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Entropy
05-02-2009, 11:05 PM
I spent some time today reading about the recent agreement between the Army and Air Force on utilization of airborne intelligence assets. Here's a quick look (http://www.acc.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123137013). For more, google "task 11 UAS."


Specifically, both services are now required to support the Joint Forces Commander across the full spectrum of conflict. Operations such as air interdiction in the early phases of a conflict, to direct support to maneuver units during the security phase and everything in between will be supported by either service. The concept specifies that both Army and Air Force theater-capable, multi-role UAS forces will be able to support either a ground or air commander.

This is one of the few cases I know of where Army assets are pledged to assist the air component's independent operations. Personally, I like this new agreement a lot because it formalizes what should be SOP - that everything, ultimately, belongs to the JFC, and he/she should be able to utilize capabilities when and where they are needed.

That's all quite interesting on its own, but it got me thinking about the defunct DARO (http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/daro/) from the 1990's (an attempt to do for airborne ISR what the NRO did for satellite reconnaissance) as well as ISR ops today (which is where I work now). So here's my proposal - extrapolate from this recent Task 11 agreement and make ISR a separate component under the Joint Force Commander led by a "Joint Force ISR Component Commander" or JFISRCC.

It seems like such a structural change would improve the JFC's ability to allocate scarce ISR assets and prevent asset hoarding. Additionally, it might solve what I see is a major problem today - inadequate coordination and intelligence sharing between the land and air component's ISR assets. Too much intelligence is still stovepiped inside those structures, causing all sorts of problems and headaches.

For example, the process a ground unit must go through for ISR support is needlessly difficult and complex - first they have to ask for "organic" support, then component support, and only after those are exhausted can they go to the air component. A JFISRC would be a "one stop shop" for ISR that, theoretically, at least, could significantly improve this process as well as better match the best ISR asset for a particularly requirement.

What do you all think?

William F. Owen
05-03-2009, 06:17 AM
I spent some time today reading about the recent agreement between the Army and Air Force on utilization of airborne intelligence assets. Here's a quick look (http://www.acc.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123137013). For more, google "task 11 UAS."


What do you all think?

Good catch. It's not a new idea. I spent a very long evening with Doug MacGregor discussing the idea of a "Strike Corps" which was one joint service group that did Arty, CAS, Cruise missiles....

Logically it sounds good, but what experience shows me is that Armed Forces are not logical and for some pretty good reasons - mostly with bad results, but demonstrating that the bad is worse than the good is hard.

ISR is a classic example. Logically, in 1916, the Royal Flying Corps should have been a branch of the Royal Artillery. That it wasn't is a function of human need.

I recently read a proposal for a Surveillance Aircraft with a very wide range of sensors. It had SAR, ELINT, COMINT, Electro-optics and ESM. Logically this made no sense at all, but the "customer" wanted all this as putting all the sensors on one aircraft ensured it got through the budget process....

Cavguy
05-03-2009, 02:45 PM
I didn't read all the links, but there is a reason why the Army went to the mat about 1.5 years ago to prevent the USAF from taking over lead for all UAV projects. It didn't trust them to support the ground as a first priority. It's the same argument that goes back to WW II when USAFE wanted to continue strategic bombing but Eisenhower redirected the effort to support operational targets ISO Overlord.

Logicially, consolidation it makes sense, like merging the marines into the army (equipment procurement), having the army/navy/marine aviation elements all in the air force, all the army's ships in the navy, etc. If efficiency is your goal, it certainly makes sense.

However, effectiveness should be the goal, not efficiency. And the CAOC concept of allocating assets simply was not meeting the ground commander's goals. In shorthand, the USAF's priorities were not the Army's (or Marines).

Practically, it was a visceral response to the way the USAF has supported ground forces in OIF/OEF the past years. The USAF ran all air ops for OIF from Qatar, with only a LNO shop in Baghdad at MNC-I HQ (the operational HQ). So all aircraft decisions, even directed by the MNC-I commander, were routed to a USAF 1-star in Qatar who ran the entire CENTCOM air-show. Who then wanted a justification, and then complained it wasn't in the 48 hour air taskord, etc. So the army/marines decided to shoot a GMLRS instead, or call a OGA Predator to do the work.

And that, replicated for each instance, is why the Army has more watercraft than the Navy, we have four air forces, two "armies", and each service managing its own ISR assets.

I was forwarded an excellent internal USAF slide show recently that asked:

"Why did it take the Army to invent TF ODIN?"

Entropy
05-04-2009, 01:33 AM
I didn't read all the links, but there is a reason why the Army went to the mat about 1.5 years ago to prevent the USAF from taking over lead for all UAV projects. It didn't trust them to support the ground as a first priority.

Well, the problem is, the ground isn't always the first priority and the reality is there are never enough assets to satisfy every need.


It's the same argument that goes back to WW II when USAFE wanted to continue strategic bombing but Eisenhower redirected the effort to support operational targets ISO Overlord.


Of course, there was a valid reason the air forces were given a separate command structure in the first place - Commanders hoarded their "organic" assets to the detriment of the mission. That's as true today as it ever was and it is not a service-specific problem. Also, I don't see the problem here - Eisenhower, as the JFC, was rightly aligning his subordinates to support HIS mission intent.


Logicially, consolidation it makes sense, like merging the marines into the army (equipment procurement), having the army/navy/marine aviation elements all in the air force, all the army's ships in the navy, etc. If efficiency is your goal, it certainly makes sense.

This isn't about procurement - it's about wartime command and control. Doctrinally, the consolidation you describe is how we do it and the reasons are not just about efficiency, but also effectiveness. Ideally, utilization of capabilities in wartime should not be tied to which service procures and maintains the capability.


However, effectiveness should be the goal, not efficiency. And the CAOC concept of allocating assets simply was not meeting the ground commander's goals. In shorthand, the USAF's priorities were not the Army's (or Marines).

If you're talking about ISR, the problem wasn't priorities, it was a lack of assets to meet increasing demands along with problems with outmoded processes. The lack of assets wasn't just a problem with the Air Force either. As mentioned in another thread, the SECDEF has gone so far as to direct the Air Force to field a tactical ISR platform dedicated for ground support because the Army could not execute on the SECDEF's timeline. Developed, flown and maintained by airmen, it will not be a CFACC asset. There's nothing wrong with that - who develops and procures a capability should not necessarily dictate who controls them in wartime. The Task 11 agreement and my proposal are in the same spirit.

Regardless, ISR priorities are set by the Joint Force Commander, who is almost always Army. The JFC's priorities are not always the same as a Commander down the chain. IOW, it's not the USAF that is denying some unit ISR support, nor is the problem "Air Force" priorities (services don't set collection priorities) - it's the intelligence collection priorities of the JFC.


Practically, it was a visceral response to the way the USAF has supported ground forces in OIF/OEF the past years. The USAF ran all air ops for OIF from Qatar, with only a LNO shop in Baghdad at MNC-I HQ (the operational HQ). So all aircraft decisions, even directed by the MNC-I commander, were routed to a USAF 1-star in Qatar who ran the entire CENTCOM air-show. Who then wanted a justification, and then complained it wasn't in the 48 hour air taskord, etc. So the army/marines decided to shoot a GMLRS instead, or call a OGA Predator to do the work.

Personally, I agree with a lot of this. A single CAOC is trying to run two wars and I don't think it's been the best way to operate. On the other hand, it does provide some flexibility. I'm glad to see the CAOC is finally pushing LNO's below the MNC-I level - should have been done long ago.

I'm glad you mentioned effectiveness, because that is what's important. I think this agreement and (possibly) my proposal further that. Consider that a lot more ISR assets of various types will by around in the near future. What this agreement does is prevent the hoarding of those assets which will decrease effectiveness. Take the example from one of the articles of a "Desert Storm" type of operation. During the air campaign phase, what should the Marine and Army UAV's be doing? Sitting on the ground waiting for G day? No, they should be supporting the air component's operations because they are the main effort at that moment. When G-day commences, then the situation changes and the bulk of UAV assets go to the land component. During post-conflict stabilization, virtually all assets go to the land component.

Seems logical and effective to me. Task 11 is simply a MOU to that effect. My proposal is simply to expand on that and make it apply to all ISR assets, not just those from the Army and Air Force (recognizing that most Navy and Air Force ISR are already integrated).

It's nice to see this kind of cooperation on both sides of the fence and will help soothe some of the bad blood and misperceptions.

Addendum: TF Odin is great, but it's also a stovepipe (one among many). The problem I see is that there is little cross-cuing and coordination of assets and too little dissemination of intelligence outside of those stovepipes. One example of this is imagery. Frankly, a lot of times it's easier to request collection of another image than it is to find and get an existing image. This is just plain dumb. Recollecting that imagery usually means that someone else's legitimate requirement goes unfulfilled.

Entropy
05-04-2009, 01:53 AM
I recently read a proposal for a Surveillance Aircraft with a very wide range of sensors. It had SAR, ELINT, COMINT, Electro-optics and ESM. Logically this made no sense at all, but the "customer" wanted all this as putting all the sensors on one aircraft ensured it got through the budget process....

I'm not so sure I agree with you here. I've found that multi-int platforms provide a lot of benefits. SIGINT can add important context to imagery, for example.

Ken White
05-04-2009, 03:19 AM
With an acknowledgment up front that I generally agree with CavGuy and am opposed to the Agreement based on what's currently available or that I can find about implementation (which is very little), couple of comments on your post.
"...I'm glad you mentioned effectiveness, because that is what's important. I think this agreement and (possibly) my proposal further that."It will in some aspects but it also has the ability to cloud others. We'll have to see how it falls out. For example, you say
"What this agreement does is prevent the hoarding of those assets which will decrease effectiveness."Depends on how you define hoarding. My suspicion is that there will be no hoarding per se, the equipment will suffer from over use if anything. If Hoarding is described as "A Bde cannot have an MQ-1C in direct support." Then I would disagree.

As for your Desert Storm example -- most commanders cooperate well on things that are logical. People only get protective when they sense or think they sense a power grab in my observation.

Joint is not the panacea for all things and it can actually decrease effectiveness as political whims in high place must be catered to. The first time a hot operation is being run and some assets are pulled for another operation that is CAOC-determined to be of higher priority -- and I guarantee you that will occur -- there's going to be trouble if as has and can happen the real priority should have remained with first using unit. Sometime remind me to tell you about a bunch of troops that needed to move from Chu Lai to Phu Bai for an operation being bumped for a load of BOQ mattresses resulting in a scrubbed op that could have done good...:mad:

I've got CAS stories as well but things in that environment are quite different now. People aren't all that much different, though...

I've defended the USAF here several times and I'm supportive of them generally as you know -- but they do tend to Empire build. I very well recall Mommyer and crew in Viet Nam and I recall Dave Deptula's comments on UAS ownership. I'll withhold judgment (not that my opinion sways anyone or anything...) until I see a product but I'm frankly quite dubious this will end well for anyone. I see a new Key West agreement building up steam.:rolleyes:

Having said all that, I do agree with your JFISRCC -- though we might not agree on its powers. :wry:

slapout9
05-04-2009, 03:26 AM
Good catch. It's not a new idea. I spent a very long evening with Doug MacGregor discussing the idea of a "Strike Corps" which was one joint service group that did Arty, CAS, Cruise missiles....


I think the Air Force would go for that. Warden has talked about that for years.

Entropy
05-04-2009, 06:04 AM
Depends on how you define hoarding. My suspicion is that there will be no hoarding per se, the equipment will suffer from over use if anything. If Hoarding is described as "A Bde cannot have an MQ-1C in direct support." Then I would disagree.

"Hoarding" is when higher-priority missions go unfullfilled because the commander who "owns" the asset won't release it. Imagine if all the 155mm arty were divided up into equal portions and each piece was dedicated to a single platoon - IOW, the platoon "owned" that piece of 155. Now there is an engagement where some platoons are heavily engaged with the enemy and others are lightly engaged or not engaged at all. This is where hoarding occurs - the individual platoons will be reluctant to use their "organic" support to assist someone else, despite the need. They naturally think of their own priorities first and don't want to use their asset to help someone else leaving it unavailable for their own use. Besides, that other platoon has its own 155, so it doesn't need mine, right?

IMO, this is why many assets are held and managed at higher levels of authority than the units they will support. This was the major reason why direct control of tactical aircraft was taken away from ground commanders in WWII.

It's not much different in the ISR world. The Army is going to have UAV's but it isn't going to give every platoon its own Warrior Alpha - it's an asset that needs to be managed at a higher echelon. Part of that means that sometimes (a lot of times, actually), you have to say, "sorry, but the guys in the middle of a TIC need that MQ-1 more than you do." People naturally get pissed when that happens and they lose an asset, but most of the time it is justified.


Joint is not the panacea for all things and it can actually decrease effectiveness as political whims in high place must be catered to.

ISTM political whims are a leadership issue and not a problem specific to "joint." Besides, what's the alternative? Joint is better in the vast majority of cases IMO.


The first time a hot operation is being run and some assets are pulled for another operation that is CAOC-determined to be of higher priority -- and I guarantee you that will occur -- there's going to be trouble if as has and can happen the real priority should have remained with first using unit.

That's going to happen no matter what at all levels of command and that's why the JFC ultimately picks the priorities and not the individual components.


I've defended the USAF here several times and I'm supportive of them generally as you know -- but they do tend to Empire build.

This isn't about defending the Air Force. It's about this agreement which represents actual cooperation between the services - cooperation that is necessary since both will be fielding and operating a variety of medium altitude UAS' - cooperation that already exists between the Navy and Air Force in a variety of areas. These UAS' are theater-capable assets. The Air Force and Navy ISR platforms are already pretty seamlessly integrated - why shouldn't the Army's be as well?

As far as empire-building goes, I think that's mostly perception and is not dissimilar to the view of the Army by the other services. The perception on this score is that the Army is a one-way player - that the Army is happy to be on the receiving end of the other services joint capabilities yet insists its own capabilities are dedicated to tactical requirements and cannot be shared. This agreement shows that perception is wrong and that Army assets can, when applicable, support Air Force and other operations. This has been happening in other areas as well, such as Apache escort of USAF CSAR helos. I frankly don't understand what all the concern is.


I see a new Key West agreement building up steam.

The difference with Key West is that the Army isn't giving up assets in exchange for promises of support - it's agreeing to provide support in exchange for support which seems like a fair quid-pro-quo to me. As far as UAS Executive Agency, the USAF got most of what it wanted in the new DoD level organization. The key concerns are, Joint CONOPS/Doctrine, airspace control/deconfliction, and standardization. It's still early, but it appears those will be addressed.

wm
05-04-2009, 11:51 AM
Guy in a bar orders a beer, drinks it,and a few minutes later goes into the men's room. He does this several times. Then he orders a beer, takes it into the men's room and come out with an empty glass--does that a few times as well. The bartender gets curious, follows the guy into the men's room and sees him pouring the beer into the urinal. Bartender asks the guy what he's doing. The response: "Eliminating the middle man."

So why do we want to create another middleman with a JFISRCC? Seems to me we just need to have the existing command structure do what it is supposed to do--allocate resources, give orders for their use, and ensure that they are used to get the job done. An ISR platform is no different than any other combat support asset. Where things get weird with them is trying to make sense of what they collect. We need intel guys to be smart about analysis. They may be smart about how to manage resources, but so are most competent Ops officers and any good commander.

BTW, it seems we're already trying the new "monkey in the middle" concept proposed by Entropy's JFISRCC with the the guy titled DNI. How's that working ?

William F. Owen
05-04-2009, 12:53 PM
I've found that multi-int platforms provide a lot of benefits. SIGINT can add important context to imagery, for example.

I agree, but while the SIGINT can stand-off, imagery has to get "eyes on." There are different time on task/ time and distance aspects at play.

Same is true of ISAR/SAR. It's the multi-role v dedicated role argument. There are always going to be trade-offs, but the trades have got to realise more benefit than loss.

Ken White
05-04-2009, 03:28 PM
"Hoarding" is when higher-priority missions go unfullfilled because the commander who "owns" the asset won't release it.on "hoarding." That description is priority setter centric and is part of the problem that accrues from our trend in ALL the services to micro-manage. The very bad flaw in that philosophy says the Air Commander can set priorities for the theater and those override ground tactical considerations of which both the AFCC and the JFC may not be fully aware and often are not -- or sometimes don't care. They will be correct sometimes -- and incorrect sometimes; the incorrect cases may be benign or may result in unnecessary deaths. The law of averages says that'll work out about 50:50. IMO, that's not good enough, 60:40 I can accept, less -- no.

IOW, it presumes everyone will always be accurately informed and do the right thing. In DS/DS and the currrent fights, that may be the norm due to several factors including tempo and visibility -- in a bigger harder fight, that has not been and will not be the case. Bad idea to base wartime operating procedures on peacetime processes. Or semi-peacetime...
... Besides, that other platoon has its own 155, so it doesn't need mine, right?Even that example counters your argument ;) -- if he does have one, then , no, he doesn't need mine -- however if he makes valid case I can lend him one...
IMO, this is why many assets are held and managed at higher levels of authority than the units they will support. This was the major reason why direct control of tactical aircraft was taken away from ground commanders in WWII.Partly true -- it IS the usual justification for doing that, developed by Lesley J. McNair (who did not do the Army nearly as many organizational favors as he is credited) and adopted by the AAC / AAF to become an AF. Many assets are also held at higher levels because of an overweening desire to control. Egos get involved.
The Army is going to have UAV's but it isn't going to give every platoon its own Warrior Alpha - it's an asset that needs to be managed at a higher echelon.True but the plan was to allot MQ-1Cs to each Brigade. That made sense -- I see this agreement as a back off on that; if not now then soon. I disagree with that back off because in my experience, over centralized control in combat is wasteful, causes inflexibility, stifles initiative and slows the operational tempo dangerously.

It also increases casualties due to those factors.
Part of that means that sometimes (a lot of times, actually), you have to say, "sorry, but the guys in the middle of a TIC need that MQ-1 more than you do." People naturally get pissed when that happens and they lose an asset, but most of the time it is justified.Been my experience that in era of less centralized control, when that occurred, no one generally got in the way.

OTOH, I have seen troops in contact denied support (by all four services, multiple times each) because someone at a higher or distant echelon was not getting shot at...
ISTM political whims are a leadership issue and not a problem specific to "joint." Besides, what's the alternative? Joint is better in the vast majority of cases IMO.Not when those political whims are service (or branch / community in a service) parochial are they totally leadership issues. Try over ruling an Aviator who says it's unsafe to fly whether it is or not -- or an Artillery Commander who says "I can't support that attack because my Ammo must be reserved for Operation Misfire" and the real reason is he's concerned that the fire request will be closer to friendlies than he wishes. I've seen both those things happen more than once.
That's going to happen no matter what at all levels of command and that's why the JFC ultimately picks the priorities and not the individual components.Perfect word syndrome. That process assumes the JFC is (a) competent; (b) has accurate intel and complete knowledge; and (c) a crackerjack, rapidly performing and efficient staff. My experience says all of those occurring at once is unlikely and I have seen all totally absent...:rolleyes:
These UAS' are theater-capable assets. The Air Force and Navy ISR platforms are already pretty seamlessly integrated - why shouldn't the Army's be as well?We'll see.
I frankly don't understand what all the concern is.I'm not an ISR nor an air power knowledgeable bod -- but I do know people, I do know C2, I can run a high level 3 shop and I do know service and inter-service quirks. This can be good, perhaps. It can also go bad and that, as I said, for everybody, not just the Army...
It's still early, but it appears those will be addressed.Yes, it is. We'll see. I'll just leave you with this thought while we wait. Designing systems and processes for combat based on people behaving properly and a best case scenario is not smart.

Entropy
05-04-2009, 07:58 PM
That description is priority setter centric and is part of the problem that accrues from our trend in ALL the services to micro-manage.

Exactly, so who do you think should get the final say in what the priorities are? I think it should be the JFC. Leaving it up to the individual components is probably going to get you a lot more instances where BOQ mattresses gett transported instead of troops. It means that sharing assets with another component is going to be spotty at best. It also probably means that there won't be any peacetime training in providing that support, with all the negative wartime consequences.


The very bad flaw in that philosophy says the Air Commander can set priorities for the theater and those override ground tactical considerations of which both the AFCC and the JFC may not be fully aware and often are not -- or sometimes don't care.

But as I think I've indicated a few times now, it's not the Air Commander setting priorities, and that's the entire point. The priorities are not hidden - everyone knows what they are - they are published along with what PIR's each fragged ISR mission is supporting. If an ad hoc requirement comes up with a greater priority, then it takes precedence. Subterfuge is very difficult in this system because of transparency. I also don't think the "fully aware" argument applies much anymore since LNO's have been pushed down to lower levels and our comm systems ensure wide, immediate dissemination. When a requirement comes up, pretty much everyone in the theater can see it. I watch those ad hoc requests flow through the Army chain which gives me and my team the opportunity to parallel plan in the event the request is approved. If the request is denied, 95% of the time it's nixed long before its ever formally presented to the air component.


They will be correct sometimes -- and incorrect sometimes; the incorrect cases may be benign or may result in unnecessary deaths. The law of averages says that'll work out about 50:50. IMO, that's not good enough, 60:40 I can accept, less -- no.

Why does it have to be static? Allocation should be situationally dependent. Does the ground component need control of 60 percent of the assets during the air only phase of operations? No. Does the air component need 40 percent of assets during phase IV ops? No.


Even that example counters your argument -- if he does have one, then , no, he doesn't need mine -- however if he makes valid case I can lend him one...

So are you advocating that every platoon should be given one tube of 155 to call their own? My point was that it's not smart to give each platoon some small piece of 155 that will always be "theirs." Why? Because that small piece will be doing nothing much of the time and when it is needed, it will prove inadequate. In that situation, the enemy will be doing their METT-TC and IPB, see the weakness, and know that when attacking a single platoon the only arty they'll likely face is a single tube, particularly if they simultaneously conduct diversionary attacks on the other platoons. On the other hand, if arty is held at a higher echelon, like it currently is, then the enemy will have to plan for significant fires against their main effort.



Many assets are also held at higher levels because of an overweening desire to control. Egos get involved.
Yes, that can happen, which is why you need a set of rules for sharing assets and a JFC to enforce those rules and make everyone play nice. That set of rules is exactly what this new agreement is. What's the alternative?


True but the plan was to allot MQ-1Cs to each Brigade. That made sense -- I see this agreement as a back off on that; if not now then soon. I disagree with that back off because in my experience, over centralized control in combat is wasteful, causes inflexibility, stifles initiative and slows the operational tempo dangerously.

How is that a back-off? Remember that this agreement is a two-way street and that it formalizes USAF theater-level ISR support for the Army's tactical needs - something I don't the the USAF was ever required to do previously. The Army, now that it has its own theater-level assets, has to reciprocate. What is wrong with that?

Here's a portion of an article about the new agreement:


"This concept provides guidance to both services on how to organize, train, and equip their UAS forces to provide maximum flexibility to a joint forces commander. Specifically, the concept describes the desired effects and tells the services what type of missions they have to be ready to perform.”

At the same time, the concept directs that both services be able to meet their service-specific requirements. For the Army, that means the ability to forward-deploy their UAS’ as part of an organic ground force. For the Air Force, it means being able to operate as part of an air-only strike package while carrying a wide array of advanced weapons and sensors. The concept therefore provides a context within which both services will be able to meet their own needs while still being able to flex to provide maximum joint support.

Again, what, specifically, is wrong with that?


Perfect word syndrome. That process assumes the JFC is (a) competent; (b) has accurate intel and complete knowledge; and (c) a crackerjack, rapidly performing and efficient staff. My experience says all of those occurring at once is unlikely and I have seen all totally absent...

First, not everything is decided by the JFC and his staff, so he doesn't need complete knowledge, particularly at the tactical level. He's not approving every ISR ad hoc - he provides the Commander's intent, priorities and guidance and the actual implementation takes place at lower levels. Secondly, an incompetent JFC is bad regardless of how ISR is managed.

Sorry, Ken, but I'm still not understanding your concern.

Wilf,


I agree, but while the SIGINT can stand-off, imagery has to get "eyes on." There are different time on task/ time and distance aspects at play.

That's true but missions are flown where one INT is primary and the others are secondary. So, for example, in a mission where IMINT is primary SIGINT is still collected, but only on a not-to-interfere basis. This relationship can be changed at anytime, though, so if, for example, the IMINT sensor breaks, the platform can change to a "SIGINT prime" mission. It also makes dynamic retasking more flexible.

WM,

JFISRC is not another middleman. It's consolidating a whole bunch of middlemen. I'm an intel weenie. It sucks for me to have to navigate through dozens of middlemen to get info on a particular subject. It sucks even more when you don't even know what kind of information those middlemen have because its been hidden from you.


Where things get weird with them is trying to make sense of what they collect. We need intel guys to be smart about analysis. They may be smart about how to manage resources, but so are most competent Ops officers and any good commander.

Well, in my experience, making sense of collection is a problem because so much information is locked in stovepipes, propriety systems, and password-protected databases. I don't know why so many Army units feel the need hide secret products behind passwords on a secret system. There are a lot of little empires on the siprnet.

As for the DNI, it's still a work in progress, but IMO it's much better than the CIA director running the show.

Ken White
05-04-2009, 09:24 PM
Exactly, so who do you think should get the final say in what the priorities are? ... It also probably means that there won't be any peacetime training in providing that support, with all the negative wartime consequences.The first item depends on what asset we're discussing. Some things need to centrally controlled, some do not. can't address that sensibly without specificity.

The second is due to service parochiality which should be punished with flogging IMO (Intra or inter service). It is tolerated, even encouraged (by Congress among others...) so it flourishes and the 'fix' is to prescribe 'jointness.' That's effectively legislating morality, some believe in that. I do not.
But as I think I've indicated a few times now, it's not the Air Commander setting priorities, and that's the entire point. ... Subterfuge is very difficult in this system because of transparency...At the STAFF level... There, you're correct. Elsewhere, you just made my point: "OTOH, I have seen troops in contact denied support (by all four services, multiple times each) because someone at a higher or distant echelon was not getting shot at..." No one needs to get defensive about that, it's not a knock on those who serve on Staffs, it is just a cold hard fact, it's reality. For every staff person who bleeds for the troops and they exist, there are three that do not; that's life.
...When a requirement comes up, pretty much everyone in the theater can see it...I know. Shame they can't see the ATO or the total picture...
Why does it have to be static?...You misunderstood, I meant the probability of a foul up was 50:50 and I don't think that's acceptable, I like 75:25 odds better but I can live with 60:40. Even that ratio will change, admittedly. Given a really good JFC, superb intel and a good staff, the odds for success probably go to 70:30, maybe a bit better -- however, in my observation, you can't depend on those three factors aligning (see MacArthur, D.; Westmoreland, W.; and Sanchez, R. for examples). At times in Viet Nam the odds were in the 30:70 range and that was not a good thing...

Again, you cannot design using the best case for wartime processes.
So are you advocating that every platoon should be given one tube of 155 to call their own?Not at all -- but they should have consistent and constant access to suitable indirect fire support. If they do not, they will eventually suffer due to that lack. The Platoon Leader and probably the Company and Battalion commander are really concerned about that. The Bde Commander will be slightly less concerned, the Division commander even less so and so forth. Their staffs even less so. Proximity is the issue affecting availability. The further one is away from the action, the more one can be objective, I guess.
Yes, that can happen, which is why you need a set of rules for sharing assets and a JFC to enforce those rules and make everyone play nice. That set of rules is exactly what this new agreement is. What's the alternative?I've seen -- gone to war under -- JFCs who would not enforce those rules. Everyone does not play nice but if roles and mission are adequately sorted and units are adequately equipped and manned they will usually play nice -- until an inter service issue arises that affect either turf or reputation -- not operational matters -- then people get weird.

As for an alternative, we don't know what those 'rules' will be so It's hard to say. My generic complaint is that excessive centralization always offers efficiency. However, I'm aware of absolutely no case where it has truly increased combat effectiveness across the board.
How is that a back-off? ... What is wrong with that? ... Here's a portion of an article about the new agreement: ...Again, what, specifically, is wrong with that? Don't know; I said "True but the plan was to allot MQ-1Cs to each Brigade. That made sense -- I see this agreement as a back off on that; if not now then soon." Allot to me means it's the Bdes to control, this agreement would seem to obviate that; we'll have to wait and see what ends up occurring. The agreement appears innocuous at this point but, forgive me, I'm very dubious of over centralization. Genetic flaw...
First, not everything is decided by the JFC and his staff, so he doesn't need complete knowledge, particularly at the tactical level. He's not approving every ISR ad hoc - he provides the Commander's intent, priorities and guidance and the actual implementation takes place at lower levels.Really? That's good to know. I certainly wasn't aware of that. Thank you for that info...

Uhh, what happens if an implementer at a lower level plans an operation and suddenly loses a critical asset to a higher hq pull that turns out to be a bad call. Does anyone suffer for that? Like the implementer may suffer?
Secondly, an incompetent JFC is bad regardless of how ISR is managed.Exactly. Centralization compounds that effect. Badly...

Decentralization OTOH, mitigates and ameliorates the JFCs poor performance by providing numerous nodes to counteract bad decisions from on high. Think of Petreaus in Mosul diligently ignoring Sanchez. All your eggs in one basket and all that. It worked in DS/DS dues to the opponent; it works today due to the unique situations -- can you guarantee me that it will work in a moving war?
Sorry, Ken, but I'm still not understanding your concern.My concerns, plural, are:

- that I'm deeply cynical about major headquarters capabilities and competence based on experience long ago and apparent evidence in many places (including but not limited to Tampa, Doha, Baghdad and Kabul) today, the 4th of May, 2009.

- that I have seen few success in excessive centralization. If the center fails, all is lost, the limbs and implementers don't know what to do.

- that I am too familiar with interservice games and agreements to believe what is seen is all there is. There may be a pony in there; we'll see.

- that we consistently attempt to fight wars at echelons above the real war.

- that in a real hard charging war -- which we have not seen since 1951 -- the Armed forces (all) will not be adequately supported by these bureaucratic solutions we continually espouse in peacetime

- that, mostly, Joe is always the guy that suffers for the screwups of his nominal betters...

Oh - and this too is a concern:
...It sucks even more when you don't even know what kind of information those middlemen have because its been hidden from you. :D

wm
05-05-2009, 12:22 PM
JFISRC is not another middleman. It's consolidating a whole bunch of middlemen. I'm an intel weenie. It sucks for me to have to navigate through dozens of middlemen to get info on a particular subject. It sucks even more when you don't even know what kind of information those middlemen have because its been hidden from you. Quod erat demonstratum. When you eliminate the middle of a loaf of bread, what you have left still has a middle you know. Similarly, consolidating a bunch of middlemen still leaves a middleman--in this case it just happens to be a middleman with more seniority (and, I suspect, less expertise).
RANT ON: I'm a retired intel weenie. I know how hard it is to find data across a pile of collection stovepipes. I don't think creating a JFISR Czar is going to fix the databases problems that many of us know have been out there for decades. To fix the problem, get the acquirers to stop creating more stove pipes with one-off systems development, stop talking platitudes about netcentricity and get a database architecture that everyone must use tied into an effective comm system with meaningful multi-level security so that all share what they have in one great database in the sky. Appointing some guy a JFCISRCC on the ground in an AOR isn't going to make that happen.
RANT OFF

BTW, your complaint doesn't seem to be about priortizing/cuing scarce collection assets. As the following quotation suggests, you seem more unhappy that you can't find stuff that someone may already be collecting.

Well, in my experience, making sense of collection is a problem because so much information is locked in stovepipes, propriety systems, and password-protected databases. I don't know why so many Army units feel the need hide secret products behind passwords on a secret system. There are a lot of little empires on the siprnet.
Isn't just the Army that hides stuff--people who live in tin houses shouldn't throw can openers.
Been my experience that there's tons of stuff collected--probably more than a horde of analysts many times larger than what we our wildest dreams could ever hope to havewould ever be able to wade through--reminds me of these lines from Lewis Carroll's poem "The Walrus and the Carpenter"

The Walrus and the Carpenter
Were walking close at hand:
They wept like anything to see
Such quantities of sand:
'If this were only cleared away,'
They said, 'it would be grand.'

'If seven maids with seven mops
Swept it for half a year,
Do you suppose,' the Walrus said,
'That they could get it clear?'

William F. Owen
05-05-2009, 12:44 PM
RANT ON: I'm a retired intel weenie. I know how hard it is to find data across a pile of collection stovepipes. I don't think creating a JFISR Czar is going to fix the databases problems that many of us know have been out there for decades. To fix the problem, get the acquirers to stop creating more stove pipes with one-off systems development, stop talking platitudes about netcentricity and get a database architecture that everyone must use tied into an effective comm system with meaningful multi-level security so that all share what they have in one great database in the sky. Appointing some guy a JFCISRCC on the ground in an AOR isn't going to make that happen.
RANT OFF


Well I was once also an Intel Weenie, albeit a lowly NCO working at formation level and below, and I hear your pain, and mostly agree, but part of the problem is the nature of the activity as we have come to believe it.

Most of what you are talking about comes from "gathering" rather than "finding." NATO tends to have a an information gathering approach,(information requirements) when actually a "finding of nouns" can be far simpler, more useful and durable. (tank spotting!)

Back in my day, some of us pushed for a "28-32 tanks are here," angle rather than "we think this is the 2nd Echelon BN of the 191 Reserve MRD moving into an assembly area."
In terms of how that information gets used the differences are huge. Simpler aims make the a lot of Stovepipes go away, and with it all the network malarkey as well.

wm
05-05-2009, 02:01 PM
Most of what you are talking about comes from "gathering" rather than "finding." NATO tends to have a an information gathering approach,(information requirements) when actually a "finding of nouns" can be far simpler, more useful and durable. (tank spotting!)

Back in my day, some of us pushed for a "28-32 tanks are here," angle rather than "we think this is the 2nd Echelon BN of the 191 Reserve MRD moving into an assembly area." .

Wilf,
I tend to agree that a properly asked question tends to get better results. Your example is a great mix of collection and analysis btw. If a sensor can tell me the location of 28-32 tanks, I'll use my analytic skills to figure who it is, what it means, and whether it's important to tell the boss about it.
Even better is if a sensor can tell me that 28-32 bad guy tanks are doing something at a place I asked about during the time frame I asked about because that was an important place/time to getting done the job assigned to my boss.

William F. Owen
05-05-2009, 02:15 PM
If a sensor can tell me the location of 28-32 tanks, I'll use my analytic skills to figure who it is, what it means, and whether it's important to tell the boss about it.
For sure, but back then we were entirely focussed on getting the tanks killed. In our context the other stuff wasn't important, yet we spent time working on it for no actionable benefit.


Even better is if a sensor can tell me that 28-32 bad guy tanks are doing something at a place I asked about during the time frame I asked about because that was an important place/time to getting done the job assigned to my boss.
...and in the COIN context this becomes critical because you are seeking to kill or capture humans, within a population so the precision of the information required is far greater, yet the number of useful sensors greatly reduced. Time frames are also generally far greater and less critical - though not in every case.

Entropy
05-05-2009, 07:50 PM
Ken,

Thanks, as always, for your reasonable and thoughtful responses.



Uhh, what happens if an implementer at a lower level plans an operation and suddenly loses a critical asset to a higher hq pull that turns out to be a bad call. Does anyone suffer for that? Like the implementer may suffer?

I sent you a PM, but the short version is that, at least in the current conflicts, the asset loss is the result of the ground force's decision. I don't have any insight into what repercussions, if any, occur, but I haven't yet seen a definitive "bad call" so it's hard to say. When assets are pulled, it's usually for obviously good reasons - for example an MQ-1 is doing a route or area scan and it gets pulled to support a TIC.


- that I'm deeply cynical about major headquarters capabilities and competence based on experience long ago and apparent evidence in many places (including but not limited to Tampa, Doha, Baghdad and Kabul) today, the 4th of May, 2009.

- that I have seen few success in excessive centralization. If the center fails, all is lost, the limbs and implementers don't know what to do.

Sure, the key word being "excessive" - I'm against excessive centralization too, but not everyone is going to agree on what is excessive.

I share your cynicism about HHQ and think we probably agree that stuff needs to get pushed to the lowest possible level. I maintain that is mostly a leadership problem and what you see as overcentralization, I see as poor leadership. Our promotion system rewards micromanagement, careerism and risk-aversion. The solution to this problem is not decentralization, it's fixing the personnel system so competent and innovative leaders get promoted. Yes, decentralization can mitigate some effects of poor leadership, but I think excessive decentralization is not the answer and carries it's own set of costs.

Additionally, there is the question of what one does when there are not enough of a particular asset or capability to go around. In that case there are a couple of basic choices:

1. Divide the assets, make them "tactical" or "dedicated" or whatever. For medium-altitude ISR this means the platforms will have to be time-shared because there are not enough for everyone. So great, now a platoon has 30 minutes of dedicated playtime a day that no one can take away from them, but if they need more they'll have to cut some deal with another platoon. The problems with this approach seem pretty obvious to me.

2. Centralize the assets under a separate or higher command structure and allocate based on "need" (however that is defined). There is a range of "centralization" of course and it's legitimate to debate what balance should be struck. The downsides are all the points you've raised.

The best choice is to ensure that all units have all the assets they'll need for almost any situation, on call and under their control. Unfortunately, that's not practical nor possible until we can develop those suits from Starship Troopers, mini nukes and all. The next best option, IMO, is pooling resources through centralization. The worst option is, IMO, to divy resources/assets because, at the end of the day, they will be insufficient to impact the mission much, if not most, of the time.

Consider fuel supply on the western front in 1944. This was ultimately controlled by Eisenhower and there was intense competition among Commanders (especially Patton and Montgomery) for those supplies. The argument against centralization would suggest that fuel should have been divided equally between them, but the problems with that are obvious, no?

Of course, no option is cost-free and risks must be balanced to maximize the effectiveness of scarce resources/assets.


- that I am too familiar with interservice games and agreements to believe what is seen is all there is. There may be a pony in there; we'll see.

Yes we will see. But the reality is that if the Army is going to operate medium-altitude UAS', then they are going to have to do at least some minimal coordination with others using that space. I also think they need to support a fair share of theater-level ISR taskings and be available to assist others if needed, just as those others should assist the Army when needed. To do all that, or something completely different, requires agreements between the relevant parties that are worked out and implemented before going to war.


- that in a real hard charging war -- which we have not seen since 1951 -- the Armed forces (all) will not be adequately supported by these bureaucratic solutions we continually espouse in peacetime

Maybe not, so what is your solution? Should we have no agreements for sharing & coordinating and just make it up as we go along? Remove all dependencies so land, sea and air forces are completely independent of each other? Is that even possible?


- that, mostly, Joe is always the guy that suffers for the screwups of his nominal betters...

That's been true through the whole history of warfare and ISTM reducing that requires picking good leaders more than anything else.

WM,


I don't think creating a JFISR Czar is going to fix the databases problems that many of us know have been out there for decades.

You're right. I don't mean it to be a silver bullet for information sharing, but WITHIN ISR that problem is particularly bad. A lot of that does come from the push to expand ISR capacity no matter what, which results in poor coordination. Some of that is inevitable and over time things will improve, but I think it's moving much too slowly.


BTW, your complaint doesn't seem to be about priortizing/cuing scarce collection assets. As the following quotation suggests, you seem more unhappy that you can't find stuff that someone may already be collecting.

Those are separate complaints. Sorry for the confusion - you got me on a tangent there! A JFISRC may or may not be a good idea for either one - I tend to think it may be more applicable for prioritization and not as applicable for information sharing (which is a bigger problem).


Isn't just the Army that hides stuff--people who live in tin houses shouldn't throw can openers.

Actually, it is mostly the Army. I've registered accounts for over a dozen different Army sites on the SIPRnet so I can have access to their ops and intel - something I need to have so I can provide their unit support. On the CFACC side, I have two accounts and one of those requires registration because access lets me modify the database. Most everything is on the CFACC website or is linked through there (though I have to say the layout and design of the CAOC site sucks).

The real problem comes in when doing research-based analysis and not simply supporting current ops. When info is hidden inside websites that require registration, it's unsearchable - IOW no one can find it unless they already know it's there.


Been my experience that there's tons of stuff collected--probably more than a horde of analysts many times larger than what we our wildest dreams could ever hope to havewould ever be able to wade through--reminds me of these lines from Lewis Carroll's poem "The Walrus and the Carpenter"

Yes, and that's why search tools are so critical today because they allow you to find the information you need. Unfortunately, when people needlessly hide their information then search tools can't find it.

Personally, I like the NSA model. Pretty much all SIGINT finds its way to the NSA. So, for example, if I'm looking for something Guardrail may have collected, I don't need to contact the Guardrail unit - I can search NSA's databases. There's no equivalent for imagery, MASINT, full-motion video, etc.

Wilf,


Back in my day, some of us pushed for a "28-32 tanks are here," angle rather than "we think this is the 2nd Echelon BN of the 191 Reserve MRD moving into an assembly area."
In terms of how that information gets used the differences are huge. Simpler aims make the a lot of Stovepipes go away, and with it all the network malarkey as well.

That's true to a point, but in my experience, my Commanders are not satisfied with simple numbers which is really just information, not intelligence. Knowing the particular unit those tanks belong to is important because it can give you a better idea of that unit's capabilities: Is it a regular formation, or is it elite? Has it seen combat or taken losses recently? Knowing the particular unit, I can look at recent comint/humint reporting and maybe find things that provide value added information. I can also use templating to estimate where the other formations in the brigade/division, whatever are located. While all that can be important value-added information, I agree that knowing the tanks are there is the most important.


and in the COIN context this becomes critical because you are seeking to kill or capture humans, within a population so the precision of the information required is far greater, yet the number of useful sensors greatly reduced. Time frames are also generally far greater and less critical - though not in every case.

That's a very important point. When dealing with the Soviets, our intelligence problem wasn't too complicated. It didn't take a lot of resources to find Soviet armored formations (or ships, or aircraft). The challenge was defeating those threats - having enough of the right firepower at the right time, etc. In the wars today the situation is reversed. We don't need a lot of firepower to, for instance, take out a Zaqari or an IED cell. Finding that person or that cell is the main challenge. Unfortunately, our intelligence apparatus is very slow to change to meet this reality.

George L. Singleton
05-05-2009, 09:46 PM
I spent some time today reading about the recent agreement between the Army and Air Force on utilization of airborne intelligence assets. Here's a quick look (http://www.acc.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123137013). For more, google "task 11 UAS."



This is one of the few cases I know of where Army assets are pledged to assist the air component's independent operations. Personally, I like this new agreement a lot because it formalizes what should be SOP - that everything, ultimately, belongs to the JFC, and he/she should be able to utilize capabilities when and where they are needed.

That's all quite interesting on its own, but it got me thinking about the defunct DARO (http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/daro/) from the 1990's (an attempt to do for airborne ISR what the NRO did for satellite reconnaissance) as well as ISR ops today (which is where I work now). So here's my proposal - extrapolate from this recent Task 11 agreement and make ISR a separate component under the Joint Force Commander led by a "Joint Force ISR Component Commander" or JFISRCC.

It seems like such a structural change would improve the JFC's ability to allocate scarce ISR assets and prevent asset hoarding. Additionally, it might solve what I see is a major problem today - inadequate coordination and intelligence sharing between the land and air component's ISR assets. Too much intelligence is still stovepiped inside those structures, causing all sorts of problems and headaches.

For example, the process a ground unit must go through for ISR support is needlessly difficult and complex - first they have to ask for "organic" support, then component support, and only after those are exhausted can they go to the air component. A JFISRC would be a "one stop shop" for ISR that, theoretically, at least, could significantly improve this process as well as better match the best ISR asset for a particularly requirement.

What do you all think?

With due respect, sounds like another layering or military bureaucratic way to try to add to the pile of the chain of command which thickens rather than thins out the chain.

The flexible either air or land scenario requiring reciprocal support quickly is doable with existing command structure who simply change mission targets as required and the area commander is the one who decides mission target changes.

My view as an old USAF guy who served inside Pakistan in the mid-1960s.

Ken White
05-05-2009, 09:52 PM
Thanks, as always, for your reasonable and thoughtful responses.Back atcha...
I sent you a PM, but the short version is that, at least in the current conflicts, the asset loss is the result of the ground force's decision.Got the PM and responded. Thanks. Which force pulls is irrelevant -- a higher HQ made the pull. I know some of the time, that will be a good decision. You and I both know that there are no guarantees that it will always be a good one and I've seen about as many bad as good (thus my 50:50 earlier).
Sure, the key word being "excessive" - I'm against excessive centralization too, but not everyone is going to agree on what is excessive.True. Been my observation that everyone assigned or working at Division level or above supports increased centralized control while those at Brigade and lower oppose it. I believe there's a message there...
I maintain that is mostly a leadership problem and what you see as overcentralization, I see as poor leadership. Our promotion system rewards micromanagement, careerism and risk-aversion. The solution to this problem is not decentralization, it's fixing the personnel system so competent and innovative leaders get promoted.I believe the possibility of what you and I agree should occur is quite slim -- thus the probability is that there will be mediocrity at JFC and upper Staff level. The processes must be designed to preclude them from doing too much damage.
Yes, decentralization can mitigate some effects of poor leadership, but I think excessive decentralization is not the answer and carries it's own set of costs.Excessive decentralization like excessive centralization is in the eye of the beholder -- and again, one's location in the chain affects what is beheld. I'll just leave that one with the fact that I've seen a lot of decentralized screwups that did minor damage. Most of the centralized screwups I've seen, OTOH, did MAJOR damage in many places -- to include the psyche of citizens of the US...
1. Divide the assets, make them "tactical" or "dedicated" or whatever. ... 2. Centralize the assets under a separate or higher command structure and allocate based on "need" (however that is defined)...Depends on the item and the war . Your 155s need to be no lower and usually higher than Bde directed wpns; my 60 / 81 and even 120 mortars need to be assigned to owning units at Pltoon, co and Bn fpr most operations. Locatikon of UAVs, all equipment, depends on many variables (yet again Ken waves METT-TC :D). Your solution will work in Iraq and or Afghanistan. It may or may not work in a major conflict entailing movement and HIC; it really does depend on the situation.

Short answer: There should never be a one size fits all for a warfighting problem-- and an 'agreement' between the services heads down that road and deters flexibility of thinkong

Flexibility and intiaitve are tenets of US doctrine yet we constantly ptoduce well intentioned efforts that havr the terrible unintended consequence of stifling people.
The best choice is to ensure that all units have all the assets they'll need for almost any situation, on call and under their control.True and if we purchased equipment on an organized and rational basis instead of whichever way Congress decides to spend money this year, we could do that. We should do that. We should also fix the personnel system.

We're unlikely to do either -- so we need to design processes that allow the best use of what we have and that means maximum flexibility and preparing for a worst case scenario.
Consider fuel supply on the western front in 1944. This was ultimately controlled by Eisenhower and there was intense competition among Commanders (especially Patton and Montgomery) for those supplies. The argument against centralization would suggest that fuel should have been divided equally between them, but the problems with that are obvious, no?No. the argument against centralization would have been to give the bulk of the fuel to Patton and tell Montgomery to continue "Tidying up his battlefield..." What centralization did was give Eisenhower the authority to make a political decision that almost certainly prolonged the war. I understand why he did it and I think it was bad decision. I also know the British would have accepted -- it would've hacked them off but then we did and do that on a daily basis anyway.

Yes we will see. But the reality is that if the Army is going to operate medium-altitude UAS', then they are going to have to do at least some minimal coordination with others using that space. I also think they need to support a fair share of theater-level ISR taskings and be available to assist others if needed, just as those others should assist the Army when needed.Unless I missed something, there is no Air War there, strictly speaking...

I also do not believe we have any reason to think that the Army would not support theater level ISR taskings.
To do all that, or something completely different, requires agreements between the relevant parties that are worked out and implemented before going to war.No. Those agreements induce a mindset and build tunnel vision Every war is different -- even Afghanistan and Iraq are quite different. What's going to be required if we go to war is the same thing that happened in WW II, a lot of deadwood and a lot of peacetime foolishness will have to be swept away. One size doesn't fit all; METT-TC and all that -- war is not a bureaucratic effort, no matter how much we try to make it so.
Maybe not, so what is your solution?
. . .
That's been true through the whole history of warfare and ISTM reducing that requires picking good leaders more than anything else.In reverse order; yes and we do a fair job of that but people vary and we cannot guarantee the good leaders will be in the right place at the right time. The solution is to design processes that are dummy proof instead of those that presume every Commander is infallible. We used to have those but they've mostly been stripped away by political correctness.

Which is interesting as there's little that's less PC than a war...:wry:

My solution is to look at the equipment that we have and that is in the pipeline; get rid of stupid things like MRAPs (purchased at the behest of Congress just to be PC), rationalize equipment and give Commanders the tools to do their jobs. When a new tool, the MQ-1C for example, becomes available, determine who needs it -- not who should operate it; who needs it -- then assign it to that echelon provided they are capable of operating it and can totally care for it. If they cannot, they should not 'own' it and someone above must operate it for them. Note the need has not gone away, merely the operating capability. Once it is established at an operating and for a supported echelon, any excess capability accrues to higher echelons or adjacent units METT-TC dependent.

There will be occasional failures to share properly just as there are occasional failures to prioritize correctly in a central control regimen. The probability of least dangerous failure accrues at the lowest echelon.

As I said in response to the PM, we're unlikely to ever agree on this, background and perspectives are too different. I'll leave it alone with three final thoughts.

Re: agreements before wars; I'm reminded of what Ernie King said when he went to be the CNO in 1942. "Yeah, whenever there's a war, they call the sonsabicthces out front." He tore up every interservice agreement in existence.

The Army and the Marines have their own aircraft and every 'Joint' operation causes an interservice food fight over control. There's a reason those dumb Neanderthals want to hold on to their birds...

Increased efficiency almost never enhances effectiveness. In combat, I'd prefer an effective solution rather than an efficient one...

William F. Owen
05-06-2009, 06:05 AM
That's true to a point, but in my experience, my Commanders are not satisfied with simple numbers which is really just information, not intelligence.

Well that's telling in and of itself. I know exactly what you mean, and I faced that problem. "Staff, which MMR are facing?" and I wanted to reply "I don't know and it doesn't matter." I also wanted to add, "If I tell you will it change your plan?" I have numerous horror stories from that period.

Looking back we were extraordinarily bad at defining what we actually needed to know versus, what we felt we wanted. At the formation level, we should have limited ourselves to intent and capability.

wm
05-06-2009, 12:15 PM
The real problem comes in when doing research-based analysis and not simply supporting current ops. When info is hidden inside websites that require registration, it's unsearchable - IOW no one can find it unless they already know it's there.
Again this is trying to conflate two different efforts it seems to me. If you can't get the feeds you need to provide intelligence to current ops, that is indeed a problem. But I suspect that this is more about providing what I'd call combat information than about providing "finished" intelligence products. And as you noted in your response to Wilf,
That's true to a point, but in my experience, my Commanders are not satisfied with simple numbers which is really just information, not intelligence. your bosses seem to be more interested in the sort of stuff that comes form the longer-term studies. Again, I'll suggest that putting a new guy in the chain with a button or two on the collar isn't going to get those databases identified and unlocked. To get stuff like that one has to do some HUMINT within our own intel system. But, I don't think that's any different in any dealing with the other systems responsible for providing the various elements of combat power. If it were, then I don't think we'd see the push for common operating pictures and better situatiomal awareness display software and hardware.


Yes, and that's why search tools are so critical today because they allow you to find the information you need. Unfortunately, when people needlessly hide their information then search tools can't find it. Perhaps the best search tools out there are the old telephone and MIRC Chat. I suspect they are much more productive than Google searches and SQL queries of databases. Sometimes we need to look elsewhere than to a technology solution. Business folks still usually travel to "seal the deal" face-to-face even though VTC is pretty ubiquitous.

Entropy
05-06-2009, 01:29 PM
Ken,

Thanks again for the discussion and PM's. You are right that we have different backgrounds and perspectives, but I think we may not be that far apart in the end.


My solution is to look at the equipment that we have and that is in the pipeline; get rid of stupid things like MRAPs (purchased at the behest of Congress just to be PC), rationalize equipment and give Commanders the tools to do their jobs. When a new tool, the MQ-1C for example, becomes available, determine who needs it -- not who should operate it; who needs it -- then assign it to that echelon provided they are capable of operating it and can totally care for it. If they cannot, they should not 'own' it and someone above must operate it for them. Note the need has not gone away, merely the operating capability. Once it is established at an operating and for a supported echelon, any excess capability accrues to higher echelons or adjacent units METT-TC dependent.


I pretty much agree with this, in theory at least. In practice, however, there will be times when there will be more people who need a capability than what is available or can be acquired. So the problem of scarcity remains and my sense is that scarcity will have to be managed somehow. That's really the angle I come at this from.


WM,


Again this is trying to conflate two different efforts it seems to me. If you can't get the feeds you need to provide intelligence to current ops, that is indeed a problem. But I suspect that this is more about providing what I'd call combat information than about providing "finished" intelligence products. And as you noted in your response to Wilf,

My job is both, depending. Air Force DGS's mainly support current ops, but they also do finished intelligence. To give you an example of the latter, we might create a "pattern of life" product for a high interest individual, graphically tracing his movements over a period of time. This is easy enough to do with DGS-only assets, but there is usually video from the Army and other's assets that provide additional information or, more importantly, coverage of that individual from periods when there wasn't a dgs asset.

So, unlike the NSA and SIGINT, there's no "one-stop shop" for this information. It's not like conglomeration is technically difficult - it isn't - but it never happens. There's no reason IMO to require registration on the vast majority of SIPR websites and there's no good reason not to have centralized portals for intelligence and ops information.


your bosses seem to be more interested in the sort of stuff that comes form the longer-term studies. Again, I'll suggest that putting a new guy in the chain with a button or two on the collar isn't going to get those databases identified and unlocked.

Well, my bosses are interested in whatever our "customer" is interested in, which can vary.

Classified information is becoming more fragmented, not less, IMO. Since I first started in the intel business in the early 1990's, my time spent finding information has gone up tremendously compared to the time I spend on analysis and preparing products. I'm not the only one who feels that way. Maybe some higher authority is not the answer, but the status quo is not acceptable. Again, I like NSA's model. We need something similar for the other "ints."

I'm not wedded to the idea of a JFISRC - it was something I threw up for discussion and so far I'm less supportive of the idea than I was originally.


Perhaps the best search tools out there are the old telephone and MIRC Chat. I suspect they are much more productive than Google searches and SQL queries of databases. Sometimes we need to look elsewhere than to a technology solution. Business folks still usually travel to "seal the deal" face-to-face even though VTC is pretty ubiquitous.

Naturally, but you can't get everything over the phone or mirc, assuming you even know who to contact (the contact info on websites is often wrong/out of date). Besides, calling a dozen or so people to see if they have information on subject X is often a waste of my time and theirs. I should simply be able to get the basic information I need, then I can call/chat/email who I need to in order to get context, clarifications, etc.

Now, over a period of months, I've "learned the system." I've learned through experience who has what and I'm somewhat more efficient at finding information. I know, or at least have a general idea, when/if one of those hidden veins of information is likely to have something I need. I know who the key people are that I need to contact for various types of information.

The problem is that it took months to get here, it's still a PITA and I bet there's still stuff out there I'm still unaware of. There's simply no excuse for that.