Building an Iraqi Marine Corps

[USMC MTT]

Hello to all. My name is Capt David Ortiz (USMC). I am a military training team chief who has been tasked with training a newly formed Iraqi Marine Corps (IqM). What make this mission unique is that the Iraqi Navy has expressed a desire to create an Iraqi Marine Corps that is versatile and capable of operating in a joint battle space as a light infantry unit, not a specialized naval infantry unit. In my research, I have found that similar efforts were attempted in 2004 and 2005, however, I am still attempting to gain knowledge of the scope of the effort. From what I have learned so far, the work and training done in 04 and 05 has not endured with the Iraqis.

My team’s Mission is to assist the Iraqi’s in creating a sustainable IqM ethos and light infantry skills. A biggest step that has occurred is that the Iraqi senior leadership has expressed a keen desire for this type of force. My team must now help facilitate its execution and help to ensure the middle management in the IqM has bought into this concept.

We have been tasked to assist the IqM in the development of an ethos that will make them different than the Army. What we have to figure out is how best to assist in doing this without creating an USMC solution to the problem. While we are both Marine units, the core values that motivate US Marines do not necessarily cross cultural boundaries and motivate the IqM’s.

While my team and I have some ideas and methods, we are looking for any advice anyone might have on how to assist the IqM in developing a POI that will build this ethos that will endure after we leave.

Any thoughts, ideas, points of contact, or experiences are appreciated.

V/R
Capt Ortiz

[goesh]

a 10% better pay rate, single men only, distinct uniforms, boots and hair cuts ( high and tight for instance), old Corps style boot camp training, the way it was during 'Nam and before 'Nam - let the lads do knuckle push ups on gravel until their hands bleed to see if they really want to be Iraqi Marines - no leave during boot camp and infantry training unless a true emergency, Muslim only, 1/2 day total slack time on Prayer day with easy duty the rest of the day with mandatory Mosque attendance, better chow than the average units but spartan barracks, as much as possible an isolated training site, small cash bonus upon completion of initial training then a major PR blitz if the intial group can get up and running and blooded fast.

If the Koreans can do it, so can the Iraqis. Semper Fi ~

[Umar Al-Mokhtār]

Sounds like you have a very daunting, and somewhat politically sensitive, task ahead of you.

One difficulty is the lack of any tradition to leverage upon, Iraq not being a maritime power with a significant naval history. Also, the only previous “Marine” unit was the Marine Brigade attached to the As Saiqa Special Forces Division of the Iraqi Republican Guard. Probably not an organization you would want to draw any traditions from. :rolleyes:

Aside from basic light infantry training you have to build a mystique about them. Make them look and feel different from the run of the mill military, just as the Corps does. As you note, grafting USMC core values and traditions might not be the best way (hopefully some of our sociologists and anthropologists may offer to assist).

Since you are starting literally from scratch a good example to perhaps leverage on might be that of General Rollet, known as the father of the Legion. Between WW I and WW II he noticed that the French Foreign Legion was languishing, discipline was poor, and there was talk of disbanding it. So he went about creating several traditions in the Legion: The white kepi as the signature headgear of the Legion and the green tie, epaulets, and blue sash as distinctive parts of the dress uniform. The annual celebration of Cameron was also one of his initiatives.

So some esprit-de-corps suggestions (beyond the basic instruction as light infantry):

Have a very distinctive dress uniform and utility uniform items that distinguish the IqM from all other branches. One thing the French do is “dress up” their cammies by wearing items from their dress uniform with them: the kepi, ribbons, epaulets, etc… This is also done by other militaries. Hold them to a high standard of personal appearance.

Some traditions from the Legion here (http://www.legion-etrangere.com/fr/tradition/tenue.php).

Have distinctive guidons (http://www.legion-etrangere.com/fr/tradition/symb_visu.php)for the units (the USMC ones are a bit plain). Leverage on traditional Iraqi and Islamic symbolism (the crescent and star), and colors (green and black). Whoever designed the MNF-I (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MNF-I) patch was very cognizant of these.

Create a “code of honor” and a distinctive motto.

Create songs or music if appropriate.

Try to look at past Iraq military units (to include the Republican Guard) to see how they were motivated. Leverage on the history of Iraq to create traditions to be honored.

Have distinctive “holidays” that your Marines will celebrate.

Also, teach them the history of our Corps and other Marine units around the world and make them feel to be part of a very special brotherhood of arms that extends far beyond Iraq.

Inculcating in them a high level of pride in Iraq and the IqM is probably what will carry over once you leave.

If you need any assistance I would be glad to help.

Good luck and Semper Fi!

[jcustis]

Capt Ortiz,

When did you come on mission, and who did you relieve? I ask because I have a company commander in our battalion who just came off a JMD assignment (in Umm Qasr IIRC) dealing with similar issues, and I believe he has already written a white paper about these very issues that made it's way into the hands of the CG for 1 MARDIV. I think the two of you need to talk if you have not already met. He may not have dealt with ethos issues, but he sure is passionate about it all and may have addressed some of the issues already.

Please shoot me a PM with a reply about the first two questions above, and I might be able to help.

[William F. Owen]

While I agree with the intent of what some here are saying, I would offer a very strong note of caution.

As Umar Al-Mokhtār correctly notes, you do not want to graft on USMC values. Values are a reflection of culture and culture is very dangerous stuff to play around with. I would merely observe the following - and this is OPINION, not fact.

a.) Do not force a culture upon them. Let one grow. The USMC did not invent it's culture. It took 200 years to grow what you see today.
b.) What you can control is the training and the type of man who can complete it successfully. Their culture will become the unit culture. Hard training creates strong bonds, if that training emphasises strong individuals working as a team, then Yallah! ...
and Not everyone can be a Marine, so it must be hard, but also rational eg - Who cannot, not who can.

c.) Core values are essential, BUT you can't invent core values. You can present them and see which ones get picked up and which ones get sustained. You can't have "Courage" as a Core value. It's meaningless. Core values have to build on what is there already, or that which can be proved to have real worth.
d.) Do not glorify being "Light Infantry," as an element of culture. Emphasise that the role/work/task requires operating on foot, WHEN REQUIRED - and as Marines, they can't walk on water!! :eek:
e.) As Marines - and part of the Navy! - I would suggest emphasising a role that requires working at sea and on land. The Army does LAND WARFARE. The "Marines" do those infantry tasks which require the skill and confidence to work within, on and close to water/sea/rivers - so all Marines, can

Swim
Climb
Understand and work around the sea/rivers/marsh and boats.


...and while I understand the need for Berets, haircuts and all other forms of fancy dress, I would emphasise dressing in the way the job demands. And if you are dead set on fancy dress, I'd ditch anything western, like a Beret, and let them wear Kefyah or Shemagh, made from a distinctive fabric - and I'd let them decide, once they've been going a few months/years.

I know this is all pretty banal and obvious stuff, but it may merit some thought.

[Umar Al-Mokhtār]

Wilf - completely agree on your points about caution being taken in being highly sensitive to cultural norms while trying to develop esprit-de-corps. Certainly a robust, rigerous, and highly challenging training program will go a long ways towards building unity and fostering esprit-de-corps.

I do disagree on a few uniform points however. True, it is important for the IqM to have a utilitarian utility uniform and quality military training that both instructs and bonds the unit. But "fancy dress" is also very important. Look at the US Marines' recruiting, it prominently features dress blues, a uniform we rarely ever wear (I typically wore it once a year, at the MC Ball). But it projects an image and sets Marines distinctly apart from the other services.

One should never underestimate the power of "fancy dress" or more appropriately distinctive items of wear which distinguish one as separate from the rest, and the member of an elite. This is where you leverage on the tribal element that exists in all cultures. If "fancy dress" wasn't important then all of our services (and those of all other countries) would wear the exact same uniform with no distinguishing features.

As to wearing of the Kefyah or Shemagh, that might be pushing a bit of politically sensitive areas, given that they are popular headgear for the PLO and Hamas. The historian in me says it might be the right headgear culturally and historically, but in these PC times might not be acceptable. Berets do seem to be common headgear in the Iraqi armed forces and police, so why not.

Napoleon attributed much importance to the power of symbolism in insignia, uniforms, and flags and how they impacted moral. When he designed the Legion of Honor he supposedly noted "it is with such baubles that men are led" and also quipped "a man won't sell you his life, but he'll trade it to you for a little piece of ribbon."

The challenge of course is finding the right balance of both. :D

[Ken White]

people and it will repel others. Basic unit values mean more than attire to some while to others the uniform or items of it are extremely important. USMC dress blues are an example, so is a maroon or green beret -- but there are some folks wearing all three who would keep doing what they're doing if you told them they had to wear a kilt and no cover in the wintertime -- and there are those who wear a kilt that will fight you for the ability to do that.

People are different, fancy attracts some, repels others while many can take it or leave it -- none of them are wrong.

Competence at a job OTOH attracts more respect than uniforms attract admiration.

[Umar Al-Mokhtār]

that competence at a job is ultimately the base upon which unit cohesion and esprit-de-corps is built. And that competency (and also mystic) holds far greater appeal when your institution is 230 plus years old and can point to places like Tarawa, Iwo Jima, Khe Sanh, Fallujah, etc to prove your proficiency, experience, and just general kickassedness.

At issue here, however, is the task to build an "elite" military organization virtually from scratch with absolutely no significant history or competency to draw from (worse when the only potential competency, history, and tradition is now a regime in total disfavor). I posit that, while under our present circumstances the Corps’ competency attracts more respect than its uniforms attract admiration (and is more important), when trying to “jump start” an “elite” organization one must attract with other means, besides just money. Perhaps we today just take for granted the power of symbology to inspire and motivate, which is what most modern dress uniforms leverage upon.

Capt Ortiz is trying to build an organization that will last well beyond his tour of duty, yet already in past efforts has proven to whither and die. Why is that? Granted there are numerous other factors in that equation, key of which is probably that there was/is no cadre of Marines assigned for any significant length of time to this effort, ones who will provide some measure of continuity throughout the birthing process. So what previous competencies can the nascent IqM leverage upon to attract quality motivated recruits?

While a hefty pay check would certainly attract many into the ranks are they who we want? I didn’t enlist for the paycheck, I enlisted because of the four services the Marines had more mystic, elitism, and a really sharp uniform (I was 17 and impressionable, as many teenagers still are today). One problem is those things are not thus far present in the as yet to be formed IqM.

So if one were sitting in Tun Tavern in 1775, what would one do? I’d come up with a snazzy grass green uniform (http://www.acidus.com/Continental_Marines.html)with sparkling white facings and a smart, jaunty cover turned up on one side so that we look oh so much more different that those slobs wearing blue and buff with those silly tricornered hats. :D

The IqM uniform doesn't have to be fancy, but it should be highly distinctive and very different from those Army and Navy types. ;)

[William F. Owen]

As to wearing of the Kefyah or Shemagh, that might be pushing a bit of politically sensitive areas, given that they are popular headgear for the PLO and Hamas. The historian in me says it might be the right headgear culturally and historically, but in these PC times might not be acceptable. Berets do seem to be common headgear in the Iraqi armed forces and police, so why not.


I was thinking more Arab Legion,
http://www.historama.com/onlinepricelist/israeli-army-military-militaria/Arab%20Legion1.jpg

... and yes, the irony of me even engaging in this thread....

[Umar Al-Mokhtār]

recomended to Capt Ortiz that he look into the Arab Legion as it might provide him with some insights as to how Peake and Glubb worked on training and instilling esprit-de-corps into their troops.

While berets certainly seem to have become de rigueur in Iraq it would be nice if the Iraqi armed forces returned to their traditional headgear and like the Legion have Kefyah in special designs for various units. That would be pretty cool. :D

[Culpeper]

South Vietnam had a Marine Corps, right?

[Ken White]

Why do you ask?

[jcustis]

South Vietnam had a Marine Corps, right?

Yes, and they were made (akin to the Philippine Marine Corps) in our image, which is not what we are trying to do here...perhaps.

[William F. Owen]

Yes, and they were made (akin to the Philippine Marine Corps) in our image, which is not what we are trying to do here...perhaps.

Having looked at the Royal Thai Marine Corps pretty closely, I am not sure the USMC model travels that well. Thai culture doesn't make it easy and I think Iraqi culture would present real problems.

Personally - and I have NO dog in this fight - I'd see them more as a type of River Commando Force, or Fleet Protection Group, or something like Commachio (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fleet_Protection_Group_Royal_Marines). OK so Iraq does not have Nukes, but change nukes for Oil platform and that may be a start.

[Old Eagle]

OK, so somebody explain to me why in the wide, wide world of sports we need to create another army in Iraq.

Capt Ortiz has already explained that they are not to be naval infantry, just "different". Huh? Better faster shinier?

[goesh]

- well, this civilian's outside opinion is worth about .001 but every time I see Iraqi army troops on TV, they come across as somehow hesitant or something, a little light on their feet so to speak, reminds me of the ARVNs of S. Viet Nam, not a lot of grit but there are bound to be some solid Iraqi units, just not enough of them. I don't have any answers but I wonder how many Iraqi soldiers are in it for the pay check, steady income for the family? I would think an Iraqi Marine Corps would seek to instill some esprit de corps, pride in sacrifice and ability with the paycheck being secondary.

[William F. Owen]

OK, so somebody explain to me why in the wide, wide world of sports we need to create another army in Iraq.

Capt Ortiz has already explained that they are not to be naval infantry, just "different". Huh? Better faster shinier?

The man in charge of the Iraqi Navy wants a another budget stream? This is a Navy you are talking about. Why are you applying logic? :wry:

Seriously, my understanding of Naval Infantry, based on the Royal Navy, is they are sailors who are also trained as infantry, so anything that is not that would seem to be within bounds. Logically I can only see a role for some kind of Fleet Protection Group or proper Navy SF/Combat Swimmer.

[BayonetBrant]

OK, so somebody explain to me why in the wide, wide world of sports we need to create another army in Iraq.

Capt Ortiz has already explained that they are not to be naval infantry, just "different". Huh? Better faster shinier?

I didn't want to ask that question, b/c it seems from CPT Ortiz's info that the die has been cast, and the Iraq gov't wants this, whether it's a good idea or not.

They didn't ask our advice on whether or not they should do it, they asked for help with execution. To that end, I think there have been some good suggestions for CPT Ortiz here (I especially like the very first response, brusque tho it was). The policy debate before the mission was handed to him seems to have ended a while ago.

My gut is certainly with you - this is a waste of Iraqi time and money, and USMC effort - but given that no one asked me, I'm like the others here, trying to answer a question that shouldn't've been asked to start with, in teh hopes that we can help a Marine do a good job downrange.

[Culpeper]

Why do you ask?


No particular reason.

[Umar Al-Mokhtār]

may just be why does Iraq need an IqM. But it's in the works. Perhaps there may be some influence on the Iraqi Navy by the performance of the US Marines.

Wilf you may be close on the mark since I read here (http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2008/07/iraqi_security_force_17.php)that a mission of the 2nd Marine Battalion was primary security of Umm Qasr port facility, while the 1st Marine Battalion had the primary oil terminal point defense security mission.

The formation of the ROKMC, RTMC, VNMC, and others certainly used the USMC as a baseline for start up but each gradually developed into it's own distinctive service. One does see the USMC influence in much of the iconography of many Marine formations still today.

[jcustis]

- well, this civilian's outside opinion is worth about .001 but every time I see Iraqi army troops on TV, they come across as somehow hesitant or something, a little light on their feet so to speak, reminds me of the ARVNs of S. Viet Nam, not a lot of grit but there are bound to be some solid Iraqi units, just not enough of them. I don't have any answers but I wonder how many Iraqi soldiers are in it for the pay check, steady income for the family? I would think an Iraqi Marine Corps would seek to instill some esprit de corps, pride in sacrifice and ability with the paycheck being secondary.

Across my two later deploys, I came to believe that the number of guys in for a meal tix was about 75-90%

[davidbfpo]

Perhaps the Trucial Oman Scouts, which became the UAE Defence Force in 1971, are an example to examine? A small force with a reputation, note mainly locally recruited and some expat officers: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trucial_Oman_Scouts

Closer to visit and not so long ago.

davidbfpo

[Xenophon]

Congratulations on getting that job and know that I am green with jealous rage. That's a dream job for someone who takes being an advisor seriously. (You'll see how rare that is soon enough.)

I spent a year on a MTT with 3rd Battalion, 3rd Brigade, 1st IA in 2008. I'll let you know the issues we had with the Iraqi Army which will probably be pretty similar.

First off, you mentioned uniforms. The IA have an official uniform but don't provide enough, if any, of them to the jinuud. You'll see them with old style woodlands, both knock off and real digitals of both desert and woodland MARPAT, along with the army gravel driveway digitals, and even flight suits. By now they've probably got frog suits as well. Anything military-esque they can acquire they wear. Your problem won't be designing a uniform, it will be getting enough so that they can wear only that and nothing else.

Second, the US Military has passed on its addiction to motorized ops to the IA. Getting them to do ops dismounted took some serious wasta and only the experienced, intelligent officers would consider it. If they're going to be light infantry, they need to walk.

Third, the NCO corps in the IA is in its infancy, it will be worse in a freshly stood up Iraqi Marine Corps. Hopefully you have a strong senior enlisted Marine on your team who can focus on developing them through their senior leadership. We wanted to set up a "battalion SNCO academy" but couldn't due to high optempo and weak SNCO leadership on the MTT side.

Speaking of leadership, the officer in the Iraqi military is everything. Nothing will get done unless it's through them. Focus on encouraging a strong officer corps and developing the NCOs and everything else will eventually fall into place. I realize these are both "big picture" issues but hopefully your MTT chain of command will listen to your observations and suggestions from the ground level. (If they're anything like mine, they won't)

As for building an ethos, personal leadership is everything in Arab culture, and the Iraqi Army has been pretty bad at this. If you convince the officer and NCO corps to lead from the front, share hardships and danger with their jinuud, and not take advantage of the privileges of rank, they will become different than the IA and be stronger for it. (For example, field grade officers in the IA have personal servants drawn from their unit, elevate their relatives and ensure they are paid whether or not they are official members of the unit, and skimming money from the jinuuds' pay is almost pervasive.) The best way to do this is through example, second nature for Marines, and again focus on the officers. Once they are square, it will trickle down eventually. The Reaganomics of Leadership, if you will.

[Mark O'Neill]

to the MiTT in question, but I have to say that I think Iraq needs a Marine Corps as much as it needs Saddam to rise from the grave.

What ever happened to adhering to the 'successful and unsuccesful practises' that was an annex to a chapter right near the front of FM 3-24. Anyone else recall the advcie about 'creating local forces in your own image'?

I spent some time in Basra during COTK in 08. What I saw even back then seemed to suggest that the relatively infant capacity of the Iraqi Navy, supported by elm of the IA, the Border police and the NP could more than meet any 'marine' requirement in a nation that has an almost laughably small littoral.

-Mark

[Xenophon]

Mark O'Neill:

Definitely agree that Iraq does not need a Marine Corps, especially now. But I'm pretty sure they did have one under Saddam so it's natural for the current Iraqi leadership to want one now. Might as well support it as best we can.

Anyway, the more Iraqis we can get gainfully employed and pointing their guns at bad guys vice good guys, the better.

[Ken White]

to insure a long life is to have competing military forces so no one gets excessive power. Hence the Iranian Armed forces and the Pasdaran; the Saudi Armed forces and the National Guard; and in Iraq, the the Police / Border Police / ERU and the Army / a Marine Corps.

Hmm. We have a National Guard... :D

[BayonetBrant]

Hmm. We have a National Guard... :D

Yep - the one that's enshrined in the Constitution. According to our founding document, the National Guard and the Navy are mandatory - the rest of you (Army, Air Force, Marines) are merely optional. :wry:

[Ken White]

Yep - the one that's enshrined in the Constitution. According to our founding document, the National Guard and the Navy are mandatory - the rest of you (Army, Air Force, Marines) are merely optional. :wry:The Guard slickly got itself named the Militia by Statute. :D

Navy's legit, though...

[Steve Blair]

Actually the Marines are enshrined in public law if memory serves...along with a mandated minimum organizational strength. And I'll stop derailing now....:o

[Ken White]

Bringing up the point the slickness of the USMC getting itself enshrined in law was easily as good as that of the Guard. Now, question is, can the IMC can do the same thing?

We're totally back on thread... ;)

[Umar Al-Mokhtār]

TITLE 10 - ARMED FORCES, Subtitle A - General Military Law, PART I - ORGANIZATION AND GENERAL MILITARY POWERS, CHAPTER 13 - THE MILITIA

Sec. 311. Militia: composition and classes

-STATUTE-
(a) The militia of the United States consists of all able-bodied
males at least 17 years of age and, except as provided in section
313 of title 32, under 45 years of age who are, or who have made a
declaration of intention to become, citizens of the United States
and of female citizens of the United States who are members of the
National Guard.
(b) The classes of the militia are -
(1) the organized militia, which consists of the National Guard
and the Naval Militia; and
(2) the unorganized militia, which consists of the members of
the militia who are not members of the National Guard or the
Naval Militia.

I guess "grabass" militia wasn't appropriate for (b)(2). :D

Yes, I know, I know, took us off thread. So, to answer Xenophon and Mark:

While Iraq certainly doesn't ‘need’ a force of Marines it absolutely has need of a navy. While Iraq was never, nor needs to be, a maritime power with the capability to project naval power beyond the northern Gulf, they do need forces afloat to patrol their coast and secure the two off shore oil platforms (Al Basrah Oil Terminal (ABOT) and Khawr Al Amaya Oil Terminal (KAAOT) which pump approximately 1.4 million barrels per day and account for 85 to 90 percent of the gross domestic product for the Iraqi nation). The Iraq Navy performs this service and need naval personnel trained in VBSS operations and personnel to man their oil platforms. It seems they have decided that instead of sailors who crew their patrol craft perform VBSS they have a specific group trained in it: called Marines. Which happens to be one of the missions British and US Marines of yore performed, back in the days of sail, which I think Ken may remember… :p

[Umar Al-Mokhtār]

Capt Ortiz’s biggest challenge, IMO, is not in adequately training these Marines to perform their assigned duties. He's no doubt got an outstanding handle on that. I think it will be harder to inculcate them with a certain esprit-de-corps that will last past the departure of the US Navy, Coast Guard, and Marines.

We’ve done this before in Thailand (1932), Korea (1949), the Philippines
(1950), Vietnam (1954), with influence on the formation of the Taiwanese Marines. The RTMC, ROKMC, VNMC, and ROCMC emblems were directly influenced by the USMC eagle, globe, and anchor.

[jcustis]

I sat back and pondered on this today, and then thought hard about an email I sent to my old bosses when describing what had changed in Iraq this last go around, from when I served with them in 2003 and 2004-5, respectively.

I think it all starts with getting the officers on board. Like it or not, the deal with officership in the Iraqi Security Forces can be a fickle thing. If you want the esprit de corps to well up, you have to ensure that the leaders get their heart into it, first and foremost. As you work towards that end, be careful to avoid rushing headlong into the abyss that gets presented by the senior leaders and even junior grade guys (who are long in the tooth in terms of time in service) who might drag their feet, or want to do it a different way. You will have to use plenty of carrots, but I think you've already recognized that aspect of the issue. Just remember that a large part of the answer may already lie in the way the Iraqis used to conduct business in pre-OIF, but we just need to ask the right guys. Even in the main formation of the 3D IA, I saw esprit in action prior to a combined operation when I witnessed company commanders issuing final coordinating instructions to their men.

I offer that you need to get in touch with two types of Soldiers (yes, the US Army type). The first is someone with SF or SOF background who has trained any of the various SWAT-esque CT elements currently operating. Second is a psyop guy who has spent time supporting these SF/SOF trainers/advisors with products, specifically recruiting posters, and other media. Although I think the mission they do sometimes gets skewed in favo of formations the Iraqis don't need, the die is already cast in your case, and you have your mission. I think those guys have historically done a good job developing an ethos akin to what you are looking at, and like the lightbulb, they had plenty of failures before they got it right.

Finding those types of guys are no small task, so I recommend that you research some of the members here who serve in ACU, have the outreach ability based on where they currently work (ROb Thornton, Cavguy, and Bob's World come to mind), and have an interest in helping guys like yourself.

This might not be a Marine-ish problem after all, and the heavy lifting may already be done. Good luck either way, and I hope that the Marine I put you in contact with has already provided some assistance.

[Backwards Observer]

Mesopotamia had kind of an MC back in the day. Eat the apple...:eek:

[USMC MTT]

I want to thank everyone for their contributions so far. Some of the leadership of the IqM Bn we are advising has experience in dealing with Marine MTT's from their time in the Iraqi Army 1st Division . This experience makes them very receptive to my team and has made the rapport building much easier. Additionally, since we are the 1st MTT dedicated to their Bn, the leadership seems hungry to repeat their past experience with MTT's and feel that our presents help to enhance their unit. They are eager to train and we are in the process of developing a 6 week training package that will enable their leadership to train their subordinates.

The method we have followed in concert with the the Iraqi's has been:

1. We have conducted a historical study of past experiences training Arab militaries and forming Marine Corps world wide. The advice given on this blog has enabled us to conduct research on a wide range of historical examples. Based on this research and conversations with our Iraqi counterparts, we have come to the conclusion that using some of the Bedouin qualities of toughness, discipline, bravery and loyalty will be the best way to create a unique ethos. We have found that this is a historical background that the majority of IqM's know, admire, and can relate to.

2. We have developed a survey that we will conduct on randomly selected IqM. The questions were developed with the IqM leadership and we will use the findings to refine our ethos building ideas.

3.We are in the beginning stages of building the POI with our Iraqi counterparts. The good thing is that the leadership has bought into the concept, has been listening to our inputs, and has been driving the planning.

While we have started off on the right foot, we still have a long ways to go and the actions taken will be the true measure of effectiveness.

I would like to thank everyone for their contributions and we will post our plan and other products in a few weeks.

We look forward to reading future postings; all your inputs have been a tremendous help.

V/R
Capt Ortiz

[William F. Owen]

Based on this research and conversations with our Iraqi counterparts, we have come to the conclusion that using some of the Bedouin qualities of toughness, discipline, bravery and loyalty will be the best way to create a unique ethos. We have found that this is a historical background that the majority of IqM's know, admire, and can relate to.


Good call. If you can get a copy of John Glubb's "War in the Desert". He was a British Officer who worked with and commanded the Arab Legion who were essentially Bedouin. His insights maybe useful.

One small issue that does spring to mind based on British experience of such units, is make sure, if possible that all the US personnel associated with the hands on training/admin/support of the unit, wears the same uniform as those in the unit. Historically this seems to matter. One less difference perhaps?

[Umar Al-Mokhtār]

would no doubt be useful, there were factors of his success that cannot be replicated by the US: Glubb was fluent in Arabic, was posted to Iraq in 1920, joined the Arab Legion in 1930, assumed leadership of it in 1939 and was with the Legion another 17 years. The man spent 36 of his 41 years in uniform serving in Arab countries. That length of commitment to a foreign unit by an individual has not, in my knowledge, ever been done by any member of the US military.

One thing the British colonial service did well (and which the US does poorly) was to create and nuture "native" units. They did this often by speaking the language and being posted to a country for many years. The US military has rarely ever done that, for a variety of reasons.

T.E. Lawrence's success is also a good example and his 27 Articles is a very concise "how to" of the unique challanges in advising Arab units.

[IqMTT]

Capt Ortiz,

I'm not sure if you're still monitoring this thread, but I will be deploying to pick up you mission very soon. My team is currently in PTP and the training schedule has been so condensed and packed with the basics of deployment that we really haven't had time to sit down and think and talk about the mission. I was wondering if there were any lessons learned in the past year+ from this post that you can pass on. If you'd like to PM, I can give you my NMCI address and we can go high side from there if necessary. Thanks.

[davidbfpo]

Moderator's Note

Capt. Ortiz appears to have last visited just after his last post, but if you access the Public Profile there is an option to send an email - without his email address being revealed. Good luck.