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Cavguy
05-20-2009, 02:15 PM
All,

Attached is a slide I use during my presentations that usually engenders quite a bit of discussion (which Is why I use it - to stir the pot).

This is why (in my view) we have hard times with COIN/SO/etc. Failure to understand the nature of the beast.

Like all slides there is a heavy dose of generalization. Obviously Ahmed the RPG gunner in AQI isn't necessarily consumed with the political strategy, but his leaders are.

A simple application of this slide is the ongoing debate over the Predator strikes in AfPak and ongoing collateral damage issues. There are many more examples.

Again, slide is meant to provoke discussion, pro and con. So discuss! :cool:

Niel

AmericanPride
05-20-2009, 02:38 PM
Cav,

This reminds me of a component of my argument to include class analysis (and a rethinking of Clausewitz) into COIN. In the conventional fight, the political leadership makes the decision to go to war just once -- and so the military is intently and exclusively focused on the "Tactical". But the insurgent makes that decision to 'go to war' every time he decides to act violently; every attack is a new "declaration" of war so-to-speak because the militant/insurgent/terrorist is, in essence, a political-soldier (whereas in contrast the American soldier is just that, a soldier). So the whole focus is on the political cause, or the "Political Strategic Theater". This is because the political object precedes the military/violence means used. The problem IMO is that the military is taking the lead on addressing a political conflict, and so we are in some ways putting the cart before the horse.

marct
05-20-2009, 04:30 PM
Niel, I couldn't have done it better! Really great slide!!!!!

Eden
05-20-2009, 04:40 PM
1. I wonder just how much thinking our opponents do on any level. Those who rise to the top ranks of the current crop of insurgents seem to me to be consummate politicians. They excel at fund-raising, deal-making, patronage, and intimidation - the same skill set you find in Congress or mafioso. Like many successful politicians, they do not seem to have much strategic sense, and their operational skills seem aimed at achieving personal rather than 'organizational' goals. Look how long it took the bad guys in Afghanistan to attack one of the coalition's true vulnerabilities: its supply lines. Moreover, they don't seem to recognize that both their tactics and operational styles are typically self-defeating; terrorism, especially, rarely works and most often creates the very conditions that will lead to its defeat (or abandonment as a tactic). Finally, they don't have the C2 to either implement or sustain a coherent strategy or operational style. In Afghanistan, we often spent long hours trying to impose a pattern on events to figure out what the bad guys were trying to do; I came to the conclusion that they weren't entirely sure either.

2. Some of the reason for the inversion pictured may be structural. I believe that the ratio of leaders/thinkers/decision-makers to foot soldiers in your typical insurgency is much higher than in conventional forces. This may not seem the case due to the hordes of staff officers and subordinate commanders in western armies, but they are not really setting policy or operating independently. Guys in caves with twenty hard-cores and a hundred stringers or part-timers are making their own tactical, operational, and sometimes strategic decisions in a way our battalion/brigade/regional commanders are not.

Ken White
05-20-2009, 04:42 PM
"...because the militant/insurgent/terrorist is, in essence, a political-soldier (whereas in contrast the American soldier is just that, a soldier)."I agree with his entire comment but that senetence is key. It's true and we should never, ever forget that -- as we sometimes try to do...

It is also unlikely to change. His comments concerning conventional versus COIN thinking are correct with respect to most but not all US Forces and I suspect that will always be true; we are probably not as a collective psychologically willing to adapt to the political and public face / relations efforts needed for us to essentially fight the Insurgent on his own terms.

I believe that efforts to attempt such adaptation for most of the force will actually be very counterproductive. One should also remember that not all fights against non-state actors or seeming insurgents are actually counterinsurgencies...

The Slide itself illustrates a conundrum that is not at likely to be addressed in the near term. I do not say rectified because I do not think that the dichotomy is really a problem or that we need to adapt our action to mirror the Insurgent model. We absolutely need to be aware of the difference and to develop counters for it but aside from Special Forces (not SOF in their entirety) no significant 'adaptation' is required of most units. What's required is simply acknowledgment of the difference and the development of strategic and operational flexibility to counter that. What we lack at this time is that flexibility and that is difficult to develop in a large bureaucracy. Difficult is not impossible.

Best way to fight a fire is with a suppressive agent, a different compound or process that deprives the fire of the oxygen it requires. Another fire, a backfire will sometimes allow a temporary gain but it will rarely extinguish the original fire.

Of course, good firebreaks and fire prevention are vastly superior to and easier than fire fighting.

marct
05-20-2009, 04:50 PM
Some good points, Eden.

On your first point re: politicians and not thinking, how is that different from the West? On your second point, I think you have a really good observation here.

I have a suspicion that part of the reason why the differences are there is how some (not all by any stretch of the imagination) insurgent groups define their battlespaces. From what I have seen, a lot of the definition, at least for AQ and similar irhabi groups, the primary battlespace is defined as the media, which the tactical / geographic (physical space) is of secondary concern. That might be because they lack the skills and troops, but it may also be because they realize that the best way to defeat the US is to get the American people to order a withdrawl; a "lesson" in tactics from Vietnam.

At the same time, and keeping with the idea of differing topologies of and emphasis on battlespaces, the US forces are, on the whole, as hampered in mediaspace as AQ is in Afghanistan - i.e. there are severe structural limitations on actions in mediaspace.

Gian P Gentile
05-20-2009, 04:51 PM
Niel:

At least with the slide I could understand your implied point to it.

But the implied point is the problem since it is fundamentally a slide that depicts the premise to population centric counterinsurgency and the usual critique of how the American Army doesnt get coin because we dont get the political aspect of it and only want to do tactics whereas the insurgent does and focusses on politics. Mao, Galula as opposite sides to the people's war construct would accept you slide and its implications. But why do you think it is relevant for today? Does the triangle for the insurgent fit the local villagers in the Korengal Valley?

Too, the implication to your slide for the "correct" action on the part of the American counterinsurgent is to invert our triangle so that the majority of our focus is on the political like the insurgents. But the flaw with this approach just like it is with the American Army's current flaw in how we have templated Galula and Thompson which is to treat counterinsurgency as a symetrical response to a perceived people's war. This is why I have argued that CE Callwell's book still has relevance and insights for today in that he saw small wars as essentially wars to create moral effects among local populations and leaders but saw the use of military force not in symmetrical but asymmetrical sense.

some thoughts from the other side, thanks for posting your slide.

marct
05-20-2009, 05:01 PM
Hi Gian,


But the implied point is the problem since it is fundamentally a slide that depicts the premise to population centric counterinsurgency and the usual critique of how the American Army doesnt get coin because we dont get the political aspect of it and only want to do tactics whereas the insurgent does and focusses on politics.

Honestly, when I looked at the slide, I didn't interpret it that way; I viewed it as a heuristic to get discussion going. Now, that interpretation is certainly one possible one, but I don't think that it is the only one.


Too, the implication to your slide for the "correct" action on the part of the American counterinsurgent is to invert our triangle so that the majority of our focus is on the political like the insurgents. But the flaw with this approach just like it is with the American Army's current flaw in how we have templated Galula and Thompson which is to treat counterinsurgency as a symetrical response to a perceived people's war.

I would agree that that is one possible implication, but I think there are many others. One the broader issue of "should" the US invert their position, that would be insane. That isn't to say that the US should not widen the top of their pyramid, but how that would be done is a totally subject to negotiation. For example, it is quite possible to define as tactical certain population-centric basics without inverting the triangle.

For me at least, I saw the slide as a great way of comparing conceptualizations of conflict without implying any required responses.

Cheers,

Marc

Eden
05-20-2009, 05:24 PM
I really should be working, but a third point occurs to me.

3. Again from a structural point of view, the pyramids may look like they do because the insurgent has a severely limited menu of tactical options to choose from, a slightly wider range of operational styles to work within, and far greater liberty to define an overall strategy than his conventional opponent. At least from a military viewpoint, the COIN strategy is defined by political masters and can only be changed or modified with great effort. Operational options in COIN are often constrained by host nation concerns, resource constraints, requirements to integrate with other agencies and allies, etc. On the other hand, the conventional forces normally have a wide variety of tactics, techniques, and procedures to choose from. So it may be as simple as the fact that humans tend to focus on those things they actually have some control over. As my sainted grandmother said, "when there is no option, there is no problem."

Cavguy
05-20-2009, 05:24 PM
Niel:

At least with the slide I could understand your implied point to it.

But the implied point is the problem since it is fundamentally a slide that depicts the premise to population centric counterinsurgency and the usual critique of how the American Army doesn't get coin because we dont get the political aspect of it and only want to do tactics whereas the insurgent does and focuses on politics. Mao, Galula as opposite sides to the people's war construct would accept you slide and its implications. But why do you think it is relevant for today? Does the triangle for the insurgent fit the local villagers in the Korengal Valley?

Too, the implication to your slide for the "correct" action on the part of the American counterinsurgent is to invert our triangle so that the majority of our focus is on the political like the insurgents. But the flaw with this approach just like it is with the American Army's current flaw in how we have templated Galula and Thompson which is to treat counterinsurgency as a symmetrical response to a perceived people's war. This is why I have argued that CE Callwell's book still has relevance and insights for today in that he saw small wars as essentially wars to create moral effects among local populations and leaders but saw the use of military force not in symmetrical but asymmetrical sense.

some thoughts from the other side, thanks for posting your slide.

Sir,

Good point. This slide (as you can see), doesn't give the answer, and neither does the discussion of it.

What it attempts to do is highlight what the average Stage 1/2 insurgent is doing in a broad sense. Ahmed the IED emplacer is not thinking in these terms. But his leadership knows that his IED strikes and attacks have political value far more than their tactical value.

Examples:

* COP Wanat battle. Tatical US success (assault repelled with heavy Taliban casualties) 9 US KIA. Political/Strategic victory for Taliban (can inflict pain on coalition, coalition weak/unprepared). Goal is to demoralize USA and also show local populace Americans are vulnerable despite technology. (among possible others). We tout our tactical success, and wonder why no one cares. (See also: Tet offensive)

* Any given week, A-Stan. TIC situation results in JDAM drop. Taliban clames XX civilians killed. US says they were all bad, or at least most of them. US believes its reports, locals believe the Taliban. Truth is muddled. Advantage: Insurgent, because it is the local people's perception that really counts. (Though US's matters too)

* Insurgent places IED on Route Tampa in Iraq, destroying one of 20 5k fuelers. Is he trying to halt fuel shipments to CF in Iraq? No. He doesn't have that capability (though Sadr tried in April 2004, and failed). He videotapes it and uses it as a recruitment video. US people worry about vulnerability of our soldiers and seeming inability to halt these IED attacks. Home support dwindles, attack by attack. We are tactically successful because my M1 tank still gets gas every day, and the other 19 fuelers made it in.

Solutions:

Depends on where you are. But do we always understand things in this light? The first step on an appropriate solution is understanding the problem. We have tended to look at enemy attacks from the S2 perspective about "What are they trying to do to us tactically?" (i.e. Close MSR Tampa). Less often we ask "What is the enemy trying to accomplish pol/strategically by this action".

It goes back to my fundamental mindset changing question -

It isn't "Where is the enemy"

It is "Why is the enemy there? (and why did he just do that)"

Which leads to "what things did he need to have to do it?", etc.


===

The goal isn't to guide people to a box, the goal is to understand and begin asking the questions that arrive at the appropriate answers for that location.

But yes, many people simply want a checklist to success, whether COIN or HIC. Doesn't exist.

Niel

Brandon Friedman
05-20-2009, 06:24 PM
Niel,

I think you're on target with this. This gives me an excuse to post my favorite quote from Mao. In my view, it's relevant here:


“There are some militarists who say: 'We are not interested in politics but only in the profession of arms.' It is vital that these simple-minded militarists be made to realize the relationship that exists between politics and military affairs. Military action is a method used to attain a political goal. While military affairs and political affairs are not identical, it is impossible to isolate one from the other.”

-- Mao Tse-tung

Not sure if it's still the same way, but one of the problems I encountered in Iraq was the disdain soldiers had--especially leaders--for truly trying to understand the domestic political situation on the ground. Lots of times they'd finger-drill it during briefings, but you could tell they weren't really interested. Granted, this was back in 2003.

Cavguy
05-20-2009, 09:22 PM
Niel, I couldn't have done it better! Really great slide!!!!!

I should come clean that I didn't make this slide.

My boss stole it from a Brit General who briefed something like it, came home, and had us adapt it at the COIN center. The inverted triangles work well.

Great thing about the army is that plagiarism isn't frowned upon. :D

Niel

marct
05-20-2009, 09:24 PM
I should come clean that I didn't make this slide.

My boss stole it from a Brit General who briefed something like it, came home, and had us the COIN center. The inverted triangles works well.

LOL - whatever, it works :D.


Great thing about the army is that plagiarism isn't frowned upon. :D

I never would have guessed ;) (hey, I read FM 3-07-1 and a lot of stuff looked very familiar :cool:)!

slapout9
05-21-2009, 12:10 AM
It goes back to my fundamental mindset changing question -

It isn't "Where is the enemy"

It is "Why is the enemy there? (and why did he just do that)"

Which leads to "what things did he need to have to do it?", etc.


===

The goal isn't to guide people to a box, the goal is to understand and begin asking the questions that arrive at the appropriate answers for that location.

But yes, many people simply want a checklist to success, whether COIN or HIC. Doesn't exist.

Niel

Cavguy,
You got my vote. The motive is everything, I would add why did it will lead to who did it and how does he/she benefit from the action.

Starbuck
05-21-2009, 09:52 AM
Cavguy might have done well to put "reflector belts, property books and sideburn length" at the very base of the pyramid right below "tactical". In any given organization, there are going to be those who trivialize and "don't get" the big picture, as well as those who won't be able to think for themselves--as Col. Gentile mentions, there will be those who blindly slap templates of Ramadi over a map of Helmland.

The question is, how well is the Army promoting strategic thought? I would argue that we have gotten much better at challenging our leaders to see the greater strategic and political picture in recent years, but there are some communities that haven't experienced this phenomenon.

Coming from the aviation community, I think that we in particular have yet to experience this renaissance in strategic thought as our land-based bretheren have done. I don't think I've ever heard anyone in the aviation community use terms like "sectarian violence", "money as a weapons system", "commander's emergency relief program", and I think I can count on one hand the number of times I've heard the term "information ops".

The only times I've heard a grand operational overview of Iraq or Afghanistan was from decidedly non-aviation units. If you do an intelligence overview briefing for aviators and begin talking about sectarian differences, you'll typically see a bored aviator raise his hand and ask in an annoyed voice, "I just want to know if there are any MANPADS in the area".

Some areas of the Army, unfortunately, still fit the triangle diagram.

Bob's World
05-21-2009, 11:56 AM
This is also how I describe the role of SOF, which goes to why the conventional forces often misunderstand us as well.

I don't know how many times I heard a Flag officer at PACOM or PACFLT say "You SOF guys out there doing your tactical stuff." or words to that effect.

I would then have to explain, that you judge whether or not something is tactical, operational or strategic, not by number of stars on the commander's collar, and the nature of the task,, but by the nature of the purpose.

Absolutely, tactical tasks executed by the wise insurgent are done with operational/strategic purpose intended. Similarly, when you get into a situation where your SOF guys are doing tactical tasks for mere tactical effect, you have lost the bubble on where/how you should be employing them. On the surface it may look the same, but the difference is tremendous.

William F. Owen
05-21-2009, 01:31 PM
The question is, how well is the Army promoting strategic thought? I would argue that we have gotten much better at challenging our leaders to see the greater strategic and political picture in recent years, but there are some communities that haven't experienced this phenomenon.

Why would anyone in the Army do Strategic Thinking? It's none of your business, except to inform the Political Leadership, to whom you report whether the goals they seek can be aided or achieved by military means. When they say "do it," you do it.

The top of the slippery slope for the implied reasoning is "We shouldn't be here. We shouldn't be doing this" - which is the current mind-set of some senior British Officers - so no surprise.


“There are some militarists who say: 'We are not interested in politics but only in the profession of arms.' It is vital that these simple-minded militarists be made to realize the relationship that exists between politics and military affairs. Military action is a method used to attain a political goal. While military affairs and political affairs are not identical, it is impossible to isolate one from the other.”

-- Mao Tse-tung
Mao was not a genius (his mistakes cost millions their lives) and this shows why. The military implements policy, it does not make policy. The competence of a military is something that limits or enhances policy. There is a body of opinion that strongly suggests that Mao was misreading Clausewitz (which he read) when he was stating this.

THE SLIDE
Ok, so what does this tell us? In terms of action and effect, what can you extrapolate from that slide, in terms of different actions?

I'm pretty sure the Tamil Tigers would not agree with it. Tactical incompetence lost them their base areas and a lot of other things.

Most insurgencies have to opt for symbolic success because they cannot gain real success. Most insurgencies are limited to tactical actions with perceived and symbolic meaning. I see that more as a "So what" observation than anything really insightful. If they gain symbolic advantage by blowing up tankers, then stop giving them targets. If you can't, then deal with it.

The British Armies response to 4 very large IED's on the border in 1978/9, was to stop 95% of military road movement on the border with the Republic for 16 years. Not rocket science.

Cavguy
05-21-2009, 02:03 PM
Why would anyone in the Army do Strategic Thinking? It's none of your business, except to inform the Political Leadership, to whom you report whether the goals they seek can be aided or achieved by military means. When they say "do it," you do it.

This slide isn't telling the Army to think/develop the strategic plan. But it is suggesting that simply focusing "in their lane" on tactical/operational actions has political/strategic/military effects, and that tactical successes can cause the strategic plan to fail. It also suggests that one's tactical actions in a COIN environment should be viewed broader on its overall effect on the objective than simply by its tactical results.


THE SLIDE
Ok, so what does this tell us? In terms of action and effect, what can you extrapolate from that slide, in terms of different actions?

See above. This slide isn't meant to be a solution, as I mentioned to COL Gentile. It's meant to be a framing slide, thought/discussion generator for issues later in the presentation. One can view it as a reflection of the famous quote of the NVA General to Harry Sumners (although some dispute its accuracy ) - "You know, you never defeated us on the battlefield ... Yes, but it is also irrelevant".


I'm pretty sure the Tamil Tigers would not agree with it. Tactical incompetence lost them their base areas and a lot of other things.

"Pedants will be able to cite exceptions, and thus undermine useful (insightful) theory. Their depredations must be firmly resisted by one simple test: does the theory generally aid understanding of useful military problems? If so, then exceptions are permissible."

:D

On a serious note, it doesn't suggest tactics are unimportant. It does suggest it is only important within the broader context of the objective. which CvC I am sure would agree with.

Niel

J Wolfsberger
05-21-2009, 02:27 PM
... except to inform the Political Leadership, to whom you report whether the goals they seek can be aided or achieved by military means. When they say "do it," you do it.

I think this gets to the point of Cavguy's (really excellent) slide. If "war is the continuation of politics by other means," the traditional, institutionalized response of most Western armies is that "we do war, not politics." That's probably an inevitable outgrowth of the idea of military subordinated to civil authority, and the strict non involvement of serving military in political affairs. If that is the cultural paradigm, it will carry over to the battlefield, where the military will focus on combat and leave the political dimension to the politicians. I think that is Col. Gentile's point:



This is why I have argued that CE Callwell's book still has relevance and insights for today in that he saw small wars as essentially wars to create moral effects among local populations and leaders but saw the use of military force not in symmetrical but asymmetrical sense.

Our adversaries, on the other hand, view this as a political struggle, and a "totalitarian" one at that. There is nothing off limits, if it will further the desired political goal. Their military actions may be determined by operational or tactical concerns, but the strategic goal has little to do with troops in the field or territory conquered.

How we deal with the issue is another question. Do we ask the military to become more attuned to the political dimension? Does the State Department need to develop some sort of "Directorate for COIN" to address the political dimension while the military focuses on combat? Is there an intermediate approach? Or something else entirely?

William F. Owen
05-21-2009, 02:35 PM
This slide isn't telling the Army to think/develop the strategic plan. But it is suggesting that simply focusing "in their lane" on tactical/operational actions has political/strategic/military effects, and that tactical successes can cause the strategic plan to fail.

So if you are saying "doing stupid things is counter-productive" then I'd agree. Who would not? This applies to all forms of conflict. The whole point of the Tactical-Operational-Strategic construct is that actions in one/each generate effects in the others. Yet Corporals cannot really have strategic effect. They can only make Strategy more difficult by undermining it.


It also suggests that one's tactical actions in a COIN environment should be viewed broader on its overall effect on the objective than simply by its tactical results.
Agreed, but all tactical actions have to viewed in a broader context. Commander's intent if nothing else.


"You know, you never defeated us on the battlefield ... Yes, but it is also irrelevant".
And if the US Armed Forces had stayed in RVN, like they did in Korea, the NVA could never have won. High casualty rates, which lead to the sapping of the will to fight/endure, is what caused the US to abandon its commitment to RSVN. Own high casualty rates were, in part, the result of tactical actions and decisions.


"Pedants will be able to cite exceptions, and thus undermine useful (insightful) theory. Their depredations must be firmly resisted by one simple test: does the theory generally aid understanding of useful military problems? If so, then exceptions are permissible." :eek:


On a serious note, it doesn't suggest tactics are unimportant. It does suggest it is only important within the broader context of the objective. which CvC I am sure would agree with.
CvC sure as hell would. Tactical success is no less important in Security Operations than Combat Operations. I strongly object to the idea that "tactical success can be counter-productive." If it is in anyway counter productive it is not tactical success!

The circumstances under which the successful and legitimate killing or capture of enemy is "counter-productive" are so small that I doubt they could be usefully codified.

If the enemy makes you believe that doing him harm, will somehow do you harm, he's won! - and you have no legitimate recourse to armed action. - EG: Ghandi - and Ghandi was not an insurgent! He used Politics, without warfare - so not a military problem.

William F. Owen
05-21-2009, 02:42 PM
How we deal with the issue is another question. Do we ask the military to become more attuned to the political dimension? Does the State Department need to develop some sort of "Directorate for COIN" to address the political dimension while the military focuses on combat? Is there an intermediate approach? Or something else entirely?

We/you need to teach what war is to officers when they first join, and keep beating it into them, year after year.

You now have an Army that views COIN as something different from WAR, and has to make up a silly language using words like "Complex", "Human Terrain" and "Hybrid", because no one learnt to walk before buying a Honda 750. - and this is merely my opinion. If someone can tell me I am wrong I would be heartened!

J Wolfsberger
05-21-2009, 03:27 PM
We/you need to teach what war is to officers when they first join, and keep beating it into them, year after year.

Agreed. But the great trick here is defining what "war" is. Maybe, "the organized effort by one group to impose its will on another group"?

William F. Owen
05-21-2009, 03:34 PM
Agreed. But the great trick here is defining what "war" is. Maybe, "the organized effort by one group to impose its will on another group"?

The use of violence for political aims, so yes, on one level - "the organized effort by one group to impose its will on another group", but Thucydides and CvC have laid it all out in great detail. I don't think there are any grounds to be confused as to what war is, once you correctly characterise "violence" and "political aims."

Ken White
05-21-2009, 03:47 PM
...If that is the cultural paradigm, it will carry over to the battlefield, where the military will focus on combat and leave the political dimension to the politicians.Seems to me that would be advisable. We have tried the 'Soldier as Diplomat' routine for about 60 some odd years now -- how well has that worked out for us?

Diplomacy is essentially a positive effort -- to achieve a desired outcome with minimal cost to own side. Warfighting is a negative effort, the intent is to destroy at a minimum the will of the opponent. Mixing the two creates conflicts of intent, interest and outcome.

Bob's World pointed out yesterday that use of force by the US used to be very rare and that many today do not recall those days. Our excessive application of force in recent years has done us no favors and is certainly partly the responsibility of DoD for playing around, often by default, in matters not their concern. That has not really been beneficial for the nation -- or the world.
...the strategic goal has little to do with troops in the field or territory conquered.True. I think there's a message in that.
How we deal with the issue is another question. Do we ask the military to become more attuned to the political dimension? Does the State Department need to develop some sort of "Directorate for COIN" to address the political dimension while the military focuses on combat? Is there an intermediate approach? Or something else entirely?Well, we're not doing at all well on your first item -- and have not for many years. On the second, I'd suggest that if it gets to a need for COIN, State has already failed -- they need to stop the COIN fight before it starts if at all possible.

There may be an intermediate approach but Americans in general do not do 'intermediate' well. Something else entirely is possible but improbable as, if there were a better solution, someone probably would have found it in the last few hundred years.

People or groups of people should endeavor to do what they do best. Coordination of effort can be successful, fragmentation of effort invariably creates confusion and promotes poor performance, the infamous seven 'Ps.' :wry:

Bob's World
05-21-2009, 04:13 PM
If the enemy makes you believe that doing him harm, will somehow do you harm, he's won! - and you have no legitimate recourse to armed action. - EG: Ghandi - and Ghandi was not an insurgent! He used Politics, without warfare - so not a military problem.


This is one area where WILF and I take very different perspectives. I take WILF's position to be that insurgency begins when the violence begins, as does the military mission, with both also ending along with the violence.

I see Insurgency as a continuous spectrum that every populace and governance are continuously operating within. Most well down below Mao's Phase I insurgency in what has been described as "pre-insurgency" or "phase 0 insurgency". Perhaps most accurately it is "pre-violence insurgency".

Not only was Ghandi, and also Dr. King here in the states, insurgents; they were so successful at insurgency that they never had to resort to violence to force the government to address the conditions of poor governance that gave rise to their movements.

On the flip side of that "COIN," I also see the passing and implementation of the U.S. Civil Rights Act as the most successful COIN effort ever executed by the US government as well.

Once either the insurgent or the counterinsurgent resorts to violience to accomplish their ends it recognizes a failure at accomplishing the same peacefully first. It does not mean the earlier effort was not equally insurgency or counterinsurgency.

The critical benefit of taking my perspective is that it puts and keeps the onus for COIN on the civil government, making the case that this is an enduring committment and the essence of their function in relation to the populace: Provide Good Governance. Just becuase their failure may result in violence in no way relieves them of their duty to that end. The military comes in as needed and out again once good governance is restored.

William F. Owen
05-21-2009, 04:32 PM
Perhaps most accurately it is "pre-violence insurgency".


You could call it a "Protest Group" or even "Political Party."

marct
05-21-2009, 04:49 PM
You could call it a "Protest Group" or even "Political Party."

There's a difference, Wilf? Seriously, if the political goal is to change the current balance of power and resource allocation in a society, then the means will flow along a continuous spectrum from "passive resistance" (a la Ghandi) to outright revolt. When does it become and "insurgency"? I would have to disagree with you that it does so when violence starts. I would argue, instead, that it is when violence becomes the means of choice, so it's not a crisp set, it's a fuzzy one.

Case in point, and keeping with BW's MLK example, are the Rodney King riots in LA an insurgency? How about the actions of James Cromitie, David Williams, Onta Williams and Laguerre Payen (see here (http://www.cbc.ca/world/story/2009/05/20/temple-plot.html))?

The problem, and it is a sliperry slope one, is that whatever term is applied to a group, then the group will start adopting some of the implications of that term.

Bob's World
05-21-2009, 04:58 PM
This is one of those important nuances that can make the difference between a successful or failed COIN.

I think there is a difference between a political group and pre-violent insurgency.

The difference for me lies in my definition of causation for insurgency "A perception of poor governance on the part of some significant segment of the populace that they also perceive they have no legitimate means to resolve."

I see a political group as one that is working within a legitimate system to effect change. An insurgency, perceiving that either there is no legimate means, or that the legimate means that exist, for whatever reason, will not work to adddress their concern, works outside that system to effect change. If that fails as well, they will most likely rise up to acts of violence.

A political group (defined as one working within the legimate system) will likely just accept political failure and live with it, or perhaps if it may cause them to move into the realm of "pre-violence insurgency.

A matter of stages, so shades of grey. Again, I see this as a continuous spectrum. Making it too black and white creates unneccessary gaps and seams that the insurgent can exploit

William F. Owen
05-21-2009, 05:10 PM
Seriously, if the political goal is to change the current balance of power and resource allocation in a society, then the means will flow along a continuous spectrum from "passive resistance" (a la Ghandi) to outright revolt. When does it become and "insurgency"?

So you mean subversion?

It becomes an insurgency when you use "military means." - physical actions using organised violence. The ONLY reason Ghandi opted for non-violence was that it made the use of military force against him, illegitimate and illegal. - which was the point of my original thesis about the success of tactical actions.

AmericanPride
05-21-2009, 05:34 PM
Just a quibble about definitions:

Does "military means" include TTPs considered illegal by the laws of war, etc?

Brandon Friedman
05-21-2009, 05:45 PM
Mao was not a genius (his mistakes cost millions their lives) and this shows why. The military implements policy, it does not make policy. The competence of a military is something that limits or enhances policy. There is a body of opinion that strongly suggests that Mao was misreading Clausewitz (which he read) when he was stating this.

William,

Show me a leader that understands neither the domestic political motivations on the ground, nor the political landscape back home, and I'll show you a leader that doesn't have enough information to make the right decisions in a COIN environment.

Likewise, to suggest that senior-level military officers don't play a role in formulating policy is incorrect. They testify before Congress all the time and are expected to assist Members in crafting their own views. If they don't understand the political dynamics at play, then they can't offer their best advice. If Petraeus didn't understand the politics on both sides of the ocean, would he have been as successful in Iraq?

In theory, politicians formulate policy and the military implements it. But in reality, politicians don't typically know enough to make informed defense decisions without military input.

William F. Owen
05-21-2009, 05:57 PM
Does "military means" include TTPs considered illegal by the laws of war, etc?

Not sure about "illegal" TTPs but actions deemed illegal by the various conventions would not disqualify something from being military, in my view, so yes, I guess it would.

- BUT we are getting off the point, which was that I find it hard to see how actual "tactical success" (not abuse, over reaction, or atrocities) can undermine "strategy". If the enemy has managed to cause YOU to believe that harming HIM, is counter productive, then YOU have been suppressed into not acting.

Military history just does not support this thesis in my view. In the vast majority of cases, tactical success gains you advantage, be it operational or strategic.

Bob's World
05-21-2009, 06:04 PM
We Americans are strange cats though....Generals (though never Admirals I like to remind my Navy brothers) become Presidents, and Presidents think they are Generals. War is politics and politics is war. There are rules, but no few read them, and the rest tend to ignore them.

Yet like no other nation, it is clear and inviolate that there is civilian leadership of the military, and we all serve the people and protect and preserve the Constitution. The fact that some in the military dare to have thoughts on policy and strategy and actually voice them has never placed any of that at risk, and I suspect has made us what we are today.

William F. Owen
05-21-2009, 06:09 PM
In theory, politicians formulate policy and the military implements it. But in reality, politicians don't typically know enough to make informed defense decisions without military input.

Can't argue with that. As Ashkenazi said, "Do not ask for my opinion. Tell me what you want done, and I'll tell you if it is possible." - He is helping construct policy by informing people as to the limits of the military instrument. I think we all understand this.

Soldiers have to know enough, not to do those things which are counter-productive to the political intention, so Rules of Engagement? Mao's "Point for Attention." etc etc, and MacArthur being relieved of Command in Korea.

Ken White
05-21-2009, 06:19 PM
...As Ashkenazi said, "Do not ask for my opinion. Tell me what you want done, and I'll tell you if it is possible." - He is helping construct policy by informing people as to the limits of the military instrument. I think we all understand this.is one very smart General.

Reassuring that someone is doing it right instead of (a) ignoring the Pols (we've seen how that doesn't work...) or (b) sticking their nose in where it does not belong (and we've seen how that doesn't work).

AmericanPride
05-21-2009, 07:16 PM
BUT we are getting off the point, which was that I find it hard to see how actual "tactical success" (not abuse, over reaction, or atrocities) can undermine "strategy". If the enemy has managed to cause YOU to believe that harming HIM, is counter productive, then YOU have been suppressed into not acting.

Military history just does not support this thesis in my view. In the vast majority of cases, tactical success gains you advantage, be it operational or strategic.


Clausewitz spoke of a 'culminating point of victory'; which I submit a number of armies, Napoleon's and the Third Reich being the two most prominent examples, have managed to undermine their own strategic aims with continuous tactical successes against the enemy. I would also argue that Israel's long term aim of peace and security has likewise been undermined by its military successes (particularly 1967,1973, 1982, and 2006).

Entropy
05-21-2009, 07:32 PM
Interesting graphic, but I'm not sure how useful it is. For example, a significant portion of insurgents in Afghanistan are part-timers who join in for a variety of reasons where do they fit in? Are they really at the political/strategic level of thinking? The point being that insurgents are hardly homogenous and I think at the end of the day the differences between "us" and "them" are not as great as the graphic makes them out to be.

Perhaps an easier way to describe the differences are that insurgents usually have the "home field advantage." Is fighting on and for the "home field" inherently more political/strategic?

Bob's World
05-21-2009, 07:52 PM
Interesting graphic, but I'm not sure how useful it is. For example, a significant portion of insurgents in Afghanistan are part-timers who join in for a variety of reasons where do they fit in? Are they really at the political/strategic level of thinking? The point being that insurgents are hardly homogenous and I think at the end of the day the differences between "us" and "them" are not as great as the graphic makes them out to be.

Perhaps an easier way to describe the differences are that insurgents usually have the "home field advantage." Is fighting on and for the "home field" inherently more political/strategic?

Mao named the three phases of Insurgency:

“strategic defensive,” “strategic stalemate,” and “strategic offensive.”

We then renamed these phases U.S. doctrine calls them “latent and incipient,” “guerrilla warfare,” and “war of movement.”

This probably goes to why Neil needed the slide. To our "task-based" way of thinking this was all tactical stuff. Mao was thinking about effects at all three phases.

Look at the Tet Offensive for example. Most NVA and VC were most likely focused on the tactical objectives that they had been assigned. Senior leaders in S. Vietnam were probably most focused on the coordination of the overall offensive on the ground.

But the true impact of this "failed" offensive was a tremendous N. Vietnamese stategic victory back in the US. Did Giap have this as his primary purpose in planning the attack? I don't know. Certainly he hoped for operational success, but I suspect he understood the strategic potential of the offensive as well.

How many battles in the American Revolution were fought with the primary goal not of defeating British forces on the battlefield, so much as to sustain the requisite moral and support of the American populace for the fight, and to garner the support of the French to come to our assistance?

At the end of the day, the tactical scorecard in both wars was largely irrelevant to the final outcome. The insurgent does not have to win the fight to win the war. This is the basis behind Niel's diagram. We have to do both.

Entropy
05-21-2009, 09:29 PM
Thanks, BW, that's a good explanation. I think I got wrapped around the axle by the line "how the insurgent views things." Maybe it would be clearer if "insurgent" were replaced with "insurgency" or "insurgent movement."

AmericanPride
05-21-2009, 09:43 PM
The insurgent does not have to win the fight to win the war.

Bob,

Just a note -- I agree with what you're stating, but I do not think it applies to small wars alone. The Wehrmacht had tremendous tactical successes against the Red Army in the opening phases of the Second World War, but it still did not manage to achieve a decisive or strategic advantage at any point in the conflict. In fact, its victories sunk it deeper operationally and logistically into a situation in which the possibility of victory became increasingly smaller. There is required some kind of synergy not simply between the tactics and strategy, or strategy and politics, but through the whole system from the political ends to the tactical means. It is much more simple for the insurgent/terrorist/militant IMO because his decision for war is not at all separated from his desired goals.

William F. Owen
05-22-2009, 07:31 AM
I would also argue that Israel's long term aim of peace and security has likewise been undermined by its military successes (particularly 1967,1973, 1982, and 2006).

Well 67 and 73 were successes because they stopped the nation being annihilated/invaded - so I can't see how that makes them damaging to security. 82 and 06 were not actions of choice either.

I could suggest that US action since 911 have reduced it's chances of peace and security - but I shall not.

William F. Owen
05-22-2009, 07:47 AM
But the true impact of this "failed" offensive was a tremendous N. Vietnamese stategic victory back in the US. Did Giap have this as his primary purpose in planning the attack? I don't know. Certainly he hoped for operational success, but I suspect he understood the strategic potential of the offensive as well.
... but that is not the point. Tactical failure, can still have enough effect to break enemy will (Pyrrihic victory). That is completely different from trying to suggest that actual tactical success can be counter-productive.


The insurgent does not have to win the fight to win the war. This is the basis behind Niel's diagram. We have to do both.
OK, so show me one successful insurgency that did not grow from tactical success, eroding or corrupting the Goverments will to fight.
I can only think of one, (Rhodesia/Zimbabwe) - and that was an externally force treaty because the Rhodesian's realised they couldn't win, and faced a serious threat of a conventional invasion.


Bob,
The Wehrmacht had tremendous tactical successes against the Red Army in the opening phases of the Second World War, but it still did not manage to achieve a decisive or strategic advantage at any point in the conflict.
Again this was because the strategy was flawed. At no point was German tactical success "counter-productive."

Backwards Observer
05-22-2009, 07:53 AM
This has doubtless been proposed more cogently elsewhere, but would it add needless complexity to suggest that insurgencies in particular may be operating in a culture-specific, symbolic realm that subsumes the political? The symbolic field may be opaque, inaccessible or even inimical to manipulation by outsiders, as much of its cultural resonance may occur offstage from the theatre of operations. Local insurgent leaders may have varying degrees of symbolic coup d'oeil, but even then struggle to maintain control over a feedback loop which operates largely within a cultural unconscious approaching the mythical.:confused:

Bob's World
05-22-2009, 12:00 PM
... but that is not the point. Tactical failure, can still have enough effect to break enemy will (Pyrrihic victory). That is completely different from trying to suggest that actual tactical success can be counter-productive.


OK, so show me one successful insurgency that did not grow from tactical success, eroding or corrupting the Goverments will to fight.
I can only think of one, (Rhodesia/Zimbabwe) - and that was an externally force treaty because the Rhodesian's realised they couldn't win, and faced a serious threat of a conventional invasion.


Again this was because the strategy was flawed. At no point was German tactical success "counter-productive."


Dr. King and Mr. Ghandi. But these were leader's so savvy that they realized that all operations needed to remain non-violent and focus on the strategic end.

I guess we can go with the US phase of the Vietnamese insurgency as one that has that classic line of "you know, we never lost a battle..." as an example of a kinetic insurgency that succeeded in defeating the most powerful nation in the world without tactical success. The US was able to keep them in the Phase 2 "strategic stalemate" stage, but it wore us down. After we left they were able to surge up to a successful Phase 3 "strategic offense" stage and finish off the S. Vietnamese government as well. But the main victory was achieved thru tactical defeats and strategic victories. Rope a dope.

Reminds me of a story within a Louis L'amour Sackett novel. A determined young man goes to the saturday night dance where the biggest, toughest man in the area takes him outside and publicly and decisively beats him to a pulp. The beaten man goes home, and is told to never return if he knows what's good for him and the large man returns to the dance.

The next Saturday the young man returns and is severly beaten again.

The next Saturday the young man returns and is severly beaten again, but puts up a better fight, and the county tough is less enthusiastic about the fight.

This continues, defeat after defeat, Saturday after Saturday, until finally, the tough man grows so weary of having to fight this persistent little man every single Saturday that he stops coming to the dance himself, leaving the other victorious.

Just a story, but for one who is so determined to achieve their goal that they will keep coming back no matter what, the tale of the tape in the end will be who has the most will, not who has the most might.

Eden
05-22-2009, 01:33 PM
The idea that insurgents can win without tactical victories is wrong. In Afghanistan, Vietnam, Algeria, etc., the insurgents enjoyed (or are enjoying) considerable tactical success. Every government offical assassinated, every schoolteacher intimidated, every bomb that wrecks a market, is a tactical success. Every police post overrun, every rocket that hits its target, every helicopter shot down, is a tactical success.

In Vietnam, the VC and NVA quite often scored victories over conventional SVN forces, sometimes quite considerable, and instances of successful ambushes or skirmishes with US forces were numerous. It is hard for me to understand how anyone who has read any history about Vietnam would buy into the tired old saw the 'we never lost a battle'.

In Afghanistan, hardly a day went by without some form of insurgent tactical success - mostly against civilians, often against Afghan security forces, but sometimes against allied forces, and every now and then against US.

An insurgency cannot sustain itself without tactical successes. True, these do not have to come in the form of stand up fights against conventional firepower, but they have to come in some form. Neither insurgent foot soldiers nor their leaders are superhuman - like all men, they have to see some point to their sacrifices to carry on.

William F. Owen
05-22-2009, 02:43 PM
Dr. King and Mr. Ghandi. But these were leader's so savvy that they realized that all operations needed to remain non-violent and focus on the strategic end.

Utterly, utterly irrelevant! It has no bearing on the military instrument. You could say L. Ron Hubbard, has managed to creates and convert folks to new religion without resorting to violence - unlike Christianity and Islam. If they don't "do violence" they don't register on the meter.


I guess we can go with the US phase of the Vietnamese insurgency as one that has that classic line of "you know, we never lost a battle..." as an example of a kinetic insurgency that succeeded in defeating the most powerful nation in the world without tactical success. The US was able to keep them in the Phase 2 "strategic stalemate" stage, but it wore us down. After we left they were able to surge up to a successful Phase 3 "strategic offense" stage and finish off the S. Vietnamese government as well. But the main victory was achieved thru tactical defeats and strategic victories. Rope a dope.

To paraphrase Eden, constant tactical failures eroded the US will to fight? Constantly wining caused the US to believe they could never force the NVA to quit?

The US had a Strategy in Vietnam and that protecting the territorial integrity of the RSVN. Unfortunately the US forces lacked the tactical and operational skill, or choose not to perform those actions that would break the will of the NVA.

The idea that tactical action is somehow irrelevant or that tactical success can be counter-productive or less relevant than the other three levels is a post modern myth! Military history simply does not support that contention.

If you can't consistently gain tactical success, you can do nothing.

Bob's World
05-22-2009, 02:52 PM
The idea that insurgents can win without tactical victories is wrong. In Afghanistan, Vietnam, Algeria, etc., the insurgents enjoyed (or are enjoying) considerable tactical success. Every government offical assassinated, every schoolteacher intimidated, every bomb that wrecks a market, is a tactical success. Every police post overrun, every rocket that hits its target, every helicopter shot down, is a tactical success.

In Vietnam, the VC and NVA quite often scored victories over conventional SVN forces, sometimes quite considerable, and instances of successful ambushes or skirmishes with US forces were numerous. It is hard for me to understand how anyone who has read any history about Vietnam would buy into the tired old saw the 'we never lost a battle'.

In Afghanistan, hardly a day went by without some form of insurgent tactical success - mostly against civilians, often against Afghan security forces, but sometimes against allied forces, and every now and then against US.

An insurgency cannot sustain itself without tactical successes. True, these do not have to come in the form of stand up fights against conventional firepower, but they have to come in some form. Neither insurgent foot soldiers nor their leaders are superhuman - like all men, they have to see some point to their sacrifices to carry on.

Every operation is "tactical" if assessed by the nature of the task. A B-29 togglling off a nuclear bomb over hiroshima is a "tactical task" But the over all nature of the operation was pure strategic. A savvy insurgent does not go out and seek targets that only offer tactical effect unless he has to inorder to get to those targets with much larger operational/strategic effect. That is why they target school teachers and other low-level government officials over shop keepers and farmers.

I have covered this before, but whether or not something is "tactical" or "strategic" is not determined by the nature of the task, the platform/weapon used, or the number of stars on the commander's collar. It is determined by the purpose for the action.

But you're right, I should slow down. I often forget that others need to catch up ;)

Umar Al-Mokhtār
05-22-2009, 03:00 PM
As Eden points out, the old saw about Vietnam is used too often and ignores much of the reality. “Victory in battle” during an insurgency must be viewed very carefully.

A good example: Ap Bac, January 2 and 3, 1963. While Sheehan, Vann, Halberstam, and others cast aspersions upon the performance of the ARVN, the GVN and Harkins declared Ap Bac to be a “victory.” Technically, using the traditional military definition, since the ARVN initiated the attack on the hamlet and the following day were in possession of it, they get handed the “victory.” But the real win belongs to the VC. In a day of hard fighting against 4 to 1 odds they shot down or disabled five US H-21s and a UH-1B and repulsed a full on attack by an ARVN M113 company. They then successfully broke contact on their own initiative and exfiltrated the scene prior to the ARVN occupying the hamlet. The moral boost and lessons learned by the VC in that fight far out weighed the fact that the ARVN were granted the “victory.”

Even Khe Sanh has been re-evaluated. Was Giap looking for a victory, or was he engaged in a diversionary battle to pin Marine forces in northern I Corps in order to prevent them from being employed elsewhere during the Tet Offensive? If the former is true, he lost,; if the latter, he won.

Bob's World
05-22-2009, 03:08 PM
Utterly, utterly irrelevant! It has no bearing on the military instrument. You could say L. Ron Hubbard, has managed to creates and convert folks to new religion without resorting to violence - unlike Christianity and Islam. If they don't "do violence" they don't register on the meter.



To paraphrase Eden, constant tactical failures eroded the US will to fight? Constantly wining caused the US to believe they could never force the NVA to quit?

The US had a Strategy in Vietnam and that protecting the territorial integrity of the RSVN. Unfortunately the US forces lacked the tactical and operational skill, or choose not to perform those actions that would break the will of the NVA.

The idea that tactical action is somehow irrelevant or that tactical success can be counter-productive or less relevant than the other three levels is a post modern myth! Military history simply does not support that contention.

If you can't consistently gain tactical success, you can do nothing.


Wilf, for a man as smart and grounded in CvC as you are, I have to admit I find it very interesting your total fixation on the military aspect of warfare. The military aspect is important, certainly, and can either create or lose conditions required for the larger victory, the grander competition; but it is just one aspect of a much larger whole that has no end and no beginning and is woven into that whole in such a manner that it cannot be considered in isolation without drawing flawed conclusions, or attributing undue importance to things that may have been very important to the military aspect, but perhaps merely a supporting effect to the larger political competition.

But I place far more value on the opinions of those who I know know what they are talking about and see things differently than I do, than I do on those who lack such credentials and merely agree. So I am listening. Don't agree, of course, but I am listening. :)

One of my standard positions is that "the military neither starts wars nor ends them, it is just our lot to fight them." We focus on the fight as it is so dramatic, so horrible, so visible; but it is just one aspect of the much larger competition.

As early as Sun Tzu it was recognized that a commander who had resort to combat to accomplish his ends had largely failed to begin with. The wise State Leader, the wise insurgent leader, the wise general all seek to win through superior thinking and non-violent positioning if possible. This does not make them irrelevant, just perhaps less interesting.

William F. Owen
05-22-2009, 03:28 PM
The insurgent/guerrilla often wins merely by not losing

OK, but let us state this another way. "The insurgent/guerrilla often maintains his military potential my consistently not suffering decisive defeat."

Not losing requires tactical skill, and concurrently not wining requires the inability to exploit or build on tactical success. If wining is costing you too much then you are no actually winning.

William F. Owen
05-22-2009, 03:44 PM
Wilf, for a man as smart and grounded in CvC as you are, I have to admit I find it very interesting your total fixation on the military aspect of warfare.

Well thanks for the compliment.... :wry: - likewise, you do not conduct yourself in a way that implies anything but considered and carefully crafted thought, based on some hard won experience.

Yes, I concentrate on WARFARE as a military/violent activity. My feeling is that warfare is inherently understandable and largely coherent. Nothing much is new. We have vast bodies of evidence.

I am not that concerned with the Political need which Warfare seeks to address. Politics is enmity, passion, and need. Those are not coherent or particularly predictable or understandable. Example.
Petraeus:
"The mission is to ensure that Afghanistan does not again become a sanctuary for al Qaeda and other transnational extremists. That's what it had become before the operations conducted in the wake of 9/11. Al Qaeda wants to carry out further attacks on the US and our allies, and we need to deny them safe havens in which they can plan and train for such attacks."

OK, in reality AQ could have planned and conducted 911, using the brains of a ROTC graduate and a flat in Brooklyn. If AQ gets pushed from A'Stan, they will simply set up somewhere else. The mission as stated by Patraeus is strategically irrational, and based on no actual evidence. - and I don't care.

You could strongly suggest that the reason the US Govt. attacked the Taliban Regime was to address public demand. It was not an act of Strategy, it was an act of need. - and no less valid. There was no logical reason for the US or NATO to be in A'Stan, other than vengeance.

Strategy is not rational. Operational and tactical action should be, so I limit myself to the rational.

Bob's World
05-22-2009, 04:05 PM
Strategy is not rational. Operational and tactical action should be, so I limit myself to the rational.

Wait a second...square this with your standard closing tag line!

(Though I completely agree with your assessment of the sanctuary statement and thoughts of the Taliban).

Greyhawk
05-22-2009, 04:18 PM
...and this is a good one. Note the three-tier vs two-tier triangles.

Without definition from the source, one can assume

a. "insurgents" are local/regional therefore their strategic level is the theater/operational

b. "insurgents" are part of a larger network (al Qaeda) with a theater/operational "command level" that is inconsequential to the discussion

c. both

I say "c". Regardless, the "insurgents" benefit from a more efficient model. If that isn't a "problem" from our POV it should be. The solution (I don't mean to imply that it's simple) is to increase efficiency within ours.

(I'm also operating from the assumption we're talking more Information Operations and less COIN vs conventional here.)

reed11b
05-22-2009, 04:23 PM
Considering the large amount of tactical planning and changes that the insurgent forces in Iraq went through from '03 to '07, I would argue that the slide does not apply to the average insurgent at all. I feel that most insurgents are fighting a very tactical battle and that they simply use PR as an additional fighting tool. Perhaps for politicos in the insurgent world that slide is true, but it is also true for US politicos, so where is the utility?
Reed

William F. Owen
05-22-2009, 04:35 PM
Wait a second...square this with your standard closing tag line!
.

I can't! ;)

goesh
05-22-2009, 04:36 PM
I don't think insurgent leaders have to be totally focused on strategic political theatre. At the street and village level, every insurgent action is seen as either being in direct oppositioin to the occupying force or in reaction to it. Ambush or car bomb, all can be attributed to the occupiers to some degree and that is theatre wherein everyone is a participant no matter how unwittingly - sort of like geography, it is always there.

Ken White
05-22-2009, 04:36 PM
But you're right, I should slow down. I often forget that others need to catch up ;)or is it that you're on a different road... :wry:
I have covered this before, but whether or not something is "tactical" or "strategic" is not determined by the nature of the task, the platform/weapon used, or the number of stars on the commander's collar. It is determined by the purpose for the action.I don't think anyone disputes that, nor do I think most dispute your population centric theory. I for one agree with you on both.

Where you and I disagree is on your interpretation -- and that's what it is, an interpretation -- versus my interpretation of what happened in Viet Nam. I agree with Eden and Umar Al-Mokhtār, it is too easy to draw wrong conclusions about Viet Nam from the many and very skewed histories out there. We didn't win every battle by a long shot, most US units were marginally trained and commanded and the VC /NVA initiated about, IIRC, 85% of all contacts. Good units -- and there were some -- did better but by and large our tactical ineptitude contributed to our strategic draw.

It was a political loss, no question, a strategic draw IMO and a series of tactical blunders by both sides.

That however is an aside and we can disagree on all that as we have before. The factor that leads you to believe you're way out front is that no one is following you on the Road to Grand Strategy. Wilf said it well
"I am not that concerned with the Political need which Warfare seeks to address. Politics is enmity, passion, and need. Those are not coherent or particularly predictable or understandable."

We also disagree on practical aspects of that. I suggest that no one really disputes your philosophy though many seem to question either the desirability or the possibility -- or both -- of your proposals to 'fix' the US. Thus the issue is not small war or any war related other than peripherally because national strategy is a political decision and while military aspects must be considered, they are frequently overruled by politicians. Had all military advice been heeded, there probably would have been far fewer wars. As Wilf also noted: "Strategy is not rational."

That's totally true; it is and must be based on the perceptions and beliefs of those who make strategic decisions. There's nothing wrong with having an opinion on what should be done and how but unless you're one of the shakers and movers -- a Politician, not a military person -- one as a military person can only give advice and that advice should be rational, logical, provable and not subject to personal whim or belief. To inject those latter things into a military capability, probability, possibility question concerning strategic options is, in the opinion of many, not smart.

It is not smart simply because politicians are devious, want their own way and are quite willing to twist your words and thoughts to achieve their own ends. Provable logic cannot be twisted for very long...

Steve Blair
05-22-2009, 05:05 PM
Considering the large amount of tactical planning and changes that the insurgent forces in Iraq went through from '03 to '07, I would argue that the slide does not apply to the average insurgent at all. I feel that most insurgents are fighting a very tactical battle and that they simply use PR as an additional fighting tool. Perhaps for politicos in the insurgent world that slide is true, but it is also true for US politicos, so where is the utility?
Reed

The utility lies just where CavGuy said it does in his original post...to provoke discussion. It's not intended to be all-encompassing (at least I would HOPE that one PowerPoint slide isn't intended to be that way....:D), but rather to get folks talking and (hopefully) thinking about what the slide suggests and doesn't suggest. He didn't put it forward as being definitive in any way, and we should keep that in mind when we discuss it.

Bob's World
05-22-2009, 05:28 PM
A messy business to be sure. I p-o'd(ok, this happens semi-often, so I forget which ones) some senior officers when I stated that our soldiers were out on the ground giving us an "A+" effort to execute a "C+" strategy.

So here sits COL Jones crafting strategy to try to bring up that marginal grade, because young men and women are out there giving it their all everyday with SPC Jones holding up that excellent grade. To send our military into harm's way with a flawed strategy, or a marginal plan, or unqualified leaders should be criminal, but of course it isn't. After all, this is complex stuff and reasonable minds can differ, etc, etc.

This is why what I write here isn't about TTPs, or "what I did in Iraq last summer," or about some regurgitation of the very very flawed understandings of the nature of the threat, the nature of populace-based conflicts, etc.

I am on a different road. Sometimes it is a bit lonely out here, but while I am quite sure I am not 100% right about anything; I am equally confident that I am on a path that will preserve our national interests in a manner consistent with our principles as a nation and offer us a chance at a long, bright, and relatively peaceful future.

Fixing everything wrong with Iraq, or Afghanistan or Pakistan won't do that; neither will killing every young man who decides (for whatever reason) to put on an AQ T-shirt and pick up a rifle. Besides, we already have 95% of our effort trudging down that well worn path.

I just want that A+ effort to mean something. And it won't unless we can get our senior leaders to understand that the old models they grew up with are obsolete and that they must approach similar problems in new ways, but that even those new ways must be solidly rooted in sound, enduring principles of conflict.

Ken White
05-22-2009, 07:38 PM
So here sits COL Jones crafting strategy to try to bring up that marginal grade, because young men and women are out there giving it their all everyday with SPC Jones holding up that excellent grade.you can to fix it. However,
This is why what I write here isn't about ... the nature of populace-based conflicts, etc.it does seem as though that gets mentioned... ;)
I am on a different road. Sometimes it is a bit lonely out here, but while I am quite sure I am not 100% right about anything; I am equally confident that I am on a path that will preserve our national interests in a manner consistent with our principles as a nation and offer us a chance at a long, bright, and relatively peaceful future.Possibly true -- equally possibly untrue. You may be on that path but many others will have to join you to make that happen. I'm an optimist, big time -- but my concern is that you attract enough folks in the 'right' places to achieve your goal.
...it won't unless we can get our senior leaders to understand that the old models they grew up with are obsolete and that they must approach similar problems in new ways, but that even those new ways must be solidly rooted in sound, enduring principles of conflict.No one can argue with that -- but I will point out that old models are discarded by senior military leaders only if the new model can be proven better. Military folks are risk averse. Just saying you have the golden solution won't usually sway many -- until you convince them it's their idea... :D

Old senior leaders (Mil) are a problem but they rotate out and new ones have learned some lessons. :cool:

However, they are not the big problem. The big problem is the civilian leadership -- or lack of it -- and their too near total disinterest in any effort that "will preserve our national interests in a manner consistent with our principles as a nation and offer us a chance at a long, bright, and relatively peaceful future." They like that last part but want it at no cost to themselves or their party. IOW, here you're preaching to the choir; you're proselyting in the wrong place...

Unfortunately, those young and middle aged senior leaders (Gov, civilian type) are a far greater obstacle to your goal . If your road to a better national strategy (or policy set) fails to remove that road block and gain their support, then you may be indeed be wandering alone in the wilderness.

reed11b
05-22-2009, 07:43 PM
The utility lies just where CavGuy said it does in his original post...to provoke discussion. It's not intended to be all-encompassing (at least I would HOPE that one PowerPoint slide isn't intended to be that way....:D), but rather to get folks talking and (hopefully) thinking about what the slide suggests and doesn't suggest. He didn't put it forward as being definitive in any way, and we should keep that in mind when we discuss it.

OK, understood, however my big beef w/ the slide is that it absolves us of our central role in the Iraqi insurgency by implying that the insurgency always had this long range political/strategic goal and plan. Nothing I have ever seen suggests this to be true with possible exception of AQ. OIF II, III, IV etc. did not need to occur had WE acted correctly. What is needed is an internal review focus, not an external one.
How did we create the insurgency? Too few troops to begin with, bypassing large numbers of fighters and weapons, Disbanding the Iraqi Army, Criminalizing Baath Party membership, The CPA, Bremmer’s free market experiment, Not supporting local experiments in democracy, etc etc….
The too few troops I put as a minor factor, but it did allow a large number of Iraqi soldiers to keep there weapons and contributed to our inability to create law-and –order during the riots and to find and secure the weapons caches.
All of the above were exaggerated by the complete disbanding of the Iraqi Army, leaving a large number of Iraqi Soldiers with at least some military training and no means of making an income to join in the dis-order and later the insurgency. This also made it so that anger or frustration could not be re-directed to the Iraqi leadership since it did not exist. It also created a condition were any Iraqi’s working in the new security forces were automatic stooges of the U.S. since the U.S. created those security bodies.
Criminalizing Baath Party Membership had a similar effect. Most of the professional classes in Iraq, such as Doctors, were required to be Baath members to practice there profession. The majority of Baath party members were also Suni, and this would contribute to there feelings of being discriminated against that would have violent repercussions later as the country nearly slipped into Civil War.
The CPA as a concept was a bad choice, even outside of the myriad of bad choices the CPA made. By not having a truly Iraqi interterm government, it meant that an Iraqi did not have the choice of working for the Nation of Iraq, they could either work for or against the occupying forces. Guess what many Iraqi’s chose? Even a neutered interterm Iraqi government would have been able to deflect anger away from the coalition forces, and would have made support feel more like Iraqi’s pulling themselves back up on there feet rather then an insulting handout.
Breemers free market experiment justified many educated Iraqi’s fears that the US and allies were doing a resource grab. It may also be the key reason that the Iraqi economy, including it’s oil, were so slow to recover.
I could go on, but the point is the insurgency was a reaction to our actions and was preventable from the get-go and was not created by some far thinking insurgent generalissimo. Yes AQ seems to think more on the long-term side, but perhaps a military solution is not ideal for dealing with AQ.
Reed

slapout9
05-22-2009, 07:52 PM
OK, understood, however my big beef w/ the slide is that it absolves us of our central role in the Iraqi insurgency by implying that the insurgency always had this long range political/strategic goal and plan. Nothing I have ever seen suggests this to be true with possible exception of AQ. OIF II, III, IV etc. did not need to occur had WE acted correctly. What is needed is an internal review focus, not an external one.
How did we create the insurgency? Too few troops to begin with, bypassing large numbers of fighters and weapons, Disbanding the Iraqi Army, Criminalizing Baath Party membership, The CPA, Bremmer’s free market experiment, Not supporting local experiments in democracy, etc etc….
The too few troops I put as a minor factor, but it did allow a large number of Iraqi soldiers to keep there weapons and contributed to our inability to create law-and –order during the riots and to find and secure the weapons caches.
All of the above were exaggerated by the complete disbanding of the Iraqi Army, leaving a large number of Iraqi Soldiers with at least some military training and no means of making an income to join in the dis-order and later the insurgency. This also made it so that anger or frustration could not be re-directed to the Iraqi leadership since it did not exist. It also created a condition were any Iraqi’s working in the new security forces were automatic stooges of the U.S. since the U.S. created those security bodies.
Criminalizing Baath Party Membership had a similar effect. Most of the professional classes in Iraq, such as Doctors, were required to be Baath members to practice there profession. The majority of Baath party members were also Suni, and this would contribute to there feelings of being discriminated against that would have violent repercussions later as the country nearly slipped into Civil War.
The CPA as a concept was a bad choice, even outside of the myriad of bad choices the CPA made. By not having a truly Iraqi interterm government, it meant that an Iraqi did not have the choice of working for the Nation of Iraq, they could either work for or against the occupying forces. Guess what many Iraqi’s chose? Even a neutered interterm Iraqi government would have been able to deflect anger away from the coalition forces, and would have made support feel more like Iraqi’s pulling themselves back up on there feet rather then an insulting handout.
Breemers free market experiment justified many educated Iraqi’s fears that the US and allies were doing a resource grab. It may also be the key reason that the Iraqi economy, including it’s oil, were so slow to recover.
I could go on, but the point is the insurgency was a reaction to our actions and was preventable from the get-go and was not created by some far thinking insurgent generalissimo. Yes AQ seems to think more on the long-term side, but perhaps a military solution is not ideal for dealing with AQ.
Reed


Now that is some Strategic Thinking...good job reed....you have got to be a Sergeant to write and think with that kind of clarity;)

Steve Blair
05-22-2009, 08:35 PM
I didn't take the slide to be absolving us of anything. I took it as a much more generic piece. But to each his own.:)

I agree with many of your points, Reed. But it's also important (and often, IMO, overlooked) to realize that we arrived as an occupying force for all intents and purposes. Not a role we've traditionally cared for, so I think a number of the factors you point out were swept under the rug or simply ignored because they didn't fit the "best case" planning. Number of lessons to be taken away there, but I also think that Cav's slide is intended to get folks thinking about those kinds of things beforehand. It may not work, but it's worth a try.

Bob's World
05-22-2009, 08:40 PM
I'll be in good company though. A whole lot of what is considered military gospel today was dusty, unread and unpublished notes back when the author was alive.

But as I say, the one thing that is truly new under the sun is the volume and speed of information available around the world today. This little note will potetially be read by friend and foe alike around the world within seconds of my hitting send.

Like my favorite uncle (enlisted grunt, 27th Regiment, WWII) told me one fall when I confessed that I had shot at a buck but missed, "welll Bobby, you won't ever hit anything if you don't put any bullets in the air."

Just putting a few bullets in the air...

Bob's World
05-22-2009, 09:50 PM
OK, understood, however my big beef w/ the slide is that it absolves us of our central role in the Iraqi insurgency by implying that the insurgency always had this long range political/strategic goal and plan. Nothing I have ever seen suggests this to be true with possible exception of AQ. OIF II, III, IV etc. did not need to occur had WE acted correctly. What is needed is an internal review focus, not an external one.
How did we create the insurgency? Too few troops to begin with, bypassing large numbers of fighters and weapons, Disbanding the Iraqi Army, Criminalizing Baath Party membership, The CPA, Bremmer’s free market experiment, Not supporting local experiments in democracy, etc etc….
The too few troops I put as a minor factor, but it did allow a large number of Iraqi soldiers to keep there weapons and contributed to our inability to create law-and –order during the riots and to find and secure the weapons caches.
All of the above were exaggerated by the complete disbanding of the Iraqi Army, leaving a large number of Iraqi Soldiers with at least some military training and no means of making an income to join in the dis-order and later the insurgency. This also made it so that anger or frustration could not be re-directed to the Iraqi leadership since it did not exist. It also created a condition were any Iraqi’s working in the new security forces were automatic stooges of the U.S. since the U.S. created those security bodies.
Criminalizing Baath Party Membership had a similar effect. Most of the professional classes in Iraq, such as Doctors, were required to be Baath members to practice there profession. The majority of Baath party members were also Suni, and this would contribute to there feelings of being discriminated against that would have violent repercussions later as the country nearly slipped into Civil War.
The CPA as a concept was a bad choice, even outside of the myriad of bad choices the CPA made. By not having a truly Iraqi interterm government, it meant that an Iraqi did not have the choice of working for the Nation of Iraq, they could either work for or against the occupying forces. Guess what many Iraqi’s chose? Even a neutered interterm Iraqi government would have been able to deflect anger away from the coalition forces, and would have made support feel more like Iraqi’s pulling themselves back up on there feet rather then an insulting handout.
Breemers free market experiment justified many educated Iraqi’s fears that the US and allies were doing a resource grab. It may also be the key reason that the Iraqi economy, including it’s oil, were so slow to recover.
I could go on, but the point is the insurgency was a reaction to our actions and was preventable from the get-go and was not created by some far thinking insurgent generalissimo. Yes AQ seems to think more on the long-term side, but perhaps a military solution is not ideal for dealing with AQ.
Reed


Reed,

Your knowledge of what occurred is right on. The slide, however is right also. Recognize that it is a generalization and not an absolute, and intended to get a US tactical audience to understand that the guy they are in a firefight with, or hunting down was sent out with a different purpose than they were, and so will react differently than they will to similar circumstances.

But you are absolutely right that there was no insurgency (active phase one insurgency that is) in Iraq due to the suppressive efforts of Saddam's government. We set it all in motion with our regime change operation. Which is why I say we are not conducting COIN in Iraq, but are conducting "post-regime change FID."

To my way of thinking, there are three broad categories of Insurgency, and you have described one. I believe all three exist in Iraq, and none of them include AQ. AQ is not conducting Insurgency in Iraq, they are conducting UW.

There is Resistance (as you describe, those who rose up to drive out the invader/occupier US). There is Separatist (the Kurds, who want to break a piece of the old Iraq off for a new Kurdish state), and there is Revolutionary (both Sunnis and Shia have a go at this; those who reject the current government and want to change it).

But back to the Pyramid. The wise insurgent understands his tremendous tactical disadvantage. So he maximizes his strengths. He hides among the populace, he uses information operations, he targets and disrupts low-level symbols of the government. Not because he wants to wipe out school teachers, mayors and tax collectors. Because he wants to achieve one of the three strategic effects above.

We think we can win by attrition. Kill his fighters and kill the fight. (I am not a fan of the strategy, because those fighters all come from the very populace whose support you are attempting to gain). We need to get a little more strategic ourselves. Target the causes of insurgency and not the symptoms of it. Obviously so long as we are occupying the country this is hard to do with those who are of the Resistance. One more reason to not try to fix the entire government and make it effective. Focus on goodness, focus on communicating that and your clear intent to leave. Make your actions reflect your words. Put the host nation to the fore and let them clearly demonstrate they are in charge, and get the F out.

So yeah, you are right, but so is CAVGUY. Focus on where your understanding overlap and work out from there to where you don't. Too many start by focusing on where they disagree, and there really isn't anywhere to go from there.

slapout9
05-23-2009, 12:16 AM
Military Review Article from 1974 on how to Analyze an Insurgency by Roger Darling of the US State Department, this article ties a lot of points made here all together.

Insurgency is a System with 5 main processes.

1-Cause process........Bob's World
2-Intimidation process
3-Resource process
4-Guerrilla action process
5-Collective Psychological process......Cavguy's slide

http://calldp.leavenworth.army.mil/eng_mr/txts/VOL54/00000002/art4.pdf

Ken White
05-23-2009, 12:59 AM
But you are absolutely right that there was no insurgency (active phase one insurgency that is) in Iraq due to the suppressive efforts of Saddam's government. We set it all in motion with our regime change operation. Which is why I say we are not conducting COIN in Iraq, but are conducting "post-regime change FID."Agree there was no insurgency -- partly because there was no government to insurge against...

Mostly because of that. What caused the insurgency to develop was, in order of importance to that start:

- A massive Intelligence failure on our part. Saddam told us what he was going to do; arm everyone, release all the prisoners in the jails and go to guerrilla warfare.

- A failure on the part of then CinCCent and the Army to well outline the problems foreseen and, possibly, to allow egos to get in the way of the limited intel that did point to a possible guerrilla fight.

- A failure for over 22 years by the leadership of the Army to really address the issues of IW and the occupation of a foreign nation; this failure led to a failure to have doctrine readily available and to train for those contingencies. This led to Reed's accurate summation of an Army that stood by and twiddled its thumbs and then overreacting as usual and firing at any and everything too promiscuously.

- The CPA and its errant stupidity merely solidified the three foregoing issues and exacerbated all those problems. The installation of the interim government and the subsequent election turned Saddam's IW fight into an insurgency, plus. Got to add in the criminal mischief, the sectarian feud, tribal enmities and all the other things that coexisted with the insurgency.

The first item, Intel failure, is possibly an overstatement but not by much and the error(s) are hard to attribute. The second two items are flatly military error. The fourth item is political and out of the purview of the Armed Forces.

I emphasize that because it was a factor in Korea, in the Congo, in the Dominican Republic in Viet Nam and will always be a factor that the Armed Forces cannot control.
We think we can win by attrition. Kill his fighters and kill the fight. (I am not a fan of the strategy, because those fighters all come from the very populace whose support you are attempting to gain).You're closer to decision points than I am but I do not get that perception. I do agree that some want to do that -- and I suggest part of that started from somewhere near your current home and the rest came from senior people who've been marginally trained and educated over the past 25 years (the training and education are improving, and rapidly -- but that does not excuse the lapses of senior Flag Officers and civilian leadership from 1975-2002 (with a few rare exceptions like Shy Meyer and John Wickham who the others merely waited out...). My perception is that the majority of the Army (and I include senior folks) does not believe that.

Other'n that, I agree with you... ;)

Spud
05-23-2009, 11:30 PM
Sir, all

just like to say thanks for what is probably the most intriguing set of posts on this forum to date (could have something to do with me starting my COIN elective at Staff College shortly :D)

slapout9
05-24-2009, 06:55 AM
Bob's World has often talked about the Civil Rights Movement but many here may not be familiar with it in the way Bob is talking about. Below is the 1963 letter from the Birmingham jail written by Martin Luther King while he was in jail. I highly suggest everyone read it and I think Bob's comments may become clearer.

Among the highlights are MLK's entire Strategy of non-violent Civil Disobedeance....has nothing to do with pacifism. Including the 4 step Strategy Process and The story Bob told about the guy that looses all the fights but wins the war. It is not just a story....it was a planned tactic and the people were specially selected to survive such an event.

Again I encourage everyone to read it as there are numerous lessons about COIN contained in it. And now without further adue MLK Letter From The B'ham(that how we do it down here) Jail.

http://abacus.bates.edu/admin/offices/dos/mlk/letter.html


Damn it almost forgot the music....The Birmingham Jail

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RFPFkxw4izI&feature=related

Backwards Observer
10-27-2009, 07:40 AM
It is interesting to compare the letters of previous great men to the four compass points of bull honky we are subject to in the 21st century.


[Chinghis Khan's letter of invitation to Ch'ang ch'un]

//[p.37] Heaven has abandoned China owing to its haughtiness and extravagant luxury. But I, living in the northern wilderness, have not inordinate passions. I hate luxury and exercise moderation. I have only one coat and one food. I eat the same food and am dressed in the same tatters as my humble herdsmen. I consider the people my //[p.38] children, and take an interest in talented men as if they were my brothers. We always agree in our principles, and we are always united by mutual affection. At military exercises I am always in the front, and in time of battle am never behind. In the space of seven years I have succeeded in accomplishing a great work, and uniting the whole world in one empire. I have not myself dis- tinguished qualities.

But the government of the Kin is inconstant, and therefore Heaven assists me to obtain the throne (of the Kin). The Sung to the south, the Hui ho to the north, the Hia to the east, and the barbarians in the west, all together have acknowledged my supremacy. It seems to me that since the remote time of our shan yü such a vast empire has not been seen. But as my calling is high, the obligations incumbent on me are also heavy; and I fear that in my ruling there may be something wanting. To cross a river we make boats and rudders. Likewise we invite sage men, and choose out assistants for keeping the empire in good order. Since the time I came to the throne I have always taken to heart the ruling of my people; but I could not find worthy men to occupy the places of the three (kung) and the nine (k'ing). With respect to these circumstances I inquired, and heard that thou, master, hast penetrated the truth, and that thou walkest in the path of right. Deeply learned and much experienced, thou hast much explored the laws. Thy sanctity is become manifest. Thou hast conserved the rigorous rules of the ancient sages. Thou art endowed with the eminent talents of celebrated men. For a long time thou hast lived in the caverns of the rocks, and hast retired from //[p.39] the world; but to thee the people who have acquired sanctity repair, like clouds on the path of the immortals, in innumerable multitudes. I knew that after the war thou hadst continued to live in Shan tung, at the same place, and I was always thinking of thee. I know the stories of the returning from the river Wei in the same cart, and of the invitations in the reed hut three times repeated. But what shall I do? We are separated by mountains and plains of great extent, and I cannot meet thee. I can only descend from the throne and stand by the side. I have fasted and washed . I have ordered my adjutant, Liu Chung lu, to prepare an escort and a cart for thee. Do not be afraid of the thousand li. I implore thee to move thy sainted steps. Do not think of the extent of the sandy desert. Commiserate the people in the present situation of affairs, or have pity upon me, and communicate to me the means of preserving life. I shall serve thee myself. I hope that at least thou wilt leave me a trifle of thy wisdom. Say only one word to me and I shall be happy. In this letter I have briefly expressed my thoughts, and hope that thou wilt understand them. I hope also that thou, having penetrated the principles of the great tao, sympathisest with all that is right, and wilt not resist the wishes of the people.

Given on the 1st day of the 5th month (May 15),1219.


http://depts.washington.edu/silkroad/texts/changchun.html

Oredigger61
02-04-2010, 11:40 AM
Military Review Article from 1974 on how to Analyze an Insurgency by Roger Darling of the US State Department, this article ties a lot of points made here all together.

Insurgency is a System with 5 main processes.

1-Cause process........Bob's World
2-Intimidation process
3-Resource process
4-Guerrilla action process
5-Collective Psychological process......Cavguy's slide

I taught this for six years at the PHIBSCOLCORO as senior Army representative and course manager for the, then, COIN course.

Small world

davidbfpo
02-04-2010, 01:27 PM
Oredigger61,

Welcome aboard, an interesting bio too. Have you a link to the cited Military Review article, even if 1974 pre-web? Secondly what was PHIBSCOLCORO? You will not some of our resident sages cite 're-inventing the wheel' regularly, so a 1974 article comes as not surprise.

Oredigger61
02-04-2010, 01:53 PM
The document is preserved in the counterinsurgency library at this link:

http://www.counterinsurgencylibrary.org/list_bib.php?category=Typologies+of+Insurgency

I managed to stay at the Navy's Amphibious School, Coronado during a time when the Army was encouraging folks not to move; I was there for six years and taught COIN the entire time.

A few comments on Darling.

He had the terminology wrong and he figured that out. Insurgency is, in reality, revolution. Darling republished his article a couple years later as, IIRC, "Revolution Examined Anew." He didn't change a word in the article, however.

The more important part of his construct is the "dynamics." The casual and intimidation processes combine as a dynamic of social political participation. Add the resource process to create a dynamic of preserving/gaining resources for the revolution. Add the guerrilla action process to create a dynamic of allowing the government (the other side) the opportunity to dissipate its resources. If that happens then all processes combine into a collective psychological process that drains the government (the other side) of its resources--social, political, economic, and military.

Terror is a tool in two processes: intimidation and guerrilla action. The target is different in each. In the first, the target is the movement's supporters and the populace to guarantee assured participation. In the latter, the target is specifically, and deliberately, the government.

Our lead terror expert was Brian Jenkins. We flew him out twice to tape him and then used the tape. We taught at least ten two-week courses a year.

As I read back through this thread I think the participants get it, but let me state the revolutionary objective explicitly. Revolutionaries do not organize to win, they organize to give the other side, the government, every opportunity to lose.

Further, if a revolution is qualitative (American, Chinese, Russian, Vietnamese, Cuban, e. g.) the revolutionaries know exactly how they are going to govern.

You can't wake up one morning and say, "hey, we've won, now what do we do?"

I have our course handbook from the 1970's and have the goal of getting it uploaded in some fashion. I don't want to use my current website as I want to leave that devoted solely to 9-11.

Thank you for the interest.

Miles Kara

Rex Brynen
02-04-2010, 02:41 PM
Terror is a tool in two processes: intimidation and guerrilla action. The target is different in each. In the first, the target is the movement's supporters and the populace to guarantee assured participation. In the latter, the target is specifically, and deliberately, the government.

I think the instrumental (as opposed to rather reflexive and unthinking) use of terrorism serves much broader purposes than "intimidation." It can also be used as an acte de presence to signal arrival on the stage of political-military contestation; as a way of increasing domestic support through inspiration (rather than intimidation); and, closely related to this, as a way of maintaining "market share" in context of competition with other like-minded insurgents.

Terrorism can also be used as a calibrated signal to outside actors or mediators, not only to discourage/punish them for supporting the government, but also to mean such things as "include us in the peace negotiations or we'll make things messy."

Finally, it can be a way of maintaining support from external patrons in exchange for continued support--the sort of "gun for hire" model exemplified by the Abu Nidal organization, for example.

---

Oh, and welcome aboard, Oredigger61!

Oredigger61
02-04-2010, 03:16 PM
Rex, yes on all counts.

Darling wrestled a bit with his terminology and settled on "intimidation." His larger construct was the dynamic of social-political participation and he had to account for both the positive (causal) and negative (intimidation) components of that.

Terror is a tool across the spectrum. Quality organizations use it judicially to further organizational goals. Little is happenstance in an organization that knows what it is doing.

The net outcome of the causal-intimidation dynamic in an quality organization is organizational unity, or the appearance thereof to the population. There is a negative or coercive component to, as I said, gain assured participation.

One of my best Colorado School of Mines geology instructors was from McGill. Wished I could remember his name....

marct
02-04-2010, 03:17 PM
Hi Miles,


The document is preserved in the counterinsurgency library at this link:

http://www.counterinsurgencylibrary.org/list_bib.php?category=Typologies+of+Insurgency

Thanks for the link!


I have our course handbook from the 1970's and have the goal of getting it uploaded in some fashion. I don't want to use my current website as I want to leave that devoted solely to 9-11.

You shouldn't have any difficulty with finding a place that would host it for you if you hold copyright or if it is in the public domain. I'm pretty sure that it could be posted up here at the SWC if you wanted. On a related note, I would really like to see it if possible, especially since I am teaching a course in counter-insurgency this summer.

Cheers,

Marc

Oredigger61
02-04-2010, 06:52 PM
Marc, thank you.

I'll sort out the copyright and intellectual property issues. Much of the student handbook is my writing and the course no longer exists in its previous form, if it exists at all.

Darling was just one of three primary sources we used. The other two were Tom Grassey and David V. J. Bell.

Darling republished his article as "Revolution Examined Anew," part of "A Trio of Articles on Third World Revolution and Development." That trio was published by Lectures-Seminars, 9907 Vale Road, Virginia, 22180. Don't know if that business still exists. No city was given, but that zip code is Northern Virginia. The copyright is by Roger Darling, 1974, and we reprinted with his permission and the permission of "Military Review."

Tom Grassey is now Dr. Tom Grassey, Capt, USN, Retired, PhD, and former editor of the "Naval War College Review." He published "Some Perspectives on Revolution" in the NWCR, Winter 1977 edition, p 19-29. We reprinted with permission. I haven't found a public link to his article.

Grassey's PhD is in contemporary theories of justice. He drew heavily on Aristotle in his article, but also took the time to define the groups in a revolutionary situation and the way they acted. One of Grassey's key points to us was the concept of proportional justice and the distribution of justice, and that, according to Aristotle, justice consisted of treating equals alike and unequals differently, in proportion to their relevant differences.

That led us to David V. J. Bell for a teachable model. David's book should be available in most college libraries. He wrote, "Resistance and Revolution" (York University), Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1973.

Let me know if you need more information.

Miles

marct
02-04-2010, 08:58 PM
Hi Miles,

Thanks for the references, and I'll see if I can track down copies of the NWCR article. I actually have two COIN courses to design, one at 2bd year and one at 4th year/graduate level. I'm still playing with ideas on how to organize them and what to use. I do know that one of the things I really want to work in is the historical and social dimensions, so I may well be starting it off with Sertorius, since the information on Kahmose and Ahmose is so poor :wry:. Basically, since I have to do a lecture version first, I am leaning towards a thematic or functional focus for each lecture and trace it through time, with the last part relating to current operations.

Cheers,

Marc

Oredigger61
02-04-2010, 11:30 PM
Marc,

I was not adverse to throwing in a few Milton references to my introductory hour. :)

Another approach with the advanced class is to bring in the American Revolution. There was an ABC special called "Suddenly An Eagle" starring Lee J. Cobb that was a great teaching vehicle for the processes of revolution and counter-revolution. It came out in the bicentennial era; don't know if it is at all available.

Miles

Firn
02-05-2010, 01:25 PM
I think when discussing this issues it is important to keep in mind what the specific actors wanted and why they used violence to reach their goals. I will try to keep it short and rough. It is of course my very personal opinion.

a) The founders and most prominent members of the Taliban claimed that they want to create a religious model state, out of the shattered reality of Afghanistan (and other regions as well). To reach this idealistic goal in a war-torn and violent Afghanistan violence was a considered to be a necessity.

b) The USA wanted to revenge 09/11 and to punish those who supported an ideology which claimed to revenge the misdeeds of the West and especially the USA against the Islamic world. To do so in a foreign country a good deal of violence was needed.

After the rapid sweep across Afghanistan for many in the USA 9/11 had been revenged to a large extent. The Taliban lost on the other hand their hold over a land they considered theirs. The existence as an organisation and as individuals was greatly threatened. But many won that struggle for survival, could regroup and had a very clear aim nearby to fulfill their political ambitions.


If we consider this very simple construct it makes pretty much sense that the former have a far greater focus on the political aspect as the latter. The Taliban fight for a clear political goal in a region which they consider to be their homeland. The USA (and many other countries) increasingly tried to give the impression of doing some good in a far-away land. For most Americans and Europeans it quickly became a forgotten war, supported by meager ressources.


Firn

Bob's World
02-05-2010, 02:31 PM
Niel:

At least with the slide I could understand your implied point to it.

But the implied point is the problem since it is fundamentally a slide that depicts the premise to population centric counterinsurgency and the usual critique of how the American Army doesnt get coin because we dont get the political aspect of it and only want to do tactics whereas the insurgent does and focusses on politics. Mao, Galula as opposite sides to the people's war construct would accept you slide and its implications. But why do you think it is relevant for today? Does the triangle for the insurgent fit the local villagers in the Korengal Valley?

Too, the implication to your slide for the "correct" action on the part of the American counterinsurgent is to invert our triangle so that the majority of our focus is on the political like the insurgents. But the flaw with this approach just like it is with the American Army's current flaw in how we have templated Galula and Thompson which is to treat counterinsurgency as a symetrical response to a perceived people's war. This is why I have argued that CE Callwell's book still has relevance and insights for today in that he saw small wars as essentially wars to create moral effects among local populations and leaders but saw the use of military force not in symmetrical but asymmetrical sense.

some thoughts from the other side, thanks for posting your slide.

As I was reviewing some Reconciliation and Reintegration (why can we not just say "forgive and forget"?) documents, it struck me that we really have is an insurgency within an insurgency here in Afghanistan. This may address your question to Niel as to the applicability of this slide.

The slide speaks fairly well to a Revolutionary Insurgency ( I break insurgency into three broad categories: Revolutionary -change the government; Resistance - remove an externally installed government; and Separatist- break of some segment of the country and form a new government) such as the Taliban leadership are waging in Afghanistan. This is the parent insurgency and the driving force that must be addressed to win in Afghanistan, and it is addressed far more effectively through political engagement that addresses major issues such as the widely perceived illegitimacy of the Karzai government through inherently legitimate political processes such as the Loya Jirga; than by any costly massive application of population-centric COIN tactics can hope to achieve.

Within this insurgency is the Resistance insurgency. This is the rank and file Afghan, who fights primarily because the coalition is here. He also fights because we are here and because he gets paid an honest day's wage as well to fight us. The model does not speak well to the 90% of the insurgency that is in your face, but it does not have to. This aspect of the insurgency is cured by simply sending the Coalition home.

The 10% of the insurgency that must be addressed to win is the revolutionary insurgency, and as I said, I believe Niel's model hits that fairly well.

Just an insight honed while red penciling a "forgive and forget" policy letter...

Oredigger61
02-05-2010, 05:00 PM
...( I break insurgency into three broad categories: Revolutionary -change the government; Resistance - remove an externally installed government; and Separatist- break of some segment of the country and form a new government)...

Bob, is this typology written up anywhere?

marct
02-05-2010, 05:02 PM
Hi Miles,


I was not adverse to throwing in a few Milton references to my introductory hour. :)

Tempting, VERY tempting :D! Actually, I probably will work in some Milton, especially since the archetype of the Doomed Prince is quite widespread.


Another approach with the advanced class is to bring in the American Revolution. There was an ABC special called "Suddenly An Eagle" starring Lee J. Cobb that was a great teaching vehicle for the processes of revolution and counter-revolution. It came out in the bicentennial era; don't know if it is at all available.

I'll see if I can track down a copy of it. The American Revolution might be a good focus for the advanced class, but I am somewhat concerned about the lack of knowledge most of my students will likely have about it - we don't teach that much American history up here anymore in high school, so I can't count on any basic knowledge (outside of Mel Gibson's Patriot :rolleyes:).

One case I do want to look at in the advanced course, and probably touch on in the 2nd year one, is the two Riel Rebellions. I'm in discussions right now with a colleague on looking at Canadian policy towards our First Nations and Metis through a COIN lens, and that will give me a chance to workshop some of our ideas.

Some of the other ones I'm considering are:


the 16th century bce nationalist revolt in Egypt (Kahmose and Ahmose)
Sertorius
Zenobia of Palmyra and the Barracks Emperors period
The Maccabean Revolt,
Wat Tyler
The German Bauernkrieg

Right now, it's still pretty much up in the air, though.

Cheers,

Marc

Dayuhan
02-06-2010, 06:22 AM
I think when discussing this issues it is important to keep in mind what the specific actors wanted and why they used violence to reach their goals. I will try to keep it short and rough. It is of course my very personal opinion.

a) The founders and most prominent members of the Taliban claimed that they want to create a religious model state, out of the shattered reality of Afghanistan (and other regions as well). To reach this idealistic goal in a war-torn and violent Afghanistan violence was a considered to be a necessity.

b) The USA wanted to revenge 09/11 and to punish those who supported an ideology which claimed to revenge the misdeeds of the West and especially the USA against the Islamic world. To do so in a foreign country a good deal of violence was needed.

After the rapid sweep across Afghanistan for many in the USA 9/11 had been revenged to a large extent. The Taliban lost on the other hand their hold over a land they considered theirs. The existence as an organisation and as individuals was greatly threatened. But many won that struggle for survival, could regroup and had a very clear aim nearby to fulfill their political ambitions.


If we consider this very simple construct it makes pretty much sense that the former have a far greater focus on the political aspect as the latter. The Taliban fight for a clear political goal in a region which they consider to be their homeland. The USA (and many other countries) increasingly tried to give the impression of doing some good in a far-away land. For most Americans and Europeans it quickly became a forgotten war, supported by meager ressources.

Firn

The US entered Afganistan with a reasonably clear objective (remove AQ and the Taliban from power, kill or capture as many of their leaders as possible) and promptly transitioned to a very nebulous objective (transforming Afghanistan into... well, something, I for one have never been sure what). In the process, not surprisingly, we lost a good deal of clarity and focus, a natural consequence of pursuing objectives that are uncertain and possibly unachievable.

There are certainly many valid lessons to be learned from the Cold War-era insurgencies, but the insurgency-as-revolution paradigm that emerged from that era is by no means universally applicable to current circumstances, and it has to be applied with discretion.

Oredigger61
02-09-2010, 10:10 PM
All,

Attached is a slide I use during my presentations that usually engenders quite a bit of discussion (which Is why I use it - to stir the pot).



Going back to the OP, here is a link to a construct I developed over 30 years ago.

http://mallardblue.web.officelive.com/justiceviolenceandrevolution.aspx

This links to the narrative, the embedded link at the top of the narrative leads to the construct in graphic form.

I also found the "Supplemental Reading" Syllabus for the course titled "Political Warfare Studies." That is what the Navy's Counterinsurgency (COIN) Orientation Course morphed to be over the six-year period 1974-1980.

Here is the reading list.
1. "Essay on Revolution" from the Syntopicon, Great Books of the Western World
2. "Politics Book V" Aristotle
3. "Of the Dissolution of Government" Locke
4. "Of These Things That Weaken or Tend to the Dissolution of a Commonwealth" Hobbes
5. "The Theory and Practice of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency" Bernard Fall

Firn
02-10-2010, 11:37 AM
As I was reviewing some Reconciliation and Reintegration (why can we not just say "forgive and forget"?) documents, it struck me that we really have is an insurgency within an insurgency here in Afghanistan. This may address your question to Niel as to the applicability of this slide.

The slide speaks fairly well to a Revolutionary Insurgency ( I break insurgency into three broad categories: Revolutionary -change the government; Resistance - remove an externally installed government; and Separatist- break of some segment of the country and form a new government) such as the Taliban leadership are waging in Afghanistan. This is the parent insurgency and the driving force that must be addressed to win in Afghanistan, and it is addressed far more effectively through political engagement that addresses major issues such as the widely perceived illegitimacy of the Karzai government through inherently legitimate political processes such as the Loya Jirga; than by any costly massive application of population-centric COIN tactics can hope to achieve.

Within this insurgency is the Resistance insurgency. This is the rank and file Afghan, who fights primarily because the coalition is here. He also fights because we are here and because he gets paid an honest day's wage as well to fight us. The model does not speak well to the 90% of the insurgency that is in your face, but it does not have to. This aspect of the insurgency is cured by simply sending the Coalition home.

The 10% of the insurgency that must be addressed to win is the revolutionary insurgency, and as I said, I believe Niel's model hits that fairly well.

Just an insight honed while red penciling a "forgive and forget" policy letter...

I enjoyed this post and share some feelings with you, which I echoed before. Just wanted to add that this revolutionary-resistance dynamic is often an intrinsic feature of many small wars. It is in fact even present in states and western military forces, were the primary object of many is not a lofty and distant politcal goal.

Firn

Bob's World
02-10-2010, 12:15 PM
I enjoyed this post and share some feelings with you, which I echoed before. Just wanted to add that this revolutionary-resistance dynamic is often an intrinsic feature of many small wars. It is in fact even present in states and western military forces, were the primary object of many is not a lofty and distant politcal goal.

Firn

Look how calming of an effect our clearly expressed intent to leave Iraq and focus on Afghanistan has had on the broad, resistance base of that insurgency?

Herein lies one irony of our COIN efforts. I often here senior leaders talking to the importance of how we must impress upon the populace that we will not leave them...; when in theory, some 90% of the insurgency is motivated simply by the fact that we are here.:eek:

This is why Strategic Comms are so important as well. The peaceful segment of the society needs to be assured that they will not be abandoned to the insurgency; while the rank and file insurgent segment of the society needs to be assured that you have no intent to stay; mean while the head of the insurgency is running a revolution and delighting in your quandary as you lend your support to a government widely viewed as illegitimate.

Break this down:

Step one: Address the perceptions of legitimacy to crush the head of the snake.

Step two: Assure the largely peaceful segment of the society that you are committed to assisting the freshly legitimized (by the populace, not you) government gets their feet underneath them; while

Step three: Assuring the rank and file resistance fighter segment of the populace that the insurgent leadership is lying about your intentions, and in fact you are indeed leaving them, and leaving them with a government whose legitimacy they recognize.

All of this must of course be communicated in word and deed throughout the engagement.

But first you must address step one, and for some reason, that is the step no one ever wants to take.

Firn
02-10-2010, 04:48 PM
It is certainly no easy task, because as somebody said in war the easy things become difficult.

Reflecting the campaign in Afghanistan I wonder if we did not make a classic mistake by having too little resources and manpower to shoulder the burden of a lofty and very ambitious strategy born after a stunning victory and yet enough presence and loud claims to give the enemy an excellent military and propaganda target which fitted rather neatly into their strategy.

All in all we were on a golden middle path leading into big trouble.


Firn

Oredigger61
02-17-2010, 06:54 PM
Bob, is this typology written up anywhere?

Bob, did you see my earlier question up thread?

Bob's World
02-18-2010, 05:13 AM
Sorry, yes. I've worked through it a few times in various threads here on the topic. Have also incorporated into at least one paper.

In a nutshell, many efforts at describing insurgency seem overly complicated. I am reminded of a painful experience in College when I took integration calculus for the first time. I was completely overwhelmed by the incredible complexity, and every problem was a blur of complex equations or situations to be converted to complex equations. I didn't know where to start, and I didn't have a firm grip on what I was trying to accomplish, and I didn't have a firm grasp of the reduction formulas and high end algebra and geometry required.

The following term I was sitting in the library with my nemesis the calculus book, when suddenly it dawned on me that for all of the surface complexity, there were really just three types of problems, and step one was to identify which type of problem you were trying to solve. Then as I mastered the reduction formulae and my algebra and geometry skills, it all became quite simple and I ended up earning the highest score in the class.

I think that insurgency is much like this. The complexity in front of one's face is overwhelming; and many sent in to deal with an insurgency also lack proficiency in the basic skills required for such operations

So I set out to see if there were logical "types" of insurgency. As I looked at it there were three. Others have come up with larger numbers, but I think those can be reduced down to the three that I use.

1. Revolutionary: When an element of the populace seeks to overthrow/change the current government through illegal means

2. Resistance: When an element of the populace seeks to throw out an external force that has either forced itself upon them, or come in invited and overstayed its welcome.

3. Separatist: When some segment of the populace seeks to break some portion of the state off from the parent and form a new state.

These may occur in combinations. For example, in Afghanistan, I see the Senior leader Taliban insurgency as a revolutionary movement that is rooted primarily in the perceived illegitimacy of the Karzai government and the lack of trusted and certain processes for the populace to effect legal change of that government (Causation); supported by the AQ UW operations; and employing a fundamental Islamist ideology (motivation). This is the aspect of the insurgency that must be resolved in order to bring peace to the country.

Beneath and within this is the much larger rank and file resistance insurgency of average Afghans, who care little about governance, but who care deeply about the presence of foreign invaders in their homes. They also feel deeply about the duty to safeguard their homes and families, and to have the pride that comes with earning a day's wage for a day's work. They are also Sunni Muslim, so the Islamist message speaks to them. They fight because the coalition is here and because they are paid to do so. This is good, honorable, Pashtun work. Far preferable to simply living on the coalition dole.

Solve the revolutionary "parent" insurgency, and then we can take actions in conjunction with the newly legitimized government of Afghanistan to reduce troop levels; stop the pay and motivation to resist, and all get back to our normal lives. The resistance insurgency largely fades away simply because we fade away, and be cause or narrative becomes more believable with a government perceived as legitimate in the eyes of the populace in office.


Until then, we are largely protecting and feeding a massive Ponzi scheme that would make Bernie Madoff proud. Fix that first. Small, local ponzi schemes are very afghan; the big national one fed by coalition "investors" is not. It lifts the money up and out of the country, instead of distributing it back among the people at the local, district, and provincial levels.

Oredigger61
02-18-2010, 03:28 PM
Bob, thank you for the detailed response. I sensed it was something along those lines. My reason for asking is that you appear to be plowing ground that I plowed during the period 1974-1980 while course manager for the Navy’s COIN course.

By 1974, the COIN instruction was a residual effort consisting of two classes. First, we taught a two-week seminar about 12 or so times a year. The target audience was the Navy Special Warfare Community and Marine equivalent. However, Army (and some Air Force) reserves flocked to our course because it gave them an ACDUTRA opportunity that was educational. Many of the Army officers were from Reserve Civil Affairs units, so we had a wide variety of knowledgeable folks who passed through our doors. We picked their brains on the way through.

Second, we taught a unit-specific weekend course as part of the Naval Reserve training structure.

Shortly before I arrived on station the staff had flown in Roger Darling for a presentation and video taping session. We then “taught” Darling with little idea of what he was really saying.

One day a student, Tom Grassey, wandered into my office and said we had no clue, we had no one’s attention, and we had no credibility. At the end of his two-week stay we basically said to Tom that if you know so much go out and research the subject and come back and inform us.

A few months later he did just that. One of his points was that we needed to put aside the word “insurgency” and call it what it was, revolution. That opened things up for us. We had been stuck with the terminology of the 1960’s—Left, Mass and Right Strategy. Grassey also pointed us to the construct of “unjust treatment,” which he took from Aristotle.

That led us to David V. J. Bell and his treatment of resistance and revolution. I commend his book to you.

We taped Tom and he published his findings in the Naval War College Review under the title, “Some Perspectives on Revolution.” At the same time, Roger Darling was re-titling his “Military Review” article to be “Revolution Examined Anew.” We gradually renamed our course; it ultimately became a “Political Warfare Seminar," and added the American Revolution as a case study.

We synthesized Darling and Grassey into a unified scheme for qualitative analysis, and added Bell to speak to the distribution of justice component.

Up thread I have a link to a key chart I derived which, at the time, was our understanding of the spectrum of revolutionary conflict and violence. The predicate was that any government has two fundamental tasks, the dispensation of justice (Aristotle, Bell) and the management of violence. The revolutionary goal was to get the government to focus on the latter task.

I have seen little in the intervening 30 years since I last taught the subject that substantially changes what we wrote and taught at Coronado at the close of the Vietnam War.

Bob's World
02-18-2010, 05:11 PM
Bob, thank you for the detailed response. I sensed it was something along those lines. My reason for asking is that you appear to be plowing ground that I plowed during the period 1974-1980 while course manager for the Navy’s COIN course.

By 1974, the COIN instruction was a residual effort consisting of two classes. First, we taught a two-week seminar about 12 or so times a year. The target audience was the Navy Special Warfare Community and Marine equivalent. However, Army (and some Air Force) reserves flocked to our course because it gave them an ACDUTRA opportunity that was educational. Many of the Army officers were from Reserve Civil Affairs units, so we had a wide variety of knowledgeable folks who passed through our doors. We picked their brains on the way through.

Second, we taught a unit-specific weekend course as part of the Naval Reserve training structure.

Shortly before I arrived on station the staff had flown in Roger Darling for a presentation and video taping session. We then “taught” Darling with little idea of what he was really saying.

One day a student, Tom Grassey, wandered into my office and said we had no clue, we had no one’s attention, and we had no credibility. At the end of his two-week stay we basically said to Tom that if you know so much go out and research the subject and come back and inform us.

A few months later he did just that. One of his points was that we needed to put aside the word “insurgency” and call it what it was, revolution. That opened things up for us. We had been stuck with the terminology of the 1960’s—Left, Mass and Right Strategy. Grassey also pointed us to the construct of “unjust treatment,” which he took from Aristotle.

That led us to David V. J. Bell and his treatment of resistance and revolution. I commend his book to you.

We taped Tom and he published his findings in the Naval War College Review under the title, “Some Perspectives on Revolution.” At the same time, Roger Darling was re-titling his “Military Review” article to be “Revolution Examined Anew.” We gradually renamed our course; it ultimately became a “Political Warfare Seminar," and added the American Revolution as a case study.

We synthesized Darling and Grassey into a unified scheme for qualitative analysis, and added Bell to speak to the distribution of justice component.

Up thread I have a link to a key chart I derived which, at the time, was our understanding of the spectrum of revolutionary conflict and violence. The predicate was that any government has two fundamental tasks, the dispensation of justice (Aristotle, Bell) and the management of violence. The revolutionary goal was to get the government to focus on the latter task.

I have seen little in the intervening 30 years since I last taught the subject that substantially changes what we wrote and taught at Coronado at the close of the Vietnam War.

You're right, we are definitely coming at this from similar perspectives. I look forward to finding some of those old pieces and working through them.