Blending into the mindset of the Human Terrain

[Coined]

Effects are not stove piped as they interact and are complementary to each other. The very short term can have a direct impact on the long term so they have to be balanced related to the IRoA end state (NOT the Democratic republic of Afghanistan but the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan).

Through interaction more sub effects and indicators will be derived from the Lines of Operation. "Out of the box" thinking will have to be encouraged at the expense of stove pipes, "fenced domains", personalities and comfort zones.
Those desired effect are a result of an agreed end state. Agreed at and derived from the strategic level by the ministry of Foreign Affairs, the min of development and the min of Defence.

All activities are connected to the several effect-delivering parts of our organization as everybody has a unique role in influencing behavior.

This has to be trained well before (Modular) units are deployed.

I think it would be wise to initiate some brainstorm sessions about another and more complementary way to conduct training (train as you operate) in which every participant (soldier, NCO, officer, civilian) is aware about his role as “influencer of behavior in a certain environment”.

Furthermore the point of departure should be a consistent and consequent permissive, semi-permissive and non-permissive mindset for training. Also when there is an operation in the highest level of violence the approach should be under the umbrella of that 3BW environment, btw, non-permissive imo does not refer to an exlusive hostile environment.

Such way of thinking asks for process controlled organizations rather that a line-staff organization. We have to relate to our organization as a system of systems, a modular unit of which al (non)kinetic elements make part. This means something for all our training centres because a modular organized unit will interact differently at all levels. A modular unit is a consistent and constant (non)kinetic organized unit based at a barracks working and training together permanently. All levels will be trained, the mix of (non)kinetic will differ but everyone still is aware that they are complementary.

A system of sytems approach with Modular units answers the current and future conflicts more comprohensive. The public support for military interventions is highly influenced by the opinion of the media, politicians and population in "our" home country, the country we intervene in and the countries who are in what way whatso ever are related to "our' country or to the AO.

Imo the potential conflict arena for the coming ten years stretches between the republics bordering Russia via Eur Asia, the ME to Africa. In this and other parts of our world I think we will be confronted with "fighting" about economical aspects, energy resources and water management. The military element in this will not have such a prominant role, maybe in an initial entry or as "firemen" mainly contucting a shaping role for security, development and diplomacy.

How do I see this work?

As we operate in urbanized “human” terrain we have to train in such terrain. Let’s say an initial entry in a semi-permissive environment at an airfield nearby a town (not with huge warfighting, we know how to fight but do we also know Why, How and with Whom to interact)?

Military have to make contact with logistical elements at that airfield and in the town to facilitate FoF, or they act as FoF themselves, it depends on the scenario. All civilian participants in the training are informed and civilian role play is instructed.

PsyOps teams (Train as you Operate) have made an assessment of the town population (real town, real people, real assessment), make contact with local media to inform the population about the coming exercise, explain to them the Why and How, and ask them (in one of the town parts) to participate in let’s say a roadblock.

Recce elements can perform their obs/surv task assisted by colleagues of the Home guard (a recce element makes an obs post in a room of a Home guard member opposite a bar, the bar is frequented by some MVI’s or HVI’s role play, they have to create a pattern of life, information will go up the chain and a lift ops can be executed at some training area as we don’t like to show our MO).
Lift operations and the more violent ops can be trained at a training area IVO a town.

Maneuver elements will “social patrol” a part of the town, introducing themselves to the population asking them some questions. Bottom line, Go to the people, introduce yourself, start a conversation and gain desired information/intelligence.

You can imagine the participation of all other elements (PRT and so on) that make part of the Modular unit.

Per level of training and of the Modular unit size the desired effects we like to achieve with the exercise can be developed. Of course this all depends of an integral, coordinated and synchronized approach.

Role play can be performed by:

Civilians from a theatre company to train the Modular unit in a permissive environment
Home guard in civvies to train the Modular unit in a semi-permissive environment.
Home guard or other military in "uniform" to train the Modular unit in a non-permissive environment.

Ofcourse these elements are integrated, also when the non-permissive part is manifest, the othter two elements are stiil existent as the "human terrain" will always play an important, even decisive part in our operations.

Training with modular units needs an extensive preparation, is highly related to "the way we operate" and will learn each participant that they all are key to achieve a desired end state.

An additional value of such training is the PR/Marketing of our efforts to the population who are able to get acquainted with the how and why of our activities and approaches.

[davidbfpo]

COINED,

This thread is duplicated by your other thread, with the same text. Can anyone adding comments use this thread: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=7185

Thanks

davidbfpo

[goesh]

- such a far cry from when the drill instructors made us do knuckle pushups on gravel until our hands bled. I guess it's for the best that father time has excluded me from enlisting and crossing over to Iraq or Afghan. I'm afraid if I went on a "social patrol" I would be looking for the wrong sort of interactions.

[William F. Owen]

A system of sytems approach with Modular units answers the current and future conflicts more comprohensive.


...but you cannot predict anything about future conflicts, except that war isn't changing. Future conflicts will be won in exactly the same way the old ones were and you will fight wars for the same reasons you did 500 years ago. Armies have always been "systems of systems."

This is what all the evidence tell us.

[Coined]

...but you cannot predict anything about future conflicts, except that war isn't changing. Future conflicts will be won in exactly the same way the old ones were and you will fight wars for the same reasons you did 500 years ago. Armies have always been "systems of systems."

This is what all the evidence tell us.

Read and understand the article of LTC Downey "PIR development in a COIN envirinment". Dare to look at the broader context. There is no enemy besides the ones excisting in our perception. An opponent dresses in clothings referring to the goal that opponent wants to achieve. Why is some one your enemy ? Try to figure that out. The human terrain dictates, that is the challeging fact for us military.

[Steve Blair]

Read and understand the article of LTC Downey "PIR development in a COIN envirinment". Dare to look at the broader context. There is no enemy besides the ones excisting in our perception. An opponent dresses in clothings referring to the goal that opponent wants to achieve. Why is some one your enemy ? Try to figure that out. The human terrain dictates, that is the challeging fact for us military.

Perhaps, but clarity in communication is also important. It ensures that your message isn't lost or garbled. It also prevents us from wrapping the same old smelly fish in new newsprint and trying to pass it off as the catch of the day. I think that's what Wilf thinks some of this "newfangled talk" is doing, and in some ways he may be correct.

[Coined]

Perhaps, but clarity in communication is also important. It ensures that your message isn't lost or garbled. It also prevents us from wrapping the same old smelly fish in new newsprint and trying to pass it off as the catch of the day. I think that's what Wilf thinks some of this "newfangled talk" is doing, and in some ways he may be correct.

Try to read and understand the things you like to refer to as "newfangled talk" first. We all work in a modular way with elements which we used to call "non kinetic". The (non)kinetic is not existent anymore. We constantly operate in a (semi)(non)permissive enviroment. That asks for something else than throwing lots of bombs, those bombs are just part of a, hopefully, well thought strategy. We, as military, are not the core buzzword anymore. We have to shape the environment, not to destroy it.

Do not hesitate to react in a constructive way.

[Tom Odom]

Here is a constructive piece of advice:

Simply expressing old ideas in new terms is an old technique that many of us have seen time and time again. Try using plain English versus:

Non-kinetic modular elements

(semi) (non) permissive environment

Military as core buzz word

Shape the environment, not destroy it


Those will simply get you tossed from the TOC

And finally try not lecturing the reader because you are not communicating effectively as in


Try to read and understand the things you like to refer to as "newfangled talk" first.

Tom

[William F. Owen]

Perhaps, but clarity in communication is also important. It ensures that your message isn't lost or garbled. It also prevents us from wrapping the same old smelly fish in new newsprint and trying to pass it off as the catch of the day. I think that's what Wilf thinks some of this "newfangled talk" is doing, and in some ways he may be correct.
Said better than I ever could... or did.


Here is a constructive piece of advice:

Simply expressing old ideas in new terms is an old technique that many of us have seen time and time again. Try using plain English versus:

Non-kinetic modular elements

(semi) (non) permissive environment

Military as core buzz word

Shape the environment, not destroy it


Those will simply get you tossed from the TOC

And finally try not lecturing the reader...

... and the only thing about war that is changing, is Tom and I are agreeing more often! :D

Again, Tom said it better than I did. If someone can't describe a military concept or operation, using words and expressions that an officer from 60 years ago would not understand then it should set the BS detector well into the red.

We might all be better served if we stopped using silly words like "human terrain," - do we mean population? Let's say population then. Let's start speaking real English, and stop BS'ing.

[Van]

Simply expressing old ideas in new terms is an old technique that many of us have seen time and time again. Try using plain English ...

And finally try not lecturing the reader because you are not communicating effectively...

Well said, thank you, Tom.


Coined,
I am not saying that you are uninformed, but your text is similar to that of people who have read a recent article or book, but haven't developed an understanding of the historical precedents behind the emerging ideas. The down side of all the buzz words and new constructions is that, for example, people will be so distracted by trying to figure out what a
(non)kinetic organized unit is, that they'll miss that this is an effort to bring back the COHORT concept (which I support).


Through interaction more sub effects and indicators will be derived from the Lines of Operation. "Out of the box" thinking will have to be encouraged at the expense of stove pipes, "fenced domains", personalities and comfort zones.
Just like in Truppenführung, HeeresDienstVorschrift 300, 1933.


Maneuver elements will “social patrol” a part of the town,
Just like in the USMC Small Wars Manual, 1940.


Imo the potential conflict arena for the coming ten years stretches between the republics bordering Russia via Eur Asia, the ME to Africa.

And this is the one place where I disagree. Yes, these are potential conflict areas, but, at least in the U.S., we've planned and trained for the 'right' war once in our history (Iraq 2003), and even then we only thought halfway through what needed to happen. I would argue that flexibility and adaptability must be our watch words, lest we end up with soldiers in desert camouflage fighting in the mountains of Peru.

[Coined]

And this is the one place where I disagree. Yes, these are potential conflict areas, but, at least in the U.S., we've planned and trained for the 'right' war once in our history (Iraq 2003), and even then we only thought halfway through what needed to happen. I would argue that flexibility and adaptability must be our watch words, lest we end up with soldiers in desert camouflage fighting in the mountains of Peru.

"right war"?? Hmm ... short term memory!!
Btw, smart bombs did the trick ... and after "victory" the real #### came along.

Hey, William and Tom .... your reality still is a reflection of your own shadows.
Well, at least the two of you agree ...

Nice approach you all show, if you don't get ... slaughter it ...

[marct]

Nice approach you all show, if you don't get ... slaughter it ...

Rather gratuitous, don't you think? One could also say "If you don't know about it, invent new words to describe old concepts." This post-modern trend is quite distressing both in general society and in academia. It is also, IMHO, correlated rather strongly with ad hominem attacks on people who disagree with the "new, bright shiny penny".

[William F. Owen]

Hey, William and Tom .... your reality still is a reflection of your own shadows.
Well, at least the two of you agree ...

Nice approach you all show, if you don't get ... slaughter it ...

Well that may indeed be true, but please show us some evidence. So far you have just presented a set of opinions, that are by no means clear.

This forum tends to subject ideas to rigour. If you can't explain it clearly, then no progress will be made.

For example, what does
Through interaction more sub effects and indicators will be derived from the Lines of Operation. actually mean?

What is a "sub-effect"? The result of a "sub-action" or a second order effect? Ball is in your court.

[Coined]

What is a "sub-effect"? The result of a "sub-action" or a second order effect? Ball is in your court.

If it is all old news, why then do we still follow the "old school", because it is part of our comfortzone??

By the way, the ball is in OUR court!!

[Cavguy]

Coined,

Why is the new better? Tom, Wilf, Steve, and Van have articulated reasonable responses. Between them is a huge amount of military and combat experience in high and low intensity conflict.

While there are new aspects to the current environment, the fundamental nature, and how to counter it, is thousands of years old.

Rather than reinventing terms, we need to read our history. Guerrilla war is not a new concept. Most of our failures result from a lack of understanding of the basic concept of it, not a lack of new systems.

A smart man named Robert Asprey wrote a two volume series entitled "War in the Shadows" , which is a chronology of insurgency over the past 3000 years. His point was to demonstrate to people that insurgency was not a new concept.

I went back searching for your personal or professional expertise on COIN, or executing it. Please inform us of how you are so certain your proposals would work, in practice.

Finally, I know you are communicating in a second language, so I appreciate how difficult it is to express things accurately.

[Ken White]

I did not comment on your initial post in this thread because in my opinion it said nothing. Others have commented and, essentially, expressed the thought that you really said nothing new -- and your response to that is to provide short, snippy comments that essentially do not seem communicate your thoughts at all well. I suggest that if six people -- and I make seven -- have said that your point is not well understood, then perhaps you should look at what you are trying to accomplish and rephrase significantly some of your more pithy comments.

For example
If it is all old news, why then do we still follow the "old school", because it is part of our comfortzone??Because Armies, Nations and People (as a group) all change slowly. New ideas get adopted as they appear and if they seem to make sense. People frequently will learn new things and use them but succeeding generations discard those things as irrelevant -- then a new crisis appears and things get 'rediscovered' and eventually get embedded as standard practice.

The world has been operating in that fashion for thousands of years and that is unlikely to change. So, yes, the comfort zone aspect is part of it, National psyches and penchants are part of it, the dynamics of situations are part of it -- and human fallibility is involved in all those . Also involved are group dynamics

Only the young who have no use for history don't know all that -- or pretend as if they do not.
By the way, the ball is in OUR court!!What does this mean. Specifically:

Of what Ball are you speaking, that is what specifically do you think should be done?

Follow on questions:

Is anyone doing or trying to do what you think should be done? If yes, who and how successfully? If not, who and why not?

[MikeF]

For the link to Asprey's book. At least I got something out of this thread besides a headache :eek:

Coined, welcome. Please don't upset the old men...They tend to get grumpy:p. I think you have some excellent points to make, but I would ask you not to attack the members of this group. We merely implement policy.

Just say what you mean and mean what you say.

Ken, have you seen my baseball?

v/r

Mike

[Van]

we've planned and trained for the 'right' war once in our history (Iraq 2003),

"right war"?? Hmm ... short term memory!!
Btw, smart bombs did the trick ... and after "victory" the real #### came along.


"Right" as in "the war we really we going to fight rather than the war would would like to fight"

And smart bombs did not do the trick, no matter how much they helped. The political endstate that military action was supporting was "regime change", and that came about due to the ground operations. Whether or not "regime change" was the ideal solution is for politicians to decide, not soldiers.


Nice approach you all show, if you don't get ... slaughter it ...
"Ignoratio elenchu"; ignoring the main point of our arguments and shifting to different point? Or would this be "ad hominem"; criticizing us rather than either accepting or rebutting our points?

Your hand is shown. Good day, sir.

P.S.
Please don't upset the old men...They tend to get grumpy.:p
Another crack like that and I'll thrash you with my walking stick:D
V

[Ken White]

Ken, have you seen my baseball?It is in my Court. However it's gonna cost you if you want it back -- due to that "grumpy' crack. Harummphhh... :mad:

:D

On Asprey, good job by him and by Niel for mentioning it. The abridged version does as well as the original IMO...

[Tom Odom]

"right war"?? Hmm ... short term memory!!
Btw, smart bombs did the trick ... and after "victory" the real #### came along.

Hey, William and Tom .... your reality still is a reflection of your own shadows.
Well, at least the two of you agree ...

Nice approach you all show, if you don't get ... slaughter it ...

Me and my shadow....

Dancing down the avenue...

In Baghdad

Tom

[Coined]

For the link to Asprey's book. At least I got something out of this thread besides a headache :eek:

Coined, welcome. Please don't upset the old men...They tend to get grumpy:p. I think you have some excellent points to make, but I would ask you not to attack the members of this group. We merely implement policy.

Just say what you mean and mean what you say.

Ken, have you seen my baseball?

v/r

Mike

Right, point taken, thanks.

Let's get back to the starting point of this thread.

--------------------------
As we operate in urbanized “human” terrain we have to train in such terrain. Let’s say an initial entry in a semi-permissive environment at an airfield nearby a town (not with huge warfighting, we know how to fight but do we also know Why, How and with Whom to interact)?

Military have to make contact with logistical elements at that airfield and in the town to facilitate FoF, or they act as FoF themselves, it depends on the scenario. All civilian participants in the training are informed and civilian role play is instructed.

PsyOps teams (Train as you Operate) have made an assessment of the town population (real town, real people, real assessment), make contact with local media to inform the population about the coming exercise, explain to them the Why and How, and ask them (in one of the town parts) to participate in let’s say a roadblock.

Recce elements can perform their obs/surv task assisted by colleagues of the Home guard (a recce element makes an obs post in a room of a Home guard member opposite a bar, the bar is frequented by some MVI’s or HVI’s role play, they have to create a pattern of life, information will go up the chain and a lift ops can be executed at some training area as we don’t like to show our MO).
Lift operations and the more violent ops can be trained at a training area IVO a town.

Maneuver elements will “social patrol” a part of the town, introducing themselves to the population asking them some questions. Bottom line, Go to the people, introduce yourself, start a conversation and gain desired information/intelligence.

You can imagine the participation of all other elements (PRT and so on) that make part of the Modular unit.

Per level of training and of the Modular unit size the desired effects we like to achieve with the exercise can be developed. Of course this all depends of an integral, coordinated and synchronized approach.

Role play can be performed by:

Civilians from a theatre company to train the Modular unit in a permissive environment
Home guard in civvies to train the Modular unit in a semi-permissive environment.
Home guard or other military in "uniform" to train the Modular unit in a non-permissive environment.

Ofcourse these elements are integrated, also when the non-permissive part is manifest, the othter two elements are stiil existent as the "human terrain" will always play an important, even decisive part in our operations.

Training with modular units needs an extensive preparation, is highly related to "the way we operate" and will learn each participant that they all are key to achieve a desired end state.

An additional value of such training is the PR/Marketing of our efforts to the population who are able to get acquainted with the how and why of our activities and approaches.

------------------------------------------------------------

Rather to eleborate on this than to go grumpy. ;)

[Van]

To be a little more even-handed;

This reads like a "best practices" approach to Small Wars (COIN, low intensity conflict, SASO, pick your buzzword). You are trying to assemble the concepts that have worked in Latin America in the 1930s, Malaysia in the 1950s, Viet Nam in the 1960s-70s, the hords of Middle Eastern expats that are employed by the U.S. Army National Training Centers right now, etc? If so, you've put together a good framework.

As previously stated, I agree with what you're saying here, and only disagree with a single element of what you said earlier.

To elaborate; U.S. engineers generally seek 'perfect' solutions (however, there are a large minority that don't, but that deserves a seperate thread). A 'perfect tool' is a pain in the rear end because you need a lot of them, because perfection has only one purpose and is hard or impossible to adapt to other applications. A good tool isn't 'perfect' but is adaptable enough to use in other situations. Look at the C-130; not perfect for any one job, too small as a cargo plane, too slow with its props rather than turbines, too much radar signature, not agile, etc. But incredibly adaptable; gun ship, SAR, ELINT, aircraft carrier landings, cargo, artic mods, etc. A good knife can be used for opening mail, food preparation, wood carving, and self-defense. An ideal knife for any of these applications isn't very good at the others.

So a military needs to be a good tool of statecraft rather than a perfect tool of statecraft. The U.S. military was forged into a perfect tool in the mid- to late- 1980s, and after the first Gulf War, felt vindicated (see Steven Metz "Iraq & the Evolution of American Strategy (http://www.amazon.com/Iraq-Evolution-American-Strategy-Steven/dp/1597971960/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1241081641&sr=1-1)" for an excellent discussion of this). Now we find that all the fieldcraft and subtle arts of Small Wars are equally (or more) important than the romantic vision of mechanized brigades rolling through the hills of Germany.

My concern with your vision is that, like the U.S. forces at the American entry into World War I, the soldier thus trained may have a steep and fatal learning curve to enter conventional conflict. Alternately, the price tag for a well rounded professional education that includes the full spectrum of conflict and imposition of national will, will not be considered acceptable by our civilian masters.

playin' stickball with my cane, knock the ball back to someone's court
:cool:

[Tom Odom]

Actually it reads like the training construct for mission rehearsal exercises at the JRTC as they have been for years.

Tom

[Van]

Tom,


Actually it reads like the training construct for mission rehearsal exercises at the JRTC as they have been for years.

To-MAE-to, To-MAH-to...
:)
Van

[Tom Odom]

Tom,



To-MAE-to, To-MAH-to...
:)
Van

I know

Old tomatoes just shrivel and become pasta sauce :eek:

[Coined]

To be a little more even-handed;

This reads like a "best practices" approach to Small Wars (COIN, low intensity conflict, SASO, pick your buzzword). You are trying to assemble the concepts that have worked in Latin America in the 1930s, Malaysia in the 1950s, Viet Nam in the 1960s-70s, the hords of Middle Eastern expats that are employed by the U.S. Army National Training Centers right now, etc? If so, you've put together a good framework.

Now we find that all the fieldcraft and subtle arts of Small Wars are equally (or more) important than the romantic vision of mechanized brigades rolling through the hills of Germany.

playin' stickball with my cane, knock the ball back to someone's court
:cool:

We still have to be ready for full scale combat. It wouldn't be wise to get rid of the hardware. That is not what I meant. Full scale wars like WO1 or WO2 are not likely anymore. Our weaponry and the way the information flows will hamper any possible succes in the latent phase. The approach should be a complementary one in which every soldier is trained in an 3BW environment.
Although we might think that we train for such operations I think we do not.
We stil train at training areas at which we built training villages. In such a TA we train against civilians which are dressed up soldiers, so still we train with our military mindset against role-play with, also, a military mindset.
I don't want to "stove pipe" our training just expanding it.
If you have a look at my fist contribution you will notice that I see (and seek) possibilities to train as we operate. In the midst of townpopulation who's mindset "has been shaped" by, for instance, PsyOps elements. Although other operations which have more battle (non-permissive) characteristics can be trained at the TA's, it is still ONE operation.

If we brainstorm about this, supporting eachother to be creative, we will be able to set the conditions for an organisation that will be equiped for 3Block ops. Not stove piped elements, which will be organised in a modular way just before we deploy, but a permenant modular organisation in which all kinetic and non-kinitec elements and actors "experience" eachother. Such an approach will bring a broad perpective on the environment for all participants in a conflict.
I prefer "environment" above "battlespace" because battlespace refers to a specified area. Environment combines aspects like culture, economy, politics, opponents ... This is something for the Bn, Brigade level to be aware of.

[marct]

Hi Coined,


If you have a look at my fist contribution you will notice that I see (and seek) possibilities to train as we operate. In the midst of townpopulation who's mindset "has been shaped" by, for instance, PsyOps elements. Although other operations which have more battle (non-permissive) characteristics can be trained at the TA's, it is still ONE operation.

In January, Rob Thornton and I were presenting and the discussion moved to what is being simulated. What bothered me most of all was that what was being simulated was a desired reality rather than anything that was even close to real.

If you want to simulate training for, say, a multiplayer insurgency, then you actually need to have insurgent "leaders" who can think like the insurgents they are playing. This means that the IO/PSYOPs "shaping" would be as effective as it usually is in the field, i.e. really poor and often conveying the wrong message.


I prefer "environment" above "battlespace" because battlespace refers to a specified area. Environment combines aspects like culture, economy, politics, opponents ... This is something for the Bn, Brigade level to be aware of.

That's certainly a valid point, although I would argue that culture, economy, politics, etc. are all battlespaces as well - the only substantive difference is the conventions governing each of them.

[Coined]

Hi Coined,
In January, Rob Thornton and I were presenting and the discussion moved to what is being simulated. What bothered me most of all was that what was being simulated was a desired reality rather than anything that was even close to real.

If you want to simulate training for, say, a multiplayer insurgency, then you actually need to have insurgent "leaders" who can think like the insurgents they are playing. This means that the IO/PSYOPs "shaping" would be as effective as it usually is in the field, i.e. really poor and often conveying the wrong message.

That's certainly a valid point, although I would argue that culture, economy, politics, etc. are all battlespaces as well - the only substantive difference is the conventions governing each of them.

Thanks Marc, I agree that creating such a scenario will be highly time consuming and complex.
I just took PsyOps as an example and would challenge the participants in this discussion to look further. Going back to PsyOps, for that "art" it is important to learn Why and How to make an assessment of the population, Why and how to create messages for local TV and radio, and so on. That is just one part.
This has to be integrated with the other elements which make part of a Modular unit.
Try to look at a training as an endstate you like to reach, derive effects from it and "effect-bringers", the last ones are the elements of the Modular unit.
Still, and there you make an important statement, we should not create a desired reality !!!!!!!
Maybe I am not clear enough in my first contribution of this thread, must be my Denglish :)
but .... Van gave it a try in his latest contribution:
"This reads like a "best practices" approach to Small Wars (COIN, low intensity conflict, SASO, pick your buzzword). You are trying to assemble the concepts that have worked in Latin America in the 1930s, Malaysia in the 1950s, Viet Nam in the 1960s-70s, the hords of Middle Eastern expats that are employed by the U.S. Army National Training Centers right now, etc? If so, you've put together a good framework".

About the battlespace part. Usually this term refers to linear and stove piped thinking but if we agree on this being more than the place to kinetically attack the "enemy" it is fine with me :D

[marct]

Hi Coined,


Thanks Marc, I agree that creating such a scenario will be highly time consuming and complex.

Yup :D. Still and all, if that is the type of "combat" being fought, then that is what should be trained for.


I just took PsyOps as an example and would challenge the participants in this discussion to look further. Going back to PsyOps, for that "art" it is important to learn Why and How to make an assessment of the population, Why and how to create messages for local TV and radio, and so on. That is just one part.

Agreed, but it is a crucial part. Personally, in most of the combat spaces we are operating in right now, I would pay more attention to the non-broadcast techniques for communicating (posters, word of mouth / rumour, 'net based, etc.). I don't think there is too much of a problem with the "Why", but there are some serious problems with the "How" and "What".


Maybe I am not clear enough in my first contribution of this thread, must be my Denglish :)

You DO NOT want to hear my French, German or Dutch :rolleyes:!!!


About the battlespace part. Usually this term refers to linear and stove piped thinking but if we agree on this being more than the place to kinetically attack the "enemy" it is fine with me :D

Totally works for me! I'm looking at "battlespace" as a subset of the evolutionary term "workspace" anyway. For me, a "battlespace" is just a workspace that involves a "hot" competition in a workspace, and could be any "space" that is perceived / conceived by humans (or any other so-called sentient species... like my cat and his constant insurgent campaign for more cream in the morning!!!!).

Cheers,

Marc

[Coined]

Hi Marc,



Totally works for me! I'm looking at "battlespace" as a subset of the evolutionary term "workspace" anyway. For me, a "battlespace" is just a workspace that involves a "hot" competition in a workspace, and could be any "space" that is perceived / conceived by humans (or any other so-called sentient species... like my cat and his constant insurgent campaign for more cream in the morning!!!!).
Marc

With Why I mean; Why is that particular group of people important to make an assessment of? Why are they of importance to achieve "any" effect, and so on? After that the How and What may follow.

I think that the the future battlefield is about energy, water, an overcrowded earth and the food problems which will come along with that. The armies role will be more like "firemen". If you have a look at our beautiful world you will notice that about 75% of the population lives at about 25-30% of our Earth, roughly Asia, that part together with Africa can be our "challenging" environment, a 3BW environment.

Have a look at Afghanistan, the Taliban stand closely to the Wahabism, the most extreme explanation of the Quran, which is the state-religion of Saudi Arabia. This country together with other Gulf states supports the Taliban firmly. Also the drugs trade is huge. Many countries benefit from that. Electronics find their way from China to the Taliban, both China and Iran deliver weapons to parts of the Taliban and to the Hazara.

This can't be dealt with by a stove piped military approach. The military approach is just part of that. We have to train for such an approach, military training areas are too "narrow" for that.

For instance:

We know that (in this case) the Afghan population is illiterate (80%, and in Uruzgan 99%). The "mouth to mouth" news is THE news and the one who brings it is right. The mosque is one of the places where "the word" is spread; so send guys of the ANA to thos mosques in their uniform. Let them explain that "We are good muslims as you are and that is why we like to pray with you". They can build up rapport, so they can ask the population how they want to be helped, "We are Afghan as you are, we are here to build up our Afghanistan together". Of course there is more to it but that is too much for this mail. The outcome of this will be "more blending in" and if there is a disreputable or bad Imam preaching he will reconsider his anti-coaltion forces rethoric.

There are some Western armies, like the Canadian army, who have a military imam in their midst. An army captain. Imagine the mindset of the Afghans when they see him at TV or hear him at the radio having dicussions with Afghan mullah's. Imagine the reactions of the Ministry of Religious Affairs ........... Well, it happened and it worked, but due to the lack of policy on this it stopped when the captain ended his tour.

So, there is more ...... and we can train for that.

[William F. Owen]

I think that the the future battlefield is about energy, water, an overcrowded earth and the foodproblems which will come along with that. The armies role will be more like "firemen". If you have a look at our beautiful world you will notice that about 75% of the population lives at about 25-30% of our Earth, roughly Asia, that part together with Africa can be our "challenging" environment, a 3BW environment.
.

Armies are political instruments. Future conflicts will result from future politics, and nothing else. Resources may be an issue, but there is no evidence that they definitely will be. The same was predicted before 911, and look how wrong that was

We have a very clear guide as to what the future of war looks like and that's 3,000 years of military history. It also is our best guide as to how to fight and win. Call it "stove piped" or "linear" but it works much better than anything else. :)

[Ken White]

If there is not there should be. Seems to me that the object should be to get the Politicians educated so that they do not have to commit armed forces to three block wars because sensible diplomacy and aid applied by well educated and trained civilian specialists in their fields obviate the need for or desirability of a war. War brings in folks who are specialists in their field and that field is the conversion of urban blocks to rural terrain...

That said, Coined's suggestions are, as I meant to say in my first post on this thread, nothing new. As others here have pointed out, even the evil old US has adopted all those techniques. Re adopted, actually -- we used them all before and just let them fall away. Way of the world...

Been my observation that Cops do not fight fires well. Also noted that firefighters do not do police chores well. Soldiers can of course do both jobs and have done so for years -- they just don't do either very well. My bet is that will not change. Diplomacy, successfully applied has halted a need for troops many times -- that seems a better alternative than any kind of war. Or any commitment of military force that can be avoided -- such commitments have a way of escalating things.

Spend too much time training a person to be nice and you will succeed, spend too much training him to be destructive and you will succeed. It is possible to achieve a balance and we should strive for that but we should never forget that any compromise brings shortfalls in some areas. Military forces can, if necessary, do a marginal job in stability operations; they will never do a good job, it simply is not their field. Nor should it be.

I know their is a proverb about horses for courses... :wry:

[Coined]

Armies are political instruments. Future conflicts will result from future politics, and nothing else. Resources may be an issue, but there is no evidence that they definitely will be. The same was predicted before 911, and look how wrong that was

We have a very clear guide as to what the future of war looks like and that's 3,000 years of military history. It also is our best guide as to how to fight and win. Call it "stove piped" or "linear" but it works much better than anything else. :)

Agreed on the first part but let's not go to 9/11.
Europe knew 30 years of IRA in Ireland, RAF in Germany, Red Brigades in Italy, Action Directe in France, ETA in Spain, CCC in Belgium, Red Resistance Front in the Netherlands and that was the left wing part ..... Respecting the many death which was the result of the madness at 9/11, what is the point you want to make with 9/11 ??

For the last part. The only thing I like to stress is that we have to get a broader view at conflicts, the "hardware" aproach is just a (minor) part of conflicts.

Let us go back to rethink the way we can train ourselves and our troops better than we do now.

And dear Ken and William, I would appreciate it that you do not to lift words out of a sentence to react on.

The whole is more than the sum of its parts.

Like some quote's?? http://thinkexist.com/quotations ;)

“A common danger unites even the bitterest enemies”

“Anyone can become angry - that is easy, but to be angry with the right person at the right time, and for the right purpose and in the right way - that is not within everyone's power and that is not easy.”

“The greatest barrier to success is the fear of failure.”

Ahmed Rashid wrote some fine interesting books and an informative site is http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/cgsc/

Ready for some constructive and additional coments :)

[William F. Owen]

what is the point you want to make with 9/11 ??
The point is that attempting to predict the nature, location or cause of conflict is mostly pointless.


For the last part. The only thing I like to stress is that we have to get a broader view at conflicts, the "hardware" aproach is just a (minor) part of conflicts.

Let us go back to rethink the way we can train ourselves and our troops better than we do now.
Few of us who take military thought seriously are focussed on hardware. We discuss how to apply technology and equipment, but only ever in the wider context of training, education, and concepts.

The likes of Ken and I spend most of our time thinking how to train troops to do things better than we do now. It's what we (and others) do. If you don't believe me, we have some 3,000 posts demonstrating it.


And dear Ken and William, I would appreciate it that you do not to lift words out of a sentence to react on. The whole is more than the sum of its parts.

Not my intention. If a few of the parts are poorly described, or misleading, the sum/whole will suffer.

[Steve Blair]

I take Wilf's point to be that attempting to predict the future is a risky affair. While resources will most likely be an issue, the driving force behind conflicts for resources will in all probability remain political. I don't think many regular posters here look at conflicts as being all hardware. If you look around, you'll find many discussions relating to the role of diplomats in small wars, the interaction of COIN forces with native populations, and other considerations that are pretty divorced from hardware. Granted, the hardware discussions tend to attract a good deal of attention, but in each thread you'll find almost as many posts arguing against a hardware-centric approach to the conduct of small wars.

Conflict has always cycled between major wars (Napoleonic, Rome-Carthage, WW2, take your pick) and smaller scale conflicts (Indian Wars, many of Great Britain's Imperial operations, and so on). What we seem to have lost is the ability to distinguish between these cycles and select the policy tools that are best suited for the situation.

[Ken White]

Let us go back to rethink the way we can train ourselves and our troops better than we do now.No one is disagreeing with that. What we're awaiting is your providing some fresh thinking. Thus far, as Van said; "This reads like a "best practices" approach to Small Wars (COIN, low intensity conflict, SASO, pick your buzzword). You are trying to assemble the concepts that have worked in Latin America in the 1930s, Malaysia in the 1950s, Viet Nam in the 1960s-70s, the hords of Middle Eastern expats that are employed by the U.S. Army National Training Centers right now, etc? If so, you've put together a good framework.". To cap that, you even provide a link to the US army Combined Arms Center for backup of your position even though you offered several criticisms of US practices.

You did make this valid statement:
"For the last part. The only thing I like to stress is that we have to get a broader view at conflicts, the "hardware" aproach is just a (minor) part of conflicts."I can't speak for others but I do not question that. My guess is that most here would agree. Thus my comment above; ""Seems to me that the object should be to get the Politicians educated so that they do not have to commit armed forces to three block wars because sensible diplomacy and aid applied by well educated and trained civilian specialists in their fields obviate the need for or desirability of a war. War brings in folks who are specialists in their field and that field is the conversion of urban blocks to rural terrain...""
And dear Ken and William, I would appreciate it that you do not to lift words out of a sentence to react on.

The whole is more than the sum of its parts.

I would be happy to comment on anything new that is the sum of any parts. Thus far, you have provided nothing new that I have seen and no sum.
Ready for some constructive and additional coments. :)I though I had supplied some constructive comment which apparently you missed. Let me sum up my comments:

You so far as I can tell offer nothing new or innovative, instead say we need to incorporate best practices identified by many over the years -- and which are already being applied. No one has disagreed with that, many merely pointed out that is being done.

You propose to retrain military forces for a stabilization role. My experience and observation over a good many years and involving troops from many nations tells me this is an acceptable plan if there is no alternative; if there is any way to preclude such a military commitment, it should be pursued because military forces NEVER do a good job at stability operations; there are better ways.

My view is that the problems cited in that last statement will not change regardless of training UNLESS you completely move the force away from combat operations; I doubt this is a good idea.

Stabilization of problematic nations will without be required. Identification and evaluation of such a problem should be followed by rapid and adequate application of civilian efforts to preclude the necessity of a military deployment.

Two comments to add to all that; rapid and timely civilian intervention has been precluded and deterred by several factors. It worked for Colonies; it works less well in a post-colonial world where sensitivities to 'help' are a major problem that does not change the fact that civil is better and a military effort can create as many problems as it solves. Secondly, Europeans live in smaller, more homogeneous nations with strong central governments and have a colonial history and thus are more adept at providing such aid than are Americans. We know that and we accept it. We cannot for several reasons adopt European practices in totality. Size and breadth of necessary view being but two.

That's my summation, If I'm wrong in my assessment of your proposals, please tell me precisely what is wrong and I'll adjust.

[jmm99]

for the past two days. I have a question:

Are the OP and additions thereto intended to provide any guidance to civilians who are interested in the non-military aspects of stability operations (nation building) ?

If so, the OP etc. have failed to reach this member of that audience. I have no idea of exactly what is being proposed or why.

Since the proposals are unclear to me, I cannot assess whether they are aimed at force structures, training, intra-agency co-ordination, inter-agency co-ordination, or something else.

Where does the OP etc. fit into something like James Dobbins' construct in The Beginner’s Guide to Nation-Building (http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2007/RAND_MG557.pdf) (p.27):


Setting Priorities

The prime objective of any nation-building operation is to make violent societies peaceful, not to make poor ones prosperous, or authoritarian ones democratic. Economic development and political reform are important instruments for effecting this transformation, but will not themselves ensure it. Rather, such efforts need to be pursued within a broader framework, the aim of which is to redirect the competition for wealth and power, which takes place within any society, from violent into peaceful channels.

The first-order priorities for any nation-building mission are public security and humanitarian assistance. If the most basic human needs for safety, food, and shelter are not being met, any money spent on political or economic development is likely to be wasted. Accordingly, this guidebook is organized around a proposed hierarchy of nationbuilding tasks, which may be prioritized as follows:

Security: peacekeeping, law enforcement, rule of law, and security sector reform

Humanitarian relief: return of refugees and response to potential epidemics, hunger, and lack of shelter

Governance: resuming public services and restoring public administration

Economic stabilization: establishing a stable currency and providing a legal and regulatory framework in which local and international commerce can resume

Democratization: building political parties, free press, civil society, and a legal and constitutional framework for elections

Development: fostering economic growth, poverty reduction, and infrastructure improvements.

This is not to suggest that the above activities should necessarily be initiated sequentially. If adequate funding is available, they can and should proceed in tandem. But if higher-order priorities are not adequately resourced, investment in lower-order ones is likely to be wasted.

Feel free to treat me as a three-year old in response - consise and definite statements are helpful to us infants.

-----------------
PS: Ken, you mean for 34 years I've been saddled with the boxed set of Bob Asprey's Shadows, when I could've been using an abridged edition ? And referring to that work, is it true that you introduced the gladius (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gladius) to the Legions in one of your training sessions ? :D

[Coined]

We agree on most parts.

I do not want to (re)train troops for stabilization ops.
I suggest to train troops in a broader context as I have written a few times before. I you read the last part of my contribution you will notice that.

“If you only do what you know you can do- you never do very much.”

“Whatever course you decide upon, there is always someone to tell you that you are wrong. There are always difficulties arising which tempt you to believe that your critics are right. To map out a course of action and follow it to an end requires courage.”

[davidbfpo]

I too am finding this thread hard to follow.

A couple of points I'd make:

1) Where is there a suitable environment for such urban area training, complete with Third World conditions and a living supportive population? I can only quickly think of Morocco, only as 'Blackhawk Down' was filmed there. Mmm, would Puerto Rico, Costa Rica and such small places oblige?

2) It took a long time for NATO armies in Germany, before the end of the 'Cold War', to acknowledge urban operations (Berlin excluded) and build small training villages. Venues that could be adapted for pre-Ulster deployment.

3) Is training without soldiers en masse an acceptable alternative? Sounds almost like the "war rides" staff colleges pursue.

4) Are lessons truly shared and learnt about small wars, e.g. UK intervention in Sierra Leone (rural not urban I concede)? Is there a NATO facility that does this?

davidbfpo

[Hacksaw]

COINed...

I'm neither the brightest nor dimmest bulb on the tree...

I've been trying hard to grasp what it is you are trying to communicate...

It seems you are dealing from a point of ignorance with regard to how (how the US) we train...

Not to mention most of your plaintive requests to "read" what you've said is not persuassive, just.... annoying.... trust me I'm right just doesn't go very far in this group of serious minded professionals (trust me its a tough love sort of lesson)...

So... a suggestion... just read the responses... allow for the fact that the collective operational experience of 100s of years just might be right and you wrong (or at least poorly communicated)

I'd hazzard a guess that you are in violent agreement with most who have advised you to tighten the shot group on your proposed... I don't know what idea, concept, construct... not sure what to call it...

Really take a step back from your ideas, disconnect your ego from said ideas, and reload...

Live well and row

[jenniferro10]

...it became painfully clear that all of us really are talking about the same thing with different words (as people much smarter than me have already pointed out). So, I'll offer this, in plain English:

1. Our terminology changes as our understanding of a problem becomes more refined. A great example is Jennifer Chandler's discussion of our military's fractured, incomplete definition and understanding of what culture is (www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/research/theses/chandler05.pdf). This thesis was written in 2005. I think we can all point out several examples of the changing terminology (for the better and for the worse) since then. What's the problem with that? IMHO, evolution is a good thing. Change for change's sake is not.

2. Other than terminology/semantics, we've discussed the future of war and the possible role of our military in it. So far we have not discussed the corrolary implicit in the points of every person that's replied so far (at least, the ones that weren't pickin on people): how do we capture cultural information from the soldiers' experience, make it useful (operational) for the immediate future and in the decisionmaking going on way above that guy's head and for parallel operations of other branches and teams, and also feed it back into the training system?

[davidbfpo]

Jenniferro10,

Welcome to the SWC and an impressive first post too! Just had a quick look at the linked document, in particular the templates advocated. They appear to be what some police officers inherently acquire with time, plus now appear regularly in training material and what in the UK are called 'Community Impact Assessments'.

Perhaps some US "brothers in blue" will recognise the similarities?

I acknowledge there is a big difference between police based in the area and the arrival of the foriegn military in an operational area.

davidbfpo

[Ken White]

I do not want to (re)train troops for stabilization ops.
I suggest to train troops in a broader context as I have written a few times before. I you read the last part of my contribution you will note that.My mis statement, I did understand that, but I also thought you were advocating significantly more training in that broader context than is now the case. As others said; that context -- not fully as you have stated but nearly so -- is now being used by most NATO nations. The US is certainly doing so...

Thus my slip to 'more.'
“If you only do what you know you can do- you never do very much.”That sort of quote is cute but of little significance and distracts from your posts (as do some of my attempts at humor distract from mine). In that particular case, as stated, most NATO Armies and the US in particular are already doing what you suggest -- so how does that quote apply?
“Whatever course you decide upon, there is always someone to tell you that you are wrong. There are always difficulties arising which tempt you to believe that your critics are right. To map out a course of action and follow it to an end requires courage.”Comment above applies. No one has said you were wrong in your focus, only that much of it in application is being done -- or not done for good reasons (Though you may not agree the reasons are good and that's understandable and acceptable to all).

Since most western, certainly most NATO Armies and the US are using variations of what you say you want, no one is telling you that you are wrong with respect to the training issue. Everyone has agreed that some form of your suggestions is desirable. Thus we have another quote that does not apply.

So much for training on which we seem to agree -- except that you say you wish it done and I say it IS being done -- and my understanding of your proposals. Could I draw your attention to my two other possibly constructive points above:

- Regardless of degree of training, military forces do not do a good job in stability operations and their use should be avoided.

- Problematic nations should first be assisted to the maximum possible extent by civilian efforts. I'll add to that should the security situation be dire or deteriorate, then military force can be used as necessary -- but the direction of effort and the primary stabilization work should all be civilian. Soldiers do not and will not make good nation builders...

[jmm99]

from jen..10
2. Other than terminology/semantics, we've discussed the future of war and the possible role of our military in it. So far we have not discussed the corrolary implicit in the points of every person that's replied so far (at least, the ones that weren't pickin on people): how do we capture cultural information from the soldiers' experience, make it useful (operational) for the immediate future and in the decisionmaking going on way above that guy's head and for parallel operations of other branches and teams, and also feed it back into the training system?

this is what is being discussed - although to this perhaps dim-witted legal type, it cannot be gleaned by him from the OP etc. It can be gleaned by him from MAJ Chandler's article.

[jmm99]

from Ken
- Regardless of degree of training, military forces do not do a good job in stability operations and their use should be avoided.

- Problematic nations should first be assisted to the maximum possible extent by civilian efforts. I'll add to that should the security situation be dire or deteriorate, then military force can be used as necessary -- but the direction of effort and the primary stabilization work should all be civilian. Soldiers do not and will not make good nation builders...

and so it be.

Not surprising when we consider the first of Dobbins' priorities (link in my post on p.2 of thread):


Security: peacekeeping, law enforcement, rule of law, and security sector reform

of which only "peacekeeping" is a military function (peace enforcement in a forced entry situation requires much more military input - Dobbins gives 10x as something of a norm). The remaining security functions are primarily "blue coat" and "black robe" things - although a gendarmerie-type force well might be required in a rougher environment. In any event, they are aspects of criminal law enforcement within a criminal justice system.

Dobbins' remaining five priorities are neither military nor criminal justice functions: Humanitarian relief; Governance; Economic stabilization; Democratization; and Development. In legal terms, these are all civil law sectors in a normally functioning nation - e.g., in the US and UK, civil law matters dwarf criminal law matters.

This is not to say that soldiers should be oblivious to these civilian considerations. They may well become involved in situations (e.g., in Vietnam, as Ken has pointed out in the past) where one district has HIC, another district virtually no conflict, and a third has LIC - with not many klicks separating the districts.

Another consideration (US) is that the normal legal structure established by Congress (having to do with appropriations and turf protection) gives the civilian component primacy. When in a stability operation the military is ordered to step in having primacy in fact, the result is kludgey.

My perception - very much civilian-driven.

[MikeF]

...it became painfully clear that all of us really are talking about the same thing with different words (as people much smarter than me have already pointed out). So, I'll offer this, in plain English:

1. Our terminology changes as our understanding of a problem becomes more refined. A great example is Jennifer Chandler's discussion of our military's fractured, incomplete definition and understanding of what culture is (www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/research/theses/chandler05.pdf). This thesis was written in 2005. I think we can all point out several examples of the changing terminology (for the better and for the worse) since then. What's the problem with that? IMHO, evolution is a good thing. Change for change's sake is not.

2. Other than terminology/semantics, we've discussed the future of war and the possible role of our military in it. So far we have not discussed the corrolary implicit in the points of every person that's replied so far (at least, the ones that weren't pickin on people): how do we capture cultural information from the soldiers' experience, make it useful (operational) for the immediate future and in the decisionmaking going on way above that guy's head and for parallel operations of other branches and teams, and also feed it back into the training system?


The reason the Air Force, Army, Navy and Marines bicker amongst themselves is that they don't speak the same language. For instance, Take the simple phrase "secure the building".

The Army will post guards around the place.

The Navy will turn out the lights and lock the doors.

The Marines will kill everybody inside and set up a headquarters.

The Air Force will take out a 5 year lease with an option to buy.

v/r

Mike

[davidbfpo]

As if on cue, a UK MoD "spin" story on a new training facility in the Uk for Afghaanistan: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/onthefrontline/5256219/MoD-builds-Afghan-village-in-Norfolk.html

davidbfpo

[William F. Owen]

.

2. Other than terminology/semantics, we've discussed the future of war and the possible role of our military in it.

I submit we have not discussed this. THIS IS the problem. We have a significant community who wish to paint a picture of future conflict that fits their desire to innovate and complicate. Central to this is their to change the military to fit their image of the future.

If armies did not do something in the past, it is extremely unlikely we need to do it today or even in the future.


how do we capture cultural information from the soldiers' experience, make it useful (operational) for the immediate future and in the decisionmaking going on way above that guy's head and for parallel operations of other branches and teams, and also feed it back into the training system?

If this means simple and effective education, I agree. You can teach any English speaking army how to interact with the Bedouin, in 1 day! That is, how not to unintentionally offend them. In 99% of cases, nothing more is needed.

Capturing operational lessons from conflict is pretty simple and their are at least 2 good examples of best practice, with a proven track record, so their is no need for anyone to invent anything new.

[Ken White]

...In 99% of cases, nothing more is needed.

Capturing operational lessons from conflict is pretty simple and their are at least 2 good examples of best practice, with a proven track record, so their is no need for anyone to invent anything new.With an American cynical caveat to an optimistic British figure -- I'd say 90%. There will always be 10% who can muck up anything... :D

[jenniferro10]

...for all the "success stories" that you guys are pointing out, there seem to be many more failures. As I come accross them in the interviews I'm doing lately, I've noticed a pattern in the "Monday AM quarterback" discussion of why things happened the way they did: someone, somewhere, did not relate or document what they had learned.

There's a certain amount of that that's human and understandable. And, there are some people, it seems, that are making it a personal crusade to systematically collect and distribute cultural information that they are learning "in the field". But between contracted training classes ("owned" by their creators), and the scattered authority for creating and evaluating the cultural training US soldiers get, then I think it's to be expected that there's no real institutionalized method to avoid problems like the one I heard the other day: about 25 soldiers received language training specific to a particular region that, when they got there, was useless because all of the local people spoke a very dissimilar dialect. Not one person ever asked these guys: Hey, was your training useful? No? Why? What do they speak there, if not what we thought?

I became interested in this topic out of curiosity, and have been literally deluged by responses from enlisted folks. Anthropologists, history professors, and adult ed professionals are delivering cultural training to US troops, many of whom could probably teach the class themselves for 5% of the money in 10% of the time. People ask them about the functioning of their weapons, in order to improve the weapon or training to use it, but there's no similar system (outside of some informal loops, or "on paper" processes that aren't executed) to do the same for cultural training.

I remain open to discussing directly with interested parties...

[Ken White]

...for all the "success stories" that you guys are pointing out, there seem to be many more failures.on this thread. If you're referring to comments on other threads, I'm sure there are some success stories -- and I'm equally sure there are far more failures.

That's mostly due to priority of effort followed by the size of the Armed Forces and a lot of bureaucratic impediments. It's also due to this phenomenon:
"...People ask them about the functioning of their weapons, in order to improve the weapon or training to use it, but there's no similar system (outside of some informal loops, or "on paper" processes that aren't executed) to do the same for cultural training."Rightly or wrongly -- and I'm making no excuse, just telling you what 'is' -- the weapon is seen as important, the cultural training is seen as as nice to have by most (not all) at all ranks. 'Important' beats 'nice to have.' That also means there's no good answer to your original question re: how do we capture cultural information from the soldiers' experience, make it useful... and also feed it back into the training system. The issue isn't seen as important enough to make a full scale press on it -- which is what your query would entail. The system is too big and too broadly focused (which culture is important next year? In 2015? 2025?)
"...then I think it's to be expected that there's no real institutionalized method to avoid problems like the one I heard the other day: about 25 soldiers received language training specific to a particular region that, when they got there, was useless because all of the local people spoke a very dissimilar dialect. Not one person ever asked these guys: Hey, was your training useful? No? Why? What do they speak there, if not what we thought?Bad, wrong -- but stuff like that happens frequently; not only with language or cultural training but with other even more important and more expensive training. A unit is destined to do something somewhere and before they arrive, events occur that mean a unit is needed elsewhere for a different mission. The planners have to weigh priorities and assign someone to the most important mission regardless of training. That again is not an excuse, just a reason. It shouldn't happen; we could certainly do better but it's a chaotic system, not a smooth machine and, again, the priority goes to life and death stuff, not aids to performance.

I'm old and long retired, so I can't talk about now with any facility, I can only tell you, based on experience, the 'why' of some things and wish you luck in your quest:
I remain open to discussing directly with interested parties...

[marct]

Hi Jennifer,


I remain open to discussing directly with interested parties...

I'm pretty sure that Ken has nailed the main reason - institutional (read "organizational cultural") bias / history. Evaluations such as what you are talking about are, strangely enough, rather tricky to do. It's pretty easy to ask "Did the gun fire" six months later after a mission. It's much harder to evaluate cultural training six months later.

Now, having said that, it is pretty easy to evaluate the spectacular failures of cultural training, such as the one you mentioned. But how about successes? With languages, some evaluation is possible or, rather, testing for language competencies is possible. That does not necessarily mean that the language can be used in the field (check out TOEFL scores vs the actual ability to network in a f2f setting).

"Cultural training" is even worse. All too often, it is 1-3 hours sandwiched in during the "real" stuff. Even if the students want more, they often don't have the time for more. All too often, the courses are canned - designed by a committee, delivered by anyone and, as the Bard opined, "a tale told by an idiot, full of sound and fury, signifying nothing". In the rare cases where you have a top notch instructor who knows the material well and is great at it (Paula Holmes-Eber comes to mind, but I know of others), you still have that institutional time limit.

Should there be a feedback loop to help improve the training? Yup, there should. The problem, of course, is that that type of training is often not evaluable by the students until after they have gone in the field, so such an evaluation often breaks down into a popularity contest in the infotainment field.

BTW, I'm not trying to be egregiously negative here :D. I'm just pointing out that there are some problems inherent in the evaluation process when you take subject matter that should be taught as education, not training, and attempt to apply evaluation criteria that were designed for training.

Cheers,

Marc

[William F. Owen]

The issue isn't seen as important enough to make a full scale press on it -- which is what your query would entail. The system is too big and too broadly focused (which culture is important next year? In 2015? 2025?)

Right on the money. Training should and education should focus on widely applicable fundamentals, to lay the bedrock for things that are deployment or mission specific. - and BTW in 1992 the British Army's Intelligence Corps deployed a recently qualified and fluent Mandarin speaker to Northern Ireland, not Hong Kong - because his "other" skills set was needed their. You can't tell the future.



BTW, I'm not trying to be egregiously negative here :D. I'm just pointing out that there are some problems inherent in the evaluation process when you take subject matter that should be taught as education, not training, and attempt to apply evaluation criteria that were designed for training.

I concur, but the formula to avoid the pitfall is that education has to be kept simple, relevant, and be delivered by someone the military community can trust, in language they can understand.

...and that means not using silly words and phrases, like "human terrain."

[Ron Humphrey]

...and that means not using silly words and phrases, like "human terrain."

Could you remind me again : Is it guns that kill or Humans with guns;)

[Ken White]

Could you remind me again : Is it guns that kill or Humans with guns;)and other items including occasionally even bare hands while ON terrain -- or flying above it or sailing on or under the sea that is overlaying some of it???

I think he means that anyone who tries to navigate the human 'terrain' will find out humans are not terrain -- and thus they are not truly mappable. Thus to try to equate people and the ground is to delude one self that a cursory recon will allow a great route to be chosen...

Or he could just mean it's not a well grounded idea for a term. I can dig that. :D

[Ron Humphrey]

and other items including occasionally even bare hands while ON terrain -- or flying above it or sailing on or under the sea that is overlaying some of it???

I think he means that anyone who tries to navigate the human 'terrain' will find out humans are not terrain -- and thus they are not truly mappable. Thus to try to equate people and the ground is to delude one self that a cursory recon will allow a great route to be chosen...

Or he could just mean it's not a well grounded idea for a term. I can dig that. :D

Of such silly notions as attributing supposed knowledge of the human condition as being on par with awareness of the balance of power in the weapons and physical terrain.

One aspect of confusion on my part though. Perhaps the reason it is held as important to actually delineate human terrain(awareness of that an environmental factor worth consideration) is that so often we seem to forget this part-


and other items including occasionally even bare hands

In other words just because I know where the weapons caches, airfields, command and control facilities, ports, etc are doesn't mean that I might not need to be aware of how I talk or interact with "X" human. Or that ignoring that may not cost me a whole lot more than I want to pay.

Would it be too much to suggest that a lot of this emphasis has to do with the fact that in stability ops have a whole lot more in common with police and detention than they do with HIC ops?

Thus the necessity for such analytic practices as Human Terrain awareness.

[William F. Owen]

Thus the necessity for such analytic practices as Human Terrain awareness.

Human Terrain is a meaningless phrase, or should be. There is terrain and their is the population. They are very different things. The population has social, political and religious beliefs - call it.. er culture?

If you are a military organisation your gain information as part of your inherent functions. It's what you do. Therefore, in security operations, and/or combat, you gain information about the population. That is an enduring, normal and historic practice. Good Armies did it long before we had "Human Terrain Teams." It was called "gaining relevant information.." - or err.... intelligence.

If we can't use a coherent professional language, free from silly jargon and buzz words, we'll start calling rifles "Bang Bang sticks."

[slapout9]

Would it be too much to suggest that a lot of this emphasis has to do with the fact that in stability ops have a whole lot more in common with police and detention than they do with HIC ops?

Thus the necessity for such analytic practices as Human Terrain awareness.

Ron,It is police work 101 but we sure never called it Human Terrain Awareness(I thought that was girl watching:wry:)

You don't need 14 college degrees either. I know some double clutchin detectives that could run most intell ops with 3x5 cards and I don't think there is a college degree between the whole bunch of them. But if you ended up on there to do list....they would map your terrain alright:D

[Ron Humphrey]

In relation to both silly jargon and police 101.

To the first though it may be silly to the soldier how silly is it to those external actors involved both on the diplomatic and social areas of your operations?

On the second consisdering I still haven't managed to complete even the requisit BA I'm with ya 100% there.

However that said sometimes that particular radar is easily misdirected by emotional appeals to immediate perceptions and whole lot of time could be saved if the right questions were asked.

Finding what those are involves a little more than instinct.

[Steve the Planner]

Jennifer:

I love the discussion on language, cultural training, feedback loops, and institutional retention/use of information.

Wonder why, in 2009, SIGIR called Iraq's 6-year long reconstruction effort a $141 Billion Fiasco, and Secretary Clinton, after touring Afghanistan, declared our effort there to be "heartbreaking?"

Your comments really start to cut to the heart of our reconstruction/stabilization efforts, with three additional caveats.

1. Institutionalization of knowledge/learning in an environment of constant rotations. How much is learned? By whom? In what fields (cultural, economic, social systems and structures)? How is it retained/passed on/acted upon?

Arriving in Iraq in December 2007 as a senior reconstruction planner for DoS (PRT), I was amazed at how little was known in so many civilian spheres.

When approached about dropping off a batch of portable generators to a village without power, I asked, in the fifth year of Iraq, how many years in a row were these things dropped off? No one knew anything beyond their rotation date. I asked why these things might not be working (lack of fuel, theft, lack of parts/arabic-language repair & maintenance manuals). No one knew. I asked whether there was someone in the village who had the ability and resources to actually sustain the generator's on-going operation. No one knew.

The real answer was that we had been dropping off portable generators every year, but they required fuel, parts, and careful maintenance (dust, 130 degrees, etc...). No one in the village had the where-with-all to sustain the generators, so they ended up as an expensive paperweight which was later sold for whatever could be gotten.

The big problem was agriculture---a lack of agricultural infrastructure support, and a pervasive drought. For decades before the US came along, Iraqi farm folks had been deserting the farms in what historian Pheobe Marr called "the ruralization" of Iraq's cities. Every failure to restart/support agriculture only built more pressure and instability in Baghdad, Mosul, etc... as farmers abandoned the farms for the cities. But we had no systematic responses or elevated focus on the need for agriculture, and, as of early 2008, the US did not know about poultry feed systems, or the scope of aquaculture. Clueless...

In 2008, we were just learning these things?

2. Collection/action on useful civilian knowledge. In Iraq in 2008, once the action shifted from war-fighting to economic restart, no entity (DoD, NGA or DoS) had the systematic information to support a sustainable civilian reconstruction program. Great imagery, and physical mapping, but there was no composite source for information on what people did there before, what assets were (or had been) available to support public services, industries, agriculture and value chains, what transportation linkages were essential to reopening the economy.

Our system was devoid of any useful information upon which to develop a cohesive reconstruction strategy, so health clinics and school buildings were fired off like grenades, hoping the smoke would protect the soldiers under some brigade or battalion commander's care, but with little understanding of how they would, or would not, fit into a sustainable Iraqi system of public health or education.

Having said that, once I began to seek it out, there was no end of wise CA officers who, at the end of their tours, would look me up to give me reams of data, site assessments and photos of critical economic and infrastructure assets. They always said, "I thought somebody might use this sometime."

Then, terrain folks, working with CA and engineering, began to assemble enough pieces to develop systematic maps and analysis, and local government contacts began to bring critical info to the table. Pretty soon, we were able to identify important gaps, and develop strategies to tackle the big and small picture problems, usually in conjunction with provincial and national service ministry representatives. (But this is 2008, not 2003!?!)

By early 2008, we had a functional economic map of Northern Iraq, including all the key economic and infrastructure assets needed for fast, effective reconstruction, and a basis for understanding critical economic linkages and transportation systems. From that, we were able to target civilian "systems" and get beyond the test project phase.

But, against a US reconstruction program hell-bent on accountability for delivery of US-funded schools, health clinics, refrigerated bongo trucks, etc., there was no way to integrate any of this into the Washington-based program structure. Some of us knew it in the field, and understood why the US programs were missing the mark, but there was no format to take the information higher.

Then, my tour ended and that of the folks I was working with. Like the departing CA folks, there was no one to give the info to, no out-briefing, and no lessons learned, so the info just sits in my head and on my hard drive in the States.

I can only hope the new folks picked up where I left off. (Six years in Iraq, one year at a time.)

2. Organizational awareness.

In Iraq, there was a complex governmental structure, born of post-Ottoman (and french-like) bureaus, accented by soviet-style central planning, and decades of half-imposed bureaucratic reform initiatives (including the US efforts).

Still, the revenge of geography dictated that Iraq, a large clay desert served by two rivers slicing through a central plain, with the key population centers arranged down the plain, was best managed by regional systems (public or private) of water, waste water, agriculture, etc..., and had been for centuries.
Dates from Khanaqin and Balad needed to be processed in Baqubbah, and the big cities were the key markets for all the grain, citrus, and livestock products. Feedstock came from outside, and had to be transported, stored, blended and distributed across Iraq. Fertilizer had to be trucked. Water used upstream didn't travel downstream. Etc..

After 2003, national ministries were to be avoided, and provincial government was to be created in isolation, even if from scratch. But the operational logic of locally-based effective governance was highly questionable in a country with such substantial inter-regional dependencies.

Soldiers on the ground often saw an impoverished and minimally-literate local folk struggling to get water, power, and food. The reality was that these folks had been optimized for the system they were in before. The only fast strategy was to re-institute what they had before, or spend the years and billions it would take to bring forth a new system---while everything sat dark, thirsty and waiting. But few US folks understood what the old system was, let alone how to activate it.

When I began meeting with national service ministry-types in Iraq, I found out that they were proud of having rebuild the country after the Iran/Iraq War, and having carried aging public service and infrastructure systems along through a decade of parts embargoes and strife. They were the key to addressing regional systems, not the provinces.

As with the economic system analysis above, Iraq's regions were highly inter-dependent for trade, agricultural support/processing, and much of it was under the national service ministries' control. But, apparently, they were the "bad guys." So, the ministry engineers, lacking security, transport, and direction, often stayed in Baghdad while regional systems continued to fail.

The Iraqis could basically fix their own systems, but weren't going to defy the US to do it.

In 2008, MG Mark Hertling began to break the provincial/ministerial gridlock by routinely bringing national ministry officials up north to address problems (drought, transportation, electricity, agriculture, etc...), and cajoled, pressured, and supported their efforts. In March 2009, he was quoted as citing effective national ministerial engagements as an important part of stability in the north. But that was no small feat on his part, and building national ministerial engagement ran against US province-by-province reconstruction policy.

Somewhere in my mind is the vision, borne of Iraq's efforts, of a Washington-based program to make sure every Afghan has a refrigerated bongo truck, whether they need it or not, and a whole lot of them on the black market in Kabul to bring much-needed relief to residents of the rapidly urbanizing slums.

It would be nice if I was wrong.

Steve

[Ken White]

I mean that -- but that does not mean I have to agree with them on some terms. For this one, as Wilf said,
Human Terrain is a meaningless phrase, or should be. There is terrain and their is the population. They are very different things. The population has social, political and religious beliefs - call it.. er culture?To my mind, the Human Terrain phrase is demeaning to people (either friends, foes or neutrals), is terribly imprecise (and words can be important) and it can send a bad message in several respects not least that people can or should be mapped or cataloged (they can but you better be real careful how you do that and have a lot of people working on updates). IOW, I think it is not a good selection for a title of an effort required in COIN and similar ops. That said:
...disabusing one Of such silly notions as attributing supposed knowledge of the human condition as being on par with awareness of the balance of power in the weapons and physical terrain.I don't think I said anything nearly like that. I just said humans weren't terrain. I did not say in any way that one did not absolutely have to know the people in ones AO and what their effect on the mission will be. OTOH, in that post you quoted, I did say this:

""Thus to try to equate people and the ground is to delude one self that a cursory recon will allow a great route to be chosen...""

That means that if you try to simplify people into a 'terrain' or general recon and use item; you're going to screw up. My gripe with 'human terrain' is that it can lead the ill informed to underplay the importance of the human dimension. It's a silly misleading phrase.
In other words just because I know where the weapons caches, airfields, command and control facilities, ports, etc are doesn't mean that I might not need to be aware of how I talk or interact with "X" human. Or that ignoring that may not cost me a whole lot more than I want to pay.I agree. Please tell me how that interaction or talking equates to terrain in any way.

And remind me what the first 'T' and that 'C' in METT-TC represent, perhaps explaining in the process why they are two separate items... :wry:

[jmm99]

but at least I found a starting point for something I understand - Human Terrain Mapping (http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/milreview/marr08marapr.pdf), as most simply exemplified by the map of Sunni, Shia and mixed areas (p.19 of article); but more specifically:


Defining Tactical Human-Terrain Mapping

TF Dragon executed its data-collection effort through systematic people-to-people contact. The staff planned decentralized platoon-level patrols, conducted during daylight hours, that sought answers to specific questions about the population. These specific “information requirements” (IR) about each separate village and town included—

The boundaries of each tribal area (with specific attention to where they adjoined or overlapped).

Location and contact information for each sheik or village mukhtar and any other important people (government officials, Iraqi Security Forces, etc.).

Locations of mosques, schools, and markets.

Identification of the population’s daily habits (when they woke up, slept, shopped, etc.).

Nearest locations and checkpoints of Iraqi Security Forces.

Economic driving force (i.e., occupation and livelihood).

Employment and unemployment levels.

Population flow (i.e., people moving in or out of the AO).

Anti-coalition presence and activities.

Access to essential services (fuel, water, emergency care, fire response, etc).

Particular local population concerns and issues.

This seems a valid enough use of applying graphics (overlays, etc.) to show demonstratively the relationships between the population and its terrain (geography).

IIRC (always dangerous), something akin to that was suggested within the last two decades in Egypt by some civilian assistance agency re: the problem of collecting taxes, property ownership, etc. Seems Egypt had no records id'ing who lived where, owned what, leased what, etc. Solution (which I can't recall whether implemented or not) was what any rum-dum county tax equalization department has - a database of property "cards" mapping the data against the terrain (plat maps).

Seems that "Human Terrain" has morphed beyond those concepts into something I don't understand.

Agree with slap:


You don't need 14 college degrees either. I know some double clutchin detectives that could run most intell ops with 3x5 cards and I don't think there is a college degree between the whole bunch of them. But if you ended up on there to do list....they would map your terrain alright.

[Ken White]

Seems that "Human Terrain" has morphed beyond those concepts into something I don't understand.and good for them for doing that kind of mapping, as Slap points out and as anyone who served above Rifle Platoon level in Viet Nam (knows not to mention above Cav Troop in the Indian wars or the Philippines in '01 -- 1901) it works.

While they did well to reinvent it (even though techniques are in several Intel Pams and Manuals or used to be...), they or someone somewhere did not do a good job of naming it.

You're correct, it has taken on a life of its own; jargon will do that -- and it is seldom helpful.

[Van]

Human terrain mapping is about...

Mapping, which is to say writing down and depicting, so the the Greek root graphia '-graphy' is appropriate.

Human, as in the catagorization of groups of humans, is consistent with the Greek root "ethnos". (Not 'anthro' as that is more inclusive, it doesn't carry the meaning of ordering of groups or classification.)

So Human terrain mapping could be called "ethnography"? Just like the British practiced in colonial India? As I get older and grumpier, my tolerance for adding new words to the 'buzzword bingo' chart wears thinner and thinner.

I disagree with the Wilf that human terrain mapping is meaningless. Terrain and populations are deeply inter-related, and effect each other (the Aral Sea provides an excellent case study in the interactions between terrain, culture, civics, history, and economics). The territorial behaviors of many cultures also lend themselves to a graphic depiction on a map (although this can lead to troubles too, when you consider topics like "Greater Serbia", "The Ottoman Empire", or "Persia"). Admittedly, 'human terrain' is dynamic and any ethnography will be a snapshot rather than a definative work, but how else do you capture the relevant information for the folks who are required to use said information?

On the other hand, the word 'terrain' in this context is rather like the pointy-haired boss refering to the people who work for him as resources.

[Ken White]

I don't think anyone has disagreed to any great extent with anything in your first four paragraphs. :cool:
I disagree with the Wilf that human terrain mapping is meaningless.That's not what he said; he did say "Human Terrain is a meaningless phrase, or should be. There is terrain and their is the population. They are very different things. The population has social, political and religious beliefs - call it.. er culture?(emphasis added / kw)
On the other hand, the word 'terrain' in this context is rather like the pointy-haired boss refering to the people who work for him as resources.Or worse...

Which is Wilf's point and mine. The skill and technique are older than all of us and needed, no question -- the term is just a very poor choice and not totally indicative of what one should be doing. Somewhere about 1/40th of the way into 45 years in and with the Armed Forces of the US I became totally convinced that if something can be mislabeled, misconstrued and misused, preferably all three, it will be. All the rest of that time just confirmed it. Repeatedly... :D

[Ron Humphrey]

While I recognize the wisdom in what you all are stating and yes as many have mentioned the current reinventions have been markedly less than stellar that unfortunately still leaves us with how come it had to be reinvented in the first place.

If somethings important enough how else do you get it back so those who knew it best can reshape it correctly than to throw it on the table in whatever form or format you can?

[Ken White]

It is particularly bad in the Armed forces and more particularly in the Army -- and that will not change until three things occur. (1) We inculcate in schoolkids the importance of history and the NEED to avoid wasting effort on reinvention. (2) The personnel system stops insisting on up or out; on moves every three years (to better train and round out the troops -- or to justify jobs for the Personnel Managers? Try to lay off the excess in the Hoffman Building and Congress will be breathing down your neck); that forced lack of continuity is why we don't have six years in Iraq -- we have six one year tours in Iraq. (3) We can tune egos and the overwhelming desire to 'do it my way' can be stifled. Commanders think they 'own' units -- they do not (the term "My Soldiers" was made obsolete by A. Lincoln some time ago) and they 'own' battlespace -- they do not, they operate on it.

That owenership shtick makes them reluctant to accept advice or help -- particularly from anyone they out rank, don't know or don't like or whose PME credential are less. They also, in too many, not all, cases reject the written word because as one Colonel told me "...you can't trust that stuff; I remember when I was a doctrine writer at Benning, I didn't have a clue what I was doing." Let me emphasize that there are many -- most -- to whom those comments do not apply but they do apply to a great number (and the CSMs are worse :D ).

So, really long way of getting to the point -- you're probably never going to be able to tune the egos. Fixing the Per system is in the very hard box. Fortunately, the schools are getting better. Short answer -- reinvention will likely be with us always.

The answer to your important question:
"If somethings important enough how else do you get it back so those who knew it best can reshape it correctly than to throw it on the table in whatever form or format you can?'Is, I think, a two parter. First, who decides if it's important -- critical question, allies to all my garbage spouted above.

A lot of stuff that isn't important gets 'saved' by people over impressed with their or a unit's accomplishments or who just have skewed values or perceptions; that stuff clutters the system and can obscure the really important stuff. That is not to say that lessons learned and recorded aren't important or necessary -- they are, it's just that human nature is going to put some filler in there and the initial items will almost be overlong due to recollections of where Heebley was when the RPG hit -- which may not really be germane to the lesson. If it's a good lesson, it get's retained, edited and improved over time..

Secondly, you use CALL, the forums on AKO and such -- so we are getting a whole lot better. It's not perfect but it works pretty well. More importantly, we recall that every NCO and every Officer are trainers -- so the good stuff that works gets passed on and most of it gets captured as doctrine or in training material. It is not fool proof but for humans, it works pretty well.

Take Human Terrain. I once knew who coined that but I'm old and have forgotten. It made some sense at the time and it is a form of shorthand, it's jargon, just not very good jargon. Wilf and I aren't the only ones to knock it.

So. It'll likely get changed or die a natural death (and no major harm done if it does not) -- but demographic mapping, knowing your AO and having enough cultural knowledge to know what to avoid and what to look for have been around for centuries. Any Army that does a lot of COIIN doesn't lose that skill; one like ours that deliberately avoided COIN for many years will lose those kinds of skills.

They come back quickly, the key is not to try to put them back in the attic post-Afghanistan -- and I have this vague recollection Jedburgh earlier commented on the process and mentioned a pub...

Get me started on a lazy Saturday, will ya... :D All that can be summarized with 'reinvention is a human foible we have to live with, the system ain't broke, it's even getting better -- it's just really slow and has the hiccups.' :wry:

[slapout9]

jmm99 and Entropy and Ron,

Here is how I learned it as ''Identifying Insurgent Infrastructure'' As you will see this special forces officer was so frustrated at how to do this that he resorted to finding out about standard police criminal organization analysis techniques, which is what I have been preaching since I came here. This shows how to do it by hand and is very useful. I used to use a crime scene template or traffic accident template and do them on my clipboard or desk.

This is part of my SBW book list:wry: Once you read this apply it to your local political situation or where you work....it will be fun and eye opening.:eek::eek: for some reason the file link below will let you read and print but I could not copy it to my computer???? anybody know how to fix this. I already had a hard copy but would like to save one for the digits as Jedburgh calls them...enjoy your Saturday night reading.

http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA225486&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf

[jmm99]

file, "Identifying Insurgent Infrastructure" (Googled it) loaded and saved (in Adobe Reader 7.0.5 9/23/2005 - old version & old computer) from the link:

at www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin

add /GetTRDoc?AD=ADA225486&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf

This is a kind of nutsy file and link.

---------------------------------
Now, why is it that people who are very brain alive when doing their jobs, become brain dead when the same thing comes up outside the job ?

Betcha that Slap the Cop knows well that anything from the Web viewed on your computer is saved somewhere on your computer. In this case, saved to one of the subdirectories of Temporary Internet Files - as GetTRDoc[1].pdf

Further instruction in Law Enforcement 501C will be at my normal low rates (special discount for Alabama cops). :D

[Majormarginal]

That's because cops are paid for what they know and do. Computer skills are secondary.

[William F. Owen]

So Human terrain mapping could be called "ethnography"? Just like the British practiced in colonial India? As I get older and grumpier, my tolerance for adding new words to the 'buzzword bingo' chart wears thinner and thinner. Same here and I agree


I disagree with the Wilf that human terrain mapping is meaningless. Terrain and populations are deeply inter-related, and effect each other (the Aral Sea provides an excellent case study in the interactions between terrain, culture, civics, history, and economics). The territorial behaviors of many cultures also lend themselves to a graphic depiction on a map (although this can lead to troubles too, when you consider topics like "Greater Serbia", "The Ottoman Empire", or "Persia"). Admittedly, 'human terrain' is dynamic and any ethnography will be a snapshot rather than a definative work, but how else do you capture the relevant information for the folks who are required to use said information?

I disagree with Wilf also, and I never said it, as an activity was meaningless. I said the words "Human Terrain" are meaningless. Commanders need information about the population. They always have and always will and in good armies they have always gone and got it, by whatever means.

Now.... It is in no way proven to me that you need civilians in HTTs, because soldiers can be selected and trained to do the job, and HTTs could be called... Reconnaissance Patrols, or Reconnaissance Teams... dunno. Doesn't seem like a stretch.

[slapout9]

I found it. I just got a new compter and it has windows vista or something like that. Instead of being saved to my documents it was in my photos:D:D This new technology is something else.

[jmm99]

Slap just had to be jolted out of his state as a new Windows Vista user - and back into being a cop. Once he reached that state, he was fine - good example of human population reaction to new terrain. :D

[Van]

I never said it, as an activity was meaningless. I said the words "Human Terrain" are meaningless.

Mea culpa, mea culpa, mea maxima culpa! I abase myself for this gross error, I am ashamed, and relieved that my ethnic heritage doesn't require an act that would require getting blood out of the carpet. Gross exaggeration aside, I apologize for my failure to read more carefully.


Now.... It is in no way proven to me that you need civilians in HTTs, because soldiers can be selected and trained to do the job, and HTTs could be called... Reconnaissance Patrols, or Reconnaissance Teams... dunno. Doesn't seem like a stretch.

I recently read a RAND study "Analytic Support to Intelligence in Counterinsurgencies (http://www.amazon.com/Analytic-Support-Intelligence-Counterinsurgencies-Walter/dp/0833044567/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1241333711&sr=1-1)", and the light came on. A fundamental difference (at least in the U.S. I won't speculate about other militaries) between so-called 'conventional conflict' and Small Wars is that in conventional confict, we've systematically studied and trained to fight the opposition for decades. Should we get to the point where we haven't taken mechanized forces maneuvering against each other seriously, that will become the unconventional. (And I'm sure several Council members will say 'Well, duh', and again, mea culpa.)

The relevance here:
The decades of training for conventional conflict, training for a lethal kreigspiel between professionals has desensitized us to the need for a breadth of training that was generally only offered to Special Forces officers. If you accept the premise that Small Wars are the norm rather than the exception (and I do, based on the number of years of U.S. history that have been spent engaged in SW vs. 'conventional war'), then it follows that we have had a fundamental failure to weight things like basic ethnography appropriately compared to marksmanship, combat tactics, etc. Bringing civilians to the battlefield was a stunningly flawed decision, driven by the classic "good, fast, cheap; you're not going to get them all" approach to problem solving (we chose "fast" at the expense of the others).


Originally Posted by Ken
I became totally convinced that if something can be mislabeled, misconstrued and misused, preferably all three, it will be...
Now there is a curmudgeon I can believe in. Yeah, this is as frustrating and annoying as TQM policies from people who never read Deming.

[William F. Owen]

Mea culpa, mea culpa, mea maxima culpa! I abase myself for this gross error, I am ashamed, and relieved that my ethnic heritage doesn't require an act that would require getting blood out of the carpet. Gross exaggeration aside, I apologize for my failure to read more carefully.
Eyh... no problem, but thank you for giving me the opportunity to clarify


A fundamental difference (at least in the U.S. I won't speculate about other militaries) between so-called 'conventional conflict' and Small Wars is that in conventional confict, we've systematically studied and trained to fight the opposition for decades. Should we get to the point where we haven't taken mechanized forces maneuvering against each other seriously, that will become the unconventional. (And I'm sure several Council members will say 'Well, duh', and again, mea culpa.)

Duh, but important and insightful none the less. Yes I believe you are correct. The rigid study of Soviet Operations and tactics, does not serve us well, once it becomes the institutional bedrock on which our G2 lives.

Having said that, we wouldn't have all the utter BS that got written about Hezbollah if someone with a sound Soviet Studies background had bothered to rebut all the silly things folks came out with.

Understanding how your enemy works is not that hard, if you have the minimum amount of brain cells. We have 1,000 years of relevant object lessons so it's not to hard. - but I am sure there is someone at SAMs, CAC or similar, that will make it extremely complex.

Insurgencies and/or major armies are not that dissimilar in aims and means once studied in detail. However there is a human need to build your enemy 10 foot high, and folks make good money doing it.

[MikeF]

We still have to be ready for full scale combat. It wouldn't be wise to get rid of the hardware. That is not what I meant. Full scale wars like WO1 or WO2 are not likely anymore. Our weaponry and the way the information flows will hamper any possible succes in the latent phase. The approach should be a complementary one in which every soldier is trained in an 3BW environment.


Hi Coined. I'll play devil's advocate (or COL Gentile) for this one.

If we look at today's environment as similar to that of the late 1800's/early 1900's, then there is every indication that we could be headed towards a world war in the next 20-30 years.

Similarities:

1. Terrorist = Anarchist
2. Transition from Industrial Age to Globalization/Information Age = Transition from Agrarian to Industrial Age
3. Civil Wars/Manifest Destiny/Great White Fleet = GWOT/Crisis of the Nation State
4. Transcendentalist = Post-Modernist

Just one way to look at the current dilemma. I'm not sure if a world war is likely, but it is a reasonable hypothesis given the restlessness and disruption in the current world particularly when money is involved. Remember, WW1 was supposed to be the "war to end all wars." How'd that work out for us?

v/r

Mike

[marct]

Human Terrain is a meaningless phrase, or should be. There is terrain and their is the population. They are very different things. The population has social, political and religious beliefs - call it.. er culture?....
If we can't use a coherent professional language, free from silly jargon and buzz words, we'll start calling rifles "Bang Bang sticks."

LOLOL - love it, Wilf!

Personally, my distastte for the term "human terrain" is somewhat more prosaic - I think it encourages people to look at other people as if they were "things". This is, IMO, totally de-humanizing to both the object of perception and the perceiver. It is also inherently stupid, because it means that once you start viewing a group of people as things, you are more likely to assume that they will be incapable of coming up with anything original, so you will be more likely to be surprised.

[slapout9]

LOLOL - love it, Wilf!

Personally, my distastte for the term "human terrain" is somewhat more prosaic - I think it encourages people to look at other people as if they were "things". This is, IMO, totally de-humanizing to both the object of perception and the perceiver. It is also inherently stupid, because it means that once you start viewing a group of people as things, you are more likely to assume that they will be incapable of coming up with anything original, so you will be more likely to be surprised.

Hi marct, agree it sounds like you are calling them human dirt and are going to stand on them....not a good recipe. marct as a PhD that has a bunch of good schoolin weren't you able to keep these guys straight. Just call it human infrastructure or human networks anything but terrain:eek:

[William F. Owen]

Personally, my distastte for the term "human terrain" is somewhat more prosaic - I think it encourages people to look at other people as if they were "things". This is, IMO, totally de-humanizing to both the object of perception and the perceiver. It is also inherently stupid, because it means that once you start viewing a group of people as things, you are more likely to assume that they will be incapable of coming up with anything original, so you will be more likely to be surprised.

Well your reasons are a great deal more logical and morally justified. I'm just holding out for some sort of semantic precision.

My objection to "Human Terrain" - beyond the poor use of English - is that is inventing a problem, to invite a solution that promotes the "complexity agendas" aimed at making a few folks look smart, and not much help to the Marine or Soldier.

[marct]

Hi Slap,


Hi marct, agree it sounds like you are calling them human dirt and are going to stand on them....not a good recipe. marct as a PhD that has a bunch of good schoolin weren't you able to keep these guys straight. Just call it human infrastructure or human networks anything but terrain:eek:

As I understand it, the decision to use the term "Human Terrain" was, in effect, a marketing one :(. One things I've noticed is that when you are marketing something, you aim towards the targets prejudices....:wry:


Well your reasons are a great deal more logical and morally justified. I'm just holding out for some sort of semantic precision.

My objection to "Human Terrain" - beyond the poor use of English - is that is inventing a problem, to invite a solution that promotes the "complexity agendas" aimed at making a few folks look smart, and not much help to the Marine or Soldier.

Wilf, I actually agree with you on both of those points. I have a real problem with semantic imprecision, especially when it leads to people getting killed! As for the term being used to justify spending large sums of money on people who can "put old wine in new bottles", I do get a touch peeved about it.

I remember reading an article years ago about how consultants acted as a type of "shaman" for organizations - they would come in and provide a "divine" justification for decisions that the organizational power brokers would have made anyway. It reminded me of a story my father used to tell about his first consulting contract.

My father had been hired to go into an organization and "fix" the problem with efficiency. After a couple of days, he realized that the source of the problem was the owner of the company. When he went in to talk with him, the owner said (I'm paraphrasing) "Son, I know I'm a son of a bitch. I hired you to tell me how to get my employees to deal with it."

I think your point about creating problems is a crucial on. In his really long post that I haven't got around to replying to yet (sorry Steve!), actually provides a really good example of this process. If an organization has to constantly learn how to create a wheel, then it must also have a very large budget.

Years ago, I read a novel by John Dalmas (I can't remember which on off the top of my head), where he made the observation that organizations are designed to create problems, not solutions. This has stuck in my head for a long time and, I think, has more than a germ of reality to it. Without getting into some really wonky metaphysics, organizations actually do create, hmmm, let's call them "problem-spaces", in which and through which individuals get to play at creating "solutions". If the "problem" actually disappeared, however, that would mean that no one could "play" there anymore, which would disappoint a lot of people!

[Ken White]

... If you accept the premise that Small Wars are the norm rather than the exception (and I do, based on the number of years of U.S. history that have been spent engaged in SW vs. 'conventional war'),Excellent and quite valid point. It raises questions.

Why have we not spent as nearly much effort trying to prevent those as we have preventing major wars?

What have we done that deters major war and what can we do that will deter small wars?
Bringing civilians to the battlefield was a stunningly flawed decision, driven by the classic "good, fast, cheap; you're not going to get them all" approach to problem solving (we chose "fast" at the expense of the others).Partly agree. Flawed, yes -- but no so much fast. Expedient and necessary are better words -- both factors induced by PEACETIME thinking at high levels in the US Armed Forces and by Congress (intensely lobbied by Contractors who heavily contribute to Congressional campaigns...). Thus the Services against their better judgment acquiesced to DoD in order to get funds from Congress. We now get to reap the benefits of that...

Contractors do offer the ability to rapidly expand and contract structure and support that is efficient -- it isn't all that effective but it is undeniably efficient as it is cheaper than the military personnel cost for the capability would be and it is more flexible for hiring and firing than civil service. Contractors do allow more expensive military people per fighting element in any event.

The most significant downside is that the availability of contractors impedes the necessary effort to significantly reduce the support tail for committed forces.

MarcT made a really germane observation:
"Years ago, I read a novel by John Dalmas (I can't remember which on off the top of my head), where he made the observation that organizations are designed to create problems, not solutions. This has stuck in my head for a long time and, I think, has more than a germ of reality to it. Without getting into some really wonky metaphysics, organizations actually do create, hmmm, let's call them "problem-spaces", in which and through which individuals get to play at creating "solutions". If the "problem" actually disappeared, however, that would mean that no one could "play" there anymore, which would disappoint a lot of people!Yes. Put another way, I think Einstein said "We can't solve problems by using the same kind of thinking we used when we created them."

Back to Van:
Now there is a curmudgeon I can believe in...I was going to use 'Curmudgeon' as an internet tag, shortening it because I'm terribly lazy to just 'Cur' -- my wife nixed the idea.

[Ken Wilson]

At this very moment COIN in Afghanistan is pushing us to train and arm one of the most corrupt elements of the ANSF, the AUP ..... because we were trained for (another) war ???
Where is the enemy ..... Why is it an enemy?? Do we create our enemy ???

Interesting:
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/06/weekinreview/06weiner.html?pagewanted=2&_r=1

[SWJED]

Ken Wilson,

You jumped right in here on the Council - quite bold and short statements in reference to your first three posts - very opinionated to say the least. We like to know who we converse with here and appreciate first-hand accounts or authoritive second-hand citation for bold statements. Thanks for understanding. BTW - the END Bush avatar on your SWC homepage is quite sophomoric - I would recommend dropping it to be taken a bit more seriously here. We would say the same for a reference to our CINC Obama – so don’t go down that road.

Hail and Farewell thead (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/forumdisplay.php?f=33) to include the tell us about you placeholder where we start to size you up.

Dave Dilegge