The question...

[Boot]

Ok,
So I have been to some conferences and such in the beltway and down in sunny Florida.
Can anyone explain to me what in their view is the dividing line between GPF and SOF. I read an article that was posted on this forum in which ADM Olson writes about why SOF are uniquely qualified for the Long War. I don't disagree with him on that, however I then read an article about two young Marines partnered up with Afghan forces by themselves alone and unafraid in the capacity as advisors. So I thought, well ADM although I don't disagree with you, that SOF have unique skill sets why is it that these two kids are doing it without specialized training?
So I ask again what do you think the integration between GPF and SOF will be? I have heard SOF types state that when its a potential combat situation then its an SOF mission. I cannot agree with that as OIF and OEF bear out mounds of data that run contrary to this.
The only thing I can see that is the dividing line is funding lines. Titles and authorities.
My fear is that the individual Soldier, Sailor, Airman and Marine who are those GPF tasked with IW/SFA won't get screened and trained properly, which I submit, that individual is the building block of any effort. Invest in the man. Does that sound familiar?
I think you do screen individuals for Advisory type duty who are going to be the persistent engagement types, who are carrying out FID like missions or working very closely with FSF that have a national view. These are the forces we must invest in because send the wrong people, and it could cause more harm than good. Does the screening have to be a month long event in the woods. I don't think so. I have known Marines who can hump and run all day, jump out of high flying aircraft and lock out of subs, but I would NEVER want those guys partnered with FSF on their own. Great for DA type missions not soft missions. I doubt I will get much response to this, as I haven't in the past.

Boot


Boot

[jmm99]

as an amateur (in the original sense of that word) in Marine history (US and CFM-Canada), I'd suggest that the two Marine kids - more likely grandkids to me - can do what they are doing because Marines are both general purpose and special operations oriented creatures .

They also have had combined arms for so long that they think it's a genetic feature. And can mix and match, shrink and grow, with reckless abandon (MAGTFs).

The GPF and SOF discussion(s) [re: GPF and SOF dividing lines, assuming that both of them are monoliths, which they seem not] is perceived by this detached and armchair observer to be primarily an Army thing. Although DoD Dir 3000.05, if executed fully, would affect all the services.

---------------

marsouins - sea hogs, the marine mammal with the most brains, even though no one but themselves understand their language and habits. :D

PS: like the photo with kids on your personal page.

[selil]

The GPF and SOF discussion(s) [re: GPF and SOF dividing lines, assuming that both of them are monoliths, which they seem not] is perceived by this detached and armchair observer to be primarily an Army thing. Although DoD Dir 3000.05, if executed fully, would affect all the services.



You are correct. Though the other forces would disagree they are not organized that way.

[William F. Owen]

So I ask again what do you think the integration between GPF and SOF will be? I have heard SOF types state that when its a potential combat situation then its an SOF mission. I cannot agree with that as OIF and OEF bear out mounds of data that run contrary to this.
The only thing I can see that is the dividing line is funding lines. Titles and authorities.
My fear is that the individual Soldier, Sailor, Airman and Marine who are those GPF tasked with IW/SFA won't get screened and trained properly, which I submit, that individual is the building block of any effort. Invest in the man. Does that sound familiar?
I think you do screen individuals for Advisory type duty who are going to be the persistent engagement types, who are carrying out FID like missions or working very closely with FSF that have a national view.

Good question - as I read it.

I think the difference between proper SOF and GPF forces is very to see when people are honest about intent and purpose. EG: Training, doctrine, and Description match the purpose of the forces they describe.

In the UK it is fairly easy to see who is SOF and who is not. Israel is the same, and they also have very strict rules and doctrine describing who is SOF and who is not.

[max161]

In the UK it is fairly easy to see who is SOF and who is not. Israel is the same, and they also have very strict rules and doctrine describing who is SOF and who is not.

Here is the legislation describing Special Operations Forces and activities.

http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/10/167.html

§ 167. Unified combatant command for special operations forces
How Current is This?
(a) Establishment.— With the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the President, through the Secretary of Defense, shall establish under section 161 of this title a unified combatant command for special operations forces (hereinafter in this section referred to as the “special operations command”). The principal function of the command is to prepare special operations forces to carry out assigned missions.
(b) Assignment of Forces.— Unless otherwise directed by the Secretary of Defense, all active and reserve special operations forces of the armed forces stationed in the United States shall be assigned to the special operations command.
(c) Grade of Commander.— The commander of the special operations command shall hold the grade of general or, in the case of an officer of the Navy, admiral while serving in that position, without vacating his permanent grade. The commander of such command shall be appointed to that grade by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, for service in that position.
(d) Command of Activity or Mission.—
(1) Unless otherwise directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense, a special operations activity or mission shall be conducted under the command of the commander of the unified combatant command in whose geographic area the activity or mission is to be conducted.
(2) The commander of the special operations command shall exercise command of a selected special operations mission if directed to do so by the President or the Secretary of Defense.
(e) Authority of Combatant Commander.—
(1) In addition to the authority prescribed in section 164 (c) of this title, the commander of the special operations command shall be responsible for, and shall have the authority to conduct, all affairs of such command relating to special operations activities.
(2) The commander of such command shall be responsible for, and shall have the authority to conduct, the following functions relating to special operations activities (whether or not relating to the special operations command):
(A) Developing strategy, doctrine, and tactics.
(B) Preparing and submitting to the Secretary of Defense program recommendations and budget proposals for special operations forces and for other forces assigned to the special operations command.
(C) Exercising authority, direction, and control over the expenditure of funds—
(i) for forces assigned to the special operations command; and
(ii) for special operations forces assigned to unified combatant commands other than the special operations command, with respect to all matters covered by paragraph (4) and, with respect to a matter not covered by paragraph (4), to the extent directed by the Secretary of Defense.
(D) Training assigned forces.
(E) Conducting specialized courses of instruction for commissioned and noncommissioned officers.
(F) Validating requirements.
(G) Establishing priorities for requirements.
(H) Ensuring the interoperability of equipment and forces.
(I) Formulating and submitting requirements for intelligence support.
(J) Monitoring the promotions, assignments, retention, training, and professional military education of special operations forces officers.
(3) The commander of the special operations command shall be responsible for—
(A) ensuring the combat readiness of forces assigned to the special operations command; and
(B) monitoring the preparedness to carry out assigned missions of special operations forces assigned to unified combatant commands other than the special operations command.
(4)
(A) The commander of the special operations command shall be responsible for, and shall have the authority to conduct, the following:
(i) Development and acquisition of special operations-peculiar equipment.
(ii) Acquisition of special operations-peculiar material, supplies, and services.
(B) Subject to the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense, the commander of the command, in carrying out his functions under subparagraph (A), shall have authority to exercise the functions of the head of an agency under chapter 137 of this title.
(C) The staff of the commander shall include an inspector general who shall conduct internal audits and inspections of purchasing and contracting actions through the special operations command and such other inspector general functions as may be assigned.
(f) Budget.— In addition to the activities of a combatant command for which funding may be requested under section 166 (b) of this title, the budget proposal of the special operations command shall include requests for funding for—
(1) development and acquisition of special operations-peculiar equipment; and
(2) acquisition of other material, supplies, or services that are peculiar to special operations activities.
(g) Intelligence and Special Activities.— This section does not constitute authority to conduct any activity which, if carried out as an intelligence activity by the Department of Defense, would require a notice to the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives under title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413 et seq.).
(h) Regulations.— The Secretary of Defense shall prescribe regulations for the activities of the special operations command. Such regulations shall include authorization for the commander of such command to provide for operational security of special operations forces and activities.
(i) Identification of Special Operations Forces.—
(1) Subject to paragraph (2), for the purposes of this section special operations forces are those forces of the armed forces that—
(A) are identified as core forces or as augmenting forces in the Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, Annex E, dated December 17, 1985;
(B) are described in the Terms of Reference and Conceptual Operations Plan for the Joint Special Operations Command, as in effect on April 1, 1986; or
(C) are designated as special operations forces by the Secretary of Defense.
(2) The Secretary of Defense, after consulting with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the commander of the special operations command, may direct that any force included within the description in paragraph (1)(A) or (1)(B) shall not be considered as a special operations force for the purposes of this section.
(j) Special Operations Activities.— For purposes of this section, special operations activities include each of the following insofar as it relates to special operations:
(1) Direct action.
(2) Strategic reconnaissance.
(3) Unconventional warfare.
(4) Foreign internal defense.
(5) Civil affairs.
(6) Psychological operations.
(7) Counterterrorism.
(8) Humanitarian assistance.
(9) Theater search and rescue.
(10) Such other activities as may be specified by the President or the Secretary of Defense.

[Boot]

Max,
Your right we do have this; however I would submit that GPF has ans is doing some of this. Not just as providing security for SOF forces as they carry out their mission. I think that is a waste of GPF forces. I also have to question whether or not items (2), (4), (5), (6), (8) and (9) should be considered solely the purview of SOF. I have done some of that. An argument can even be made about DA; Some GPF do carry out DA.


Boot

[Boot]

I do believe that you can screen and select GPF and still be GPF for this type duty. Three examples I know of:

Marine Recon, Marine Force Recon and the US Army's Asymetric Warfare Group. All have a screening and selection process. In the case of Recon, they do get trained in skill sets commonly associated with SOF, such as Combatant Diver (this will test your manhood) and MFF to name two. I am not sure what the Army's AWG standard they are trained to.
I do know that Recon has traditionally had a screening and further assesment (RIP then Amphibious Recon School) and those who didn't cut it were dropped.
So there is precedent for this. It seems to me that there is resistance from sectors of SOF, in having GPF carry out some of these missions. I say take the lead like the SECDEF has directed, and help the GPF who will be assignned to this, screen, train etc...bring their standards up. I think they will find that some organizations are a lot better than they think and it wouldn't be that big of a leap to do this.


Boot

[Surferbeetle]

Boot,

Your point about the two young Marines who are getting it done out in the boonies is the definition of what tactical SOF is IMHO. Max161 brings up a key operational issue for SOF with the legislative background...no legislation, no funding, no officially sanctioned SOF forces. We need someone to chime in on the strategic definition of SOF...

Like most things it can be boiled down to the people who are involved.

SOF is people who are intuitively inquisitive about other cultures and languages, who intuitively understand that there is one than one path to accomplishing the mission, and who are able to use whatever skill set they have to advance the cause.

There are of course GPF who meet these criteria and from a management standpoint a SOF identifier, and some sort of vetting by training would be beneficial for when GPF forces have to cover down on SOF missions.

From my viewpoint DA is more a 'super-set' of GPF skills, but this defintion does not mesh with the legislation (j)(1).

Regards,

Steve

[William F. Owen]

SOF is people who are intuitively inquisitive about other cultures and languages, who intuitively understand that there is one than one path to accomplishing the mission, and who are able to use whatever skill set they have to advance the cause.


My perception is that most SOF forces are men seeking to be physically and psychologically challenged to a degree that sets them apart from the vast majority of soldiers, and thus to make them eligible for the most demanding forms of military missions.

Additional screening will disqualify those who cannot learn sufficiently fast, or are unable to gain rapid understanding of problems based on available data.

I am not sure an interest in foreign cultures is implicit to most of the selection processes I have studied in any degree of detail.

[Ken White]

Having been around at the conception as it were and having seen Barbwire Bob scuttling around the halls of Congress, I'm very much aware of the law that created USSOCOM -- and the fact that it was deliberately delayed so it could develop some bypasses to the six months prior Goldwater Nichols Act.

Few points on the Law. The SecDef has the authority to move units in and out of SOCOM. Law also says that unless the Prez or secDef directs otherwise, all SO activities will conducted under command of -- not coordination with -- the Geographic Commander. Note that the list of activities at the bottom of the post of Max 161are not a list of Special Operations but a list of activiteis that can relate to Special operations.

That's a long way of saying that Special operations are what ever the President and /or the Sec Def say they are. Or, in many cases whatever SOCOM wants to say they are and the GPF allows them to get away with.

As far as I know, the PREVIOUS SecDef gave SOCOM an exception to being under CoCom command and I guess that's still in force. whether that's wise or not is very much TBD.

I watched the migration of many GPF 'mission sets' into the SOF arena during the 80s and 90s as the US Army lost its focus and adopted a training system that robbed commanders of time and choices. I have watched -- and cheered -- as the GPF has regained those minor skills in the last few years. We're supposed to be in this together...

Surferbeetle says:
Like most things it can be boiled down to the people who are involved.True. Today, many SOF missions are a result of that deteriorating number of mission capabilities of the GPF, a quest for dollars back in the 80s and 90s and some good -- and bad -- decisions. All people products...
SOF is people who are intuitively inquisitive about other cultures and languages, who intuitively understand that there is one than one path to accomplishing the mission, and who are able to use whatever skill set they have to advance the cause.True for CA and most SF, less true for all PsyOps and the DA types (JSOC, SEALs). All are needed but they do different things and the DA guys do not need the in-depth culture and language bit; though the other attributes apply.

I'll note that all those attributes exist in the GPF as well -- they're just under trained and under used. That is due to the fact that the Army for 25 plus years denied those things were important - all of todays Generals grew up in that time period. IOW, it's a situation that need not exist and should cahnge for the good of all.
There are of course GPF who meet these criteria and from a management standpoint a SOF identifier, and some sort of vetting by training would be beneficial for when GPF forces have to cover down on SOF missions.Condescend often? :D

How about forgetting management and concentrating on mission accomplishment, not 'vetting' but just training people properly for the jobs they may have to do simply because the numbers will always -- write that down, always -- in any MAJOR operation entail the GPF doing, as they have done and are doing today, some full spectrum missions. Not SO missions, just full spectrum of warfare missions.
From my viewpoint DA is more a 'super-set' of GPF skills, but this defintion does not mesh with the legislation (j)(1).DA is an infantry skill . Application of DA is an Infantry job, period. Application of DA for some missions can be Special Operations depending on several parameters -- but most in most wars, most such operations will not be SO due to the quantity. Nor should they be. Special can lose its meaning if one is not careful...

Boot said:
So there is precedent for this. It seems to me that there is resistance from sectors of SOF, in having GPF carry out some of these missions. I say take the lead like the SECDEF has directed, and help the GPF who will be assignned to this, screen, train etc...bring their standards up. I think they will find that some organizations are a lot better than they think and it wouldn't be that big of a leap to do this.Absolutely correct.

Calling basic military missions 'Special operations' when they are essentially basic everyday warfighting tasks pose the risk to the SO community of making them not special...

We will ignore what Boot says at some cost to the Nation and to people in ALL the Armed Forces.

[Surferbeetle]

That's a long way of saying that Special operations are what ever the President and /or the Sec Def say they are.

Agreed.


Or, in many cases whatever SOCOM wants to say they are and the GPF allows them to get away with.

I am amazed at some of the rivalry between GPF and SOF that I see at times. We on the CA-side try to downplay things with some humor since we do not have the super-DA skills but its interesting nonetheless. On the civilian-side, when I need help with a special problem I call a specialist in that problem and its not an affront to my manhood to do so...it would be a good thing if we could do this consistently in the Army.


I watched the migration of many GPF 'mission sets' into the SOF arena during the 80s and 90s as the US Army lost its focus and adopted a training system that robbed commanders of time and choices. I have watched -- and cheered -- as the GPF has regained those minor skills in the last few years. We're supposed to be in this together...

I would agree here as well, like most SOF I started as GPF and I find that I rely upon my GPF skills to keep me and mine alive, as well as most day to day soldiering issues. My SOF skills are reserved for a more narrow range of problems.


Today, many SOF missions are a result of that deteriorating number of mission capabilities of the GPF, a quest for dollars back in the 80s and 90s and some good -- and bad -- decisions. All people products...

Your USMC time is showing through and its a good thing. Fiscal discipline, everybody is a rifleman, la-de-da and everybody will get it done no matter what attitude...I can see through the sides of some their helicopters they use them so much...sheesh. Very different than the approach that I often see in the Army.


True for CA and most SF, less true for all PsyOps and the DA types (JSOC, SEALs). All are needed but they do different things and the DA guys do not need the in-depth culture and language bit; though the other attributes apply.

DA is both a needed and a different beast and I suspect you know one or two more things more than do I about the need for a specialization in things other than the culture and language bit.


Condescend often? :D

Sometimes, although the vast majority of times its not intended (and it was not intended here) and a timely boot upside the head helps me to reset, thanks :wry:


How about forgetting management and concentrating on mission accomplishment, not 'vetting' but just training people properly for the jobs they may have to do simply because the numbers will always -- write that down, always -- in any MAJOR operation entail the GPF doing, as they have done and are doing today, some full spectrum missions. Not SO missions, just full spectrum of warfare missions.DA is an infantry skill . Application of DA is an Infantry job, period. Application of DA for some missions can be Special Operations depending on several parameters -- but most in most wars, most such operations will not be SO due to the quantity. Nor should they be. Special can lose its meaning if one is not careful...

Ken/Sir - Let me be CA-centric here for a moment. Unlike some, I do not have a problem with GPF doing CMO or even CA missions...not all CA soldiers are CA...yet (this may/probably applies in other areas of SOF but I will defer on SF). Brainpower and skills uber-alles baby. I try not to get hung up on rank either, as long as everybody understands that since the highest ranking guy gets fried if it all goes bad the team will factor this into the equation. We had a USMC/USAR/ENG/LT-non CA type Electrical Engineer running electricity, which as it should be. I have also seen a Electrical Engineer with E-5 stripes being used as a driver...bad #### and unfortunately I didn't win that particular fight to get that changed. My experience then is that it would be beneficial to our efforts that folks holding these, and other 'special' skills sets, be consistently identified and properly utilized.

As a dirt and water guy I definitely believe in get-er done, and truly understand the difference between theory and real world application. I do find however that its faster and less painful when we have the right folks on the team. Either way, I still enjoy the work.

Best,

Steve

[Old Eagle]

There -- mansolved!

The truth of the matter is that we now need to develop more synergy between SOF and GPF than ever before. During the Army's recent Unified Quest war game, some SF participants actually admitted that. We're going to see SFA missions led by conventional organizations that are augmented by SOF, and other SFA missions led by SOF that are augmented with GPF, whether as SMEs or as force multipliers. Let's just get used to it. Nobody is trying to "steal" anyone else's thunder. War is a conclict between or among opposing sides, not a conflict or competition within our side.

The truth of the matter is that future requirements will outstrip SOF capability and capacity. We need to get used to working together. GPF should not be unilaterally conducting CA or CMO activities, but they should be enablers for the pros from Dover (Bragg). A little levening goes a long way. Same with the advisory roles that SF traditionally do. Gotta have a meaningful mix.

Tell me I'm wrong.

[MikeF]

Tell me I'm wrong.

Just kidding:D. We can start by giving SOF a seat on the JCS. Then, I'd recommend them to move from Tampa to Fort Bragg.

On the lower end, SF should consider allowing CF/GPF personnel with significant advisor time to slide into their ranks.

That's all common-sense to me until you throw in ricebowls, budgets, egos, and tabs...The simple things that get in the way of mission requirements :cool:.

Mike

[Ken White]

Surferbeetle:
On the civilian-side, when I need help with a special problem I call a specialist in that problem and its not an affront to my manhood to do so...it would be a good thing if we could do this consistently in the Army.True -- and most everyone in the Army does the same thing with no hassles -- until you get to a certain level of either ground in parochialism (due usually to an incident somewhere along the line; after that every perceived slight became reinforcement) or concern for flags and spaces. In the end, much of the discombobulation is really about those flags and space, not about manhood. Both sides, IMO are at fault but regardless of source, I agree it should go.
not all CA soldiers are CA...yet (this may/probably applies in other areas of SOF but I will defer on SF).I think it applies across the board. I spent 45 years being amazed at the number of people, including some quite senior people who didn't like or want to be in the Army (and the other services as well). I was also amazed at the number who really had no self confidence...
Brainpower and skills uber-alles baby. I try not to get hung up on rank either, as long as everybody understands that since the highest ranking guy gets fried if it all goes bad the team will factor this into the equation.Couldn't agree more. Unfortunately, some of those folks I mentioned: senior, don't really like the Army, more importantly those with no self confidence -- they think you and I are nuts and will fight for form over function.

Old Eagle:
Tell me I'm wrong.Can't. Target. Good shot!

Mike F:
That's all common-sense to me until you throw in ricebowls, budgets, egos, and tabs...The simple things that get in the way of mission requirements.Sigh. Too true...

[Boot]

Then, I'd recommend them to move from Tampa to Fort Bragg.

Groan...Tampa is sooooooo much nicer than Fayetteville...

I say NOOOOO to that!


BOOT

[Boot]

That's all common-sense to me until you throw in ricebowls, budgets, egos, and tabs...The simple things that get in the way of mission requirements


Well we don't have a tab problem in the Marines, now about those egos and ricebowls...



BOOT

[Uboat509]

We can start by giving SOF a seat on the JCS.

I used to believe this but I have come to reconsider this of late. If we did create a "SOF" seat at the JCS then experience tells me that the command will be dominated by JSOC and that means SF will continue to be the red headed step children of the SOF community.


Then, I'd recommend them to move from Tampa to Fort Bragg.

Fort Bragg is already way overcrowded and there are more than enough major headquarters there now.


On the lower end, SF should consider allowing CF/GPF personnel with significant adviser time to slide into their ranks.

Selection is open to every qualified candidate.

SFC W

[MikeF]

I used to believe this but I have come to reconsider this of late. If we did create a "SOF" seat at the JCS then experience tells me that the command will be dominated by JSOC and that means SF will continue to be the red headed step children of the SOF community.



Fort Bragg is already way overcrowded and there are more than enough major headquarters there now.



Selection is open to every qualified candidate.

SFC W

Uboat,

I'm an armor officer that has spent many moons with SOF and SF.

Relook what you stated and see if you want to change your words.

I have PT with a seal tomorrow morning. If you're words stand, I'll rebut them one by one.

I love you guys, but your wrong on this one.

And with my brain injuries, I have no dog in this fight :)

v/r

Mike

[MikeF]

And this is my opinion. It may change.


I used to believe this but I have come to reconsider this of late. If we did create a "SOF" seat at the JCS then experience tells me that the command will be dominated by JSOC and that means SF will continue to be the red headed step children of the SOF community.

The issue is not about SOF/SF. I don't think y'all will ever get along, and I never understood why you're under one command. Personally, I thought it was kinda similar to when they did away with specialties for infantry (Bradley grunt = airborne grunt). Just weird.:(

IMO, y'all need a four-star seat at the table. That's the only way to work within bureaucracies (ricebowls, budgets, egos, etc)...On the big army level, y'all have not done that well since 9/11. ADM Olson wears too many hats. Is he the Chief of staff of SOF, the CoCom of SOF, or equivalent of FORSCOM? He can't do all three jobs, and I think that's hurt y'all a bit.




Fort Bragg is already way overcrowded and there are more than enough major headquarters there now.

True, but in some respects, it is the center of the universe:D. Seriously, well, you may be right on that one.



Selection is open to every qualified candidate.

That's just not a true statement particularly with O's. I know you're probably laughing right now thinking we have enough O's, but you are missing out on some GPF company commanders who excelled working in patrol bases and FID.

Plus, some of the enlisted that would make excellent SF's simply don't want to go to school after 3-4 deployments.

Does it matter? I dunno.

Would you be better off if you found a way to integrate them? Probably.

Will it happen? Probably not.

I've tried to look at these issues from a neutral standpoint.

v/r

Mike

[Ken White]

I'm inclined to agree with UBoat 509 so I'm looking forward to the discussion

[MikeF]

I'm inclined to agree with UBoat 509 so I'm looking forward to the discussion

SFC W is probably right. I can provide counter-arguments to my statements, but I though this would provide an interesting discussion.

Many do not understand the difference between SOF and SF. I didn't until I worked with them.

v/r

Mike

[jmm99]

I am not about to explain the difference. I will state where I am coming from (which ultimately goes back to the War Crimes thread where I had to read in order to understand, since most Gitmo detainees resulted from special operations, military and/or civilian).

My knowledge of SOCOM is based on looking at its legal framework, which is summarized in the Operational Law Handbook 2008 (http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/operational-law-handbook_2008.pdf) (chap. 24, Special Operations - all quotes below from that source); and by reading other, related materials.

From a lawyer's standpoint, SOCOM is very legal intensive: (1) as to the Laws of War and Rule of Law, and development of ROEs, because it is on the cutting edge of operational considerations involving them; and (2) as to the "Laws of Appropriations" (turf and rice bowls), which affect everything:


A. As noted above, 10 U.S.C. §167 established USSOCOM. This Combatant Command is unique in that it is the only Combatant Command specifically established by Congress and required by law. The DoD could, for example, eliminate the Pacific Command (PACOM) and reorganize its sub-component units. However, DoD does not have the authority to disband USSOCOM. Congress realized that, if it created a Combatant Command without a separate funding authority, DoD would continue to have tremendous control and the ability to drawdown SOF assets simply by refusing to fund their programs. Therefore, an entirely new budgetary authority, Major Force Program Eleven (MFP-11), was established to fund SO. Some have observed that USSOCOM is the only Combatant Command with its own "checkbook." This is important for SO because MFP-11 funds may only be used for articles and programs with an SO basis or nexus.

B. USSOCOM is both a supporting and supported command. It is a supporting command in that it is responsible for providing ready and trained SOF personnel to the geographic Combatant Commanders. It is a supported command in that, when directed by the President or Secretary of Defense (SECDEF), it must be capable of conducting selected strategic SO under its own command.

All of the following is well-known to everybody in this discussion - so, this is not intended to be educational, but solely a framework for discussion (which comes at it from a legal viewpoint):


D. Each service has its own specific SO command. For the Army, it is the U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC), commanded by a Lieutenant General, at Fort Bragg, NC. The Naval Special Warfare Command (NAVSPECWARCOM) is commanded by a Rear Admiral at Coronado, CA. The U.S. Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) is located at Hurlburt Field, FL and led by a Lieutenant General. These service specific SO commands are responsible for selecting, training, and equipping the force. They are also responsible for SO doctrine within their respective services. In the Army, USASOC is a Army Service Component Command (formerly MACOM) and, therefore, Army SOF (ARSOF) is not within the FORSCOM chain of command.

E. There is also a Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC), a sub-unified command of USSOCOM, which is located at Fort Bragg, NC. This is a joint command that studies special operations requirements and techniques; ensures interoperability and equipment standardization; plans and conducts joint special operations exercises and training; and develops joint SO tactics.
[JMM: plus more].

F. In 2006, the U.S. Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command (MARSOC) was established at Camp Lejeune, NC under the command of a Major General. Other than MARSOC, certain units of the Marine Corps, along with particular conventional elements of the U.S. Navy and U.S. Air Force, have been designated "special operations-capable." SO-capable units are, from time to time, designated as SOF units by SECDEF for specific operations. Many Marine Corps units perform and train to perform SO-type missions. The expeditionary nature of the Marine Corps makes it particularly well-suited as an SO-capable force.

The discussion re: the difference between SOF and SF (I think) focuses on USASOC and ARSOF and their components (quoting just the headings):


G. U.S. Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) includes active duty, Army National Guard (ARNG) and U.S. Army Reserve elements. ARSOF falls under the command of USASOC, which is headquartered at Fort Bragg, NC. USASOC is comprised of the following subordinate commands:

1. U.S. Army Special Forces Command (Airborne) (USASFC(A)).
....
2. The 75th Ranger Regiment, commanded by a Colonel, and its three battalions, are also ARSOF.
....
3. The 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (SOAR), commanded by a Colonel and located at Fort Campbell, KY, provides special aviation support to ARSOF, using specialized aircraft and highly-trained personnel.
....
4. The 95th Civil Affairs (CA) Brigade and four active component CA battalions fall under USASOC. Additionally, the 4th Psychological Operations Group (4th POG) falls under USASOC.
....
5. The John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School (JFKSWCS) is responsible for training, leader development, and doctrine.
....
6. The Sustainment Brigade (Special Operations) (Airborne) provides Combat Service Support and Combat Health Support to ARSOF. ....

I suspect that the difference(s) also relate to the mission tasked, which from a legal standpoint include nine basic missions (headings only):


A. Direct Action (DA).
....
B. Special Reconnaissance (SR).
....
C. Foreign Internal Defense (FID).
....
D. Unconventional Warfare (UW).
....
E. Combating Terrorism.
....
F. Psychological Operations (pSYOP).
....
G. Civil Affairs (CA) Operations.
....
H. Counterproliferation (CP) of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD).
....
I. Information Operations (I0).

Finally, besides the nine mission (operational) areas, a number of collateral activities fall within the legal ambit of SOCOM. E.g., the following (headings only):


A. Coalition Support.
....
B. Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR).
....
C. Counterdrug Activities (CD).
....
D. Foreign Humanitarian Assistance (HA).
....
E. Countermine Activities.
....
F. Security Assistance (SA).
....
G. Peace Operations.
....
H. Special Activities. These are activities that are planned and executed so that the role of the U.S. Government is not apparent or acknowledged publicly. Special activities require a Presidential finding and Congressional oversight.

All of that is one heck of a mix of different missions and activities, as much driven by where funding and bodies are available than by logic (my perception).

So, I would like to hear the discussion from a practical standpoint. All the above tends to look very neat from a legal standpoint, but reality often differs.

[Ken White]

Depends on who's the White Queen and can really say "It means whatever I say it means." Not being dismissive or evasive, there are just too many varied situations to pin it down with legal precision (and if someone tried, the other guys lawyers would dispute it... ;) ). It really does depend on the situation -- and the senior parties involved at the time. You are correct to point out the funding issues as that drives many things -- particularly in peacetime or, as now, near peacetime. Once a big war starts, most -- not all -- that infighting gets put away. Lacking that, lotsa turf and ego battles. At lower level, the troops generally work it out pretty well.

Basically, the conventional forces can do any of the missions listed in your two boxes. Note that the law says that SOCOM is on the hook for the special operations facets of all those missions, not the pure or total mission.

A, C and I on the upper chart can certainly be SOF missions but they are not exclusively so. Item D there and the application of items F and G can also leave the 'special' definition and become quite mainstream.

Same thing applies to your second chart. Items A, D, E ,F and G are not at all SO peculiar. Even Item D, which nominally is that can also be parceled out to conventional forces when things get busy. I've been on three CSAR mission myself when I was no longer SF.

Clear? :D

[Ken White]

Many do not understand the difference between SOF and SF. I didn't until I worked with them.I think that's partly due to our ignorant media, partly to the similarity in abbreviations, partly to the fact that SF is part of our SOF but all SOF is not part of our SF and partly due to the fact that the DA crowd effectively dominates SOCOM and therefor those SOF missions are given priority over normal SF missions -- even by some in SF -- and that priority has resulted in some SF doing SOF DA and allied missions...

Or something like that. :wry:

I think that is slowly changing and I acknowledge my perceptions are all from hearsay. Equal opportunity hearsay, though. SF, non-SF SOF and conventional -- and even less conventional -- military types all contribute to my hearsay collection. They contribute far more than I could ever gather open source (without more work than I'm prepared to put into it). ;)

[John T. Fishel]

Special Forces are a US Army SOF element. SF consists of USASF Command under USASOC. SF Command consists of 1st SFG(A), 3rd SFG(A), 5th SFG(A), and 7th SFG(A) & 10th SFG(A) in the Active Component plus the 19th and 20th SFG(A) of the National Guard (reserve component). All other Army SOF are not SF with the exception of some of the training elements of the JFKSWC which train SF. To be considered SF and wear the Green Beret, Flash, and SF tab, a soldier has to have successfully completed the SF Qualification Course (and normally have been assigned to a SF unit).

SF soldiers are qualified infantrymen, airborne qualified, and trained and cross trained in two SF team specialties (intel, engr, comms, medic +). They are alos supposed to be proficient in the language (or one or more of the languages) of the area in which their group normally operates. They are all supposed to be proficient in all kinds of weapons including foreign and are trained to be trainers. And they train on knowing the culture, history, and politics of their region.

3 of the SF groups have left particular marks on SF as a whole. 10th SFG(A) historically specialized on UW, 7th SFG(A) on FID, and 5th SFG(A) on DA. Thus, 2 of the 3 central groups have a trainer/advisor focus.

Non-SF SOF do not go through the full array of training that SF do and focus on other SOF skills. I would not, for example want to give the Ranger Regiment the mission of training Afghan Rangers if I had 5th group available (or any other SFG). I would not want to give 4th POG the mission of training Iraqi infantry nor the 95th CAB the same mission. If I had a US commando mission, I would want SEALS, Delta, or Rangers to do it with support from AFSOC. If I had to lead foerign troops on a similar commando mission I would prefer to have SF rahter than any of the others. (I've left out MARSOC because I'm still not entirely sure of their niche but, from what I've heard and read, the Marines would likely be my back up choice for SF tasks.)

Cheers

JohnT

[Boot]

F. In 2006, the U.S. Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command (MARSOC) was established at Camp Lejeune, NC under the command of a Major General. Other than MARSOC, certain units of the Marine Corps, along with particular conventional elements of the U.S. Navy and U.S. Air Force, have been designated "special operations-capable." SO-capable units are, from time to time, designated as SOF units by SECDEF for specific operations. Many Marine Corps units perform and train to perform SO-type missions. The expeditionary nature of the Marine Corps makes it particularly well-suited as an SO-capable force.

You know I have forgotten about that piece of this. Thanks for bringing it up; Perhaps the GPF who carry out FID/COIN get designated SOC. I had a discussion today with someone at yet another conference and we discussed the GPF/SOF subject. His take was that it a GPF individual that goes to a unit (NON-SOF, I know the difference between SF/SOF)
become "specialized" for the amount of time they are in a GPF unit designated "SOC" and after 2-4 years return to the GPF which would enhance their units having served as advisors and such. Now the organization carrying out FID or SFA missions aren't SOF but they aren't necessarilly a GPF unit. What would be the difference in this? Obviously the specialized training (a screening, language, culture, force protection skills, negotionation skills, title/authorities law etc...)
Also, if a Marine helo squadron is undermanned (pilots etc...) and are preparing to deploy, that squadron gets priority and from across the Marine Air Wing (other squadrons), Marines are sourced. In a GPF unit that specializes in traditional SF missions (lets say advisors) they would be fenced off, and not touched. I would also submit someone who is at this type unit would be a perfect candidate for MARSOC, AFSOC, USASOC (SF) organizations that carry out this type missions. Sure they would still have to qualify but would have a leg up on other potential selectees, and they probably wouldn't have to spend as much time and money training them as they would have language, culture and certain other skill sets already, that is if they got selected.
Just my thoughts.

Boot

[jmm99]

Basically, the conventional forces can do any of the missions listed in your two boxes. Note that the law says that SOCOM is on the hook for the special operations facets of all those missions, not the pure or total mission [JMM emphasis].

A, C and I on the upper chart can certainly be SOF missions but they are not exclusively so. Item D there and the application of items F and G can also leave the 'special' definition and become quite mainstream.

Same thing applies to your second chart. Items A, D, E ,F and G are not at all SO peculiar. Even Item D, which nominally is that can also be parceled out to conventional forces when things get busy.

because sec. 167(j) is clearly phrased inclusively, not exclusively, with respect to SOCOM:


(j) Special Operations Activities.— For purposes of this section, special operations activities include each of the following insofar as it relates to special operations:

(1) Direct action.
(2) Strategic reconnaissance.
(3) Unconventional warfare.
(4) Foreign internal defense.
(5) Civil affairs.
(6) Psychological operations.
(7) Counterterrorism.
(8) Humanitarian assistance.
(9) Theater search and rescue.
(10) Such other activities as may be specified by the President or the Secretary of Defense.

Also pretty much totally clear as to John's succinct explanation; except as to this one:


I would not, for example want to give the Ranger Regiment the mission of training Afghan Rangers...

Does this mean that the 75th is capable of performing its ranger mission, but incapable of transmitting that knowledge to trainees ? Maybe so, but that seems odd to me, since I can't think of a legal analogy.

I also understand the distinction between SF and non-SF (Rangers, CA and POG) as explained by John - and how it could be a source of friction. What I perceived (in at least one of the posts) as friction between SF and JSOC is really lost on me - I can only infer it is really inside-inside baseball.

Coming back to the OP question - "what in their view is the dividing line between GPF and SOF" - the answer seems to be that the lines are pretty well drawn from a legal standpoint - and organizationally.

One could I suppose question why CA and POG are in SOCOM; and probably a zillion other questions as to why this or why not that. I'd like to hear all of them. This is a very interesting area of the law in the process of development - Common Article 3 and the "irregular combatant" (which legally is different from the current buzzword "irregular warfare").

Hey, Boot, the US Marines have been doing special ops in "gray-space" areas since at least Puerto Plata (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Battle_of_Puerto_Plata_Harbor) - 1800 - my CFMs much earlier. They both attained and retained the art of shape-shifting from porpoises to land crabs. ;) As they say, colonialement. :)

[ODB]

In a nut shell the seperation comes down to laws not to capabilities, at least not on the level it should. In a perfect world yes, capabilities would be as much as a dividing line as the laws are, but they are not.

IMO it is also time to relook the Titles that dictate what SF can and cannot do legally. The world has changed since these laws were implemented and need a re-evaluation. Will not elaborate other than there is a call from some to change these things and I think they are headed in the right direction.

We "SF" are own worse enemy. In many formal articles we do call ourselves SOF not SF. Forty some yars ago how many had Green Beret comic books? How many saw Green Berets in National Geographic? How many owned a Green Beret action figure? My point is that along the way we took the "Quiet Professional" role too far. I'm not advocating chest beating, but the line needs to be drawn again, before the identity disappears all together.

Ken: Your sources are good.......there is a fundamental shift taking place. Better late than never.

Can some one riddle me this? Why is the USASFC only a 1 star billet?

GPF vs SF training others. As an NCO in the U.S. Army do I not train my own soldiers daily? Am I not a trainer? So should GPF be able to train host nation forces? The quick answer would be yes, but! And that is a big but. One has to look at two big differences: mindset and maturity. In no other situation does that one oh sh!t wipe away 1000 atta boys more than when working with host nation forces. The effect can be disastorous if not deadly.

Finally to address the post about letting GPF slide into the ranks....no no no! The more I have thought about it over the years, it's not about the training I received, so much as about my assessment throughout SFAS and the Q-Course. It's not all about physical prowless or mental capacity but a whole person, what is SF getting when they get me? They know what they are looking for and are good at picking them out. Yes, inevitably some slip through the cracks, but very few. The QC is good. If you have read some of my posts on other threads you'd realize I am a fan of bringing them into the fold in a staff capacity and vice-versa. It would be good for Army and my stop some of the bigger d!ck on the block syndrome.

[jmm99]

from ODB
GPF vs SF training others. As an NCO in the U.S. Army do I not train my own soldiers daily? Am I not a trainer? So should GPF be able to train host nation forces? The quick answer would be yes, but! And that is a big but. One has to look at two big differences: mindset and maturity. In no other situation does that one oh sh!t wipe away 1000 atta boys more than when working with host nation forces. The effect can be disastorous if not deadly.

Good answer to my 75th question - mindset (teaching-oriented) and maturity (experience in both teaching and subject-matter).

General thought. The laws ("titles") should allow as full scope to operational considerations as is possible within the rather broad constraints that exist (my position - other lawyers will take a more retarded view). The laws are unclassified - so proposed changes can be discussed and hypotheticals safely proposed.

The laws are the broad strokes on the canvas. The ROEs, which result from a confluence of (1) operational considerations; (2) laws of war and rule of law (the latter to a lesser degree); and (3) diplomatic, policy and political considerations, are generally classified - so, e.g., JAG found it somewhat difficult to spell out with completeness, for public consumption, the lessons learned re: ROEs in Iraq and Astan.

CLAMO has a number of legal studies - for public consumption - dealing with special operations. You can find them here (http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/CLAMO.html) and here (https://www.jagcnet.army.mil/8525751D00557EFF/0/A86D78669E17E6F9852574DA005E3ADF?opendocument&noly=1) - big .pdf files (best have broadband - and put them on a CD).

Appreciate the answer.

[ODB]

Who? Where? I am trying to expand my horizons, to be a more well rounded individual and just never know when that art knowledge might just build some rapport! Have had to put that one on the back burner as of late.....

Laws are unclass, but there are some that others should never know that the military is capable of carrying out legally.

[Uboat509]

IMO, y'all need a four-star seat at the table. That's the only way to work within bureaucracies (ricebowls, budgets, egos, etc)...On the big army level, y'all have not done that well since 9/11. ADM Olson wears too many hats. Is he the Chief of staff of SOF, the CoCom of SOF, or equivalent of FORSCOM? He can't do all three jobs, and I think that's hurt y'all a bit.

Don't get me wrong, I am not disagreeing that SOF should have a seat at the table. I just don't want to see it overtaken by JSOC guys again. Given the current numbers, I don't see how it wouldn't be.



That's just not a true statement particularly with O's. I know you're probably laughing right now thinking we have enough O's, but you are missing out on some GPF company commanders who excelled working in patrol bases and FID.

O's do have a smaller window than we enlisted swine but they do have a window.


Plus, some of the enlisted that would make excellent SF's simply don't want to go to school after 3-4 deployments.

Does it matter? I dunno.

Would you be better off if you found a way to integrate them? Probably.

Will it happen? Probably not.

I've tried to look at these issues from a neutral standpoint.

v/r

Mike

SF is not just a cool hat and some more uniform flair, nor is it just a collection of good guys. It is a series of skill sets and a lot of institutional experience doing many of the things that GPF had to learn, more or less from scratch, but more than that it is a mind set. If you aren't ready to put in the time and training to be SF then you aren't ready to be SF.

SFC W

[jmm99]

from ODB
Laws are unclass, but there are some that others should never know that the military is capable of carrying out legally.

as provided by sec.167(j)(10) "Such other activities as may be specified by the President or the Secretary of Defense."

And your ideal image definitely appears to be "a more well rounded individual." ;)

Cheers

Mike

[Ken White]

I'm sitting here chortling at the thought of USASOCOM, USASFCOM, JSOC and USSOCOM all being located at Bragg -- then when FORSCOM moves up there in 2011, the 7th SFG goes to Eglin (unless they win the fight to not do that...) and with XVIII Airplane Corpse and the Eighty-Deuce and a few earthling commands, it would be downright interesting... :D

'Course, if you had all those hindquarters there, Bragg would have a higher GO count than Afghanistan (barely...). :wry: and man, what a target; take all the hot responders out at one whack. :eek:

I'm also trying to picture Jim Lindsey (LINK) (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/James_J._Lindsay) at a meeting in the Tank with his Cigar ...

Mike, you know someone once tried to tell me that the XVII Abn Corps was not commanded by the 82d. Silly guy or a heretic, one or t'other... ;)

[Ken White]

What I perceived (in at least one of the posts) as friction between SF and JSOC is really lost on me - I can only infer it is really inside-inside baseball.is the basic problem. Though it's really more complex, that serves as a simple andswer.

It's just different tribes -- and different jobs. JSOC folks are shooters primarily; hard wired, multi skilled and pretty much Type A guys. The SF guys OTOH are fixers and trainer; educators, if you will primarily; most of' em are pretty laid back.

It's the battle (philosophical differences) between the SWAT eam and the EMTs in a sense.

Those are very broad generalizations and there are exceptions and nuances all over the place but that'll do for a quick and dirty broad description. Add in the fact that in the upper echelons of USSOCOM, preference has in the past been given to the slightly more glamorous (to some) but far smaller community of shooters and that the far more numerous SF guys have folks who also do the DA stuff and you have a recipe for dissension. As ODB mentioned, this is slowly changing as some high powered shooters realize the value of SF -- and become aware of the fact that one can train an Operator a lot quicker than one can train an SF Team member.

The operator takes more and expensive practice to sustain but the SF guy takes longer initially. The Rangers sort of get caught in the middle, though they serve as a farm team (Dalton Fury's words) to an extent for both JSOC and SF. All those folks cost more per bod than do conventional units; that and the selection and training time required preclude a rapid strength increase of either type.

As usual, most of the Troops on the ground work it out with little friction; the flaps occur in the States and are about dollars and spaces -- and who gets the dirty thankless jobs sort of stuff -- while in the field that stuff is not important. Usually.

SF and JSOC both run selection and assessment programs -- similar yet different and passing one does not mean automatic entry to the other (or it didn't used to...) -- and it has been said that passing that in both cases is seen as as big or a bigger bragging / unit cohesion factor than simply being there by many...

The 82d also plays farm team but they're far bigger, strength wise than the Ranger Regiment, so while the 82d grumbles about it, it doesn't impact them as badly as it does the Rangers. There are people who got to selection (both) without being in or having been in the Ranger Regiment or the 82d but from elsewhere in the Army; the numbers used to be sort of small. SF also directly recruits with the '18X' program (LINK) (http://usmilitary.about.com/od/enlistedjobs/a/18x.htm); Uboat509 commented on that some time ago.

[jmm99]

had definite value in your answer to my inside-inside baseball question. Thanks for your insights.

Time for sleep.

Mike

[MikeF]

Thanks for the replies...


I'm sitting here chortling at the thought of USASOCOM, USASFCOM, JSOC and USSOCOM all being located at Bragg -- then when FORSCOM moves up there in 2011, the 7th SFG goes to Eglin (unless they win the fight to not do that...) and with XVIII Airplane Corpse and the Eighty-Deuce and a few earthling commands, it would be downright interesting... :D

'Course, if you had all those hindquarters there, Bragg would have a higher GO count than Afghanistan (barely...). :wry: and man, what a target; take all the hot responders out at one whack. :eek:

I'm also trying to picture Jim Lindsey (LINK) (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/James_J._Lindsay) at a meeting in the Tank with his Cigar ...

Mike, you know someone once tried to tell me that the XVII Abn Corps was not commanded by the 82d. Silly guy or a heretic, one or t'other... ;)

I placed my initial comments to spark some emotion/discussion so we could possibly figure out how to better leverage our capabilities with the lessons learned in combat.


SFC W says


SF is not just a cool hat and some more uniform flair, nor is it just a collection of good guys. It is a series of skill sets and a lot of institutional experience doing many of the things that GPF had to learn, more or less from scratch, but more than that it is a mind set. If you aren't ready to put in the time and training to be SF then you aren't ready to be SF.

He is right. Every discussion that I have with an SF personnel reminds me of how intuitive small wars are to them. It is impressive. One analogy could be that SF's are Sun Tzu and everyone else is Clausewitz.

ODB brought forward a good suggestion- cross-fertilization on the staff level. I served as an LNO and worked in the JSOTF's J2,J3, and JOC. That "internship" was probably the best professional development that I had as a young captain.

MTF...

Mike

[Ken White]

The real question...

I placed my initial comments to spark some emotion/discussion so we could possibly figure out how to better leverage our capabilities with the lessons learned in combat.Though I have to admit my warped sense of humor frequently obscures my messages... :o

Serious answers to your points; IMO, of course:


We can start by giving SOF a seat on the JCS. Then, I'd recommend them to move from Tampa to Fort Bragg.I do not see any advantage to doing either. If you elect to have Congress pursue a Fifth (Sixth?) service and form USSOF, then the JCS idea make sense, other wise, they have adequate clout as a Unified Command with their own funding authority. If the perception is that they are not listened to on high, then I think that's as much a transient personality issue as anything.

Moving it is okay but I do believe Bragg is over crowded and has too many Hq already -- I'd even move some of those to different locations given the chance.
On the lower end, SF should consider allowing CF/GPF personnel with significant advisor time to slide into their ranks.Your problem there is that Selection is a rite of passage. The comments of you and ODB re: staff interchange are right on target.
That's all common-sense to me until you throw in ricebowls, budgets, egos, and tabs...The simple things that get in the way of mission requirements .True and having been on both sides of the GPF / SF fence, the Armor / Cav fence, the Airborne / Leg fence, the Light / heavy fence, the FID / UW vs. DA fence and the USMC / US Army fence plus watching the Yard Sign supporting one or another candidate for Prez last fall, I'm inclined to believe that Tribal loyalties and fences are a part of the human condition.

If that's correct, it seems to me that the best approach is not to try to tear apart tribal loyalties but to use them to leverage their strengths. On an allied note, it's been my observation that while excessive competition is harmful, a little competition is really beneficial and helps develop TTP that can cross fertilize all the tribes. We ought to encourage that...

While competition is beneficial, we do need to tear down a number of those fences. There are two major ways to do that, I think -- dumb everyone down to a not so special level... :mad:

Or we could smarten and toughen everyone up to even higher levels and realize that all those Tribes have strengths that can be mutually and beneficially employed. :wry:

Quality has a quantity all its own; we're supposed to be a Professional Armed force -- we sometimes do not act like one.

You raised some good points; now someone can tear my point apart.

[MikeF]

Though I have to admit my warped sense of humor frequently obscures my messages... :o

Serious answers to your points; IMO, of course:

I know, and my jokes are rather not so funny at times too.:D

The reason I suggested a move from Tampa/Bragg and a seat at the table of the JCS has nothing to do with SF.

Currently, the majority of our warfare is irregular. SF specializes in IW/UW so if 1 + 1 = 2, then they should be in charge. Unfortunately, too many other factors (ricebowls, money, ego, etc...) get in the way.

Currently, I believe that ADM Olsen is forced to wear too many hats as the USSOCOM commander. If he spends time in DC, then he can't spend time in Tampa. If he spends time in Tampa, then he can't spend time abroad...etc...

If he focuses on funding and training, then he does not focus on the current fight.

If USSOCOM is supposed to lead the GWOT or Long War, then there must be a organizational change at the top levels to divide up the neccessary tasks with the appropriate rank.

What we have been doing is called taming or satisfycing (seeking a 70% solution to deal with the 50m target in the hopes that that will be good enough). So far it has worked, but as the conflicts expand, we could come up short if we don't adjust.

v/r

Mike

[Bill Moore]

This is a great comedy. I have to agree with the posts that the differences between SOF and so called GPF are much easier to discern in the U.K. and Israel. In our system SOF is everything, but only as everything pertains to SOF. Sort of reminds me of Steve Martin's Special Purpose in one of his earlier movies, when he finally found out what is special purpose was for.

We didn't have the capabilities across the joint force to rescue our hostages in Iran because the services under invested in these special capabilities. There was a "real" capability gap, not a perceived gap, so we have SOCOM, and I think we can make a strong argument that SOCOM has done a pretty darn good job of fixing that problem.

Unfortunately, as Ken has pointed out a lot of common Army skills related to COIN and FID migrated to SF over the years, so not only did SF provide specialized COIN/FID support, they also supported basic infantry skills training which some would argue (like me) that isn't the ideal use of a specialized force, but there are times when it is appropriate.

Rice bowls, ego issues, etc. are just part of the DoD culture, so just roll with it and enjoy the food fight. We need to stay focused on getting the mission accomplished in spite of the great comedy.

[Ken White]

The reason I suggested a move from Tampa/Bragg and a seat at the table of the JCS has nothing to do with SF.USSOF, as in U.S. Special Operations Force, (as in USAF only different), a separate Armed Service, not US SF, an Army Branch opcom to USSOCOM.

Currently, the majority of our warfare is irregular.True but no telling how long that'll last and be careful of making forces structure changes that are not capable of addressing the full spectrum of warfare.
Currently, I believe that ADM Olsen is forced to wear too many hats as the USSOCOM commander. If he spends time in DC, then he can't spend time in Tampa. If he spends time in Tampa, then he can't spend time abroad...If he focuses on funding and training, then he does not focus on the current fight.He only has one hat, Cdr USSOCOM. He has subordinates -- a bunch of them in many places with adequate rank to do the warfighting; his job is to give broad direction and worry about funding and training. He did his warfightng and now he has to focus on broader issues. He needs to spend no more time in DC than does CinCpac or CinCEur and they're a lot further away than Tampa. He also need spend little time oversea - where would he go, he has troops in many nations...

SOCOM is not a geographically constrained command, it's global, he can't be everywhere, so where his Hq is makes little difference.
If USSOCOM is supposed to lead the GWOT or Long War, then there must be a organizational change at the top levels to divide up the neccessary tasks with the appropriate rank.That 'global' bit is the primary reason SOCOM was given the lead in the "GWOT" -- a secondary reason was for him to get a smack on the Army. Whether they should have such a role now may deserve a relook.

Aside from possibly trifling with the Constitution, you're sure messing with some laws and Congress on the organizational change at the top -- thus my comment, if you want A SOF person on the JCS, you'll probably need to establish a new armed force. As for rank, he's got four stars, doesn't get much better than that. Got to also consider that the current fight is in the CentCom AO -- should he also get a seat on the JCS. Should CincEur and CinCPac have had them in WW II?

I also think three really excellent questions are (1) Will there in fact be a long war? (2) If so, should SOCOM have the lead or should State have it? If the combat effort is confined to the current locales, should CentCom have the lead? (Scary on several levels I know but the bulk of our force effiort is in that AO; the other stuff around the world ha some effect on that but not a great deal).
What we have been doing is called taming or satisfycing (seeking a 70% solution to deal with the 50m target in the hopes that that will be good enough). So far it has worked, but as the conflicts expand, we could come up short if we don't adjust.That's the American way, we've done that in every war since I was born -- including WW II. We always adjust if the pressure is severe -- so far, since 2001, it has not been. Pressure on some people and some units has been heavy at time but even that has not been constant. Overall for the Armed forces and the Nation, pressure is no worse than moderate.

[Ken White]

Did I spell that right...
This is a great comedy.We aim to please... :D
Rice bowls, ego issues, etc. are just part of the DoD culture, so just roll with it and enjoy the food fight. We need to stay focused on getting the mission accomplished in spite of the great comedy.True, it all works out...

[MikeF]

I also think three really excellent questions are (1) Will there in fact be a long war? (2) If so, should SOCOM have the lead or should State have it? If the combat effort is confined to the current locales, should CentCom have the lead? (Scary on several levels I know but the bulk of our force effiort is in that AO; the other stuff around the world ha some effect on that but not a great deal).That's the American way, we've done that in every war since I was born -- including WW II. We always adjust if the pressure is severe -- so far, since 2001, it has not been. Pressure on some people and some units has been heavy at time but even that has not been constant. Overall for the Armed forces and the Nation, pressure is no worse than moderate.

Excellent questions, and of course any of these changes would be mandated by others (congress). This thread does tie in with the debate on Advisors- just from a different angle.

If this conflict persist, we'll probably see some type of legislation forcing reorganization. Just hope we get the proper balance.

For now, we can just stay focused on the current fight:D

v/r

Mike

[Boot]

Rice bowls, ego issues, etc. are just part of the DoD culture, so just roll with it and enjoy the food fight. We need to stay focused on getting the mission accomplished in spite of the great comedy.

I just can't believe that anyone in the services or DoD would let these things influence thinking! D::rolleyes:(note: laced with laughter)


Boot