we fix and how do we fix it ?

Bob's World
09-10-2009, 06:44 PM
For oh so many reasons, we should not confuse Afghanistan with Vietnam.

We went to Vietnam to stop the spread of communism and to support a democratic government in the South (or that is how I have it in my head)

We went to Afghanistan to punish AQ and to deny them Afghanistan as a sanctuary by facilitating the Northern Alliance's efforts to remove them from power.

Often what we pass off as "moral duty" is more often an issue of "face." Not saying that face is not important, just saying that it isn't moral duty.

If "It would be embarrassing" was a legitimate rationale for not doing something that you otherwise should do or an excuse for poor or illegal behave, the world would be a very different place. Judges hear every excuse under the sun, but I would never advise a client to apply the "it would have been embarrassing" defense.

Ken White
09-10-2009, 07:10 PM
I'm not clear what moral obligation the USA has incurred in Afghanistan.Moral obligation for any nation is IMO shorthand for 'a voluntarily assumed or inadvertently obtained commitment.' I dislike applying the world 'moral' to any action of nations because nations don't have morals, people have them. However, many people use moral as a construct for what nations do or should do, thus it gets to be an habitual if really incorrect form of reference.

We in fact have no 'moral obligation' but we, the United states did voluntarily assume a commitment due to the words, right or wrong of two Presidents who have said the US would do 'something.'

Whether they should have said that or not is another issue.

What the potential difficulties are in ignoring or changing the commitment is also a separate issue; the fact is they said something and many people are desirous of finding out if those statements were meaningful or not.
I'd like to see some argumentation that identifies what moral duty we've saddled ourselves with by being stupid with the decision to "get even" for 9/11, followed up with the decisions to be missionaries for American democracy and forcibly baptize the Afghan people with a "democraticly elected" government. What the country's leadership did was to exacerbate an already existing poor international relations situation. I submit that America finds itself in this predicament because of what Bob describes in the quoted excerpt above as "misplaced pride" and what I prefer to consider as extreme hubris by those who ostensibly lead this nation. What ever happened America's espousal of the principle of self-determination as expressed in the Declaration of Independence and the Monroe Doctrine?In reverse order, it got swept up in partisan politics and ideological disconnects. Thanks, Baby Boomers...

I disagree that 'getting even' for 9/11 was stupid -- not done well, I agree -- but something needed to be done apart from the non-response or minimal response to a number of provocation emanating from the ME over a period of 22 years starting in November of 1979. all those failure were directly responsible for 9/11 so not only the then in power administration was guilty of hubris and misreading the ME /South Asia -- so were its four predecessors.

Offering to stay in Afghanistan and 'fix' it was probably dumb. I do not know why the change occurred; to stay instead of the initial topple the Taliban and leave. I only know it was said and I believe that most of the world construes that as an obligation.

I'm glad you mentioned "exacerbate an already existing poor international relations situation." Having watched that aspect closely since i947, it was not that great then, right after we "saved the free world." (and let everyone who'd been fighting longer and harder than we had know it...) and it has been on a downhill slope since then with occasional usually brief upticks. It was down in the late 60s, it was down in the 2000s -- I guess the rest of the world doesn't like Texans. I wonder what walking away from yet another commitment would do...

It is my contention that we have walked away from numerous prior obligations -- most voluntarily assumed by one US Administration and recanted by another, in both cases due to domestic, not international politics and that all such case have resulted in a downward slide is US credibility and general approval throughout the world. Thus such incidents should be avoided where possible. I agree with Marc T that a precipitous withdrawal from Afghanistan is likely to have more adverse impacts than did the withdrawal from Viet Nam -- which in my observation has been the low point in the downward trending saw blade graph of US approval world wide since 1947; 1974-6 were definite low points. Not sure we need to go even lower in the estimation of others...
I'd also like Bob or someone else to cash out for me what grave strategic risk to the homeland necessitated US involvement in Afghanistan. It isn't clear to me that the Taliban or some AQ training camps in Afghanistan from which apparently were spawned the 9/11 activities and the prior attempt to blow up the WTC towers constitute grave threats to the US's territorial integrity or its ability to exercise political sovereignty within that territory. But, I don't think Pancho Villa's incursions crossed that threshold either. Maybe I just have a higher tolerance for risk :rolleyes:.I don't think they were seen as a 'strategic' threat (and that word 'strategic' may be what's muddying things... :wry:). I think they were seen as a low grade tactical threat that was unacceptable in terms of domestic politics and US public approval. I believe that was probably a good assessment. YMMV...

The issue then became how to preclude recurrence. It was probably quickly realized that there was absolutely no way to protect a nation this large, this diverse and with such large, porous borders. Thus the options became preemption, disruption and / or dismantlement. It appears that all three of those tactics were pursued and the dismantlement bit being the most effective was pursued firmly but is low key, about finances and people in many countries and thus, while the most important aspect, is the lowest in visibility. The disruption pieces was more complex, entailed high visibility actions and was in part intended to obscure and divert attention from the dismantlement effort; that part at least seems to have been quite successful.

Ideally, for the disruption, a series of strategic raids could have been mounted -- the need for such capability became apparent in in November of 1979 and some sporadic work had been undertaken to acquire the capability but it had never been fully achieved because the upper echelons of DoD were risk averse and did not want a capability some Politician might decide to use. Thus, options were artificially restrained and the tools available had to be used. Unfortunately, they weren't cleaned and ready, so a poor initial job was done, entailing more tools and more time...

The preemption portion required far better intelligence and an effort to reconstitute that capability was undertaken with an eye to preemption down the road. The physical aspects of preemption are in portions of the R&D and other obscure portions of the Budget.

You can fault the politicians for all that if you wish but I suggest that the actual planning AND operating was done by people in various colored suits, couple of varieties green, couple of blue...

There's enough egg here for everyone.

Which doesn't change the fact that the eggs were broken even if they should not have been and, dumb chef or not, still are better cooked than running around smelling bad. Cook these, over lightly, quickly -- and don't break any more. I think we can all agree on that.

I seem to recall that P. Villa's incursion developed a bit of over and flawed reaction. Do you suppose it's something in the water in Washington? :D

Fuchs
09-10-2009, 07:17 PM
As I'm reading through this thread, I was struck by an article by Krugman on economic theory and practice. The theory assumes 1. perfect communication and 2. fair competition. In practice, the assumptions are often wrong. Throughout the last two decades, economists thought their theories had finally described and evolved to a point where capitalism was perfect and the marketplace could run itself without any regulation. Obviously, that did not happen. Capitalism is not dead (as some suggest) nor is it evil (as Michael Moore is attempting to promote). It is a human endeavor- one that will continue to ebb and flow with (self and outside) corrections.

Honestly, Krugman - Nobel prize or not - very often writes as if he's a high school-level economics teacher AT MOST.
I think he's addicted to attention and this compromises his quality and thinking. His description of economists may apply to a few of the U.S./UK economists, but there aren't only 400 million people on earth.
My economic studies went way beyond his description of macro/micro theory in my 2nd year at the university. He reinforces ridiculous clichées about economic science.
He sure gets a lot of attention, I guess that means he's accomplishing his mission.

In the same way, COIN is a study of war that is heavily influenced by social scientist b/c it involves people. Social science produces theories, not laws. I would suggest that we take a closer look at some of our assumptions in our own theories on COIN, and learn a little bit from the mistakes of the economists. I really don't want to read articles/books ten years from now about how CNAS or SWJ or whoever got it wrong. I think we can still get it right. BW, Slap, Marc, and Ken are on the way towards that path.

COIN theory could begin with considering the enemy as a thinking, decentralized force that adapts and innovates. Most COIN theory I've ever seen or heard of treats the enemy as a target or even as a sideshow.

Thoughts? More directly, what assumptions in our present constructs should be challenged?

The assumption hat an army can stay the same and doesn't need to re-invent itself if it enters a completely new arena, for example.

Modern corporations strive to adjust their strategy every 3-5 years.
They create divisions, dissolve divisions, sell divisions, unite divisions, split divisions, re-task divisions - all in a never-ending quest for a temporarily optimum shape.
There are good and bad sides in this, but it's got a lesson for the military.

How many artillery battalions were mis-used as MP or infantry?
How many MP battalions have been raised since 2002?

How many incompetent colonels and generals were relieved after years of war?

How many soldiers were trained and equipped with motorcycles or ATVs in order to match Taleban mobility off-road?

Ken White
09-10-2009, 08:13 PM
For oh so many reasons, we should not confuse Afghanistan with Vietnam.Totally agree; two very different things and very different times. They will only become more alike if we are perceived as departing Afghanistan too quickly. ;)
We went to Vietnam to stop the spread of communism and to support a democratic government in the South (or that is how I have it in my head)Actually, the Kennedy brothers wanted to boost a stagnant economy and look tough but that's another thread. :rolleyes:
We went to Afghanistan to punish AQ and to deny them Afghanistan as a sanctuary by facilitating the Northern Alliance's efforts to remove them from power.Agreed. That was the initial impetus. That changed. You may know why, I do not.
Often what we pass off as "moral duty" is more often an issue of "face." Not saying that face is not important, just saying that it isn't moral duty.Agree, as I said to WM , 'moral' for any nation is a misnomer; it's shorthand. Nations do not have morals or morally related issues.

Duty, however, does get closer to the truth. 'Face' doesn't bother me; spend more time in the FE and you get comfortable with all the permutations. The basic issue, really is 'obligation.' It matters to one what one construes as an obligation -- however, in this case, what matters a great deal is not how you or I consider the issue but how the rest of the world will construe things.
If "It would be embarrassing" was a legitimate rationale for not doing something that you otherwise should do or an excuse for poor or illegal behave, the world would be a very different place. Judges hear every excuse under the sun, but I would never advise a client to apply the "it would have been embarrassing" defense.No one has said it would be embarrassing. That's not a really great diversionary attempt... :D

The issue, Counselor, is that the Client's predecessor for seven years voluntarily and publicly obligated himself and his heirs and assigns to fulfillment of a task which Client has recently affirmed. The question that arises is not the extent to which that obligation is binding or defensible before the law, nor one of potential embarrassment for failure to perform or fulfill an assumed obligation.

The question is one of consequences which are likely to accrue from a failure of performance and oral contract fulfillment.

Specifically, what effect will yet another abrogation have on community attitudes toward the Client? Given the known predilection of certain members of the community to seek out weaknesses and exploit them and some other members to encourage those actions provided they are not seen to be in support the potential for further attacks of suspicious provenance on said heirs and assigns would seem to be enhanced.

If you can guarantee with or without the force of law that such activities will not occur then the issue is moot. If you cannot so guarantee, Client would be advised to continue fulfilling his commitment to some extent...;)

slapout9
09-10-2009, 11:28 PM
De Oppresso Liber-To Liberate The Oppressed, sounds like a moral obligation to me.

The Ballad of The Green Berets......"Men who mean just what they say".....sounds like that moral obligation thing again.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LH4-tOqLH94&feature=related

MikeF
09-11-2009, 12:23 AM
Duty, however, does get closer to the truth. 'Face' doesn't bother me; spend more time in the FE and you get comfortable with all the permutations. The basic issue, really is 'obligation.' It matters to one what one construes as an obligation -- however, in this case, what matters a great deal is not how you or I consider the issue but how the rest of the world will construe things.No one has said it would be embarrassing. That's not a really great diversionary attempt... :D

The issue, Counselor, is that the Client's predecessor for seven years voluntarily and publicly obligated himself and his heirs and assigns to fulfillment of a task which Client has recently affirmed. The question that arises is not the extent to which that obligation is binding or defensible before the law, nor one of potential embarrassment for failure to perform or fulfill an assumed obligation.

Ken, I understand your take on our obligations (and I agree). A good catholic would never consider not doing his duty or even ponder divorce; however, there is always a point where it is deemed necessary- in this case, we could argue adultery on behalf of the spouse coupled with substance abuse issues:eek:. I'm just wondering at what point do we move to family court and declare "irreconciliable grievances?" What is our commitment? Moreover, how much is it going to cost us in alimony and child support?:cool:

v/r

Mike

Ken White
09-11-2009, 12:48 AM
..I'm just wondering at what point do we move to family court and declare "irreconciliable grievances?" What is our commitment? Moreover, how much is it going to cost us in alimony and child support?:cool:The end will come, we all know that, the issue is when. Do we wait 'til the kids are grown or just go ahead and split the blanket. Dunno. Inadequate data at my level at this time. However, having watched the US Guvmint in peace and war for a good many decades, I could cynically advise watching late 2011 - early 2012 very carefully and I will say the next most likely time, October 2010, is probably a trifle early, I think...

Oops, forgot the Child support. I'd say about about half Israel's or Egypt's annual stipend initially tapering to 10% at ten years as a WAG.

MikeF
09-11-2009, 04:29 AM
I found the approriate analogy...I'm not happy with it, but it is true.
Now, we must discuss it...

v/r

Mike

Ron Humphrey
09-11-2009, 05:13 AM
How unfortunate that it had to be one that carries with it such a large amount of emotional baggage.

First thing all parties have to do is ensure they have proper representation by those more astutute in both the legal and especially politically correct forms of communication. As we're all aware this will mean stiff financial obligations to ensure we have the best representation(not something to be handled on the cheap)

Second it is necessary to recognize that any prenuptual agreements that were made (inlaws included) must be reconciled in such a way as to hopefully avoid future legal and or merely spitful outtbursts.

Third and probably most importantly be sure that any agreements on alimony
Require an accounting of some sort so one party doesn't agree then screw up and then try coming back later saying it wasn't done right the first time.

How's that for a starter?

MikeF
09-11-2009, 05:23 AM
working with the marraige analogy, I'd suggest we forgive and forget...

Pray for forgiveness to those that harmed us, stay true to our own values, and stand tall... Allow our own values shine and triumph over the nothingness of al Qaeda's caliphate.

v/r

Mike

Ron Humphrey
09-11-2009, 05:28 AM
working with the marraige analogy, I'd suggest we forgive and forget...

Pray for forgiveness to those that harmed us, stay true to our own values, and stand tall... Allow our own values shine and triumph over the nothingness of al Qaeda's caliphate.

v/r

Mike

That should probably always be the goal, then again it's never as easy as it sounds.

slapout9
09-11-2009, 05:57 AM
I found the approriate analogy...I'm not happy with it, but it is true.
Now, we must discuss it...

v/r

Mike

Now your talking, this is the biggest and a not uncommon case of Domestic Violence I have ever seen. You have all the Brothers and Sisters and Aunts and Uncles and Friends siding off and lining up and changing their minds every 15 minutes.

So moral obligation on our part also implies a moral responsibility on their part. If they will not help in the fight then I say we have fulfilled our moral obligation and are no longer bound by it. We used to tell DV victims in order for us (the Police) to protect you requires cooperation on your part, which could sometimes be uncomfotrable...like moving to a shelter, being a witness during the trial,etc. if you don't do that there is not much we can do.

So here is the trial separation pending a final divorce as it relates to A'stan. Give Karzid 30 days to show dramatic improvement or we will establish an Exit point and leave.....and we want come back, but if our interest are in jepordy we will run an Air Campaign to protect our interest and we are not going to protect anyones population but ours.


What is the jury verdict:wry:

MikeF
09-11-2009, 06:40 AM
Continuing the analogy if this thing went to trial...

I'd hire Ken and JMM as my defense team.
Fuchs would be her attorney.
WILF would be my hitman if sh*t hit the fan.
MarcT and BW would be my expert professionals to describe why the b*tch was crazy...
Tom and Stan would serve as my bodyguards.
After Wilf's hit, Slap would arrest me.

Enough seriousness...I had to have some fun with that one...

v/r

Mike

wm
09-11-2009, 10:51 AM
Ken,
Thanks for the help.
Moral obligation for any nation is IMO shorthand for 'a voluntarily assumed or inadvertently obtained commitment.' I dislike applying the world 'moral' to any action of nations because nations don't have morals, people have them. However, many people use moral as a construct for what nations do or should do, thus it gets to be an habitual if really incorrect form of reference.
I suspect that nations, when viewed as the "artificial person," a term that Hobbes uses to describe a nation when he doesn't call it a Leviathan, do have moral obligations, but that's not the real point here. I was trying to suggest to Bob's World that he was, as you point out above, playing fast and loose with some terminology


I disagree that 'getting even' for 9/11 was stupid -- not done well, I agree -- but something needed to be done apart from the non-response or minimal response to a number of provocation emanating from the ME over a period of 22 years starting in November of 1979. all those failure were directly responsible for 9/11 so not only the then in power administration was guilty of hubris and misreading the ME /South Asia -- so were its four predecessors. We agree here. I was not suggesting that getting even was dumb, just our method for doing something to satisfy the need to respond to the continuing chain of provocative, anti-American actions that we can choose to say started with the occupation of the US embassy in Iran (your 1979 window), but I suspect probably goes back to some things that happpened as follow ups to a "partition" decision made in the 1947 time frame.



You can fault the politicians for all that if you wish but I suggest that the actual planning AND operating was done by people in various colored suits, couple of varieties green, couple of blue...
There's enough egg here for everyone. I faulted the nation's ostensible leadership--and that is not just the elected folks/politicians.


I seem to recall that P. Villa's incursion developed a bit of over and flawed reaction. Do you suppose it's something in the water in Washington? :D I'm reminded of Governor LePetomane's meetings in Blazinng Saddles.
Holy underwear! Sheriff murdered! Innocent women and children blown to bits! We have to protect our phoney baloney jobs here, gentlemen! We must do something about this immediately! Immediately! Immediately! Harrumph! Harrumph! Harrumph!
Can I get a "harrumph" here?

wm
09-11-2009, 10:59 AM
So here is the trial separation pending a final divorce as it relates to A'stan. Give Karzid 30 days to show dramatic improvement or we will establish an Exit point and leave.....
What is the jury verdict:wry:

30 days seems a little short of a time frame to expect results. Don't most "no-fault" divorce proceedings require a 1-year separation?

Bob's World
09-11-2009, 11:51 AM
De Oppresso Liber-To Liberate The Oppressed, sounds like a moral obligation to me.

The Ballad of The Green Berets......"Men who mean just what they say".....sounds like that moral obligation thing again.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LH4-tOqLH94&feature=related

The whole idea is that we can send a few ODAs instead of a few Divisions to places like this where we have concerns that are important, but that for whatever reason are best managed with a light hand on the wheel.

Trust me, we understand moral obligation. We just don't think one should wear it like a badge of honor to cover motivations that are in fact something very different....

Bob's World
09-11-2009, 12:11 PM
When I wrote my War College paper several years ago, I looked at things like COG theory and the GWOT, and Ends-Ways-Means for the same. (For those suffering from insomnia, well worth the read) :)


But my assessment then, and nothing since has convinced me to either retreat or advance from this position, is that exactly 8 years ago today the President of the United States received two clear mandates from the American populace to go to war, and that those two mandates were therefore our "Strategic Ends" for the same:

1. To find the murdering sons of dogs who had attacked us, and to punish them for their actions. (Revenge)

2. To make us feel as safe as we had felt on September 10th.

The key aspect of both of these ends is that they are both intangible, subjective, and rooted in emotion. One is avenged when they feel avenged. Usually this takes a mix of action, justice, and time. One is never truly secure or safe either, but you know when you feel safe. America felt safe on 9/10, but we clearly weren't. It is the feeling that is important.

So, based on this I argued then that the GWOT was really over, that we had met the ends and that what we were engaged in now was really something very different and we needed to either identify it as such, or begin standing it down.

So, I ask this august group, those who feel morally compelled to hold this piece of dirt at all costs when no enemy action fixes us to it, nor does any critical interest become exposed to enemy action if we withdraw to better ground, which, exactly, of these two ends do you think we can either achieve or enhance by this plan??

America writ large feels avenged, and by my eye-ball assessment, feels safe as well. But these are things are fleeting, requiring constant vigilence and effort.

I don't think much about tactics these days, and focus on the big picture. And my big picture assessment is that while there are plenty of tactical victories to be had here; that the pursuit of them will weaken, rather than strengthen, our strategic posture.

Physical Terrain in such warfare means nothing to the enemy, be it hill 875 outside Dak To; or an entire country such as Afghanistan. We need to focus on the populace. Whatever course is most likely to make the Afghan populace neutral to America, or perhaps even somewhat pro-America is what we should seek. Occupation rarely achieves that end.

MikeF
09-11-2009, 04:12 PM
Physical Terrain in such warfare means nothing to the enemy, be it hill 875 outside Dak To; or an entire country such as Afghanistan. We need to focus on the populace. Whatever course is most likely to make the Afghan populace neutral to America, or perhaps even somewhat pro-America is what we should seek. Occupation rarely achieves that end.

Spot On. I used to wonder why Sunnis in Iraq would stare at us with disgust while we attempted to build schools. Then, I found out. They felt impotent. They used to build the schools for their children. Now, their children watched as their fathers were unemployed and powerless. David Wood addresses a similar issues here (http://www.politicsdaily.com/2009/09/08/uncle-sugar-goes-to-war/), and David Kilcullen speaks volumes about it in The Accidental Guerrilla. That's one of the paradoxes of Pop-centric COIN as practiced by GPF forces. We often hurt more than we help, and, sometimes, we don't even know it.



v/r

Mike

slapout9
09-11-2009, 04:18 PM
album: Band of the Hand Soundtrack

lyrics

It's Hell Time Man

Down these streets the fools rule
There's no freedom or self respect,
A knife's point or a trip to the joint
Is about all you can expect.

They kill people here who stand up for their rights, The system's just too damned corrupt
It's always the same, the name of the game
Is who do you know higher up well.

It's Hell Time Man

The blacks and the whites,
The idiotic, the exotic,
Wealth is a filthy rag
So erotic so unpatriotic
So wrapped up in the American flag.

Witchcraft scum exploiting the dumb,
Turning children into punks and slaves
Whose heroes and healers are rich drug dealers Who should be put in their graves.

It's Hell Time Man

Listen to me Mr. Pussyman
This might be your last night in a bed so soft. We're not pimps on the make, politicians on the take, You can't pay us off.

We're gonna blow up your home of Voodoo
And watch it burn without any regret
We got the power we're the new government,
You just don't know it yet.

It's Hell Time Man

For all of my brothers from Vietnam
And my uncles from World War II,
I'd like to say that it's countdown time now
And we're gonna do what the law should do.

And for you pretty baby,
I know you've seen it all.
I know your story is too painful to share.
One day though you'll be talking in your sleep.And when you do, I wanna be there yeaahhh.

It's Hell Time Man
It's Hell Time Man
Band of The Hand

Sorry forgot the music. Bob Dylan-Band of The Hand-(It's Hell Time Man) from the Movie "Band of The Hand" 1986 I think?

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2JLoO1S3-QE&feature=PlayList&p=190C0CF83D5EBCD5&playnext=1&playnext_from=PL&index=42

jmm99
09-11-2009, 04:27 PM
You injected more humor in your post #230 (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=82331&postcount=230) than you could ever know. I've never been counsel of record in a divorce ! I guess I'd rely on Ken for guidance. :D

OTOH, when Wilf and you are indicted for conspiracy and murder one, I would feel comfortable handling that case - even though it would be prosecuted by one Robert Jones, with Slap as the witness in chief. See you on cross, Slap. :)

Thirty days does seem a bit quick, until you remember that Slap is used to judicial continuences, where 30 days is followed by another 30 days, etc. I've a complicated case (my last piece of litigation ? ) which was settled on the record a year ago - which is still waiting for the exact terms of the judgment to be finalized. :eek:

I actually have some serious comments re: both Ken and BW, but thought I'd get this gem out of the way.

-------------------

A problem I've had over the last 10 years is the need to refer out litigation. Have another lawyer coming in (starting next week) who will be handling general litigation and municipal law as his focus. His military service was in a branch of MI and spent about 20 years in municipal operations as an engineer before going to law school. Tried to get Ken, but he couldn't stand the winters.;)

tequila
09-11-2009, 05:01 PM
Whatever course is most likely to make the Afghan populace neutral to America, or perhaps even somewhat pro-America is what we should seek. Occupation rarely achieves that end.

Occupation rarely brings popularity, but the other strategy, that of withdrawal followed by a period of "repetitive raiding" as Kilcullen calls it from the sky and SOF seems unlikely to do so either.

The results of such a Krulak-like campaign can be seen in the current situation in the FATA. Abandonment of ground (by the Pakistani Army, the FC, and government) combined with repetitive raiding (by Predators and Pak Air Force) has created enormous hatred of the U.S. even in the parts of Pakistan that aren't targeted. I can't imagine we're much more popular in the FATA itself.

Moreover, after eight years of such a strategy, the Pakistani Taliban has mestasized from nowhere in 2001 to the most serious threat to the Pakistani state in 2009.

As for the threat to the U.S., I will only recall that most of the serious terror plots in the West, both successful and unsuccessful, of the past decade can be laid at the door of AQ planners and trainers in the NWFP and FATA. Noticeably not from Afghanistan, where such high-level people cannot operate safely.

MikeF
09-11-2009, 05:13 PM
Occupation rarely brings popularity, but the other strategy, that of withdrawal followed by a period of "repetitive raiding" as Kilcullen calls it from the sky and SOF seems unlikely to do so either.

This debate on strategy in Afghanistan is NOT an either/or of Occupy with Pop-Centric COIN versus simply leaving and only conducting limited CT.

What BW is describing (I think), is a softer, lighter footprint and indirect approach. Instead of masses of foreign soldiers conducting COIN and SFA, we go back to the traditional SF role of FID as seen in the Phillipines and Colombia where civilian and military advisors quietly advise the HN government. It takes a lot longer to do, but it is more effective. Simultaneously, we allow the other SOF elements to stalk the enemy at night.

v/r

Mike

MikeF
09-11-2009, 05:20 PM
Glad I could offer some humor to this otherwise serious debate. Eventually, I'm going to do a dissertation on this topic, game theory, and international relations using marraige, divorce, and arbitration.

BW is finishing up his plan which is pretty good from what I understand. Now, I'm ready for some SBW:cool:.

Slap- since you're taking a systems-based approach, I would suggest that you brush up on Mintzberg (the godfather of systems) and check out Dr. Jon Arquilla's work on the enemy as a social network- a more organic, open system. Besides that, you caught my attention with the Band of the Hand or paragraph one alpha- enemy situation.

Standing by for class.

v/r

Mike

William F. Owen
09-11-2009, 05:43 PM
WILF would be my hitman if sh*t hit the fan.


Seriously, you could not hire a worse hitman! More likely to hurt myself than anyone else these days, and not that skilled even back when it mattered! :)

jmm99
09-11-2009, 06:21 PM
deceiving .....

Which seems a good point to keep in mind when considering the topic at hand.

tequila
09-11-2009, 06:23 PM
This debate on strategy in Afghanistan is NOT an either/or of Occupy with Pop-Centric COIN versus simply leaving and only conducting limited CT.

What BW is describing (I think), is a softer, lighter footprint and indirect approach. Instead of masses of foreign soldiers conducting COIN and SFA, we go back to the traditional SF role of FID as seen in the Phillipines and Colombia where civilian and military advisors quietly advise the HN government. It takes a lot longer to do, but it is more effective. Simultaneously, we allow the other SOF elements to stalk the enemy at night.

v/r

Mike

That makes a bit more sense than Krulak's prescriptions.

I agree that from a standpoint of military and political endurance, this is much more doable than pop-centric COIN.

However, I think it fails to take into account the ability of the Taliban and its motives, as well as the possible reaction of Pakistan and Iran. The GoA is experiencing a crisis of legitimacy at the moment in the international arena and a slow-motion destruction of said legitimacy in the eyes of the Afghan public. The withdrawal of foreign forces will mean in reality handing on-the-ground control over entire provinces of Afghanistan over to the Taliban and its allies. It is difficult to see how the GoA can survive in such a state.

Such a GoA would likely be forced to bandwagon support from what commanders it could bribe or manhandle to its side. Iran, and more importantly, the Pakistani military establishment, would seek out similar allies to entrench their own interests. Large segments of Pakistan's military appear to believe that Pakistan's interests are best served by aligning with the Taliban, the HiG, and the Haqqanis rather than the GoA.

The examples of El Salvador, the Philippines, and Colombia lack the troublesome neighbors that Afghanistan has, as well as the centrality to the jihadi universe that Afghanistan represents. All three states were also far more advanced and able than the GoA or the Afghan Army and Police are ever likely to be, even with American assistance.

wm
09-11-2009, 06:24 PM
To find the murdering sons of dogs who had attacked us, and to punish them for their actions. (Revenge)
If we wish to talk of strategic ends, then we ought to talk about the ends of punishment. Punishment is a means to an end--but what end and how good a means is it? By ends, I mean goals. In what follows, I think I'm espousing a pretty standard line found in HLA Hart's "'A Prolegomenon to the Principles of Punishment."
Punishment is usually done to achieve one of three ends/goals: revenge, rehabilitation, or remediation (we might also consider reparation, but that seems a sub-category of remediation to me).
Revenge is a poor motive for punishing--it tends to continue to pile wrong on to wrong (and treats other people as objects not as people--see Immanuel Kant's ethics for an explanation why this is immoral or at least amoral). And do we really feel better after the fact?
Rehabilitation is supposed to keep a perpetrator from recidivism--The only case of this working that I know of is to be found in Butler's fiction Erehwon (which happens to spell "Nowhere" backwards), where crime is actually a treatable disease like the measles.
That leaves us with remediation. I ask what could we have gotten out of aiding the Northern Alliance to help restore things to something like the status quo ante 9/11/2001.

Invading Afghanistan was a quintessential example of closing the barn door after the horse had already run away. Our response to 9/11 should have been something that made it clear in no uncertain terms to those who planned such activities that the US would not sit idly by while those of their ilk thought about occupying/bombing our embassies, bombing our ships in foreign harbors, or stealing our planes and flying them into buildings.
One doesn't show another that "crime doesn't pay" with crimes like those I just described. Instead one needs to interrupt the planning process, show that planning such a crime doesn't pay. And that cannot happen after the crime has been committed. So we need to be better at identifying plots and stopping them with actions of extreme prejuduice to the plotters. We don't do that with a large general purpose force tromping around another country dropping bombs and shooting missiles at suspects fleeing the scene of the crime. Wedo that by cultivating relationships with people who sense that hurting others is a bad thing to do and getting them to tip us off whne they get word that someone else is contemplating doing that to us or those near and dear to us.



We need to focus on the populace. Whatever course is most likely to make the Afghan populace neutral to America, or perhaps even somewhat pro-America is what we should seek. Occupation rarely achieves that end.

Sounds like a variant on commmunity-based policing to me; how about you Slap?

Ken White
09-11-2009, 06:32 PM
The whole idea is that we can send a few ODAs instead of a few Divisions to places like this where we have concerns that are important, but that for whatever reason are best managed with a light hand on the wheel.Absolutely, totally agree -- and get a few more ODAs by dumping the strategic recon mission and the CIF. Put those missions in specially trained organizations and save the SF for their more important if less glamorous job. I look forward to seeing all that implemented.
Trust me, we understand moral obligation. We just don't think one should wear it like a badge of honor to cover motivations that are in fact something very different...."We. We..." What is this we stuff... :D

Seriously, understand that you understand it is not so much a moral obligation as it was a commitment of the 'full faith and credit' of the US and I'm glad to hear that. :cool:

However, I do not understand the inference that the commitment is being fraudulently misused for other purposes. Could you expand on that for us?

You have elsewhere inferred that a precipitous withdrawal is to our strategic advantage but have never explained why that might be. You have also never stated whether you believe that such a withdrawal will incur a penalty affecting future US actions or, that if it does incur one it will be manageable. Any thoughts on those factors?

slapout9
09-11-2009, 06:37 PM
Glad I could offer some humor to this otherwise serious debate. Eventually, I'm going to do a dissertation on this topic, game theory, and international relations using marraige, divorce, and arbitration.

BW is finishing up his plan which is pretty good from what I understand. Now, I'm ready for some SBW:cool:.

Slap- since you're taking a systems-based approach, I would suggest that you brush up on Mintzberg (the godfather of systems) and check out Dr. Jon Arquilla's work on the enemy as a social network- a more organic, open system. Besides that, you caught my attention with the Band of the Hand or paragraph one alpha- enemy situation.

Standing by for class.

v/r

Mike


Mike, you may have to wait a while as part of what you bring up will be in my article if Col. Gurney decides to publish it. I learned about organic systems thinking in 1963...1964?? so be patient.

Bob's World plan will be good. I was the one that originally posted his article for discussion and also got his email so he would join the SWC(which he probably regrets:D)
I agree with him most of the time but on some I don't.

SBW I should have posted that a long time ago, I needed a mental model of the Situation. I don't believe in planning in competitive/dynamic environments.....you'll just loose:mad: Dynamic Models can be useful.
As for class......go.... run to the video store and rent Band of The Hand this weekend..... you will like it and there will be many good lessons to learn. Let me know what you think.

davidbfpo
09-11-2009, 06:44 PM
Citing WM and a Quote:
Originally Posted by Bob's World
We need to focus on the populace. Whatever course is most likely to make the Afghan populace neutral to America, or perhaps even somewhat pro-America is what we should seek. Occupation rarely achieves that end.

WM's question:
Sounds like a variant on commmunity-based policing to me; how about you Slap?

WM,

Community-based policing models do not conduct policing on the basis of changing how the population "feel" towards a foriegn power, even one present locally. Community policing tries to meet local public needs for law enforcement / security etc and what the state wants the police to deliver. Both sets of priorities vary - public nuisances preferred by the public over robbery for example, crimes that happen to others. There can be communication with the public, direct rather than via elected officers and trying to increase community-based provision of information.

INHO Afghan needs are reasonably well known: religion, social customs, security, justice, health, education and minimal state government.

In many places for all manner of reasons achieving this would mean our retirement, with more remote means to fight and deter local hospitality for our enemies - not their enemies.

This completly ignores the theory in community-based policing that the local population will provide the police with good, reliable information to target issues and individuals. An issue that rears it's head on SWC regularly; the 'Find' factor.

davidbfpo

William F. Owen
09-11-2009, 06:47 PM
At the end of the day, I am still not clear on what the Strategic goal is. Seriously, what is it?

AQ could work out of Canada or Pakistan, so going after AQ is not really a goal.
Stable A'Stan. OK, but why? See AQ? If it is just because saving Afghans is good, do we start on Somalia next?


A stable A'Stan requires defeating those who would seek to gain power by violence, and that can really only be done by violence, but at the heart of my slightly mis-represented "blood, fire and Pillars of Smoke," Irregular Warfare, I see violence as merely a instrument to Strategy, and Strategy instrumental to Policy..... so what's the policy and WHY?

William F. Owen
09-11-2009, 06:49 PM
This completly ignores the theory in community-based policing that the local population will provide the police with good, reliable information to target issues and individuals. An issue that rears it's head on SWC regularly; the 'Find' factor.

Spot on. Exactly!

Armchair eh? Pretty good armchair from where I sit!

jmm99
09-11-2009, 06:49 PM
WRT to AQ, there are four ends realized by hunting down and killing specific AQ leaders (or by accepting their surrenders if they are so inclined):

1. Retribution - yup, revenge, eye for eye, tooth for tooth. This may not satify jurisprudes, but it would satisfy a large percentage of our society. Since I believe that law reflects society (and is not based on jurisprudential logic), that is an acceptable end.

2. Reprobation - expression of and validation of society's disapproval of their acts. Again, an acceptable end if one accepts society as the source of law.

3. Specific deterrence - if they are dead or detained, they cannot repeat what they did. That is simply a fact.

4. General deterrence - I am not a particular fan of general deterrence in criminal law because many criminals do not think about the time they might spend for the crime, or ignore it. However, those who rationally look at potential consequences (e.g., a nation-state or a calculating non-state actor) might be a different story - and some here think so. A friend of mine said that we have capital punishment backasswards. It should apply to white collar crimes where the consequences are considered.

While criminals do rehabilitate, AQ leadership is not likely to convert (minor fish are another story).

Remediation is a non-starter.

PS: For a view of how the legal system, judges & lawyers actually operate, take a look at "FROM LEGAL THEORIES TO NEURAL NETWORKS AND FUZZY REASONING (http://www2.cirsfid.unibo.it/~sartor/GSCirsfidOnlineMaterials/GSOnLinePublications/GSPUB1999IntroductionPhilipps.pdf)" (only 11 pages).