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jonSlack
11-22-2006, 04:55 AM
The French Path to Jihad - John Rosenthal (http://www.policyreview.org/139/rosenthal.html)


How does one become a jihadist? Just how unprepared Americans have been to confront this question was made embarrassingly clear during the recent trial of Zacarias Moussaoui as large parts of the established media dwelt thoughtfully on Moussaoui’s broken family and childhood spells in an orphanage — as if such banal details could somehow account for the behavior of a man who has pledged allegiance to Osama Bin Laden, been found guilty of plotting to fly a jetliner into the White House in connection with the 9/11 plot, and testified to his readiness to kill Americans “anytime, anywhere”3 every day until his death. Moussaoui was apparently supposed to be just like you and me — the defense witness who recounted for the court the allegedly sad story of young Zacarias was a social worker from Greenville, South Carolina — only not as well-adjusted. At the other extreme, a current of opinion has emerged that is widely represented in the “new” media and that offers a ready-made and conveniently foreshortened answer to the question: one that spares the investigator all need to enter into the details of individual life histories. How does one become a jihadist? By being a Muslim. For the representatives of this current, whose more or less openly avowed “Islamophobia” can easily degrade into simple racism, the jihadist threat is entirely a product of Islam or the “Muslim world” and consequently wholly alien to “the West.”

It is a pity that, in effect, none of the media — neither the old media nor the new — took advantage of the unique opportunity provided by the Moussaoui trial to seek more convincing answers. To this day, for instance, despite the sensation created by Moussaoui’s decision to take the stand, the full transcript of his testimony has never been published. If Americans were able to consider the portrait of Moussaoui that emerges from his own words, what they would discover is a figure who is neither so familiar as the sympathetic psychotherapeutic accounts in the old media suggest nor so alien as the theories of the new media pundits would lead one to assume. Of course, it would be hazardous to attempt to generalize from the single case of Zacarias Moussaoui. But a just-published collection of interviews with suspected members of al Qaeda in French prisons, Quand Al-Qäida parle: Témoignages derrière les barreaux (When al Qaeda Talks: Testimonials from Behind Bars), provides us with an unprecedentedly large body of evidence on the backgrounds, worldview, and motivations of those who make the choice for violent jihad in the name of Islam.

Rob Thornton
11-22-2006, 08:36 AM
That was a great read. There are some very telling revelations in what was said, many we should consider applying to our view of the future.

Tom Odom
11-22-2006, 05:27 PM
Earlier, France was my model — even if I also resented this. But my ideal was to be French, to act like the French: to have my wife, my kids, my car, my apartment, my house in the country, to become an average Frenchman and live in peace. . . . [E]ven before I had French citizenship or I had work, in my mind, I wanted to conform to the image of the average Frenchman, to be like them, to make myself in their image. But at the same time I had the feeling that this was more or less impossible: they didn’t want me, even if I had citizenship and all the rest. They looked down on me, they treated me like I was nothing, they despised me. This contempt was killing me. Were we really so despicable? . . . I went back and forth between what I was and what I wanted to be: a little Frenchman. Whereas I was an Algerian. I was tortured by it. Some days, I couldn’t fall asleep, I had the impression that my life had no meaning, that my part in life had been unjustly denied me.

Interesting in that many of these exact sentiments fueled Franz Fanon in writing Wretched of the Earth as a statement of disillusionment with France and especially his realization that as an Martinique born citizen of greater France he would never be accepted as French. I have to believe that Rosenthal is playing on that parallel with his paragraph heading French masks, Muslim faces because Fanon's first book was titled Black Skin, White Masks, (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Black_Skin%2C_White_Masks). Fanon advocated communism as the answer to colonialism. Rosenthal makes the point that the French Jihadists advocate radical Islam as an answer to French "racism".

Best

Tom

SWJED
11-25-2006, 03:17 AM
25 November London Daily Telegraph - Town that Breeds Suicide Bombers (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2006/11/25/wirq25.xml) by Fiona Govan.


Their destination may be almost 3,000 miles away, but the draw of martyrdom in Iraq is proving irresistable for the young men of Tetouan.

American intelligence officials believe that the Moroccan town, less than 30 miles from the Spanish enclave of Ceuta, has become one of the world's most fertile recruiting ground for jihadists.

In the last eight months a group of young men, all worshippers at the same mosque, have left their homes to become suicide bombers in Iraq.

After DNA tests on their bodies, and Moroccan authorities asking families to provide samples, US intelligence traced at least nine of those responsible for recent suicide missions in and around Baghdad to Tetouan and its surrounding area in the foothills of the Rif Mountains.

Local reports suggest that another 21 individuals have left the area to seek martyrdom, following in the footsteps of five other Tetouanis who blew themselves up in a Madrid suburb when cornered by police, who believed they played a part in the train bombings in the Spanish capital in March 2004...

Rob Thornton
11-25-2006, 04:50 AM
You know I used to have a very narrow view of suicide jihadists, but after reading the post on the making of a French Jihadist, I realize I need to understand the different motivations better. Its not enough for me to say they are duped by an interpretation of religious faith to travel to another place and commit themselves to the fight as a human PGM. I feel like I don't know the enemy in this regard. Any thoughts by some of you who have done the tough research?
Thanks, Rob

Sarajevo071
11-25-2006, 06:51 AM
You know I used to have a very narrow view of suicide jihadists, but after reading the post on the making of a French Jihadist, I realize I need to understand the different motivations better. Its not enough for me to say they are duped by an interpretation of religious faith to travel to another place and commit themselves to the fight as a human PGM. I feel like I don't know the enemy in this regard. Any thoughts by some of you who have done the tough research?
Thanks, Rob

No one is “duped” nor do they have “mercenaries” like some here like to think… Only mercenaries that I know of are those from private companies in Iraq and Afghanistan… Now about they “ideology” or “motivation”, no one can give one satisfactory answer since they motivations are different and somewhat complicated… Also, be sure that you make distinction between Islamic martyrs (suicide attacks) and Islamic jihadi fighters (guerilla that fights to live so they can fight other day). Also there are different motivations in older versus younger jihadi, different motivations in born Muslims versus converts, and different motivations between different schools of thoughts in Islam.

Hope this will guide you toward better understanding of this topic.

Rob Thornton
11-25-2006, 10:45 AM
That is a great place to start. I think I can at least accept the Jihadist who comes to fight witht he intention of participating as an insurgent, freedom fighter, holy warrior or guerilla (all distinct enough to mention) because he has the intent of remaining alive even though his convictions allow him to face death.

The one I don't understand is the suicide martyr. Do they see it as suicide? How do they view their act? What is the conviction that allows them to prepare for the event (Mentally, Physically, Spiritually)? What is the attraction (maybe a poor choice of words)? This is not facing death, it is accepting death (or is it?).

It seems to me that if a village (or another geographically distant) location outside of Iraq can produce people who are willing to destroy themselves then it is important to understand why. It is their "will" to do so which interests me.
Thanks, Rob

aktarian
11-25-2006, 04:56 PM
That is a great place to start. I think I can at least accept the Jihadist who comes to fight witht he intention of participating as an insurgent, freedom fighter, holy warrior or guerilla (all distinct enough to mention) because he has the intent of remaining alive even though his convictions allow him to face death.

The one I don't understand is the suicide martyr. Do they see it as suicide? How do they view their act? What is the conviction that allows them to prepare for the event (Mentally, Physically, Spiritually)? What is the attraction (maybe a poor choice of words)? This is not facing death, it is accepting death (or is it?).

It seems to me that if a village (or another geographically distant) location outside of Iraq can produce people who are willing to destroy themselves then it is important to understand why. It is their "will" to do so which interests me.
Thanks, Rob

They don't call it "suicide bombings" but "martyrdom seeking operations". As suicide is prohibited they would go to hell. but if their act of killing themselves strikes a blow against the enemy they are martyrs and admited to paradise. think of it as modern day kamikaze rather than suiciders.

We had a debate about a year ago about this motivation. You might want to find it.

Sarajevo071
11-25-2006, 06:46 PM
They don't call it "suicide bombings" but "martyrdom seeking operations". As suicide is prohibited they would go to hell. but if their act of killing themselves strikes a blow against the enemy they are martyrs and admited to paradise. think of it as modern day kamikaze rather than suiciders.

Great point there!

Also... Sometimes, just to be participant in the war (jihad) and being killed (with intention of seeking martyrdom or with wish to defend Muslim Umma) will be enough for some of them… It’s not necessary for enemy to be killed.

Sarajevo071
11-25-2006, 07:00 PM
That is a great place to start. I think I can at least accept the Jihadist who comes to fight witht he intention of participating as an insurgent, freedom fighter, holy warrior or guerilla (all distinct enough to mention) because he has the intent of remaining alive even though his convictions allow him to face death.

The one I don't understand is the suicide martyr. Do they see it as suicide? How do they view their act? What is the conviction that allows them to prepare for the event (Mentally, Physically, Spiritually)? What is the attraction (maybe a poor choice of words)? This is not facing death, it is accepting death (or is it?).

It seems to me that if a village (or another geographically distant) location outside of Iraq can produce people who are willing to destroy themselves then it is important to understand why. It is their "will" to do so which interests me.
Thanks, Rob

It is not suicide. It’s sacrifice in the name of God and greater good having no other weapon except one’s own life, against powerful enemy with better weapons or bigger numbers… There is no fear of wining or loosing since either win (on the battlefield) over the enemy or being killed in that holly struggle is – win.

It is deep religious feeling and motivation, either from childhood or “newcomers” (converts) who are sometimes even more zealots trying to prove that they can be good Muslims like they brethren who was born in Islam… That’s reason why you see high number of converts doing martyrdom seeking operations…

Attraction are not virgins they are promised (like many westerners like to mock them) but promise of Paradise, of doing something great for Islam and they people (since not everyone can be martyr) and promise that to they souls would be forgiven any transgressions they did (and they families)…

They are not thinking in ways of “facing the death” or “accepting the death”, since they essentially not dieing… For them, being not Muslim is being dead.

taillat
12-14-2006, 09:47 PM
Three points:
-first, I don't think that french are racists. French with arabian origin maybe feel themselves as "discriminates".However, this is a widespread feeling that must be explained.
-This feeling rely on the a fact. French society has failed to challenge the multiculturalist turn 30 years ago. Since French society has universalist claim (which means a belief in the superiority in the so-called "Enlightment") it could never understand outer-european culture. This is linked with the colonisation. It was long seen as a civilisationnal task for us, and a deep humiliation by this proud arab culture. Universalist habit dressed in humanitarian concerns (antiracism whose result was the acceptance of islamic customs) failed to integrate arabs when they came in France. Furthermore, its arrogance doesn't convince the second and third generations of arabs born in France (and thus having french nationality) that French culture and french social model was worthing to fight for it. The consequence was growing violence, ghettoism, and reject of laicity and french identity. If France is responsible of growing vocations in terrorism, it is due to its incapacity to structure a coherent national identity for the young arabs (who are french!!!). For example, teachers must teach France's history through a critical lens, with more and more repentance about the past, seen as "dark moments of our history". The french-arabs have no idea of the pride to be french. Furthermore, they feel not to share a common identity with other french communities. European tragedy lies here: we failed to transmit what our ancestors gave us. Our universalist ideology betrayed us.
-in an other way, these young terrorists had the possibilities not to become such. I usually encountered young french-arabs in french army. Reports (which couldn't rely on ethnic statistics, because it's forbidden by law to ask someone for its ethnic origins) learned us that they are well integrated, even if they are mosque-going. I think that these young french who became terrorist had no landmarks about their country (who is France.When they "came back" in Algeria, Tunisia or Morocco, they are considered as French and rejected also). This is the result of a thirty-years-old policy based upon antiracism (and acceptance of foreign customs) without true integration (which could have relied on a national indentity). In the other way, this is also the result of misperception about other french. Because they were born in France from arabian parents (or grandparents), they believed they are rejected. Because secularity is well-advanced in France, they weren't able to recognise in such a society (as for the catholics today who are truly persecuted). The sole way is violence against us and against West which is seen as responsible for their "mal de vivre".
To sum up, french terrorist with arabian origin are not victims of racism. They are the result of a policy. This policy consisted of national identity filled with guilt-feeling about the past. It has confused tolerance with inaction. It has failed to integrate these foreigner to an universalist (but european-based) ideology which confused secularity with anti-religion. To conclude, terrorism has met frustration and lack of strong and pride identity

Jedburgh
03-27-2008, 12:46 PM
Danish Institute for International Studies, Feb 08:

Studying Violent Radicalization in Europe I: The Potential Contribution of Social Movement Theory (http://www.diis.dk/graphics/Publications/WP2008/WP08-2_Studying_Violent_Radicalization_in_Europe_I_-_The_Potential_Contribution_of_Social_Movement_The ory.pdf)

Why do some apparently well-integrated youth in Europe become attracted to Islamist militancy? Why and when do people cross from violent talk to violent action? What prevents others, exposed to the same political, ideological, and socioeconomic influences, from crossing? When and how might people de-radicalize and draw back from violent action? What policy initiatives would be called for to limit the spread of radical ideas, counter the factors that spur violent radicalization, and strengthen those, which pull in the other direction? In sum: When, why, and how do people living in a democracy become radicalized to the point of being willing to use or directly support the use of terrorist violence against civilians, and what can be done about it?

These questions have been at the center of both academic and public debate over the past years. Yet, there is still a scarcity of empirically based knowledge and no consensus with regard to which theories and approaches to apply to the study of violent radicalization and mobilization.

This working paper explores the potential contribution of Social Movement Theory to throw light on the question of violent radicalization in Europe....
Studying Violent Radicalization in Europe II: The Potential Contribution of Sociopsychological and Psychological Approaches (http://www.diis.dk/graphics/Publications/WP2008/WP08-3_Studying%20Violent%20Radicalization%20In%20Europ e%20II%20-%20The%20Potential%20Contribution%20of%20Sociopsyc hological%20and%20Psychological%20Approaches.pdf)

The subfield of socio-psychological and psychological approaches to terrorism studies is, like the overall field of terrorism research, characterized by a variety of competing approaches with different explanations of what causes terrorism and violent radicalization. For the sake of overview this paper groups them into sociological approaches, individual level approaches, and group process approaches.

Sociological theories focus on overall structural factors impacting large groups, group process approaches focus on mechanisms at play in smaller groups, and psychoanalytically inspired and cognitive theories focus on factors at the level of the individual personality. Sociological and psychoanalytical approaches focus on relatively stable factors – be they structural conditions or individual dispositions – hypothesized to cause radicalization and terrorism. Group process approaches, in contrast, take a dynamic view and focus on processes and stages through which violent dispositions emerge. Some approaches rely on a psychology of needs (what psychological or group psychological traits make individuals or groups prone to violence?); whereas others instead rely on a psychology of rewards (what do radical groups offer the individual?)....

Jedburgh
10-06-2008, 08:44 PM
Kings College London, Dec 07:

Recruitment and Mobilisation for the Islamist Militant Movement in Europe (http://www.icsr.info/files/ec_radicalisation_study_on_mobilisation_tactics_en .pdf)

This report presents a comprehensive overview of the methods through which Islamist militants in Europe mobilise their supporters and find new recruits. It finds that Islamist militant recruitment efforts have largely been driven underground, with little overt propagation and recruitment now occurring at mosques. Prisons and other ‘places of vulnerability’ continue to be a great cause of concern. Rather than ‘radical imams’, who have lost some influence, the report points out that ‘activists’ are now the ‘engines’ of Islamist militant recruitment. They often draw on recruits from so-called ‘gateway organisations’ which prepare individuals ideologically and socialise them into the extremist ‘milieu’. It also shows how Islamist militants skilfully exploit young Muslims’ identity conflicts between Western society and the ‘cultural’ Islam of their parents. Furthermore, the report highlights the role of the Internet which has come to play an increasingly important role in Islamist militant recruitment, either in support of ‘real-world’ recruitment or in entirely new forms of militant activism described as ‘virtual self-recruitment’.

The reports finds there to be clear differences between countries in Southern Europe, where Muslim immigration is recent, and those in which the second and third generation of European Muslims is reaching adolescence. In countries with no second or third generation of European Muslims, language is less of an issue, nor is the conflict of identity between Western society and traditional culture as pivotal. Across all countries, however, the environment in which Islamist militants seek support has changed. Especially after the attacks in Madrid and London, open recruitment has become difficult. The authorities and many Muslim communities have become more vigilant and willing to confront extremism, yet there are no indications at all that the pressure of radicalisation has ebbed away. Based on these observations, the report argues that the trend towards ‘seekers’ and self-starter groups will continue. It also predicts that, given the constraints now faced by Islamist militants in the ‘open’ environment, the significance of the Internet as a ‘virtual’ recruitment place will grow, with new forms of Islamist militant activism becoming more important.

The report proposes a series of measures aimed at countering recruitment. In the short term, governments need to prevent the emergence of ‘recruitment magnets’ which allow ‘seekers’ and ‘selfstarters to find ‘links to the jihad’ and deepen their involvement in the Islamist militant movement. Governments also need to pay urgent attention to the situation in European prisons, which are likely to become major hubs for radicalisation and recruitment. Intelligence and law enforcement strategies have to be geared towards identifying the ‘activist’ leaders of cells. The report challenges governments to tackle the problem posed by gateway organisations, and to be clear and consistent in doing so. It also calls for more attention to be paid to extremist activities on the Internet. In the longer term, mainstream Muslim communities need to be re-vitalised and empowered. Law enforcement agencies need to build and/or re-establish trust with Muslim communities. It is also vital for schools to address the narratives used by violent extremists as well as the ways in which they are likely to be drawn into their circles. A similar effort is required on the Internet. The report concludes by saying that even longer term measures aimed at resolving the drivers of recruitment will not bear fruit unless the causes of radicalisation are successfully addressed.
Complete 103-page paper at the link.

davidbfpo
04-28-2009, 08:32 PM
Just found a new report on radicalisation / radicalization by a US think tank:
http://www.defenddemocracy.org/downloads/HomegrownTerrorists_USandUK.pdf

On my first reading a nice easy read, with a literature review and an attempt to interpret the pathway taken by convicted terrorists in the UK and USA as a template. Some of the conclusions are different, notably that prisons should be a low priority in the struggle!

Refers to many previous studies e.g. NYPD report and the views of Sageman etc.

Of note are the six signposts, which could be used to enable assessment (sorry police thinking to the fore).

When downloaded, slow as one large colour image, appears as sixty-nine pages and do not despair many are blanks.

davidbfpo

goesh
04-29-2009, 12:36 PM
My opinion on the proposition that prisons contribute very little to the radicalisation is that gangs are too dominant and powerful and personal survival often centers on some degree of attachment to an established group/gang. There probably isn't enough literal and figurative space for a radical Islamic cell to thrive. I also note that immediately after 9/11, there was a blurb in the news on how much money convicts in the prison systems had donated. The general prison populations may not be very accepting of a group whose power base is not related to drugs, extortion and profit. With a Quaran in every cell and an established prayer space on hand ( Masjid) it remains possible for a jihadist to at least keep his faith active and accept the inhibition of direct action imposed by confinement.

I found it very odd the huge conversion discrepancy between Europe and the US. Rouhgly 43% here at home had converted from Christianity to Islam compared to roughly 18% in Europe.

Ron Humphrey
04-29-2009, 01:06 PM
I found it very odd the huge conversion discrepancy between Europe and the US. Rouhgly 43% here at home had converted from Christianity to Islam compared to roughly 18% in Europe.

numbers can be decieving when

There are given requirements for access to certain materials if you claim them

1- You get a prayer rug (Actually its an extra blanket because that's what they have, and its often pretty cold in the cells)

2- Attend worship meetings (There's usually a marked difference in the demographics at various services)

3-Different meals than others so invariably there's barter capacity built into that

There are a variety of other things which lead to "official" choice besides actually believing, Not always but quite often.

davidbfpo
12-16-2009, 09:32 PM
An excellent short article 'How al Qaeda Dupes Its Followers' by Malcolm Nance (SWC member) from FP:http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/12/15/how_al_qaeda_dupes_its_followers


Osama bin Laden's terror network has perfected the art of masking its unpopular agenda with a recruitment pitch that can hook just about anyone.

Last sentence:
What's really at work here is not any one man's disposition; it's an ideology packaged to kill.

davidbfpo
12-16-2009, 09:51 PM
A new USMA CTC report, headlined 'Al-Qaeda killing mostly Muslims' : http://www.nationalpost.com/news/story.html?id=2340654#ixzz0ZtIXrpss


The study, by the academy's Combatting Terrorism Center and based on Arabic media sources to avoid accusations of pro-Western bias, concludes (my bold)85% of the casualties from all al-Qaeda attacks in 2004-08 were Muslims, compared with 15% Westerners....The trend appears to have intensified toward the end of the period studied. In 2006-08, 96% of the victims were inhabitants of countries with Muslim majorities and only 2% were westerners.

The actual CTC report: http://www.ctc.usma.edu/Deadly%20Vanguards_Complete_L.pdf

omarali50
12-17-2009, 02:42 AM
A news item was published in the Urdu press (unfortunately no web link, I have a pdf) which I have translated below:
It describes the indoctrination of a suicide bomber (as revealed by a failed bomber). He says they were kept isolated and constantly bombarded with references from the quran and hadith that support the notion that when you die for Islam, you will receive endless rewards. One reward of course being the hoories of paradise. The business of hoors was taken to the extent that in the dark he was brought very close to a woman and allowed to feel her up and then told this is nothing compared to what awaits in paradise (he is 17 and has probably never seen any woman other than his close relatives). When he was being driven to his target, the driver kept zigging and zagging on an empty road and when he asked why, he was told that thousands of hoories are so desperate to get him that they are crowding the road, fighting with each other about who gets this martyr...
I cannot vouch for the truth of this particular story (the urdu press is notorious for making up stories) but other than the bit about feeling up an actual woman (something i have never heard of) the rest sounds plausible and should be familiar to anyone who has heard the more lurid preachers who populate fringe mosques in Pakistan. Researchers have looked at Palestinian suicide bombers who come from a much more developed culture. Similar research has not yet been done on the suicide bombers being trained in the tribal areas of Pakistan. But when such research is done, it may surprise some people to learn how crudely literal and "corporeal" the rewards and promises can be....

Rex Brynen
01-29-2010, 01:37 AM
While the Somali context isn't handled very well, the NYT nonetheless has an interesting, lengthy case study of the radicalization of Omar Hammami (Abu Mansoor Al-Amriki).

NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE PREVIEW
The Jihadist Next Door (http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/31/magazine/31Jihadist-t.html?pagewanted=1&ref=global-home)

By ANDREA ELLIOTT
Published: January 27, 2010


ON A WARM, cloudy day in the fall of 1999, the town of Daphne, Ala., stirred to life. The high-school band came pounding down Main Street, past the post office and the library and Christ the King Church. Trumpeters in gold-tasseled coats tipped their horns to the sky, heralding the arrival of teenage demigods. The star quarterback and his teammates came first in the parade, followed by the homecoming queen and her court. Behind them, on a float bearing leaders of the student government, a giddy mop-haired kid tossed candy to the crowd.

Omar Hammami had every right to flash his magnetic smile. He had just been elected president of his sophomore class. He was dating a luminous blonde, one of the most sought-after girls in school. He was a star in the gifted-student program, with visions of becoming a surgeon. For a 15-year-old, he had remarkable charisma.

Despite the name he acquired from his father, an immigrant from Syria, Hammami was every bit as Alabaman as his mother, a warm, plain-spoken woman who sprinkles her conversation with blandishments like “sugar” and “darlin’.” Brought up a Southern Baptist, Omar went to Bible camp as a boy and sang “Away in a Manger” on Christmas Eve. As a teenager, his passions veered between Shakespeare and Kurt Cobain, soccer and Nintendo. In the thick of his adolescence, he was fearless, raucously funny, rebellious, contrarian. “It felt cool just to be with him,” his best friend at the time, Trey Gunter, said recently. “You knew he was going to be a leader.”

A decade later, Hammami has fulfilled that promise in the most unimaginable way. Some 8,500 miles from Alabama, on the eastern edge of Africa, he has become a key figure in one of the world’s most ruthless Islamist insurgencies. That guerrilla army, known as the Shabab, is fighting to overthrow the fragile American-backed Somali government. The rebels are known for beheading political enemies, chopping off the hands of thieves and stoning women accused of adultery. With help from Al Qaeda, they have managed to turn Somalia into an ever more popular destination for jihadis from around the world.

More than 20 of those fighters have come from the United States, many of them young Somali-Americans from a gritty part of Minneapolis. But it is Hammami who has put a contemporary face on the Shabab’s medieval tactics. In a recent propaganda video viewed by thousands on YouTube, he is shown leading a platoon of gun-toting rebels as a soundtrack of jihadi rap plays in the background.

He is identified by his nom de guerre, Abu Mansoor Al-Amriki, “the American,” and speaks to the camera with a cool, almost eerie confidence. “We’re waiting for the enemy to come,” Hammami whispers, a smile crossing his face. Later he vows, “We’re going to kill all of them.”

In the three years since Hammami made his way to Somalia, his ascent into the Shabab’s leadership has put him in a class of his own, according to United States law-enforcement and intelligence officials. While other American terror suspects have drawn greater publicity, Hammami exercises a more powerful role, commanding guerrilla forces in the field, organizing attacks and plotting strategy with Qaeda operatives, the officials said. He has also emerged as something of a jihadist icon, starring in a recruitment campaign that has helped draw hundreds of foreign fighters to Somalia. “To have an American citizen that has risen to this kind of a rank in a terrorist organization — we have not seen that before,” a senior American law-enforcement official said earlier this month.

...

bourbon
02-02-2010, 09:45 PM
While the Somali context isn't handled very well, the NYT nonetheless has an interesting, lengthy case study of the radicalization of Omar Hammami (Abu Mansoor Al-Amriki).

NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE PREVIEW
The Jihadist Next Door (http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/31/magazine/31Jihadist-t.html?pagewanted=1&ref=global-home)

By ANDREA ELLIOTT
Published: January 27, 2010
A very fascinating and well done article. Here’s what stood out to me:

If anything has remained a constant in Hammami’s life, it is his striving for another place and purpose, which flickered in a poem he wrote when he was 12:

“My reality is a bore. I wish, I want, I need the wall to fall and the monster to let me pass, the leash to snap, the chains to break. . . .
“I’ve got a taste of glory, the ticket, but where is my train?”

Yet for all of his social triumph, Hammami was consumed with a profound internal conflict. He didn’t know whether to be Muslim or Christian. On rare trips to Damascus when they were little, Omar and Dena were warned by relatives that they would go to hell if they weren’t Muslim, Dena recalled. In Perdido, their mother’s family insisted that hell was reserved for non-Christians.

A trip to Damascus the summer before Hammami’s sophomore year would make a lasting impression on him. He loved the order of things: how his aunts waited on him, how his male cousins shared a “cohesiveness of brotherhood,”...

When he got back to Daphne, Hammami remained conflicted. One night before he went to sleep, he turned to God for guidance. “Slowly I started to incline toward Islam,” he later wrote to his sister, “and my heart became tranquil.”

Hammami plunged headlong into Salafism, mastering its nuances and lexicon. The movement gave him a new sense of brotherhood and discipline. But it was, above all, “an excuse to disobey his father,” recalls Joseph Stewart, a Muslim convert who became close to Hammami.

Hammami concluded that his Salafi mentors had been “hiding many parts of the religion that have a direct relationship to jihad and politics,” he wrote. He began searching for guidance on the Internet, Culveyhouse says, discovering a documentary about the life of Amir Khattab, a legendary jihadist who fought in Chechnya. The documentary traces Khattab’s evolution as a promising Saudi student who gave up a life that “any young man would desire” to embrace a higher purpose. Hammami was mesmerized, Culveyhouse recalls.

....
Back then, Hammami and Culveyhouse talked about jihad in the way that star football players at Daphne High School dreamed about the N.F.L. The idea remained romantic and hypothetical.

That same month, Hammami seemed more taken by his cause than ever. “I have become a Somali you could say,” he wrote in the December e-mail message. “I hear bullets, I dodge mortars, I hear nasheeds” — Islamic songs — “and play soccer. Sometimes I live in the bush with camels, sometimes I live the five-star life. Sometimes I walk for miles in the terrible heat with no water, sometimes I ride in extremely slick cars. Sometimes I’m chased by the enemy, sometimes I chase him!”

“I have hatred, I have love,” he went on. “It’s the best life on earth!”

tequila
02-03-2010, 01:19 PM
The asshole sounds like half the guys in my boot camp platoon. Bored kids looking for meaning and finding it in the wrong place. Sometimes I think 70% of our jihadi problem is the lack of a decent non-religiously oriented "cause" or institution in most Muslim countries --- a Marine Corps equivalent to join in order to find challenge and a sense of identity.

marct
02-03-2010, 02:43 PM
Hi Tequila,


The asshole sounds like half the guys in my boot camp platoon. Bored kids looking for meaning and finding it in the wrong place. Sometimes I think 70% of our jihadi problem is the lack of a decent non-religiously oriented "cause" or institution in most Muslim countries --- a Marine Corps equivalent to join in order to find challenge and a sense of identity.

This has been a real problem in North America for about 40-50 years or so. A friend of mine spent a fair amount of time researching some of the radicalization amongst Jewish kids in the 1980's, and the pattern is pretty much the same. I saw a similar pattern looking at a lot of people who joined modern Craft and some of the Charismatic groups as well.

It is one of the central problems in large, secular societies - we don't have many good, functioning, rites of passage. Also, because there isn't a single, unifying, religious symbol system, we have a mishmash which has a really hard time working together. Personally, I think the Romans had a much better system with the Pontifex Maximus :wry:.

Tukhachevskii
02-04-2010, 11:15 AM
I saw a similar pattern looking at a lot of people who joined modern Craft and some of the Charismatic groups as well.

Is that Craft as in World of Warcraft?:rolleyes:

davidbfpo
02-04-2010, 01:16 PM
Hat tip to another observer Tim Stevens, Kings ICSR, who has pointed to this Dutch report; link:http://english.nctb.nl/current_topics/reports/ where it is the first report

Summary:
The Jihadist movement is the driving force behind the current worldwide terrorist wave that is carried out on the pretext of a religious armed fight, the ‘jihad’. This movement derives its strength largely from its ideology. There is increasing consensus that Jihadism should be combated not only by repressing it, in the form of a war against terrorism or by means of intelligence organisations and police, but rather by also addressing it specifically at the level of ideology. The knowledge of Jihadist ideology is, however, still limited. This study aims to provide insight into this ideology, the strategy derived from it, and the method of production, reproduction, and propagation of this ideology and strategy, in order to improve the capability to counter Jihadist terrorism.

Yet to be read fully, on a quick scan looks interesting.

marct
02-04-2010, 02:55 PM
Is that Craft as in World of Warcraft?:rolleyes:

Nope - Craft as in Witchcraft :D.

William F. Owen
02-04-2010, 03:49 PM
Has anyone done any work on why people became communists, nazis or fascists?

Anyone inquired as to why some Native Americans got "radicalised" and rejected the authority imposed upon them?

My point is, if what is radicalising them is "the political reality" then the only real issue is do they express their politics using violence. - if they do that, then kill or incarcerate them, in line with what the law allows.
Nothing you can or or say, will stop some kid becoming a suicide bomber - and if you can, then he's not one of the ones to worry about.

marct
02-04-2010, 08:50 PM
Hi Wilf,


Has anyone done any work on why people became communists, nazis or fascists?

Tons of work done after WW II, especially on the ability to compartmentalize (this (http://www.amazon.com/ANATOMY-CONFORMITY-Edward-Roger-Walker/dp/B002D91H0I/ref=sr_1_2?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1265316235&sr=8-2) is just an example).


Anyone inquired as to why some Native Americans got "radicalised" and rejected the authority imposed upon them?

Funny you should mention that - I'm talking with a colleague of mine about looking at that in the Canadian situation. And, yes, a lot has been written on that particular topic. The same can also be asked about why the Irish "got radicalized and rejected the authority imposed upon them" ;).


My point is, if what is radicalising them is "the political reality" then the only real issue is do they express their politics using violence. - if they do that, then kill or incarcerate them, in line with what the law allows.

[tongue in cheek]

Well, I certainly would agree with the first part of that. As to the second, I'm sure some of our colleagues who are descended from the violent, godless, anarchist insurgents under MAJ Washington, might, possibly, disagree.

[/tongue in cheek]


Nothing you can or or say, will stop some kid becoming a suicide bomber - and if you can, then he's not one of the ones to worry about.

Maybe nothing you can say or do can stop him or her from becoming one, but it can certainly start them becoming one ;).

davidbfpo
02-04-2010, 09:43 PM
(Taken from and only partial) Has anyone done any work on why people became communists, nazis or fascists? Nothing you can or or say, will stop some kid becoming a suicide bomber - and if you can, then he's not one of the ones to worry about.

Wilf,

Over the decades lots of academic work has been done on radicalization; I assume in the past this research has reflected contemporary issues and after WW2 the totalitarian temptation. There are some continuities and what appear to be new factors.

Contemporary terrorism or political violence, is assumed to be the end result of radicalization and is best described as "an old wine in a new bottle". It is possible to dissuade and prevent a 'kid becoming a suicide bomber'. There is plenty of evidence to that effect.

There are many unresolved aspects to the preventative aspects of counter-terrorism, not helped when even the experts do not agree on the process, the signs and how to respond (as reflected in other threads).

Just a quick, considered response.

William F. Owen
02-05-2010, 06:30 AM
Tons of work done after WW II, especially on the ability to compartmentalize (this (http://www.amazon.com/ANATOMY-CONFORMITY-Edward-Roger-Walker/dp/B002D91H0I/ref=sr_1_2?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1265316235&sr=8-2) is just an example).


Maybe nothing you can say or do can stop him or her from becoming one, but it can certainly start them becoming one ;).
....and you will probably never know what that was or when it occurred.



Over the decades lots of academic work has been done on radicalization; I assume in the past this research has reflected contemporary issues and after WW2 the totalitarian temptation. There are some continuities and what appear to be new factors.


Contemporary terrorism or political violence, is assumed to be the end result of radicalization and is best described as "an old wine in a new bottle". It is possible to dissuade and prevent a 'kid becoming a suicide bomber'. There is plenty of evidence to that effect.

Guys, basically what this research is trying to do is ascertain why some people have the political beliefs they do. Essentially why did anyone vote for Tony Blair or George W?
The "kids" we are supposedly worried about have a political belief and they believe it enough to fight. .... so what?
Anyone asking which members of the USMC was "radicalised by 911?" Was George W. Bush?

I know why Palestinians and Tamils become suicide bombers. It's all pretty obvious once you get on their value ladder, but I very much doubt the practicality of any work that would be able to make them change their mind. If it were that simple, why do not folks simply do it, because the flow down is "Please accept our occupation of your land peacefully." - THAT IS WHAT YOU WANT THEM TO BELIEVE!

Tukhachevskii
02-05-2010, 12:38 PM
Hat tip to another observer Tim Stevens, Kings ICSR, who has pointed to this Dutch report; link:http://english.nctb.nl/current_topics/reports/ where it is the first report

.

I've read through it once quickly and am impressed with its grasp of the subject matter but (and it's a big BUT) I am still averse to describing Jihadists as some kind of fringe movement. Furthermore, and this irks me no end, the admonition to study the "ideology" of Jihadism when IMO it's not an "ideology" but a totalisitc worldview (or "religion", a word I have problems with in this respect too); being a Dutch (therefore dependant upon a post-modernist multicultural/relativist paradigm) product it is no wonder they are hard pressed to say the I word (thats Islam to you and I). Furthermore, the presentation and explication of Jihad follows almost to the letter what Muslim "moderates" would have us belive rather than revealing the centrality of Jihad to Islam (reminiscent of Calvin and the calling of the elect in extreme Protestantism). Also, and I think this is something not many have commented upon, is the strange prediliction we have of assuming that we and they inhabit the same "worlds" in which time and space are interpreted through similar paradigms but articulated through difficult languages (hence the priority of diplomacy, communication, radical- translation, et al) when in fact the conflict is not over "interpretation" (although that's a big part of it) but over "constituion" of the world according to different understanding of what the "good life" should be. It's not a question of somehow "getting through" to them (based on the assumption that we all want the same thing, see the world in the same way, and that everything is, at bottom, identitical with only our languages vielling reality) but instead its a question of whose "way of life" in the widest phenomenological sense is going to prevail in our respective AOs. We don't live (or "dwell" as Heideger would have said) in the same "world" and the until we begin grasping that issue (among others) we will always interpret the "jihadists" as we want them to see themselves and not as they actually do see themselves. Unfortunately, I can't copy and paste segments from the article to illustrate my point but I will attempt to do so in greater depth (and one hopes greater cohesion) later in order to more fully adumbrate my concerns.

OTOH here's an article I find better conforms to my own line of thinking although there are still issues I would accentuate and others I would relegate to the sidelines, S.P. Lambert, Y: The Sources of Islamic Revolutionary Conduct http://www.dia.mil/college/pubs/pdf/5674.pdf

Bob's World
02-05-2010, 02:11 PM
Query:

Is one "radicalized" by the government that they believe is oppressing them; or are they radicalized by the organization that comes along and offers them an alternative to that oppression?

As I always say, the Pied Piper is a fairy tale. If the conditions (real or perceived) of poor governance do not exist, no amount of leadership or ideology is going gain much traction with the populace.

Personally, I find the whole concept of "deradicalization" just one more blame shifting tactic to soothe ourlselves that we are merely victims here. This is not helpful, and it will not work.

bourbon
02-05-2010, 03:44 PM
Query:

Is one "radicalized" by the government that they believe is oppressing them; or are they radicalized by the organization that comes along and offers them an alternative to that oppression?
Sir, I would make a distinction between groups like Palestinians and Tamils that become suicide bombers and Muslims in the West who radicalize. This material is more applicable to the later. The Abu Mansoor Al-Amriki’s or Hamburg Cell’s are not oppressed by their governments. I believe the organization that comes along offers the Salafi Jihadist script, which they reach for to fill an internal psychological void.

As has been mentioned by others before, the book/film Fight Club illustrates this dynamic substituting Salafi Jihadism for a revolutionary-anarchist movement.

"We're the middle children of history, man. No purpose or place. We have no Great War. No Great Depression. Our great war is a spiritual war. Our great depression is our lives." - Tyler Durden, Fight Club

marct
02-05-2010, 04:32 PM
Hi Bob,


Query:

Is one "radicalized" by the government that they believe is oppressing them; or are they radicalized by the organization that comes along and offers them an alternative to that oppression?

The answer to that question is "Yes" :D.

On a more serious level, we have a very nasty tendency in the West to want to assume mono-causal models since, if we can identify them, we can in theory gain some form of control over them. Personally, I'm part of that annoying emergentist camp.....


As I always say, the Pied Piper is a fairy tale. If the conditions (real or perceived) of poor governance do not exist, no amount of leadership or ideology is going gain much traction with the populace.

At any given point in time and space, I might agree with you but, at a general level, I have to disagree. Ideologies, actually grand narratives is a better term since "ideology" implies a secular worldview with a political focus and they are only a sub-set of the totality of grand narratives, can spread within a population without requiring either a Pied Piper or going kinetic. Once spread, however, they can act as an emergent base from which political change emerges and, as part of that emergence, brings moral entrepreneurs - your Pied Pipers - to popular attention. "Governance", good, bad or indifferent, may have nothing whatsoever to do with the spread of a grand narrative that will, latter on, act as the wellspring for latter political contests that may go kinetic.


Personally, I find the whole concept of "deradicalization" just one more blame shifting tactic to soothe ourlselves that we are merely victims here. This is not helpful, and it will not work.

Not in the materialist sense of immediately diminishing the pool of "radicals". Where it does, however, play a major part is in constructing and maintaining the, hmmm, the technical term would be "mana" or "spiritual power", of the opposing grand narrative. It allows for the process we could call "witnessing" to take place which, when we look at it at the population level, can be a pretty potent way to kill off key components of an opposing grand narrative.

Now, having said all that, I don't mean in any way to imply that they people setting up the deradicalization programs have a coherent theoretical model of what they are doing and why they are doing it, at least in the terms and sense that I see them. IMHO, this is just another example of the emergence of a process from a dynamic situation that is pretty much probable (BTW, I've seen and documented similar patterns in other areas).

Cheers,

Marc

Dayuhan
02-06-2010, 12:56 AM
Query:

Is one "radicalized" by the government that they believe is oppressing them; or are they radicalized by the organization that comes along and offers them an alternative to that oppression?

As I always say, the Pied Piper is a fairy tale. If the conditions (real or perceived) of poor governance do not exist, no amount of leadership or ideology is going gain much traction with the populace.

Personally, I find the whole concept of "deradicalization" just one more blame shifting tactic to soothe ourlselves that we are merely victims here. This is not helpful, and it will not work.

In some environments yes, in others perhaps less so. In this case we're not talking about mass radicalization of a populace, but of disaffected individuals. Looking back at recent history we can see that these individual radicalizations generally have nothing to do with quality of governance. They're more likely to be driven by a combination of boredom, youthful energy with no immediate outlet, and in many cases generalized anger, often with "society" standing in for resentment toward parents and other immediate authority figuresd.

I'm not convinced that any level of quality governance will completely eliminate that fraction of a percent that comes out with a chip on the shoulder heavy enough to drive a turn to violence.

Bob's World
02-06-2010, 01:19 AM
Sir, I would make a distinction between groups like Palestinians and Tamils that become suicide bombers and Muslims in the West who radicalize. This material is more applicable to the later. The Abu Mansoor Al-Amriki’s or Hamburg Cell’s are not oppressed by their governments. I believe the organization that comes along offers the Salafi Jihadist script, which they reach for to fill an internal psychological void.

As has been mentioned by others before, the book/film Fight Club illustrates this dynamic substituting Salafi Jihadism for a revolutionary-anarchist movement.

I think you are whistling past the cemetery if you take the position of holding western governments blameless; be it in regards to shaping and supporting despots down range; or in subtle policies at home that create perceptions of disrespect or injustice among some segment of your nation's own populace.

When you combine foreign policies that support oppressive regimes of a country elsewhere, that has provided a significant immigrant populace to your country at home, and that populace holds such perceptions; I would advise you that you are sitting on a powder keg of your own making.

To simply blame the messenger or the message that actually motivates members of that populace to action is naive and dangerous.

Dayuhan
02-06-2010, 04:06 AM
I think you are whistling past the cemetery if you take the position of holding western governments blameless; be it in regards to shaping and supporting despots down range; or in subtle policies at home that create perceptions of disrespect or injustice among some segment of your nation's own populace.

When you combine foreign policies that support oppressive regimes of a country elsewhere, that has provided a significant immigrant populace to your country at home, and that populace holds such perceptions; I would advise you that you are sitting on a powder keg of your own making.

To simply blame the messenger or the message that actually motivates members of that populace to action is naive and dangerous.

Certainly if an insurgency is driven by resistance to Western-supported despotism one would be right to revisit the policy of supporting despots. We found ourselves in that position with a depressing regularity during the Cold War, but that paradigm is not necessarily applicable in every circumstance.

In Iraq and Afghanistan the "insurgencies" (using the term loosely) are not driven by resistance to Western-supported despotism but by a desire to take advantage of a power vacuum left when Western governments removed despots. The Western supported governments in both cases are widely perceived as ineffectual and vulnerable and likely to collapse as soon as Western support is withdrawn, leaving the prize open for whoever has the means to seize it. Western support is perceived (probably accurately) as being unsustainable over the long haul, so the "insurgents" try to erode that support and gain position to take power when it is withdrawn.

AQ, for its own part, may have had its roots in resistance to foreign-supported government and foreign occupation of Afghanistan, but the power in question was not Western. AQ's continuing campaign is based less on resistance to Western-supported despotism than on a desire to impose a despotism more conducive to AQ's goals.

It is in some quarters fashionable to attribute all that happens in the world (at least all that involves violence) to a response to Western actions. In some ways it would be lovely if this were true: if everything everyone did was a response to our actions, we could easily control the responses by modifying our own actions. The world, alas, is a bit more complicated than that, and the non-West is not simply a reflexive responder to Western stimuli. There are people out there with their own agendas and they have both the will and the capacity to proactively pursue those agendas, for their own purposes and quite apart from any knee-jerk response.

Bob's World
02-06-2010, 05:06 AM
Certainly if an insurgency is driven by resistance to Western-supported despotism one would be right to revisit the policy of supporting despots. We found ourselves in that position with a depressing regularity during the Cold War, but that paradigm is not necessarily applicable in every circumstance.

In Iraq and Afghanistan the "insurgencies" (using the term loosely) are not driven by resistance to Western-supported despotism but by a desire to take advantage of a power vacuum left when Western governments removed despots. The Western supported governments in both cases are widely perceived as ineffectual and vulnerable and likely to collapse as soon as Western support is withdrawn, leaving the prize open for whoever has the means to seize it. Western support is perceived (probably accurately) as being unsustainable over the long haul, so the "insurgents" try to erode that support and gain position to take power when it is withdrawn.

AQ, for its own part, may have had its roots in resistance to foreign-supported government and foreign occupation of Afghanistan, but the power in question was not Western. AQ's continuing campaign is based less on resistance to Western-supported despotism than on a desire to impose a despotism more conducive to AQ's goals.

It is in some quarters fashionable to attribute all that happens in the world (at least all that involves violence) to a response to Western actions. In some ways it would be lovely if this were true: if everything everyone did was a response to our actions, we could easily control the responses by modifying our own actions. The world, alas, is a bit more complicated than that, and the non-West is not simply a reflexive responder to Western stimuli. There are people out there with their own agendas and they have both the will and the capacity to proactively pursue those agendas, for their own purposes and quite apart from any knee-jerk response.


First Afghanistan: There was an alliance of northern tribes in insurgency against the illegitimate Taliban government that was installed and supported by Pakistan. We went into that mix to get revenge against AQ and to wrest control of Afghanistan away from the Taliban with out, I assume, fully appreciating the role of Pakistan in their regime. The follow-on insurgency we are dealing with in Afghanistan now has nothing to do with GWOT, and has everything to do with the current Karzai regime that draws its legitimacy from the West/US; and the Taliban insurgency to challenge that; along with a general popular resistance against the western military presence in their country.

In Iraq there was no insurgency and no connection to GWOT. They just happened to be governed by a guy who pissed us off. The insurgency there was purely a response to our invasion.

This is the great irony, the two places we have sent our military to "defeat terrorism" in fact, have very little to do with the root cause of the political factors that gave rise to AQ and also that motivate many nationalist insurgents across the middle east (from places like Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Egypt, Algeria) to engage the West in acts of Terrorism.

Until we are ready to stop using GWOT as an excuse to attack the States that we don't approve of; and instead recognize that we are not being attacked by the populaces of our enemies, but are in fact being attacked by the populaces of our allies, we will not may true progress in defeating terrorsim.

This is the critical strategic point that we must address. The West supports a handful of the most oppressive regimes in the world across the Middle East, and it is the insurgent populaces of those countries that attack us; along with the relatives of those populaces who have migrated to western countries.

This is like a magicians trick. No one is seeing the real problem because we are all staring intently at the misdirection.

Yemen is the latest poster child for this. An oppressive despot being promised US aid to oppress and suppress the insurgent segment of his populace that dares to stand up to his autocratic rule all in the name of "GWOT" and because he is an ally. We can only expect more attacks on the west from this policy. We should be cracking down on the government of Yemen, not the populace of Yemen. Once we change our policies and refocus our military efforts accordingly the populaces of places like Yemen will find they don't need what AQ is selling; and they will also have little reason to feel that they must attack the US to be able to get out from under oppressive regimes at home.

Dayuhan
02-06-2010, 06:05 AM
First Afghanistan: There was an alliance of northern tribes in insurgency against the illegitimate Taliban government that was installed and supported by Pakistan. We went into that mix to get revenge against AQ and to wrest control of Afghanistan away from the Taliban with out, I assume, fully appreciating the role of Pakistan in their regime. The follow-on insurgency we are dealing with in Afghanistan now has nothing to do with GWOT, and has everything to do with the current Karzai regime that draws its legitimacy from the West/US; and the Taliban insurgency to challenge that; along with a general popular resistance against the western military presence in their country.

Largely agree, though "revenge against AQ" could also be stated as "disruption of State support for AQ and resulting safe haven". I'd also question whether the current conflict qualifies as "insurgency". An insurgency requires a government, and I'm not sure anybody other than us recognizes the Karzai assemblage as that.



In Iraq there was no insurgency and no connection to GWOT. They just happened to be governed by a guy who pissed us off. The insurgency there was purely a response to our invasion.


Agreed, though to an extent the "insurgency", especially in the early stages, could be viewed as less a resistance to a Government than as armed competition to fill the vacuum left by Saddam's removal.



This is the great irony, the two places we have sent our military to "defeat terrorism" in fact, have very little to do with the root cause of the political factors that gave rise to AQ and also that motivate many nationalist insurgents across the middle east (from places like Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Egypt, Algeria) to engage the West in acts of Terrorism.


I personally believe that the purpose of the 9/11 attacks was to draw the US into punching the tar baby and initiating military actions that could be dragged into wars of attrition. That was not a response to US actions or policies, but a carefully calculated proactive gambit aiming to simultaneously reinforce the narrative of Western aggression against Muslims (a narrative that was at the time becoming rather weak) and engage the US in a military action that would exploit our rather notorious unwillingness to maintain expensive and unpleasant long term actions. If I'm right, we gave AQ an abundance of what they wanted.



This is the critical strategic point that we must address. The West supports a handful of the most oppressive regimes in the world across the Middle East, and it is the insurgent populaces of those countries that attack us; along with the relatives of those populaces who have migrated to western countries.


Where and when in this conflict have we been attacked by an insurgent populace resisting a Western-supported regime? AQ is not a populace, nor does it represent a populace. They have never managed to draw enough support from any populace anywhere to initiate an insurgency, though they have managed to successfully exploit insurgencies that they did not initiate.



Yemen is the latest poster child for this. An oppressive despot being promised US aid to oppress and suppress the insurgent segment of his populace that dares to stand up to his autocratic rule all in the name of "GWOT" and because he is an ally. We can only expect more attacks on the west from this policy. We should be cracking down on the government of Yemen, not the populace of Yemen. Once we change our policies and refocus our military efforts accordingly the populaces of places like Yemen will find they don't need what AQ is selling; and they will also have little reason to feel that they must attack the US to be able to get out from under oppressive regimes at home.

Have we the capacity to transform the Yemeni government into something functional? I suspect not. We could withdraw support and allow that government to collapse, but the immediate outcome would likely resemble what we see on the other side of the strait, which would benefit neither us nor the populace. My opinion of the Yemeni government is no higher than yours, but we've a rather limited list of options for action, and any or all of them could work out badly.

Bob's World
02-06-2010, 07:54 AM
So, when in quick sand, struggle harder?

When in a rip current, swim faster?

When in a hole, dig deeper?

I prefer to subscribe to "If something isn't working, try something else." Coupled with the belief that usually when a guy thinks all his problems are someone elses fault, he is delusional.

Our current foreign policy is suffering from just such delusion. We are so sure of our goodness, our rightness, that we assume that any who dare to reject or resist what we offer or impose upon them to be "threats." They are either with us or against us, right?

I will completely agree that AQ has no populace. I repeat, AQ has no populace. They are a non-state political organization that is conducting a global unconventional warfare campaign. They target and leverage the insurgent populaces of other nations with common grievances to provide the manpower and funding to make their movement work.

You ask:

"Where and when in this conflict have we been attacked by an insurgent populace resisting a Western-supported regime? "

The first World Trade Center attack; the USS Cole, the Embassy bombings, 9/11; all of the foreign figher attacks in Iraq and Afghanistan; etc, etc, etc.

To make matters worse, the despotic governments that these insurgencies are struggling to affect now come to the US with hat in hand as great allies, and ask for money and weapons to use against their own people in the name of "combatting terrorism;" and we laud them as great allies...

We are being played, and we allow ourselves to be played because we fear the economic impact that breaking relations with these countries could cause to our economy. Ironic. Supporting them has trashed our economy even worse that what we feared would happen if we did not support them.

What I fear more than terrorism; what I fear more than the economic disruption that could come from damaged relations with Saudi Arabia, et. al; what I fear as we pursue these fear-driven policies; is that we are doing irrepairable damage to the reputation of the United States of America. That we standing up more for those who oppress more than for those who are oppressed. That we are becoming far less the country we see ourselves as, and becoming the type of country that we have always stood against.

It is time to face our fears and to get our country back on track; and no amount of military effort against the populaces of others will get us anywhere but deeper into the darkness that we fear.

As to having the capacity to "fix" Yemen. Not our job. We don't need to fix these guys, we need to give them some tough love and stop supporting their destructive behavior and demand that they either begin addressing the concerns of their popualces with our help, or ignore them and deal with the results on their own.

The "Good Cold Warriors" in DC think they have this figured out, but they are destroying us by clinging to relationships and methods that just don't bear up to the current age. We must evolve if we want to prevail.

Dayuhan
02-06-2010, 11:25 AM
You ask:

"Where and when in this conflict have we been attacked by an insurgent populace resisting a Western-supported regime? "

The first World Trade Center attack; the USS Cole, the Embassy bombings, 9/11; all of the foreign figher attacks in Iraq and Afghanistan; etc, etc, etc.


I can't see any of these as the acts of an insurgent populace. A few highly radicalized individuals, yes, but that's not the same thing.

Certainly one could cite attacks on US forces in Iraq and Afghanistan conducted by Iraqis and Afghans as the acts of an insurgent populace, but attacks by foreign fighters? Again, the acts of a small number of highly radicalized individuals.



To make matters worse, the despotic governments that these insurgencies are struggling to affect now come to the US with hat in hand as great allies, and ask for money and weapons to use against their own people in the name of "combatting terrorism;" and we laud them as great allies...


I can't quite see the Saudis, for one, coming to the US with hat in hand asking for favors... more the other way around. There is dependency in that equation, certainly, but it ain't them depending on us.



We are being played, and we allow ourselves to be played because we fear the economic impact that breaking relations with these countries could cause to our economy. Ironic. Supporting them has trashed our economy even worse that what we feared would happen if we did not support them.


I'm not sure this equation makes sense to me... who is "playing" us, and how? How has supporting anyone in the ME "trashed our economy"? We did that all by ourselves, I'd say.



As to having the capacity to "fix" Yemen. Not our job. We don't need to fix these guys, we need to give them some tough love and stop supporting their destructive behavior and demand that they either begin addressing the concerns of their popualces with our help, or ignore them and deal with the results on their own.


I'm not convinced that they have the capacity to address the concerns of the populace, and I don't think any amount of tough love from us or anyone is likely to create that capacity in less than a generation or two. Certainly we can ignore them, but if the place degenerates into chaos and turns into another Somalia it will be difficult to ignore. I can't say I'm entirely comfortable with the short term choices that have been made, but neither am I sure that I've anything better to offer.

Bob's World
02-06-2010, 12:37 PM
Dayuhan. I know we see this from differing perspectives, so what follows is not so much aimed at you personally, but merely a quick effort on my part to try to explain my perspective more clearly. I realize mine is a minority position.

"Foreign fighters": A node of the AQ UW Network. These are not "radicalized individuals", and these are not "terrorists". These men come from a handful of countries and are for the most part directly related to, in membership or purpose, with nationalist insurgency movements in their respective countries. They travel to fight the US where we are, primarily because they buy into the AQ message that they cannot be successful in their quest to throw off illegitimate governance at home until the break the support of the US-led west to those same governments in particular and the Middle East in general.

They come from Saudi Arabia, they come from Yemen, they come from Algeria, and they come from Libya. They come from others as well. All nations with active nationalist Sunni insurgencies. All nations with governments that arguably do not draw their legitimacy from sources their respective populaces recognize. All Nations that score high on the despotism scales. All Nations that are US allies and partners in our "War on Terrorism." They also come from the imigrant populaces from these states living currently in Western nations. Many of these groups are angered by the treatment of their homelands, and also perceive less than full inclusion in their new homes. I.e. they do not identify themselves as citizens of their current states first.

The strategic key is that we do not need to "fix" any of these countries, but neither should we set ourselves up as a protective buffer between these governments and their own populaces. The "tough love" I speak to is a combination of breaking unconditional aspect of this protective relationship and striking hard conditions. Governments need not be "effective" to be resistant to insurgency: they need primarily to be perceived as legitimate by their own populace, and that same populace needs to have some mechanism that they trust in to effect needed changes in governance. Two simple strategic steps

1. Perceived Legitimacy through the eyes of the governed populace,

2. A trusted mechanism in place that that populace can rely upon to effect governmental changes when they believe it to be necessary.

We delude ourselves to our detriment when we:

1. Blame the growing violence against the US on "radicalized individuals"

2. Convince ourselves that supporting despotic leaders will not result in consequences at the hands of those populaces forced to endure under governments they have no legal means to address

3. When we think that massive military charity in the form of "Population-Centric COIN" tactics will somehow buy/force peace on these insurgent populaces while at the same time protecting the very government over them that they see as illegitimate.

The sad part is the smarter answer is actually far less expensive and far less damaging to our reputation, and far less burdensome on our superb military forces. The smarter answer is also far more likely to produce a positive enduring effect. The kicker though, is that it requires that we relinquish control over the outcome. The "Good Cold Warriors" cannot do that. There world is based in the control of others.

Once we step back from the anomaly of Cold War policies; and re-embrace our founding principles as a nation, much of the current problems will sort out. Self-Determination is a beautiful thing. We demanded it for ourselves; we need to stop working so hard to deny it to others. Islamism is no more dangerous to the world than communism was. Both were just convenient ideologies that spoke to oppressed populaces that worked for driving out illegitimate governments in their time and place. 40 years from now we'll look at the nut jobs ranting about "radicalization" the same way we look back at Senator McCarthy. They didn't understand the role of ideology in insurgency then, and they still don't.

Legitimacy of government in the eyes of the governed; and a trusted mechanism to legally affect governmental change. These two things are, I believe, the strategic keys to COIN. Address them first, and the rest will in short order fall into place. Ignore them and address the symptoms instead, and you are in for a long, painful ride.

Bill Moore
02-06-2010, 05:08 PM
Posted by Bob's World,
This is the great irony, the two places we have sent our military to "defeat terrorism" in fact, have very little to do with the root cause of the political factors that gave rise to AQ and also that motivate many nationalist insurgents across the middle east (from places like Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Egypt, Algeria) to engage the West in acts of Terrorism.

I sympathize with your frustration my brother, but I question the practicality of addressing so called root causes, especially political factors that gave rise to AQ (and groups like them that arose and have fallen in the past). We all know the problem is painfully complex, so any post is simply one or two thoughts on the subject out of many. “Some” reasons I do not concur with your point above are:

It is imperial hubris for us to attempt to “push” our values upon another country. What you see as illegitimate governments may in fact be legitimate in the eyes of the majority of their population. Just because a few thousand radicals who want to impose Shari’a law upon their fellow men are dissatisfied doesn’t equate to a popular revolt. While not political correct (I know that concerns our lawyers) the “root” cause is not oppressive governments in the Middle East or Western oppression, but rather the interpretation of Islam itself my some (not a majority) of its followers. Jihad existed long before the West had colonies, and the root cause was their religion, which is political. They strived to establish a caliphate by the sword. If we think that the current governments are illegitimate just wait until a caliphate is established and all women are oppressed, education is dumbed down to religious studies, and these nations go backwards in time. It is tricky business for us to determine what is legitimate and what isn’t.

On 9/11 we were attacked by AQ, not by illegitimate governments in the Middle East. Their base was in Afghanistan, and the American people appropriately demanded a harsh response for the murder of close to 3,000 citizens. I’m not sure attempting to reform the government of Saudi would have been accepted by the American people as a practical or appropriate response, and as Dayuhan wrote below the reason for the attack was to draw us into battle to begin with. If we didn’t respond, they would have hit us again.

In my opinion we went in too light, and although our forces assumed great risk they didn’t assume enough risk and we allowed AQ senior leadership to escape into Pakistan. Our mission was to defeat AQ, then the mission morphed into developing a “legitimate” government, but it was only legitimate in the eyes of the coalition, not the Afghan people. The nature of the conflict has changed, it now has very little to do with AQ, and we have created our own mess by trying to rebuild the country, while AQ is establishing safe haven elsewhere. There is a certain beauty to punitive military operations, and that IMO is what we should have done in Afghanistan, go in hard and leave. If they come back we go back. You may find that amusing, but is it more amusing than what we’re doing now?

Attempting to reform the governments in the Middle East, unless you are suggesting we help AQ build the caliphate, will not undermine AQ’s motivation. Are we going to get rid of Israel? Are we going to withdraw from the Middle East completely after we install Islamist regimes?


Posted by Dayuhan,


I personally believe that the purpose of the 9/11 attacks was to draw the US into punching the tar baby and initiating military actions that could be dragged into wars of attrition. That was not a response to US actions or policies, but a carefully calculated proactive gambit aiming to simultaneously reinforce the narrative of Western aggression against Muslims (a narrative that was at the time becoming rather weak) and engage the US in a military action that would exploit our rather notorious unwillingness to maintain expensive and unpleasant long term actions. If I'm right, we gave AQ an abundance of what they wanted.

This was UBL's stated intention in open source documents long before 9/11. They defeated the Soviets in Afghanistan and believed they could do same with the U.S. through a form of economic and political attrition warfare. What a victory if they could defeat the world's two super powers. 9/11 wasn't the first attack, others were conducted in an attempt to drag us into Afghanistan, but I think you would agree that at least initially the fight went very bad for AQ. They didn't truly appreciate the power of our military and CIA or our national commitment (at the time) to crush them. IMO we didn't pursue it hard enough and lost our asymmetric advantage of brute military power against a consolidated enemy trying to fight us head on, BUT when we over stayed our welcome the nature of the fight changed to our disadvantage, the fight AQ wanted, although AQ only plays a small role in that fight now.

It's frustrating, but I'm confident we'll still triumph in the end. Agree with Bob's World that our current strategy is still off track, but we'll eventually get right (probably out of necessity).

jmm99
02-06-2010, 09:42 PM
from Dayuhan
.... our rather notorious unwillingness to maintain expensive and unpleasant long term actions.

in light of OEF 2001-2010 and still counting, OIF 2003-2010 and still counting; and their granddaddy Indochine 1953-1973. "Maintain", we will; "like it", we won't.

Good post, Bill Moore - "imperial hubris" vs "punitive raids", an interesting juxtaposition. ;)

Regards

Mike

Ken White
02-06-2010, 09:48 PM
Islamism is no more dangerous to the world than communism was. Both were just convenient ideologies that spoke to oppressed populaces that worked for driving out illegitimate governments in their time and place. 40 years from now we'll look at the nut jobs ranting about "radicalization" the same way we look back at Senator McCarthy...He had the right idea but used some poor methodolgy to try to do what he thought needed to be done.

Lot of that going around...

That's a long way of saying that if you do not think Communism was and is dangerous, you have obviously missed what has happened to this country as a result of the actions and activities of some so-called Communists, their hangers on and collection of useful idiots.

If you do not think facets of Islamic belief, misapplied, are dangerous you may not have lost any good friends to those bizarre beliefs before 9/11, before Afghanistan and before Iraq.
Legitimacy of government in the eyes of the governed; and a trusted mechanism to legally affect governmental change. These two things are, I believe, the strategic keys to COIN. Address them first, and the rest will in short order fall into place. Ignore them and address the symptoms instead, and you are in for a long, painful ride.I don't totally agree with that but it too is as right as it is wrong. Question not answered, still, is how do you get that "legitimacy of government?" I have yet to see one that all involved believed was legitimate. In the unlikely event you were to plan and describe one that would be viewed by all as legitimate then comes the hard part. What, precisely, is your trusted mechanism? Even Canada has election fiddles... :wry:

And COIN is still a myth, a theory that needs to be parked in a museum... ;)

Ken White
02-06-2010, 09:59 PM
Jihad existed long before the West had colonies, and the root cause was their religion, which is political... It is tricky business for us to determine what is legitimate and what isn’t.

...If we didn’t respond, they would have hit us again...There is a certain beauty to punitive military operations, and that IMO is what we should have done in Afghanistan, go in hard and leave. If they come back we go back. You may find that amusing, but is it more amusing than what we’re doing now?I don't find it amusing -- it's one of the most sensible things that's been posted on this board in a while. I know the ancient Chinese (and I think Bob's World) put a lot of stock in threes. Been my observation that most persistent pests are stopped by three hard smackdowns. Hard, not light (as we have tried to do three times now; Viet Nam, Afghanistan and Iraq. hopefully we smacked ourselves hard enough to not try it again...). Gotta be hard (and that will cost less and harm fewer people in the long run) and you have to be able and prepared to deliver three...
...Are we going to withdraw from the Middle East completely after we install Islamist regimes?Heh. This reality trash needs to cease. :D
It's frustrating, but I'm confident we'll still triumph in the end. Agree with Bob's World that our current strategy is still off track, but we'll eventually get right (probably out of necessity).I agree with all that... :cool:

omarali50
02-06-2010, 11:24 PM
I agree with most of what Bill Moore is saying. btw, some days i have the feeling that people are OVERESTIMATING the "insurgency". What if super taliban is not as super as everyone seems to think? What if Pakistan completely switched sides? Where will Mullah Omar and friends go? It might be easier than many people think...

Bob's World
02-07-2010, 03:53 AM
Bill: Totally agree that a strong raid into Afghanistan to punish the living crap out of AQ and then leave was the way to go. Tell the Taliban stay out of this, it isn't about you, do our business and then go home. Instead we took out the Taliban, installed a new government, and then took on the role of protector....

But to clarify some key points in my root causes argument, because AQ is a symptom of the problem, not the problem itself.

1. Illegitimate governments: I am very clear that the definition is through the eyes of the populace being governed, not some external party. That when the populace of a nation (or even some autonomous region that isn't really a state in western terms) does not recognize the legitimacy of the governance over them, you have a prime, strategic, causal factor for insurgency.

2. I never said we need to attack or reform these illegitimate governments, I said that we need to stop protecting and supporting them in the suppression of their own populaces. The second prime strategic causal factor for insurgency is the lack of a trusted, certain process that a populace can employ to affect governance legally and peacefully. I don't care what that process is. I don't think we need to force western values, democracy or voting on anyone. I do think we need to hold a hard line with this entire crop of autocratic despots whose populaces are filling the ranks of AQ on the road, and insurgent movements at home to devise and implement such processes. This will either lead to new governments that those respective populaces recognize the legitimacy of, or will bestow new popular legitimacy on the existing government. It will allow the populaces of these nations to enact their OWN reforms. Hubris indeed to attempt to shape in our image.

3. Everyone jumps from "We must support despotic dictators" to "we must abandon our influence in the Middle East." Is there really no middle ground? I refuse to believe that. We live in an era of Lazy Diplomacy. We are bigger and stronger so we either demand that others do as we wish them to under threat of economic or military violence; or if they refuse, we label them "rogue" and either ostracize them or attack them. We have become selfish bullies. Do what I say or I'll take my ball and go home, or kick your ass, depending on how I feel, and if I think you can hurt me or not (i.e., have nuclear weapons). We must find a middle ground in the Middle East. In another thread they talked about having as powerful as possible military, and then using it as rarely as possible. I agree. So long as everyone knows you also possess the will to use it quickly and judiciously when necessary. We have gotten lazy and now lead with the military option.

For Ken:

4. No question major mayhem has been wrought in the name of Communism and Islam. But there is also no question that major mayhem has been wrought in the name of Democracy, Christianity, etc, etc etc. It isn't the ideology one uses to motivate their populace to action that is to be feared, it is the underlying causal factors that promote the violence itself. Colonialism is a big problem today. The residue of Western imperialism will shape conflicts for years to come. Just as the residue of Greek imperialism shaped conflicts from the Balkans to India for hundreds of years. Just as the residue of Roman imperialism shaped conflicts for hundreds of years from the Levant to Great Britain. To fear and attack the ideology of those who rise up to throw off illegitimate or oppressive control measures is to fear the wrong thing. It is to fear the loud noise of a gun going off rather than the bullet headed for your brain. It is to counter the noise rather than to address why you are being shot at in the first place.


No, I stand firm on my two points of strategic COIN:

1. First ensure that the populace recognizes the legitimacy of its governance on their terms.

2. Second, ensure that the populace has legal, peaceful, trusted and certain measures in place to effect changes of governance.



Finally, to bring this home: As I watched the inaugural of President Obama, I found it very interesting how the media went on and on about how America was electing its first Black President; I also found it interesting how fired up about this fact the African American populace was (I had thought that insurgency was resolved, but no, it requires more work and constant nurturing). But what I found the most interesting was what no one was talking about. The most powerful man in the world, the leader of the most powerful nation in the world, was handing over that mantle to another man peacefully, as a matter of course, because the people had chosen a new leader and it was time to transfer in accordance with the laws of the land and with will of the people. And no one noticed.

In America this is as natural as breathing. No one notices oxygen when it is all around you. In many lands around the world there is no such "political oxygen." There are few things more noticeable than the lack of oxygen. When we support despotic, illegitimate leaders, it is Uncle Sam's hand that is on the knob of the oxygen tank. When the populaces of those countries seek to throw of those illegitimate, despotic governments, it is only natural that they seek first to take our hand off of that knob. We don't need to take our hand off the knob (i.e., pack up and go home), we just need to turn the damn oxygen on.

Ken White
02-07-2010, 04:52 AM
...But there is also no question that major mayhem has been wrought in the name of Democracy, Christianity, etc, etc etc... Colonialism is a big problem today. To fear and attack the ideology of those who rise up to throw off illegitimate or oppressive control measures is to fear the wrong thing.True on the fact that 'democracy' and colonialism have their own failures that have left fear and resentment in many places. Yet, most people I've talked to around the world over the years acknowledged that 'our' crimes were and are slight compared to at least one of the two you cited -- and the other is rapidly gaining, even among its own devotees, an equally bad reputation. A lot of folks overseas "hate the US" but most of them also want to emigrate and come here...:wry:

While there are undoubtedly some who fear the ideology instead of what said ideologies can do, I think they're relatively few in number and are rarely in a position to affect policy. I think you're seeing 'what they can do' attacked in a not very effective way partly due to poor information and knowledge and partly to lack of some effective tools to do it another way. An example is the punitve strategic raid -- those things have been done for centureis -- but we do not do them for a variety of reasons. I believe that is large measure due to a lack of political will in the corridors of power of the US. I agree with much you say but your ideas are not going to work unless you fix that.
No, I stand firm on my two points of strategic COIN:

1. First ensure that the populace recognizes the legitimacy of its governance on their terms.

2. Second, ensure that the populace has legal, peaceful, trusted and certain measures in place to effect changes of governance.Yes, you do indeed stand firm on those two items and have for many months -- you also have yet to tell us how to realistically implement those ideas. ;)
Finally, to bring this home: As I watched the inaugural of President Obama...And no one noticed.I don't think that's correct; most of the rest of the world noticed but our flaccid media doesn't report foreign news at all well -- it doesn't even report US news at all well -- so you might have missed it. As a cruiser of worldwide English language news on the internet, I saw a lot of comment on that aspect. Many wondering why their transitions were not as assured. Interestingly, there were people here who did not believe that relatively smooth transition would occur, rumors of coups and other things abounded inside the US.
When we support despotic, illegitimate leaders, it is Uncle Sam's hand that is on the knob of the oxygen tank. When the populaces of those countries seek to throw of those illegitimate, despotic governments, it is only natural that they seek first to take our hand off of that knob. We don't need to take our hand off the knob (i.e., pack up and go home), we just need to turn the damn oxygen on.Sorry, do not agree at all. Some of those regimes are despotic; many more are just not as nice a some would like -- though the bulk of the populace is content. A lot of those 'populaces' you frequently are in fact merely segments of a populace with axes to grind and / or agendas that point in other directions. A few of those axes are reflexively anti-American simply because we're big, arrogant and clumsy. All those failings are due to our governmental system and real change means changing that system. Good luck with that...

We also need to satay away from other folks' oxygen...

You have an amazingly benign view of people for a former Prosecutor. My Daughter in Law in the Seattle area has a Sister who is a prosecutor and has been for about 20 years. Same region of the country, same basic demographics -- and she's more cynical about people than I am... :D

We can agree philosophically but practically, probably not. People are as a collective are prone to be unduly selfish which leads them to follow demagogues and do strange and illegal things (including being rebels without a cause...). People will tolerate poor governance and the USA is a major example of that (proof is in your daily news, just check the Early Bird). You tend to gloss over that little failing...

The world is not a nice place and some of your suggestions are unlikely to be implemented because the ebb and flow of international relations mitigates against it. All those other nations have a say in what happens and many of them do not wish us well and they will look for any chink to do some minor or major harm as they believe they can succeed. This:
we label them "rogue" and either ostracize them or attack them. We have become selfish bullies. Do what I say or I'll take my ball and go home, or kick your ass, depending on how I feel, and if I think you can hurt me or not (i.e., have nuclear weapons).is one result of that. US desires are not the sole reason we appear to do what you say, other nations including some 'friends' nudge and fiddle to take us down a peg, sometimes successfully, sometimes not. We respond to many things the way we do primarily due to having a dysfunctional (by design) government.

Lastly, you have never addressed how you intend to get the US political class and system to operate as you desire; how you're going to get around that designed, Constitutional, illogical and flawed functionality -- even though I have repeatedly asked you to do so. You can blow me off and not answer but to then keep saying the same things over and over without addressing the issues raised is not IMO helpful to your position. YMMV but I think changing the US approach is a far bigger impediment to Bob's World than the other two factors combined.

Bob's World
02-07-2010, 09:29 AM
Better we strive hard to change ourselves, than to demand that everyone else change to suit our out of date expectations.

OK, a few "Hows"

1. Declare and end to the war on terrorism. Running around the world declaring that we are a nation at war makes us sound like Chicken Little.

2. Officially announce that the State Department is once again lead (now that the war is over) for foreign policy and direct two things of them:
a. Change your name from State Department to something along the lines of "Foreign Office", that better recognizes that not every organization we must work with is a "State."
b. Conduct a top down review of all foreign policies and relationships shaped over the course of the Cold War and following period; and assess for relevance. Come back in 8 weeks with initial misison analysis for how to conduct foreign polciy in the current globalized world, highlighting any place where a "Cold Warism" was either retained or rejected and explain why.
(1) Specifically address an alternative position on Taiwan and Iran that are more relevant to the modern security concerns of our nation and that are apt to allow the devopment of healthier relationships with two of the most important nations (China and Iran) in the emerging world order.
(2) Also specficially address any nation considered an "Ally" or receiveing U.S foreign aid that is also listed as a major human rights violater and is possessed of a populace that is a major provider of AQ foreign fighters / terrorists. Include a plan that cuts aid to each of those countries by 50% per year until such time as they open negotiations with their own populaces to identify and address concerns; as well as to create mechanisms, logical and acceptable to them, to provide a reasonable and certain procedure for the populace to affect changes of governance short of insurgency.

3. I would immediately put all surge of forces to Afghanistan on hold and publically congratulate Mr. Karzai on his announcements about holding a Loya Jirga to address the legitimacy issues that his govenrment has; and then privately tell him we are packing up and gone by the end of the year unless he has a true, wide open, Loya Jirga with all Afghan stake holders appropriately represented. Then publicly offer our assurances of safetey of those who attend, and commit to working with whatever government emerges from this uniquely Afghan vehichle of government legitmacy.


Oh, and as to this:

"A lot of those 'populaces' you frequently are in fact merely segments of a populace with axes to grind and / or agendas that point in other directions. A few of those axes are reflexively anti-American (British) simply because we're big, arrogant and clumsy. All those failings are due to our governmental system and real change means changing that system. "

That could be a direct lift from the transcripts of British Parliment back in 1775...I suspect that is where you either first heard or used the line! :D

Backwards Observer
02-07-2010, 03:26 PM
-- and she's more cynical about people than I am... :D

Gee willikers, Mr. White, Old Soldiers like yourself are one of the reasons I'm not cynical! Although I'm not sayin' you're old, y'unnerstan'...:)

Ken White
02-07-2010, 07:15 PM
-- those aren't 'hows,' they're really 'whats.' My question was HOW you get the US government and specifically, the Congress, to do those what thingys you have often suggested...:confused:


Better we strive hard to change ourselves, than to demand that everyone else change to suit our out of date expectations.Well said and I agree but that's pie in the sky...
1. Declare and end to the war on terrorism.That's been done. In theory anyway.
...Running around the world declaring that we are a nation at war makes us sound like Chicken Little.I totally agree, a lot of folks in Congress and the country will or do also agree -- unfortunately, there are probably more that do or will not for various reasons including turf protection -- what do you propose to do about them? I'm sure you recall that hope is not a plan...

I agree with your other numbered items but am unsure how you propose to get there and frankly, quite strongly doubt that it is possible.

Oh, and as to this:
That could be a direct lift from the transcripts of British Parliment back in 1775...I suspect that is where you either first heard or used the line!Actually I first heard it on the border of Nubia even longer ago. It was true then, true in Gaul in 300 BC, true in 1775 AD and is still true today. Passing it off does not make it one bit less true; ignoring that reality by a strategic thinker is umm, surprising...

And you still have not proffered one single idea for HOW you plan to make that change occur... :wry:

Backwards Observer. Simply stop looking at your fourth point of contact, look ahead and you too can and will become cynical. It's absoutely painless -- and it keeps you alive. ;)

You can say I'm old because I "unnerstan" that I am. Generally when I look about today, I'm pretty thankful that I am.. :cool:

Backwards Observer
02-07-2010, 08:11 PM
Backwards Observer. Simply stop looking at your fourth point of contact, look ahead and you too can and will become cynical. It's absoutely painless -- and it keeps you alive. ;)

I try to face up and be a good cynic, but this world is so unusually interesting that I reckon it's nigh on a miracle that there are any good folks at all. Maybe it's some Isaiah 11:6 thing I'm trying to get over.


Isaiah 11:6 (King James Version)

6The wolf also shall dwell with the lamb, and the leopard shall lie down with the kid; and the calf and the young lion and the fatling together; and a little child shall lead them.

I guess in this world the little child is probably holding an rpg...whoa, I think I'm starting to see the light!

Ken White
02-07-2010, 08:37 PM
start 'em off with throwing rocks and then, when they get good, escalate to grenades...:D

The RPGs are for the teenagers who get those with which to be surly (in lieu of body piercing).:o

Actually, one shouldn't be cynical and I hope I'm not unduly so -- but it does flat pay to be suspicious. :wry:

Dayuhan
02-08-2010, 02:23 AM
Dayuhan. I know we see this from differing perspectives

No, really? Ah hadn't noticed... :D

Yes, I know we keep coming back to it, but it's an issue at the core of how we're trying to handle the current mess, and I'm not quite willing to let it go.

The idea that foreign fighters represent an insurgent populace at home is something that needs to be examined, and I'm not convinced that it stands up to examination. After all, an abundance of foreign fighters flocked to Afghanistan to fight against the Soviets... were they also representatives of an insurgent populace? Fighting the Russians in Afghanistan seems an odd way of expressing discontent with American influence over the homeland. I'm not sure quite why you would say that foreign fighters indicate insurgency on the home front, rather than a relatively small number of young men driven by a potent mix of testosterone, religious fervor, and lack of anything better to do at home... a mix that has sent young men off to fight in wars of dubious purpose many times in the past (the Crusades might be cited as an example).

I agree with Bill, who said what I was trying to say in a good deal fewer words:


It is imperial hubris for us to attempt to “push” our values upon another country. What you see as illegitimate governments may in fact be legitimate in the eyes of the majority of their population. Just because a few thousand radicals who want to impose Shari’a law upon their fellow men are dissatisfied doesn’t equate to a popular revolt.

Regarding this...



(2) Also specficially address any nation considered an "Ally" or receiveing U.S foreign aid that is also listed as a major human rights violater and is possessed of a populace that is a major provider of AQ foreign fighters / terrorists. Include a plan that cuts aid to each of those countries by 50% per year until such time as they open negotiations with their own populaces to identify and address concerns; as well as to create mechanisms, logical and acceptable to them, to provide a reasonable and certain procedure for the populace to affect changes of governance short of insurgency.


In the case of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states, this of course gets us exactly nowhere, because we don't give them any aid and they are not in any way dependent on us. Even if we had leverage, though... how do you think the populace of, say, Saudi Arabia would react if we demanded or even suggested that the Saudis need "a reasonable and certain procedure for the populace to affect changes of governance". I wouldn't expect any appreciation or gratitude. I'd expect them to tell us to mind our own damned business, amid a great deal of suspicion that our intention is to use that mechanism in some devious way to insert of Government that will be subject to our control, a suspicion that AQ will be all to eager to promote and exploit. AQ, after all, is agitating for more despotism, not less.

Whatever our actual intentions, I suspect that the policy you suggest will be perceived, even among its intended beneficiaries, as arrogant imposition, self-interested meddling, or both.

The notion of "dialogue with the populace" is I think hopelessly simplistic. Many of these populaces are extremely fractured and factionalized, and there is nothing even resembling consensus on who speaks for the populace or what policies are desired. What one faction sees as an irreducible minimum demand may be seen by another as an intolerable provocation. The problem in many cases is not that there is no dialogue, but that the dialogue has devolved into a screaming match, or a shootout.

You mentioned Algeria and Yemen... Algeria has an elected National Assembly with over 20 political parties represented. Yemen has what on paper appears to be a quite admirable set of democratic institutions. Of course these institutions don't work the way anyone would want them to. Your suggestion seems to assume that the Governments in question have the capacity to make things work, but don't choose to do it, and that we can force them to make things work by threatening to reduce aid. I doubt that's going to work, because the sad reality is that they have no idea how to make things work, and neither do we.

In Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states I really don't think there's any major popular demand for a mechanism to remove and replace Governments. These are very conservative countries, and there is a pervading fear that establishing such a mechanism would generate intense competition for position, and the result would be chaos. For better or worse, many in that part of the world fear chaos more than they fear despotism.

Certainly there was much discontent in SA during the 90s, driven by the combination of the oil glut and the highly visible US military presence. In many eyes these two phenomena were related: just as Americans tend to blame high oil prices as a conspiracy driven by the Saudis and the oil companies, Saudis tend to blame low oil prices on a conspiracy between Americans and oil companies. Despite prodigious efforts to exploit that discontent, UBL et al were never able to generate anywhere nearly enough support to drive an insurgency. Today the narrative of resentment from those days has dissolved almost completely under a rain of dollars: it's amazing what sloshing a few hundred billion around will do to mellow out a disgruntled populace.

I think it's dangerous to assume that AQ's attacks on us were a reactive phenomenon that was driven by our policies and can be undercut by a change in our policies, and that if we follow that assumption we can easily spend a great deal of effort in policies and actions that are not productive and may be counterproductive.

Ken White
02-08-2010, 03:03 AM
The notion of "dialogue with the populace" is I think hopelessly simplistic. Many of these populaces are extremely fractured and factionalized, and there is nothing even resembling consensus on who speaks for the populace or what policies are desired...
. . .
I think it's dangerous to assume that AQ's attacks on us were a reactive phenomenon that was driven by our policies and can be undercut by a change in our policies, and that if we follow that assumption we can easily spend a great deal of effort in policies and actions that are not productive and may be counterproductive.Two very important truths...

There may be one out there but I know of no nation where the population is monolithic as implied. Not Norway, not Singapore. Not even the Vatican...

As for AQ and a number of other "they hate us for what we are /were/ did..." That's very fallacious thinking. A lot of quite counterproductive effort is undertaken due to standing broad jumps at wrong conclusions...

Bob's World
02-08-2010, 03:06 AM
No, really? Ah hadn't noticed... :D

Yes, I know we keep coming back to it, but it's an issue at the core of how we're trying to handle the current mess, and I'm not quite willing to let it go.

The idea that foreign fighters represent an insurgent populace at home is something that needs to be examined, and I'm not convinced that it stands up to examination. After all, an abundance of foreign fighters flocked to Afghanistan to fight against the Soviets... were they also representatives of an insurgent populace? Fighting the Russians in Afghanistan seems an odd way of expressing discontent with American influence over the homeland. I'm not sure quite why you would say that foreign fighters indicate insurgency on the home front, rather than a relatively small number of young men driven by a potent mix of testosterone, religious fervor, and lack of anything better to do at home... a mix that has sent young men off to fight in wars of dubious purpose many times in the past (the Crusades might be cited as an example).

I agree with Bill, who said what I was trying to say in a good deal fewer words:



Regarding this...



In the case of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states, this of course gets us exactly nowhere, because we don't give them any aid and they are not in any way dependent on us. Even if we had leverage, though... how do you think the populace of, say, Saudi Arabia would react if we demanded or even suggested that the Saudis need "a reasonable and certain procedure for the populace to affect changes of governance". I wouldn't expect any appreciation or gratitude. I'd expect them to tell us to mind our own damned business, amid a great deal of suspicion that our intention is to use that mechanism in some devious way to insert of Government that will be subject to our control, a suspicion that AQ will be all to eager to promote and exploit. AQ, after all, is agitating for more despotism, not less.

Whatever our actual intentions, I suspect that the policy you suggest will be perceived, even among its intended beneficiaries, as arrogant imposition, self-interested meddling, or both.

The notion of "dialogue with the populace" is I think hopelessly simplistic. Many of these populaces are extremely fractured and factionalized, and there is nothing even resembling consensus on who speaks for the populace or what policies are desired. What one faction sees as an irreducible minimum demand may be seen by another as an intolerable provocation. The problem in many cases is not that there is no dialogue, but that the dialogue has devolved into a screaming match, or a shootout.

You mentioned Algeria and Yemen... Algeria has an elected National Assembly with over 20 political parties represented. Yemen has what on paper appears to be a quite admirable set of democratic institutions. Of course these institutions don't work the way anyone would want them to. Your suggestion seems to assume that the Governments in question have the capacity to make things work, but don't choose to do it, and that we can force them to make things work by threatening to reduce aid. I doubt that's going to work, because the sad reality is that they have no idea how to make things work, and neither do we.

In Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states I really don't think there's any major popular demand for a mechanism to remove and replace Governments. These are very conservative countries, and there is a pervading fear that establishing such a mechanism would generate intense competition for position, and the result would be chaos. For better or worse, many in that part of the world fear chaos more than they fear despotism.

Certainly there was much discontent in SA during the 90s, driven by the combination of the oil glut and the highly visible US military presence. In many eyes these two phenomena were related: just as Americans tend to blame high oil prices as a conspiracy driven by the Saudis and the oil companies, Saudis tend to blame low oil prices on a conspiracy between Americans and oil companies. Despite prodigious efforts to exploit that discontent, UBL et al were never able to generate anywhere nearly enough support to drive an insurgency. Today the narrative of resentment from those days has dissolved almost completely under a rain of dollars: it's amazing what sloshing a few hundred billion around will do to mellow out a disgruntled populace.

I think it's dangerous to assume that AQ's attacks on us were a reactive phenomenon that was driven by our policies and can be undercut by a change in our policies, and that if we follow that assumption we can easily spend a great deal of effort in policies and actions that are not productive and may be counterproductive.


But as the airwaves and print are full of the same steady drum beat of a majority opinion that has us 8 years into a war, and strategcially worse off and an economy in tatters and a national reputation at arguably an all time low to show for it.

I could be wrong, its theory and I have no metrics to prove my case.

There are strong metrics however that the majority opinion is wrong.

(Oh, and 5 minutes of google research on foreign fighers and and insurgent movements will show you the clear connections that I speak to. And I have NEVER, EVER said we should impose our values on others, quite the contrary. In fact, I beat a steady drum that we need to stop the hubris, and stop trying to control every outcome, and to help enable populaces everywhere to enjoy their own self-determination, and that in so doing we will turn down the heat on a global security environment.)

davidbfpo
02-10-2010, 11:09 PM
The first episode of a three-part BBC TV series called the 'Jihad Generation' by Peter Taylor, a respected reporter - notably for his work in Northern Ireland, was shown on Monday and gives an insight into the emergence in the UK of this 'generation'.

The programme is available on the BBC as an Ipod for nineteen days:
http://www.bbc.co.uk/iplayer/episode/b00qt1pm/Generation_Jihad_Episode_1/and a summary is on: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/8500782.stm

An alternative and hopefully works for those overseas, yes in the USA: http://watch-tv-episodes-online.com/generation-jihad/watch-generation-jihad-part-1-online/ alas registration required - well I tried.

The BBC summary:
Peter Taylor investigates the terrorist threat from young Muslim extremists radicalised on the internet.

Following the attempt to bomb an airliner over Detroit on Christmas Day, this landmark series looks at the angry young men of Generation Jihad who have turned their backs on the country where they were born.

In the first episode, Peter hears from those convicted under Britain's newest anti-terror laws and investigates how some of the most notorious terrorists came to be radicalised. He finds a generation that has shed the moderate Islam their parents brought to this country, and instead have adopted a faith that they believe compels them to stand apart from Britain and its values.

The next programme:
How young, radicalised Muslims plotted major attacks in Europe and America.

The Kings ICSR blogsite has one comment on the programme by Dr John Bew:http://icsr.info/blog/Generation-Jihad

Dayuhan
02-15-2010, 01:58 AM
But as the airwaves and print are full of the same steady drum beat of a majority opinion that has us 8 years into a war, and strategcially worse off and an economy in tatters and a national reputation at arguably an all time low to show for it.

I could be wrong, its theory and I have no metrics to prove my case.

There are strong metrics however that the majority opinion is wrong.


There are certainly strong metrics to suggest that current strategy is misguided... though the relationship between "GWOT" strategy and our economic issues is pretty tenuous. I'm not convinced that this strategy is built around a majority opinion on radicalization, though: it seems to me to have derived more from a poorly considered backlash after 9/11, an impulse that was exploited by a relative minority who had long believed that US military force could be used to reshape the Middle East.

It seems to me that the fundamental flaw in current strategy was inaccurate assessment of capacity: we believed we could do things that we did not in fact have the capacity to do. We believed that we could remove governments, and we were right. We believed that we could quickly replace those governments with fully functioning alternatives that would be accepted by the various populaces involved, and we were wrong. We also significantly underestimated our antagonist's capacity to muster opposition to our operations in the countries involved.

It seems to me that your proposal suffers from many of the same problems. You suggest that we can use the threat of withholding aid to move countries to govern better, satisfy their own populaces, and reduce the motivation for insurgencies that target both host nations and the US. For this to even be possible, 4 conditions have to be met:

First, there has to be a government: we can't press a government to reform if there isn't one. Won't work in Somalia or in the various ungoverned spaces in our target areas.

Second the government has to have the capacity to implement the reforms we want. If a government lacks the capacity to perform, pressing it to reform is like threatening to stop feeding a paraplegic who refuses to walk: all you get is starvation. Misgovernment is not always a consequence of willful neglect or exploitation by despots. It also happens when a weak or ineffectual central government is unable to control exploitive or abusive local clans, tribes, power brokers, military units, or other elements of a factionalized populace. I think you'd find that these conditions apply in a number of our target countries.

Third, the government in question has to be dependent on US aid. Many of the countries involved are not. The insurgency in southern Thailand, for example, could certainly be resolved with reform, but the government does not rely on US aid and the threat of withholding aid is not likely to have any effect. We might want to influence the Saudis but we can't do it by withholding aid, because they don't get any aid from us, nor are they in any way dependent on us. Libya, Kuwait, Syria and Sudan are not on our aid list.

Fourth, we have to apply pressure in a way that is not going to provoke a backlash against us. As I've said before, many countries are extremely sensitive to anything that could be perceived as American interference in domestic affairs, and our efforts are likely to be interpreted as self-interested meddling. Populaces are anything but uniform, and substantial parts of any given populace may see our pressure as an unwelcome threat. A country where a portion of the populace opposes the government may also have a portion of the populace that supports the government and resents are pressure. We've recently seen this problem in action: the US put its weight behind a fatally flawed "peace agreement" in the southern Philippines that was supposed to placate one restive segment of the populace, totally failing to anticipate the response of another segment of the populace. Good intentions are not necessarily interpreted as such by the intended beneficiaries. The road to hell, they say, is paved with 'em.



(Oh, and 5 minutes of google research on foreign fighers and and insurgent movements will show you the clear connections that I speak to.


After rather more than that, I don't see a connection. Correlation, perhaps, but no solid evidence of causation, and even the correlation is tenuous. Looking here:

http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/49-watts.pdf

Ranking by foreign fighter intensity (fighters/100k Muslims) we see that by far the most intense sources of fighters are Libya and Saudi Arabia. Both countries face internal dissent, but in neither case has it reached a level that could credibly called insurgency. The Libyan government is hardly a creation or a tool of the US, and since neither country receives aid from the US it isn't likely that we can change their policies by withholding aid. In Saudi Arabia in particular any suggestion that we are applying pressure toward a move away from monarchy would almost certainly inspire far more resistance than sympathy among the populace.

Next down the list we have Yemen. Substantial US aid, but it's very doubtful that the government has the capacity to initiate significant reform, and the most probable consequence of aid withdrawal is a collapse into full ungoverned-space status. Not a desirable outcome.

Then we have Kuwait, Syria, Tunisia, Jordan... Kuwait and Syria aren't getting aid from us, no leverage there. Tunisia and Jordan, possibly, but now we're getting into environments where the number of foreign fighters is really pretty small and unlikely to be significantly influenced by the policies suggested.

On top of all of this, where is the compelling evidence that foreign fighters are part of a populace driven to insurgency by misgovernment? Experience shows us that religious or ideological fervor, personal discontent, and testosterone can drive some individuals to violence in virtually any governance environment. There's a significant difference between distributed discontent and insurgency.



And I have NEVER, EVER said we should impose our values on others, quite the contrary. In fact, I beat a steady drum that we need to stop the hubris, and stop trying to control every outcome, and to help enable populaces everywhere to enjoy their own self-determination, and that in so doing we will turn down the heat on a global security environment.)

Isn't self-determination one of our core values? Aren't we assuming that populaces want structures that allow for regular changes in government? Don't we tend to let our definitions of these values guide our evaluations of governance in other countries?

Suppose we have a country where .05% of the population is radically disaffected and willing to use violence to express its disaffection, 30% are substantially discontent, may provide indirect support to violence but not participate, and the balance have some gripes but aren't all that opposed to the status quo. Are we going to come in and demand changes that may not satisfy even those who are angry... and who may want to see changes very different from those we are trying to promote?

Certainly the desire to control can cause problems, but it's not the only cause. For much of the 1990s, when our current problems were brewing, our policies seemed driven less by a desire to control than by a desire to deny and ignore.

davidbfpo
02-21-2010, 09:56 PM
Hat tip to Leah Farrell on .... .This could drop into the Yemen thread, but sits better here, even if a short article and a pointer to a short clip from the film:

Starts with:
The Oath," a documentary by filmmaker Laura Poitras, opens a window into the world of al-Qaida, Osama Bin Laden, the detention center at Guantanamo Bay and the image of the United States in Yemen. (Ends with). Poitras does not take sides. She says she tells it like it is. Her documentary "The Oath," links al-Qaida's growth in Yemen to anger at U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East and to the controversial detention of terror suspects at Guantanamo Bay.

davidbfpo
03-01-2010, 10:46 PM
An interesting angle on radicalisation in Pakistan entitled 'Frustrated Strivers in Pakistan Turn to Jihad':http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/28/world/asia/28youth.html?hp

Bob's World
03-02-2010, 01:33 AM
There are certainly strong metrics to suggest that current strategy is misguided... though the relationship between "GWOT" strategy and our economic issues is pretty tenuous. I'm not convinced that this strategy is built around a majority opinion on radicalization, though: it seems to me to have derived more from a poorly considered backlash after 9/11, an impulse that was exploited by a relative minority who had long believed that US military force could be used to reshape the Middle East.

It seems to me that the fundamental flaw in current strategy was inaccurate assessment of capacity: we believed we could do things that we did not in fact have the capacity to do. We believed that we could remove governments, and we were right. We believed that we could quickly replace those governments with fully functioning alternatives that would be accepted by the various populaces involved, and we were wrong. We also significantly underestimated our antagonist's capacity to muster opposition to our operations in the countries involved.

It seems to me that your proposal suffers from many of the same problems. You suggest that we can use the threat of withholding aid to move countries to govern better, satisfy their own populaces, and reduce the motivation for insurgencies that target both host nations and the US. For this to even be possible, 4 conditions have to be met:

First, there has to be a government: we can't press a government to reform if there isn't one. Won't work in Somalia or in the various ungoverned spaces in our target areas.

Second the government has to have the capacity to implement the reforms we want. If a government lacks the capacity to perform, pressing it to reform is like threatening to stop feeding a paraplegic who refuses to walk: all you get is starvation. Misgovernment is not always a consequence of willful neglect or exploitation by despots. It also happens when a weak or ineffectual central government is unable to control exploitive or abusive local clans, tribes, power brokers, military units, or other elements of a factionalized populace. I think you'd find that these conditions apply in a number of our target countries.

Third, the government in question has to be dependent on US aid. Many of the countries involved are not. The insurgency in southern Thailand, for example, could certainly be resolved with reform, but the government does not rely on US aid and the threat of withholding aid is not likely to have any effect. We might want to influence the Saudis but we can't do it by withholding aid, because they don't get any aid from us, nor are they in any way dependent on us. Libya, Kuwait, Syria and Sudan are not on our aid list.

Fourth, we have to apply pressure in a way that is not going to provoke a backlash against us. As I've said before, many countries are extremely sensitive to anything that could be perceived as American interference in domestic affairs, and our efforts are likely to be interpreted as self-interested meddling. Populaces are anything but uniform, and substantial parts of any given populace may see our pressure as an unwelcome threat. A country where a portion of the populace opposes the government may also have a portion of the populace that supports the government and resents are pressure. We've recently seen this problem in action: the US put its weight behind a fatally flawed "peace agreement" in the southern Philippines that was supposed to placate one restive segment of the populace, totally failing to anticipate the response of another segment of the populace. Good intentions are not necessarily interpreted as such by the intended beneficiaries. The road to hell, they say, is paved with 'em.



After rather more than that, I don't see a connection. Correlation, perhaps, but no solid evidence of causation, and even the correlation is tenuous. Looking here:

http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/49-watts.pdf

Ranking by foreign fighter intensity (fighters/100k Muslims) we see that by far the most intense sources of fighters are Libya and Saudi Arabia. Both countries face internal dissent, but in neither case has it reached a level that could credibly called insurgency. The Libyan government is hardly a creation or a tool of the US, and since neither country receives aid from the US it isn't likely that we can change their policies by withholding aid. In Saudi Arabia in particular any suggestion that we are applying pressure toward a move away from monarchy would almost certainly inspire far more resistance than sympathy among the populace.

Next down the list we have Yemen. Substantial US aid, but it's very doubtful that the government has the capacity to initiate significant reform, and the most probable consequence of aid withdrawal is a collapse into full ungoverned-space status. Not a desirable outcome.

Then we have Kuwait, Syria, Tunisia, Jordan... Kuwait and Syria aren't getting aid from us, no leverage there. Tunisia and Jordan, possibly, but now we're getting into environments where the number of foreign fighters is really pretty small and unlikely to be significantly influenced by the policies suggested.

On top of all of this, where is the compelling evidence that foreign fighters are part of a populace driven to insurgency by misgovernment? Experience shows us that religious or ideological fervor, personal discontent, and testosterone can drive some individuals to violence in virtually any governance environment. There's a significant difference between distributed discontent and insurgency.



Isn't self-determination one of our core values? Aren't we assuming that populaces want structures that allow for regular changes in government? Don't we tend to let our definitions of these values guide our evaluations of governance in other countries?

Suppose we have a country where .05% of the population is radically disaffected and willing to use violence to express its disaffection, 30% are substantially discontent, may provide indirect support to violence but not participate, and the balance have some gripes but aren't all that opposed to the status quo. Are we going to come in and demand changes that may not satisfy even those who are angry... and who may want to see changes very different from those we are trying to promote?

Certainly the desire to control can cause problems, but it's not the only cause. For much of the 1990s, when our current problems were brewing, our policies seemed driven less by a desire to control than by a desire to deny and ignore.

Self-Determination is the ultimate form of Democracy, even if a populace chooses for itself complete dictatorship. The point being that the populace, through processes that they see as legitimate in their culture, chooses the form and make-up of government that THEY desire. This means free from outside shaping and manipulation.

If the US still stood for the principles we claim so boldly to stand for, we would have embraced Hamas when chosen by the people of Palestine. But instead we rejected them because WE didn't like them. Hypocrisy.

Whatever a populace believes is right for them is "self-determination." Tell me the populace, tell me the culture, that believes that it is better if some foreign body shapes their governance instead?? Is this American? Only so far as America is one country with the stones to put such bold empowering words into law. But the human principle is universal.

M-A Lagrange
03-02-2010, 07:13 AM
Self-Determination is the ultimate form of Democracy, even if a populace chooses for itself complete dictatorship. The point being that the populace, through processes that they see as legitimate in their culture, chooses the form and make-up of government that THEY desire. This means free from outside shaping and manipulation.

If the US still stood for the principles we claim so boldly to stand for, we would have embraced Hamas when chosen by the people of Palestine. But instead we rejected them because WE didn't like them. Hypocrisy.

Whatever a populace believes is right for them is "self-determination." Tell me the populace, tell me the culture, that believes that it is better if some foreign body shapes their governance instead?? Is this American? Only so far as America is one country with the stones to put such bold empowering words into law. But the human principle is universal.


Bob,

You are absolutly right and that is why none of the liberation wars were won by the colonial forces, evem malaysia as the british did give independance.

The ultimate question is: what if not elections?

M-A

Bob's World
03-02-2010, 07:49 AM
Bob,

You are absolutly right and that is why none of the liberation wars were won by the colonial forces, evem malaysia as the british did give independance.

The ultimate question is: what if not elections?

M-A

Every culture has some process for selecting leaders. Many may not have the same hierarchy, but one can probably expand the hierarchy of an existing system more effectively than they can scrap an existing system and replace it with our own.

For example, the Sioux Indians had no concept of a single over-arching "Chief," but they had a very sophisticated and effective form of council-based governance with a variety of leaders in a system that worked for them. We needed one guy to sign treaties, so we picked on. Predictably, disastrous results came of that. We created an "official" system of governance, but it was not a "legitimate" system as well. Ideally we would want both; but if you can only have one, you want Legitimate.

The problem with legitimate is that it implies "free from outside influence and manipulation." Big problem there for the good Cold Warriors, as "containment" was rooted in controlling the periphery; so we have become used to sacrificing legitimacy in favor of official all in the name of containment.

I think that model is obsolete, and the current "GWOT" is essentially the popular backlash to such manipulation of governance.

In Afghanistan they have system of Shuras and Jirgas with Village, Tribal and Religious leaders all feeding into it. Since the mid 1700s they have used this to create national governance as well (National Afghan-style, not Western-style). I would recommend enforcing and enabling the systems that already exist within a culture. Sometimes these systems get damaged by outside interference or internal manipulation. Returning to the roots of what works for a culture is more apt to produce "legitimacy" than a wholesale replacement by outsiders with a foreign system.

I believe that we will learn that we can be even more successful fostering and working with Legitimate governments than we ever were in working with those that we had manipulated to merely being "Official."

M-A Lagrange
03-02-2010, 12:35 PM
Every culture has some process for selecting leaders. Many may not have the same hierarchy, but one can probably expand the hierarchy of an existing system more effectively than they can scrap an existing system and replace it with our own.

For example, the Sioux Indians had no concept of a single over-arching "Chief," but they had a very sophisticated and effective form of council-based governance with a variety of leaders in a system that worked for them. We needed one guy to sign treaties, so we picked on. Predictably, disastrous results came of that. We created an "official" system of governance, but it was not a "legitimate" system as well. Ideally we would want both; but if you can only have one, you want Legitimate.

The problem with legitimate is that it implies "free from outside influence and manipulation." Big problem there for the good Cold Warriors, as "containment" was rooted in controlling the periphery; so we have become used to sacrificing legitimacy in favor of official all in the name of containment.

I think that model is obsolete, and the current "GWOT" is essentially the popular backlash to such manipulation of governance.

In Afghanistan they have system of Shuras and Jirgas with Village, Tribal and Religious leaders all feeding into it. Since the mid 1700s they have used this to create national governance as well (National Afghan-style, not Western-style). I would recommend enforcing and enabling the systems that already exist within a culture. Sometimes these systems get damaged by outside interference or internal manipulation. Returning to the roots of what works for a culture is more apt to produce "legitimacy" than a wholesale replacement by outsiders with a foreign system.

I believe that we will learn that we can be even more successful fostering and working with Legitimate governments than we ever were in working with those that we had manipulated to merely being "Official."

I do agree but (As there is always a “but”) then we have separate problematic that do affect stabilization operations or build or what ever phase.

First, as you pointed it, there is this need to have an interlocutor whose similar to us (by us, I hear weberian like governments). This has been pointed by many, including Kilcullen, and denounced by several anthropologists. This shows a difficulty from our side to adapt after the cold war consensus on “democracies victory”. If we won, this implies that our form of governance is better, even the only one legitimate and sustainable.

Then, the example of Afghanistan is interesting in the sense that the constitution was debated through a large council based on cultural researches and cultural approach to form a new government. I remember that at a point some were talking about bringing back a Kingdome in place.
Apparently, the cultural approach failed to bring a culturally endorsed and accepted form of governance. One of the main obstacle being the non recognition of such form of centralised governance (the weberian state) by at least a part of the cultural assembly and more precisely the religious part of it, but not only.
One of the hiccups may lay in the fact that cultural approach has been used, up to now, to find a way to impose weberian state by making it culturally attractive or at least acceptable. Rather than using culture studies to dig out governance mechanisms, it has been used to prove that there were pre democratic practices in a defined culture. And use them as levier to impose a governance copycat system.
The second one lay with us. Basically a “president” needs an interlocutor and not a complex group of leaders that he needs to talk with. And that is may be our biggest weakness in countries as Afghanistan as it leads us to not imagine any other forms of governance and administration.
On the other hand, post communist/neo communist/ extreme liberal see in the weberian state the most powerful revolutionary governance concept. They justify it through it success through history and both communist and capitalist form of governance. According to them, radical Islam, by rejecting the weberian state, is then doomed. So, by imposing the weberian state we do provoke an ineluctable mutation of the governance to which populations are ineluctably leading their leaders.
This may be also part of the narrative concept of justification…

davidbfpo
03-04-2010, 09:21 PM
An academic study pub. Jan. 2010 'Anti-Terror Lessons of Muslim-Americans', which I found intriguing and here is the opening paragraph:
In the aftermath of the attacks on September 11, 2001, and subsequent terrorist attacks elsewhere around the world, a key counterterrorism concern is the possible radicalization of Muslims living in the United States. Yet, the record over the past eight years contains relatively few examples of Muslim-Americans that have radicalized and turned toward violent extremism. This project seeks to explain this encouraging result by identifying characteristics and practices in the Muslim-American community that are preventing radicalization and violence.

Link:http://www.sanford.duke.edu/news/Schanzer_Kurzman_Moosa_Anti-Terror_Lessons.pdf

Dayuhan
03-05-2010, 12:50 AM
Every culture has some process for selecting leaders. Many may not have the same hierarchy, but one can probably expand the hierarchy of an existing system more effectively than they can scrap an existing system and replace it with our own.

For example, the Sioux Indians had no concept of a single over-arching "Chief," but they had a very sophisticated and effective form of council-based governance with a variety of leaders in a system that worked for them. We needed one guy to sign treaties, so we picked on. Predictably, disastrous results came of that. We created an "official" system of governance, but it was not a "legitimate" system as well. Ideally we would want both; but if you can only have one, you want Legitimate....

In Afghanistan they have system of Shuras and Jirgas with Village, Tribal and Religious leaders all feeding into it. Since the mid 1700s they have used this to create national governance as well (National Afghan-style, not Western-style). I would recommend enforcing and enabling the systems that already exist within a culture. Sometimes these systems get damaged by outside interference or internal manipulation. Returning to the roots of what works for a culture is more apt to produce "legitimacy" than a wholesale replacement by outsiders with a foreign system.

I believe that we will learn that we can be even more successful fostering and working with Legitimate governments than we ever were in working with those that we had manipulated to merely being "Official."

I pretty much agree, and certainly in Afghanistan I think the system of shura and jirga would have made the strongest basis for a new government. It seems to me that in both Iraq and Afghanistan our method of establishing new governments was targeted mainly at perceptions of legitimacy among our populace and among our allies, not at the local perception of legitimacy. Our people wanted to see the immediate establishment of a centralized government that we could recognize as a government, established in a way that our people perceived as legitimate.

Unfortunately, once you start down that road it's not easy to reverse course, and now that we've put our backing behind these processes and the resulting governments it is going to be extraordinarily difficult to change our approach. It's not as if we can announce that the whole idea was a mistake, and now we're going to remove this government and give them another. We can of course withdraw support, let the government fall, and try to work with the successor, but there's no assurance that the successor would have any interest in working with us, and there's a good chance, at least in Afghanistan, that this would mean a return to the same circumstances that generated our intervention in the first place. It's not an easy situation and I don't see any advantageous way out of it, but we made the bed and one way or another we're gonna lie in it.



The problem with legitimate is that it implies "free from outside influence and manipulation." Big problem there for the good Cold Warriors, as "containment" was rooted in controlling the periphery; so we have become used to sacrificing legitimacy in favor of official all in the name of containment.

I think that model is obsolete, and the current "GWOT" is essentially the popular backlash to such manipulation of governance.

Can't entirely agree with that, not least because I don't think there is really a "GWOT". There's a whole raft of factors involved, and I don't see any single overarching explanation that can cover the range of phenomena that we're facing. Barnett's hypothesis of reactionary backlash against the changes implicit in modernization and globalization is part of the picture, as is the Bernard Lewis observation of "aggressive self-pity" rising out of the whole history of Islamic decline, of which US policy is but a small part. Groups like AQ ride on locat conflicts that are driven primarily by local issues, just as the 3rd world communist movements of the cold war gained traction by riding on local conflicts based on local, not global, issues.

Also worth noting that self-determination is not simply a factor of us not taking control. There are other outside influences in play in virtually every conflict on the planet, and many are even less sympathetic to true self determination than we are. A power vacuum does not necessarily mean that traditional means of selecting a government will prevail. Often the response to a power vacuum is simply that whoever can muster the largest armed force takes over, kicks the stuffing out of everyone else, and imposes their own rules. Governments like that of Sadddam's Iraq, Qaddafi's Libya, or for that matter like the Taliban's in Afghanistan were not imposed by foreign powers, but the level of self-determination enjoyed by their citizens is debatable.

Steve the Planner
03-05-2010, 01:12 AM
Bob:

Brilliant:


In Afghanistan they have system of Shuras and Jirgas with Village, Tribal and Religious leaders all feeding into it. Since the mid 1700s they have used this to create national governance as well (National Afghan-style, not Western-style). I would recommend enforcing and enabling the systems that already exist within a culture. Sometimes these systems get damaged by outside interference or internal manipulation. Returning to the roots of what works for a culture is more apt to produce "legitimacy" than a wholesale replacement by outsiders with a foreign system.

The problem, as I have heard from a very few wise folks, is that the problem is in the Constitution, pushed by us, and adopted by a few under pressure without deep understanding.

Now, the have tried it, and the problems in implementation are evident.

As a dumb Marylander, I know that our state constitution actually provides for a diversity of county, town, and special area/purpose governance structures. There are three hierarchies of County forms (from virtual autonomy to minimal), and every manner of municipality (big cities, six person towns), and tons of special purpose, regional and multi-regional formal regulatory structures. If you are bored, you can always go to a local school board meeting, or County zoning committee, or formal community association with special tax district authority.

How could anybody believe that Afghanistan could not be the same way. Our overly-simplified one step approach for "other" countries never could have worked here, and won't work anywhere else.

How to facilitate systems that can work, and are deeply embedded in the Urf of what is known?

Bob's World
03-05-2010, 03:59 AM
There are always many ways to achieve any given effect, and what works great in one circumstance may be a complete failure in another. But if one has achieved an understanding of the essence of the problem, then they can tailor their approaches accordingly. This has always been my personal approach to problem solving, and one that we have applied in the Strategy Division at USSOCOM over the past couple of years as well. Personally, I feel that the most useful form of "strategy" is not one of generating ever more vague guidance for ever higher headquarters (like I learned at the War College...) but rather to dive into a problem, peeling back the layers to seek fundamental understanding that can be employed by leaders AT ALL LEVELS of command to achieve effects that collectively contribute to the ultimate strategic effect that one is seeking.

A simple example: the 2-minute push-up event on the Army fitness test. Over the course of my career I have met so many soldiers who "just can't do push-ups." These soldiers are often very motivated, and want to excel, and have read the dozens of articles published by various people who max the test that offer specific work out programs that worked for the author, but not for the frustrated soldier who ultimately resigns him or herself to "not being able to do push-ups."

I thought about this a lot as an LT. "Why” I asked. Not "how." When one shifts their focus from how to why, they are, I believe on a longer journey, but one that will ultimately get them to a much more universally effective answer to the "how" question.

The answer I ultimately came to on this little problem was simply "train for the second minute." As I asked those who couldn't do push-ups how they trained, and then compared that to workout that were generally more successful, and my own personal experience, I came to realize that most people who "just couldn't do push-ups" were constantly replicating the conditions of the first minute of the test in their training programs. You don't max your push-ups in the first minute, it is the ability to do push-ups in the second minute that earns the high score.

Based on this simple concept I developed a couple of example workouts (that I still use to this day for three or four weeks prior to an APFT in lieu of my normal workouts that I use to prepare for life rather than a silly test that doesn't really do that very well) and would simply advise people to train for the second minute, why, point out how their current program doesn't to that, and then offer them a couple examples, but also urge them to find what works for them personally, so long as it follows the second minute principle. Many soldiers who could never do push-ups now do them very well, because they were given a little understanding and encouragement, and then allowed to find their own path to success.

Governance is not unlike this. My one liner there is "Ensure the governance is seen as legitimate in the eyes of the governed." For some cultures an election will create this. For others it comes from some form of councils. For others it may be as simple as a single religious leader saying "this is the guy." Who are we to judge??

We need to judge less, and understand more. Principles are pure, but values are principles with a judgment applied to them. We tend to push values over principles, and no one I know likes to be judged.

When the military is tasked to assist with an insurgency the first questions go to "how do I defeat the insurgent?" I would offer that the first questions should go to "why is there an insurgency?" What I find is that it can almost always be traced back to governance that lacks legitimacy in the eyes of most, or at least some key segment of its populace.

Afghanistan has suffered under nearly 30 years of illegitimate government. Address that first, and the rest will follow. Ignore it, and no amount of good COIN tactics and hard effort are likely to produce more than temporary suppression of the symptoms of the insurgency.


But this is just what I have come to in my own personal journey. Maybe just killing all who dare to challenge the government is enough. Maybe if a government is effective enough the populace will ignore its lack of legitimacy. Maybe. But I don't buy it.

I think that Gen McCrystal's plan for the military in Afghanistan is sound. I have far less confidence in policy decisions that are still rooted in a belief that "official" is good enough. The people of Afghanistan deserve a government that is legitimate as well. And truth be told, it probably would not look much different than what they have now, but it is how it is perceived that matters.

Dayuhan
03-06-2010, 06:43 AM
Governance is not unlike this. My one liner there is "Ensure the governance is seen as legitimate in the eyes of the governed."


Is it possible for us to ensure the legitimacy of someone else's government?


When the military is tasked to assist with an insurgency the first questions go to "how do I defeat the insurgent?" I would offer that the first questions should go to "why is there an insurgency?" What I find is that it can almost always be traced back to governance that lacks legitimacy in the eyes of most, or at least some key segment of its populace.

In this case I would have to say that the "insurgency" does not trace back to "governance that lacks legitimacy in the eyes of most, or at least some key segment of its populace". It traces back to invasion, conquest, and occupation by a foreign power. The insurgency was not generated by resentment against the Karzai government, it was (like the Karzai government) a consequence of our intervention.

We didn't go to Afghanistan to support a government against insurgents. We went there to remove a government that gave aid and shelter to people who attacked us. For that reason, an acceptable end state for us is not only the presence of a legitimate government, but the presence of a legitimate government that does not harbor our enemies. If we arrive at a legitimate government by sacrificing the objective that brought us there in the first place, we haven't accomplished anything.



Afghanistan has suffered under nearly 30 years of illegitimate government. Address that first, and the rest will follow. Ignore it, and no amount of good COIN tactics and hard effort are likely to produce more than temporary suppression of the symptoms of the insurgency.

I agree. Unfortunately, our initial efforts to create a government in Afghanistan were undertaken by an administration that was under fire on the home front and internationally, and our actions were calculated not to establish legitimacy in the eyes of the Afghans but to establish legitimacy in the eyes of our own populace and an international audience. That has led us to a pretty uncomfortable place. The next obvious question: how do we get from where we are now to where we want to be? Having put the weight of our approval and support behind a government and a process that were not appropriate to the environment where we were operating, how - short of going back in time and doing it all differently - do we undo what we've done and move back to some course that has some reasonable chance of generating a legitimate government that has reasonable prospects of surviving and that will not give aid and comfort to our enemies?

Ken White
03-06-2010, 04:08 PM
Is it possible for us to ensure the legitimacy of someone else's government?That would be, IMO, the 'No.' :wry:
...our actions were calculated not to establish legitimacy in the eyes of the Afghans but to establish legitimacy in the eyes of our own populace and an international audience.That would be the 'yes', with a tag-on that the bulk of our political effort is always expended internally; our domestic politics drive our international actions to a very significant extent -- and to the confusion of the rest of the world. :eek:

This is the crux of the issue:
...how - short of going back in time and doing it all differently - do we undo what we've done and move back to some course that has some reasonable chance of generating a legitimate government that has reasonable prospects of surviving and that will not give aid and comfort to our enemies?It shows the flaw of predicating international action on domestic party politics -- a condition that is unlikely to change in the near term. However, it deserves an answer and that answer has to unhappily be that we cannot. We will leave and what happens will happen. It will not all be for naught but it will have been far more costly in all terms than it needed to be simply because we ignored your first question and the US domestic concern drove the second ...:(

Bob's World
03-06-2010, 05:28 PM
I have to disagree that once one makes a mistake they are simply doomed to failure.

I also have to disagree that the US invasion of Afghanistan is the causation of the current insurgency. I would argue that it is the US installation and continued support of a government that is globally perceived as illegitimate that is the causation of the insurgency. If we would have enabled (yes, you can indeed enable a populace's legitimate processes to form governance and select leaders. It only becomes illegitimate if you also try to shape outcomes, or some other ways meddle with the process) legitimate local processes we would not have had this problem.

So, DOD does not need to develop a time machine to accomplish the mission in Afghanistan. It merely needs to recognize that step one to true success is to force the GIROA hand on the legitimacy issue. Mr. Karzai has claimed he wants to hold a "Peace Jirga." Frankly, I believe he is bluffing and wants nothing of the kind, but I say call his bluff. He would far rather we conduct elections that he an easily manipulate and keep all his buddies in the plump positions; while we expend our national blood and treasure feeding his ponzi scheme and protecting him from popular backlash.

A grand Loya Jirga conducted in Kandahar City, open to traditional representatives from across Afghanistan, coming together to address the creation of a legitimate government. I will probably look much like the current one, but could look very different; but if done correctly would, I believe, take the starch out of the "Big T" Taliban revolutionary insurgency (about 10%), which in turn will allow the Coalition to begin ramping down, which will take the starch out of the "little t" taliban resistance insurgency.

The critical task is that the west must not manipulate the results, and must commit to recognize and work with whatever and whomever emerges. Good Cold Warriors choke on that one. They might well choke to death on it. There is little room for Cold War strategy here. We will not "contain" AQ in Pakistan by manipulating governance in Afghanistan. Trust me.

But by changing our approach to Muslim populaces in countries like Afghanistan, we will disempower AQ over time and render them moot.

Ken White
03-06-2010, 07:57 PM
I have to disagree that once one makes a mistake they are simply doomed to failure.I sure didn't.
I also have to disagree that the US invasion of Afghanistan is the causation of the current insurgency. I would argue that it is the US installation and continued support of a government that is globally perceived as illegitimate that is the causation of the insurgency...we would not have had this problem.That's possible but far from certain.
So, DOD does not need to develop a time machine to accomplish the mission in Afghanistan.Is that DoD's call? I think not.
A grand Loya Jirga conducted in Kandahar City, open to traditional representatives from across Afghanistan, coming together to address the creation of a legitimate government. I will probably look much like the current one, but could look very different...You will? Will your wife still recognize you? ;)
But by changing our approach to Muslim populaces in countries like Afghanistan, we will disempower AQ over time and render them moot.True, we'll get there -- may not do it your way or mine but it will happen...

Bob's World
03-07-2010, 02:13 AM
Ok, a couple of typos. I was tired. "It will look much like the current..."

Agree completely that DoD needs to get out of the lead on this; as does the coalition. But we are all so fearful of what will happen if we do the right thing, that we instead cling desperately to the wrong thing.

I've said it before, but we need to confront our fears as a Nation; and it is not a fear of terrorists or even of other nations. It is a fear of who we will be if we relinquish the role of controling outcomes.

Why is our military so budget-crushing big compared to other states? To fight the wars that might occur? No. It is so damn big and committed to so many big ticket programs to control the peace

If we relinquish the "control" task as the essential one, we could then build a foreign policy and defense department that are designed to maintain the peace; and to win our naiton's wars. That is a very different thing altogether. For my one vote, a better thing as well.

Ken White
03-07-2010, 02:40 AM
Ok, a couple of typos. I was tired. "It will look much like the current..."AR 600-8-22, 11 Dec 2006, Para 8-49. k (1) says SF Colonels ain't authorized to be tired... ;)

However, given you are where you are, we can waive that.:cool:
If we relinquish the "control" task as the essential one, we could then build a foreign policy and defense department that are designed to maintain the peace; and to win our naiton's wars. That is a very different thing altogether. For my one vote, a better thing as well.I'll vote for that. :wry:

Dayuhan
03-07-2010, 11:31 AM
I have to disagree that once one makes a mistake they are simply doomed to failure.

I didn't say that... but some of the mistakes made in Afghanistan have certainly made success (which was never going to easy) far more remote and failure far more likely.



I also have to disagree that the US invasion of Afghanistan is the causation of the current insurgency. I would argue that it is the US installation and continued support of a government that is globally perceived as illegitimate that is the causation of the insurgency. If we would have enabled (yes, you can indeed enable a populace's legitimate processes to form governance and select leaders. It only becomes illegitimate if you also try to shape outcomes, or some other ways meddle with the process) legitimate local processes we would not have had this problem.


I'm not sure that global perceptions mean much. It's Afghan perceptions that count, and it appears that to many Afghans our presence is precisely what deprives the Government of legitimacy. If large portions of a populace see foreign efforts to enable as an inherently de-legitimizing factor, the outcome of anything we do will be seen as illegitimate simply because it was we who did it.

It also has to be noted that we do have a stake in at least one facet of the outcome: the question of whether AQ will be able to use Afghanistan as a refuge and a base. If that interest is illegitimate, then our entire presence there has been illegitimate from the start, because that's why we're there.



So, DOD does not need to develop a time machine to accomplish the mission in Afghanistan. It merely needs to recognize that step one to true success is to force the GIROA hand on the legitimacy issue. Mr. Karzai has claimed he wants to hold a "Peace Jirga." Frankly, I believe he is bluffing and wants nothing of the kind, but I say call his bluff. He would far rather we conduct elections that he an easily manipulate and keep all his buddies in the plump positions; while we expend our national blood and treasure feeding his ponzi scheme and protecting him from popular backlash.

A grand Loya Jirga conducted in Kandahar City, open to traditional representatives from across Afghanistan, coming together to address the creation of a legitimate government.


I'm not sure we have the capacity to force the GIROA to dissolve itself and hold a Loya Jirga to create a new government. Afghanistan has a Constitution - adopted by a Loya Jirga, I believe. Does it provide for an outside power demanding a new government? Are we proposing to tell the Afghans that WE have decided that what that Loya Jirga did was no good, this constitution is no good, this government isn't working, and WE want a new Loya Jirga to select a new government? Do we propose the toss the entire edifice that we helped to establish, because WE aren't happy with what it's done? Somehow I don't think that's going to be interpreted as us relinquishing control.

Of course Karzai isn't going to hold any kind of assembly that could remove him from power. I expect he'd like to stage a sort of grand consultation, packed with delegates that support him, and use it to reinforce himself. If we try to stop him, we are effectively asserting ourselves as the real governing power in Afghanistan, which is more likely to enable the insurgency than to disable it.


I've said it before, but we need to confront our fears as a Nation; and it is not a fear of terrorists or even of other nations. It is a fear of who we will be if we relinquish the role of controling outcomes.

Why is our military so budget-crushing big compared to other states? To fight the wars that might occur? No. It is so damn big and committed to so many big ticket programs to control the peace

If we've been paying all that money to control the peace, or to control anything, we've gotten a very raw deal, because when you get right down to it, what have we actually controlled? Between, say, the end of the Cold War and 9/11, did we ever control a Muslim country? If we did it must have been very briefly and under cover of absolute darkness, because I sure didn't notice it. Even during the Cold War we were manipulated more effectively and more consistently than we manipulated others: how many dictators discovered to their delight that they could unlock the US Treasury simply by shouting the word "Communist"?

Though much of the 90s our policy was not to control, but rather to avoid, deny, and kick as many problems as possible down the road for others to deal with. Once the Soviets were out of Afghanistan we forgot the place existed. We let the UN take the lead in Iraq, and ended up with a stagnant stalemate - we may or may not have had a better alternative, but we certainly didn't try to take control. When AQ first attacked us our response was not to seek control, but to fire off a few cruise missiles and go back to watching the Nasdaq.

Not saying I'm in favor of the control passion, but I'm not convinced that it's the sole cause of our current problems. There's a fair blend of causes at play, and I think we're deceiving ourselves if we choose to see the problems purely as a response to our actions. The other parties involved do not merely respond, they can and do actively initiate actions in pursuit of their own agenda.

Spud
03-13-2010, 03:59 PM
Hi guys

haven't been on for a while but thought this might add to the discussion if you can find it.

I recently used a paper from American Psychologist to expand on a concept I had about public diplomacy/influence. Found the paper really useful and quite easy to understand.

Reference is: Moghaddam, Fathali M, 2005. “The Staircase to Terrorism,” American Psychologist, Vol 60, No 2.

Bit from my paper


Psychologist Fathali Moghaddam sought to develop better understanding of the cognitive reasoning and psychological processes that lead to terrorism in a 2005 paper. Moghaddam’s Staircase to Terrorism model focuses on the perceptions of the individual at each stage and utilises a staircase metaphor to highlight the options open to the affected individual. His work is particularly important in that through the use of the model it clearly identifies points of intervention at which an individual can be persuaded from ascending to the next level. While worldview is the predominant manifestation of perception throughout the staircase model, it is not until an individual ascends to the third floor that that they develop a moral complicity with terrorism. Moghaddam believes that entry to the third floor of his model is last point at which intervention will prevent ascendency to the conduct of a terrorist act. Whether a person reaches the fifth floor and commits to destructive acts of terrorism is still open to external influences. By entering the third floor of the terrorism staircase a person’s worldview statement transforms from one of perceived grievances towards one of fundamentalist reality – the person becomes morally engaged with the narrative that underpins the cause. Importantly it is also at this point that increased isolationism to external factors becomes the norm and through this action the potential terrorist gains greater cultural consensus for their thoughts by excluding competing ideals. Widening the cultural information basis may prevent the limiting of group consensus. However once a potential terrorist enter the fourth floor and enters the secret world of an active terrorist organisation Moghaddam argues that “there is little or no opportunity to exit alive.” At this point the impact of any influence strategy is negligible and the focus shifts to law enforcement or counter-terrorism solutions. In the “war of ideas” focussing on root causes, often as Moghaddam identifies “perceptions of fairness,” may offer a key element of a Strategic Communications program. Moghaddam expands the communication requirement further by highlighting that ascension from the first to second floor is often precipitated by a lack of participation or engagement in decision making on justice issues. He also argues the importance of cultural understanding during this early stage of terrorism. He found that “when local cultural interpretations lead to a view that the in-group is being treated fairly, there is greater likelihood of support for central authorities.” Maintaining linkages with the widest possible cultural group then seems a pertinent course of action.

Another decent read was:

Halverschied, Susanne & Witte, Erich H, 2008. “Justification of War and Terrorism: A Comparative Case Study Analyzing Ethical Positions Based on Prescriptive Attribution Theory,” Social Psychology, Hogrefe & Huber Publishers. Vol 39(1). p 26-36.

Bob's World
03-13-2010, 05:07 PM
"In the “war of ideas” focussing on root causes, often as Moghaddam identifies “perceptions of fairness,” may offer a key element of a Strategic Communications program."

This ia an area where we are in complete agreement.

Global Scout
03-13-2010, 05:40 PM
Posted by Bob's World
The problem with legitimate is that it implies "free from outside influence and manipulation." Big problem there for the good Cold Warriors, as "containment" was rooted in controlling the periphery; so we have become used to sacrificing legitimacy in favor of official all in the name of containment.

B.W. I think you tend to conflate issues at times. This particular thread was focused on counter radicalization. While the term radicalization is problematic to say the least, the practice of undoing the harmful effects of brainwashing have been practiced throughout history with mixed results. If you look at the process that is used to convince people to become suicide bombers it is a very skillful approach (often enhanced with the use of drugs) to get a subject to commit suicide (thus become a useful idiot to some group).

I guess you can call this individual choice, or more accurately you could label it as maligned outside influence (actors from outside his/her previous social circles) that are hunting the psychologically vulnerable. Is it really self choice? Maybe as much as it is for a kid to join a gang, start taking meth, etc., but that sure as hell doesn't make it legitimate.

Our ability to describe the problem is weak to say the least, and I largely blame SOCOM for coming up with crap ways to define the problem. Take the hard thinking role away from the military and let the political anthropologists take a whack at defining the problem we're trying to solve. Preventing brain washing by sects is one approach, as is "attempting" to heal those who been brainwashed (what SOCOM calls VEO members). However, there is a big difference between a kid who has been isolated, drugged, and feed Islamic dogma to prepare hiim for a sucide mission, and an insurgent. SOCOM lumps them all conveniently into the VEO category.

bourbon
03-13-2010, 07:06 PM
haven't been on for a while but thought this might add to the discussion if you can find it.

I recently used a paper from American Psychologist to expand on a concept I had about public diplomacy/influence. Found the paper really useful and quite easy to understand.

Reference is: Moghaddam, Fathali M, 2005. “The Staircase to Terrorism,” American Psychologist, Vol 60, No 2.
PDF of the article (http://fathalimoghaddam.com/upload/doc/1256627851.pdf) and additional work (http://fathalimoghaddam.com/themes/intergroup-relations/) available on the Professors webpage.

marct
03-13-2010, 10:54 PM
Hi GS,


Our ability to describe the problem is weak to say the least, and I largely blame SOCOM for coming up with crap ways to define the problem. Take the hard thinking role away from the military and let the political anthropologists take a whack at defining the problem we're trying to solve. Preventing brain washing by sects is one approach, as is "attempting" to heal those who been brainwashed (what SOCOM calls VEO members). However, there is a big difference between a kid who has been isolated, drugged, and feed Islamic dogma to prepare hiim for a sucide mission, and an insurgent. SOCOM lumps them all conveniently into the VEO category.

Most political Anthropologists don't know bupkiss about the cult / deprogramming literature (that's us symbolic and/or ritual Anthropologists). And, honestly, "preventing brainwashing by sects" just isn't on (BTW, the literature always refers to these groups as "cults" 'cause sects have too much political power ;)).

Global Scout
03-14-2010, 02:54 AM
Marc, agreed, but my focus is on accurately defining the problem. This is something Kilcullen took a pretty good stab at. We now simply call all those that fight us extremists, which is not helpful.

marct
03-14-2010, 03:16 AM
Hi GS,


Marc, agreed, but my focus is on accurately defining the problem. This is something Kilcullen took a pretty good stab at. We now simply call all those that fight us extremists, which is not helpful.

Totally agree with that :wry:! While I disagree with some of Bob's World's definitions, I actually think he has a workable model. That said, the entire term "radicalization" is a problem, and, IMHO, we need to concentrate on one tiny, and very specific, component of it - the likelihood that people will shoot at us. Bob (and Dave K.) is, however, quite right that that is actually a balancing act between the restrictions we put on and the interpretations that people put on those restrictions (okay, I'll admit, I'm rather liberally interpolating here...).

That said, maybe the question to ask is by what process, in what manner and under what conditions do people come to believe that it is "right and proper" to shoot other people?

Bob's World
03-14-2010, 06:56 AM
Posted by Bob's World

B.W. I think you tend to conflate issues at times. This particular thread was focused on counter radicalization. While the term radicalization is problematic to say the least, the practice of undoing the harmful effects of brainwashing have been practiced throughout history with mixed results. If you look at the process that is used to convince people to become suicide bombers it is a very skillful approach (often enhanced with the use of drugs) to get a subject to commit suicide (thus become a useful idiot to some group).

I guess you can call this individual choice, or more accurately you could label it as maligned outside influence (actors from outside his/her previous social circles) that are hunting the psychologically vulnerable. Is it really self choice? Maybe as much as it is for a kid to join a gang, start taking meth, etc., but that sure as hell doesn't make it legitimate.

Our ability to describe the problem is weak to say the least, and I largely blame SOCOM for coming up with crap ways to define the problem. Take the hard thinking role away from the military and let the political anthropologists take a whack at defining the problem we're trying to solve. Preventing brain washing by sects is one approach, as is "attempting" to heal those who been brainwashed (what SOCOM calls VEO members). However, there is a big difference between a kid who has been isolated, drugged, and feed Islamic dogma to prepare hiim for a sucide mission, and an insurgent. SOCOM lumps them all conveniently into the VEO category.

I'll save my constructive comments on what SOCOM does well or poorly for when I have those conversations with the leadership there. They know they can count on me for a candid, thoughtful assessment.

As to the quote you posted here; the point that was getting to is my belief that what I call the "Pied Piper Theory of Insurgency," that some dynamic leader with a powerful ideology can engage a well governed populace and lead them into insurgency is a Fairy Tale. Certain individuals like our own nut job "Jihad Jane"? Sure. But not the populace in a way sufficiently to create insurgency.

So, if not the Pied Piper, then why these growing insurgencies? Why do members of these many separate growing insurgencies travel to be foreign fighters to counter US efforts; why do members of these insurgencies conduct acts of terror on US and US interests? Why is the US threatened far more today by the populaces of our allies than by any other source?????

To my analysis it is a reaction to the retention of a very controlling family of foreign policy developed and employed for the Cold War, but retained for convenience and because we could long past its expiration date. Some great metrics that people tend to ignore:

1. The previously stated point about the greatest threat to the US coming from the populaces of our allies.

2. The fact that we have been deploying our military at an every growing rate to enforce our foreign policy among the same "allied" states that these populaces come from.

To me the problem is not that someone is "radicalizing" these populaces; the problem is that our obsolete foreign policy contributes so directly to creating conditions that creates a populace that is easily motivated to attack the US as a solution to their domestic concerns.

Is this conflating? I don't think so. I think it is looking past the spin to try to see what is making it spin.

Dayuhan
03-14-2010, 12:02 PM
As to the quote you posted here; the point that was getting to is my belief that what I call the "Pied Piper Theory of Insurgency," that some dynamic leader with a powerful ideology can engage a well governed populace and lead them into insurgency is a Fairy Tale. Certain individuals like our own nut job "Jihad Jane"? Sure. But not the populace in a way sufficiently to create insurgency..

Agreed; no "pied piper" is going to generate the depth and breadth of resentment and hostility needed to initiate or sustain an insurgency. Generating enough to sustain a terrorist movement that requires only a relatively small base of intensely radicalized individuals is another matter altogether.



Why do members of these many separate growing insurgencies travel to be foreign fighters to counter US efforts; why do members of these insurgencies conduct acts of terror on US and US interests? Why is the US threatened far more today by the populaces of our allies than by any other source?????


I have yet to see any evidence that either foreign fighters or AQ terrorists act as "members of insurgencies", unless we are to embrace the "global insurgency" notion, which I personally find insupportable.

I do not agree that the US is threatened by the populaces of our allies. I don't think the US is threatened by any populace at all, but by a group of radicalized individuals recruited from many populaces (including our own) but neither representing nor acting on behalf of any of them.



Some great metrics that people tend to ignore:

1. The previously stated point about the greatest threat to the US coming from the populaces of our allies.

2. The fact that we have been deploying our military at an every growing rate to enforce our foreign policy among the same "allied" states that these populaces come from.


If we're going to use these as metrics, we need to quantify them, or at least to verify them. What indication do we have that we are being threatened by a populace... any populace?

Where have we been "deploying our military at an every growing rate to enforce our foreign policy" among allied states? I've seen us deploying our military to remove governments we disliked and to try to manage the power vacuums left by these removals... but where are we deploying forces at an increasing rate to enforce our policies among allies?

Ken White
03-14-2010, 03:31 PM
They know they can count on me for a candid, thoughtful assessment.As an aside, I hope you'll point out that DA is ruining SF for lasting harm... :(
Is this conflating? I don't think so. I think it is looking past the spin to try to see what is making it spin.That's the "differ."

Seems to me that you are spinning a simplistic solution to a complex problem (and one that elides the reality of US domestic politics, as I've often said). I'm not at all sure there's as much Cold War thinking today as you seem to believe -- nor am I convinced there ever was such channeled thinking as you also seem to believe. My perceptions of that period apparently differ significantly from yours... ;)

You have some really good ideas. Like Global Scout, I believe you tend to conflate many diverse things into one overarching mantra that is at least arguable. That obsession unfortunately obscures some of those good ideas.

Global Scout
03-14-2010, 07:23 PM
Ken,

Want to 2nd your call for a review of SF's focus on DA and the harm it has done to the force. Some SF junior officer recently insulted one of our Canadian brothers by telling him he wasn't capable of understanding tribal engagement because he wasn't SOF. I feel off by chair because I was laughing so hard. While SF has been doing DA the conventional forces were focused on the popualce. SF so called tribal engagement is a late show to the fight, yet a couple of junior MAJs think they have a brand new idea and thet won't want to hear any criticism from non- SF types.

Besides being comical, and a flawed approach the arrogance demonstrated is simply sad. He sounds more like an 18 y/o Marine who just completed basic than a seasoned professional. Our DA forces are very good at what they do, now if we could only get SF to be good at what they should do we could actually give the enemy hell.

Bob's World
03-15-2010, 04:33 AM
As an aside, I hope you'll point out that DA is ruining SF for lasting harm... :(That's the "differ."

Seems to me that you are spinning a simplistic solution to a complex problem (and one that elides the reality of US domestic politics, as I've often said). I'm not at all sure there's as much Cold War thinking today as you seem to believe -- nor am I convinced there ever was such channeled thinking as you also seem to believe. My perceptions of that period apparently differ significantly from yours... ;)

You have some really good ideas. Like Global Scout, I believe you tend to conflate many diverse things into one overarching mantra that is at least arguable. That obsession unfortunately obscures some of those good ideas.


Equally fair though is to point out that "containment" was very simple in concept, yet very complex and evolving in execution. Same applies to thories that I offer up as being more relevant to today's security environment.

Also equally fair is to note that most "good Cold Warriors" are skeptical of my theories. It shakes the foundation that their entire professional lives have been built upon a bit harder than they are comfortable with. Easier to just assume you are right and that others attack you in growing frequency for reasons completely disconnected from one's own actions. Personally, I know it is a pet peeve, so I may be biased, but I just hate victim mentalities that draw comfort through rationalizing the sources of major challenges off onto others. Responsibility and blame are very different things, and yes, I confess, that I do believe that it will only be once the US takes greater responsibility for the higher order effects of our actions that we will begin to get a better handle on our current security challenges.

I just can't join the group think that rationalizes such things away as "terrorism", or "Islamism" or "radicalization." I believe in all of those things, just not that they are all directed at us for things that we do not have to take responsibility for.

As to DA, there is plenty of that thinking going around. SF jumped in the pool, but it was crowded when they got in, and it will be crowded when they get out. Change is hard. Read LTC Petit's article in the current Special Warfare magazine on thinking COIN but executing FID. He has the SOTF here in the South now, and more than any other leader, other than perhaps MG Carter and GEN McChrystal himself, gets it.

Tribal engagement is certainly a growing area, but is defensive only, essentially a reinforcing of the self-governance that is the essence of governance in Afghanistan. I do get nervous at what I hear from senior leaders inside the beltway who appear to be grasping at this grassroots approach as a magic exit strategy; they misunderstand both the program and the nature of the conflict here. Its a good program, it is not the magic easy button that wins the day. Infanteer, who is a regular poster here is not SOF, but gets this very well and from all accounts is doing great things in a very tough neighborhood. He is, however, an exception. No the problem and the solution to this and every insurgency is at the top, not the bottom. If you build an "NFA" around the top, you are in for a long, hard road.

Threat-Centric, Population-Centric, Government Centric. Can make your head hurt. Truth is the lines blur considerably. One can't get at the populace without dealing with the threat. Typically (in good Cold Warrior fashion...though learned from our "Great Game" predecessors) whether one says they are focused on the threat or the populace, we end up way too often actually being focused on establishing and sustaining some particular government.

So, yes, this will remain my steady drumbeat: Legitimacy, Legitimacy, Legitimacy are the three most important things in COIN. If the top doesn't have it in the eyes of THAT populace, you will probably not be able to bail that leaky boat out fast enough to keep up.

Bob's World
03-15-2010, 05:22 AM
"I have yet to see any evidence that either foreign fighters or AQ terrorists act as "members of insurgencies", unless we are to embrace the "global insurgency" notion, which I personally find insupportable.

I do not agree that the US is threatened by the populaces of our allies. I don't think the US is threatened by any populace at all, but by a group of radicalized individuals recruited from many populaces (including our own) but neither representing nor acting on behalf of any of them."


One merely needs to look past the cover story of "Terrorism" and "Counterterrorism."

And, for the record, no one is a bigger critic of the "Global Insurgency" theory than I am. Does AQ use a common cause to get support from many diverse insurgencies to put effort against common objectives? Absolutely. Does that make it a "Global Insurgency"? NO. The effects may be massed, but the solutions remain diverse. The US must trace each line of foreign fighters back to their homelands, and then honestly assess our relationships with the governments there. Not just from our biased perspectives, but from the biased perspectives of that populace as well. At the end of the day it is the perception of the affected populace that controls.

So, just a couple examples from a couple of articles I googled. I don't agree with these articles, but there are good facts to pull from them.

http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Current-Affairs/Security-Watch/Detail/?ots591=4888CAA0-B3DB-1461-98B9-E20E7B9C13D4&lng=en&id=108612

From this article: "top five foreign fighter producing cities for that cohort of individuals per capita were: Darnah, Libya; Mecca, Saudi Arabia; Jawf, Saudi Arabia; Dayr al zur, Syria; and Sanaa, Yemen, respectively."

Pay attention to those locations, they will come up again.

US-Saudi Cooperation in War on Terrorism Lauded in State Department Annual Report; 30 April, 2004
http://www.saudi-us-relations.org/newsletter2004/saudi-relations-interest-04-30.html

This second article is full of interesting facts. It praises the Saudis for their tremendous efforts in Combating Terrorism, and even for pushing for governmental reforms at home (This was 6 years ago, it would be interesting to see if any real action on these reforms took place).

Take this paragraph for example:

"Since May, Riyadh has arrested more than 600 individuals during counterterrorism operations and continues investigating the Riyadh attacks. Saudi security forces have suffered significant casualties while conducting counterterrorism operations and raids. Raids in Mecca, Riyadh, and Medina led to arrests and document seizures and netted large quantities of explosives and a variety of weapons. In July alone, security services seized more than 20 tons of explosive-making materials in Qassim. In November, the authorities seized a truck bomb at a reported al-Qaida safehouse in Riyadh. Meanwhile, Saudi officials met several times with their Yemeni counterparts in an effort to stanch the flow of weapons into Saudi Arabia from Yemen."


Ok, news flash, this isn't CT, this is COIN. The Saudis have been in nearly continuous LVL 1 insurgency for at least since FDR gave them his blessing of US Legitimacy. The beauty of doing COIN with in a despotic monarchy is that you can simply label your citizens who dare to challenge your benevolent rule as "Terrorists" and crush them, so it never really begins to look like a classic insurgency. This will however train your insurgents to look for more indirect means to achieve their goals. This is where Bin Laden comes in. He offered an indirect approach. Take down the Western protectors first, and then redirect your energies at home.


I could be totally wrong, but what I see (and there are thousands of articles out there, these are just two that popped up at the top of one search) are restless populaces, joined and energized by the modern information age, drawing strength from each other to rise up to resist their own separate conditions of poor governance. Many of these countries, like Saudi Arabia and Yemen, were US allies from the start. Some, like Libya, came to the US late to gain our blessing as an ally in the War on Terrorism and get a US sanction to ruthlessly attack their own insurgent populace in the name of "counterterrorism." And they all send fighters to work under the AQ flag to nick away at the US where ever we might be.

Global Insurgency? No. Global War on Terrorism? Equally no. Global friction to a US foreign policy in dire need of a fresh approach that is more populace focused and less rooted in sustaining "friendly dictators"? Yeah, I really do think so. But that is just my assessment. I toss it out here not to "radicalize" anyone, but just to gain other perspectives to help shape my own.

William F. Owen
03-15-2010, 05:40 AM
So, yes, this will remain my steady drumbeat: Legitimacy, Legitimacy, Legitimacy are the three most important things in COIN. If the top doesn't have it in the eyes of THAT populace, you will probably not be able to bail that leaky boat out fast enough to keep up.
OK, but in War you assert your legitimacy by killing those who seek to dispute by force of arms. Once the bad guys are dead, you can have the political process decide the legitimacy.

In Irregular Warfare, you do not win by being the better government. You win by being the only government.

Bob's World
03-15-2010, 06:04 AM
OK, but in War you assert your legitimacy by killing those who seek to dispute by force of arms. Once the bad guys are dead, you can have the political process decide the legitimacy.

In Irregular Warfare, you do not win by being the better government. You win by being the only government.


Violent, no doubt.

But given the inherent internal nature of insurgency and COIN, I am currently of the mind that calling it "war" is extremely counterproductive to effective COIN. Better to look at insurgency as a "Civil Emergency" and the military aspect of COIN through the doctrinal construct of "Military Support to Civil Authorities" (MSCA). I think this leads to healthier perspectives that are more likely to yield an enduring result.

To wage war on one's own populace is a slippery slope indeed.


As to sending one's military to conduct FID through that same MSCA construct in support on another nations COIN efforts; that is another thing as well.

I am drafting up a paper now that hits this in greater detail, tentatively titled "Changing the Lexicon - A Critical Step in Winning the Battle of the Narrative" that explore dropping the current lexicon rooted in war and COIN; and evoliving to lexicon rooted in MSCA and Criminal Law. Actions will certainly remain "war-like" for a while in Afghanistan, but with the idea that words proceed action, and that changing how we think as well as how we talk will pave the way more quickly to reducing military support and evolving from military prosecution to civilian prosecution of those who act out.

If you'd like, I'll push you a draft in a week or so.

Bob

Dayuhan
03-15-2010, 08:12 AM
And, for the record, no one is a bigger critic of the "Global Insurgency" theory than I am. Does AQ use a common cause to get support from many diverse insurgencies to put effort against common objectives? Absolutely. Does that make it a "Global Insurgency"? NO. The effects may be massed, but the solutions remain diverse. The US must trace each line of foreign fighters back to their homelands, and then honestly assess our relationships with the governments there. Not just from our biased perspectives, but from the biased perspectives of that populace as well. At the end of the day it is the perception of the affected populace that controls.

I don't dispute this, but I think you're systematically overestimating the degree of American influence in these environments, and focusing excessively on the assumption that participation in this conflict is a response to American provocation, possibly to the point where equally important factors are excluded from the picture.



From this article: "top five foreign fighter producing cities for that cohort of individuals per capita were: Darnah, Libya; Mecca, Saudi Arabia; Jawf, Saudi Arabia; Dayr al zur, Syria; and Sanaa, Yemen, respectively."

Pay attention to those locations, they will come up again.


I'm well aware of the data, as you know, but I think your interpretation of those data are colored by certain assumptions.



Ok, news flash, this isn't CT, this is COIN. The Saudis have been in nearly continuous LVL 1 insurgency for at least since FDR gave them his blessing of US Legitimacy.

I'm curious, why would you choose that as a starting point? Why not 1744, generally accepted as the start of the first Saudi State? Or 1932, roughly the point at which Ibn Saud consolidated his control of the peninsula and initiated the third Saudi dynasty. I get the feeling that you're overemphasizing the degree to which the Saudi State owes its legitimacy to the US... which in actuality is a very limited degree indeed.



The beauty of doing COIN with in a despotic monarchy is that you can simply label your citizens who dare to challenge your benevolent rule as "Terrorists" and crush them, so it never really begins to look like a classic insurgency. This will however train your insurgents to look for more indirect means to achieve their goals. This is where Bin Laden comes in. He offered an indirect approach. Take down the Western protectors first, and then redirect your energies at home.

Are you suggesting here that despotic monarchies are more effective at suppressing insurgency than democracies are? According to all our COIN precepts, shouldn't the oppression of a despotic monarchy exacerbate insurgency? I'm not sure that experience elsewhere in the world supports the hypothesis that oppressive monarchies are effective mechanisms for the suppression of insurgency... certainly didn't work well for the Shah of Iran. The other plausible explanation, of course, is that a large part of the extremely conservative Saudi population actually prefers monarchy (at least when the monarchs are spreading money around) and that the dissidents have not been able to muster sufficient support to initiate full scale insurgency.

It's also worth noting that AQ was able to recruit large numbers of foreign fighters from Saudi Arabia and the other areas under discussion to fight the Soviets in Afghanistan. These fighters were clearly not fighting to reduce Soviet influence in their home country or as an extension of domestic insurgency. The combination of testosterone, boredom, lack of opportunity, and a noble cause were sufficient, and I see no reason to suppose that these same factors are not driving young men to go and fight in today's jihad. It's worth noting that the numbers involved are miniscule percentages of the populations in question. I suspect that a charismatic recruiter with a good pitch and a bit of money could recruit a few hundred Saudi men to go and fight just about anywhere they could claim that Muslims were being oppressed, regardless of whether or not the US was involved.



I could be totally wrong, but what I see (and there are thousands of articles out there, these are just two that popped up at the top of one search) are restless populaces, joined and energized by the modern information age, drawing strength from each other to rise up to resist their own separate conditions of poor governance. Many of these countries, like Saudi Arabia and Yemen, were US allies from the start. Some, like Libya, came to the US late to gain our blessing as an ally in the War on Terrorism and get a US sanction to ruthlessly attack their own insurgent populace in the name of "counterterrorism." And they all send fighters to work under the AQ flag to nick away at the US where ever we might be.

Do you really think Qaddafi needed US sanction to attack his own populace? Seems to me he's been doing it quite capably for many years, including the many years during which the US regarded him as a bitter enemy. While the US may have pulled Libya from the "sponsors of terrorism" list and resumed diplomatic relations, it would be a huge exaggeration to describe Libya as a US ally, and the US certainly isn't providing Libya with any critical support or assistance. I don't see any reason to assume that Libyans who go to Afghanistan or Iraq to fight are doing so because they object to America's support for Qaddafi, because America isn't supporting Qaddafi.

Foreign fighters and AQ participants are very much a mixed group. Some come from countries where Governments depend on the US almost entirely for military and financial aid (i.e. Yemen). Some come from countries that are US allies and receive US aid, but that are not fully dependent on the US (i.e. Jordan, or Egypt). Some come from US allies that are not at all dependent on the US, or have more influence over the US than the US has over them (I.e. Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf Sates). Some come from countries with a long tradition of hostile relations with the US (i.e. Libya or Syria. Some come from the US itself, and from Western Europe. I don't see how we can lump them together and assume that they are driven by resentment toward US interference in their homelands... in actuality their motivations are more likely to be as diverse as their points of origin, and in many cases the primary driving factors are likely to be testosterone, boredom, and a rather loose sense of religious cause orientation. "Drive the infidel out of Muslim lands" is a compelling line, whether or not you have any particular beef with the particular infidel in question... it worked to recruit fighters to the anti-Soviet jihad, why wouldn't it work as well with the jihad of today?

You wrote this in a previous post:


The fact that we have been deploying our military at an every growing rate to enforce our foreign policy among the same "allied" states that these populaces come from.

Again I have to ask... where exactly are we deploying military forces at an ever-growing rate to enforce our foreign policy on allied states?

I think we flatter ourselves and underestimate our antagonists if we assume that those fighting us are purely reactive, and that we can control them simply by adjusting our own policies. Reaction to US policies - some flawed, some not unreasonable - is a part of the picture, and it's a part that we ignore at our peril. It is by no means the entire picture, and it is equally perilous to focus on that part to the exclusion of all others.

Tukhachevskii
03-15-2010, 10:25 AM
I think we flatter ourselves and underestimate our antagonists if we assume that those fighting us are purely reactive, and that we can control them simply by adjusting our own policies. Reaction to US policies - some flawed, some not unreasonable - is a part of the picture, and it's a part that we ignore at our peril. It is by no means the entire picture, and it is equally perilous to focus on that part to the exclusion of all others.

I whole heartedly agree. On a number of threads I have attempted, usually dismally, to impress upon the members of the central role of Islam in Islamism/Islamist violence(political uncorrect notion of course). I decided that I would write a proper article for the Small Wars Journal outlining my conceptual and theortetical basis for such an assertion. However, I came up against two problems; 1) getting hold of the necessary material, either via the library or via my university alumni service, would immediately flag me up as one of them!; 2) most of the material avaliable is through websites whom I would rather NOT give my personal details to. However, while schlepping through the internet to find what research material I could I discovered that someone had beaten me to it and produced a work that I could only hope to ape rather than best. The work is a thesis written as part of the course requirements at the US National Defence Intelligence College in 2007 by a Major Stephen Collins Coughlin. I think it would be to Our Great Detriment (www.strategycenter.net/docLib/20080107_Coughlin_ExtremistJihad.pdf) if it were more not more widely diseminated. I understand he is in political hot water for his work but from what I hear right thinking individuals in the Pentagon (shock horror, who would have thought it) are rallying around him (www.americanthinker.com/2008/01/saving_major_coughlin.html); finally, common sense prevails.

Bob's World
03-15-2010, 10:41 AM
I whole heartedly agree. On a number of threads I have attempted, usually dismally, to impress upon the members of the central role of Islam in Islamism/Islamist violence(political uncorrect notion of course). I decided that I would write a proper article for the Small Wars Journal outlining my conceptual and theortetical basis for such an assertion. However, I came up against two problems; 1) getting hold of the necessary material, either via the library or via my university alumni service, would immediately flag me up as one of them!; 2) most of the material avaliable is through websites whom I would rather NOT give my personal details to. However, while schlepping through the internet to find what research material I could I discovered that someone had beaten me to it and produced a work that I could only hope to ape rather than best. The work is a thesis written as part of the course requirements at the US National Defence Intelligence College in 2007 by a Major Stephen Collins Coughlin. I think it would be to Our Great Detriment (www.strategycenter.net/docLib/20080107_Coughlin_ExtremistJihad.pdf) if it were more not more widely diseminated. I understand he is in political hot water for his work but from what I hear right thinking individuals in the Pentagon (shock horror, who would have thought it) are rallying around him (www.americanthinker.com/2008/01/saving_major_coughlin.html); finally, common sense prevails.

You wouldn't want to have us radical Christians feeling left out simply because our movement to throw off the poor governance of the Holy Roman Empire is already over.

But if you are looking for allies in making this all about villanizing a particular religion, google some of Ralph Peters recent stuff. He's pretty out there on that limb as well.

No doubt about it though, religious-based ideology works. That's why so many insurgent leaders use it. National leaders as well for the same reasons.

Tukhachevskii
03-15-2010, 11:08 AM
You wouldn't want to have us radical Christians feeling left out simply because our movement to throw off the poor governance of the Holy Roman Empire is already over.

But if you are looking for allies in making this all about villanizing a particular religion, google some of Ralph Peters recent stuff. He's pretty out there on that limb as well.

No doubt about it though, religious-based ideology works. That's why so many insurgent leaders use it. National leaders as well for the same reasons.

Sir, if I am out to villianise Islam does that mean that AQ, Hezbollah, JI, MB (et al) are perverting it? Upon whom does the onus of responsibility lie for providing us with a proper strategic appreciation of our foes and their relationship to their "religion"? I seek merely to understand Jihad for what it is (www.archive.org/details/mohammedanismlec00hurg) not for what we would like it to be. If we don't like the conclusions fine...and as for protestanism, the inquisition etc. I don't think I ever absolved them for their violence but I do find it hard to find scriptural evidence to support such actions unlike our Jihadi friends: yes, the Book of Joshua could be held up but then the Book of Joshua is meant as history- what Joshua did- not what Christians should do. Unlike the Shari'a and the Quran. However, I do not mean to dismiss your concerns/points, I would rather not get into a flame war, but I acknowledge your valid and pertinent concerns. And yes, I do like "most" of what Ralph Peters writes because invective, polemic and controversy are very often the foundations of proper debate and the beginnings of truth.

Bob's World
03-15-2010, 11:45 AM
Sir, if I am out to villianise Islam does that mean that AQ, Hezbollah, JI, MB (et al) are perverting it? Upon whom does the onus of responsibility lie for providing us with a proper strategic appreciation of our foes and their relationship to their "religion"? I seek merely to understand Jihad for what it is (www.archive.org/details/mohammedanismlec00hurg) not for what we would like it to be. If we don't like the conclusions fine...and as for protestanism, the inquisition etc. I don't think I ever absolved them for their violence but I do find it hard to find scriptural evidence to support such actions unlike our Jihadi friends: yes, the Book of Joshua could be held up but then the Book of Joshua is meant as history- what Joshua did- not what Christians should do. Unlike the Shari'a and the Quran. However, I do not mean to dismiss your concerns/points, I would rather not get into a flame war, but I acknowledge your valid and pertinent concerns. And yes, I do like "most" of what Ralph Peters writes because invective, polemic and controversy are very often the foundations of proper debate and the beginnings of truth.

Not a company I will join, but that is both of our perogatives.

Most see ideology as a COG for insurgency; I, like Chairman Deng Xiaoping, see it much more as a Critical Requireiment. A good cat that catches mice. I think the history of insurgency backs this perspective. Often that good cat is steeped in the religion of the populace that a leader is seeking to motivate. That is a smart insurgent leader. But it is not the religion that is likely to be at fault so much as it is the governance over that same populace.

I was debated vigorously on this topic by a religious scholar who had read my paper published here on SWJ regarding the role of ideology in insurgency. He was determined to prove to me that religion was at the core of the problems and touted his "several PhDs" on the topic. Then, in a moment of high irony, accused me of have secular biases due to my background. He was not amused when I suggested that perhaps he may have a religious bias or two based upon his.

Mike (JMM) has made the point on this forum about the difference between information that are "facts", those facts that are "relevant" and those facts that are "material." I believe you are good all the way up through relevant in terms of the role of islam in the current insurgencies in the middle east. But I also believe you fall short of "material." But as I said, the majority position is quick to tout the criticality of Islamism as a causal factor for our current troubles. I've spent a lot of time thinking and studying on this, and I just can't make that connection.

Dayuhan
03-15-2010, 12:43 PM
I certainly wouldn't want to be associated with the views of Ralph Peters, or to a lesser extent those of Maj Coughlin, who I would say have turned to blindness at the other end of the ideological spectrum. Certainly it's possible to say that Islamic Law provides a scriptural basis for jihad, just as a particular interpretation of the Christian scriptures once provided justification for the Crusades. To jump from there to the conclusion that every Muslim is a jihadi waiting to strike would be as absurd as it would be to assume that every Christian is just waiting to go all Old Testament and start smiting unbelievers.

Religion - any religion - or any other committing belief system can be a powerful motivator to violence. Whether or not any given individual member of any given belief system is motivated to violence depends on a whole host of factors, some personal, some external. It is easier, for example, to motivate young single males to violence than it is to motivate females with families, regardless of their religion, their social standing, or their perceived level of oppression. Individuals who are alienated, disaffected, or angry can easily have those emotions directed toward an external target, whether or not they have actually suffered any injustice. As I stated earlier, it is generally not possible to use this kind of manipulation to generate enough support to initiate or sustain an insurgency in the absence of real and immediate motivating issues, but if you're aiming only to recruit a few hundred fighters or a few dozen terrorists, these tactics will serve quite well.

Perceptions of unfairness play an important part in this equation, but it's important to note that perceptions are easily manipulated and may not be associated in any way with reality. Building a perception of unfair or abusive treatment aimed at "the other" or "the outsider" is a common way for leaders to divert attention from their own shortcomings and motivate others to violence.

This means that at any given point the causes of hostility and our capacity to address them have to be realistically assessed, whether looking backward or looking forward. If a previous or proposed action is or will be viewed as unfair or abusive, it is likely to be counterproductive, as it will simply play into the enemy propaganda base. I was personally opposed to the Iraq war largely for this reason: I expected that no matter what our actual intentions were, the war would be perceived as a grab fo Iraqi oil , and that our extended presence in Iraq would be unnecessarily provocative.

On the other hand, we should not fall into the trap of believing either the enemy's propaganda or our own. For example, we cannot address anti-US sentiment in Saudi Arabia by relinquishing control because we haven't any control to relinquish. If in fact our policies in the ME have been aimed at control, as BW says, those policies must have been failures of the highest order, because... well, despite numerous wars and the expenditure of many lives and much treasure, what have we ever actually controlled in the ME? Maybe our own bowel movements, on a good day, but not much more.

We need to refrain from unnecessary provocation, without falling into the trap of trying to redress every real or imagined injustice in modern history: we can't do that in any event and if we try we'll likely end up making an even larger mess. A reasonable course lies somewhere between the extremes, as usual.

marct
03-15-2010, 01:02 PM
Hi Bob,


I am drafting up a paper now that hits this in greater detail, tentatively titled "Changing the Lexicon - A Critical Step in Winning the Battle of the Narrative" that explore dropping the current lexicon rooted in war and COIN; and evoliving to lexicon rooted in MSCA and Criminal Law. Actions will certainly remain "war-like" for a while in Afghanistan, but with the idea that words proceed action, and that changing how we think as well as how we talk will pave the way more quickly to reducing military support and evolving from military prosecution to civilian prosecution of those who act out.

If you'd like, I'll push you a draft in a week or so.

Well, I'd like to see the draft :).


Most see ideology as a COG for insurgency; I, like Chairman Deng Xiaoping, see it much more as a Critical Requireiment. A good cat that catches mice. I think the history of insurgency backs this perspective. Often that good cat is steeped in the religion of the populace that a leader is seeking to motivate. That is a smart insurgent leader. But it is not the religion that is likely to be at fault so much as it is the governance over that same populace.

I'm not sure if an ideology per se is a CR (much less a COG); more likely a "belief structure" would be a better term since it could be a set of inter-related, bottom-up belief structures rather than anything coherent. Having said that, I suspect that a coherent belief structure or, at a minimum, one that is capable of translating between and, to a limited degree, "harmonizing" across different belief structures is the necessary condition.


I was debated vigorously on this topic by a religious scholar who had read my paper published here on SWJ regarding the role of ideology in insurgency. He was determined to prove to me that religion was at the core of the problems and touted his "several PhDs" on the topic. Then, in a moment of high irony, accused me of have secular biases due to my background. He was not amused when I suggested that perhaps he may have a religious bias or two based upon his.

LOL - don't you know the Golden Rule of Academia, Bob? If you don't have a Ph.D., you're biased and probably suffering from some variety of False Consciousness :D.


Mike (JMM) has made the point on this forum about the difference between information that are "facts", those facts that are "relevant" and those facts that are "material." I believe you are good all the way up through relevant in terms of the role of islam in the current insurgencies in the middle east. But I also believe you fall short of "material." But as I said, the majority position is quick to tout the criticality of Islamism as a causal factor for our current troubles. I've spent a lot of time thinking and studying on this, and I just can't make that connection.

There is a concept from physics that I have found immensely useful: potential vs. actual. I can't think of a single religion that doesn't have a potential for violence so, rather than looking at a religion qua religion, I tend to ask how did this get converted from potential to actual? Why, for example, didn't you have Christian insurgencies in the Roman Empire until the 4th century? Why did you have so many of them in the 6th & 7th centuries? etc., etc.

Bob, you might want to take a look at some of Max Weber's stuff on Charismatic leaders and the role of Prophets (check this one (http://www.amazon.com/Sociology-Religion-Max-Weber/dp/0807042056) out if you haven't already). Most of the times when a religious "field of symbols" is converted from a potential to an actual, it involves the construction of a "vision" that meets current needs more parsimoniously than other expressions.

William F. Owen
03-15-2010, 03:26 PM
Agreed. But I don't think COIN is war.

Well then why are you using violence to set forth a policy? Are you killing people to make them like you?

If you want to drop some silly words, try getting rid of "COIN." - Thanks to CNAS and the like, it is now utterly meaningless and a block to clear and effective thinking.

....and winning a war requires you destroy the enemy. It works. It works better than anything else and it is proven to work.

marct
03-15-2010, 03:32 PM
Hi Wilf,


Well then why are you using violence to set forth a policy? Are you killing people to make them like you?

You know, the Inquisition had this one solved - it wasn't about making them "like" you, it was about saving their souls (too bad about the bodies, but....).


If you want to drop some silly words, try getting rid of "COIN." - Thanks to CNAS and the like, it is now utterly meaningless and a block to clear and effective thinking.

Why not drop the term "war" as well? I mean, think about how it has been stretched all out of shape - the war on terror, the war on poverty, the war on obesity, etc. ad nauseum.


....and winning a war requires you destroy the enemy. It works. It works better than anything else and it is proven to work.

Auferre, trucidare, rapere, falsis nominibus imperium; atque, ubi solitudinem faciunt, pacem appellant.

Ken White
03-15-2010, 03:38 PM
Global Insurgency? No. Global War on Terrorism? Equally no. Global friction to a US foreign policy in dire need of a fresh approach that is more populace focused and less rooted in sustaining "friendly dictators"? Yeah, I really do think so. But that is just my assessment. I toss it out here not to "radicalize" anyone, but just to gain other perspectives to help shape my own.Totally agree with you on this -- as always, my disagreement is limited to two factors:

- I believe you significantly misunderestimate the American domestic political impact on your proposed courses of action.

- Like Dayuhan and Tukhachevskii among others, I believe you significantly over estimate the global impact of America the ugly and evil while discounting the impact of America the very excessively rich.

I also believe that the latter error leads in a sense to the first error... ;)

Good ideas can be obscured by the adverse impact of arguable propositions on one's audience. :wry:

Bob's World
03-15-2010, 03:48 PM
Well then why are you using violence to set forth a policy? Are you killing people to make them like you?

If you want to drop some silly words, try getting rid of "COIN." - Thanks to CNAS and the like, it is now utterly meaningless and a block to clear and effective thinking.

....and winning a war requires you destroy the enemy. It works. It works better than anything else and it is proven to work.

CNAS would be number 3...but they are protected by the Constitution so I leave them on.:D

William F. Owen
03-15-2010, 03:55 PM
You know, the Inquisition had this one solved - it wasn't about making them "like" you, it was about saving their souls (too bad about the bodies, but....).
Christians? Go figure.....

Auferre, trucidare, rapere, falsis nominibus imperium; atque, ubi solitudinem faciunt, pacem appellant.
....and this is a problem why? :D
- point being he's complaining. He's objecting to the fact that this is not "setting forth policy." War is not fought to create peace. It's fought advance or resist political change.

Bob's World
03-15-2010, 03:56 PM
Totally agree with you on this -- as always, my disagreement is limited to two factors:

- I believe you significantly misunderestimate the American domestic political impact on your proposed courses of action.

- Like Dayuhan and Tukhachevskii among others, I believe you significantly over estimate the global impact of America the ugly and evil while discounting the impact of America the very excessively rich.

I also believe that the latter error leads in a sense to the first error... ;)

Good ideas can be obscured by the adverse impact of arguable propositions on one's audience. :wry:


Which, of course, is why I take tactical pauses to post. So here goes:

As I have stated fairly often, when it comes to insurgency it's all about the perception of the insurgent populace. Doesn't have to be real, doesn't have to be fact, and it sure as hell does not have to be a perspective that the target of that insurgency agrees with. In fact, more often than not the counterinsurgent finds the insurgent positoin to be rediculous all the way to the Guillitine.

So, the question is not if WE think America is to blame for conditions of poor governance in so many Muslim dominated contries that we have relations with. The quesiton is not if those governments think they have conditions of poor governance in those countries. The question is not even if there actually are conditions of poor governance in those countries.

The one material question is, the one material perspective is, do the insurgent and subversive elements of those populaces believe it to be true.

Marie Antionette did not understand the importance of this point.

King George did not understand the importance of this point.

WE MUST understand the importance of this point. To fail to do so is to risk following in some very tragic shoes indeed.

marct
03-15-2010, 04:04 PM
Hi Wilf,


Christians? Go figure.....

Yup. It's one of the reasons why the Dominicans earned a "special place" in many folk histories ;).


....and this is a problem why? :D

Well, look at the first part of the quote:


To ravage, to slaughter, to usurp under false titles, they call empire; and where they make a desert, they call it peace.

Deserts are soooo unproductive :cool:.


- point being he's complaining. He's objecting to the fact that this is not "setting forth policy." War is not fought to create peace. It's fought advance or resist political change.

Actually, I think Bob is complaining because the general strategies, and concepts, are based on an old policy that is about as useful today as the Dominican's foundational doctrine is.

marct
03-15-2010, 04:06 PM
Hi Bob,


The one material question is, the one material perspective is, do the insurgent and subversive elements of those populaces believe it to be true.

You don't go far enough. Belief isn't enough, that belief must be converted into action (back to that potential vs. actual thing again...).

William F. Owen
03-15-2010, 04:18 PM
Deserts are soooo unproductive :cool:.

I can show a pretty big patch of the northern Negev that would say otherwise.... :D

jmm99
03-15-2010, 04:28 PM
this one:


from Bob's World
I am drafting up a paper now that hits this in greater detail, tentatively titled "Changing the Lexicon - A Critical Step in Winning the Battle of the Narrative" that explore dropping the current lexicon rooted in war and COIN; and evoliving to lexicon rooted in MSCA and Criminal Law.

BTW: the Eminent Jurists Panel may already have beat you to this, but I'm always open to new "material" points of view.

Suggestion: start it as a new thread ?

Regards

Mike

Bob's World
03-15-2010, 04:43 PM
this one:



BTW: the Eminent Jurists Panel may already have beat you to this, but I'm always open to new "material" points of view.

Suggestion: start it as a new thread ?

Regards

Mike

Give me a day or two and I'll put something up.

Ken White
03-15-2010, 07:49 PM
The one material question is, the one material perspective is, do the insurgent and subversive elements of those populaces believe it to be true.I agree but I do not believe that all insurgents believe what they say they believe for public consumption and I would suggest you consider the fact most talk one thing when out of power and do quite another when they are able to gather power. That includes such icons as one time insurgents Thomas Jefferson and Andrew Jackson...

It's mostly about power, the out of office malfeasants want to replace the in-office malfeasants. I've played games with far too many groups of nominal insurgents around the world that lie about all that quite well...

I also find it fascinating that someone with time in the ME takes anything said there by anyone at face value.
WE MUST understand the importance of this point. To fail to do so is to risk following in some very tragic shoes indeed.Can't speak for Marie or George -- though I think the latter got overcome more by arrogance than by ignorance (message in that?) -- but unlike you, I really think most in policy positions are quite well aware of what you say. I also think many in such positions have a more pragmatic take on what nominal insurgents might believe as opposed to what they profess to believe.

Your problem will be convincing those NOT in policy positions, notably about a third of the US population and a like number of both Congroids and Senatorial Grandstanders of the validity of your approach. They will be your big obstacle. My perception is that you will also have some trouble with another third of the population and said Congress critters who will want to see some validation of your approach before they will commit. The good news is that about a third of all communities will agree with you. :D

However, that's a minority and as the man said, "Aye, there's the rub..."

Addendum:

Another idealist has to bite that same bullet:

"Look, I would have loved nothing better than to simply come up with some very elegant, you know, academically approved approach to health care. And didn’t have any kinds of legislative fingerprints on it. And just go ahead and have that passed. But that’s not how it works in our democracy. (LINK) (http://blogs.suntimes.com/sweet/2010/02/katie_couric_super_bowl_obama.html)."

Dayuhan
03-16-2010, 01:08 AM
the question is not if WE think America is to blame for conditions of poor governance in so many Muslim dominated contries that we have relations with. The quesiton is not if those governments think they have conditions of poor governance in those countries. The question is not even if there actually are conditions of poor governance in those countries.

The one material question is, the one material perspective is, do the insurgent and subversive elements of those populaces believe it to be true.

Marie Antionette did not understand the importance of this point.

King George did not understand the importance of this point.

WE MUST understand the importance of this point. To fail to do so is to risk following in some very tragic shoes indeed.

This is true, but it raises further questions, and one must point out that the parallel with Marie A. or King G. is of limited applicability: we do not face an insurgent populace in our own country or in a territory we claim to own or control. They did. Big difference.

Some of the questions we have to come up against, in any given case...

First, is there in fact an insurgent populace? There may be some insurgents among the populace, but do they account for a significant portion of the populace? Have they achieved sufficient support for their views to actually initiate or sustain an insurgency? No government in history has ever made everyone happy, and a few radically disaffected individuals, or a few hundred, does not constitute an insurgency, even if they express their displeasure with bombs.

Second, is this insurgency in fact directed at us, or at our relationship with the government in question? What in fact do the insurgents want? We tend to assume that others think as we think and want what we want, and thus that the solution to every insurgency is the sort of "reforms" that Americans would want to see. This isn't always the case, sometimes far from it.

Third, if there is a perception of American-supported injustice, is that perception grounded in reality, and is there in fact anything we can do about it? If a policy of ours is, reasonably assessed, unfair or unjust and if that policy has inspired anti-US sentiment, we may be able to alter that by adjusting the policy. If the perception of unfairness is based on propaganda or is purely grounded in perception without a substantial base in reality, changes in US policy aren't likely to have any impact at all on the radicalization process.

Take, for example, Libya, a major source of foreign fighters. Libya may have come off our list of absolute enemies, but they're not a US ally. We don't provide them with aid, we don't sustain their government, we haven't sent military forces to support them. We have absolutely no leverage on Libyan internal policy and absolutely no way to push reforms on the Libyan government. It seems very unlikely that even the most thoroughly deranged Libyan foreign fighter actually believes that he is undermining the Libyan government by fighting Americans in Iraq or Afghanistan, but anyone who did hold that belief would be so completely disconnected with reality that nothing we could say or do would have any impact on that belief. In short, we have no reason at all to suppose that Libyan foreign fighters are motivated by our nonexistent support for the Libyan dictatorship, and no reason to suppose that we can stem the flow of foreign fighters by changing our policy toward Libya. If we put Libya back on the terrorist sponsors list and re-severed diplomatic relations, would Libyans stop signing up to fight abroad? Not likely.

Saudi Arabia is a good deal more complicated. There is a long-term relationship, and in the 1990s the combination of the US military presence and the oil glut and consequent economic hard times drove considerable resentment toward both the Saudi government and the US. The question, though, is what, if anything, can we do about that now? The US military presence is over. The oil glut and the Saudi recession are over, the country is awash in cash, and unlike the cash glut of the 70s, the royals are spreading the money around domestically instead of stashing it abroad. So what are we expected to do? Some people want us to push the Saudis to "reform", or "democratize", but in reality this makes little or no sense. First, whatever the Saudi populace may think of their government, they do NOT want the US interfering for any reason, even to advance goals they support. Second, there's very little reason to suppose that any substantial portion of the Saudi populace wants the kind of "reforms" that Americans would want to support. Third, even if we tried to press the Saudis to reform we wouldn't accomplish anything, because we have no leverage over them at all - they simply don't need us. We have no carrots and no sticks that mean anything. We wouldn't change any perceptions either, because our efforts would be interpreted as an effort to press western values on Muslims, and that would inspire more resentment, not less. Even if the perception that the US sustains the Saudi regime exists, there's not a whole lot we can do to alter it.

If we look at Yemen we have a different situation. The Yemeni government is not a despotic monarchy; it's structured on a thoroughly Western parliamentary democracy. The structure just doesn't work, and I can't help suspecting that the Yemenis might have been more comfortable with an old-fashioned Sheik, Emir, or King. Unlike Libya or Saudi Arabia, Yemen depends on us, which gives us theoretical leverage, but also creates the perception that we're responsible for what the government does. In theory we could alter the government's policies by threatening to withhold aid, but in reality the government simply hasn't the capacity to function effectively, regardless of intent. The most likely outcome if we withdraw support is not forced reform, but collapse into Somali-style anarchy, which would be unlikely to reduce the flow of foreign fighters. The policy of providing conditional support and trying to slowly build capacity is certainly flawed, but it's hard to see a better alternative.

I do not see the rise of AQ and other militant Islamic groups purely as a backlash against flawed US policy, neither do I see it as an inevitable expression of an inherent Muslim inclination to violence. Both theories have a piece of the puzzle, but neither has the whole picture, and focusing on either will be counterproductive.

We face real insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan, insurgencies that we created with the flawed (and in my view absurd) assumption that we had the capacity to remove governments and successfully insert replacements that suited us. Managing those insurgencies is a big enough job, and we may or may not be able to complete it. I don't think there's any advantage in trying at the same time to manage other insurgencies, real or perceived, especially in environments where we have little or no influence. We need to keep our eye on the ball and try to contrive some sort of stable - or at least non-catastrophic - exit strategy for our current engagements, not to try to reform and reconstruct governments across the Islamic world. We can't do that in any event, the people of those countries generally don't want us to try, and the effort is likely to cause more trouble and more resentment. Even in cases where our prior interference caused problems, we're not going to alleviate the resultant hostility by trying to interfere in the other direction.

Steve the Planner
03-16-2010, 04:52 AM
This post started out with the underlying motivation of radicals and insurgents, and from there....

As I read some of it, I was struck between the "follies of youth" and the seriously held motivations of young people to change their world, or address injustice.

Justice Thurgood Marshall's Mom was a school teacher in Baltimore. She got paid half what a white teacher did for the same job, and he had to go out of state for a legal education since University of Maryland was for "whites only."

This young fellow then dedicated thirty years, as an oppressed minority, challenging a system by leaving the safety of his NYC office to travel to the deep south to challenge lynchings and abuses going on before, around, and after him---and without a PSD or up-armored anything---just a ballsy guy making a life's commitment to change.

Oh, yes, teachers in Maryland get paid on a "unitary model," and the Supreme Court ruled in his support for Brown vs. Board of Ed (1955, Topeka, KS), and even that is still playing out 55 years later. Did I mention, he spent a lot of time in and around churches and preachers.

How do you contrast these Marshalls and Ghandis with the young Omar?

At this point, I am back to two of Bob's early points:

(1.) A basically functional supported government leaves no room for insurgents, and becomes the locus for internal change rather than outside de-stabilization. Is there one? Where are its Thurgood Marshalls (in jail?)? What venue do they have for serious grievances and change? ( a serious Loya Jirga process?)

(2.) How much of our problems are externalities from our allies (Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, etc...)? Gen. Petreaus's latest effort to redefine Centcom to include Gaza and the West Bank suggests Bob is on the right track, but the solution remains beyond political possibility. Is it's effect on Afghanistan interdependent on issue No. 1, and to what extent?

And there is a third question out there, suggested by Schmedlap's and others' unending quest for answers to the governance solution on other threads:

What is all this war stuff for if it can't be effectively translated into substantive change at the local, provincial and national levels to address issue No. 1? (...Say it again. What is it good for?...)

Seems to me that we need to understand issue 1 and the interdependent issue 2 to understand young Syrian boys in Alabama and Pakistanis in London, as much as Afghan refugees in Pakistan (and Germany).

Bob's World
03-16-2010, 06:13 AM
You call something a war, and you will treat it like war.

You call someone a terrorist and you will conduct counterterrorism against them.

You go to a foreign country and claim that your own mission is COIN, and you will suppress the COIN efforts of the HN beneath your own.

The world is changing; we are indeed in an era of strategic uncertainty. We were attacked and we attacked back. We are evovling, coming to grips with what is changing, what stays the same, what still works and what must be discarded or updated.

But at the end of the day, there is no nation on this earth with a better philosophy of populace-based governance, or that is better situated to be a major success as well as to provide leadership by example (rather than controls) than the U.S. of A. There is a long and rocky road before us, and we will continue to have a mix of successes and failures, but I am confident that we will ultimately overcome the inertia of the past 60+ years of heading in a particular direction to set a new course better suited for the current environment.

Dayuhan
03-16-2010, 08:01 AM
You call something a war, and you will treat it like war.

You call someone a terrorist and you will conduct counterterrorism against them.

You go to a foreign country and claim that your own mission is COIN, and you will suppress the COIN efforts of the HN beneath your own.


If we invade a foreign country, conquer it, toss out a government we don't like, put in a government we do like, and declare that this government is now the government (because we say it is) and anyone who doesn't accept it is an "insurgent"... what do we call that, other than "trouble"?

If we're discussing Afghanistan. I really don't think our problem is our policy toward Saudi Arabia, Libya, Yemen, Algeria, Palestine, or the Muslim world. Our problem is that we're occupying Afghanistan and a lot of Afghans don't like it. We've installed a government that looks the way we think a government should look, and a lot of Afghans don't like that either, for which I can't much blame them. I suspect that the quality of governance is for many a secondary issue: they don't want foreign forces in their country and they don't want foreigners telling them what their government should be, regardless of how it governs... and honestly I can't blame them for that either.

For me the root problem here lies in our own inability to accurately assess the complexity and difficulty of tasks before we take them on. We can't build a state, a nation, or a government in Afghanistan. Nobody can do that but the Afghans, and realistically it will probably take them generations to do it. There is no "government in a box". There is no way we can "install" a democracy. These are things we cannot do. We we assigned ourselves a task we do not have the capacity to accomplish. We bit off more than we could chew, and now we're looking at the possibility of choking on it. To extricate we will probably have to abandon the original goal and perform something akin to a Heimlich maneuver on ourselves - ain't gonna be pretty but it's better than choking.

For the same reason, I don't think it's practical for us to try and re-form our relations with the Muslim world by challenging the vast range of autocratic governments that exist in that world and trying to make them accountable to their populaces. I don't think the populaces in question want our intervention, I don't think we have the capacity to accomplish that task, and I think that if we try to do it we're likely to bite off more than we can chew all over again, and ending up choking ourselves some more.



But at the end of the day, there is no nation on this earth with a better philosophy of populace-based governance, or that is better situated to be a major success as well as to provide leadership by example (rather than controls) than the U.S. of A. There is a long and rocky road before us, and we will continue to have a mix of successes and failures, but I am confident that we will ultimately overcome the inertia of the past 60+ years of heading in a particular direction to set a new course better suited for the current environment.

Our way of government has worked out reasonably well for us, but our track record at bringing it to others is mixed, at best.

I don't think "they" need or want our control or our example... they need to work things out their own way, and we need to let them do it, with the understanding that people who attack us or shelter those who do are going to have very serious problems. Personally, I think this whole issue of "control" is blown way out of proportion: as I said before, we have not done a whole lot of controlling in the Middle East. There's a certain virtue to the simple message, and my preferred simple message runs something like "leave us alone and we will leave you alone, attack us and we will kill you, or chase you to the end of the earth trying".

Steve the Planner
03-16-2010, 08:06 AM
Bob:

I, for one, am very proud of what we did in Iraq at the end of 2007-2009 to shift authority and capability to Iraqis to govern themselves, believing that only they are capable of finding the ways to govern themselves (even if it doesn't look like what US folks think it should). Iraqcracy is not something we created or promoted.

Having watched that particular sausage being made from a unique vantage point, there were and are huge gaps and learning curves for the US to lead that process.

War, we do. Post-conflict is not a current US skill. We are learning PR, but there seems to be a lot more PR than productivity. It is falling flat at home, and, I think, causing the originators to become confused by it.

Iraq was a routine stabilization/reconstruction effort which, regrettably, was often delayed and confounded by US aspirational philosophies, and complete lack of adequate planning and execution.

Afghanistan is, at its core, aspirational, and transformational on the most radical levels---change everything, create new stuff, make things happen which never happened (or even been dreamed of happening before), and do it very fast with people who are not ready for it, and with institutions and structures yet to be defined or created.

I'm not sure that a lot of folks on the military side really understand the profundity of what is being proposed as the civilian foundation for their efforts. Somewhere, there is always a pitch that the real work has to be done elsewhere by somebody else (State Department? USAID? Karzai?) but there is never any clear connection to an actual plan or resource to do this stuff.

I could buy into Nad Ali, Now Zad, Marjah, etc.., if the idea was simply stated that we have to control these areas to deprive the Taliban of poppy revenues and safe zones---and hold those places at any cost (yadda, yadda). That makes sense as a military prerequisite to the looming effort for Kandahar.

But all this silliness about governments in a box, winning the hearts and minds of people, and making their world beautiful is either delusional, or just propaganda aimed at some unknown audience.

I would feel much more comfortable establishing these places under a provisional military control, and skip the PR. That way, any understandable opposition to provisional control would be short-lived, and understood as a necessary exigency of war. Jockeying could then legitimately focus on post-occupation power placements. That's how the Brits managed colonial controls during the last ten years---everyone knew British control would end, so they were all positioning for the next phase. Discharging much of the anti-Brit sentiment.

Under the new scheme, it sounds like opposition can immediately move to the new government before it is even ready to perform, and with no expectation for change (except by restoration of the poppy-minders). Makes no sense to me.

Problem in Afghanistan is that the 30 years prior has not been easy or conducive to a proactive future pattern of self-governance. And there is little to build on or hope for (except through foreign aid which doesn't seem to trickle down to these places). Just trading one tough situation for another.

Personally, I would rather have the aspiring opponents fighting with each other for position in the post-occupation period, than to become the direct subject of their wrath or the supporter of their enemy.

Just seems like not a very smart way to manage things.

Steve the Planner
03-16-2010, 08:33 AM
Dayahan:

Your description is bulemic. But I don't know that it is wrong.

"We bit off more than we could chew, and now we're looking at the possibility of choking on it. To extricate we will probably have to abandon the original goal and perform something akin to a Heimlich maneuver on ourselves - ain't gonna be pretty but it's better than choking.

For the same reason, I don't think it's practical for us to try and re-form our relations with the Muslim world by challenging the vast range of autocratic governments that exist in that world and trying to make them accountable to their populaces. I don't think the populaces in question want our intervention, I don't think we have the capacity to accomplish that task, and I think that if we try to do it we're likely to bite off more than we can chew all over again, and ending up choking ourselves some more."

I was reading some of the alternate press coverage on the gamesmanship between DoD and DoS for funding and responsibility, and playing out in congress now.

Word is that DoD is trying very hard to distance itself for governance responsibility and to pin the tale on State, despite the lack of resources for it to perform (Mullen comments).

The same kinds of games are also going on in the aid world over control of programs and funding. All playing out in a Congress embattled with other issues, and no public interest in these endeavors.

A recent report indicated a 2-4% public interest in Afghanistan, and huge focus on the budget and economy.

This is not a good time to be mission-creeping into ill-defined hearts, minds and Heimlich manuevers in far away places.

If the Afghan mission is retaliatory and suppressive, there is support.

As it continues to be limitlessly defined in creating new worlds in far off places, the elections-clock will bring a lot to an end quicker than many folks imagine.

I'm afraid these domestic realities are moving rapidly forward.

Dayuhan
03-16-2010, 10:47 AM
Your description is bulemic. But I don't know that it is wrong.


Bulimic to a degree, and I wish it were wrong. But as you wrote in response to BW...


Afghanistan is, at its core, aspirational, and transformational on the most radical levels---change everything, create new stuff, make things happen which never happened (or even been dreamed of happening before), and do it very fast with people who are not ready for it, and with institutions and structures yet to be defined or created.

I'm not sure that a lot of folks on the military side really understand the profundity of what is being proposed as the civilian foundation for their efforts. Somewhere, there is always a pitch that the real work has to be done elsewhere by somebody else (State Department? USAID? Karzai?) but there is never any clear connection to an actual plan or resource to do this stuff.


This is exactly what I'm talking about. When we decided to undertake this radical transformative change-and-create approach, who did we think was going to do the changing, creating, and transforming? The military? DoS? AID? Did we really think the Afghans were simply going to kick back and let us transform their country as we saw fit, without any objection? Did we just think somebody somewhere was going to somehow make it all work?

I just don't grasp the process that led us to believe that we could accomplish that sort of change in a time frame that would be acceptable in our domestic political picture.

davidbfpo
06-17-2010, 06:36 PM
A short BBC News item:
how a Muslim man went from being a drug addict in the UK to a militant fighting for the Taliban.

Link:http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/8722955.stm

davidbfpo
07-29-2010, 03:22 PM
Here in the UK the official state campaign against violent extremism (known as Preventing Violent Extremism PVE), known as 'Prevent' (a strand of the UK's CT strategy Operation Contest), is under review by the coalition governemnt, partly as they have financial spending to cut and a different outlook on the way ahead.

Not unexpectedly there is a lobbying campaign in private and public over the future of PVE. Some insight into what may happen is available from recently published documents and reports:

1) Quilliam Foundation's private submission that has been "leaked" to: http://www.scribd.com/doc/34834977/quilliamjune2010 (60 pgs long and I am looking to see if there is an alternative to scribd).)

2) Demos (left of centre think tank) published 'From Suspects to Citizens': http://www.demos.co.uk/publications/fromsuspectstocitizens

3) A commentary by Rachel Briggs, ex-Demos and now at RUSI: http://www.rusi.org/analysis/commentary/ref:C4C331519B8C90/

4) Andrew Gilligan, in The Daily Telegraph: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/journalists/andrew-gilligan/7908262/Hizb-ut-Tahrir-is-not-a-gateway-to-terrorism-claims-Whitehall-report.html which refers to the debate over confronting violent extremism or extremism

Bob's World
07-29-2010, 03:35 PM
Here in the UK the official state campaign against violent extremism (known as Preventing Violent Extremism PVE), known as 'Prevent' (a strand of the UK's CT strategy Operation Contest), is under review by the coalition governemnt, partly as they have financial spending to cut and a different outlook on the way ahead.

Not unexpectedly there is a lobbying campaign in private and public over the future of PVE. Some insight into what may happen is available from recently published documents and reports:

1) Quilliam Foundation's private submission that has been "leaked" to: http://www.scribd.com/doc/34834977/quilliamjune2010 (60 pgs long and I am looking to see if there is an alternative to scribd).)

2) Demos (left of centre think tank) published 'From Suspects to Citizens': http://www.demos.co.uk/publications/fromsuspectstocitizens

3) A commentary by Rachel Briggs, ex-Demos and now at RUSI: http://www.rusi.org/analysis/commentary/ref:C4C331519B8C90/

4) Andrew Gilligan, in The Daily Telegraph: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/journalists/andrew-gilligan/7908262/Hizb-ut-Tahrir-is-not-a-gateway-to-terrorism-claims-Whitehall-report.html which refers to the debate over confronting violent extremism or extremism

The entire concept of "radicalization" is premised in the flawed construct that good citizens go bad due solely to outside influence. Prevention seems to have been focused at these bad outside influences.

So, a man who largely ignores his wife, fails to show her proper respect, or prioritizes her low in his life relative to other interests may well take the position that she was "radicalized" when she becomes infatuated with the attentions lauded upon her by someone who is also lending a sympathetic ear to her plight. But is it really the "fault" of the guy who lures her away, or is it the fault of the man who foolishly created the condtitions that contributed to the new guy's success?

"Prevent" is fine, but the majority of it must be turned internally under the harsh light of frank self-assessment. What can we change about our own behavior to prevent radicalization? Weight the effort there. Only minor and reasonable measures will then be needed for dealing with the efforts of others.

Dayuhan
07-30-2010, 09:20 AM
The entire concept of "radicalization" is premised in the flawed construct that good citizens go bad due solely to outside influence. Prevention seems to have been focused at these bad outside influences.

So, a man who largely ignores his wife, fails to show her proper respect, or prioritizes her low in his life relative to other interests may well take the position that she was "radicalized" when she becomes infatuated with the attentions lauded upon her by someone who is also lending a sympathetic ear to her plight. But is it really the "fault" of the guy who lures her away, or is it the fault of the man who foolishly created the condtitions that contributed to the new guy's success?

"Prevent" is fine, but the majority of it must be turned internally under the harsh light of frank self-assessment. What can we change about our own behavior to prevent radicalization? Weight the effort there. Only minor and reasonable measures will then be needed for dealing with the efforts of others.

What if a man has a hundred wives... 90 are happy, 6 are mildly irritated, three hate his guts, and one shoots him in the head. On the basis of the numbers you might say he's not doing a bad job, but he's still been shot in the head.

What if a man has a million wives, or a billion?

There's a difference between the kind of radicalization that creates insurgents and the kind that creates terrorists. If the populace has risen against the government and is out in the streets saying it with bombs, then absolutely the government needs to look to its conduct. On the other hand, if a government that failed to infuriate small numbers of extremists at various ends of various political and religious spectra, it's probably doing something wrong. Timothy McVeigh hated the US Government badly enough to blow up a building... but if the US had the kind of government that he would have liked, far more people would have been alienated or infuriated.

You can't please everybody, and given the various extremes floating around it's almost impossible to do anything without making somebody angry enough to kill. There are people out there who want their governments to adopt blatantly racist policies, or to impose medieval religious restrictions, or tax the wealthy out of existence, or outlaw currency, or ban eating meat, etc, ad nauseam. Some of them want these things badly enough to kill. Does their violence mean the Government is remiss in not giving them what they want? Should we allow violent minorities to impose their will on larger numbers simply because they are violent?

When we deal with other countries, we often have to admit that there is little or nothing we can do to prevent radicalization, whether it is insurgent or terrorist in nature. We generally don't have the kind of influence that would make any difference. It's not just between a government and a populace, either... the various factions and sub-factions that compose any given populace need to be able to reach compromises on many issues, especially if the minimum demands of one group are seen by others as cause for rebellion.

Bob's World
07-30-2010, 09:56 AM
Radicalization is a grossly overblown concept. It's part of the victim mentality that is so common among officials faced with insurgency, or even terrorist attacks.

Are some out there actually brainwashed, radicalized ? Certainly, but it is, I suspect, a very small percentage of those who engage in such acts.

Find the young Muslim British citizen, living in London who becomes engaged with such a group who also is very satisfied with how the government treats any group at home or abroad that he sees as "his people." I doubt you would find many, perhaps none.

I find this recent focus on "counter-radicalization" to be taking on a dangerous perspective that leads to tendencies to downplays the shortcomings of government by playing up the evil influence of the outsider conducting UW, or the insurgent leaders locally.

You see the same things in the illegal drug realm, with dealers painted as the source of evil and users as victims. This just doesn't match my experience in life or as a prosecutor. Same victim mentality and shifting of responsibility. Most Drug Dealers are businessmen who are willing to risk jail time and competitive violence in order to service the demand for the product.

Most groups conducting UW are the same. They have a product and they take it to where the demand is. Target demand, not supply for best effect, but to target demand requires first to come to grips with ones own problems, and Pols don't do that well (once in office).

davidbfpo
07-30-2010, 10:05 AM
Bob's World in part stated:
The entire concept of "radicalization" is premised in the flawed construct that good citizens go bad due solely to outside influence. Prevention seems to have been focused at these bad outside influences.

Yes, I would agree the UK counter-radicalisation strategy is undermined IMHO by adherence to the concept of 'vulnerability' of the 'good citizens'. I am not sure why officialdom has taken this course, but I suspect that the previous Labour government did not want foriegn policy to be acknowledged as a factor. Something the Chilcot Inquiry on the Iraqi War has heard from retired officials.

I am also mindful that in the UK we focus on the 'vulnerable' and the "bad guys", without enough consideration of the vast majority of citizens and the majority of Muslims. We need to be wary of state actions that provoke this majority and cause them to shift allegiances, if only to a clear neutral "I see no evil" stance.

What is clear in the UK, since 2005, is the clear lack of public, political involvement and their reluctance to be engaged in the public debate of the issues that can contribute to radicalisation. All too often, usually aimed at the "silent majority", engagement has been by "hired hands" or "extremism entreprenurs", civil servants - who with few exceptions recite the official "line" and those in the "frontline".

So much so that for many, notably in the urban Muslim communities, 'Prevent' is a dirty word and best kept away from.

This may all be changing:http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2010/jul/13/ministers-dismantle-programme-prevent-violent-extremism

Bob's World
07-30-2010, 10:56 AM
The best COIN is "prevent" and is performed by civil government in stable countries and communities around the world everyday. Those who neglect true prevent inevitably find themselves soon mired in "react," or what we generally see as classic insurgency and counterinsurgency.

Today's characterization of COIN as warfare steers us away from appreciating the day to day role of prevention that takes place during phase 0 "pre-insurgency" governance of a populace. It also tends to make us over-militarize COIN in both our thinking and our deeds.

David, I think if you change the perspective of what it is you are trying to prevent, and then broaden the aperture as to how to best achieve such prevention, you may well find a fresh appetite for the smartest COIN of all: Peacetime prevention through the delivery of good governance to the entire populace of a land. (and now in growing importance, fair treatment to the lands that populace hailed from as well)

Dayuhan
07-30-2010, 12:37 PM
Are some out there actually brainwashed, radicalized ? Certainly, but it is, I suspect, a very small percentage of those who engage in such acts.

Find the young Muslim British citizen, living in London who becomes engaged with such a group who also is very satisfied with how the government treats any group at home or abroad that he sees as "his people." I doubt you would find many, perhaps none.

Brainwashed, no. Angry, yes, and angry young men will always be with us. You cannot prevent anger by giving everyone what they want and treating everyone as they wish to be treated, because the way some wish to be treated is not compatible with the way others wish to be treated.

In any event I think the whole COIN thing may be much blown out of hand, because aside from the insurgencies we've created, through our insistence on occupying countries and trying to create governments, we don't really have an insurgency problem. To me the answer to that problem is not to get really good at COIN, but to stop creating insurgencies by trying to tell others how they ought to be governed. A bit late for that in Iraq and Afghanistan, certainly, but what other insurgency is out there that the US need to concern itself with?

We always talk about the Middle East... how many countries in the Middle East are actually facing insurgencies? Not nebulous concepts like "pre insurgency" or "Phase 1 insurgency", which can be manipulated to postulate an insurgency almost anywhere in the developing world, but actual organized functioning insurgencies that pose a realistic threat to government?

Rex Brynen
07-30-2010, 02:48 PM
We always talk about the Middle East... how many countries in the Middle East are actually facing insurgencies? Not nebulous concepts like "pre insurgency" or "Phase 1 insurgency", which can be manipulated to postulate an insurgency almost anywhere in the developing world, but actual organized functioning insurgencies that pose a realistic threat to government?

By almost any possible measure, the Middle East hasn't been unstable since the 1970s--indeed, its arguably the most stable part of the developing world.

No government in the region (not even Iraq or Yemen) faces a substantial current risk of being overthrown. A number do face security threats from violence due to localized ethno-religious-political rebellions (Yemen/Houthis, Iran/Jundallah, Turkey/Kurds) or Islamist terrorism (Iraq/AQI, Algeria/AQIM, others). However, none of these has the slightest chance of marching into the capital.

On that note, I would like to nominate a candidate for SWJ's "worst insurgent strategy of the month" award--the ambitious, but out-of-favour, Sheikh Khalid bin Saqr al-Qasimi of Ras al-Khaimeh (UAE):


The Israeli ambassador to London, Ron Prosor, has met Sheikh Khalid bin Saqr al-Qasimi, the exiled crown prince of Ras al-Khaimeh (RAK), who asked him to help with his campaign to oust the leadership of the northernmost state in the United Arab Emirates.

The meeting took place in London in March and has been followed by phone calls and wider assistance and advice, according to records of the relationship seen by the Guardian.

Khalid, who has been based in London and has hired a solicitor from Ickenham as his agent, is bidding to replace his ailing father, Sheikh Saqr, and half brother, Sheikh Saud, to take control of RAK....

Public stories of your flirtation with Israel do you so very much good in building street (or palace) credibility in the Arab world. As for Ickenham (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ickenham), its a real power-center of Middle East politics. :D

Full story at The Guardian (http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/jul/28/israel-link-sheikh-uae-coup).

bourbon
10-26-2010, 04:21 AM
Talking to the Enemy by Scott Atran – review (http://www.guardian.co.uk/books/2010/oct/24/scott-atran-talking-to-the-enemy-review), by Jason Burke. The Observer, 24 October 2010.

Rather than being brainwashed by militant recruiters, terrorists tend to be ordinary people driven by their peer group, argues anthropologist Scott Atran

Audio: Book Event with Scott Atran (http://csis.org/multimedia/audio-book-event-scott-atran). Center for Strategic and International Studies, Oct 21, 2010.

Book reception with Scott Atran, director of research at Anthropology National Center for Scientific Research in Paris, France, author of "Talking to the Enemy: Faith, Brotherhood, and the (Un)Making of Terrorists." This event was moderated by The Honorable Juan C. Zarate, Senior Adviser, CSIS Transnational Threats Project.

Bob's World
10-26-2010, 11:32 AM
It is well to consider that behind the ideologies of "communisim" that U.S. foreign policy shifted to containing upon the fall of Nationalist China were always vast popular movements in the pursuit of liberty.

We had no need to contain the ideology, it died of its own unsustainability as a concept. Similarly, no amount of effort can contain a people committed to the idea of liberty.

Ironically enough, it was the pursuit of liberty by the people of Eastern Europe that put a fork in the Soviet Union (whose expansion was the original focus of containment prior to 1950) far more than any effort to contain Soviet ideology.

Today the nations of the Middle East may well be "stable" (much as the Soviet Union was stable...) but the forces of liberty are still at work, and are still far too powerful to be contained indefinitely. Is it a radical idea to risk individual death in the pursuit of nationalist liberty? Absolutely, but such "radicalism" was once admired by Americans, and similarly such radicals once admired America as well. The past sixty years of US commitment to containing such radical aspirations of liberty have put more than a little tarnish on our grand old liberty bell.

Someday (soon I hope) those who rant on about Islamism will be relegated to the same historic dust bin as Joe McCarthy and his ilk. It is simply far too easy to rationalize the compromise of one's national principles and ethos in the pursuit of idealistic agenda's to contain "ideas.". It is time for a return to Realpolitic, and to focus policies designed to advance national interests of the U.S. that do not require a policy commited to the idealistic suppression of the liberty of others.

The U.S. I know, while it has certainly supported and helped sustain many of the governments of the Middle East, does not stand for the principles employed to secure such stability. It is time to evolve.

Influence is emerging as the primary resource of national power in the globalized era. Containment of others expends influence far faster than it can be acquired. While the growing U.S. fiscal deficiet is extremely worrysome, it is the influence deficiet that may ultimately break us.

Becoming more focused on our roots as a nation, less willing to compromise our values in the name of a security that too often comes at the expense of the liberty of others, and learning to see past ideologies employed to pursue liberty as well as fear-mongering to suppress ideologies, are all esential to evolving to more effective Ways and Means of foreign policy.

davidbfpo
11-07-2010, 09:56 PM
The BBC have this article supporting a File on Four radio documentary, on the unclear impact of Al-Shabab on the Somali community in the UK:
Jenny Cuffe investigates how British-based Somalis are being lured into fighting for the al-Qaeda-linked Islamists of al-Shabaab.

There have been consistent rumours that dozens, perhaps scores of British-based Somali men have travelled to Somalia to join the militant Islamist group which was banned by the British Government earlier this year.

File on 4 explores the techniques used by Al-Shabaab to persuade young members of the 250,000-strong British Somali community to sign up for Jihad in Somalia. Members of the close-knit and reticent British Somali community tell Jenny Cuffe of their fears that youngsters are being seduced through the internet and by shadowy recruiting sergeants for the Horn of Africa's most feared military force.

And the programme travels to the state of Minnesota to see how a vigorous FBI investigation and cooperation from the Somali community have laid-bare a pipeline which first lured, then transported young American Somalis to the training camps and battlefields of Somalia.

Link:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-11667690 and the File on Four podcast:http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b00vkxkc

I noted the references by US Customs to the issues around Khat being smuggled into the USA, via the UK originating from Kenya and the suspected fund raising for Al-Shabbab. Khat is not illegal in the UK, unlike the rest of the EU and USA.

davidbfpo
12-27-2010, 09:28 PM
Too long a title to fit, hence the short opener. The full title is 'Online De-Radicalization? Countering Violent Extremist Narratives: Message, Messenger and Media Strategy', an article by Omar Ashour, in Perspectives on Terrorism.

Link:http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php?option=com_rokzine&view=article&id=144&Itemid=54

Taken from the summary:
..this article outlines a broad strategy for countering the narratives of violent extremists. It argues that an effective counter-narrative should be built on three pillars. The first is an effective comprehensive message that dismantles and counter-argues against every dimension of the extremist narrative, namely the theological, political, historical, instrumental and socio-psychological dimensions. The second pillar is the messengers. The article argues that for the first time in the history of Jihadism a “critical mass” of former militants, who rebelled not only against the current behaviour of their former colleagues but also against the ideology supporting it, has come into existence. This “critical mass” can constitute the core of credible messengers, especially the few de-radicalized individuals and groups that still maintain influence and respect among vulnerable communities. The third pillar is the dissemination and attraction strategy of the counter-narratives(s) which focuses on the role of the media.

Bill Moore
12-28-2010, 01:04 AM
We refuse to convert to Islam as a nation (or in the West), and we refuse to implement Shari'a law, and we refuse to suppress our women, and we refuse to do a lot of things that we simply think our wrong headed ideas/beliefs.

John Smith is a loser (and it's obviously our fault) sitting in bumfudge, NY looking for meaning in life, and then he finds it finds on Anwar Awlaki's website and starts a dialouge with him, maybe attends a mosque that is relatively close. Ah he has found meaning and happiness now, and has decided to take his self actualization a step further by attempting a terrorist attack in a crowded mall over the weekend. He now knows if he dies conducting Jihad against the evil government that oppressed him all these years he'll get to go to paradise. I'm not how that is our fault due to our foreign policy, but apparently it is.

Most "terrorists" come from middle class or upper class families (fact), most terrorists have education beyond high school (fact), most terrorists come from secular or non-practicing families (fact).

Our approach to challenging terrorism? Economic development, build schools, and focus on secular education? I'm sure this is completely logical and a good use of our tax dollars, but I don't see it, maybe you can help me contect the dots?

The reality is there are narratives and ideologies that simply incompatible in the real world outside of academia. More education and economic development will not change their minds, the issue is neither, it is their beliefs. Obviously not every Muslim, nor even most, embrace the views of the extremists that desire to murder civilians to achieve their goals. Something about the radicalization process pushed them off the fence. They may have been sitting on the fence because of their perceptions of oppressive governments, etc., but there was a process that pulled them into the ranks of terrorism (not talking insurgents, although the two are frequently confused in SWJ). It is worth continuing to see is we can lessen that calling, and for those affected by the radical narrative, at least offer another view that may at a minimum put them back on the fence again. I readily admit most programs to date have been terrible failures.

However, it is time we move beyond the liberal self imposed view that we're too blame for a few men attacking the U.S. and murdering thousands of civilians, or attacking the public transportation systems in England and Spain and murdering hundreds of innocents. The blame is a belief system that is NOT compatible with the modern world.

davidbfpo
03-14-2011, 03:53 PM
Hat tip to CLS alert (a consistently good daily news alert on CT issues) for an article in The Salon: 'The Muslim "radicalization" myth: Debunked. What Peter King missed this week: How the government should actually fight homegrown terrorism'.

Which summarises a longer report by the Brennan Centre and ends with:
If we're going to talk about radicalization, let's look at the evidence that's out there. Let's not rely on stereotypes or preconceived notions about what radicalization is and who is susceptible to becoming a terrorist. The empirical evidence that is available so far is directly in contradiction to the theories that have been put forward by the FBI and the NYPD. So we want to make sure that those theories -- that are unfounded and contradicted by the social science evidence -- are not being used to influence policy.

Link to The Salon article:http://www.salon.com/news/politics/war_room/2011/03/12/radicalization_explained

Link to the Brennan Centre report:http://brennan.3cdn.net/3ff468de1211ff853e_hwm6beu15.pdf

On my first, quick read I noted the emphasis on outwardly visible signs regarding the Muslim faith being taken as indicators of radicalisation; a good point IMHO and as Muslim police officers repeatedly have said to me rarely an indicator of political radicalisation.

Incidentally the Brennan Centre report is very critical of an earlier NYPD report, see posts 15 & 16 on this thread 'The Homegrown Threat':http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=3672

davidbfpo
04-12-2011, 10:29 AM
A fairly standard article on the flight from Toronto, Canada of naturalised, if not born there Canadian-Somalis, except two women have fled:http://www.thestar.com/news/article/972041--somali-canadians-grapple-with-terrorism-s-appeal-to-youth

One hopes that the two affected communities are in contact.

davidbfpo
05-14-2011, 09:30 PM
A short commentary on the flow of those radicalised / radicalized to overseas training camps, which touches upon the special category status of white converts:http://raffaellopantucci.com/2011/05/14/the-white-mans-jihad/

SWJ Blog
09-16-2011, 01:05 PM
The Process of Islamic Radicalization in Intra-State Conflict (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/the-process-of-islamic-radicalization-in-intra-state-conflict)

Entry Excerpt:



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Read the full post (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/the-process-of-islamic-radicalization-in-intra-state-conflict) and make any comments at the SWJ Blog (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog).
This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.

davidbfpo
02-02-2012, 12:24 PM
I rediscovered this 2002 article at the weekend and it is a good illustration of how violent extremists can be unknown to their families. The Greek terrorist group, November 17th, eluded capture for twenty-seven years and were unravelled after one bomber was unlucky.

Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/greece/1402020/I-thought-my-sons-were-good-boys-who-just-got-into-bad-company.html

davidbfpo
02-02-2012, 06:59 PM
An ICSR paper and from the flyer:
ICSR’s latest paper – ‘De-Radicalising Islamists: Programmes and Their Impact in Muslim Majority States’ – identifies key factors that make de-radicalisation and counter-radicalisation programmes more effective.

Written by Professor Hamed El Said, it examines the approaches of eight Muslim-majority states that have developed ‘soft’ strategies to counter and prevent jihadist radicalisation.

The study has found that the factors which contribute to the effectiveness of such programmes include:

• National consensus – Lack of popular and political support has denied Jordanian de-radicalisation efforts the social underpinning that contributes to their relative success in Saudi Arabia. In Yemen, initial support for de-radicalisation has ebbed away, while in Algeria it has remained relatively strong.

• Committed national leadership – Enthusiastic leadership by national governments can provide ‘soft’ counterterrorism policies with impetus; inject them with confidence; build trust in their purpose; and – in doing so – create and maintain the needed national consensus.

• Civil society – The engagement of civil society can provide new ideas and reinforce the state’s actions by empowering local communities and associations, especially those that are vulnerable and hard to reach for the government.

• Non-religious programming – Religious dialogue alone will not eliminate violent extremism. Programmes must not ignore the social, economic and political factors that contribute to radicalisation and consider them in their mix of programming.

• Cultural awareness – De-radicalisation programmes must be consistent with, and derive from, each country’s mores, culture, rules and regulations, and take account of what is acceptable and not acceptable in their societies.
El Said shows that each programme has different approaches and objectives – often depending on the nature of a particular society and the terrorist threat with which it has been faced:

• Countries like Morocco and Bangladesh, for example, have focused on countering and preventing further radicalisation, whereas Saudi-Arabia and Yemen have emphasised rehabilitating and counselling those who have become radicalised.

• Saudi Arabia has developed well-structured official programmes, while many others, including Jordan, have relied on individual and civil society based initiatives.

• Some countries, such as Egypt and Algeria, have gone through processes of collective de-radicalisation (whereby an entire group denounces violence), whereas others deal with individuals on a case by case basis.

This diversity in approaches, El Said argues, is one of the various programmes’ greatest sources of strength. However, this also makes it difficult to measure success and produce valid comparisons. One size, he concludes, does not fit all.

Link:http://icsr.info/paper/de-radicalising-islamists-programmes-and-their-impact-in-muslim-majority-states

I wonder how well Western countries would fare if the key factors were applied?

davidbfpo
02-05-2012, 12:52 PM
Hat tip to Randy Borum, a SWC Member, to a special issue of the 'Journal of Strategic Studies' on Rethinking Radicalisation, which is free to access:http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/

Economy of effort needed, Randy's introduction is on:
http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1150&context=jss

davidbfpo
07-16-2012, 09:30 AM
A rare IMHO article by an Indian commentator on radicalisation, which also looks briefly at Asian examples:http://www.sunday-guardian.com/analysis/indian-mujahideen-is-symptom-of-deeper-rot

davidbfpo
07-17-2012, 10:49 AM
Just found this EU-funded website, which has a reference section with, currently, 171 reports on counter-extremism:https://www.counterextremism.org/resources/?&page=1

davidbfpo
08-11-2012, 02:19 PM
A short, fifteen minute radio interview of Hanif Qadir on his journey:http://www.bbc.co.uk/iplayer/episode/b01lhfs7/One_to_One_Razia_Iqbal_talks_to_Hanif_Qadir/

I have assumed the link will work beyond the UK.

Hanif returned from Afghanistan to London and with his brother set up a youth club in a "hot-spot" Waltham Forest, Active Change Foundation:http://www.activechangefoundation.org/

davidbfpo
08-27-2012, 05:24 PM
Young Muslim men in Germany are systematically trying to recruit their peers for jihad using sophisticated rhetoric and psychology and by targeting vulnerable youths who are searching for direction in life. Two men who have quit the scene tell their story to SPIEGEL, providing a rare look into a dangerous underground.

Link:http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/how-german-islamists-recruit-young-men-for-jihad-a-851393.html

There are those who argue the group involved are not Jihadists:
recruiting young men for the Hamburg branch of the Islamist organization Hizb ut-Tahrir. The group has been banned in Germany since 2003, but its members are still active underground.

Nevertheless an interesting read and one that is largely conducted in private and without any electronic communication.

davidbfpo
09-20-2012, 03:51 PM
A report published a few weeks ago 'Building Resilience to Violent Extremism Among Somali-Americans in Minneapolis-St. Paul'; link to summary:http://www.start.umd.edu/start/announcements/announcement.asp?id=406

I found the context discovered via interviewing far more interesting than the models used, especially:
A large epidemiological survey conducted in Minneapolis‐St.Paul in 2004 found that 37% of Somali women and 25% of Somali men had been tortured....Another study...found that nearly half of Somali mothers were torture survivors; more than a quarter had no formal education; and 70% were single parents..

SWJ Blog
10-11-2012, 10:04 AM
War on Terror: Radicalization and Expansion of the Threats (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/war-on-terror-radicalization-and-expansion-of-the-threats)

Entry Excerpt:



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Read the full post (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/war-on-terror-radicalization-and-expansion-of-the-threats) and make any comments at the SWJ Blog (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog).
This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.

davidbfpo
11-06-2012, 05:05 PM
Just an outlive via Twitter 'Pathways, Processes, Roles and Factors for Terrorist Disengagement, Re-engagement and Recidivism':http://www.icst.psu.edu/docs/1.Outline/ICST.Diseng.Outline.pdf

davidbfpo
12-04-2012, 04:13 PM
A new report:
Over the past five months, we have studied dozens of cases and spoken to leading experts and policymakers. The result is an extensive report that will be released by the Bipartisan Policy Center on Tuesday. Our conclusion is clear: Online radicalization is here to stay, and future terrorist attacks against the homeland will involve individuals who have been radicalized — at least in part — on the Internet.

The White House agrees with us. In its 2011 counter-radicalization strategy, it promised to "develop a ... comprehensive strategy for countering and preventing violent extremism online." One year later, however, this still hasn't happened, and our first recommendation is for the administration to complete its work, make the strategy public and begin its implementation.

Link:http://www.politico.com/story/2012/12/a-radical-call-against-online-extremism-84484.html?hp=l10

Link to the report:http://www.politico.com/story/2012/12/a-radical-call-against-online-extremism-84484.html?hp=l10

I have skimmed through the report, which less than thirty pages; it has many good points and in places is IMHO rather weak.

There is a touch of "Big Brother" in some of the recommendations and several assumptions that all our enemies use electronic communications. Not to overlook a No. 151 Footnote:
To our knowledge, there has not been a single terrorism prosecution in the United States in recent years that has not relied, to a greater or lesser extent, on defendants’ personal electronic communications.

davidbfpo
12-13-2012, 11:31 PM
A new, so far un-read ICSR report on four countries experience, namely UK, Netherlands, Norway and Denmark:
Since the mid-2000s, European countries have developed counter-radicalization strategies, seeking to de-radicalize committed militants and preventing the radicalization of vulnerable populations. What do these strategies entail? Where do they differ, and what do they have in common? How successful have they been?.....the most comprehensive and systematic report to date about counter-radicalization policy and practice. It sums up the experiences of four European countries, outlines key challenges and areas of convergence, and describes the lessons that have been learned in this new area of policymaking.

Link:http://icsr.info/2012/12/icsr-report-countering-radicalization-in-europe/

davidbfpo
12-30-2012, 02:23 PM
A short, excellent article; full title being 'U.S. Strategy for Countering Violent Extremism: An Assessment' by Clint Watts (aka CWOT) and Will McCants:http://www.fpri.org/articles/2012/12/us-strategy-countering-violent-extremism-assessment

They end with:
we ask the U.S. government to take a hard look at the number of people who support terrorist groups. If their numbers are small and if their violent acts are few, a traditional law enforcement approach might be all that is required. We know that CVE is viewed by some as a more holistic approach to terrorism. But the downside of holistic approaches is that they can do a whole lot of harm and consume a disproportionate amount of resources. If CVE is required, identify sympathizers and supporters, select a limited set of actions, execute them through a few agencies and measure their effectiveness against defined objectives. Such measures might prevent a few people from pursuing a bad course in life, and if the measures fail, law enforcement knows what to do.

Interesting to note how the UK experience in this field has had so much effect, a classic case of "selling" a bad product.

Bill Moore
12-30-2012, 05:46 PM
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XCOp7nTTW1U

Homegrown Radicalization -- How Data Analytics Can Help Prevent Terrorism

Hat tip to David for passing the link above, which is a presentation given by Prof Peter Neuman on the radicalization process and where he thinks we should focus our efforts (it isn't root causes). An excellent overview on the radicalization process even you don't concur with his recommendations.

We have spent a lot of money at home and abroad in support of CVE, and I think it is impossible to tell if it is working or not. We may have had major successes (stopping a few folks from conducting violent acts that would have been catastrophic), but how would we ever know?

davidbfpo
01-04-2013, 12:42 PM
Three ICST papers, not fully read:

1) A scholarly journal article - In Their Own Words? Methodological Considerations in the Analysis of Terrorist Autobiographies by Mary Beth Altier, John Horgan, and Christian Thoroughgood:http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1210&context=jss

2) A short summary project outline, in two parts - Pathways, Processes, Roles and Factors for Terrorist Disengagement, Re-engagement and Recidivism by Altier & Horgan:http://www.icst.psu.edu/docs/2.Brief/ICST.Disengagement.Brief.pdf and http://www.icst.psu.edu/docs/1.Outline/ICST.Diseng.Outline.pdf

SWC have looked at disengagement in Afghanistan and Iraq under different titles, alongside a thread on leaving the Jihad. Good to see some academic rigour appearing, this is a very neglected area of policy and study.

davidbfpo
01-09-2013, 11:59 AM
A curious article from a previously unknown blogsite, but one writer is known to me, so I followed a link to find this on an Australian convert who was radicalised:http://extremisproject.org/2013/01/the-role-of-religion-in-radicalisation-to-violent-islamist-extremism/

I use curious as only one person was interviewed.

It concludes:
Roche’s case also highlights that religion is not necessarily the primary motivator for violent extremism. Roche’s jihadist activities were less a result of his conversion and commitment to Islam and more a factor of his commitment to the group: it was not religious beliefs that prompted and sustained Roche’s level of activity but group loyalty and the personal benefits associated with group membership.

Roche’s trajectory from ‘moderate’ Muslim convert to active JI member suggests that individuals are not necessarily predisposed to radicalisation by virtue of their religious beliefs. Rather, sustained exposure to extremist ideologies and close interaction with radical social groups are the key drivers of radicalisation.

Bill Moore
01-10-2013, 06:48 AM
Tend to agree, it is rarely about the cause, the man, or the ideology, but mostly about group identity. Soldiers, cops, gang members, and other groups with strong bonds should grasp this.

davidbfpo
02-03-2013, 12:26 AM
Violent Canadian extremists are more likely to be citizens than immigrants, according to a “secret” study by the federal intelligence service. And these radicals tend to be relatively young and well-integrated members of society.

These findings appear in “A Study of Radicalization: The Making of Islamist Extremists in Canada Today,” a 21-page study released to The Globe and Mail under the Access to Information Act.

Link to CSIS paper (heavily redacted, more like reading an incomplete jigsaw):http://www.theglobeandmail.com/incoming/article8151644.ece/BINARY/csisradicals_001.pdf and press story:http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/canadian-extremists-more-likely-homegrown-secret-csis-report/article8149887/

Bob's World
02-03-2013, 01:53 PM
#1 radicalizer of insurgents or terrorists? Government.

Everything else is just lubrication and nudges to move those radicals in the direction of one organization or another.

Bill Moore
02-03-2013, 05:45 PM
Did the government radicalize the KKK?

You can't dismiss ethnic terrorism as simply poor governance.

Bob's World
02-04-2013, 02:54 PM
Did the government radicalize the KKK?

You can't dismiss ethnic terrorism as simply poor governance.

Ok, fair enough, let's explore this niche of "ethnic terrorism."

Is this just pure racist violence for the sake of hate, or for some political purpose?

I'm no expert on what the KKK is today, but I believe it began as a political movement among people who shared certain beliefs about the relative roles, abilities, etc between white people and black people.

Or perhaps the persistent back and forth violence between Jews and Muslims in the Middle East? That undercurrent of cultural bias is there, but any of the organizations employing terrorist tactics that I am aware of do so for political purpose.

Or the Catholics and Protestants in N. Ireland?

Like religion, race can be a powerful unifying "ideology" for an insurgent movement.

The world will always have hateful, violent, ignorant people in it. Sometimes those people are in government and organize governments around such concepts. Sometimes they are in organizations that oppose governments and employ terrorist tactics.

But does one really "radicalize" a racist? Aren't they already radicalized by their very upbringing?

Are there many groups conducting race-based violence solely for the purpose or race hating and not for a larger organizational purpose built around some profit or political purpose?

Usually I see the term "radicalization" employed by those who support some system of governance to vilify those who oppose that same system.

I am reminded of a George Carlan comedy routine where he was talking about driving. The speed of any driver is in their mind, the "proper" speed. And when one gets stuck behind someone driving slower they are "an idiot," or passed by someone driving faster they are "a maniac." Of course both the Idiot and the Manic think that it is they who are proper, and to the idiot you are a maniac, and to the manic you are an idiot. Most governments think they are governing at the proper speed, and equally see those different than them as some mix of idiots and maniacs.

Obviously there are many exceptions, but by and large I stand by my assessment that the primary radicalizer of people is governments - after all, it is a label applied by governments thinking they are the ones who are right and the power and authority to deal with those who disagree as they see fit. Many governments deal with such people in a manner that serves to further "radicalize" them and the populaces they come from.

Does anyone think drone strikes are raising feeling of good will toward American governance among the populaces subjected to such attacks? We don't need AQ operatives to "radicalize" people in places like Yemen or the Sahel, we do an outstanding job on our own.

davidbfpo
03-28-2013, 10:38 PM
A seventy page long Dutch report (in English) by Alex Schmid 'Radicalisation, De-Radicalisation, Counter-Radicalisation: A Conceptual Discussion and Literature Review'.

In summary:
Based on an in-depth literature review, ICCT Visiting Research Fellow Dr. Alex P. Schmid explores the terms ‘radicalisation’, ‘de-radicalisation’ and ‘counter-radicalisation’ and the discourses surrounding
them. Much of the literature on radicalisation focuses on Islamist extremism and jihadist terrorism. This is also reflected in this Research Paper which explores the relationship between radicalisation, extremism and terrorism. Historically, ‘radicalism’ – contrary to ‘extremism’ – does not necessarily have negative connotations, nor is it a synonym for terrorism. Schmid argues that both extremism and radicalism can only be properly assessed in relation to what is mainstream political thought in a given period. The paper further explores what we know well and what we know less well about radicalisation. It proposes to explore radicalisation not only on the micro-level of ‘vulnerable individuals’ but also on the meso-level of the ‘radical milieu’ and the macro-level of ‘radicalising public opinion and political parties’. The author reconceptualises radicalisation as a process that can occur on both sides of conflict dyads and challenges several widespread assumptions. The final section examines various counter-radicalisation and deradicalisation programmes. It concludes with a series of policy recommendations.

I went straight to the conclusion, which is worth reading and this point really need to be hammered home, hence my emphasis:
....a goal which has not been reached despite more than ten years of CT efforts, is the formulation of an effective counter-narrative to the single narrative of al-Qaeda and its affiliates which claim that Islam is under attack and defensive Jihad against the West is the obligation of every Muslim.

Link:http://www.icct.nl/download/file/ICCT-Schmid-Radicalisation-De-Radicalisation-Counter-Radicalisation-March-2013.pdf

davidbfpo
04-21-2013, 07:06 PM
This thread has posts on the official Saudi programme to de-radicalise and a clearly PR article by AFP appeared today:http://english.alarabiya.net/en/perspective/2013/04/20/Saudi-opens-luxury-rehab-center-for-Qaeda-militants.html

Three key facts given:
Just under 3,000 [Islamist prisoners] will have to go through one of these centers before they can be released....a total of 2,336 Al-Qaeda prisoners have now been through Saudi rehabilitation schemes....The percentage of those who rejoin the deviant minority does not exceed 10%.

davidbfpo
04-28-2013, 12:36 PM
The effectiveness of official, state sponsored de-radicalization schemes is rarely in the public domain and even more so when it is Singapore, which has had a comprehensive scheme in place for the individuals, with family support:
Susan Sim, noted security analyst from Singapore recently quoted the case of Yazid Sufaat, originally arrested and sentenced for harbouring two 9/11 hijackers in Malaysia prior to the actual attack. He was again arrested in February this year for recruiting Malayans for suicide missions in Syria although he was considered "rehabilitated" after his prison term.

Link:http://www.sunday-guardian.com/analysis/preventive-surveillance-may-not-hinder-terror

davidbfpo
05-05-2013, 06:26 PM
One of the better comments on the, assumed, radicalization of the two suspects by Daveed Gartenstein-Ross:http://thewasat.wordpress.com/2013/05/04/notes-on-the-tsarnaevs-radicalization/

Why this was written:
I wanted to introduce these radicalization models because they will help us to think about the points that follow. But my goal in this entry is not to discuss the merits or shortcomings of existing radicalization models. Rather, I want to outline some aspects of this case that strike me as significant.

This point is often lost in post-attack discussions:
.. it is worth noting that there is a difference between someone holding extremist views and someone being likely to undertake violence.

The author's own website:http://www.daveedgr.com/ and on Wikipedia:http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Daveed_Gartenstein-Ross

davidbfpo
05-09-2013, 10:31 AM
Following the vents in Boston it appears that those academics, analysts and pundits are in full flow. Here is a short commentary by J.M. Berger, via his blog-site Intelwire on 'The Myths of Radicalisation':http://news.intelwire.com/2013/05/myths-of-radicalization.html?utm_source=feedly&m=1


Myth One: Radicalization leads to terrorism; Myth Two: Counterradicalization equals counterterrorism; Myth Three: Radicalization is an issue best addressed by law enforcement; Myth Four: Radicalization is always bad and Myth Five: Because Myths One Through Four Are Myths, Radicalization Doesn't Matter

Myth Four is well pungent:
Martin Luther King Jr. was investigated as a dangerous radical in his day because he advocated racial equality against the social norms of his time. Few people today would defend the law enforcement tactics used against King. In the context of his era, King was radical, but he was also right. Radicals and radicalization can take on many forms, and much of what we consider radical today is also repugnant and regressive. But sometimes radicalism arises to address real problems that are entrenched in society. The verdict of history doesn't always track with the present view. Sometimes societies require radical change, but advocating for such change -- even loudly -- is by no means the same as advocating for violence or terrorism.

A riposte by Jamie Bartlett, of the UK think tank Demos:http://www.demos.co.uk/blog/decouplingradicalisationandterrorism

davidbfpo
05-17-2013, 08:04 PM
Somehow I missed this report being published in January 2012, it is worth a scan as there is a broad range of opinions on radicalization - with a British focus - in the report of the House of Commons Home Affairs Committee 'Roots of violent radicalisation':http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmhaff/1446/1446.pdf

davidbfpo
06-04-2013, 05:58 PM
Link to:
This Insight outlines the work that the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation (ICSR) has undertaken since 2008 which is directly relevant to the government's newly-formed tackling extremism and radicalisation task force.

Link:http://icsr.info/2013/06/icsr-insight-after-woolwich-understanding-and-dismantling-the-conveyor-belt-to-radicalisation/

davidbfpo
07-30-2013, 06:13 PM
A real tour de force by Professor John Horgan, which starts with:
Terrorist deradicalization. What an intriguing idea for a quick fix if ever there was one. Yet never in the history of counter-terrorism has any short-term solution ultimately proven to be more than a naïve pipedream. That is not to suggest that what is commonly called “deradicalization programs” would see themselves as representing a quick fix. But the allure surrounding these creative approaches to counterterrorism has been so powerful that a seeming failure to deliver on the implicit (and vague) promise of “revers[ing] radicalism” has apparently led to a loss of popularity. That may not be a bad thing, but a critical question lingers around whether or not these programs are effective.

Link:http://www.e-ir.info/2013/07/29/fully-operational-the-ongoing-challenges-of-terrorist-risk-reduction-programs/

Effectiveness and value for money he writes cannot be judged as so little independent, academic evaluation has actually happened.

davidbfpo
09-27-2013, 05:54 PM
In mid September 2013 the Qatar Institute Applied Security Studies (QIASS) and the Soufan Group published 'Countering Violent Extremism: The Counter-Narrative Study', it is a lengthy report, 200 pgs, although double-spaced. It was only identified thanks to an Indian contact, who also had a working link:https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/35252063/QIASS%20Counter%20Narratives%20Study%20Report%209% 20Sep%202013.pdf

I have only read the sections on the UK, Northern Ireland and Singapore which is described as:
..the gold standard in counter-radicalization...

Considering the role played today by Qatari state in Syria, providing ample funding to Jihadist groups I do wonder if Admiral Nelson was involved in writing the report.:wry:

davidbfpo
12-10-2013, 09:48 PM
Just as the UK government advocates filtering extremist on-line content up pops Jamie Bartlett of the London-based think tank Demos, in a blog on The Daily Telegraph and mentions how hard this will be:
...there is a bigger problem that no one wants to mention: we still don’t really know whether watching extremist material online actually radicalises people. In my experience, it is not sermons by frothing fundamentalists that radicalise, but mainstream BBC reports about Syria or Palestine.

At the end he writes:
Dealing with extremism is difficult, and on the whole, we’re doing a remarkably good job. The internet is making this a little harder. But in the age of ever-increasing information and openness, reaching for the block button is not the answer.

Link:http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/technology/jamiebartlett/100011712/filtering-islamist-and-far-right-websites-is-a-lousy-idea-heres-why/

Within is a reference and link to a RAND report, based on research in the UK, 'Radicalisation in the digital era: The use of the internet in 15 cases of terrorism and extremism'.

Link:http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR400/RR453/RAND_RR453.pdf

davidbfpo
12-11-2013, 03:59 PM
Published yesterday by the London-based Institute for Strategic Dialogue: 'Review of Programs to Counter Narratives of Violent Extremism: What works and what are the implications for government'. Their explanation:
..it provides an overview of the efforts made to push back on extremist content online, or ‘counter-narratives’. It involved background research and interviews with former violent extremists, policy-makers and civil society activists.

The work was funded by Public Safety Canada. The report is 49 pgs, cases studies amount to half. Link:http://www.strategicdialogue.org/CounterNarrativesFN2011.pdf

After years of national and international counter-terrorist action it is remarkable that the report's summary states:
It is important to stress that counter-narrative work as an area of public policy is in it's infancy.

Short of time? There is a short article by Rachel Briggs (co-author) here:http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/sebastien-feve/tackling-extremism_b_4397982.html

Bob's World
12-12-2013, 02:36 PM
A real tour de force by Professor John Horgan, which starts with:

Link:http://www.e-ir.info/2013/07/29/fully-operational-the-ongoing-challenges-of-terrorist-risk-reduction-programs/

Effectiveness and value for money he writes cannot be judged as so little independent, academic evaluation has actually happened.

David,

I would offer that "de-radicalization" is not a successful solution to terrorism simply because "radicalization" is not the cause of terrorism.

Terrorism is a political weapon that is employed when legal political methods are either unavailable or ineffective. We need to focus on the politics that energize the systems, not the methodologies employed to recruit from energized populations, or the tactics employed by "politicians" (terrorists) denied effective, legal means to relieve negative political energy that has developed within some population.

We also need to stop being so distracted by the "solutions" offered by the groups that emerge to tap into this political energy. We are too quick to think of those proposed, and often "radical" solutions as the problem. They rarely are the problem at all. But they do distract us from the problem of politics that is energizing the population to provide a source of sanctuary, support, personnel, etc to such movements that promise change.

davidbfpo
12-12-2013, 11:07 PM
David,

I would offer that "de-radicalization" is not a successful solution to terrorism simply because "radicalization" is not the cause of terrorism.

Terrorism is a political weapon that is employed when legal political methods are either unavailable or ineffective. We need to focus on the politics that energize the systems, not the methodologies employed to recruit from energized populations, or the tactics employed by "politicians" (terrorists) denied effective, legal means to relieve negative political energy that has developed within some population.

We also need to stop being so distracted by the "solutions" offered by the groups that emerge to tap into this political energy. We are too quick to think of those proposed, and often "radical" solutions as the problem. They rarely are the problem at all. But they do distract us from the problem of politics that is energizing the population to provide a source of sanctuary, support, personnel, etc to such movements that promise change.

Bob,

You raise fundamental issues around how Western liberal democracies respond to terrorist campaigns. My main focus has been the UK, with some knowledge of a few other, mainly Western countries. I now you take a wider viewpoint.

Maybe there is a distinct difference between 'de' and 'counter' radicalization, for my purposes here today there is none. To be fair the UK has always referred to counter-radicalization.

When the UK state designed its national CT strategy, known as 'Operation Contest', the standard themes of Pursue, Plan and Prepare had a fourth 'p' Prevent - into which counter-radicalization dropped. The main author, Sir David Omand, has stated Prevent was very much an after-thought.

Prevent, with 'counter' action, was seen IMHO as a method of responding to the national government's perception that a significant minority were or had been radicalised to accept, if not use terrorism within the UK primarily. It was and is seen as legitimating the other 'P's.

I do differ from you that:
Terrorism is a political weapon that is employed when legal political methods are either unavailable or ineffective.

Terrorism is a political weapon and tactic used by determined minorities, who rarely wish to engage in legal politics when violence starts to be used. It is not - in the West - that political methods are unavailable or ineffective. Such minorities know their cause has very limited appeal and they will not get political power via the ballot box. They expect terror will lead to fear and their aims will - one day - be achieved.

Western Europe in the 1970-80's had a succession of such minority groups choosing terrorism; 'The Angry Brigade' here, the RAF or Baader-Meinhof gang in Germany and the 'Red Brigades' in Italy come to mind. Both the IRA and ETA eventually opted for the "Armalite and the ballot box", in the knowledge their cause(s) resonated within part of the nation-state.

From my perspective the jihadists, as seen with AQ plus, have not considered - where there is a political option - using 'legal politics'. They believe such politics is not for them, for a variety of reasons, including their interpretation of Islam.

In the UK context the jihadist cause resonates within a tiny minority. Now whether 'Prevent' has worked is a very moot point, I would argue it has done more damage than good. It is a quirk of modern British demography that "new" communities, not exclusively Muslim, were found in polling recently to be more loyal to our institutions and ways than the "old" nation.

SWJ Blog
02-19-2014, 07:21 PM
The Process of Radicalization (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/the-process-of-radicalization)

Entry Excerpt:



--------
Read the full post (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/the-process-of-radicalization) and make any comments at the SWJ Blog (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog).
This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.

davidbfpo
03-24-2014, 11:15 PM
More of a bibliography than a review article, but useful enough and appears to be very up to date on CVE:https://medium.com/p/5696616d8f0c

davidbfpo
06-04-2014, 06:30 PM
Actually the full title was 'Syria on our minds – fear of youth radicalisation across the European Union'. It is a report by four authors for the European Parliament and this is a link to a short article on it:http://www.opendemocracy.net/didier-bigo-francesco-ragazzi-emmanuelpierre-guittet-laurent-bonelli/syria-on-our-minds-%E2%80%93-fear-of-yo

A clue as to their views:
As Preventing and countering youth radicalisation in the EU makes clear, European counterterrorist and counter-radicalisation policies not only have the potential to undermine the democratic principles, institutions, and processes they seek to preserve but also to produce unintended consequences; rather than discouraging violence, they may trigger and encourage it. Actually, we may need to be more concerned by trends in European counter-radicalisation policies’, their social and political effects, and their unintended consequences rather than by European citizens heading to Syria who, if they come back, mostly come back disillusioned

davidbfpo
06-27-2014, 08:36 PM
A UK-based academic group, with international members, offers a monthly free e-newsletter:http://www.radicalisationresearch.org/contact/newsletter/

TheCurmudgeon
06-28-2014, 04:19 PM
A UK-based academic group, with international members, offers a monthly free e-newsletter:http://www.radicalisationresearch.org/contact/newsletter/

Thanks.

davidbfpo
08-21-2014, 10:48 PM
A short, detailed article based on an interview of Professor John Horgan, a British psychologist now @ UMass-Lowell:http://nymag.com/scienceofus/2014/08/how-isis-seduces-new-recruits.html

A key point:
They’re offering an opportunity for people to feel powerful. They’re making disillusioned, disaffected radicals feel like they’re doing something truly meaningful with their lives.Are we and others ready for this?
Disillusionment is very, very common in every single terrorist and extremist group you can think of. That’s something that can be very toxic if those accounts get out and gather momentum.

Disillusionment is the most common reason why people voluntarily choose to walk away from a terrorist group. People become disillusioned if they feel that the group has gone too far, if they don’t seem to have a strategy beyond indiscriminate killing. Disillusionment can arise from disagreements with a leader, it can arise from dissatisfaction with the day-to-day minutiae. There are many directions from which disillusionment can arise, and it’s only a matter of time before those accounts leak out from ISIS, and I think we would do very well to be on the lookout for those kinds of accounts, because they offer an opportunity to dissuade further potential recruits from being involved.

Bill Moore
08-25-2014, 11:32 AM
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/08/25/isis-hip-hop-jihadists-and-the-man-who-killed-james-foley.html

ISIS, Hip-Hop Jihadists and the Man Who Killed James Foley

Anthropologist Scott Atran, who is frequently consulted by the U.S. government, has long argued that a jihadist’s motivations cannot be fit within a purely rational framework of costs and benefits, nor can they be understood as utterly irrational. Instead they work within the context of what they come to see as “sacred values,” which may be religious, or may have to do more with honor and respect and, perhaps, what the 18th-century political theorist Edmund Burke called “the sublime”: that “quest for greatness, glory, eternal meaning in an inherently chaotic world,” as Atran says.

“It seems like volunteers for ISIS are surfing for the sublime,” Atran wrote to me on Sunday. They are escaping “the jaded, tired world of democratic liberalism, especially on the margins where Europe’s immigrants mostly live.”

Not everything is governance, religion, or any of the other areas myopic theorists focus on, sometimes is just simple human psychology.

Bob's World
08-25-2014, 04:59 PM
Why any individual is motivated to join the USMC is not why the USMC exists.

Why the USMC is employed to address any particular problem is not why the USMC exists.

To understand why the USMC exists one must study the organization, its history, missions and role in relation to the goals of the US as a whole. The stories of individual Marines, battles and campaigns are interesting, but only lend color, not clarity to the larger question.

We understand this inherently, and yet we continue to agonize over the eaches of any particular individual who decides to throw their support behind a group such as AQ or ISIS in an odd belief that if we understand why individuals join we will somehow be better postured to make the organization as a whole either comply with acceptable social norms or go away in the entirety.

The sum of these many personal stories does not tell the story of why these organizations exist. These stories certainly lend insights, but they equally distract us from reasons much more closely aligned to challenging the activities of those these organizations oppose, than to the promotion of the beliefs or promises these challengers advertise.

Historically there is almost universally a powerful bias of perspective regarding the nature and rationale for revolutionary actors by those these revolutions are directed against. We need to adjust for that bias in our analysis.

Revolutionary activity tends to be far more about the removal of some system of power or governance (often associated with some ideological system of beliefs) deemed as both intolerable and equally something one is now empowered to do something about; than they are about advancing something new and better.

Far easier to get a disparate group to agree that the status quo is intolerable, than it is to get them to agree to some future solution. Thus the chaos that typically follows a wholesale regime change, regardless of how bad or evil that previous regime might have been.

Revolution creates the chaos opportunity is made of - the problem is that so many line up to seize that opportunity, and typically not with the good of the many as their prime directive.

Bill Moore
08-25-2014, 05:18 PM
Why any individual is motivated to join the USMC is not why the USMC exists.

Why the USMC is employed to address any particular problem is not why the USMC exists.

To understand why the USMC exists one must study the organization, its history, missions and role in relation to the goals of the US as a whole. The stories of individual Marines, battles and campaigns are interesting, but only lend color, not clarity to the larger question.

We understand this inherently, and yet we continue to agonize over the eaches of any particular individual who decides to throw their support behind a group such as AQ or ISIS in an odd belief that if we understand why individuals join we will somehow be better postured to make the organization as a whole either comply with acceptable social norms or go away in the entirety.

The sum of these many personal stories does not tell the story of why these organizations exist. These stories certainly lend insights, but they equally distract us from reasons much more closely aligned to challenging the activities of those these organizations oppose, than to the promotion of the beliefs or promises these challengers advertise.

Historically there is almost universally a powerful bias of perspective regarding the nature and rationale for revolutionary actors by those these revolutions are directed against. We need to adjust for that bias in our analysis.

Revolutionary activity tends to be far more about the removal of some system of power or governance (often associated with some ideological system of beliefs) deemed as both intolerable and equally something one is now empowered to do something about; than they are about advancing something new and better.

Far easier to get a disparate group to agree that the status quo is intolerable, than it is to get them to agree to some future solution. Thus the chaos that typically follows a wholesale regime change, regardless of how bad or evil that previous regime might have been.

Revolution creates the chaos opportunity is made of - the problem is that so many line up to seize that opportunity, and typically not with the good of the many as their prime directive.

Despite how intelligent this analysis appears on the surface it is deeply flawed when it is applied to ISIS. Apply to the Kurds and it fits perfectly. ISIS is not popular, and they're not focused on removing so much as focused on imposing their form of governance regardless of what the masses desire. It is obviously true that existing governments can and do create conditions that enable these movements to gain steam, but that doesn't mean the existing form of governance is the "sole" problem and that this morally justifies ISIS/ISIL's activities and intent. What is also true is we have our strategy must address protecting our interested (interests can be debated) and our citizens (not debatable), and if we sincerely believe ISIS/ISIL is a threat then there is a moral obligation to act. How we act to protect those interests must be informed by a wide range of factors, and it doesn't necessarily mean military action, nor does it mean we always must address the core underlying issues that are frankly beyond our control.

Iraq, Yemen, Somalia, etc. all have ineffectively executed governance and created an ecosystem that AQism groups can exploit, but that does not make their movements popular or just. If our interests our threatened, we merely need to protect our interests in the short run and stop fooling ourselves that we have the power to solve the deeper issues of inappropriate borders, ethnic hatred, etc. Limited objectives should be our guiding light, not social-political reform, that aspect belongs to the indigenous people.

davidbfpo
09-25-2014, 11:03 PM
A short UK article that starts with:
Young British Muslims whose families have lived in the UK for generations are more at risk of radicalisation than recent migrants to Britain, according to new research which reveals the common characteristics of those most vulnerable to recruitment by terrorists.

Suffering from depression, being financially comfortable and being socially isolated were also common factors amongst those sympathising with terrorism, the University of London study found.

The author is Professor Kamaldeep Bhui, lead author of the study and professor of cultural psychiatry and epidemiology at Queen Mary University of London said:
The relationship between radicalisation and mental health is complex but we now know depression, alongside poor social networks and isolation, does play a role in vulnerability to radicalisation.

Link to newspaper report:http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/radicalised-muslims-in-uk-more-likely-to-be-wellheeled-9754062.html

This C4 News (TV) report has a little more information:http://www.channel4.com/news/islamic-state-depression-radicalisation-jihadi-uk-research

Finally found the actual research paper 'Might Depression, Psychosocial Adversity, and Limited Social Assets Explain Vulnerability to and Resistance against Violent Radicalisation?' on an open access e-journal:http://www.plosone.org/article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pone.0105918

davidbfpo
10-05-2014, 06:30 PM
In an open letter to IS jihadists Maajid Nawaz, a former radical Muslim, speaks to them in their own language. Whether the desired audience reads The Daily Beast I think unlikely, so maybe SM will reach out.

A brave move, timely as today one UK paper reported a hundred former fighters had exited, planning to go the countries of their parents origin or stuck in limbo unable to return to the UK.

Link:http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/09/10/an-ex-radical-s-open-letter-to-isis-fighters-quit-now-while-you-can.html

There are three current threads on foreign fighters, but his letter deserves a read. You never know his message might come in useful to understand their faith, fanaticism and fears now of the Islamic State jihadis.

Nawaz is hardly unknown to many of them I expect, he has been a prominient counter-radical voice, although often criticised for his associations and views by fellow, non-radical Muslims. He is the chair of the Quilliam Foundation:http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/

davidbfpo
10-06-2014, 11:18 AM
This is a far better, shorter question for aspiring jihadists, my emphasis:
We have to disassociate from the two words Islamic and State...There is nothing Islamic about these individuals, nor is it a state. My question to these young people [who might be sympathetic to Isis] is simple: who is living closer to the message of the Qur'an? Is it Isis, or is it somebody like Alan Henning?

The speaker is a well known Muslim civic leader from Leicester:http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/oct/05/isis-murder-alan-henning-british-muslim-community?

AdamG
10-11-2014, 02:15 PM
So compared to the glory of combat (shrouded in the tapestry of Jihad) that applies to youts' worldwide, the sense of fulfillment to a higher calling (see also Jihad) and the monthly stipends (thanks to a currently-unnamed Gulf State or two), what exactly is he offering as an alternative?

davidbfpo
10-28-2014, 01:03 PM
A short article with links to the areas covered:http://digest.bps.org.uk/2014/10/the-psychology-of-violent-extremism.html

OldyButGoodie
11-01-2014, 07:48 PM
Religious Fundamentalism is not explainable. It is a failure of reason. It is also distinct from faith which is a triumph of reason. ISIS cannot be understood or reasoned with. They are not curable. When fundamentalists choose to proselytize they should have full freedom to do so. On the other hand, proselytizing with a gun or very long knife should quickly result in the use of prevailing violence to those so armed.

TheCurmudgeon
11-01-2014, 10:29 PM
Religious Fundamentalism is not explainable. It is a failure of reason. It is also distinct from faith which is a triumph of reason. ISIS cannot be understood or reasoned with. They are not curable. When fundamentalists choose to proselytize they should have full freedom to do so. On the other hand, proselytizing with a gun or very long knife should quickly result in the use of prevailing violence to those so armed.

I am curious how you see faith as the "triumph of reason"?

All religions of every religious strip rely on faith, and not reason, to justify their beliefs. Fundamentalist, regardless of religion, take that faith to the level of addiction. It replaces reason in their lives. But it is not the religion that is the problem. It is the deep seeded need. It is a desire for a purpose to life.

So while I agree that you cannot reason with a religious zealot, I do believe that they can come to their senses on their own, once they realize that that level of fundamentalism does not fill the void either, if they ever come to that realization.

OldyButGoodie
11-01-2014, 10:44 PM
Curmudgeon. More accurately, faith for me in particular has been a reasoning process. And I have spent enormous effort trying to reach a shared reasoning with the zealots with out much success. Although, to your point, there has been some. They probably claim some success with me as well.

My real point was that the Islamic State has made it undeniable that reason has no interest for them.

OldyButGoodie
11-01-2014, 11:21 PM
A short article with links to the areas covered:http://digest.bps.org.uk/2014/10/the-psychology-of-violent-extremism.html

Certainly interesting. As I read history, this process is not limited to a small group of close friends. Whole nations can and have made a "Risky Shift". Germany, Cambodia, Rwanda, and others. At large scales, these shifts look very much like self-determination.

Here's the question: If self determination leads to a nation or people bent on world conquest or tribal slaughter, must that self-determination be respected?

davidbfpo
11-02-2014, 11:10 AM
Certainly interesting. As I read history, this process is not limited to a small group of close friends. Whole nations can and have made a "Risky Shift". Germany, Cambodia, Rwanda, and others. At large scales, these shifts look very much like self-determination.

Here's the question: If self determination leads to a nation or people bent on world conquest or tribal slaughter, must that self-determination be respected?

Your question, if worded differently, regularly appears here on SWC. I recall discussions over R2P (Right to Protect) and Mass Atrocities (usually with an African setting). Rwanda crops up too IIRC.

The world remains imperfect, but there is some form of concensus that genocide should be responded to - Darfur comes to mind and the LRA's longterm campaign of murder plus. It is a political decision of course, as non-state responses are rarely, if ever, effective.

Respecting 'self-determination' now that is a question that Bill C. often raises, usually on SWJ, about the American wish to pursue its own values beyond its shores: free trade, markets, democracy etc.

davidbfpo
11-13-2014, 05:19 PM
A lengthy article in The Guardian, on the city of Aarhus programme. Citing an academic psychologist
Look: these are young people struggling with pretty much the same issues as any others – getting a grip on their lives, making sense of things, finding a meaningful place in society. We have to say: provided you have done nothing criminal, we will help you to find a way back.

(Citing a local police officer) What’s easyis to pass tough new laws. Harder is to go through a real process with individuals: a panel of experts, counselling, healthcare, assistance getting back into education, with employment, maybe accommodation. With returning to everyday life and society. We don’t do this out of political conviction; we do it because we think it works.Link:http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/nov/12/deradicalise-isis-fighters-jihadists-denmark-syria?CMP=twt_gu

Added. A short three minute BBC News report:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-30045214

davidbfpo
11-29-2014, 02:07 PM
A three part, superb Der Spiegel article:http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/why-young-germany-are-answering-call-to-war-in-syria-a-1003468.html

The actual title is: The Jihad Cult: Why Young Germans Are Answering Call to Holy War.

Full of good quotes on how to understand why.

SWJ Blog
12-13-2014, 12:17 AM
Prisons and Radicalization (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/prisons-and-radicalization)

Entry Excerpt:



--------
Read the full post (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/prisons-and-radicalization) and make any comments at the SWJ Blog (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog).
This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.

davidbfpo
01-13-2015, 02:27 PM
Parents in The Netherlands worried their boys and girls will join the ranks of ISIS now have a place to call.
Link:http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/01/13/who-to-call-when-your-kid-wages-jihad.html?

A nice, simple step - a hotline for help. Sadly it took till 2015 to arrive.

davidbfpo
01-14-2015, 04:18 PM
An Australian academic's contributution, which is entitled as above and sub-titled:
There is no empirical evidence that religion and ideology are primary motivators for violent extremism. Radicalisation is a social issue
Link:http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/jan/14/the-role-of-islam-in-radicalisation-is-grossly-overestimated

It is a very good contribution IMHO.

davidbfpo
01-22-2015, 01:52 PM
A useful contribution via WoTR by Lorenzo Vidrino, a European SME, which will be copied to the Paris attacks thread too: 'Wrong assumptions, integration, responsibility and counterterrorism in France':http://warontherocks.com/2015/01/wrong-assumptions-integration-responsibility-and-counterterrorism-in-france/?singlepage=1

This passage needs some explanation or sources, with my emphasis:
On the other side, the rhetoric (particularly in some quarters of the U.S. debate) about the French suburbs (banlieues) often populated by large minority communities) is largely exaggerated. It is undeniable that areas like Les Minguettes in Venissieux (Lyon) or Clichy sous Bois (outside of Paris) are not exactly St. Tropez or central Paris. But they are not the lawless and squalid “no-go” zones they are often made out to be. In fact, based on crime rates, health care, education, and public transportation, the banlieues are actually significantly better off than neglected cities and communities in the United States.

davidbfpo
02-13-2015, 09:49 PM
A short article prepared by Professor Daniel Byman for the CVE conference on February 18th @ The White House. Nicely put:http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/five-myths-about-violent-extremism/2015/02/13/2dc72786-b215-11e4-827f-93f454140e2b_story.html

One point is about Europe, which ends with:
Europe’s bigger problem is the divide between its Muslim and non-Muslim communities. This is less about counterterrorism and more about the need for better political and economic integration.

This article, with useful diagrams, helps to set the context in the UK:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/immigration/11409181/Worried-about-Muslims-in-Britain-Heres-the-answer.html

Bob's World
02-14-2015, 05:05 PM
David, the type of self determination we are talking about among disaffected European Muslims is not that of a nation of people seeking governance determined by themselves rather than some foreign, and therefore illegitimate, power.

What we are talking about is a vital sub-set of that same principle - one I think of as Empowerment.

For me, this is belief that I and a critical segment of the population that I identify with, have available to us trusted, certain and legal means to participate fairly and adequately in the political process of the place we live. This is heavily colored by cultural expectations and perception.

This is why one cornerstone of the US civil rights reforms of the 1960s was the Voting Rights Acts. That was what we needed in the US at that time to begin creating a sense of empowerment, and why there was such a powerful reaction when President Obama was elected.

davidbfpo
02-14-2015, 08:57 PM
David, the type of self determination we are talking about among disaffected European Muslims is not that of a nation of people seeking governance determined by themselves rather than some foreign, and therefore illegitimate, power.

What we are talking about is a vital sub-set of that same principle - one I think of as Empowerment.

For me, this is belief that I and a critical segment of the population that I identify with, have available to us trusted, certain and legal means to participate fairly and adequately in the political process of the place we live. This is heavily colored by cultural expectations and perception.

This is why one cornerstone of the US civil rights reforms of the 1960s was the Voting Rights Acts. That was what we needed in the US at that time to begin creating a sense of empowerment, and why there was such a powerful reaction when President Obama was elected.

Bob,

My remarks only refer to the UK, not Europe.

'Disaffected Muslims' are a very small minority, within whom some have been and are being radicalised to use violence abroad and at home. They already have access to power here, but remain a minority and the majority appear to have rejected their demands. How can these people be empowered further?

One issue is that the 'disaffected Muslims' have failed to mobilise other Muslims. Nor are British Muslims a coherent group, except when practising their faith. There is no single, legimitimate public body to represent them for example. Many Muslims, especially those of Kashmiri / Pakistani origin, supported the Labour Party and generally remain loyal, if reluctant voters.

If you compare the influence the British Jewish community (which is more cohesive, but not always united) has on UK politics it is far greater than that the Muslim communities have - this is very noticeable in the two main parties in parliament.

We know what the jihadists and their non-violent followers seek already. First and foremost that the UK radically changes its foreign policy, for example ending support for the USA. Their goal of a society that turns to a particular school of Muslim thought and practice - would require them to be a majority, which is simply hard to imagine.

Bob's World
02-14-2015, 11:11 PM
The demands of the vocal few rarely reflect the reasonable concerns of the groups the claim to represent. One must look past the noise to hear the sounds that really matter. One also must attempt to step back from the bias of their own perspective to hear those sounds clearly.

Too often what I see is a highly biased listener who is overly focused on the express words of that vocal few.

(My own Yank bias showing - didn't realize the UK was not part of Europe). ��

davidbfpo
02-14-2015, 11:44 PM
The demands of the vocal few rarely reflect the reasonable concerns of the groups the claim to represent. One must look past the noise to hear the sounds that really matter. One also must attempt to step back from the bias of their own perspective to hear those sounds clearly.

Too often what I see is a highly biased listener who is overly focused on the express words of that vocal few.

(My own Yank bias showing - didn't realize the UK was not part of Europe). ��

My caveat maybe a bias, but I cannot reasonably comment on the situation in Europe on these issues.

You can make a good case that the UK is struggling to adjust at home to the changes seen in the last forty years and that the 'disaffected' are legion, not just Muslims. The far larger disaffected pool can be seen in many ways: declining political participation, single issue pressure groups, the call for independence, ineffective governance and more. Rarely spoken about has been a steady rate of emigration, so Brits make up one of the largest expat communities - IIRC second after Mexicans.

Some see similar patterns in the USA - which has found expressions on SWC before in at least one thread, if not more.

A small group of Muslims in favour of the violent jihad exploit that within their own communities as they have no traction beyond. Their activities have led to arguably greater security and less liberty - which affects all citizens, not just the 'disaffected' or Muslims alone.

Firn
02-16-2015, 05:00 PM
The Danish security forces are of course for obvious reasons still stilent on many aspects of the latest attacks so there are many blanks yet to be filled. It seems that the terrorist was born in Denmark as a son of Palistinian immigrants. He was possibly radicalized in jail (http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-31485086) but it is of course early days:



Michael Gjorup, head of the country's prison and probation service, told Danish media that authorities were concerned about changes in El-Hussein's behaviour in prison and passed on information to Danish intelligence before the attack.

The head of Danish intelligence, Jens Madsen, acknowledged that El-Hussein had been "on the radar" of his services.

Mr Madsen said investigators were working on the theory that he could have been inspired by the shootings in Paris last month.

The story of a criminal of arabic descent, Islamic faith and a background of violence becoming a terrorist sounds quite familiar. It is obviously important to point out the tiny amount of terror attacks compared to the population(s) as a whole.


Some also put flowers at the place where police shot the suspect dead. One told Danish TV2: "I did it because I am Muslim and because I knew him."

I'm pretty sure that the persons with question will get checked. As I stated before such signals given by the persons themselves mean that they are far more likely to be a potential threat as a person from the same demographic background. However as the terrorist in question has shown even if somebody is on the radar for excellent reasons due to some big red flags attacks can still happen.

P.S: Once again the internet dragnet by Western intelligence played seemingly no part in flagging the terrorist.

Bob's World
02-16-2015, 05:12 PM
So, just curious, what percentage of American colonists in support of revolution were "radicalized" by the words of Sam Adams and Thomas Paine; versus those who were radicalized by the actions of British governance and discrimination?

Was this man radicalized while he was in prison, or because of why he perceived he was in prison??

Firn
02-16-2015, 05:37 PM
Was this man radicalized while he was in prison, or because of why he perceived he was in prison??

Perhaps we will never know but I'm pretty sure this is a question which gets asked in Western security services.

The Guardian has a short profile (http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/feb/16/copenhagen-shooting-suspect-omar-el-hussein-a-past-full-of-contradictions) which as often asks more question then it gives answers.


Past the children’s play areas of the estate, Emilie Hansson, 26, who is half Swedish, said she knew El-Hussein and had seen him at the estate last week. She said: “For me he’s not a terrorist. He’s someone who felt finished with life and decided to go out with a big bang.” An 18-year-old at school nearby said he thought those who knew El-Hussein had been shocked he could have carried out the attacks.

He had certainly some of the more common traits of European citiziens going to Syria. Perhaps most importantly he was an unemployed young loser of Islamic faith with a certain ethnic and criminal background.

davidbfpo
02-16-2015, 06:19 PM
Firn,

On Twitter there were several references to this man being involved a random act of violence, possibly with a knife and he was released two weeks ago after serving an incredibly short jail sentence.

On my second reading The Guardian does refer to this:
where he was serving a two-year sentence for stabbing a 19-year-old man on Copenhagen’s inner-city train system. He had been released from prison only two weeks before the attacks in Copenhagen this weekend.

Wiki has this:
he only served one year out of his two year prison sentence

Firn
02-16-2015, 07:39 PM
Without knowing the circumstances one year does seem indeed little, especially if his change in behaviour in prison brought him seemingly on the radar of the Danish security services. Lots of speculation of course.

An important aspect of the two recent attacks is in my humble opinion is the use of (illegal) automatic rifles. As I wrote before gun violence in Europe is very rare, especially the use of (semi)automatic rifles. In the US handguns dominate, on a considerable higher overall level, gun violence as well. Keep in mind that in many European countries access to semiautomatic rifles on military patterns is quite easy, for example in Italy (http://www.bignami.it/en/target-shooting/prodotti-en/?cat0=100&cat1=288). Objectively the majority of the population can buy such weapons with practically zero problems. This might surprise some, personally I 'found out' about that aspect only after the Sandy Hook Shooting. (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sandy_Hook_Elementary_School_shooting) Keep in mind that I hunt, so maybe I should have known better.

So far I read little about the origin of the weapons as the security forces are clearly trying to map out their trails.

Bob's World
02-17-2015, 07:07 AM
The greasegun is a super cheap .45 cal submachine gun developed by the US to arm revolutionary and resistance fighters with who's actions we thought would advance our interests. We did not radicalize those fighters, that had already been accomplished by the occupying powers and the illegitimate regimes established by those powers to support their agendas.

Point being, who gave this guy a weapon is interesting, but it doesn't have much to do with why he used it.

davidbfpo
02-18-2015, 10:21 PM
The much-hyped White House CVE conference has led to many comments and one Tweet just saying it was a chaotic meeting!

Yassin Musharbash, a German-Jordanian, has a comment on an important aspect 'A few Thoughts on "Counter Narratives" and "Counter Messaging:
....radicalization can be the result of frustration over not having been able to achieve anything through political activism. But that's not the case, apparently. What we see instead is that many of those who end up waging war in Syria have been radicalized at a dramatic speed. As if there had been a vacuum that needed to be filled as quickly as possible.

In fact, I think this is actually what happens. Many of those who radicalize do it because the ideology of Jihadism offers them simple and all-encompassing answers to all their questions and problems - and it instills them with a deep sense of purpose and meaning, something most other ideas on offer seem to be failing at.
Link:http://abususu.blogspot.de/2015/02/a-few-thoughts-on-counter-narratives.html

The official WH public statement:http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/02/18/fact-sheet-white-house-summit-countering-violent-extremism

Clint Watts asks 'What should we expect? More of the same or a new direction to counter ISIS?' and he ends asking for a few simple tools:
... creativity, a credit card, and some film students.
Link:http://www.fpri.org/geopoliticus/2015/02/white-house-cve-summit-what-should-we-expect-more-same-or-new-direction-counter-isis#.VOTlax7UfUE.linkedin

Two useful tables
http://www.fpri.org/docs/screen_shot_2015-02-18_at_11.55.37_am.png

http://www.fpri.org/docs/screen_shot_2015-02-18_at_11.55.27_am.png

Bob's World
02-19-2015, 03:32 AM
The ideology has been there for 15 years, but now suddenly 20,000 pack up and go.

Is it so hard to accept that it is the mission that is the draw, and not the message?

I think Western egos can accept that so many have been brainwashed, but can't accept that so many see the Sunni-Shia competition for influence as so incredibly vital with clear eyes and mind.

We need to wake up and clear our own eyes and minds as to the nature of the problem.

davidbfpo
02-20-2015, 10:58 PM
The ideology has been there for 15 years, but now suddenly 20,000 pack up and go.

Is it so hard to accept that it is the mission that is the draw, and not the message?

I think Western egos can accept that so many have been brainwashed, but can't accept that so many see the Sunni-Shia competition for influence as so incredibly vital with clear eyes and mind.

We need to wake up and clear our own eyes and minds as to the nature of the problem.

Bob,

The estimated 20,000 that have gone to Iraq / Syria to join the fighting and possibly many to Daesh (ISIS) should be compared to the flow of foreign fighters to Afghanistan in the Soviet era and to Bosnia-Herzogovina afterwards. I cannot now recall any reliable numbers.

A swift search found an article by Thomas Hegghammer. He estimated 5-20k in Afghanistan (1980-1992) and 1-2k in Bosnia (1992-1995). Another paper refers to 3-5k in Bosnia. See:http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/The_Rise_of_Muslim_Foreign_Fighters.pdf

Personally I think many went in the early part of the Syrian civil war to defend fellow Muslims from a violent tyranny. Anecdote here is that the UK government's contradictory stance over Libya acted as a factor.

Is it the message that motivates the aspiring fighters to go, but after arrival it is the mission?

I have yet to read a study that estimates how many are with Daesh and non-Daesh groups.

davidbfpo
02-20-2015, 11:03 PM
ICSR have provided an abbreviated version of Peter R. Neumann remarks at the CVE Summit:http://icsr.info/2015/02/icsr-insight-professor-neumanns-remarks-white-house-summit/

He highlights three issues, cited in part:
Parents are our strongest allies, they need to be helped and empowered.

The internet is the most powerful tool that ever existed for promoting ideas – good ideas and bad ideas. But right now, we’ve handed over that tool to the extremists.

There’s an uncomfortable truth for my European compatriots. However different the foreign fighters that my colleagues and I have found, what many, if not most of them, had in common is that they didn’t feel they had a stake in their societies. They sometimes felt that, because of who they are, how they look and where they come from, they weren’t part of us, that they’d never succeed.

Bob's World
02-21-2015, 12:40 PM
We need to appreciate the powerful effect of the identity-based populations that every person has. If a person identifies with some issue or cause, they become a member of a distributed population who also identify with that same issue. Each person is a member of literally thousands of these populations, and has their own priority for how they value these identities relative to each other.

The most important identities are those a person is willing to kill or die for. If I identify as a Sunni and prioritize identity I would reasonably see joining ISIS as a way to help preserve and advance issues critical to that identity. If I return home to perceived discrimination by my nation because i am a member of that Sunni population i have an internal crisis i must resolve. I will reasonably come to value my Sunni identity over my national identity (as most religious people of any ilk do).

This isn't voodoo magic or mass brainwashing - it is just common sense and human nature. None of that validates acts of terrorism, but when legal and less drastic approaches are either denied or ineffective in addressing the perceived grievances, people of every culture historically will ultimately act out.

davidbfpo
02-22-2015, 06:00 PM
Well The White House CVE summit has set off a host of comments, Peter Bergen's piece for CNN for example:http://edition.cnn.com/2015/02/19/opinion/bergen-terrorism-root-causes/index.html


Indeed, New America has studied the backgrounds (http://securitydata.newamerica.net/extremists/analysis) of some 250 U.S.-based militants since 9/11 who have been indicted in or convicted of some kind of jihadist terrorist crime. They are on average middle class, reasonably well-educated family men with kids. They are, in short, ordinary Americans....Post-9/11 research demonstrating that Islamist terrorism is mostly a pursuit of the middle class.

So if it's clearly not deprivation that is driving much Islamist terrorism, what is?

Bob's World
02-22-2015, 10:19 PM
The US founders were not deprived either, but they burned at the disrespect levied against them their fellow British citizens who officially and in practice deemed Colonists inferior due merely for where they were born.

They came to not recognize the right of a distant King and his Governors the Colonists had no say in the selection of to govern them.

This is not about money or religion, this is a fundamental human nature response to injustice and disrespect. Everyone needs to stop looking for ways to fix those who are acting out against governance, and instead ask what it is about that governance that is so provocative to the identity-based populations they are emerging from.

Bill Moore
02-22-2015, 10:53 PM
Well The White House CVE summit has set off a host of comments, Peter Bergen's piece for CNN for example:

David,

We have perpetuated this myth to the point it is widely perceived as fact. We have done this for terrorists and insurgents by cherry picking comments from selected detainees or interviews with others, while ignoring the overwhelming evidence that people for fight the reasons Bob points too.

When we deceive ourselves and develop strategies to counter so called radicalization we end up developing plans based on false assumptions.

Providing jobs may or may not be a humanitarian act (it has been demonstrated our aid programs in the past have stunted economic growth in some countries) we want to pursue, of course we seem to forget that people want jobs that provide personal satisfaction, not working for pennies a day developing a road we're paying for.

Economic development is important for a lot of reasons, but we need to stop confusing it with the sole reason people take up arms.

davidbfpo
03-14-2015, 10:16 PM
Unusual report from the Lebanon:
Armed with their black veils, open ears and expertise in forensic psychology, two young Saudi-raised Lebanese sisters spend hours each week tapping deep into the lives and minds of terrorists of the Islamic State (IS), al-Qaeda and other groups imprisoned in Lebanon's notorious Roumieh prison.
Link:http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/03/terrorism-social-work-jihadist-profile-roumieh-prison.html?

davidbfpo
04-08-2015, 11:56 AM
A provocative article, which opens with:
More than thirteen years after the U.S. intelligence community named the prevention of terrorism its number one goal, it seems to have little understanding (http://www.nybooks.com/blogs/nyrblog/2014/dec/02/isis-what-us-doesnt-understand/) of what drives terrorism, or how to counter (http://www.stripes.com/news/middle-east/in-campaign-against-terrorism-us-enters-period-of-pessimism-and-gloom-1.333328) it. And, if the recently increasing (http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/08/opinion/sunday/where-terrorism-research-went-wrong.html) criticism (http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/09546553.2014.895649) is correct, the government’s investment in academic terrorism research isn’t helping. It may be because the government is continuing (https://ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/sl001152.pdf) to fund research supporting discredited theories (http://mabonline.net/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/Claystone-rethinking-radicalisation.pdf)of terrorist radicalization, rather than objective empirical analyses (http://www.safire-project-results.eu/documents/focus/22.pdf).
Link:http://justsecurity.org/21823/flawed-terrorism-research-driving-flawed-counterterrorism-policies/

This is not a problem confined to the USA.

The short podcast with Arun Kundani is worth listening to.

davidbfpo
04-26-2015, 01:16 PM
This week the UN Security Council held an open session on radicalisation, amidst the official and academic speakers was Scott Atran, whose work has been cited on SWC before.

Link:http://www.huffingtonpost.com/scott-atran/violent-extremism-social-science_b_7142604.html

omarali50
06-16-2015, 07:14 PM
A new post about the :Myth of Radicalisation" (comment on article from Spike)

http://brownpundits.blogspot.com/2015/06/myths-of-radicalisation.html

davidbfpo
06-16-2015, 07:29 PM
Earlier today I read a parallel article by Yahya Birt, a British Muslim convert, admittedly the catalyst being a recent, un-seen TV programme:https://yahyabirt1.wordpress.com/2015/06/16/this-dance-between-extremists-and-formers-is-past-its-sell-by-date-a-review-of-itvs-jihad-documentary/

Two passages:
Former extremists dramatize their personal stories to overshadow all of our community’s multifarious and untold human stories to feed a dominant meme of the post-9/11 world: namely, that this complex geopolitical crisis is really all about maladjusted Muslim men.

(Ends with) We all really need to step back and have a more honest and searching debate if we are to have any chance of getting purchase on the perplexing and frightening problem of ISIS’s current success and appeal.

davidbfpo
07-14-2015, 12:29 PM
A provocative WoTR article by a former USG CVE SME:http://warontherocks.com/2015/07/countering-islamic-state-recruitment-youre-doing-it-totally-wrong/?singlepage=1


In a CVE context, pushing back on terrorist narratives makes intuitive sense ― it’s a way of exposing falsehoods in a very public forum. But does it work? Research has shown that when you’re trying to convince people, facts don’t matter (http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2011/03/denial-science-chris-mooney). We seem to understand this in domestic politics, but not in CVE. Appealing to an individual’s value system is the most effective way to change opinions and spur people to action. This is because humans have evolved to push “threatening information” away (http://media.wix.com/ugd/fa8393_6973c3639e3c4bdfa2908cab10587cf4.pdf) in favor of information that confirms their own beliefs. In this way, humans apply the same concept of “fight or flight” to the intake of information. And there are neuroscientific explanations (https://books.google.com/books?id=bfqsAAAAQBAJ&pg=PA157&lpg=PA157&dq=head+and+heart+in+preventing+religious+radicali zation,+sara+savage&source=bl&ots=J1gWiFWqOo&sig=xp_yFxcQ8lPW_lv3jevrI61raB4&hl=en&sa=X&ei=9bz4VIDbB4HYggSomoSYAQ&ved=0CCQQ6AEwAQ#v=onepage&q=head%20and%20heart%20in%20preventing%20religious %20radicalization%2C%20sara%20savage&f=false) as to how this happens: When humans feel stress or feel threatened, the blood flow in the brain moves away from the neocortex, the site of higher-order thinking, and toward the limbic system, the more automatic and primitive site of our thinking. The movement of blood flow in this situation renders humans physically less capable of thinking in more nuanced and complex terms, and this has further consequences. Conflict is more likely to ensue (http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1253&context=jss&sei-redir=1&referer=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.google.com%2Furl%3Fq%3Dht tp%253A%252F%252Fscholarcommons.usf.edu%252Fcgi%25 2Fviewcontent.cgi%253Farticle%253D1253%2526context %253Djss%26sa%3DD%26sntz%3D1%26usg%3DAFQjCNGysHXsl nNd8nfNhexzV2kEnvUXNg%23search=%22http%3A%2F%2Fsch olarcommons.usf.edu%2Fcgi%2Fviewcontent.cgi%3Farti cle%3D1253%26context%3Djss%22) when individuals process ideas only in black and white.
So what does all this mean? Efforts to undertake mass counter-narrative initiatives don’t achieve their intended effect ― and might even work against us. Ad campaigns, online or otherwise, that attempt to dissuade individuals from traveling to join groups like the Islamic State by pointing out the realities on the ground (http://www.theguardian.com/world/video/2015/jan/28/jihad-video-french-government-isis-video) are missing the mark by failing to appeal to each potential recruit’s value system and his or her own personal motivations. And any counter-narrative campaign attempting to dissuade potential recruits by ridiculing terrorist narratives is most certainly missing the mark because of the human tendency to internalize ridicule as a threat to their beliefs ― leading them to double down on or harden their beliefs.

See a similar themed SW Journal article:http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/narrative-the-critical-component-of-counter-terrorism-strategy

davidbfpo
07-31-2015, 10:49 AM
The full title is: What we’ve learned about radicalisation since 7/7 bombings a decade ago, which comes via the emailing of newly published research from:http://www.radicalisationresearch.org

A leading article as per the title:http://www.radicalisationresearch.org/debate/what-weve-learned-about-radicalisation-since-77-bombings-a-decade-ago/?

Plus podcasts and texts on other papers:http://www.radicalisationresearch.org/debate/2015-radicalisation-briefings/?

SWJ Blog
08-06-2015, 12:00 PM
Confronting the Narcoterrorism Nexus (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/confronting-the-narcoterrorism-nexus)

Entry Excerpt:



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This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.

davidbfpo
08-25-2015, 09:39 PM
An interesting development in Minnesota, where experience of radicalisation, going abroad to fight and terrorism - from the settled Somali community - as a local court opts for a new non-custodial option:http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/08/24/judge-orders-isis-recruit-to-rehab-not-jail.html?

The article starts with:
The first attempt to de-radicalize an Islamic extremist is happening in Minnesota right now, and it resembles a high-school civics class.An American citizen who pleaded guilty to supporting ISIS (http://www.thedailybeast.com/features/isis.html) was ordered by a federal judge to leave jail—and go to a halfway home instead. That rehab program is run by a group that had no prior experience with would-be Islamic terrorists, The Daily Beast has learned.
Abdullahi of Minnesota was allowed to depart from jail and stay at a halfway home after he pleaded guilty to conspiring to provide material support to the so-called Islamic State widely known as ISIS in January. (Yusuf was stopped at the airport trying to fly to Turkey in May 2014, at age 18.) Once inside the halfway home, Yusuf was to be “de-radicalized” through regular meetings with a counselor whose curriculum looked more like a high-school civics course than religious deprogramming.

davidbfpo
09-19-2015, 09:11 PM
A contrast to the first post, a long, local newspaper article on the Somali-Americans who have fled the USA to fight or who await court:http://www.startribune.com/from-the-heartland-to-jihad-heeding-isil-s-call-to-terror/324121191/

davidbfpo
10-29-2015, 09:44 PM
Hat tip to WoTR for this medium-sized article 'The Social Science of Online Radicalisation' by Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Nathaniel Barr:http://warontherocks.com/2015/10/the-social-science-of-online-radicalization/?

davidbfpo
11-09-2015, 10:12 PM
A short article via Brookings by J.M. Berger:http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/markaz/posts/2015/11/09-countering-violent-extremism-online-berger?

davidbfpo
11-30-2015, 11:07 PM
A contrarian viewpoint; which starts with:
From “shoebomber” Richard Reid, to Abdelhamid Abaaoud (http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/abdelhamid-abaaoud-killed-what-do-we-know-about-the-belgian-mastermind-behind-the-paris-terror-a6740491.html), the ringleader of the attacks in Paris, there seem to be increasing examples of people becoming “radicalised” in jails. So how concerned should we be about the role of prisons in producing violent extremists? Contrary to those who argue that jails are at risk of becoming “universities of terror (http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/publications/free/unlocking-al-qaeda.pdf)” there is actually relatively little systematic evidence (http://pun.sagepub.com/content/16/1/74.refs) of a link between prison and involvement in terrorism.
Link:http://www.radicalisationresearch.org/debate/marsden-prisons-radicalisation/?

davidbfpo
12-02-2015, 10:21 PM
A different focus, the English Defence League (EDL) seen by many as an extremist right wing group and short article:http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/understanding-the-english-defence-league-life-on-the-front-line-of-an-imagined-clash-of-civilisations/

The summary:
Joel Busher (http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/understanding-the-english-defence-league-life-on-the-front-line-of-an-imagined-clash-of-civilisations/#Author) reflects on what his 16 months of ethnographic fieldwork with the English Defence League tells us about what distinguishes them from the ‘ordinary English people’ that they claim to represent. His research (https://www.routledge.com/products/9780415502672) highlights the importance of linking the attitudes and ideology of EDL activists with their lived experience, and questions what role society at large plays in shaping that experience.

davidbfpo
12-08-2015, 03:31 PM
A really interesting critique by two academics, thanks to WoTR:http://warontherocks.com/2015/12/curbing-the-enthusiasm-why-de-radicalization-programs-get-fanaticism-wrong/?

They end with:
The result is that public policy in the West ignores fanatic agency and responds instead in self-consciously depoliticized ways. In effect, this criminological therapeutic model treats the converted zealot not as a danger to the wider society but as a victim pumped full of ideological steroids by unscrupulous online recruiters who, like predatory pedophiles, groom their otherwise innocent prey. The approach becomes even more suspect when extended to the case of the young women who happily trip off to Islamic State-controlled territories to offer themselves as jihadi brides. De-radicalization paints these young women as the deluded subjects of brainwashing. The simple but harsh truth is that like the men they embrace, they too have found meaning in an enthusiasm, which the wider society finds rebarbative, but which inspires action.

Neither “radicals” nor victims, they are largely immune to community sensitive de-radicalization programs promoted by Western governments because there is not much that is particularly radical in jihadist self-understanding. Arguably, it is we in the West who are deluded and we should make a start by “de-radicalizing” our own thinking.

SWJ Blog
01-25-2016, 12:36 AM
The Country Club Jihad: A Study of North American Radicalization (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/the-country-club-jihad-a-study-of-north-american-radicalization)

Entry Excerpt:



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This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.

davidbfpo
01-26-2016, 08:54 PM
Malaysia has a long established counter-radicalization programme for those who are interned / detained without trial and rarely do I spot any reports. Here is one after a regional conference:http://www.themalaysianinsider.com/malaysia/article/rehabilitated-terrorists-can-deradicalise-extremists-says-zahid

davidbfpo
02-18-2016, 10:07 PM
A curious mixture of thoughts in this short article, mainly as it is based on East African and Australian experience:https://www.issafrica.org/iss-today/known-unknowns-and-the-fight-against-violent-extremism

davidbfpo
02-21-2016, 08:09 PM
Alison Jamieson is an author from way back, with a focus on IIRC on Italian terrorism and the linked memo to a UK parliamentary inquiry on 'Prevent', has many useful points. Not only on 'Prevent' in schools, but also other approaches to the issues:http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/home-affairs-committee/countering-extremism/written/28666.html

davidbfpo
04-13-2016, 09:27 PM
A FP article that challenges the traditional narrative to explain radicalisation:http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/04/13/the-joint-smoking-gay-club-hopping-terrorists-of-molenbeek-abdeslam-radicalization/

Here is one passage:
...perhaps the more realistic — and in some ways more unsettling — scenario is that the Abdeslam brothers drifted in and out of jihadi activism and that this owed more to who they knew and how they lived than anything they believed.....

Later (CVE uses) the transformational view of radicalization: Implicit in their language and rhetoric is the idea that terrorism is the end stage of a process in which people come to adopt an extremist worldview that justifies violence.

davidbfpo
04-20-2016, 05:03 PM
A short, excellent BBC World Service podcast (23mins), using four experts to answer the question: What Kind of Person Becomes a Violent Jihadi? I caught Marc Sageman and Andrew Silke's names. The summary:
For decades researchers, academics and psychologists have wanted to know what kind of person becomes a terrorist. If there are pre-existing traits which make someone more likely to kill for their beliefs – well, that would be worth knowing. In this edition of The Inquiry – part of the BBC World Service Identity Season – we tell the story of that search for a ‘terrorist type’. It’s a story which begins decades ago. But, with the threat from killers acting for so-called Islamic State, finding an answer has never felt more pressing.Link:http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/p03qr716

One expert towards the end says words akin to:
Friends radicalise friends, nowt else. In Belgium two men started the recruiting off.The presenter says words akin to:
After the next attack questions will be asked. What kind of person would do this? Anyone.Marc Sageman has a very short comment:
Intelligence analysts know everything, but understand nothing....his ex-colleagues don't have the skills to find out why some people turn to political violence.Link:http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/p03r5572

By coincidence and being a post-arrest report maybe inaccurate, The daily Mail reports an arrest of an ISIS suspect in Majorca, Spain under the headline:
Revealed: 'ISIS recruiter' arrested in Majorca is Moroccan immigrant 'cocaine dealer' who worked as a chef at a tourist resort hotelLink:http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3549309/ISIS-recruiter-arrested-Majorca-Moroccan-immigrant-cocaine-dealer-worked-chef-tourist-resort-hotel.html? (http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3549309/ISIS-recruiter-arrested-Majorca-Moroccan-immigrant-cocaine-dealer-worked-chef-tourist-resort-hotel.html?ito=social-twitter_mailonline)

davidbfpo
04-22-2016, 08:17 PM
From an international research project by ICSR @ Kings; the summary ends with:
Fighters’ families are among the most powerful assets in the struggle against IS. Their stories highlight the pain and suffering that aspiring jihadists are causing to their loved ones. Families can be key to stopping their sons and daughters from leaving; encouraging them to defect; and helping them re-integrate once they return. They need to be empowered, not left alone.
Link:http://icsr.info/2016/04/icsr-report-pain-confusion-anger-shame-stories-islamic-state-families/

Bill Moore
05-02-2016, 12:26 AM
The short review of the book Radical seems germane here. The link goes to that review.

http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=186156&postcount=9

davidbfpo
06-07-2016, 09:13 PM
From VICE:
I wanted to find out how and why a few former extremists left the world of fanaticism behind, so I got in touch with a few of them: ex-Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) members Billy McCurrie and Martin Snoddon, reformed racist Matthew Collins, former Irish Republican Army (IRA) member Shane O'Doherty, and Manwar Ali, who was once involved in violent jihad. Here are their stories in their own words.Link:http://www.vice.com/read/former-extremists-tell-us-how-and-why-they-left-fanaticism-behind

Bill Moore
07-04-2016, 01:27 AM
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/07/03/dhaka-isil-terrorists-were-drawn-from-well-eduated-bangladeshi-e/


"They are all Bangladeshis. They are from rich families, they have good educational background," said Asaduzzaman Khan, the country's home minister, of the gunmen.Another source I can't place here because it was based on a phone call, stated the captured terrorist indicated it was becoming a fad for college kids to associate with the Islamic State.

Regardless, these kids weren't motivated by poverty or not having jobs. They were well do to kids. In some ways this reminds me of many who join far left militant groups or protests, and then when they're interviewed they prove they have no knowledge (except for a limited number) of what they're fighting for, or what they're protesting against, it is just something cool to do. We tend to ignore the psychological aspects when we focus on the political factors, which at times can be a red herring.

Firn
07-04-2016, 03:52 PM
Regardless, these kids weren't motivated by poverty or not having jobs. They were well do to kids. In some ways it reminds me many who join for left militant groups or protests, and then when they're interviewed they prove they have no knowledge (except for a limited number) of what they're fighting for, what they're protesting against, it is just something cool to do. We tend to ignore the psychological aspects when we focus on the political factors, which at times can be a red herring.

Aren't the higher strata of Arab society also overreppresented in the rank of the Daesh? Maybe somebody has some study at hand...

Obviously that vile murder of foreigners, among them many Italians will have a negative effect on the economy.


*On a side note a distant relative of mine was a Catholic priest in Bangladesh during British Rule. Another, more distant one was murdered in China over a hundred years ago while serving as Franciscan friar. Nothing new under the sun...

davidbfpo
07-04-2016, 11:26 PM
There is a short thread Poverty & Militancy do not mix, from 2012-2015:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=16304

This may help readers.

davidbfpo
07-18-2016, 08:30 PM
A superb IMHO article on radicalisation in London, that appeared on Professor Landis blog on Syria, last week:http://www.joshualandis.com/blog/the-inside-story-of-the-british-suicide-bomber-of-ramadi-by-tam-hussein/

The author's opening summary:
This is the back story of Abu Musa al-Britani, a young British suicide bomber who blew himself up in Iraq. He grew up in Ladbroke Grove, the area that I worked and grew up in as a youth worker. We also went to the same school. My essay seeks to answer the question as to why such a popular young man went to Iraq when he had planned a trip to Spain two weeks earlier. What compelled him to go, it also seeks to explain why the like of him and Jihadi John came from the same area. What are the factors that lead to their choices?

It is clear that neither foreign policy nor ideology are solely responsible for motivating European youth to go on Jihad. My essay argues that the reason many of these men went to Syria and join specifically ISIS is due to the subtle interplay between religion, foreign policy and gang culture and modernism.Curiously his neighbourhood was:
a stones throw away from David Cameron’s Notting HillNeedless to say this thread will be merged one day into the main thread on radicalisation:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=7188

davidbfpo
09-06-2016, 06:55 PM
The UK has had considerable experience with convicted terrorists, mainly during 'The Troubles' in Northern Ireland, so it is hard to understand that the system has been criticised by an official report as inadequate. This report, the public version, may be of interest:
This summary provides an overview of the review led by Ian Acheson into Islamist extremism in prisons, probation and youth justice, namely its context, key findings and principal recommendations.Link:https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/islamist-extremism-in-prisons-probation-and-youth-justice/summary-of-the-main-findings-of-the-review-of-islamist-extremism-in-prisons-probation-and-youth-justice

A different point of view by the Gatestone Institute (US-based, conservative), neat title 'Prisons: Harvard for Radicals':https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/8873/prisons-radical-islam

davidbfpo
10-07-2016, 08:00 PM
An Australian commentary on the UK's Prevent strategy and what lessons can be learnt:http://www.aspistrategist.org.au/dissecting-britains-approach-countering-violent-extremism/

A BBC report on Sweden, which has problems at home, let alone jihadists going abroad:
Sweden is a peaceful democratic state that has long been a safe haven for those fleeing conflict. Yet many young people whose families took refuge there are now turning their back on the country. More than 300 people have gone to fight in Syria and Iraq, making Sweden per capita one of the biggest exporters of jihadists in Europe.Link:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-37578919?

Jason Burke provides links to a World Bank report on who is radicalised in the MENA and aFinnish report on Boko Haram, in Nigeria:https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/oct/05/islamic-state-recruits-world-bank-study-education-boko-haram

The UK's Prevent strategy once again is in the foreground, with a variety of opinions on whether it is flawed, "toxic" and working.

From a Muslim woman activist, who practices Prevent:
Despite the government engaging with hundreds of mosques, community organisations and faith organisations in the last year, many Muslim organisations do not want to publicise the fact that they support Prevent. Sara Khan argues that this is because of a loud anti-Prevent lobby that is dominating the discourse on Prevent and vilifying those Muslim organisations that do engage with it. Khan argues that a far more complex and nuanced picture exists amongst British Muslims than is commonly presented.Link:http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/religionpublicsphere/2016/10/the-anti-prevent-lobby-are-dominating-the-discourse-not-all-muslims-oppose-prevent/

Then there is a prominent criminal lawyer, David Anderson, who is the independent reviewer of CT legislation, who is now calling for change:http://www.dailymail.co.uk/wires/pa/article-3824815/Prevent-anti-extremism-strategy-fuelling-distrust-Muslim-communities.html

davidbfpo
10-11-2016, 08:32 PM
An ICSR report released today; the full title being 'Criminal Pasts, Terrorist Futures: European Jihadists and the New Crime-Terror Nexus'. From their summary:
In many European countries, the majority of jihadist foreign fighters are former criminals.
The purpose of this new report is to describe the nature and dynamics of the crime-terror nexus, and understand what it means. To do so, a multi-lingual team of ICSR researchers compiled a database containing the profiles of 79 recent European jihadists with criminal pasts.
What we have found is not the merging of criminals and terrorists as organisations but of their social networks, environments, or milieus. Criminal and terrorist groups have come to recruit from the same pool of people, creating (often unintended) synergies and overlaps that have consequences for how individuals radicalise and operate. This is what we call the new crime-terror nexus.Link to press release:https://gem.godaddy.com/p/e167d8?fe=1&pact=57646-134827918-8754577104-181c025174f51fc63dd05d9 (https://gem.godaddy.com/p/e167d8?fe=1&pact=57646-134827918-8754577104-181c025174f51fc63dd05d957a46010a02cbe5ee)
57a46010a02cbe5ee (https://gem.godaddy.com/p/e167d8?fe=1&pact=57646-134827918-8754577104-181c025174f51fc63dd05d957a46010a02cbe5ee)

One press report:http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/isis-recruiting-violent-criminals-gang-members-drugs-europe-new-crime-terror-nexus-report-drugs-a7352271.html

davidbfpo
10-18-2016, 06:58 PM
Just found that one of the authors of the above ICSR report, Peter Neumann, spoke recently @ IISS, London and there is a podcast (just over 1hr):http://www.iiss.org/en/events/events-s-calendar/the-new-jihadist-c84e

davidbfpo
11-23-2016, 11:27 AM
A mother's story about her son who suddenly left for ISIS and died later. In a joint BBC-PBS report she tells:
..the truth about her son’s secret life and death.Links:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/resources/idt-acfd761e-0dff-46f7-87a4-96cec7824254 and http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/son-joined-isis-mother-fights-radicalization-home/?platform=hootsuite

There are subtle differences in the two reports.

davidbfpo
12-24-2016, 11:00 AM
Four short video clips where ex-radicals give their stories: three British and one German; three Muslims and one fascist.

One of them, Shahid Butt, I know slightly, as a former Jihadist radical, with a very mixed history; with history in Bosnia and Yemen. His voyage away took years. His video is available on YouTube:https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ph3wfvVk01c or the main website of ConnectFutures (linked below).

There are several online references to his story; this one is fair and in one place points out his account about the Yemen is contested:https://themodernthesis.wordpress.com/2015/08/16/shahid-butt-routes-to-extremism/

ConnectFutures is a small, Birmingham based company, led by two women and their website states:
Our Formers project aims to tell the stories of four former extremists in their own words. These include a mixture of both former ‘Islamist’ as well as former ‘far-right’ violent extremists.Link:http://connectfutures.org/formers/

davidbfpo
04-09-2017, 08:28 PM
An Australian story reporting on the work by a US academic in Australia for a year, Valerie M. Hudson and with a provocative title on April Fool's day no less:http://www.smh.com.au/world/the-missing-link-between-terrorism-and-sex-20170328-gv871a.html

It starts with:
What makes it easier to recruit young men into terrorist groups? Lack of employment opportunities, alienation and disenfranchisement are sometimes cited. But what if we've been missing something fundamental all along?What if we were ignoring sex?
A group of researchers have found a causal relationship between the rising trajectory of "brideprice" (similar to a dowry but paid by the prospective groom to the family of the bride) and the ease of recruitment into insurgent groups, in groundbreaking research that is soon to be published in the Harvard-based journal International Security."For example, the sole surviving terrorist from the Mumbai attack of several years ago admitted his father urged him to join the group so that he and his brothers could afford to marry...

Azor
04-09-2017, 10:49 PM
An Australian story reporting on the work by a US academic in Australia for a year, Valerie M. Hudson and with a provocative title on April Fool's day no less:http://www.smh.com.au/world/the-missing-link-between-terrorism-and-sex-20170328-gv871a.html

It starts with:

Well, if these young men were getting any, would they be that committed to killing and dying? No wonder Daesh stayed put after capturing all of those Yazidi women...

SWJ Blog
04-19-2017, 11:32 AM
U.S. Increasingly Concerned About Nexus of Terror, Criminal Networks (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/us-increasingly-concerned-about-nexus-of-terror-criminal-networks)

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Read the full post (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/us-increasingly-concerned-about-nexus-of-terror-criminal-networks) and make any comments at the SWJ Blog (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog).
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