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SDSchippert
10-03-2005, 12:44 PM
Indonesian police scrutinized amateur video (http://today.reuters.com/news/newsarticle.aspx?type=topNews&storyid=2005-10-03T111837Z_01_MOL147042_RTRUKOC_0_US-INDONESIA.xml) on Monday that showed a man apparently with a backpack entering a Bali restaurant seconds before one of three suicide bombings that killed as many as 22 people.

Jedburgh
10-13-2005, 03:27 PM
Interesting paper published on-line today (13 Oct) by the International Crisis Group: Lessons from Maluku and Poso (http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/asia/indonesia/103_weakening_indonesia_mujahidin_networks_lessons _fr_maluku__poso.pdf)

In the wake of a second terrorist attack on Bali, the need to understand Indonesia's violent jihadist networks is greater than ever. Two incidents in May 2005 -- the execution of paramilitary police in Ceram, Maluku, and the bombing of a market in Tentena, Poso -- offer case studies of how those networks are formed and operate. Weakening the networks is key to preventing further violence, including terrorism. In Maluku and Poso, sites of the worst communal conflicts of the immediate post-Soeharto period, one place to start is with programs aimed at ex-combatants and imprisoned mujahidin due for release. These men are often part of networks that extend beyond the two conflict areas, but if they can be "reintegrated" into civilian life, their willingness to support mujahidin elsewhere in Indonesia and engage in violence themselves might be lessened. Addressing broader justice and security issues would also help.

Steve Blair
10-13-2005, 04:04 PM
Maybe they could look at some of the US programs aimed at helping former gang members integrate into normal society when they're released from prison...both for things to do and possibly things to avoid doing.

Strickland
10-13-2005, 10:53 PM
Indonesia has done a respectbale job of rounding up known or suspected terrorists. Whether it is done so out of self-interest vice concern for the GWOT is irrelevant. Unfortunately, recent governments have been handicapped by corruption, internal insurgencies, piracy, drug trafficking, and counterfeiting as to make them less than fully effective partners in the GWOT. What Indonesia does provide, along with Pakistan and Bangladesh, is a good example as a potential manpower pool for well financed terror organizations. With 55 million people living in absolute poverty and most illiterate, how do we begin to address their greivances in order for these folks not to become terrorists? Between Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Indonesia, you have over 100 million people living in total poverty and ignorance, thus making them susceptible to being deceived into actively supporting terror networks. What can be done about this? Are we prepared to embark on a global campaign to eradicate ignorance and poverty in order to eliminate those who turn to terrorist groups?

YellowJack
10-18-2005, 05:35 AM
I'm kinda pessimistic about Indonesias hand in the GWOT. There was a report (http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=viewArticle&code=20051014&articleId=1085) on this a few days back here in Australia. Take the report with a grain of salt. The liberal Islamist Wahid (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abdurrahman_Wahid) is going senile methinks, but the Indonesian police chief is spot on. POLRI (Indon Police) is incompetent and corrupt. The ICG released a telling report two years back on how POLRI members blatantly paraded a group through the town thereby stirring up violence. I think it might have been this (http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=2754&l=1) report. The links between the TNI (Indon military) and militia groups is also well known. Seeing as though some of these militia are muslim oriented (http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/laskar.cfm) it kinda raises the question as to what extent the TNI are cracking down on extremists and to what extent they are interacting with them (http://news.sbs.com.au/dateline/index.php?page=transcript&dte=2005-03-16&headlineid=940) for their own purposes. So these social networks might have to be investigated and curtailed.

It's in my own view that a lot of the military members at the lower levels can get out of control. Because the TNI works right down to a village level, whereby members are actually embedded within the political structure of small communities, recklessness can get out of hand without any sort of authoritative oversight. Also considering the massive command and logistical strains over the archipelago which can leave military members isolated like a modern day Colonel Kurtz (just kidding, but you get my point on the ties between geographic isolation and information isolation).

On the political front the conservative political Islamists are doing an excellent job at separating themselves from the radical Islamists. This was seen in the 2004 elections. If anything the best warning signal for growing strife within Indonesia would be to watch their political parties (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Category:Political_parties_in_Indonesia) and see which are starting to be influenced by the jihadi zeitgeist. Because the two can be closely intertwined it could pop out of nowhere. One way to weaken the extremist Jihadi political aspirations would be to support and strengthen the liberal Islamist movements within Indonesia, as they are an effective deterrent.

On the media front, if anyone peruses the Indonesian news on this board you'll be aware that corruption is the new black (http://news.google.com.au/news?svnum=10&as_scoring=r&hl=en&tab=wn&ie=UTF-8&q=indonesia+corruption+source%3Ajakarta_post&btnG=Search+News) within the Indonesian media (that and their constant love of the paranormal, something that Ralph Peters would probably have something to say about in regards to bad information). So I would expect some of this news to either be: spotlighted for the international community on the corrupt links between terrorism and the military; or, for that news to be blowtorched by the government and military.

Also, in regard to the International Crisis Group ... they should be applauded for their work on gathering open source information on Jemaah Islamiyah.

Jedburgh
05-06-2006, 03:27 PM
From ICG: Terrorism in Indonesia: Noordin's Networks (http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/asia/indonesia/114_terrorism_in_indonesia_noordin_s_networks.pdf)

The Indonesian police are closing in on Noordin Mohammed Top, South East Asia’s most wanted terrorist. In a dramatic pre-dawn raid on 29 April 2006 in Wonosobo, Central Java, they shot and killed two members of his inner circle and arrested two others. If and when they capture Noordin, they will have put the person most determined to attack Western targets out of commission. But the problem of Noordin’s support structure will still have to be tackled.

For four years Noordin has tapped into jihadist networks to build a following of diehard loyalists, and those same networks may be available to others. Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), the region’s largest jihadist organisation, continues to provide the hard core of that following: the two killed in the Wonosobo raid were longstanding JI members, as was at least one of those arrested. But beginning in 2004, Noordin began reaching out to young men from other organisations and some with no previous organisational affiliation.

Many JI members reportedly see the group he has cobbled together – he grandly calls it al-Qaeda for the Malay Archipelago – as a deviant splinter that has done great harm to the organisation they joined in the mid-1990s. Noordin, however, reportedly sees himself as leading JI’s military wing, even though he answers to no one. He justifies his actions by citing jihadist doctrine that under emergency conditions – for example if surrounded by the enemy – a group of two or three or even a single individual can take on the enemy without instructions from an imam.

This report examines the way in which Noordin has relied on personal contacts to put his group together. It is based on interrogation depositions, court documents, and Indonesian press reports, with information crosschecked through extensive interviews with knowledgeable sources,
both official and unofficial.

Jedburgh
06-06-2006, 01:10 PM
2 Jun 06 Terrorism Monitor: The Role of Kinship in Indonesia's Jemaah Islamiya (http://jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2370016)

...The use of sibling relationships in jihadi recruitment is to provide further ideological support for the recruits beyond the group itself. Sometimes two or more brothers are recruited for jihad, helping each other during an operation and providing each other inspiration and reassurance. This particular type of recruitment is an effective use of kinship to ensure deeper engagement with the cause and group...

SWJED
06-11-2006, 12:22 AM
10 June Voice of America - Pending Release of Accused Jemaah Islamiyah Leader Raises Concerns (http://www.voanews.com/english/2006-06-10-voa20.cfm).


Pending Release of Accused Jemaah Islamiyah Leader Raises Concerns
By Douglas Bakshian
Manila
10 June 2006

Abu Bakar Bashir, the accused spiritual leader of the militant group Jemaah Islamiyah, is due to be released from prison soon. A top terrorism expert says his release sends the wrong message to terrorists.

Indonesian Muslim cleric Abu Bakar Bashir is expected to be released in a few days, after completing a prison sentence for his involvement in the 2002 Bali bombings, which killed more than 200 people.

Western countries view him as the spiritual leader of Jemaah Islamiyah, a regional militant network linked to the al-Qaida group, and he was convicted of being part of the conspiracy behind the bombings on the resort island.

Southeast Asian and Western authorities also blame Jemaah Islamiyah for other terrorist strikes in the region. Bashir denies any wrongdoing, and says Jemaah Islamiyah does not exist.

Bashir's prison term is almost over, and he will be released in a few days. Rohan Gunaratna, of Singapore's Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies, an expert on terrorist groups in Southeast and South Asia, says Bashir's release sends the wrong message to terrorists.

"It will be a huge boost for the jihadists, because Bashir is a leader of a terrorist group that killed 250 people… innocent people," he said. "I think that Bashir's release will send the wrong signal to jihadists, that you can be the head of a terrorist group and you can still be free."

Gunaratna told foreign correspondents in Manila Saturday that freeing Bashir will likely prompt more terrorist actions. He also argued that militant groups will get a political boost.

"Bashir is also the leader of the Majilis Mujahedin Indonesia, or the Mujahedin Council of Indonesia, umbrella organization of jihad groups in Indonesia," he added. "He will mobilize them, he will politicize them. He has the credentials, because he went to prison and he suffered. So, people will join him, people will work with him. That is why he must stay in prison forever."

An Indonesian court last year sentenced Bashir to 30 months in jail for conspiracy in the Bali bombing. That term was reduced because of time he spent in detention and a reduction he received on Indonesia's 60th independence anniversary in 2005.

Gunaratna describes Bashir as the leader of the most dangerous terrorist group in Southeast Asia, because Jemaah Islamiyah is the group closest to al-Qaida.

Strickland
06-11-2006, 11:16 AM
Things in Indonesia's Judicial system are different than ours; however, trust that Bakr Bashir will be re-arrested, re-tried, re-convicted, and re-sentenced, as he has been several times before, as soon as he is released. He is in extremely poor health, and similar to the US with Sheikh Abdel Rahman, there is considerable concern that Bakr Bashir will die in custody, and thus provide conspiracy "nuts" with something to potentially exploit. JI and Abu Bakr Bashir are NOT Indonesia's biggest problem. They are still trying to indict, try, and convict members of Suharto's family that stole $8 billion from the country, and left it in financial ruin.

SWJED
08-06-2006, 04:04 PM
2000 PHD Thesis by LtCol David Kilcullen (Twenty-Eight Articles: Fundamentals of Company-level Counterinsurgency (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=659)) - The Political Consequences of Military Operations in Indonesia 1945-99: A Fieldwork Analysis of the Political Power-Diffusion Effects of Guerrilla Conflict (http://www.library.unsw.edu.au/~thesis/adt-ADFA/public/adt-ADFA20060323.121124/).

Abstract:


Problem Investigated. This dissertation is a study of the political effects of low-intensity warfare in Indonesia since 1945. In particular, it examines the interaction between general principles and contextual variables in guerrilla conflict, to determine whether such conflict causes the diffusion of political power. Analysis of insurgent movements indicates that power structures within a guerrilla group tend to be regionalised, diffuse and based on multiple centres of roughly equal authority.

Conversely, studies of counter-insurgency (COIN) techniques indicate that successful COIN depends on effective political control over the local population. This tends to be exercised by regional or local military commanders rather than by central authority. Based on this, the author’s initial analysis indicated that one should expect to see a diffusion of political authority from central leaders (whether civilian or military) to regional military leaders, when a society is engaged in the conduct of either COIN or guerrilla warfare.

The problem investigated in this dissertation can therefore be stated thus: To what extent, at which levels of analysis and subject to what influencing factors does low-intensity warfare in Indonesia between 1945 and 1999 demonstrate a political power-diffusion effect? Procedures Followed. The procedure followed was a diachronic, qualitative, fieldwork-based analysis of two principle case studies: the Darul Islam insurgency in West Java 1948-1962 and the campaign in East Timor 1974-1999.

Principle research tools were:

• Semi-structured, formal, informal and group interviews.
• Analysis of official and private archives in Australia, Indonesia, the Netherlands and the UK.
• Participant observation using anthropological fieldwork techniques.
• Geographical analysis using transects, basemapping and overhead imagery.
• Demographic analysis using historical data, cartographic records and surveys.

Research was conducted in Australia, Indonesia (Jakarta and Bandung), the Netherlands (The Hague and Amsterdam) and the United Kingdom (London, Winchester, Salisbury and Warminster). Fieldwork was conducted over three periods in West Java (1994, 1995 and 1996) and one period in East Timor (1999-2000). General Results Obtained. The two principal case studies were the Darul Islam insurgency in West Java 1948-62 and the campaign in East Timor since 1974.

The fieldwork data showed that low-intensity warfare in Indonesia between 1945 and 1999 did indeed demonstrate the political power-diffusion effect posited by the author. This effect was triggered by the outbreak of guerrilla warfare, which itself flowed from crises generated by processes of modernisation and change within Indonesian society from traditional hierarchies to modern forms of social organisation. These crises were also affected by events at the systemic and regional levels of analysis – the invasion of the Netherlands East Indies by Japan, the Cold War, the Asian financial crisis and increasing economic and media globalisation. They resulted in a breakdown or weakening of formal power structures, allowing informal power structures to dominate. This in turn allowed local elites with economic, social or religious influence and with coercive power over the population, to develop political and military power at the local level while being subject to little control from higher levels.

This process, then, represented a power diffusion from central and civilian leadership levels to local leaders with coercive means – most often military or insurgent leaders. Having been triggered by guerrilla operations, however, the direction and process by which such power diffusion operated was heavily influenced by contextual variables, of which the most important were geographical factors, political culture, traditional authority structures and the interaction of external variables at different levels of analysis. Topographical isolation, poor infrastructure, severe terrain, scattered population groupings and strong influence by traditional hierarchies tend to accelerate and exacerbate the loss of central control. Conversely good infrastructure, large population centres, good communications and a high degree of influence by nation-state and systemic levels of analysis – particularly through economic and governmental institutionalisation – tend to slow such diffusion. Moreover, while power may be diffusing at one level of analysis (e.g. nation-state) it may be centralising at another (e.g. into the hands of military leaders at local level).

Analysis of the Malayan Emergency indicates that, in a comparable non-Indonesian historical example, the same general tendency to political power diffusion was evident and that the same broad contextual variables mediated it. However, it would be premature to conclude that the process observed in Indonesia is generally applicable. The nature and relative importance of contextual factors is likely to vary between examples and hence additional research on non-Indonesian examples would be necessary before such a conclusion could be drawn. Further research on a current instance of guerrilla operations in Indonesia is also essential before the broader contemporary applicability of these findings can be reliably demonstrated. Major Conclusions Reached.

Based on the above, the theses developed to answer the initial problem can be stated thus: The command and control (C2) structures inherent in traditional, dispersed rural guerrilla movements that lack access to mass media or electronic communications tend to lessen the degree of control by central (military or political) leaders over regional leaders. If COIN or Internal Security Operations are conducted, two factors will operate. First, there will be an increase in the degree of control over the civil population by local military leaders, at the expense of local or central political leaders. Second, where military command structures are pyramidal or segmentary, there will be an increase in control by local commanders at the expense of central military leaders. Where the central government is civilian or has interests divergent from the military’s, the first of these factors will dominate. Where the government is military or has interests largely identical to those of the military, the second factor will be dominant. The process of power diffusion can thus be summarised as follows: A crisis driven by processes of societal change or by external causes, leads to the outbreak of violence, one facet of which may include guerrilla operations. If guerrilla operations do occur, the C2 structures inherent in such operations give a high degree of autonomy and independence to local military leaders. The same (or a contemporaneous) crisis produces a breakdown of formal power structures, causing organisations to fall back upon informal power structures.

The nature of these informal power structures is determined by geography, political culture, patterns of traditional authority within the society and the degree of interaction of systemic/regional factors with local events. Thus the guerrilla operations and the concomitant breakdown in formal power structures form the trigger for political power diffusion. The precise nature and progress of this diffusion is then determined by contextual variables.

Jedburgh
01-24-2007, 08:56 PM
ICG, 24 Jan 07: Jihadism in Indonesia: Poso on the Edge (http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/asia/indonesia/127_jihadism_in_indonesia___poso_on_the_edge.pdf)

...This report examines how one neighbourhood in Poso became a JI stronghold and how a small group of men managed to terrorise the city for three years before their identities became known. It looks at the links between the JI structures in Poso and Java and the local grievances and resentments driving the ongoing violence and analyses the way forward...

Jocko54
02-19-2007, 12:55 AM
The TNI have demonstrated a pretty good capability in COIN ops. Their performance in Lebanon has been solid, and their efforts in places like Poso have demonstrated the type of restraint that will contribute to winning some credibility. Gen Petraeus has asked for increased Muslim participation in the coalition. What are the councils thoughts regarding Asian Muslims and the help they can provide in OIF? How can we help MNF I?

CSC2005
02-19-2007, 02:06 AM
The "JI Kinship" article is a great example of how local culture impacts the structure and relationships inside a terrorist group. To often I read about terrorist theories that try to explain all terrorist groups from Yemen to Colombia. It is not rocket science to think that a terrorist groups is a by-product of its local culture, but too often this angle is overlooked in favor of nodal analysis and number crunching.

Jedburgh
03-22-2007, 08:27 PM
ICG, 22 Mar 07: Indonesia: How GAM Won in Aceh (http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/asia/indonesia/b61_indonesia_how_gam_won_in_aceh.pdf)

When local elections were held in Aceh on 11 December 2006, conventional wisdom (shared by Crisis Group (http://www.acheh-eye.org/data_files/english_format/analisys/analysis_icg/analysis_icg_report_2006_11_29.pdf)) was that candidates from the Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, GAM) would not do well. They might pick up two or three of the nineteen district races, but the biggest prize – the provincial governorship – was almost certainly out of reach. The old Jakarta-linked parties would benefit from deep pockets, established structures and a split in the former insurgency’s leadership. Polls just before formal campaigning began showed GAM’s governor/deputy governor slate – Irwandi Yusuf and Muhammad Nazar – virtually out of contention. But GAM won overwhelmingly, in what an analyst called “a perfect storm between the fallout from the peace accord and the failure of political parties to understand the changing times”. The challenge now is to govern effectively and cleanly in the face of high expectations, possible old elite obstructionism and some GAM members’ sense of entitlement that it is their turn for power and wealth....

Jedburgh
05-03-2007, 07:05 PM
ICG, 3 May 07: Indonesia: Jemaah Islamiyah’s Current Status (http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/asia/indonesia/b63_indonesia_jemaah_islamiyah_s_current_status.pd f)

...We will have to wait for more arrests and more information from those detained in March for definitive answers to questions about JI’s current status. It is resilient but not invulnerable, and while it continues to recruit, the organisation as a whole may be shrinking. People have left for different reasons. In some cases, like Subur Sugiarto’s, it may be because a more militant wing finds JI too cautious and bureaucratic. Others, particularly released prisoners, may be co-opted, if only temporarily, by government officials hoping to infiltrate and divide the organisation. One alumnus of a JI pesantren said that he realised he had graduated with no useful skills, and the only occupation open to him, outside petty trade, was teaching in another JI school. If schools are critical to JI’s regeneration, then dissatisfaction with restrictions inside and opportunities outside may ultimately do more damage to the group than arrests....

SWJED
05-10-2007, 09:07 PM
May 2007, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace - Where the War on Terror is Succeeding (http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=19146&prog=zch) by Josh Kurlantzick.


In October 2002, Islamic radicals set off two powerful bombs on the Indonesian island of Bali. Detonated in the heart of the tourist district, they obliterated several bars and nightclubs, killing over 200 people—visiting Australians, Americans, and other foreign nationals, as well as Indonesians—and wounding still more. It was the worst terrorist attack in the country’s history. Shocked and taken aback by the carnage, the international media proclaimed the end of innocence for the tropical retreat.

To anyone who had been paying attention to political developments in Southeast Asia over the previous decade, however, the surprise was misplaced. Well before the Bali bombing, Islamists had turned the region as a whole into a front in their global jihad. In the Philippines, the radical group Abu Sayyaf, which received funding from the brother-in-law of Osama bin Laden, had built itself into a powerfully lethal force. In Indonesia, an even deadlier terror group, Jemaah Islamiah (JI), had also expanded, bombing churches and ultimately putting in motion the Bali plot...

Today, less than five years after the attack on Bali, the situation in Southeast Asia has changed dramatically. Across the region, jihadist groups like Abu Sayyaf and Jemaah Islamiah are struggling to survive, Islamist parties seem to be weakening, and the region’s newest leaders openly wage war on terror. Moreover, the United States has played a leading role in these successes, and it has done so without creating much in the way of an anti-American reaction. Indeed, Southeast Asia is proving to be a model for the “long war” against Islamist terror. The lessons of its recent progress deserve to be studied closely...

wm
05-11-2007, 12:01 AM
I wonder how much of this can be attributed to the good guys providing some pretty wonderful tsunami relief to the region while the bad actors did nothing to help the stricken.
It would be interesting to see how things stand with terrorist organizations in
Thailand , Malaysia, and Myanmar these days as well.

SWJED
06-16-2007, 05:05 AM
15 June AP - 2 Terror Leaders Arrested in Indonesia (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/06/15/AR2007061500395.html) by Robin McDowell.


The head of Southeast Asia's most feared terrorist group was arrested along with his military chief, police said Friday, claiming a breakthrough in the fight against extremists in the world's most populous Muslim nation.

Authorities warned, however, that Jemaah Islamiyah - blamed for the 2002 Bali bombings and other attacks - and breakaway factions could still carry out strikes against Western and Christian interests...

Jedburgh
06-17-2007, 09:24 PM
Counterterrorism Blog, 17 Jun 07:

Major Changes within Jemaah Islamiyah Alleged (http://counterterrorismblog.org/2007/06/print/major_changes_within_jemaah_is.php)

Based on initial interrogations of top Jemaah Islamiyah members who were captured over the past week, the Indonesian police are now painting a picture of a terrorist organization attempting to consolidate in the face of heavy attrition.

According to the police, JI has now done away with its earlier region-wide mantiqi ("regional command") structure. Previously, JI had four mantiqi covering large portions of Southeast Asia and Australia. At its peak (prior to late 2002), each mantiqi consisted of up to a dozen wakilah, and each wakilah were comprised of several fiah, or cells. Overseeing all this was a markaz, a small headquarters consisting of top JI members.

It is now understood that JI still recognizes a markaz. But under the markaz, JI now divides itself into four ishoba which only cover the Indonesian island of Java. These ishoba are named after historical figures in Islam....

SWJED
06-18-2007, 07:23 AM
18 June NY Times - Indonesian Terror Group Limits Attacks (http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/18/world/asia/18indo.html?_r=1&oref=slogin) by Seth Mydans.


Long before the arrests of two of its top militants last week, the region’s major terrorist group had been moving away from the tactic of large-scale attacks, experts said Sunday.

This is a time of religious and social ferment, as Indonesia’s tradition of moderation and inclusiveness is tested by a rise in conservatism and an increased focus on Islam as a religion and a moral code.

Islamist violence is only one factor, and there is division and debate among militants as well as among the population at large...

Jedburgh
06-20-2007, 08:47 PM
The Jamestown Foundation's Terrorism Focus, 19 Jun 07:

Indonesia Neutralizes JI as Immediate Threat (http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2373479)

...It is evident that the number of first-generation, al-Qaeda trained operatives is dwindling, which will have important ramifications for the strategies that JI embarks on in the coming years. A lesser-known cadre of leaders should be expected to emerge out of the more traditional Darul Islam wings who will be more engaged in fomenting sectarian violence as well as in social welfare and dawa activities to rebuild JI's depleted ranks. Two of its four wings focus on recruitment. Assassinations and kidnappings by fringe groups may also increase (http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2373360). In the short-term, however, Indonesian counter-terrorism police unit Densus-88 deserves inordinate credit for neutralizing JI as an immediate threat.

Mark O'Neill
06-26-2007, 11:24 AM
The success of Detachment 88 is obviously starting to 'bite' amongst JI. The latest from the alleged spiritual leader of JI, quoted by the Australian Broadcasting Commission this evening (Tues 26 Jun):

http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2007/06/26/1962819.htm?section=justin"]http://http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2007/06/26/1962819.htm?section=justin

SteveMetz
06-26-2007, 11:38 AM
The success of Detachment 88 is obviously starting to 'bite' amongst JI. The latest from the alleged spiritual leader of JI, quoted by the Australian Broadcasting Commission this evening (Tues 26 Jun):

http://http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2007/06/26/1962819.htm?section=justin


Can't get the link to open. I think you have one too many "http"s in there.

Mark O'Neill
06-26-2007, 11:43 AM
Can't get the link to open. I think you have one too many "http"s in there.

yep, :o sorry, works now.

Jedburgh
07-09-2007, 01:29 PM
....he's not just complaining about CT efforts, he's considering a run for office:

ISN Network, 9 Jul 07: Courting Sharia in Indonesia (http://www.isn.ethz.ch/news/sw/details.cfm?id=17837)

Reports say that Abu Bakar Ba'asyir - the reputed spiritual leader of the militant Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) and head of the Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia party (MMI) - is considering running for president of Indonesia in elections scheduled for 2009.

While an estimated 86.4 percent of Indonesia's 234 million citizens are Muslims, most are moderates, and some of Ba'asyir's policies, especially his call for the implementation of Sharia law, could well strike resonant chords among many.

Ba'asyir's MMI is an umbrella organization for groups fighting for Sharia law in Indonesia.

While Ba'asyir denies involvement with the militant JI, he has stood trial and been convicted of involvement in terrorism and the recent arrests of top JI commanders have implicated him in direct involvement in the group's leadership.....

Mark O'Neill
07-14-2007, 11:46 AM
....he's not just complaining about CT efforts, he's considering a run for office:

ISN Network, 9 Jul 07: Courting Sharia in Indonesia (http://www.isn.ethz.ch/news/sw/details.cfm?id=17837)

JI is definitely a minor rump group compared to many other Islamic parties that have already 'embraced' the democratic process in Indonesia. The idea of Bashir getting a serious run in the presidential elections would appear to be a farcical pipe dream.

For good information about the state of these things I really commend the International Crisis Group's reports on JI to you. Sidney Jones has a hand in these and I do not think that there are too many others with such in depth knowledge.

At the same time, I would try and avoid 99.9% of what Abuza or Gunaratana write about JI. From SE Asia and Indonesia experts I have spoken with , their fame appears to be inversely proportional to their knowledge.

max161
07-14-2007, 12:17 PM
At the same time, I would try and avoid 99.9% of what Abuza or Gunaratana write about JI. From SE Asia and Indonesia experts I have spoken with , their fame appears to be inversely proportional to their knowledge.

I have known Zack and Rohan for a number of years and based on my experiences in SE Asia they are very knowledgable - Zack particularly has great access to the MILF and MNLF in the Philippines.

Mark O'Neill
07-14-2007, 11:29 PM
I have known Zack and Rohan for a number of years and based on my experiences in SE Asia they are very knowledgable - Zack particularly has great access to the MILF and MNLF in the Philippines.

You will note that I specifically mentioned JI. I did not offer any opinion on the Southern Philippines or any of the groups there.

I stand by my statement.

max161
07-15-2007, 12:31 AM
You will note that I specifically mentioned JI. I did not offer any opinion on the Southern Philippines or any of the groups there.

I stand by my statement.

Well the JI is here in the Philippines and from my first hand knowledge of Zack's and Rohan's work I believe that they do know what they are talking about and other SE Asia experts, operators and analysts, that I know and work with in Indonesia and throughout the region respect highly their work as well.

I stand by my statements.

Mark O'Neill
07-15-2007, 08:08 AM
Hi David,

I think it is important that people understand that there are a lot of quite different interpretations of what is happening in SE Asia other than those being offered by these two men.

That is not to say that they should not be heard - far from it - just that what they say should be evaluated against both credible criticisms, and some knowledge of their positions and backgrounds. The problem at the moment that I see (as foreshadowed in my previous post) is that the 'popular media' (and some government and defence agencies) has to date almost uncritically swallowed hook line and sinker whatever these men publish.

There are two parts to developing such a picture. First is establishing the veracity or otherwise of what they write. Second is understanding their motivations and or support.

For the first part, I note that I am relying in part here on a recent seminar conducted by Prof Carl Thayer (who at one point Abuza has acknowledged as a form of mentor on SE Asia) at the Defence and Security Applications Research Centre at the Australian Defence Force Academy.

I have also spoken at length to credible regional experts based here in Australia and the region regarding both authors works.... perhaps / probably even some of the same people you refer to .

I have only relied on open source, unclassified material in forming my concerns.

There is a body of literature critical of the techniques and analysis employed by both authors. These criticisms have been published in refereed journals( World Politics, Critical Asian Studies, Survival and South -East Asian Affairs) as well as regional newspapers such as the Jakarta Post.

I have distilled down these criticisms into the two main ones made openly:

1. Both authors make unsubstantiated claims. This normally involves only citing 'Intelligence sources". Byman on Gunaratna's Inside Al Qaeda "Although it often overwhelms the reader in detail , many of its key claims... are unsupported. In addition, it often relies on intelligence reporting without so much of a hint of whether the material is from an interview, a document , or a media leak. Other claims by Gunaratna deserve additional substantiation..."

2. Abuza lacks sufficient knowledge of Islam, Arabic, Indonesian or Malaya and Islam in SE Asia in general (The Jakarta Post). This leads to excessive reliance on secondary sources . Tim Huxley on Militant Islam: "It reads largely like a rough, unedited first draft, replete with inappropriate and factual inaccuracies". Kit Collier on the same work: " It is tedious to recount the numerous errors of fact, spelling, and interpretation that plague Abuza's work. This may explain why there has been so little published criticism of it. For country specialists, these errors expose a weak grounding in history, geography, and culture of the peoples described. Unfortunately, the errors are reproduced by other regionalists drawing on Abuza'.

It should be noted that prior to becoming an SE Asia Islamic terror 'expert' post 9 -11, Abuza's substantive academic knowledge was in other parts of Asia. He was not an Islamic scholar.

I have also heard both men speak at seminars. I have questioned Abuza about some of his assertions with regard to the (to date) unsubstantiated claims he has offered about JI's alleged or likely role in Southern Thailand. He could not offer any proof of the claims made and basically admitted it was in fact largely speculation based on what seemed plausible.

I have no problem with admitting the 'possible' plausibility of his points - they are highly plausible in this instance - but that does not make them fact. I have serious concerns when a man regarded as a credible figure is making assertions based on speculation.

Two weeks ago I had a substantial discussion with Sidney Jones from the ICG. She basically offered a diametrically opposed view of JI ,and its current abilities, to that offered by Abuza in Political Islam and Violence in Indonesia. I do not have sufficient knowledge of the subject matter to have arrived at a definitive personal opinion, but the differences that arose were striking and again gave me cause to question the certainty that Abuza offers in his opinions.

The second point was with regard to where both men are coming 'from'. Gunaratna's organisation receives a significant amount of support from his national government. It would reasonably be expected that this shapes certain things with regard to perceptions and message delivery. Likewise, Abuza receives / has received quite large sums of money from various think tanks and organisations in the US, some of whom are neither independent or non-partisan. All messages need to be interpreted against the background knowledge of who is paying for their production (and why).

Finally, both men make money from selling books. Books that do not sell do not make money. Since 9/11 very few authors have gone broke by inflating the threat of terrorism....


regards,

Mark

max161
07-15-2007, 02:56 PM
Finally, both men make money from selling books. Books that do not sell do not make money. Since 9/11 very few authors have gone broke by inflating the threat of terrorism....


regards,

Mark

Excellent points and certainly you have provided a useful perspective. Thank you. However, in Zack's defense I would offer that the books he has written do not sell well. He has not made a lot of money from his books. But I appreciate your analysis and perspective though I find Zack's first person sources from actually meeting with and interviewing key figures on both sides in SE Asia to be very valuable.

V/R,

Dave

Jedburgh
07-19-2007, 07:11 PM
ICG, 19 Jul 07: Indonesian Papua: A Local Perspective on the Conflict (http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/asia/indonesia/b66_indonesian_papua___a_local_perspective_on_the_ conflict.pdf)

Most outside observers see only one dimension of conflict in Papua – the Indonesian government vs. the independence movement – but it is much more complex. Tensions among tribal groups and between indigenous Papuans and non-Papuan settlers, as well as competition over political power and access to spoils at the district and sub-district levels, are also important. The issues vary substantially from one region to another. National and international attention has tended to focus on the northern coast and the central highlands, with relatively little on the districts in the south, which have long felt excluded from politics in the Papuan capital, Jayapura....
Good background, also from ICG, 5 Sep 06: Papua: Answers to Frequently Asked Questions (http://se1.isn.ch/serviceengine/FileContent?serviceID=7&fileid=DA34B975-8D38-2B36-DC4C-EC10EF21E13E&lng=en)

Jedburgh
08-29-2007, 12:27 PM
Time, 9 Aug 07: How Indonesia is Winning its War on Terror (http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1651213,00.html)

....Since the first Bali bombings five years ago, Indonesia has transformed itself from a country riddled with radical Islamist movements and terror threats — Indonesians once called autumn "the bombing season" because attacks had become so regular — to one of the world's few triumphs in fighting terrorism. Even better, Jakarta has succeeded without resorting to the draconian antiterror tactics increasingly preferred by governments from Sri Lanka to Iraq.

In recent years, Indonesian authorities have arrested or killed some 300 alleged militants. Indonesia has won removal from the Financial Action Task Force's list of nations not complying with global standards on fighting money laundering and terror, and earned praise from the U.S. State Department, which lauds its "new urgency on counterterrorism." The International Crisis Group's Southeast Asia project director, Sidney Jones, probably the world's leading expert on Indonesian terror, agrees, concluding that J.I. is "certainly much weaker" today than ever before.....

Jedburgh
10-04-2007, 05:55 PM
ICG, 4 Oct 07: Aceh: Post-Conflict Complications (http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/asia/south_east_asia/139_aceh_post_conflict_complications.pdf)

Two years after the Indonesian government and the Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, GAM) signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) in Helsinki, the peace is holding – but it is not the peace that many envisioned. The euphoria that swept Aceh after GAM candidates trounced their opponents in the December 2006 local elections is gone, replaced by a sense of gloom that the new elite is not that different from the old, and as many divisions are being created as healed in Acehnese society.

Jobs and contracts are going to the victors: loyalty to GAM has replaced good connections to Jakarta or local army commanders as the key to political and business opportunities. Extortion by ex-combatants is rampant, and armed robberies are on the rise, many carried out by former fighters operating outside any command structure. In some areas – North Aceh is one – former commanders of GAM’s armed wing, now called the Aceh Transition Committee (Komite Peralihan Aceh, KPA), serve as a virtual shadow government, playing much the same role as the Indonesian military did in the past vis-à-vis civilian officials, although without the clout of an authoritarian state behind them. Journalists have found that many KPA leaders have an allergy to criticism and a sense of themselves as above the law that do not bode well for democratic governance.

The cash that has made new and lucrative patronage networks available to GAM members has also divided a fractious movement still further, deepening divisions at the top and creating new fault lines between commanders with access to funds and the rank-and-file who feel they have not received their fair share. Many KPA members who consider themselves short-changed or simply deserving of a cut take matters into their own hands and exact payments from businesses, contractors and sometimes non-governmental organisations (NGOs) or turn to profitable pursuits like illegal logging....

Jedburgh
11-19-2007, 05:03 PM
ICG, 19 Nov 07: Deradicalisation and Indonesian Prisons (http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/asia/indonesia/142_deradicalisation_and_indonesian_prisons.pdf)

Even as the police are focusing their deradicalisation program on prisoners and ex-prisoners, they are the first to acknowledge that the current state of Indonesian prisons undermines their efforts. It is a telling indictment of the system that they do their best to keep top terrorists at police headquarters, out of the normal prison system entirely, because the chances of backsliding are so high.

Choices about isolation or integration are important but they cannot be made outside a broader program of prison reform, particularly an attack on prison corruption, which is very much on the agenda of the new director general of corrections. More important than choosing between two policies, in any case, is training prison administrators to look at terrorist prisoners as individuals and tailor prison programs to their needs.

Deradicalisation programs are important but they will inevitably be trial-and-error in nature; there is no single intervention that can produce a rejection of violence among a disparate group of people who have joined radical movements for many different reasons. Within JI alone there are the ideologues, the thugs, the utopians, the followers and the inadvertent accomplices; local recruits from Poso are motivated by very different factors than those who graduate from JI-affiliated schools in central Java.

Much more thought needs to be given to how to evaluate the “success” of deradicalisation programs, because there is a danger that many people deemed to have been deradicalised are those who were never the real problem, or that the reasons individuals renounce violence have nothing to do with police programs. Even if we could measure the number of people deradicalised according to specific criteria, that figure would only have meaning if we had some sense of the number of new recruits and knew that the balance was going in the right direction.

Focusing on the criminals-turned-jihadis in prison is also important. In all the prisons where “ustadz” are held, there is likely to be a small group of such men but it is not clear that anyone is tracking them or turning deradicalisation efforts in their direction. If it is important to design programs to ensure newly released JI members have vocational opportunities, what about the criminal recruits who may, like Beni Irawan, the Kerobokan guard, turn out to be more militant than their mentors? These men also need to be the focus of special programs and thus far have been left out.

It is hard to set performance goals for deradicalisation because it means so many different things to different people. But setting such goals for improving prison management is possible, desirable and critically necessary.
Complete 35 page paper at the link.

Jedburgh
01-22-2008, 03:54 PM
22 Jan 08: Indonesia: Tackling Radicalism in Poso (http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/asia/indonesia/b75_indonesia___tackling_radicalism_in_poso.pdf)

Serious violence in Poso has had a ten-year history. Between 1998 and 2001, it had been the scene of Christian-Muslim fighting. After 2001 and a government-brokered peace pact, the violence became one-sided, with local extremists, many of them linked to and directed by the extremist organisation Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), mounting attacks on Christians, local officials and suspected informants. The 11 and 22 January 2007 operations were the culmination of almost a year’s unsuccessful effort by the police to persuade those responsible for criminal acts to turn themselves in. Fourteen militants and one policeman died in the process, but Poso is quieter and safer, by all accounts, than it has been in years. As a result of the January operations:

�� almost all the JI religious teachers from Java have fled the area;

�� the perpetrators of all the jihadi crimes committed since the 2001 Malino peace accord (http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/ACOS-64BRC3?OpenDocument) have been identified, and most have been arrested, tried and convicted, without any backlash;

�� the JI administrative unit (wakalah) in Poso appears to have been destroyed, at least temporarily;

�� a major vocational training program is underway aimed at ensuring that would-be extremists have career opportunities that will keep them out of trouble;

�� the central government has made new funding available, including for improving education in the hope of diluting the influence of radical teaching; and

�� no serious violence has taken place in Poso in twelve months.
Complete 12 page paper at the link.

Jedburgh
02-29-2008, 01:30 PM
ICG, 28 Feb 08: Indonesia: Jemaah Islamiyah’s Publishing Industry (http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/getfile.cfm?id=3332&tid=5324&type=pdf&l=1)

A handful of members and persons close to Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), Indonesia’s most prominent extremist organisation, have developed a profitable publishing consortium in and around the pesantren (religious school) founded by Abu Bakar Ba’asyir and Abdullah Sungkar in Solo, Central Java. The consortium has become an important vehicle for the dissemination of jihadi thought, getting cheap and attractively printed books into mosques, bookstores and discussion groups. The publishing venture demonstrates JI’s resilience and the extent to which radical ideology has developed roots in Indonesia. The Indonesian government should monitor these enterprises more closely, but they may be playing a useful role by channelling JI energies into waging jihad through the printed page rather than acts of violence.....
Complete 25 page report at the link.

Jedburgh
06-16-2008, 12:38 PM
ICG, 16 Jun 08: Indonesia: Communal Tensions in Papua (http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/asia/indonesia/154_indonesia_communal_tensions_in_papua.pdf)

....The potential for communal conflict is high in Papua because both sides consider themselves aggrieved. Indigenous Christians feel threatened by ongoing Muslim migration; Muslim migrants feel democracy may be leading to a tyranny of the majority, where in the long term they will face discrimination or even expulsion. Even though there are significant rifts and factions in both communities, especially over competing nationalisms (Indonesian vs. Papuan), the developments in Manokwari and Kaimana may be a sign of more clashes to come.....
Complete 35 page report at the link.

Jedburgh
07-03-2008, 02:09 PM
IHT, 3 Jul 08: Islamic militants abort terror attack in western Indonesia at last minute (http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2008/07/03/asia/AS-Indonesia-Terror-Arrests.php)

Militants linked to Southeast Asia's most wanted terror suspect placed three bombs inside a tiny cafe in western Indonesia, but aborted their attack at the last minute after realizing many of the victims would have been Muslims, police said Thursday.

The revelation came during the interrogation of 10 men who were arrested this week on Sumatra Island. Twenty-two explosives also were seized, many packed with bullets to maximize the impact of the blasts, said police spokesman Maj. Gen. Abubakar Nataprawira.

The busts highlighted the lingering threat in Indonesia, which has been hit by a string of suicide bombings in recent years, including the 2002 Bali nightclubs attacks that thrust the world's most populous Muslim nation onto the front lines in the war on terrorism.......

Jedburgh
07-22-2008, 02:53 PM
CHD, Jun 08: Non-Governmental Actors in Peace Processes: The Case of Aceh (http://se1.isn.ch/serviceengine/FileContent?serviceID=PublishingHouse&fileid=30785079-FD56-58F6-FE4E-37CE5EB6935E&lng=en)

....Two peace processes were conducted in Aceh, first, lead by Henry Dunant Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (from now on HDC (http://www.hdcentre.org/)) in 1999-2004, and the other by the CMI-Crisis Management Initiative (from now on CMI (http://www.ahtisaari.fi/)) and the former president of Finland, Martti Ahtisaari (Helsinki negotiations) in 2005. Both created an atmosphere of optimism and reduced the annual number of casualties. The fact that the latter of the two heavily built on the principles agreed upon by the former makes the distinction of the two processes difficult. From the point of view of third party agency, though, they can be separated as the third parties involved, were different. After the signing of Memorandum of Understanding on peace between GAM and the government of Indonesia on August 15, 2005, the conflict has ceased to exist and there has only been a few casualties ever since between the two former conflicting parties.5 While there is a considerable risk of the conflict reoccurring, if economic and political structures of conflict cannot be transformed in time, and if the agreements agreed upon are not honestly implemented, the process to peace can be largely treated as a successful case. Aside with the fact that peace negotiations never involved the parliament, and the lack of commitment of the parliament could become a problem in the legislative implementation of the peace deal, it would be difficult to pinpoint clear problems in the peace process itself that could later be seen as causes, if the conflict reoccurs.....

JeffWolf
11-12-2008, 09:45 PM
http://www.usindo.org/publications/reports/pdf/WarOnTerror.pdf

Indonesia’s War on Terror, by William Wise describes the threat from international terrorism and Jakarta’s response. The desirability of law reform and
improving Indonesia’s intelligence capabilities are highlighted.

Jedburgh
05-20-2009, 12:31 PM
ICG, 20 May 09: Indonesia: Radicalisation of the Palembang Group (http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/asia/south_east_asia/b92_indonesia___radicalisation_of_the_palembang_gr oup.pdf)

Indonesia has earned well-deserved praise for its handling of home-grown extremism, but the problem has not gone away. In April 2009, ten men involved in a jihadi group in Palembang, South Sumatra, were sent to prison on terrorism charges for killing a Christian teacher and planning more ambitious attacks. Their history provides an unusually detailed case study of radicalisation – the process by which law-abiding individuals become willing to use violence to achieve their goals. The sobering revelation from Palembang is how easy that transformation can be if the right ingredients are present: a core group of individuals, a charismatic leader, motivation and opportunity. Another ingredient, access to weapons, is important but not essential: the Palembang group carried out its first attack with a hammer and only later moved to making bombs......

Jedburgh
07-07-2009, 01:22 PM
CSIS, 30 Jun 09: Conflict, Community, and Criminality in Southeast Asia and Australia: Assessments From the Field (http://www.humansecuritygateway.info/documents/CSIS_ConflictCommunityCriminality_SoutheastAsia_Au stralia.pdf)

A collection of essays with a foreword by Marc Sageman.

....In Southeast Asia, as in the rest of the world, it would be naïve to believe that terrorism can be defeated. It is and will remain a tactic of the weak against their government, and Southeast Asia has seen its share throughout modern history. However, the appeal of Islam is fading in some theaters but gaining strength in a few others due to local reasons. In the future, terrorism in Southeast Asia may still be waged in the name of new concepts. The key to holding it in check is to not overreact, punish only the criminals directly involved in violence, and encourage young people that might be attracted to violent ideology to pursue their political activism in a more effective and lawful way.
Essays include:

Radical Islam in the Middle East and Southeast Asia: A Comparison
The Middle East, Islamism, and Indonesia: Pull versus Push Factors
Jemaah Islamiyah and New Splinter Groups
Can Indonesian Democracy Tame Radical Islamism?
The Role of Radical Madrasahs in Terrorism: The Indonesian Case
Communal Violence in Indonesia and the Role of Foreign and Domestic Networks
Radical Islam in Malaysia
Governmental Responses to Extremism in Southeast Asia: “Hard” versus “Soft” Approaches
The Malayu Insurgency in Thailand’s Southern Border Provinces
“A Carnival of Crime”: The Enigma of the Abu Sayyaf
Will the Conflict in Mindanao Look Like the Insurgency in Southern Thailand?
Little-known Muslim Communities and Concerns in Cambodia, Burma, and Northern Thailand
Assessment of Criminal Threats Emanating from Burma
The Extremist Threat in Australia
Muslim Alienation in Australia: Europe Down Under?
Jihadi Ideology: An Overview

Jedburgh
07-23-2009, 04:43 PM
CTC, 22 Jul 09: Radical Islamist Ideology in Southeast Asia
(http://www.ctc.usma.edu/publications/Southeast%20Asia%20Report.pdf)

....The 17 July 2009 terrorist attacks on two hotels in Jakarta, Indonesia were a vivid reminder of the breadth of the battle space and the importance of constant vigilance. This break in Indonesia’s four-year calm might be a one-time event or an indication of a resurgent regional terror threat. With crude weapons and little logistical support, a small group of people were capable of carrying out an attack that received global media attention. The focus on the perpetrators of this attack may also veil the importance of ideologies other than global jihadism to political violence in the region, such as various strands of ethno-nationalism. As this report highlights, global jihadism is not the only ideology animating terrorist violence, and ethno-nationalism is still a prevalent force in Southeast Asia.

The inherent difficulty of tactical defense makes it ever more important to address the broader ideological and strategic aspects of the terror threat in the hopes of identifying important trends. This volume examines the salience and content of jihadi ideology across Southeast Asia in an attempt to gain a better understanding of the types of threats and susceptibility to global jihadist violence in the region.....
Essays Include:

The Landscape of Jihadism in Southeast Asia
The Current and Emerging Extremist Threat in Malaysia
The historical development of Jihadi Islamist thought in Indonesia
The Influence of Transnational Jihadist Ideology on Islamic Extremist Groups in the Philippines: The Cases of the Abu Sayyaf Group and the Rajah Solaiman Movement
Ideology, Religion, and Mobilization in the Southern Thai Conflict
A Survey of Southeast Asian Global Jihadist Websites

Jedburgh
07-24-2009, 04:09 PM
ICG, 24 Jul 09: Indonesia: The Hotel Bombings (http://www.humansecuritygateway.info/documents/ICG_TheHotelBombings_Indonesia.pdf)

On 17 July 2009, suicide bombers attacked two hotels in the heart of a Jakarta business district, killing nine and injuring more than 50, the first successful terrorist attack in Indonesia in almost four years. While no one has claimed responsibility, police are virtually certain it was the work of Noordin Mohammed Top, who leads a breakaway group from Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), the regional jihadi organisation responsible for the first Bali bombing in 2002. One of the hotels, the Marriott, was bombed by Noordin’s group in 2003; this time, a meeting of mostly foreign businessmen appears to have been the target. The restaurant of the nearby Ritz-Carlton was also bombed.

The attack sets back Indonesia’s counter-terrorism efforts, but its political and economic impact has been minor. On 23 July President Yudhoyono was declared the winner of the 8 July elections with more than 60 per cent of the vote; nothing about the bombing is likely to weaken his government or prompt a crisis. The impact on the business community, which lost four prominent members, has been devastating, but economic indicators are stable.....

Dayuhan
07-26-2009, 11:54 PM
I'm not sure I'd agree that the attacks are a "setback to Indonesia's counter-terrorism efforts"... they seem to me less a setback than an indication that the job is not finished.

JI and other jihadi groups have been substantially alienated from the Indonesian public. The deaths of Indonesians and Muslims in terror attacks have not been well received, and the jihadi agenda lacks popular appeal. The general quiet in sectarian violence in Maluku and Sulawesi has removed a powerful recruitment driver. Many JI leaders and members have been arrested and the group has splintered to a large extent.

It must be remembered, though, that JI is not an insurgency, it's a terrorist group. In many ways the group is most dangerous when it is pared down to a small core network of committed extremists. Even with very limited manpower and resources, a group like Top's can still generate very dangerous attacks.

ICG's recommendations make sense, though I would emphasize the need to achieve a permanent resolution to the sectarian conflicts that have provided extremists with their raison d'etre in the past. The Indonesians are on the right track and need to stay on it, but that does not and cannot assure that there will not be more such attacks as the process goes on. Unfortunately the nature of modern terrorism allows even a largely defeated group to make an enormous mess.

Jedburgh
08-28-2009, 04:21 PM
ICG, 27 Aug 09: Indonesia: Noordin Top’s Support Base (http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/asia/indonesia/b95_indonesia___noordin_tops_support_base.pdf)

This briefing examines the linkages among the people Noordin drew on for the 17 July attacks in an effort to understand his support base. It is focused on the local network, mostly on Java, not on the overseas links, as those were still being uncovered as this went to press. It is not about the ongoing police investigation and does not draw on any privileged information from the men arrested since 17 July. It is necessarily an interim study, using the known pieces of the puzzle to help explain why Noordin and his network have not only survived in Indonesia, but in some senses thrived. It is based on press reports and interviews conducted in connection with the current investigation, and extensive reading of documents collected for previous Crisis Group reports.

davidbfpo
08-19-2010, 07:15 AM
A little reported insurgency, even if in a strategic location and understandably Indonesia did not want an external media role. This is an update on Aceh, with a podcast:http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2010/08/17/The-sounds-of-Aceh-today.aspx

I'd forgotten the eventual peace agreement was signed in Helsinki and without research a sign that Nordic quiet diplomacy worked.

Erich G. Simmers
09-14-2010, 02:38 PM
The link in the original post appears to be broken. If you are looking for this document, please try this link instead: The Political Consequences of Military Operations in Indonesia 1945-99 (http://unsworks.unsw.edu.au/vital/access/manager/Repository/unsworks:3240).

davidbfpo
03-31-2011, 08:09 PM
Due to a host of factors, Indonesia continues to witness an upsurge of religious radicalism. Some salient characteristics, the DNA of radicalism so to speak, stand out when one analyses the attitudes and behavior of jihadists.

The jihadist embodies the following characteristics:

Link:http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2011/03/26/decoding-indonesia%E2%80%99s-radical-islamists-what-de-radicalize.html

Jedburgh
04-19-2011, 06:38 PM
ICG, 19 Apr 11: Indonesian Jihadism: Small Groups, Big Plans (http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-east-asia/indonesia/204%20Indonesian%20Jihadism%20%20Small%20Groups%20 Big%20Plans.ashx)

Violent extremism in Indonesia increasingly is taking the form of small groups acting independently of large jihadi organisations but sometimes encouraged by them. This is in part a response to effective law enforcement that has resulted in widespread arrests and structural weakening of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), Jama’ah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT) and other organisations accused of links to terrorism. But it is also the result of ideological shifts that favour “individual” over “organisational” jihad and low-cost, smallscale targeted killings over mass casualty attacks that inadvertently kill Muslims....

Bill Moore
04-22-2011, 09:59 PM
http://www.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/asiapcf/04/22/indonesia.terror.plan/index.html


Authorities found about 150 kilograms (330 pounds) of explosives near the church on Thursday, said Boy Rafli Amar, the national police spokesman.

There were two large bombs and five smaller ones, he said.

The actual CNN report (on T.V.) also mentioned the bombs were placed next to a gas pipeline and that the potential casualty figures could have been quite high if this attack wasn't disrupted.

The security forces in Indonesia have been highly successful in the past few years, but extremist groups are still operating. One of their goals is to re-create the ethnic strife responsible for hundreds of deaths a decade ago, which appears to be the logic behind this target.

Indonesia is the largest Muslim nation in the world, so what happens there matters.

Backwards Observer
04-23-2011, 11:03 AM
Off topic, but another side of Indonesia:


Tens of thousands of fans will greet teen heartthrob Justin Bieber at his concert in Sentul Bogor Saturday, event organizer Berlian Entertainment said.

...

Around 1,000 security personnel will be deployed to secure the concert, Berlian Entertainment Project Director Marcel Permadhi said. Security will consist of the police, the military as well as private security personnel, Marcel said. Bieber will also bring his own bodyguards, Marcel said. About 100 medical staff and 10 ambulance units will be on stand by during the event.

Thousands of fans to greet teen heartthrob at concert - Prodita Sabarini - Jakarta Post - 23 April, 2011 (http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2011/04/23/thousands-fans-greet-teen-heartthrob-concert.html)

and 'back in the day'...


In 1993, youths rioted outside a Jakarta stadium after being denied entrance to a "Metallica" concert. The Indonesian news agency reported 13 people were taken to hospital, and cars and houses were damaged. But independent reports said the rioting was much more serious. The Indonesian government said it would take more care in issuing rock concert permits.

global metal - metallica concert, jakarta 1993 - youtube (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WgnpQXZcCTE)

Metallica setlist, April 10, 1993, Jakarta - metallica.com (http://www.metallica.com/tour/apr-10-1993-jakarta.asp)

...

but also:


A suicide bomber attacked the Adz-Zikro mosque located within a police complex in Cirebon City in Indonesia last Friday, April 15, 2011. Dozens were injured when the bomb exploded during Friday prayers. Indonesia is the most populous Muslim dominated nation in the world and in recent years, it has been targeted by extremist terrorist groups.

Indonesia: Suicide Bomber Targets Police Mosque - Tikno - Global Voices - 21 April, 2011 (http://globalvoicesonline.org/2011/04/21/indonesia-suicide-bomber-targets-police-mosque/)

Bill Moore
04-24-2011, 12:50 AM
I don't what concerns me more, thousands of Justin Bieber fans in Indonesia, or Islamists in Indonesia? :D

Actually I think one feeds the other, and there are at least two movements that appear to be gaining traction in Indonesia. One is a movement towards the West. They want to incorporate some western business models and culture. Another movement is back towards fundamentalist Islam, and they'll employ extreme tactics in hopes of stopping the progression towards the West. I think the fact that there are thousands of Bieber fans simply makes the situation both more dangerous in the short run and perhaps more hopeful in the long run.

Backwards Observer
04-24-2011, 03:33 AM
I don't what concerns me more, thousands of Justin Bieber fans in Indonesia, or Islamists in Indonesia? :D

I know, tough call. If it was thousands of Islamist Justin Bieber fans, then there might be real trouble...or something.


Actually I think one feeds the other, and there are at least two movements that appear to be gaining traction in Indonesia. One is a movement towards the West. They want to incorporate some western business models and culture. Another movement is back towards fundamentalist Islam, and they'll employ extreme tactics in hopes of stopping the progression towards the West. I think the fact that there are thousands of Bieber fans simply makes the situation both more dangerous in the short run and perhaps more hopeful in the long run.

I agree with this. Thousands of Metallica fans can't be wrong...er, can they?

Backwards Observer
05-06-2011, 07:10 AM
More very naughty behaviour averted in Indonesia.


JAKARTA - INDONESIAN police said on Thursday they had found six unexploded bombs similar to one detonated by a suicide bomber inside a police mosque last month.

National police spokesman Boy Rafli Amar said the improvised devices appeared to have been prepared for a wave of suicide attacks in the mainly Muslim archipelago of 240 million people.

'They planned to use the six pipe bombs for another terror attack like the one which was carried out by Syarif,' he told reporters, referring to the mosque bomber's name. Thirty people were wounded in that incident.

Indonesian Police Find Six Unexploded Bombs - Straits Times - May 5, 2011 (http://www.straitstimes.com/BreakingNews/SEAsia/Story/STIStory_665117.html)

(hat tip to The Interloper, ah, I mean The Interpreter (http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/) :))

davidbfpo
05-24-2011, 01:42 PM
A report released last week by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute found that Indonesian jails are an "incubator" of terrorist operations and recruitment, where extremists can preach, mingle freely with others (radicalisation), and have easy access to cell phones and other forms of communication:http://www.aspi.org.au/publications/publication_details.aspx?ContentID=293&pubtype=10

The BB's summary:
A new report has concluded that Indonesian prisons are incubators of terrorism where jailed jihadis form new links and even plan attacks.

The New York Times last week looked at the rise of Islamic "vigilante groups" in Indonesia, whose violence against minority sects and religions is often ignored by police:http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/20/world/asia/20iht-indonesia20.html?ref=world.

And Indonesian police alleged last week that the group said to be responsible for a deadly suicide attack on a police mosque last month was linked to the hardline cleric Abu Bakir Bashir and the group Jemaah Ansharut Tauhid:http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/home/mosque-suicide-bomber-linked-to-abu-bakar-bashir/441851

Dayuhan
10-04-2011, 10:40 PM
Got this from ICG...

http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/south-east-asia/indonesia/B128-indonesia-trouble-again-in-ambon.aspx


Indonesia: Trouble Again in Ambon

Clashes on 11 September between Muslims and Christians in Ambon, capital of Maluku province, and sporadic incidents thereafter raised fears of a return to the communal fighting that wracked the region from 1999 to 2002. This time, an extraordinary effort by grassroots “peace provocateurs” and local officials largely kept the violence from spreading further in Maluku. But the unrest triggered efforts by extremists elsewhere to manipulate communal tensions, apparently motivating the bombing of a church in Solo, Central Java on 25 September...

Small incidents, but with potential to flare up further. Relevant to regional terror issues as well. The decline in Islamist influence in Indonesia has been closely linked to the decline in outbreaks of sectarian violence. JI and similar groups there (as elsewhere in SE Asia) have had very little success with the global jihad message, or in rallying support behind issues in Afghanistan or the Middle East: the concern is overwhelmingly with local issues. They have, however, very successfully portrayed these sectarian outbreaks as oppression of Indonesian Muslims.

Hard to say whether this outbreak was orchestrated for this purpose (the date could be coincidence) or was simply a recurring flare-up, but it bears watching, as this sort of violence has a direct bearing on local support for and recruitment by extremist groups.

Backwards Observer
10-27-2011, 07:35 AM
[anecdote] A whiles back, I was slated for a business trip to Indonesia. I asked some of the old Asia types if it might be wise to get a cheaper watch owing to stories of people getting their hands chopped off in order to steal Rolexes and such. They said that one shouldn't believe every cock and bull story one hears, and besides where I was headed they'd probably chop off the hand, throw away the watch and keep the hand.

So, it is with mild disbelief one can read today a gender theory critique of Islam as it relates to terrorism published as an editorial in the Jakarta Post, also noting that none of the comments involve chopping. Peace be upon them.


Religious radicalism and the masculinization of God
Satrio Wahono, Jakarta | Mon, 10/24/2011

We apparently live in fear now that terrorist bombers are flourishing in the country. Less than a year after the suicide bombing of the police headquarters in Cirebon, West Java, we have again been shocked by similar acts of terror at Bethel Injil Sepenuh Church (GBIS) in Surakarta, Central Java, in late September.

This series of events inevitably leads us to the gloomy conclusion that the movement driven by radical religious doctrine has not disappeared in Indonesia. Such a doctrine believes that any means — including the use of violence — are justified to overthrow an order perceived as secular and corrupt. In exchange, followers of the doctrine aspire to establish an ideal order that they believe will be approved by God. Therefore, analyzing such a doctrine is important for us in an attempt to neutralize it.

Religious radicalism and the masculinization of God (http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2011/10/24/religious-radicalism-and-masculinization-god.html) - Jakarta Post - Oct 24, 2011

Bill Moore
01-28-2012, 06:00 PM
http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/south-east-asia/indonesia/b132-indonesia-from-vigilantism-to-terrorism-in-cirebon.aspx


Anti-vice raids and actions against non-Muslim minorities are becoming a path to more violent jihadism in Indonesia. The 2011 suicide bombings of a police mosque in Cirebon, West Java and an evangelical church in Solo, Central Java were carried out by men who moved from using sticks and stones in the name of upholding morality and curbing “deviance” to using bombs and guns. They show how ideological and tactical lines within the radical community have blurred, meaning that counter-terrorism programs that operate on the assumption that “terrorists” are a clearly definable group distinguishable from hardline activists and religious vigilantes are bound to fail. They also mean that the government must develop a strategy, consistent with democratic values, for countering clerics who use no violence themselves but preach that it is permissible to shed the blood of infidels (kafir) or oppressors (thaghut), meaning government officials and particularly the police.

Backwards Observer
01-29-2012, 02:14 PM
Allah willing, Indonesia may one day become an egalitarian society
Tom Allard, Sydney Morning Herald, Jan 30, 2012.

For a self-styled non-practising atheist, I was surprised to find one of the great pleasures of living in Jakarta was the call to prayer.

Like most homes in the city, mine was just 100 metres or so from the local mosque, a labyrinthine whitewashed building with a towering minaret where the muezzin sings praises to Allah five times a day.

Even at 4.30am, the smooth and melodious voice of Tata, the mosque's main singer, enchants, wafting across the warm tropical pre-dawn to herald the new day.

The chattering congregations for Friday prayers and the quiet meditations of business owners, workers and street vendors as they pause for the salat has endeared me to a faith that is too often maligned.

Most of all though, I have been impressed and inspired by the programs and projects run by worshippers to help the poor.

Allah willing, Indonesia may one day become an egalitarian society (http://www.smh.com.au/opinion/politics/allah-willing-indonesia-may-one-day-become-an-egalitarian-society-20120129-1qo11.html) - Sydney Morning Herald - Jan 30, 2012

Backwards Observer
01-29-2012, 03:28 PM
In Indonesia Chinese Wary of Standing Out Too Much
Desiree Tay, Straits Times Indonesia, Jan 28, 2012.

Glodok was once the vibrant heart of this capital city’s Chinese community. Yet, a full decade since Chinese New Year became a public holiday in Indonesia, Jakarta’s historic Chinatown is a faint shadow of its once-bustling self.

...

From 1966 to 1998, the Chinese language and many expressions of Chinese identity were driven underground as the Suharto government, driven in part by fears of communist China, pushed its policy of assimilation hard. The teaching of Chinese and use of Chinese script in public were banned, and Chinese Indonesians were urged to take on Indonesian-sounding names.

...

Medical hall worker Zhu Qiu Mei, 58, has lived in Glodok for more than 20 years, since her family moved from Palembang.

Asked about the muted Chinese New Year celebrations, she responds with two words: “Si chen” (dead city).

This sentiment is echoed by other Chinese Indonesians in the area. The turning point for them was 1998.

In May that year, political turmoil sparked by the Asian financial crisis saw mobs of rioters take to the streets in parts of Jakarta, targeting businesses and properties owned by ethnic Chinese.

Chinatown was particularly badly affected. Several buildings were burnt and scores lost their lives. Thousands of Chinese Indonesians fled the only country many had known to be home.


In Indonesia, Chinese Wary of Standing Out Too Much (http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/jakarta/in-indonesia-chinese-wary-of-standing-out-too-much/494263) - Jakarta Globe - Jan 29, 2012.

---


Indonesian Christians Protest Over Intimidation

Indonesian Christians held a prayer vigil in Jakarta on Sunday urging President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono to re-open their church and stop intimidation by Muslim hardliners.

About 200 people, mostly members of the Taman Yasmin Indonesian Christian Church, prayed and sang hymns outside the state palace.

“We hope the president will protect us from harassment by radical groups and re-open the church which is legally ours so we can conduct worship,” the group’s spokeswoman Dwiati Novita Rini told AFP.

The Christians have been forced to hold services on the pavement outside their church in Bogor city, south of Jakarta, after its permit was revoked in 2008, Rini said.

“But the Supreme Court overturned the decision in December 2010 and ordered for the church to be re-opened. The Bogor city administration however refused to comply,” she added.

Indonesian Christians Protest Over Intimidation (http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/home/indonesian-christians-protest-over-intimidation/494399) - Jakarta Globe - Jan 29, 2012.

Bill Moore
03-19-2012, 02:23 AM
http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/news/indonesian-police-kill-5-terror-suspects-in-bali-raid/505683


Hariadi said that police suspected the group was plotting a robbery to finance a terrorism act. Police, the spokesman said, also confiscated firearms and several rounds of ammunition from both locations but declined to divulge further details. “All information will be revealed [on Monday morning],” he said.

Supports the trend of the growing convergence between criminality and terrorism, especially since other sources of funding for these clowns have been cut off by good police work. Admittedly terrorists have used crime since the beginning of crime to fund their activities, but the Islamist groups were fairly funded by wealthy donors from the Middle East in recent years, so hopefully this is a positive trend.

http://news.yahoo.com/indonesia-police-5-terror-suspects-killed-bali-004247418.html


Two FN-45 rifles and masks were seized from the scene, Amar said. He said the men had been planning to rob a currency exchange, a jewelry shop and a cafe near Kuta and Jimbaran, two of the Bali beaches most popular with tourists.


Amar said the suspects killed Sunday were allegedly part of a terror group wanted for a series of armed robberies in Medan, the capital city of North Sumatra province in 2010. Police are investigating whether the suspects were connected to Jemaah Islamiyah or another larger terror group.

Jedburgh
07-16-2012, 07:34 PM
ICG, 16 Jul 12: How Indonesian Extremists Regroup (http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-east-asia/indonesia/228-how-indonesian-extremists-regroup.pdf)

The threat of extremist violence in Indonesia is not over, even though the last two years have seen major successes in breaking up extremist networks. One by one, men on the police most-wanted list have been tracked down, arrested, tried and imprisoned. The police have been good, but they have also been lucky. The would-be terrorists have been poorly trained, poorly disciplined and careless. The last major attack in Jakarta was in 2009, and the total number of people killed by terrorists in 2011 was five: three police and two of their own suicide bombers. A familiar sense of complacency has set in that the problem is largely over.

This report shows, however, that even with so many strikes against them, extremists have been able to regroup under pressure and plot new operations, often drawing on friends in prison. A highly-skilled leader with more patience than jihadis have shown to date might still be able to pull a group together and build it up without detection; certainly the determination to try has not faded. The report also shows how adversity has brought most jihadi groups into contact with one another, in a way that undercuts some of the progress made by the police in breaking up individual cells.

Bill Moore
10-27-2012, 06:48 PM
http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-202_162-57541663/indonesia-suspects-planned-attack-on-u.s-embassy/


He said the suspects belonged to a new group called the Harakah Sunni for Indonesian Society, or HASMI.

"From evidence found at the scene, we believe that this group was well prepared for serious terror attacks," Alius said.

Sticking with the theme of trends, what we seem to be seeing in Indonesia is the result of effective security operations that forces an enduring threat to continuously morph into new terrorist cells and organizations. Defeat of the idea and the strategic logic of terrorism is no where in sight. The terrorists like most adversaries have a political objective that won't be countered by population centric operations that focus on economic development and the rule of law. It may be we just have to accept this as the new norm until their is (if there is) an evolution in their underlying ideology and political goals. I think that means our security forces (the US and all its partners) need to focus our main effort on intelligence and disruption from a security aspect. Individual governments will have to wage the political competition within in their own borders.


Last month, police arrested 10 Islamist militants and seized a dozen homemade bombs from a group suspected of planning suicide attacks against security forces and plotting to blow up the Parliament building. The alleged bomb maker turned himself in to police while wearing an empty suicide vest.

Recent terror attacks in the country have been carried out by individuals or small groups and have targeted security forces and local "infidels" instead of Westerners, with less deadly results. The arrests announced Saturday appear to be the first in recent years to involve a group that allegedly planned to target foreign facilities.

Different groups experimenting with different approaches to achieve a common political objective.

Dayuhan
10-27-2012, 10:07 PM
Sticking with the theme of trends, what we seem to be seeing in Indonesia is the result of effective security operations that forces an enduring threat to continuously morph into new terrorist cells and organizations. Defeat of the idea and the strategic logic of terrorism is no where in sight. The terrorists like most adversaries have a political objective that won't be countered by population centric operations that focus on economic development and the rule of law. It may be we just have to accept this as the new norm until their is (if there is) an evolution in their underlying ideology and political goals. I think that means our security forces (the US and all its partners) need to focus our main effort on intelligence and disruption from a security aspect. Individual governments will have to wage the political competition within in their own borders.

Actually the idea and the strategic logic of terrorism have been significantly challenged, mainly through continued success in avoiding further sectarian conflict in Sulawesi, Maluku, etc. Those conflicts have long been the motivator that links the radical core to a broader audience and gives them recruits and credibility. That core is still there, and probably will be for some time, but without local sectarian conflict they become increasingly isolated from the community and have a harder time attracting recruits and resources. The radical narrative coming out of the Middle East doesn't have a broad enough appeal in Indonesia to generate much active public support, they need local issues, and increasingly they haven't got them.

Bill Moore
10-27-2012, 10:52 PM
Posted by Dayuhan,


Actually the idea and the strategic logic of terrorism have been significantly challenged, mainly through continued success in avoiding further sectarian conflict in Sulawesi, Maluku, etc. Those conflicts have long been the motivator that links the radical core to a broader audience and gives them recruits and credibility. That core is still there, and probably will be for some time, but without local sectarian conflict they become increasingly isolated from the community and have a harder time attracting recruits and resources. The radical narrative coming out of the Middle East doesn't have a broad enough appeal in Indonesia to generate much active public support, they need local issues, and increasingly they haven't got them.

What I wrote is the defeat of the idea and the strategic logic of terrorism is no where in sight. That argument stands, just because they're not gaining traction doesn't mean "their" strategic logic is going to change, they will continue to use the tactic to pursue their strategic ends. I agree one of their goals is to foment ethnic strife, which they were successful doing in the past. Hopefully their society remains resilient to those provocations, but regardless a significant core of true believers are not going to stop using terrorism among other tactics. I agree they have a much hard path to go down than extremists in S. Asia and the Middle East.

Bill Moore
11-03-2012, 06:17 PM
http://www.boston.com/news/world/asia/2012/11/03/indonesian-police-kill-alleged-militant-raid/SYwEYDx26e44UacAMRoVfP/story.html

Indonesian police kill alleged militant in raid


National police spokesman Brig. Gen. Boy Rafli Amar said the two suspects were among fugitives wanted for the assassination of two police officers who were killed last month while investigating terrorist activities in the area.

The two men resisted arrest by throwing homemade bombs toward security forces during the raid at a house in Kayamaya village in Poso district, Amar said.

They fight with the same tenacity their brothers in the ME do, so much for the argument they're not as susceptible to radicalization.


Poso was a flashpoint for violence between Christians and Muslims that left more than 1,000 people dead in 2001 and 2002. Authorities believe the district is now a terrorist hotbed.

They have no qualms about killing those from other ethnic groups, and creating communal strife is still part of their strategy, this wasn't a flash in the pan.

http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/publication-type/crisiswatch/crisiswatch-database.aspx?CountryIDs=%7B31FFC734-F47F-4E3C-91D4-5273537D1775%7D


Authorities early Sept discovered new Islamist militant group in Jakarta, with mission to attack potential targets including police stations, govt officials and Buddhists, the latter over Myanmar’s treatment of Muslim Rohingya people: 8 Sept blast injured 6 including 1 militant in Depok near Jakarta; 1 accomplice surrendered 9 Sept, 2 suspects arrested. Police 22-23 Sept arrested 10 suspected terrorists in Solo for planning attack on parliament, 1 Sept arrested member of group behind Aug attacks on police. Following Aug attacks by Sunni mob on Shiites in Madura, E Java, Shiite organisations rejected govt’s plan to relocate Shiite community to avoid further sectarian violence; Religious Affairs Minister Suryadharma Ali 6 Sept proposed Sunni-Shiite dialogue. Demonstrations against anti-Islam film 17 Sept turned violent in front of U.S. embassy; protests in Medan led U.S. to temporarily shut down consulate. In Papua police 2-3 Sept arrested some 25 Free Papua Movement (OPM) members including leader Danny Kogoya for alleged involvement in Aug 2011, May 2012 shootings.

The extremists are persistently seeking opportunities to exploit, the latest being the Burmese attacks on the Rohingya people. This will be used as justification to attack Buddhists in yet another attempt to mobilize Muslims to arms. I do agree that the vast majority of Indonesian muslims do not support this, but Indonesia is the world's largest Muslim nation but the 3-7% that are estimated to support these radical views still equates to tens of thousands. Of those a much smaller percentage will be motivated to participate in violent acts, but is still signficant.

davidbfpo
11-11-2012, 12:25 PM
An article by an Indian friend, on a quite different topic, has this aspect of countering terrorism CT:
It recommends the present Indonesian model of policing, which could transform from a repressive paramilitary force into an acceptable civilian police department in 13 years and where an April 2007 Gallup Poll found 81% of the public having confidence in the reformed police.

Link:http://www.sunday-guardian.com/analysis/poor-investigation-bedevils-police-in-india-pakistan

I have read that the Australian Federal Police (AFP) have played a role in supporting the reforms.

davidbfpo
11-12-2012, 10:38 AM
Rarely reported, but IMHO a good sign:
A man threw a pipe bomb at the South Sulawesi governor while he was on a stage but the device packed with nails failed to explode, police said Monday after arresting the suspect and a second man. No one was injured...

The suspect, Awaluddin Nasir, 25, was beaten up by the crowd and arrested just after allegedly tossing the device.

Link:http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2012/11/12/police-arrest-2-men-failed-bomb-attack.html

RotzKhan
11-13-2012, 07:10 PM
Interesting report from ICG on changes in Indonesian terrorism. Notes 2011 suicide bombings links to vigilante actions not directly tied to more traditional established groups connected with international jihad:

http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/south-east-asia/indonesia/b132-indonesia-from-vigilantism-to-terrorism-in-cirebon.aspx

The opening paragraph:
Anti-vice raids and actions against non-Muslim minorities are becoming a path to more violent jihadism in Indonesia. The 2011 suicide bombings of a police mosque in Cirebon, West Java and an evangelical church in Solo, Central Java were carried out by men who moved from using sticks and stones in the name of upholding morality and curbing “deviance” to using bombs and guns. They show how ideological and tactical lines within the radical community have blurred, meaning that counter-terrorism programs that operate on the assumption that “terrorists” are a clearly definable group distinguishable from hardline activists and religious vigilantes are bound to fail. They also mean that the government must develop a strategy, consistent with democratic values, for countering clerics who use no violence themselves but preach that it is permissible to shed the blood of infidels (kafir) or oppressors (thaghut), meaning government officials and particularly the police.

davidbfpo
01-24-2013, 11:48 PM
A very short review by a Singapore think tank of recent developments:
The recent killings of militants belonging to the so-called East Indonesia Mujahidin Commandos point not to the rise of a brand new militant network, but rather, yet another “mutation” of the old Darul Islam separatist movement or “super-organism.”

Link:http://www.rsis.edu.sg/publications/Perspective/RSIS0082013.pdf

One does wonder how they reached this conclusion, first the apparent situation, followed by a frankly bizarre suggestion (edited citation):
Finally, the Indonesian police must recognise that excessive use of force actually strengthens the hand of Santoso and his ilk. Granted, the police have suffered casualties themselves at the hands of the militants in recent years. Thus some police officers apparently maintain that “the best kind of deradicalisation is through killing (such) people”. Such an attitude however is counter-productive: worryingly, human rights observers complain that heavy-handed Densus 88 tactics are “driving militancy”.

Perhaps all police units should explore more systematically the calibrated use of so-called less-lethal weaponry, such as for instance acoustic and directed energy weapons, with Western assistance.

davidbfpo
08-22-2013, 01:26 PM
My title will be a familiar theme to SWC, the focus of a new book probably not - Indonesia, a key nation, partly due to its majority Muslim character.

This week the Australian think tank, the Lowy Institute launched a new book, The Roots of Terrorism in Indonesia: from Darul Islam to Jema'ah Islamiyah, by a leading authority on Islamic extremism in Indonesia, Solahudin:
Based on a remarkable bredth of original material, Solahudin's book shows how the ideas and form of activism that lead to the Bali Bombings in 2002 have a long and complex history in Indonesia, stretching back to Darul Islam revolt in the 1940s. Solahudin argues that 'al Qaeda-style ideology has been present in Indonesia for decades, long before al Qaeda itself emerged in the 1980s.

There are a small number of links to reviews, a podcast etc on:http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2013/08/16/Solahudin.aspx

In a longer Lowy comment 'Is the 'far enemy' off the agenda for Indonesian terrorists?' the author explains how terrorism has shifted to the 'near enemy', notably the police, from the 'far enemy', usually the Western presence. He refers to the impact since 2006 of a Jordanian theologian's writings - a new name for me, Muhammad Al Maqdisi and jihad tamkin. Ideology is in constant flux, so the target can change.

It ends with:
Consequently, a key to understanding terrorism in Indonesia, including whether or not terrorists will again attack the far enemy, is to have knowledge of the local and international political situation and of ideological changes in terrorist circles.

Link:http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2013/08/20/Is-the-far-enemy-off-the-agenda-for-Indonesia-terrorists.aspx

The book is not (yet) on Amazon, it is available from the Australian publisher:http://www.newsouthbooks.com.au/books/the-roots-of-terrorism-in-indonesia_from-darul-islam-to-jemaah-islamiyah/

I placed this thread here instead of the Asia-Pacific forum as the book and comments apply far beyond Indonesia. There is a long running thread 'Mainly terrorism in Indonesia; catch all':http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=737

davidbfpo
08-22-2013, 01:26 PM
My title will be a familiar theme to SWC, the focus of a new book probably not - Indonesia, a key nation, partly due to its majority Muslim character.

This week the Australian think tank, the Lowy Institute launched a new book, The Roots of Terrorism in Indonesia: from Darul Islam to Jema'ah Islamiyah, by a leading authority on Islamic extremism in Indonesia, Solahudin:
Based on a remarkable bredth of original material, Solahudin's book shows how the ideas and form of activism that lead to the Bali Bombings in 2002 have a long and complex history in Indonesia, stretching back to Darul Islam revolt in the 1940s. Solahudin argues that 'al Qaeda-style ideology has been present in Indonesia for decades, long before al Qaeda itself emerged in the 1980s.

There are a small number of links to reviews, a podcast etc on:http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2013/08/16/Solahudin.aspx

In a longer Lowy comment 'Is the 'far enemy' off the agenda for Indonesian terrorists?' the author explains how terrorism has shifted to the 'near enemy', notably the police, from the 'far enemy', usually the Western presence. He refers to the impact since 2006 of a Jordanian theologian's writings - a new name for me, Muhammad Al Maqdisi and jihad tamkin. Ideology is in constant flux, so the target can change.

It ends with:
Consequently, a key to understanding terrorism in Indonesia, including whether or not terrorists will again attack the far enemy, is to have knowledge of the local and international political situation and of ideological changes in terrorist circles.

Link:http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2013/08/20/Is-the-far-enemy-off-the-agenda-for-Indonesia-terrorists.aspx

The book is not (yet) on Amazon, it is available from the Australian publisher:http://www.newsouthbooks.com.au/books/the-roots-of-terrorism-in-indonesia_from-darul-islam-to-jemaah-islamiyah/

I placed this thread here instead of the Asia-Pacific forum as the book and comments apply far beyond Indonesia.

graphei
08-22-2013, 03:27 PM
First, I'm very excited this book was translated into English. Solahudin has a reputation for doing solid work, and I can't wait to get my hands on this.

Second:

Indonesia, a key nation, partly due to its majority Muslim character.
Indonesia isn't just a Muslim majority. It is the world's most populous Muslim country, even beating out Pakistan. I think just under 13% of the world's Muslims live in Indonesia, yet only 83% or so of the population is Muslim. Let's sit and think about that for a second. They are the most populous Muslim nation on Earth, and while they're a majority, they have more religious diversity there than any other Muslim country. Pretty neat! Okay, enough of me geeking out.

Third:
David, you summed this up nicely.

Ideology is in constant flux, so the target can change.
I think there is a tendency for people to look at a group, analyze them, and say "Okay. We know them." This is dead wrong. They change. Frequently. Much the same way grad students vie to study under a particular professor, so too, do they. They have conferences, publish, and talk about how to further their field. Furthermore, I know I'm preaching to the choir when I say it's dangerous to look at one of these groups and assume because we aren't on their list now, we won't be in the future.

Fourth:
I've spent a lot of time thinking about how the non-Arab Muslim world (aside from Iran and Pakistan) largely floats under the radar. This isn't good. Yes, it is important to know what is going on in the Middle East, but to focus on one area to the detriment of the others is short sighted. Case in point: Finding programs to study Arabic required some thinking and planning before 9/11. After that fateful day, they popped up everywhere. Arabic was the 'it' language. Outside of the government, do you know how hard it is to find Urdu? Hell, even Farsi is hard to come by.

Before I get on my soapbox, I'll stop myself and say it takes years to develop any sort of meaningful understanding these cultures. Do yourself a favor and pick a country in Africa or South Asia/Southeast Asia, and learn everything you can about it. If you want to pick a topic- extremism/religious violence, gender issues, development/reconstruction, globalization, whatever- wonderful. But pick a country.

graphei
08-22-2013, 03:27 PM
First, I'm very excited this book was translated into English. Solahudin has a reputation for doing solid work, and I can't wait to get my hands on this.

Second:

Indonesia, a key nation, partly due to its majority Muslim character.
Indonesia isn't just a Muslim majority. It is the world's most populous Muslim country, even beating out Pakistan. I think just under 13% of the world's Muslims live in Indonesia, yet only 83% or so of the population is Muslim. Let's sit and think about that for a second. They are the most populous Muslim nation on Earth, and while they're a majority, they have more religious diversity there than any other Muslim country. Pretty neat! Okay, enough of me geeking out.

Third:
David, you summed this up nicely.

Ideology is in constant flux, so the target can change.
I think there is a tendency for people to look at a group, analyze them, and say "Okay. We know them." This is dead wrong. They change. Frequently. Much the same way grad students vie to study under a particular professor, so too, do they. They have conferences, publish, and talk about how to further their field. Furthermore, I know I'm preaching to the choir when I say it's dangerous to look at one of these groups and assume because we aren't on their list now, we won't be in the future.

Fourth:
I've spent a lot of time thinking about how the non-Arab Muslim world (aside from Iran and Pakistan) largely floats under the radar. This isn't good. Yes, it is important to know what is going on in the Middle East, but to focus on one area to the detriment of the others is short sighted. Case in point: Finding programs to study Arabic required some thinking and planning before 9/11. After that fateful day, they popped up everywhere. Arabic was the 'it' language. Outside of the government, do you know how hard it is to find Urdu? Hell, even Farsi is hard to come by.

Before I get on my soapbox, I'll stop myself and say it takes years to develop any sort of meaningful understanding these cultures. Do yourself a favor and pick a country in Africa or South Asia/Southeast Asia, and learn everything you can about it. If you want to pick a topic- extremism/religious violence, gender issues, development/reconstruction, globalization, whatever- wonderful. But pick a country.

davidbfpo
08-26-2013, 07:25 PM
From Time magazine 'Q&A: Indonesia’s Terrorism Expert on the Country’s Homegrown Jihadis', the author of the cited book above:http://world.time.com/2013/08/26/qa-indonesias-terrorism-expert-on-the-countrys-homegrown-jihadis/

The last Q&A:
Are you optimistic that Indonesia’s terrorist movement can be eradicated?

They will always be there. They can weather all sorts of changes. They will be there as long as there are people who dream of imposing Shari‘a and people who can be easily recruited. Terrorism relies on these three ingredients: a disappointed people, a justifying ideology and an organization. The challenge is how to prevent it from getting big.

Within the Q&A is an intriguing passage, a practice in counter-radicalisation I have never heard of before, so enlightenment would be a bonus:):
How has Indonesia fared in combating terrorism?

The most effective way is to organize a meeting between convicted terrorists and victims. Let them see how their acts affect the victims’ lives and their families’. One example: last year, [jailed JI member] Umar Patek met a man who was badly injured in the 2003 Marriott Hotel bombing. It was an emotional encounter. The terrorist was so shocked that he couldn’t say much, apart from telling the victim, “Please tell others how sorry I am. If they can’t forgive me, I can’t go to heaven.”

Dayuhan
08-28-2013, 03:48 AM
First, I'm very excited this book was translated into English. Solahudin has a reputation for doing solid work, and I can't wait to get my hands on this.

I'm looking forward to seeing it as well; neighborhood affairs and all that.

I agree that there has long been a radical core in Indonesia following what might be called an "Al Qaeda ideology". I'd also point out that this group's ability to achieve any influence outside it's core membership has typically been related to sectarian violence within Indonesia, rather than to issues elsewhere. That does not mean, of course, that this small core cannot make a big mess. They can: that is the nature of terrorism. If we're looking at the ability of radical Islamists to gain significant political influence, I'd say that ability relates much more closely to internal Indonesian affairs than to an international Islamist agenda.

Certainly the study of Indonesian history, society, and politics is critical to understanding terrorism in Indonesia. I'd hesitate to base conclusions about "terrorism" generically or in any other market on that study.



Do yourself a favor and pick a country in Africa or South Asia/Southeast Asia, and learn everything you can about it. If you want to pick a topic- extremism/religious violence, gender issues, development/reconstruction, globalization, whatever- wonderful. But pick a country.

I did that, over 30 years ago, but I'm not sure I did myself a favor. There are rewards, in a rather abstract sense, but it wasn't exactly an astute career move!

davidbfpo
08-30-2013, 02:29 PM
Away from Indonesia now, on the same theme the 'far' or 'near' enemy an article 'Al Qaeda grows as its leaders focus on the 'near enemy':http://www.thenational.ae/thenationalconversation/comment/al-qaeda-grows-as-its-leaders-focus-on-the-near-enemy#full

Bill Moore
02-02-2014, 07:17 PM
http://file.understandingconflict.org/file/2014/01/IPAC_Indonesians_the_Syrian_Conflict.pdf

INDONESIANS AND THE SYRIAN CONFLICT
30 January 2014
IPAC Report

This is a very insightful report that should also probably be posted under one of the Al-Qaeda threads, but since the geographic focus is the impact of jihad in Syria on Indonesia I opted for this thread with the very relevant title of the evolving terrorist threat in Southeast Asia.

You need to read all 13 pages of the report to capture of the full scope of the analysis. If you read the first two pages, you can confuse it with being overly alarming that Indonesians are sending fighters to Syria to support Al-Qaeda, but it is much more nuanced as you progress and points to the various divisions within the Indonesian jihadist community on whether to support ISIS, Al-Nusra, local groups, or even Assad. More importantly if read with an open mind it help readers make a shift from the tactical (focused on cells committing terrorist acts) to the strategic and gain an appreciation of what they're trying to achieve and the plan for doing so. It also validates what many already appreciate, which is politics are not just local affairs, but local issues have global implications, especially with nations/identity groups that don't appreciate state borders.


The Syrian conflict is also attractive to Indonesian extremists because it enables them to apply the so-called “two-arm strategy”, the title of a book that has become a runaway hit in the jihadi community.

The two army strategy is explained in detail in the report, in short it was written my an Al-Qaeda strategist. Much of it is similar to "The Management of Strategy," another jihadist strategy, but this one is focused on how to exploit the Arab Spring. The author notes,


the restoration of the caliphate cannot start in what he calls “politically dead” areas like Sudan and Mauritania that are of little importance to the Islamic street. Instead it must start in an area of vital interest, near to areas of religious influence, with natural barriers for defence and secure bases. The two places that have these qualities are Syria and Yemen.

The conflict in Syria has impacted the jihadist movement in Indonesia (and I'm sure many other countries) in ways that can't be fully appreciated yet. Most significantly it has given the jihadist movement a voice again which can breath new life into what was a dying movement in Indonesia. A number of Islamist leaders and their websites are leveraging it in different ways, one I found most interesting was,


The Syrian conflict has already had an impact in Indonesia by convincing many extremists that their local jihad should be set aside for now to devote energy to the more important one abroad.


JI’s Abu Rusydan expressed a widely held view when he said: Why should we expend so much energy by thinking small and undertaking a local jihad experiment as we’ve done up till now?


He went on to say that history showed that the local jihads only end in defeat, because the enemy will be as strong or stronger than any force trying to destroy them. He used as an example the state set up by the Taliban in Afghanistan in the 1990s that eventually collapsed after the Americans invaded. He also pointed to Darul Islam, defeated by the TNI in the 1960s. He said it was time for Indonesians to join the global jihad – a war undertaken collectively by jihadi forces from different countries in an area where victory was assured in prophecies. Indonesians would find the victory that up till now has been elusive: the establishment of an Islamic caliphate.

The conclusion seems reasonable, but elsewhere in the article the author notes is the political situation in Indonesia changes, then the potential for a revived jihadist movement will exist.


Without local grievances to build on, no mujahid coming back from Syria or Yemen or anywhere else can build much of a movement, and without community support, as Abu Rusydan has repeatedly argued, no movement can succeed. Indonesia’s great strengths are its own political stability and relatively peaceful regional environment. It is nonetheless worth keeping an eye on Syria.

Dayuhan
02-03-2014, 10:19 AM
They fight with the same tenacity their brothers in the ME do, so much for the argument they're not as susceptible to radicalization.

Yes, they fight hard, and there are radicals. As in most places, the inner circle will not de-radicalize and they will not change. They will eventually have to be killed or imprisoned. What can be done, however, is to isolate that radical core from the broader societal base to the greatest possible extent, which makes it harder for the radicals to hide and to recruit replacements for those arrested of killed. In Indonesia the reduction in domestic sectarian conflict has not eliminated the radical core, but it has succeeded to some extent in isolating it from the broader population.


They have no qualms about killing those from other ethnic groups, and creating communal strife is still part of their strategy, this wasn't a flash in the pan.

Clearly they want to re-ignite the sectarian fighting, but so far they are not succeeding. 12-15 years ago an incident like that would have generated an instant flare-up. That of course is what the radicals want. Hopefully they won't get it.


I do agree that the vast majority of Indonesian muslims do not support this, but Indonesia is the world's largest Muslim nation but the 3-7% that are estimated to support these radical views still equates to tens of thousands. Of those a much smaller percentage will be motivated to participate in violent acts, but is still signficant.

3-7% of Indonesia is a lot of people. How many of those will actually give support up to the point of embracing terrorism remains to be seen, though. My guess is that a focus on Syria will prove to be a poor tactical move, as Syria is a long way from Indonesia and not a matter of immediate concern to most Indonesian Muslims... but as always, we will see. Not much to be done about it anyway, beyond keeping an eye on who goes and who comes back. That's the job of the Indonesians, and they are able to do it, though I'd assume that the US and other players will feed them any intel they can on movements of their nationals.

davidbfpo
01-12-2015, 04:49 PM
A news report from August 2014 just found on the Indonesian counter-radicalisation programme; that starts with:
Indonesian authorities have started transferring 170 hard-core convicted terrorists from prisons nationwide to a state-of-the-art facility in West Java.

(Citing the CT body's head) De-radicalisation is a slow process, but we hope we can see results in a few years to come,
Link:http://khabarsoutheastasia.com/en_GB/articles/apwi/articles/features/2014/08/12/feature-01

WarPorcus
03-22-2015, 12:03 AM
It was a good interview and he didn't minimize the threat. The current numbers mean little, which is why he didn't focus on numbers. Sleeping cells can sleep, but more importantly those that return can build there their own networks in their home country much like JI did in Indonesia. The threat is serious and there is no reason it will reside in 10 years. It has already existed over 20 years. We need to find the sweet spot between over and under reacting.

First I'd like to say, I should read/hang out/post here more often. The other forum - which is still excellent - has turned a bit too vitriolic for my taste.

Back to the topic at hand:

The GoI estimates that around 5-600 Indonesians are now actively participating in the Syrian conflict. Most, if not all, of these people are affiliated with Daesh/IS, instead of the more 'professional' (to an extent) jihadi groups such as AQ or even Al-Nusra.

Recently 32 Indonesians tried to enter Syria from Turkey. 16 disappeared from a tour group (which is how most of them get to Turkey by the way), and another 16 were intercepted at the border.

So far, there is little evidence that those who do manage to return have engaged in any nefarious activities. Most just slip back into the society they left. Others returned so disillusioned that they are no longer comfortable about being associated with any jihadi movements. A small portion try to build networks.

As we do not - that I know if - have any official numbers/statistics of the activities of these returning personnel vis-a-vis the jihadi movement, could you guys give me a link with the above percentage? I'd like to see if it correlates here.

WarPorcus
03-22-2015, 10:19 PM
WarPorcus,

I'm not sure what statistics you're looking for, but I'll do a search through my computer tomorrow and see what I have for foreign fighter flow from Southeast Asia. A few reports point to several foreign fighters being disillusioned by ISIL's extreme behavior, so hopefully that trend continues. As for Indonesia and the Philippines (similar but still very different), JI and ASG's initial core were foreign fighters from Afghanistan during the USSR occupation. The vast majority of fighters returning that conflict didn't engage in terrorism, but it only takes a handful to have a strategic impact.

We can't compare this to the Crusades where Christians go out and fight and return to their Christian homes, nations that were already somewhat extremist on the Christian side. Fighters today are returning to countries that don't embrace their extreme (and illegitimate) beliefs, so some seek to impose their views via violence. Indonesia from what I can gather from a few short trips there, discussions with experts, and reading is that the government is doing a relatively good job of addressing the concerns of their people (within reason in a developing country), so people aren't fighting because they're being discriminating against. They're fighting to impose their extreme and unpopular beliefs. We're talking Martin L. King freedom marches here (lol).

The Philippines is another issue altogether, since their government does discriminate against their Muslim population. The government does little to address the concerns of their Muslim population, and while President Aquino has a been light of hope, his time is getting short, and not unlike our system their Congress is corrupt and eager to undo much of the progress he has made. I project the situation will devolve for the worse in the Philippines.

Regardless of the conditions on the ground, the terrorists in these countries will reconnect, or strengthen their existing links with global terrorist networks based on foreign fighter flow to support ISIL. That points to a bigger challenge for security forces. I also think those who were repulsed by ISIL may find al-Qaeda more attractive if they're still looking a group to affiliate with. Reportedly, the jihadist websites/blogs in Indonesia contain a fierce internal debate between jihadists on whether to support ISIL or AQ.

For one, I see no reason this will go away in 10 years, but hopefully it can be contained to a manageable level.

Sorry for being unclear. I meant to ask if you have any statistics as the above for Europe, but for SE Asia.

In most cases, yes, the GoI is doing a pretty decent job staving off the IS/Daesh message. Having said that domestic politics often play up the muslim angle with predictable results. We are, by no means, a bastion for the IS in Asia, but it is gaining popularity in certain demographics.

What is truly astounding is still the lack of major attacks so far. This is mostly because the majority of the population is muslim, so there's some restraint there. Heavy intelligence/security operations also seem to keep their numbers down, although it does not change the fact that the radical/extremist view is a growing concern. Especially among high schools and college campuses.

Bill Moore
03-22-2015, 11:27 PM
A few links that may be helpful.

http://file.understandingconflict.org/file/2014/01/IPAC_Indonesians_the_Syrian_Conflict.pdf

http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/142004/joseph-chinyong-liow/isis-goes-to-asia



In 2012, ISIS’ appeal started to grow among Indonesian and Malaysian civil society groups that had mobilized in response to Syria’s humanitarian crisis by creating local awareness and fundraising. Within a year, several Islamic preachers in Indonesia had pledged allegiance to ISIS’ caliphate, and about half a dozen graduates from Indonesia’s Ngruki Islamic boarding school, previously a hotbed of Jemaah Islamiyah membership ideology and recruitment, are believed to have left to join the jihad in Syria (often with funding from Jemaah Islamiyah and other affiliated extremist groups).

Later in the article it explains that unlike returning fighters from Afghanistan in the early 90s, the current fighters have lost the advantage of surprise. Security forces will be monitoring the problem much more closely.

http://khabarsoutheastasia.com/en_GB/articles/apwi/articles/features/2015/01/07/feature-02

Not stats, but interesting nonetheless.

"
I am sending this message to you, Moeldoko, the National Police, and Densus 88, as well as Banser," Abu Jandal states, referring to NU's security wing.

"We are awaiting your arrival here (in Syria)… If you're not coming, we will come to you. We will return to Indonesia to enforce Sharia Islam. For those who are against us, we will slaughter each of you one by one".

http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2015/03/17/isis-posts-footage-boy-trainees-se-asia.html

ISIS posts footage of boy-trainees from SE Asia


The footage depicts a group of at least 20 boys studying, praying, eating and undergoing defence and weapons lessons in territory held by the terrorist group.


There has been a surge in Indonesian- and Malay-language material posted by ISIS online," Jasminder Singh, a research analyst at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, told The Straits Times.

http://www.mei.edu/content/map/how-isis-charmed-new-generation-indonesian-militants


The Islamic State’s (ISIS) media wing, Al-Hayat Media Center, recently released a video entitled “Join the Ranks” that features a group of Indonesian foreign fighters in Syria. In the video, the charismatic Indonesian militant Bahrumsyah calls on his fellow Indonesian Muslims to migrate to the land of the “caliphate.”[1] It is estimated that 100 to 300 Indonesian militants have gone to fight in Syria.[2] While some are spread across al-Qa‘ida (AQ)-affiliated groups such as Ahrar Sham, this essay focuses specifically on links between Indonesian militants and ISIS. Indonesians and Malaysians fighting for ISIS appear to have formed their own military unit, the Katibah Nusantara.[3] Meanwhile, 2,000 people across the Indonesian archipelago pledged allegiance to ISIS earlier this year.[4]

http://www.establishmentpost.com/asean-must-get-rid-isis-southeast-asia/


Asean is the fourth largest exporting region in the world. It is the most diverse and fast-moving competitive region in the world. All this would be lost if the region was riddled with terror attacks and violence.

ISIS presence in Southeast Asia
Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), the largest Muslim rebel group in the Philippines, has condemned extremist jihadists in Iraq and Syria, and vowed to stop the spread of their “virus” into the Southeast Asian nation.
Another Philippine rebel group Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) claims Sunni preachers have been conducting recruitment for ISIS members.
Al-Qaeda affiliate Abu Sayyaf pledges allegiance to ISIS.

Much more in the article . . .

WarPorcus
03-26-2015, 02:27 AM
Apparently DI cells in Indonesia is starting to go active.

Last month, a DI cell in Depok - a suburb of the capital - attempted to activate a chlorine laced IED. (http://thejakartaglobe.beritasatu.com/news/police-syria-returnees-tied-depok-chlorine-bomb/)


Jakarta. Indonesian militants believed to have returned from fighting with the Islamic State group in Syria are suspected of being behind an attempted chlorine bomb attack in a shopping mall last month, police said on Wednesday.

The homemade device — made up of several bottles and a detonator — was discovered in the ITC Depok mall south of Jakarta after it failed to go off properly. Police said it was the first such attack ever attempted in Indonesia.

Insp. Gen. Tito Karnavian of the National Police said the use of the chlorine resembled tactics employed by IS jihadists, who have taken over a vast swathe of territory in Syria and Iraq.

“It really surprised us,” said the former commander of the police’s elite counter-terror unit Densus 88. “This is a signature of ISIS,” he added, referring to the jihadists by an alternative name. “It is connected to a group likely already returned from Syria.”

He said police were pursuing “very good leads” into the bomb attempt but would not reveal further details. Exposure to chlorine gas causes intense irritation to the eyes, skin and airways, and can be deadly.

IS has been accused of using chlorine, notably in a Jan. 23 car bomb attack on Kurdish forces in Iraq. The Syrian regime has also been accused of carrying out chlorine gas attacks.

A police source told BeritaSatu earlier this month that all the chemicals used to manufacture the bomb were relatively easily available, and that the perpetrators of the failed attack in Depok may have attempted to produce the nerve agent sarin.

Indonesia, a hotbed of extremist violence in the past, has largely dismantled the Islamic militant networks responsible for a string of deadly attacks throughout the country in the early 2000s.

But the rise of IS poses a new threat, with nearly 160 Indonesians confirmed by police as having left to join IS, and authorities worried about the potential for radicals to revive extremist groups on their return.

Indonesian anti-terror police this week arrested five men who allegedly arranged for a group of mostly women and children to try and enter Syria to join IS.

Bill Moore
03-26-2015, 11:58 PM
Apparently DI cells in Indonesia is starting to go active.

Last month, a DI cell in Depok - a suburb of the capital - attempted to activate a chlorine laced IED. (http://thejakartaglobe.beritasatu.com/news/police-syria-returnees-tied-depok-chlorine-bomb/)

This certainly has the potential to go viral, or at least viral enough to set back the progress Indonesia has made in recent years. I tend to look at Indonesia (like other countries) as a kaleidoscope, and with a small twist of the scope the picture can change radically. If you only view Indonesia through the eyes of a counterterrorist you see jihadists behind every bush, if you only view Indonesia through the eyes of democratic reformer, you only see hope behind every bush, and if you only view Indonesia as a businessman, you see opportunity behind every bush. Few people are that narrow minded, and most realize that reality rests upon shifting sands that can shift with great suddenness for the better or the worse.

Bill Moore
04-20-2015, 10:38 AM
http://news.yahoo.com/asia-needs-military-balance-not-led-one-major-075027922.html

Indonesia military launches anti-IS operation on eastern island


JAKARTA (Reuters) - Indonesia's military has launched an anti-terrorism operation on the eastern island of Sulawesi to crack down on militants with suspected links to Islamic State, the armed forces chief said on Monday.

davidbfpo
07-26-2015, 01:44 PM
An Australian academic article, which although with a legal focus does provide a quick overview of the presence and activity of ISIS in Indonesia:http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2627961

The Abstract:
Indonesia, as signatory and co-sponsor of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2170, has committed to suppressing the flow of foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs), along with financing and other support, for Islamist extremist groups operating in Iraq and Syria – in particular the group known as the Islamic State of Iraq and Al-Sham (ISIS). Varying levels of support for ISIS have been observed in Indonesia, including displays of ISIS paraphernalia, support rallies, swearing of allegiance to the caliphate and an uncertain number of individuals travelling to the region to fight. Recognising the risk posed by support for ISIS and returning FTFs, the Indonesian government announced a 'ban' on the terrorist organisation in 2014. However, doubt remains with regard to the legal and practical enforcement of the 'ban' by Indonesian police and actions they are able to take against ISIS's Indonesian supporters. While there have been calls for the government to enact a new law or revise existing laws to specifically address ISIS and its supporters in Indonesia, it is uncertain if or when such a law could be finalised and passed. Accordingly, this article examines the legal position as it exists under current Indonesian law with respect to preventing and punishing supporters of ISIS.

Bob's World
07-27-2015, 06:05 PM
One major side effect of the US invasion of Iraq was the destabilization of the Shia-Sunni line of competition that once lie along the Iraq-Iran border.

Where is that line now? Along the northern borders of Kuwait, KSA, Jordan and Israel? Is that better? Hardly.

We created a band of Shia influence that consumed the Sunni-Arab populations of Syria and Iraq - quite likely producing the strategic tipping point for why those populations erupted into revolutionary insurgency against their respective governments. There was, and remains, little hope for those populations under either of those Shia dominated regimes.

Then along comes ISIS, sees a parade and leaps in front (to paraphrase Mao who grasped a similar opportunity in China back in the 30s).

So, to this article on Indonesians, and equally to those who travel from Europe, Africa and elsewhere. Is it just possible, that they do not travel to support ISIS, but rather travel to support the return of stability to this existential Sunni-Shia competition that our efforts kicked into motion??

Similarly for (the comparatively vastly under-reported) foreign Shia who travel to this same region in support of the Shia side of the competition.

We need to stop fixating on "threats" when we think about the strategic nature (and correspondingly, durable strategic solutions) to these problems.

Here are two questions US policy makers must form and communicate answers to:

1. What is the US plan to restore stability to the Shia-Sunni line of competition? (My current belief is that the Euphrates is the best bet for a new line.)

2. What is the tangible, viable political alternative to the Shia dominated governments of Syria and Iraq that we can advocate to the Sunni Arab populations of those two failing states?

Until we address those two issues, all we are doing is attempting to suppress the current challengers and reset the political conditions of failure that brought us to this place to begin with.

We have created a modern "crusade" of Muslims traveling to the holy lands to fight for their respective beliefs. While this was not intended, it has happened, and it was very, very predictable. The sooner we work to frame and communicate a strategy dedicated to these two ends, the sooner we begin to stop slapping at the symptoms and set a course to a strategically durable result that few will like, but that all can live with.

Bill Moore
07-29-2015, 05:29 AM
Here are two questions US policy makers must form and communicate answers to:

1. What is the US plan to restore stability to the Shia-Sunni line of competition? (My current belief is that the Euphrates is the best bet for a new line.)

2. What is the tangible, viable political alternative to the Shia dominated governments of Syria and Iraq that we can advocate to the Sunni Arab populations of those two failing states?

I agree that for the most part the post war tensions between the Shia and Sunnis would explode into a Civil War if an effective government (read strong man) wasn't installed. It should have been clear after the USSR invasion of Afghanistan that foreign fighters from the global umma would mobilize to support their brothers. But here we are, and unfortunately strategy is cumulative, we don't have the option to start all over. One administration inherits what those before have left.

Strategy should focus on protecting and progressing our interests, and I'm not convinced restoring stability between the Shia and Sunni is feasible or in our longer term interests at this time. It seems that neither side is ready to discuss acceptable alternative forms of government at this time. As long as they feel they can achieve their goals militarily they'll continue to fight. How does this condition threaten our interests? How do we mitigate that threat? Proposals need to be feasible. Right now it seems all sides are providing just enough support to sustain the status humanitarian disaster status quo.

Bill Moore
08-10-2015, 12:56 AM
Article posted on the SWJ News Roundup

http://www.latimes.com/world/asia/la-fg-ff-indonesia-isis-20150808-story.html#page=1

Meet two Indonesians who are training to join Islamic State


"I think there's some evidence that there's enough of a support base [in Indonesia] that if they got the green light from ISIS — which they haven't yet — they could quite quickly set up a structure of ISIS here," Jones said. "It would be tiny and there would be lots of opposition, but it raises concerns [that they might] follow other kinds of orders from ISIS, which could include violence."

As many readers know, over half of the world's Muslims reside in South and Southeast Asia. The potential for extremism is alarming, but unfortunately despite our claims of dedicating effort to remain left of bang, we tend to ignore this and focus on the 5 meter knife fight.


According to an Australian intelligence report obtained by news website The Intercept, two Indonesian commercial pilots have pledged devotion to Islamic State. Ridwan Agustin, a former AirAsia pilot, may have already traveled to Syria.

It doesn't many to have a strategic impact. ISIL conducts a more or less conventional in Syria and Iraq, and an atomized global surrogate war with self-radicalized individuals of various capabilities. An airline pilot controls a potential weapon of mass destruction.


"For Muslim people, there's a quite famous proverb: Live in dignity, or die in jihad. If we die doing this, we will have won."

davidbfpo
10-26-2015, 08:45 PM
An article in the free online journal Perspectives on Terrorism 'Countering the (Re-) Production of Militancy in Indonesia: between Coercion and Persuasion' by Paul Carnegie.

The Abstract:
In the early 2000s, Indonesia witnessed a proliferation of Islamist paramilitary groups and terror activity in the wake of Suharto’s downfall. Having said this, over the years since Suharto’s downfall, the dire threat predictions have largely failed to materialize at least strategically. This outcome raises some interesting questions about the ways in which Indonesian policy responded to the security threat posed by Islamist militancy. Drawing on Temby’s thesis about Darul Islam and Negara Islam Indonesia and combining this with Colombijn and Lindblad’s concept of ‘reservoirs of violence’, the following article argues that countering the conditioning factors underlying militancy and the legacy of different ‘imagined de-colonizations’ is critical for degrading militant threats (especially Islamist ones) in Indonesia. Persistent and excessive punitive action by the state is counter-productive in the long run. It runs too high a risk of antagonizing and further polarizing oppositional segments of the population. That in turn perpetuates a ‘ghettoized’ sense of enmity and alienation amongst them towards the state and wider society. By situating localized responses to the problem in historical context, the following underscores the importance of preventative persuasion measures for limiting the reproduction of militancy in Indonesia.

Link:http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/458

davidbfpo
12-21-2015, 06:18 PM
An excellent BBC report on Indonesia the world's most populous Muslim nation, which includes how extremism is there knawing away:http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-35055487

A key passage:
Archipelago Islam, or Islam Nusantara as it's known locally, was built over the centuries on Islam that arrived from several other parts of the world and was initially intertwined with Hinduism and ancient Javanese religions. In a large and diverse country stretching over 3,000 miles from east to west and composed of more than 17,000 islands, a less tolerant and inclusive interpretation of the Muslim faith may have struggled to survive. It came to be based on five principles - social justice; a just and civilised humanity; belief in one God; Indonesian unity; government by the will and consent of the people.

There is a main thread on Indonesia, mainly on terrorism:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=737

omarali50
12-22-2015, 03:49 PM
Its a good PR effort, and who knows, it may even work. But anyone with any knowledge of history will find it hard to stay on message with a straight face. Javanese Islam is more eclectic than the rest, but at both the Eastern and Western ends, much more "traditional" Islam did indeed find it possible to survive and even thrive. The problem with this approach (to cover up actual history with platitudes like Yenni's "five principles") is that they are liable to exposure and lack depth or staying power.
On the other hand, maybe that is just because some of us (luckily, very few of us) are incorrigible pessimists and cynics or far too pedantic about history for our own good... Maybe (and I sincerely hope this is the case) a mildly hedonistic consumer culture can build a new "moderate" and tolerant national identity out of scattered bits of Javanese multicultralism and big dollops of modern state-sponsored "messaging" (aka propaganda).
I am not being facetious. I really really do hope this can work. The alternatives are all far more unpleasant.

davidbfpo
01-14-2016, 07:11 AM
A developing situation after a bomb and gun attack, possibly mobile. Six dead, including three police officers.

Rolling news coverage:http://www.theguardian.com/world/live/2016/jan/14/multiple-explosions-gunshots-reported-in-jakarta-rolling-report and http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/live/world-asia-35309116

omarali50
01-14-2016, 04:19 PM
My simple two-variant model of susceptibility (http://brownpundits.blogspot.com/)to Jihadist terrorism would have predicted this.
Indonesia, modest Sunni-shariahist affiliation plus modestly dysfunctional state = higher risk than more shariahist but also more competent/harsh/oppressive Malaysia.

davidbfpo
09-26-2016, 12:53 PM
Hat tip to Atlantic magazine for this article, which is a review of a book on far wider issues. So back to Indonesia:
The big truth is that Indonesia has come close to effectively eliminating the threat of extremist violence

(He ends with) The big truth is that Indonesia has come close to effectively eliminating the threat of extremist violence,” Tepperman writes. An alternative truth is that Indonesia, through complicated and controversial means, has, for the moment, significantly reduced the threat of extremist violence from terrorists. It’s certainly an achievement, but it’s one that lies somewhere between a stopgap and a solution.Link:http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/09/indonesia-isis-islamic-terrorism/500951/?

davidbfpo
02-13-2018, 04:58 PM
A WaPo article and the theme is familiar to observers:
Indonesia’s overcrowded prisons are ill-equipped to deal with Islamic militant inmates, hampering efforts to prevent the spread of violent radicalism in institutions that have become known as jihadist breeding grounds, a study has found.Link:https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/study-extremists-still-flourishing-in-indonesias-prisons/2018/02/09/1cc7b94a-0d5d-11e8-998c-96deb18cca19_story.html? (https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/study-extremists-still-flourishing-in-indonesias-prisons/2018/02/09/1cc7b94a-0d5d-11e8-998c-96deb18cca19_story.html?utm_term=.b7ca5d8bdfe8)

davidbfpo
04-25-2018, 06:11 PM
A short overview article. A sample passage:
The attack exposed the lingering threat from homegrown militants in a country that has largely avoided the scourge of Islamist terrorism since the collapse of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) in the late 2000s. In the years since, several newly-formed groups along with JI’s offshoots have remained active beneath the radar, posing only a latent threat to security in the world’s most populous Muslim nation.
Link:https://www.asiasentinel.com/society/indonesia-homegrown-militants-re-emerge/

davidbfpo
05-29-2018, 09:16 PM
After what appears to have been a lull in Islamist violence an Australian author @ Lowy Institute offers an explanation. He starts with:
Indonesia has again exploded in a paroxysm of terrorist violence, but with a new twist: family suicide bombers. This may be the first time in the world that parents took their children on a family outing to blow themselves up.
(Ends with) If three families can be involved in two days’ worth of terrorist attacks in Surabaya, surely there are more ready to act.
Link:https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/surabaya-and-isis-family

davidbfpo
06-25-2018, 12:20 PM
An article in the latest CTC's The Sentinel, which is detailed - even if the official investigations have not made comments.
Link:https://ctc.usma.edu/surabaya-bombings-evolution-jihadi-threat-indonesia/

There are a few points of note, aside from the role families and women. This one struck me:
Only 86 Indonesians have returned so far (from Middle East combat zones), and none of those who joined the Islamic State have been involved in violence in Indonesia. Only one of these 86 perpetrated an attack on a police officer at North Sumatra police headquarters in Medan in June 2017. And he had spent six months training in Syria with the Free Syrian Army (FSA).

davidbfpo
01-21-2019, 07:53 PM
I did spot a BBC news item on this decision, but this is the first fuller commentary - from Australia. It starts with:
President Joko (Jokowi) Widodo’s decision to release Abu Bakar Ba’asyir is misguided, legally questionable and politically inept.
It sends the message that if one defies the state long enough, it will eventually capitulate. It emboldens those who see democracy as incompatible with Islam, because that’s what Ba’asyir has been arguing all his life. It gives jihadists back their hero, his status elevated still more by apparently winning his freedom without having to accept Pancasila, the state ideology, or pledge loyalty to the Indonesian state.


Link:https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/indonesia-releasing-abu-bakar-ba-asyir-wrong-all-counts

davidbfpo
01-25-2019, 08:10 PM
A very short article, which opens with:
The State Palace has confirmed that the government decided to call off the plan to grant early release to radical Muslim cleric and terror convict Abu Bakar Ba'asyir due to his resistance to pledge loyalty to the state ideology, Pancasila, and the Republic of Indonesia.
Link:https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2019/01/23/baasyir-early-release-plan-cancelled-state-palace.html? (https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2019/01/23/baasyir-early-release-plan-cancelled-state-palace.html?src=mostviewed&pg=/)