SFA as part of a campaign design: supporting operational requirements (part 1) [Archive]

Rob Thornton

05-20-2009, 08:21 PM

In an effort to rope the other three threads together (Fundamentals of SFA (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?p=72042#post72042), Plan, Train and Organize for SFA (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=7342), SFA as an Individual Capability (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=7363)) I thought it’d be useful to start a thread on SFA as part of a campaign design where the objectives require a level of sustainable indigenous security capability and capacity in support of broader policy objectives.

I wanted to use an excerpt from Ralph Peter’s interview with GEN Petraeus because it gets to the issue of SFA as a developmental activity, and raises some significant issues with respect to campaign objectives and developmental timelines. I believe this idea supports the use of “design” in laying out the SFA LOE (Line of Effort), or LLOO (Logical Line of Effort) in Joint speak.

New York Post -May 19, 2009, Pg. 23 titled “Worried Warrior - Gen. Petraeus on US strategy”, by Ralph Peters

Post: As the commander of the US Central Command, you're the big-picture "strategy guy." Could you give readers a clear statement of our mission in Afghanistan?
Petraeus: The mission is to ensure that Afghanistan does not again become a sanctuary for al Qaeda and other transnational extremists. That's what it had become before the operations conducted in the wake of 9/11. Al Qaeda wants to carry out further attacks on the US and our allies, and we need to deny them safe havens in which they can plan and train for such attacks.
Post: Can we get there from here?
Petraeus: We can, but it won't be easy. To accomplish our mission, we and our coalition and Afghan partners need to reverse the decline in security; develop Afghan forces that can shoulder the burden of security in their country over time; help establish governance that wins local support -- which means incorporating some traditional structures, and support the improvement of basic services for the Afghan people. This will be hard, but the mission's critical. As we used to say about Iraq: Hard is not hopeless.

While the objective of denying sanctuary to transnational extremists as a broad end lends itself to flexibility with respect to ways and means, Ralph Peter’s follow up question provides GEN Petraeus the opportunity to issue what sounds like CDR’s guidance on both ways and means – this is not new, but is illustrative for this thread.

I first had the opportunity to begin experimenting with design for SFA last year after I was exposed to it in UQ 2008 – it was then referred to as the Operational Design Process, which had been derived from Systemic Operational Design. We had a brief thread on it here (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=5525&highlight=SFA+ODP). Later in 2008 I was given an opportunity to experiment with it again when JCISFA supported OSD PA&E SAC on the IW study and a Building Security Capacity excursion. While we were unable to do a full blown design due to resource constraints (to include my having a better knowledge of design), we were able to do a functional design that focused on determining requirements in light of conditions and objectives, and designing an operational approach.

Even with a reduced design process, the operational approach and requirements to enable that approach indicated a significant investment by the USG to achieve the policy objective, further it indicated that as conditions changed, and objectives were modified, so to the required capabilities would have to change.

Later we looked at other case studies and applied the design methodology to other experiments and have made similar results. To achieve policy ends in the types of scenarios where there is an obvious security vacuum of significant scale, where we have an interest to see it through, and where the enabling campaign objective is contingent on the ability of the foreign security force partner to generate, employ and sustain sufficient capability and capacity, requires a timeline that extends beyond the shelf life of any one president and probably multiple congresses. This could be in response to what has become an intolerable set of conditions for one or more parties just short of conflict or it could post conflict (not necessarily post U.S. conflict). I did not include the types of shaping activities which might mitigate or preclude conflict for two reasons; 1) there has not been allot of effort looking into that on the main stream experimentation side (we could do better here); 2) If things are A-OK and going our way, then scale is usually not the issue, and what passes for normal is usually good enough. This does not address the issue that often we miss or ignore when conditions change and require more or less effort, and then find ourselves facing the best of some bad choices.

If by using design we were able to identify what the requirements were for a given foreign security force that would support the overarching policy objective we could then walk the operational stepping stones backwards using the fundamentals of SFA. The SFA assessment methodology can be used to determine where the organizational gaps are in the FSF formations. The Operational Environment Assessment can be used to consider how the conditions affect the development and requirements of the FSF. The Institutional Assessment can be used to consider what DOTMLPF-P actions are required to make the FSF capable of generating, employing and sustaining itself. The operational framework can now be established because you have an understanding of what the FSF must be capable and have the capacity to do to support the policy end, and you have an understanding of where you believe them to be in terms of their development.

The SFA developmental tasks of Organize, Train, Equip, Rebuild and Advise can then be aligned and adjusted to accomplish those intermediate FSF developmental objectives in support of the end. This is important because as the conditions and the objectives take shape the requirements will follow, and the requirements tell us what capabilities must be generated. This allows us to consider the demand signal in light of the needs of the operational requirements, and allows us to adapt our force generation processes in a proactive manner vs. a reactive one (provided the force employer is conducting continuous assessments and communicating that implications back to force generator).

Rob Thornton

05-20-2009, 08:22 PM

slapout9

05-20-2009, 08:33 PM

If what GEN Petraeus articulated to Ralph Peters ref. Afghanistan were translated into a language of strategy (Slap, I concede there are more ways to look at it)

Best, Rob

Hi Rob, funny you should mention that:D I was reading some old Maneuver Warfare Stuff and this old crusty Marine that now runs a ballet company:eek: has the best definition of the word Objective I have seen. Objective= the physical condition the enemy will be in when you finish your mission!!!! some strategic stuff there. And of course the original concept (article by whatshis name) as posed by the 101st Airborne commanding general Max Taylor was....Objectives+Ways+Means= Strategy. Have been reading this thread closely and you have been saying some good stuff as usual....All The Way Sir;)

marct

05-20-2009, 09:00 PM

Rob,

Before I give a more detailed response (without wisecracks ;)), I do want to raise what I see as a serious flaw or, at least, a distinct impediment: the strategic focus is too tight. Let's take the example you used:

The mission is to ensure that Afghanistan does not again become a sanctuary for al Qaeda and other transnational extremists.

Okay, that might be the mission for Afghanistan, but it cannot be the (Grand) strategic mission, otherwise we end up with AQ in a cave in the FATA, and the Taliban with safe zones there doing pretty much what they want... Oh, wait, they are :eek:!

This tightness of focus will, IMHO, cause the adoption of some seriously flawed assumptions for SFA. The one that is running around in my head right now is the flawed assumption that "nationality" is the pre-eminent component of identity (vs., say, kinship, ethnicity, religion, etc.). If we assume that a lot of SFA is taking place in so-called "fragile states", i.e. ones that never really developed a strong, unitary "national character", then it strikes me that this is a fatal flaw, since those other elements of identity (think of them as the bases of motivational factors)

cut across national boundaries, and
are limited in their motivational appeal.

I'm not trying to dump undrinkable liquid substances in your Wheaties, but I do think that this is a seriously flawed "strategic" assumption that needs to be addressed, especially in the light of SFA.

Bob's World

05-20-2009, 09:18 PM

If what GEN Petraeus articulated to Ralph Peters ref. Afghanistan were translated into a language of strategy (Slap, I concede there are more ways to look at it) it might look like this - end = deny sanctuary to X-national extremists, ways = Afghan Security Capability and Capacity, means = OTERA (SFA as a force employment concept).

This better than most gets to what is probably the biggest rock in my craw about SFA: It is premised on this VERY VERY flawed equation being true.

If you have defined the problem incorrectly, no matter how terrific your answer is to flawed analysis, you will have to be very lucky indeed for it to achieve your intended effect.

This is a very Threat-Centric perspective. Build the capacity of host nation security forces to (presumably physically) deny sanctuary to extremists and you win. I can't think of a single historic example of where this has achieved more than just a temporal effect. One has to address underlying causes of such populace-based conflict in order to achieve an enduring effect. Security is a supporting effort.

I would offer as a far more effective strategic equation: End ="Good"* Afghan Governance free from perceptions of US legitimacy = vastly reduced US footprint with complete subjugation of remaining US military operations being in support of Afghan security forces = focus on development of afghan governance as main effort with at least a half of foreign assistance to that end coming from (hold your breath - )Iran.

Key is to understand that "good governance" as used by me does not mean "effective" on some objective measurement of services, but subjectively how the populace feels about the governance. Populaces will rise up in insurgency when they perceive a major problem that they also perceive that they have not legimate means to resolve. So, success does not come from massive efforts to "fix" governance and battalions of "metrics" gathers; instead it comes from addressing perceptions, polling populaces to understand and facilitate host nation efforts to address their concerns, and ensuring that reliable mechanisms to address grievances exist.

One can graph out every single populace's relationship with its respecitve government on a simple x-y graph; with "violence" on the y-axis and "poor governance" on the x-axis. Most would plot in a big scatter in the lower left hand corner, but trending upward on the violence scale as one moves outward on the poor governance scale. To take a country like afghanistan and simply suppress the insurgent without addressing the conditions of poor governance merely artifically moves it staight down on the y-axis without moving back on the x-axis. Once that artificial suppression is removed (take Yugoslavia, for example) the violence will rapidly shoot straight back up to a high level.

As an interesting side note:
from a recent Gallup poll conducted in Afghanistan:

Single Greatest Problem for Afghans today (open-ended answers):

1. The Economy (41%)

2. Unemployment (16%)

3. Security (12%)

4. Rising and high living costs since international community presence (8.5%)

Lack of Leadership Alternatives:

Most Trusted Person in Afghanistan:

1. Karzai (25%)

2. No one (22%)

3. Ramazan Bashardost (7%)

4. Younus Qanoni (7%)

5. Ali Ahmad Jalali (6%)

Most desirable election outcome:

Who should be in charge of Afghanistan?:

1. New government (53%)

2. Foreign Forces NATO/ISAF (26%)

3. Present Government (10%)

4. Other (5%)

5. Clerics (1%)

6. Taliban (1%)

Importance and Popularity of Iran

How important for Afghanistan is a strong relationship with ____ country?

1. Iran (59%)

2. US (50%)

3. India & Pakistan (both on 45%)

Which country do you feel closest to? (open-ended answers):

- 41% of all responses put Iran as most admired country

- 62% have family connections in Iran

- 35% of Afghans would move to Iran as their first-choice destination

Role of the Taliban:

Is the Taliban having a negative effect on the country?

- Yes: 78%

Is Pakistan supporting the Taliban?

- Yes: 53%

US approval Rating:

- Even Split: 48% approve ; 48% disapprove

marct

05-20-2009, 09:55 PM

Hi Bob's World,

This better than most gets to what is probably the biggest rock in my craw about SFA: It is premised on this VERY VERY flawed equation being true.
....
This is a very Threat-Centric perspective. Build the capacity of host nation security forces to (presumably physically) deny sanctuary to extremists and you win. I can't think of a single historic example of where this has achieved more than just a temporal effect. One has to address underlying causes of such populace-based conflict in order to achieve an enduring effect. Security is a supporting effort.

You know, I think we agree on a lot of things (especially the importance of perception). I would, however, like to take your comment and, since I really believe that battlespaces are much larger than tend to be generally discussed, toss it into what I believe is one of the primary battlespaces for all current and (immediate) future US conflicts: the homeland political debate.

I would argue that ever since the Crimean War, one of the key battlespaces is homeland politics. This, BTW, is much more than a simplistic concept such as "national will" since it should be taken as a dynamic model.

So, I would suggest that for the US home population, at least for those who vote and are involved in the political process, about the only way to get them to agree to a war is to wave a bloody flag and induce fear. This absolutely requires three things:

the existence of a credible "threat";
the perceived belief that that threat could "hurt us"; and
a political-military strategy that "guarenbtees" that the homeland voting populace will not get "hurt".

This final point becomes crucial when we are talking about how SFA is packaged. I would argue that it must be packaged as threat-based due to political considerations at home. Let me take this a step further, and note that the "threat", at least in the political battlesphere, doesn't have to be a physical threat; it can be a "threat to propriety". For a recent example of this type of threat, look at how the role of women in Afghanistan has been constructed in the Western media to both justify and further military intervention in Afghanistan. Even though I disagree with a lot of what he writes, Max Forte has a really good analysis (http://openanthropology.wordpress.com/2009/04/26/nato-and-afghanistans-shia-marriage-law-the-collapse-of-a-master-narrative/) of this up on his blog.

Think about the problem-centric position you are taking (which, BTW, I happen to agree with :D!). Can you imagine trying to "sell" it politically? Try the following rhetorical argument on for size and see how it flies:

I know! We have an unemployment rate of roughly 8%, but our national secruity requires that we invade X! Terrorists based in X have attacked our interests abroad, and the only way we can stop these mad dogs is to ensure a 100% employment rate in X!
Ya know, it ain't gonna sell :cool:. So what is the US left with? An argument on "principle"? Sorry, but that isn't going to cut it either (Darfur anyone?). In the only battlespace that counts for most politicians, then, it has to be threat-based. And what, pray tell, do you think that these self-same political gurus will do to generals who disagree or who frame campaigns in terms they don't like?

[/rant]

Sorry for the rant and the sarcasm, but sometimes they are the best way to make a point. In this case, and because the US military is sub-ordinant to civilian political control, that means that the politicians define the campaign master narrative, not the military folks who a) have to carry it out and b) probably know a lot better than the politicians.

Rob Thornton

05-20-2009, 10:01 PM

Hi Marc:)

Keep in mind though that I was ref. CENTCOM's response to Peter's question - and it was oriented as you noted to the specific mission in Afghanistan. I do think it requires a regional perspective to really consider the capabilities and capacities required - and moreover to put the right capabilities in the right places at the right time. AfPak is a good example, however more broadly - what are the requirements to enable a strategy for interdicting enemy recruiting, traiing and basing grounds abroad, and how can you disrupt or interupt their movements (both physical and others) between locations - this quickly gets into all oj our USG resources, and is contingent to a large degree on muli-lateral support.

As such, I think there is a signifcant component of developing partner security forces to this end, however there are other areas that must be considered as well.

You are correct in bringing up the unique nature in each set of conditions and that sustainable security can take multiple forms - however they must be weighed in light of the outcomes you can tolerate.

Marc considered:

This tightness of focus will, IMHO, cause the adoption of some seriously flawed assumptions for SFA. The one that is running around in my head right now is the flawed assumption that "nationality" is the pre-eminent component of identity (vs., say, kinship, ethnicity, religion, etc.). If we assume that a lot of SFA is taking place in so-called "fragile states", i.e. ones that never really developed a strong, unitary "national character", then it strikes me that this is a fatal flaw, since those other elements of identity (think of them as the bases of motivational factors)

This can't be just about SFA (although as a developmental activity its a great place to discuss it) - this is much more broadly the issue of all the actions we take to achieve a policy end. I will say that design supports considering this more broadly and the risks associated with one COA over another (of which one may be doing nothing as to not make things worse).

Lets asssume that design uncovered the issues you brought up - but your requirement to extend security in order to deny safehaven remained. The process of design may lead you alternative ways of doing this, and requirements that pop out of the SFA LOE and into the governance and/or economic (or whatever LOEs you are using in your campaign design). There might be a requirment for political accomodation with a tribe that is currently excercising a form of self government - but which might support some assistance in other areas. The possibilities are as numerous as the range of conditions, however our tolerance may not allow us to accept all of them.

SFA is really a force employment concept to support whatever ends are decided on, the process of campaign design though is what is supposed to frame how you can best achieve those ends. e.g. it may tell you that if you extend security in this area, you need to consider what are the implications to the adjacent areas. It may telll you that at the moment the conditions do not support a preferred COA, but you may be able to do other things that shape the outcome in the meantime - e.g. if country X says "no way" to your assistance - maybe he'll accept support from somebody else who is willing or desires your assistance. We often get myopic in the way we approach a problem and don't look at the alternative ways to solve it because it does not seem direct enough - design supports identifying the correct problem and then looking at that problem from multiple perspectives to consider the range of possibilities.

WRT to SFA - Design lends itself well to it because of the nature of development which may include a siginificant timeline where conditions can be greatly altered based on interaction. This I think is really beneficial when trying to establish a rational for generating one capability over another.

Hope that answered you questions - I'll forward you the UNCLASS design guide based on the work I did. Its not perfect - really more of a functional design, but it does get at the logic wrt identifying requirments.

Best, Rob

Rob Thornton

05-20-2009, 10:21 PM

Bob's World said:

If you have defined the problem incorrectly, no matter how terrific your answer is to flawed analysis, you will have to be very lucky indeed for it to achieve your intended effect.

I do not disagree. This is why I think design is the way to go. Now it may not change the nature of the policy, but it may provide the operational commander the analysis to argue for a different end, or at least argue for patience.

As for it being the flaw in SFA as a concept - I'd say that SFA is just a force employment concept - e.g. a set of capabilities which enable a given operational appraoch or COA.

SFA developmental objecitves are set within that, and the definition states that SFA should be part of a comprehensive whole of government approach - that is unless you already had a good enough partner in other areas and were just adding some new capabilities (e.g. not a stability op) and might not need it.

I'd add that the goal of SFA is to create sustainable capabilities and capacities in security, and that requires instituional development along with the teeth. This gets to why the assessment methodology must include an organizational assessment, an operational environment assessment and an institutonal assessment. You have to have all three. If the institutional assessment tells you for example that the ministries will not be capable of supporting the capability and capacity you are developing, then either set your sites lower, or be prepared to pony up for temporary successes which you bear the burden of sustaining (or you could cut your losses).

Perhaps we need look no further than OIF to consider the challenges associated with instituion building - I think employing something like design would help us navigate that better. WRT OEF - we just said that the Afghan security forces needed to be doubled - is this in light of them being able to do what they need to do? Using design could we have seen that earlier. Or is it just a matter of changing our objectives? What are the requirements for the partner govt. to sustain a force of that size? Could design help there?

Finally I'd note that we don't always get to pick the end - or shape the conditions, we just have to find a way to bring it a conclusion we can live with. If design is done before hand - other choices which result in options that allow us to consider how bad we really want it (and size accordingly) may be possible, but all to often we miss the boat - as Ken White noted on another thread - "fire breaks and prevention make life easier" - otherwise we have to make some tough choices.

Best, Rob

Bob's World

05-20-2009, 11:44 PM

Rob,

You're doing great work, and I assure you, there are leaders at SOCOM far senior and smarter than I that hang a great deal of hope on SFA. I just think they look at it very differently than it is being looked at within the conventional force. They see all the shades of goodness from a career of doing this business, and know how horribly limiting our current funding and authorities are for getting out and engaging with and building relations with security forces around the world. SFA is a vehicle to enable FID to rise to the next level, a level more appropriate for the world as it exists today. The actual training is only about half of the benefit.

Marc,

I was fortunate to attend conference on "Grand Strategy After War" hosted by Duke University, with many notable speaker/attendees like Dr John Gaddis of Yale, and Dr. Kratzner of Stanford. After a couple days of discussing grand strategy, I asked "Does Grand Strategy require a threat?" It was something these guys really hadn't considered because it has always been crafted as such. The "politics of fear" and all.

This is part of what is mentally slowing us down today. The world remains a dangerous place, but no matter how hard we try to get some state or some non-state to play "threat" for us to allow us to apply the old model and make the old strategies work, it just doesn't make sense. Today the things that threaten your nation the most are not other states and not non-state UW guys like bin laden. It is this globalization empowered and connected mix of "things" going on all over the world. At the middle of all of those things are people. People empowered like never before, people connected like never before.

Deterring the Soviets really when all was said and done only required that we deter one man. Today "deterrence" means deterring people everywhere. Infinitely more complex. Requries bold new thinking and bold new approaches. Bigger hammers won't do it. More security will never be enough security. It means we must not only be strong, but we must also be good. We've not been so good of late. Justified by the Cold War for a while, but then just running wild during the Clinton years, then justified by GWOT, but now once again that has worn thin.

Remember when the use of military force by the US was a rare and very big deal?

Most Americans don't.

slapout9

05-21-2009, 12:35 AM

[QUOTE=Bob's World;72310]
Key is to understand that "good governance" as used by me does not mean "effective" on some objective measurement of services, but subjectively how the populace feels about the governance. Populaces will rise up in insurgency when they perceive a major problem that they also perceive that they have not legimate means to resolve. So, success does not come from massive efforts to "fix" governance and battalions of "metrics" gathers; instead it comes from addressing perceptions, polling populaces to understand and facilitate host nation efforts to address their concerns, and ensuring that reliable mechanisms to address grievances exist.

TE]

BW,Rob,Marct.....So wouldn't it be better to change the Strategy formula to Motive,Methods and Opportunity? With the Motive of the population as the primary Objective??

Bob's World

05-21-2009, 01:32 AM

[QUOTE=Bob's World;72310]

BW,Rob,Marct.....So wouldn't it be better to change the Strategy formula to Motive,Methods and Opportunity? With the Motive of the population as the primary Objective??

I think of the presence of "poor governance" as causation.

I think of the spark that falls on a populace experiencing poor governance as motivation.

We tend to focus on the spark. Leaders, ideology, etc. Without the existence of causation such motivation is benign. But the spark is what is on the surface, what is easy to see, to measure. We focus on the spark. It draws the eye.

The key is to remove the fuel. But the fuel is made up of our own failures, and to remove the fuel you must first not only recognize the fuel but take responsibility for it. This is why most COIN efforts are either failures or long drawn out affairs. Because insurgency happens when governance fails, and most governments would really just prefer to blame the problem on the spark or the portion of the populace in flames.

When some other country is experiencing this, it comes to your door as well if you are perceived as the source of legitimacy of that failed government. This is the true root of GWOT. Failed governments across the Middle East, populaces experiencing poor governance, and the US seen as a major source of legitimacy of those governments. The US seen as an obstacle to achieving good governance.

Ken White

05-21-2009, 02:45 AM

One thought might bear a deeper look...

I agree generally with your three post-Crimean things but strongly believe that in the US the threat need not be that credible for most; the ability to hurt us is subject to many vagaries; and -- define 'hurt.'

We don't categorize that easily. I know many that would subscribe totally to your descriptions; I know as many or quite probably more who don't need those things. We're a rather belligerent crew for the most part...

That said, there's no question in my mind that domestic politics drive our wars nor is there any question that the recent ones have seen what you say postulated or used by the whoever was in charge (to one degree or another and even if very flakily for the last few Presidents...). So I agree that's been the method here -- I just do not agree that, for the US, going to war absolutely requires those things.

Bob's world asks a good question:
"Remember when the use of military force by the US was a rare and very big deal?"His answer is also good -- most American do not remember such a time.

This probably is not a good place for my anti Goldwater-Nichols rant...

Bob's World

05-21-2009, 10:32 AM

In August of 1990 I signed in to 2/5 SFG at Ft Campbell, KY, a brand new SF Captain fresh from the Q Course. The place was a bee hive of activity as the Iraqi Army had just rolled into Kuwait the week prior.

At one point in my in-processing I stood in the battalion Doc's office shoulder to shoulder with a Sergeant First Class, both of us with our asses bared in preparation for the dreaded Gamma Globulin shot the Doc was preparing for us.

SFC A. turned and looked at me, eyebrow raised,and asked "so, you're just signing in?"

"yes"

"Son of a b_____!, he muttered as he shook his head in mild disgust. "Of all the dumb luck. I've been here 12 years waiting for this, and you come in and get it on day one."

At the time the only guys in 5th SFG with CIBs were a handful of senior NCOs and warrant officers. Times have changed. Neither one us realized as we stood there leaning up against the wall taking that dose of peanut butter-like GG in our backsides that we were standing at a transition point in time.

The Cold War was officially over, we just didn't realize it yet. We were just excited to be getting our chance.

Some people visualize the tearing down of the Berlin Wall. I visualize a bare office with beige brickblock walls and metal furniture and a conversation with a couple of great NCOs.

marct

05-21-2009, 01:51 PM

Hi Folks,

First off, a great discussion even if it's not exactly what Rob was hoping for :wry:.

This is part of what is mentally slowing us down today. The world remains a dangerous place, but no matter how hard we try to get some state or some non-state to play "threat" for us to allow us to apply the old model and make the old strategies work, it just doesn't make sense. Today the things that threaten your nation the most are not other states and not non-state UW guys like bin laden. It is this globalization empowered and connected mix of "things" going on all over the world. At the middle of all of those things are people. People empowered like never before, people connected like never before.

BW,Rob,Marct.....So wouldn't it be better to change the Strategy formula to Motive,Methods and Opportunity? With the Motive of the population as the primary Objective??

Slap, I would certainly agree that that should certainly have a place in it.

I do, however, think that it is crucial, at least for me since I have a tendency to go from A to T without bothering with intermediate steps, to lay out exactly how I view these things. First, I view Grand Strategy as operating in a global environment. Ideally, it should also have some decent, long term (50-100 year) goals that can best be described as Philosophical - "Principles" as it were which are (hopefully) shared by both the military and the political spheres and, ideally, with the majority of the population.

Second, threat categorization, at the Grand Strategic level, needs to distinguish between competitors and opponents. Competitors agree to play by (very) roughly the same rules, while opponents reject those rules. NB: I am talking about rules of competition, not Grand Strategic goals.

Third, and again on the threat categorization level (i.e. "perception"), since no one will agree to play be exactly the same rules (otherwise we could just resolve conflicts via poker games), we all have to be aware that most of the players involved in the Great Game are not nation states: some are supra-national NGOs (e.g. the Red Cross / Red Crescent, various religious organizations, trans-national corporations, etc.), some are regional or local [sub-national] NGOs, while some are communities of interest / practice. What this means is that the de facto reality of NGOs (in the broad sense) as players must be recognized and they have to be held to account to play by the rules. So, if we adopt Slaps suggested Motive Means and Opportunity model, it needs to be applied here.

Fourth, Bob's World is exactly correct that changes in primarily communications technology, coupled with rapid changes in production technology (the economic and perceptual core of Globalization) are generating most of the perceptual difficulties at the Grand Strategic level and the lived reality difficulties on the ground. Central to this problem are two bits of culture lag: unequal changes in distribution technologies and cultural perceptions of scarcity.

Let me touch on the first one of these. Distribution technologies have not kept pace with communications technologies. In effect, anyone can "see" or "experience" (vicariously I admit) a lifestyle that most cannot access physically. This ability of individuals to perceive will, in many cases, also lead to a comparison of that perception with a perception of their daily lives. This comparison, in turn, leads to several things.

First, a perception that the State (i.,e. their government) has "failed" them because a) they don't have it and b) they are constantly being bombarded with messages that say it is the State's responsibility to provide them.
Second, the possibility of a perception that the State cannot provide these resources because it is being "opposed" / "oppressed" by some other State or interest group.
Third, the possibility of generating focused anger and hatred of another State based on jealousy.

These potential reactions leave a populace open to manipulation by politicians (loosely speaking to include religious "leaders" as well).

Let me touch on the "scarcity" issue, now, since it is actually much more dangerous. Let me start by saying that even since, roughly, 200 years after we, as a species, developed horticulture, we have been perceiving resources as scarce. If critical resources are "scarce", then it stands to reason that each social and cultural group has to figure out how best to allocate them - this led to the development of social stratification and "command" economies (i.e. the Temple States in Sumeria, Mohenjo-Daro, Knososs, etc.). One of the crucial things that happened during this period was that the concept of access to resources was conflated with social status (which ties in to all sorts of other things...).

Today, "scarcity" of resources is still assumed to be tied in with social status and "power" (loosley construed in the Galbraith sense of the term). However, many of the resources themselves are not scarce - the supply is artificially manipulated to induce scarcity (various agricultural Planning Boards in Canada are a good example of this, as is the production of oil). This artificial scarcity is used to maintain and enhance the social status and access to resources of various sub-state small groups as well as States themselves (OPEC anyone?). The maintenance of artificial scarcity also extends into R&D efforts (e.g. delays in the production of hydrogen fuel cell technology [from the 1970's], delays in the use of mag-lev technology [late 1970's], etc.), and also into the production and support of social movements that help to increase resource scarcity (e.g. the anti-nuclear technology groups).

This brings me to my final point about Grand Strategic perceptions, and that has to do with how the rhetoric and principles of a Grand Strategy are played out in everyday life. Let me give a really simple example from the advertising world: Nabob coffee. Nabob has declared as one of their Grand Strategic principles that "fair exchange" is one of their principles. Recently, at least in Canada, they have begun advertising their strategic alliance with the Rainforest Alliance (Coalition? Sorry, seniors moment...). They are selling a product that many Canadians buy, coffee, and showing how buying their version of it leads to improving the lived reality of the workers who produce that coffee, both as individuals and as communities. While they are also making a nice profit on the deal, that particular "message" has a value add for the Canadian consumer since most of us happen to think helping other people out, especially if it doesn't cost us much extra, is a pretty good thing to do.

Shall we compare this with the US political rhetoric in Afghanistan and Iraq, especially in light of other locations such as Darfur, Rwanda, the Congo, Nigeria and Kenya (okay, most civilians have little idea what's going on there, but they will shortly)? The near instantaneous communications technologies which enabled, and were required by, globalization mean that actions in the world are pretty darn hard to hide while, at the same time, guarenteeing that statements made "on principle" will be compared with actions in perceived "reality".

What this rather rambling post is really aimed at is that at the Grand Strategic level, the "talk" and the "walk" have to be in line with each other. Furthermore, and this has more applicability at the Strategic and Operational levels, the communications-distribution-production realities have to be kept in mind of the global population. This doesn't mean you can't shoot the "Bad Guys", it just means that you can't claim to be the "Good Guys" while simulataneously doing "Bad Things". (Gods, I hate that type of simplistic rhetoric! :D).

Let me draw out one, specific, SFA example, by way of bringing the talk back to Rob's original post. In FM 3-07-1, there is a really brilliant observation that says:

2-1. ....Soldiers conducting SFA must also understand that legitimacy is vital. The relevant population must perceive FSF as legitimate for long-term success.

What, and this is not a rhetorical question, is going to be done if the FSF is perceived by the local populace as illegitimate or as a "necessary evil"? This is why I have been harping on the Grand Strategic level stuff, since how those principles are constructed will impact on how an SFA mission deals with problems of FSF legitimacy.

Rob Thornton

05-21-2009, 02:59 PM

Marc said:

First off, a great discussion even if it's not exactly what Rob was hoping for .

I've always thought the thread must go where the thread goes - and that it is not a bad thing. Most of the time the discussions circle around because there was some point in the initial posts that sparked the wandering. Its kind of like collective cogitating:D - its healthy.

Ken made a point that has been on my mind of late - how long before we can't remember when we were not at war? We're fast approaching a decade of war - the pursuit of policy by other means does not lend itself well to being labled as "contingency operations abroad"

The SECDEF and the CJCS (and many other senior leaders) have made it a point to attempt to shape expectations in public speech by saying both we've got a significant way to go in both Iraq and particularly Afghanistan, that we should expect things to get harder in Afghansitan now that we are significantly investing more in the outcome, and that due to global conditions and our interests we will likely see more conflict on the horizon. I'm not sure that their efforts have really sunk in - anywhere.

With respect to SFA (which is one of the things I'm get paid to think about), what does this mean? I've been reading the thread started by Capt Diaz on supporting the development of an Iraqi Marine Corps (although perhaps with a more limited mission than our own) and I'm thinking - there is a significant capability that may have less to do with COIN and more with respect to protecting Iraqi interests in the Gulf, and possibly even protecting their interests abroad against piracy. Certainly the conventional capabilities that are brought to the Iraqi military with F-16s and M1s, while both have been useful in COIN, are also of great value beyond COIN (I think any good FW MR platform and MBT would indicate this). These efforts also don't absolve us from current SFA efforts in building IA, IP, NP and other ISF to combat their internal threats (and those who sponsor and support them) - I submit we'll be there in significant capacity for some time, although increasingly on the terms of the HN govt.

In Afghanistan the USG and the Afghan leadership recently estimated that they needed double the number of indigenous secuirty forces...The number of what was it 400K was significant, however think about what those numbers mean in Afghanistan in particular where the conditions (many of the cultural ones that Marc outlined & just the sheer geography of the place) are not necessarily going to facillitate moving the FSF to become competent, confident, committed, and capable. I submit this will feel like an enduring effort and may well extend beyond the current administration, even if there is a second term. Ken is right, the influence of domestic politics, or a reaction to some new crisis could change that, however just consider it.

For a member joining the US military right now who intends to make it a 20 year event, 1/2 of their shelf life will be spent at war. Several more national security strategies may be written at war, several QDRs will pass at war - already our "futures" experimentation can not escape the influence of our current fight, and I suppose the list goes on about things that will happen at war. I've not included the other events that may occur as a result of terrorism - that being the use or threat of violence to influence a political outcome vs. a man made disaster which would seem to divorce it from the influence of politics. I've not included the many other reasons wrt fear, honor and interests which might require the use of military force or forces to secure an end - I've really just covered a couple of the major efforts under way - I did not talk about HOA or OEF-P or the countless number of other things that are capturing our attention

If there is a chance that through use of design we can better identify the correct problem, consider the range of possible outcomes, capture the requirements and align our DOTMLPF policies and programs to be more effective, perhaps we can: better support the operational commanders; reduce risk to the policy objective; and through effectiveness we can reduce risk to those Title 10 functions (man, equip, etc.) we are seeing stressed form almost a decade of war with no designated hour in which we will not be at war.

This really is a good discussion, regardless of where it goes - and as I've said in other places its through the tension of discourse we really learn.

Best, Rob

Rob Thornton

05-21-2009, 03:33 PM

Let me draw out one, specific, SFA example, by way of bringing the talk back to Rob's original post. In FM 3-07-1, there is a really brilliant observation that says:

Quote:
2-1. ....Soldiers conducting SFA must also understand that legitimacy is vital. The relevant population (itlaics added by Rob) must perceive FSF as legitimate for long-term success.

What, and this is not a rhetorical question, is going to be done if the FSF is perceived by the local populace as illegitimate or as a "necessary evil"? This is why I have been harping on the Grand Strategic level stuff, since how those principles are constructed will impact on how an SFA mission deals with problems of FSF legitimacy.

Not to be cheeky - but the open door was the use of the word relevant. The cold answer wrt to legitmacy and how it affects sustainability may be one of having the will or means to resist. This is also why our intial defintion of SFA was broad, but specifically said it was done in support of a legitmate authority (it did not say whose criteria of legitmacy - however since its the application of U.S. forces and resources - we should assume that we've at least partially accepted their legitimacy - or can tolerate it until conditions change through process)

Now - not everyone wants our help, or in some cases to be known that we are helping them. This may require an approach where we support the development of capabilities or capacities in others who are tolerable and are themselves willing to help if they where able. Since most authorities don't have allot of excess capacity their willingness is often tied to their ability. There are a couple of things to consider here as well- first, the increased capacity to help others needs to be considered against the partner's ability to sustain it - second, an increase in capability and capacity may upset the regional dynamics (back to the Athenian) that must be addressed as part of a regional strategy. I think all of these things require a broader strategic outlook both in terms of the range of USG policy tools, and in terms of geographic and temporal perspective. BTW - never forget our tendency to act in the moment of political interest on the domestic political front.

Having said all of the above - it should be done with consideration of how it supports U.S. interests. This is not a band-aid application to fix the world, but to advance our interests - particularly where our interests and those of others overlap.

Hope that at least partially opens the door for further discussion on your question - it would also be the first few slides I sent you last night.

Best, Rob

slapout9

05-21-2009, 03:59 PM

marct

05-21-2009, 04:17 PM

Hey Rob,

Not to be cheeky - but the open door was the use of the word relevant. The cold answer wrt to legitmacy and how it affects sustainability may be one of having the will or means to resist. This is also why our intial defintion of SFA was broad, but specifically said it was done in support of a legitmate authority (it did not say whose criteria of legitmacy - however since its the application of U.S. forces and resources - we should assume that we've at least partially accepted their legitimacy - or can tolerate it until conditions change through process)

I think you know that I don't disagree with your assessment :wry:. Let me tease out a few points that, I believe, are relevant though...

Legitimacy re: "will to resist". Quite true but, and I'm noting this using an historical stance, in most cases that tends to backfire down the road unless the US is willing to incorporate the area into its body politic. Political deals may well be ramable down another state (or groups) throat, but there has to be some appearance of "hope" for a better world down the line. A couple of examples of where this has "worked" are the Confederacy, Hawaii, Japan and Germany, but the lessons of the Italian War (1st century bc) really need to be kept in mind. And, BTW, that is assuming that we are talking about the USG operating in the national interest rather than in the interests of, say, an American oil company (or Dole for that manner - think the Banana Wars...).

On legitimacy re: the USG, that can get a touch problematic as well if the "State" recognized by the USG is not recognized by the people living within its borders. I think that one of the more relevant examples is the 13 colonies and the use of foreign SFA (the Hessians) against the Colonials during their (your ;)) insurgency against the globally recognized, legitimate government.

I think what I am really getting at with these points is that SFA is both a "military" mission and, at the same time, a "political" mission. The military may be given broad political guidance (and constraints), but the planning for that mission - its design - must include the political component as, in some ways, co-equal with the training component. BTW, I am using am using "political" in the sense of "lived reality vs rhetoric" rather than any formal political system (a "population-centric" usage, Gian ;)).

Hope that at least partially opens the door for further discussion on your question - it would also be the first few slides I sent you last night.

Yup, it does. I hope you realize that I am Red Teaming your stuff :D! And thanks for the slides. I didn't have a chance to get to them last night, but I've blocked out some time this evening to go over them.

Rob Thornton

05-21-2009, 04:51 PM

regardless of the tool
Slap observed:

.. my concern is a good tool will get all bent up and stuff if it is not applied inside a proper Strategic setting. The US often gets absorbed with a new tool and wants to use it all the time and everywhere and ignores the initial hard questions that need to be asked and answered. Why are they fighting us? and why should we be fighting them?

I agree 100%. No policy tool should be a panacea for what ails ya! I think design, if done with the overarching policy OBJ in mind will shake that out. SFA as a force employment concept to support an end must be done in the strategic and operational context. What I've tried to convey here (and Slap I'll ask Bill and Dave to see if we can iether post the slides here on the thread, or a hyper link to somewhere they can post them - even the PDF is too big) is that if your overall operational design to achieve the policy objective requires you to support the development of sustainable capability and capacity in a FSF, then using design to help lay out your SFA LOE is a good way to go because it generally occurs over a broader period of time, its has consequences beyond the immediate, it probably requires a whole of government approach (authorities, support, contingent development, etc.) and it allows the operational commander to forecast requirements over a broad period of time which support force development and generation - thus keeping us flexible, adaptive and more in balance.

I'd go back to Celeste Ward's piece that was put up on the SWJ Blog about COIN - the means and ways must be feasible, appropriate and suitable to the objective. As conditions and objectives change then so may the requirments, the approach required and the capabilities to enable it. Unfortunately our nature is to look for templates and organizational solutions that are programable (and I'd argue risk aversive) vs. doing the leader development and education that would make us adaptive as institutions. Human nature would seem to be prone to ossification of position (the inevitable Kung-Fu stance in the rice bowl).

One of the reasons I've made it clear I believe SFA is fundamentally a developmental activity (develop sustainable capacity and capability) is to highlight its not to be taken as lightly. Developmental work is hard, and requires a significant commitment of means and will that is subject to the conditions.

In some cases such as Afghanistan, SFA has been identified (by CENTCOM) as one LOE which supports the overarching policy OBJ. Now in light of that comment, and the other commitments we are currently either undertaking or considering undertaking, this equates to some significant capability and capacity to organize, train, equip, rebuild/build and advise to develop the Afghan secuirty forces ability to generate, employ and sustain itself to a point that it supports denial of safehavens to transnational extremists. This is not just about their ability to physically deny terrain to those extremists, but about the things that the denial of terrain (in all its forms) facillitates.

I'd submit that this is operational theory - with some factual precedence - that must be proven or disproven in the current set of conditions (which is something design supports). It is also the regional CDR's approach, and as such the supporting instituions should fully support it as much as possible - this does not preclude them from identifying institutional risk (I don't think they should get a vote on operational risk - not their job) which jeapordizes their Title 10 responsibilties (note - I did not say their authorities)

Wrt AfPak (and Iraq) - it would seem this is going to be around for awhile (unless we abandon the objective, or decide to accept the risk of a different approach - all approaches have risks). In all cases I don't think its the job of the services (or the functional COCOMs) to tell the operational commanders what their requirements are - although it would seem that there are those who disagree, or that it sometimes winds up being the case because the requirements are poorly articualted, because of politics or fears (both legitimate and not), or because a desired capability was simply not on the menu - "cheeburger, cheeburger, cheeburger - no Pepsi - Coke!"

We've got to get better at fully meeting the operational commander's requirements withthe desired capabilities. The right road to efficiency is through becoming more effective in our policies, programs and planning - not through adhoc processes and waiting for Godot.

Slap - I'll also send via email the slides - keep in mind they are a "functional design" only. The full up would be built around much greater context wrt the broader operational design and the knowledge which supports it.

Best, Rob

Rob Thornton

05-21-2009, 05:05 PM

Marc - good points!

I think that one of the more relevant examples is the 13 colonies and the use of foreign SFA (the Hessians) against the Colonials during their (your ) insurgency against the globally recognized, legitimate government.

I would not characterize the use of the Hessians during the RW as SFA. The employment of a FSF is a differnet matter (although it must eb considered). If GB had gone over to support the development of the Hessians by organizing, training, equipping, rebuilding or advising in order to create sustainable capability and capacity, that would be SFA. But the moment the they were then employed as a military force it soudl no longer be SFA. The exception might be if Britich advisors remained throughout for the continued purpose of increasing capability in the Hessian war fighting functions. Does that make sense?

The actual use of the Hessians would fall into the use of a foreign force to augment your own capabilities and capacities.

I think what I am really getting at with these points is that SFA is both a "military" mission and, at the same time, a "political" mission. The military may be given broad political guidance (and constraints), but the planning for that mission - its design - must include the political component as, in some ways, co-equal with the training component. BTW, I am using am using "political" in the sense of "lived reality vs rhetoric" rather than any formal political system

I agree with you, but would point out that as the prussion would say, there is always a political component to the use of military means (even in the way you are using it - good thing about Von C is his intellecutal branches provide allot of shade). However, I'd say that it is emphasized here for many of the reasons you illuminate. This idea is something we should emphasize when contemplating leader development and education - and training. Politics are ultimately are the real interaction of people subject to desires and conditions.

Red Teaming is good:D - makes us smart.

Best, Rob

Bob's World

05-21-2009, 05:52 PM

Well sh..t,where do I start. Bob's World, What causes the cause? A person, and a person always has a motive. Until you understand that you can not prepare a Strategy to succeed. Not only that but you must have a good counter-motive to gain support for your side of things. So your objective should be to de-motivate the insurgency population(focus on their leadership). From there you can look for opportunities and select your methods. And Security Force Operations would have to play a big part in that in order to allow some type of civilized transition.

Ok, what do I mean by that? I think one good example lies within the American Revolution. Arguably one could state that "The Cause" was independence from England.

But what caused this diverse collection of colonies to unite to this common and dangerous end? Certainly there were motivating factors, such as the works of Thomas Paine, or the events in the Massachusetts Colony. But before that, what factors of causation were at work that allowed such words and actions to move a collection of individual people, and individual colonies to move as a body to throw off British rule?

I believe there are many sources of causation. One major one in this case was the simple fact that British citizens who lived in England looked down upon British citizens who lived in the colonies as somehow inferior. From what I have read this was taken as (if anyone would have even thought to ask) "of course they are inferior!" in England. But in the colonies, be it a man of means, education, and accomplishment like George Washington, denied admission to the British Regular Army due to his "status"; or a simple farmer, owning and working a plot of land that may well have qualified him for some minor title back in England; saw this as an outrage. And upon such festering sores of causation fell the cold slaps of motivation. And an insurgency is born. First of words, and then of works.

England did not need to send the most powerful Navy and Army in the world to solve this problem. A simple letter of apology and recognition of full righths of citizenship from the King would have nipped it in the bud.

But then, Kings don't do that, do they. Wouldn't be proper.

slapout9

05-21-2009, 09:18 PM

Cable outage but am back now. BW this may be a chicken or the egg question. I am sure you think you proved your point.....but I think you proved mine and hear is why. If you trace it back to the beginning, as you did, you get a person with a motive. The King and his desire for power. The reason I push this is I think this fits in with your Population Centric Based Solution.

Example a bad or unjust law caused the rebellion....who created the law!!! You have to deal with that or as you point out the revolution will just smolder and eventually resurface when another cause (triggering method:wry:)appears because the motivated person is still there and may want revenge. Where their is a will there is a way. So the objective has to be to somehow de-motivate the person(s) hopefully through nonviolent methods but might not turn out that way.

Again I think this is critacal because as you pointed out( maybe on this or another thread) is why insurgencies take to long and costs to much......which is one of my pet rocks,

Rob Thornton

05-21-2009, 11:53 PM

I'd made mention of these earlier. Here is the link to the UNCLASS functional design guide (http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/bsc-theory-od.pdf)that came out of our support to OSD PA&E. Keep in mind this was done outside the context of the larger campaign design in the interests of illustrating a methodology for functional design. Ideally, the design would be informed by the assessment methodology (organizational/Operational Environment/Institutional) which would tell you what the required capabilities were in light of the conditions and objectives.

Note- the terms BSC (Build Security Capacity) was one used by PA&E. It is not a doctrinal term - but was useful in terms of its function.

Anyway after sending them to Marc and Slap, I thought it worthwhile to bring them up. The first few slides get after identifying the correct problem, and in establishing a design framework to postulate a theory.

Best, Rob

marct

05-24-2009, 02:03 PM

Hi Folks,

Sorry for the delay in responding, but the past couple od days have been nuts!

Rob, I think you're right that the Hessians where not SFA per se, although if I remember correctly (the book I got this from years ago isn't available), they were involved in some training or, at least, cadre activities for Loyalist militia units.

Bob's World made an interesting point:

England did not need to send the most powerful Navy and Army in the world to solve this problem. A simple letter of apology and recognition of full righths of citizenship from the King would have nipped it in the bud.

Just as a matter of historical fact, the King couldn't do this.... at least in practice; this was a matter for Parliament. On the issue of 2nd (or 3rd!) class citizens, you are pretty much correct, but I'm not sure how important that actually was. A ket emotional motivator, surely, but a primary cause? Hmmm, I don't think so. BTW, the reason why I say that is that there is the rather complex example of Quebec not revolting during that time.

Where I think there are immediate lessons we can pick up is in the structures of governance; they also become crucial when we look at Upper and Lower Canada in the 19th century and, also, latter on in the other colonies that become Dominions. The evolution of socio-political thinking around governance in the 19th century, at least in Britain and the Empire, is truly fascinating - a model that really fits the currently trendy phrase of "Think Globally, Act Locally".

Part of the reason why I like to go back to the American Revolution / War of Independance is that it is one of the earliest and, in some ways, a prototype for, later revolutionary movements. We can see, at least in seed form, many of the later developments that, strangely enough, we are still struggling with: mass produced, local media (aka cheap printing presses), guerilla warfare, terrorist tactics (on all sides), and perhaps most importantly, the key to winning the conflict - it's centre of gravity - lying outside the theatre of operations (London and, to a lesser extent, Paris - shades of the Cold War!).

So, let me toss out a question.... In terms of SFA/FID operations, how would people classify (or conceive of) the French activities in that war?

Bob's World

05-24-2009, 06:20 PM

Hi Folks,

Sorry for the delay in responding, but the past couple od days have been nuts!

Rob, I think you're right that the Hessians where not SFA per se, although if I remember correctly (the book I got this from years ago isn't available), they were involved in some training or, at least, cadre activities for Loyalist militia units.

Bob's World made an interesting point:

Just as a matter of historical fact, the King couldn't do this.... at least in practice; this was a matter for Parliament. On the issue of 2nd (or 3rd!) class citizens, you are pretty much correct, but I'm not sure how important that actually was. A ket emotional motivator, surely, but a primary cause? Hmmm, I don't think so. BTW, the reason why I say that is that there is the rather complex example of Quebec not revolting during that time.

Where I think there are immediate lessons we can pick up is in the structures of governance; they also become crucial when we look at Upper and Lower Canada in the 19th century and, also, latter on in the other colonies that become Dominions. The evolution of socio-political thinking around governance in the 19th century, at least in Britain and the Empire, is truly fascinating - a model that really fits the currently trendy phrase of "Think Globally, Act Locally".

Part of the reason why I like to go back to the American Revolution / War of Independance is that it is one of the earliest and, in some ways, a prototype for, later revolutionary movements. We can see, at least in seed form, many of the later developments that, strangely enough, we are still struggling with: mass produced, local media (aka cheap printing presses), guerilla warfare, terrorist tactics (on all sides), and perhaps most importantly, the key to winning the conflict - it's centre of gravity - lying outside the theatre of operations (London and, to a lesser extent, Paris - shades of the Cold War!).

So, let me toss out a question.... In terms of SFA/FID operations, how would people classify (or conceive of) the French activities in that war?

Marc we have a similar understanding, but coming from different perspectives draw different conclusions.

As to the French and British, clearly the American Revolution was a side show, an opportunity for the French to seek an advantage in their long competition with England. If London or Paris were a COG, it would only have been so for France or England, certainly not for the Colonists. Important in that, as I say, soldiers do not start or end wars, merely fight them. Is the peace process then a COG? No, not a source of all strength and power. More a critical requirement. You need that treaty to "end" the conflict, but not a COG.

As to the French role. Neither FID nor SFA. If anything it was UW. The American populace broke into two camps: Loyalists and Rebels. He who is the current legitimate government and works with the loyalist populace is conducting FID/SFA. He who is the outsider seeking to influence the revolution to support his own selfish ends is conducting UW. France conducted UW. England conducted FID/SFA.

Ken White

05-24-2009, 06:56 PM

As to the French role. Neither FID nor SFA.Agree...
...If anything it was UW.Hmm. This doesn't look like any UW force I've encountered, (LINK) (http://www.nps.gov/york/historyculture/french-units-at-yorktown.htm).

Nor do these guys look like Go-rillas...

Bob's World

05-24-2009, 07:00 PM

Well, like I said, "if anything, it was UW" Actually a mix of UW and plain old surrogate warfare, as is often the case.

Did you take that photo yourself?? :-)

Ken White

05-24-2009, 07:34 PM

Did you take that photo yourself?? :-)will get you for that... :D

jmm99

05-24-2009, 08:12 PM

have a Bud Light (I'll join you virtually with a Bud high-test) - and reconsider the following statement in terms of the legal relationships (yup, I'm asking you to put on your lawyer's coif and put the green one in an honored position next to the Bud Light):

from BW
As to the French role. Neither FID nor SFA. If anything it was UW. The American populace broke into two camps: Loyalists and Rebels. He who is the current legitimate government and works with the loyalist populace is conducting FID/SFA. He who is the outsider seeking to influence the revolution to support his own selfish ends is conducting UW. France conducted UW. England conducted FID/SFA.

Consider:

1. Legal relationship between the British Crown and the Loyalist Colonists (whose pre-rev governments still existed, albeit with some in exile) - as viewed by the British Crown and the Loyalist Colonists.

2. Legal relationship between the French Crown and the Continental Congress (starting with our beloved Declaration of Independence - although you and I have different takes on its present uses; but more importantly, the relationship after the Battle of Saratoga) - as viewed by the French Crown and the Continental Congress.

After some consideration of the above, you should conclude that Ken is closer to the mark than you are. In short, you can have two conflicting, but valid, legal (and political) views driving an armed conflict.

I am in the process of reading (half-way through; and subject to many side-tracks) George O. Trevelyan, The American Revolution (1899; yes, the last year of the 1800s), which presents the Brit legal and political views of that conflict (biased toward the Whigs, e.g., Burke & Fox); as well as the Loyalist and Rebel views. Great insight (IMO).

The bottom line, with relevance to this thread, is that, where law and politics for each side are based on entirely different constructs, their operational plans will also differ. CvC, methinks. In short, each side will be fighting a different war within the same armed conflict.

A full-spectrum planner would, in an ideal world, say: OK, here is our plan (version 1) based on our legal and political constructs and taking into account our operational capabilities. But, here is their likely plan based on their legal and political constructs and taking into account their operational capabilities. So, to meet their challenge, we have to adapt our plan (version 2; etc., what will they then do ?). Final question (version Nx) - Can we do that and still achieve our legal and political end goals ?

So far (still only half there), Trevelyan suggests that George III and his ministers never got beyond version 1.

BTW: interesting trivia from Trevelyan - did you all know that many of the Brit generals in the Revolutionary War were also MPs ?

Old Eagle

05-24-2009, 08:49 PM

BW, the quintessential SF dude is correct about French conducting UW. However, the current defn of SFA as outlined in Army FM 3-07 allows for SFA (organizing, training, equipping, rebuilding and advising) to support both FID and UW operations, as well as a host of others. In the US Army context, UW is most likely conducted by SF, while FID and other missions involving SFA components can be conducted by either SF or GPF, or both.

Bob's World

05-24-2009, 09:02 PM

"quintessential" I like that.

still chuckling over Ken taking that picture though...

Actually, to expand, the Brits were also conducting COIN against the rebels and (yes, this is not new) "hybrid and Irregular warfare" as they executed capture/kill operations in the Carolinas against the militia; regular conventional ops against the Continental Army; and a little UW themselves west of the mountains as they leveraged the natives to make life tough on guys like George Rogers Clark and D. Boone.

It gets confusing. It gets real confusing if everyone is working off of 5 different definitions for the same named operation. But, at the heart of it, remains two very simple concepts:

1. Good/poor governance: A perception on behalf of a significant segment of the populace that the government is both failed, AND that they have no legitimate means of recourse.

2. Legitmacy: The government that exists must be percieved as legitimate by the governed, and they must recognize the source of legitimacy. If at some point they no longer recognize the source of legimacy, they will attack that source as part of their insurgency.

And lastly, ALL populaces and ALL governances are engaged in this little dance every day everywhere. There is no end, and there is no beginning. Usually it is peaceful, sometimes it gets violent. Its just basic human dynamics once you bundle us up into groups. Don't get so wrapped up in the facts or pursuit of "knowledge" that you never get past the facts down to the heart of the matter at "understanding." "Effectiveness" of governance is for bureaucrats and ametuers; don't get distracted by it.

Intel guys and Generals like Knowledge. I prefere understanding.

Ken White

05-24-2009, 09:03 PM

Tom Odom

05-25-2009, 07:23 AM

Well, like I said, "if anything, it was UW" Actually a mix of UW and plain old surrogate warfare, as is often the case.

Did you take that photo yourself?? :-)

No, he painted pictures on a cave wall...:eek:

Bob's World

05-25-2009, 12:54 PM

or we'll get nothing done... :D

Not buying UW by the French in the American Revolution; There was nothing remotely unconventional about their entry, motives or operations. All boringly conventional. Surrogate warfare I'll accept -- though one could even quibble about that on the basis of who cajoled who to do what... :wry:

More importantly, as JMM noted:Certainly applied to the Revolution but it has also applied to most of our wars. Most of which we got right.

Until the Department of Defense was created... ;)

"unconventional warfare" does not mean you dress like rambo and conduct raids from some camp deep in the swamp or jungle. It may mean you wear a $2000 suit, work in a highrise, and pick up the phone and call Fort Bragg and say : "Go see if you can get the populace of country x to make life difficult for their government."

In other words, the organization conducting UW (the French in the American Revolution with the Rebels, or the British in the American Revolution with the Indians, or the Americans in GWOT with the Northern Alliance, etc) may act VERY conventionally themselves, as may the force they are manipulating to serve their mutual objectives.

The "unconventional" part is getting the other guy to do your dirty work for you. When we say that SF conducts UW, it means that we are the middlemen between that guy in the suit and that foreign populace facilitating the transaction.

marct

05-25-2009, 02:01 PM

Hi JMM,

The bottom line, with relevance to this thread, is that, where law and politics for each side are based on entirely different constructs, their operational plans will also differ. CvC, methinks. In short, each side will be fighting a different war within the same armed conflict.

A full-spectrum planner would, in an ideal world, say: OK, here is our plan (version 1) based on our legal and political constructs and taking into account our operational capabilities. But, here is their likely plan based on their legal and political constructs and taking into account their operational capabilities. So, to meet their challenge, we have to adapt our plan (version 2; etc., what will they then do ?). Final question (version Nx) - Can we do that and still achieve our legal and political end goals ?

I knew I could count on you for this :D! Let me also note that there is one other legal fly in the ointment - the Iroquois Confederacy - which had been recognized as a sovereign state by the British via the Covenant Chain series of treaties (Hey, as a descendant of William Johnson, what else would you expect me to add ;)).

In all seriousness, however, there are two crucial points here. First, the one made by JMM that one can have equally valid and conflicting legal constructs (with operational implications) in a conflict. Second, and this wasn't mentioned per se, that the terms being used - FID, SFA, UW, etc. - actually rely on those legal constructs.

jmm99

05-25-2009, 02:23 PM

"5.1 France and Great Britain on the Eve of American Independence (http://www.hudsonrivervalley.net/AMERICANBOOK/PDF/R2.pdf)" - at the end, but it did start that way with Beaumarchais and the trading company of Roderigue Hortalez & Co (the $2000 suit folks).

But then came Saratoga and French recognition of the new nation-state and its government:

The Continental Army put Beaumarchais' supplies to good use. The defeat of General Johnny Burgoyne and his army on October 17, 1777, to Horatio Gates at Saratoga, was a major turning point in the American Revolutionary War. It was won by American soldiers, even if 90% of the gunpowder used had been supplied by and paid for by France, and was used in French M 1763-66 pattern (Charleville) muskets, which by then had become standard in the Continental Army. The victory at Saratoga proved to the French that the American rebellion could be sustained with a possibility of success.

News of Burgoyne's capitulation reached Paris in the evening of December 4, 1777; on the 17th Vergennes promised to recognize the independence of the Thirteen Colonies, with or without Spanish support. On January 30, the king authorized the Secrétaire du Conseil d'Etat Conrad Alexandre Gérard to sign the Treaty of Amity and Commerce and a secret Treaty of Alliance on his behalf. On February 6, 1778,Gérard carried out the order and Deane, Franklin, and Lee signed for the United States.

By these treaties, France offered "to maintain … the liberty, sovereignty, and independence" of the United States in case of war between her and Great Britain. France promised to fight on until the independence of the United States was guaranteed in a peace treaty. All the United States had to do in exchange was not "conclude either truce or peace with Great Britain without the formal consent of the other first obtained.

Not unlike Astan (USSR 1979- & US 2001-) in these respects: UW > new govt > CW. The last type of warfare turned out rather badly for the Sovs.

And looking back, by the time the French assistance, whether conventional or unconventional, had ended, France had spent livres 1,000,000,000; and was on its way to bankruptcy and the French Revolution (hmm ... similar to the USSR).

Are there some lessons for today ?

Final thought:

Since it is Memorial Day, we might want to remember the French sailors and soldiers, whether conventional or unconventional, who made the difference at Yorktown. All in the same boat together - colonialement. :)

(from above link)

From Yorktown's ruins, ranked and still,
Two lines stretch far o'er vale and hill:
Who curbs his steed at head of one?
Hark! The low murmur: WASHINGTON!

Who bends his keen approving glance
Where down the gorgeous line of France
Shine knightly star and plume of snow?
Thou too art victor, ROCHAMBEAU!

John Greenleaf Whittier

PS: Tyrrell, somewhere (in looking at my wife's genealogy), I have William Johnson as part of the Ulster Shane O'Neills (Shane = John). If you have anything on that, drop me a PM. And, BTW, my ancestor Nick (Aubry dit Francoeur) also squared off against Johnson's troops in 1755 - Baron Dieskau's Defeat at Lake George. You won that one; but we took the Windmill.

slapout9

05-25-2009, 02:56 PM

It may mean you wear a $2000 suit, work in a highrise, and pick up the phone and call Fort Bragg and say : "Go see if you can get the populace of country x to make life difficult for their government."

That is SBW (Slapout Based Warfare);)

jmm99

05-25-2009, 03:53 PM

from Slap
That is SBW (Slapout Based Warfare)

in some cases (e.g., Guatamala 1954), civilian agency based warfare (if you want to call disinformation and destablization "warfare"). BTW: Beaumarchais and the trading company of Roderigue Hortalez & Co were civilian.

Slap, in hindsight, if you were Louis XVI, would you have made that phone call ?

Long-term negative blowback from short-term operational success.

jmm99

05-25-2009, 04:43 PM

Here we have a listing (more focused on upstate NY, but including other NY units, with brief mention of units from other states) of: NY Frontier Loyalists (http://www.nyhistory.net/~drums/kingsmen.htm); Downstate Loyalists (http://www.nyhistory.net/~drums/kingsmen_02.htm); and Other Loyalists (http://www.nyhistory.net/~drums/kingsmen_03.htm).

Note that, for the much greater part, these were authorized units (that is, regular units within the Laws of War of that time, and probably still today) - soldiers of the Crown serving their King as British citizens.

Certainly, the RW was more a civil war than anything else, as you can see by following the various links here (http://www.nyhistory.net/~drums/dwellers.htm) (including Tyrrell's ancestor), and here (http://www.nyhistory.net/~drums/index.html).

PS: The source of much US Ranger (SOF) mythology is the unit known as Rogers' Rangers of the French & Indian War. What is not generally well known (see in link "Other Loyalists") is that the RW Queen's Rangers was a regiment originally raised on August 16, 1776 by the same Robert Rogers.

Command passed from Rogers to Lt. Col. Christopher French in 1777, followed by Major James Wemyss of the 40th Regiment of Foot, who was wounded at Germantown. The Queen's Rangers achieved its greatest fame (or notoriety, depending on your viewpoint) under the leadership of John Graves Simcoe, first Lieutenant-Governor of Upper Canada. Simcoe took command of the Rangers on October 15, 1777.
...
The unit was later placed on the Regular British rolls as part of the "American Establishment" in May 1779 and renumbered as the First American Regiment.

The Queen's Rangers were stationed in New York until sent to Charlestown in April 1780, returning to New York in June. The Rangers returned to south in December as part of Arnold's expedition to Virginia. After this they became part of Cornwallis' army, eventually surrendering at Yorktown.

and from Wiki (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rogers'_Rangers):

At the outbreak of the American Revolution at Lexington and Concord, former Rangers were among the Minutemen firing at the British. After these events, Robert Rogers offered his help to the commander of the Colonial Army, George Washington. Washington refused, fearing that Rogers was a spy because Rogers had just returned from a long stay in England. Rogers was infuriated by this and did indeed join the British--forming the Queen's Rangers (1776) and later the King's Rangers.

So, should we look at Rogers via British law and politics (a patriot), or via American law and politics (a traitor) - or should we simply ignore law and politics, as some might suggest ?

slapout9

05-25-2009, 05:06 PM

Slap, in hindsight, if you were Louis XVI, would you have made that phone call ?

jmm99,
No, because the situation was to unstable to take the risk. But that is based on hindsight. Plus everything is a system to me. I don't care if they have uniforms or don't. I look at the effect being achieved, if they perform the functions of a soldier that is all I need to know.

Wilf is right when he says we have to many words for what are essentially Infantry operations actually EBO (Effects Based Operations) to me. Just my opinion, which is why I push systems thinking, makes things a lot simpler and clearer.

Rob Thornton

05-25-2009, 05:18 PM

Originally Posted by jmm99

The bottom line, with relevance to this thread, is that, where law and politics for each side are based on entirely different constructs, their operational plans will also differ. CvC, methinks. In short, each side will be fighting a different war within the same armed conflict.

A full-spectrum planner would, in an ideal world, say: OK, here is our plan (version 1) based on our legal and political constructs and taking into account our operational capabilities. But, here is their likely plan based on their legal and political constructs and taking into account their operational capabilities. So, to meet their challenge, we have to adapt our plan (version 2; etc., what will they then do ?). Final question (version Nx) - Can we do that and still achieve our legal and political end goals ?

I think this is what design can do for you. It does not mean that it will, it just means that as a investigative, learning tool , design can help you more accurately identify points of friction, convergent and divergent points, tolerance levels, etc.

JMM's point about the world of full spectrum planner and in an ideal world is a good one. The GIGO model is a good place to start as what you learn often depends on the knowledge that you been begin with - this is an area we could probably do better in if we cultivated multiple form of engagement that could feed a learning model vs. the natural types of compartmentalization we seem to enforce. However, there is also the issue of the willingness to learn and acknowledge natural bias - this is no small cultural issue as often the desire and pressure to just do something often overrule better judgment -e.g. just because we can does not mean we should.

The last question JMM asks is the reality of policy. Many times the policy requirements (CvC - the attraction to the object in view) are so great as to be immediate. Some of this I think is what we often call surprise, but may just as often be willful ignorance in that either we did not believe what we were seeing, or that we disregarded the evidence in favor of predisposition. Ken has made the point in many other threads about the poor decisions ref. US AID and USIS. I bring this up because of the discussion on other threads about "networks of networks" - multiple organizations doing multiple things on multiple levels touch different networks and can thicken them. Provided the information is analyzed for relevance to strategic (and operational if an operation is underway) questions, the ability to shape the conditions may be greater then if we wait to the point where its a contingency and positions are hardened (Means + Will = Resistance).

Also Marc T - who was Laura Secord?

jmm99

05-25-2009, 05:24 PM

from Slap
No, because the situation was to unstable to take the risk. But that is based on hindsight.

agreed on this one - the "hindsight" point (where everything is 20-20 :)).

Serious question, how do you evaluate the systems (plural) in play during the RW ? And to what end result or results ?

I look at it as a lawyer and see at least two: British Crown (including the Loyalists) and the Rebel Americans (with France as a co-belligerent).

But, I'm not into systems analysis as a formal discipline. Thus, the question, which seems pertinent to that with what Rob started this thread.

Ken White

05-25-2009, 05:38 PM

"unconventional warfare" does not mean you dress like rambo and conduct raids from some camp deep in the swamp or jungle. It may mean you wear a $2000 suit, work in a highrise, and pick up the phone and call Fort Bragg and say : "Go see if you can get the populace of country x to make life difficult for their government."Boy, I sure wish I'd learned all that stuff somewhere...:rolleyes:
The "unconventional" part is getting the other guy to do your dirty work for you. When we say that SF conducts UW, it means that we are the middlemen between that guy in the suit and that foreign populace facilitating the transaction.Given the fact that I did the SF thing probably about the time you were born, good to know things haven't changed in that sphere. :D

I'll yet again point out that the issue to me is who got who to do what dirty work. As Tom says, I was painting that stuff on cave walls long ago -- and I distinctly recall that we in the form of Silas Deane and Ben Franklin conned -er, persuaded, Vergennes to convince a reluctant Louis and even more reluctant French Navy that even though there was a massive risk to France due to an already overburdened treasury the potential of an alliance of France, Spain and the new nation could offset British Naval superiority. An idea we had absolutely no intention of honoring.

So. Using your elastic definition was the UW practitioner France -- or the nascent US??? ;)

slapout9

05-25-2009, 05:47 PM

agreed on this one - the "hindsight" point (where everything is 20-20 :)).

Serious question, how do you evaluate the systems (plural) in play during the RW ? And to what end result or results ?

I look at it as a lawyer and see at least two: British Crown (including the Loyalists) and the Rebel Americans (with France as a co-belligerent).

But, I'm not into systems analysis as a formal discipline. Thus, the question, which seems pertinent to that with what Rob started this thread.

Have to go do my honey do list:) Will answer shortly.

Bob's World

05-25-2009, 06:02 PM

If I were to apply design to this particular problem set (not to SFA...that is just one potential solution or line of operation that I could shape to apply to some aspects of the larger problem once I had achieved a fuller understanding through the design process), I may well start by simply writing the three parties ID'd my JMM99 on a big whiteboard in a triange formation about 3' apart. Circle each.

Those three big circles could be connected by arrows running each way, with description of the nature of the enagement/perspective each way.

Then go ahead and Cluster around each node the key sub-parts, with their particular perspectives that made them unique. Attempt to connect these as well with the same identification of the perspectives/relationships on the lines. Key individuals and groups.

Then step back and look at it for a while and discuss it with your team. Not looking for solutions, just trying to gain an understanding of the dynamics at work.

Add environmentals. Economic, political, cultural, etc.

It's a journey. You add layers of information to your initial simple model increasing the complexity of data so that you can begin to work your way back to a simple, but far more accurate, understanding of the nature of the problem(s).

You may have began the drill with the mission of "prepare an SFA campaign build capacity and capability in the American security forces so that they can defeat the British and secure their independence."

By the time you have worked through the design process you may well have determined that such capacity is not the missing ingredient at all, and in fact a very different action of policy or perhaps a military action, etc is actually what will achieve your intended purpose.

Our problem is we're like a mechanic who fixed an engine using three particular wrenches, they aren't doing the job on a couple of cars that just came into the lot. Someone said "have you tried this new SFA wrench? It looks just like the FID wrench your holding there, but its very different and sure to work." So you get all excited and go back to wrenching away at the engine now with this new tool worked into the mix.

The purpose of design isn't to figure out how to apply a particular wrench, it is to understand the complex internal workings and relationships that make up a fully functional vehicle. May turn out it just needs gas.

But I would recommend strongly against simply dragging the driver out of the vehicle and jumping in with the guys family and driving off. No matter how poor of a driver he may have been, or how poorly he may of been maintaining the vehicle such actions are rarely appreciated and sure to produce unintended difficulties...

jmm99

05-25-2009, 06:09 PM

the posts are moving so fast today it's hard to keep up.

Good point on bias, perception, etc., and:

Some of this I think is what we often call surprise, but may just as often be willful ignorance in that either we did not believe what we were seeing, or that we disregarded the evidence in favor of predisposition.

Recently, Ken and I had a little sidebar re: Chinese POWs in Korea (late Oct 1950) and FECOM C2's refusal to recognize the threat they posed. Knew I'd seen the story before; and lo and behold, in Fehrenbach's This Kind of War (p.315) is a Wide World photo (7 Nov 1950) of Ned Almond (Ken's Corps CO) talking to one of them, big as life (actually, the Chicom is pretty small). Almond knew they were Chinese; but Willloughby disregarded reality in favor of the dogmatic perception of Tokyo HQ.

Agreed, it usually is not that clear; and your job (to something I can relate) is like a hot day on a 200 yd bench rest range where the scope picture looks more like a fishbowl of roiling water.

------------------------
Hey, as to Laura Secord, here's a Wiki (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Laura_Secord). She illustrates a point about civil wars - and probably relevant to Astan. Laura's husband James (officer in Loyalist Butler's Rangers) was a relative (distant cousin) of my wife's ggg-grandmother. The Secor (Secord; originally Sicard) family was of French Huguenot ancestry (Ambrose Sicard coming to NY in the 1600s). During the RW, the family split into Loyalists (James, etc.), Neutralists and Rebels (my wife's side). New York was a mess of conflicting people.

I don't know where you put all that into a plan. Hire a Pashtun genealogist, I suppose. :)

Tis a complicated world you have to plan for. We do appreciate it (which is why we sent you and pay you the big bucks ::D).

Bob's World

05-25-2009, 06:19 PM

Boy, I sure wish I'd learned all that stuff somewhere...:rolleyes:Given the fact that I did the SF thing probably about the time you were born, good to know things haven't changed in that sphere. :D

I'll yet again point out that the issue to me is who got who to do what dirty work. As Tom says, I was painting that stuff on cave walls long ago -- and I distinctly recall that we in the form of Silas Deane and Ben Franklin conned -er, persuaded, Vergennes to convince a reluctant Louis and even more reluctant French Navy that even though there was a massive risk to France due to an already overburdened treasury the potential of an alliance of France, Spain and the new nation could offset British Naval superiority. An idea we had absolutely no intention of honoring.

So. Using your elastic definition was the UW practitioner France -- or the nascent US??? ;)

I started off with a reply to you, then switched gears into a tutorial for the broader SWJ audiance. Realized it looked like I was preaching to the choir, but certainly wasn't the intent. Doing pushup now....

As to your question though: Both. We absolutely wanted the French to renew their war with England so that England couldn't focus so much attention on us.

Goes back to mapping all this complexity out in the design process. A whole lot of time spent on understanding the problem saves a whole lot more time and energry pursuing sadly flawed COAs.

Back in the days before GPS I learned the hard way that spending at extra 5 minutes plotting my next move twice, and studying the map for the type of terrain and vegetation I was likely to encounter, looking for that creek or hardball road that would allow me to update my pacecount or varify azimuth, etc all saved me from potentially hours of frustration hunting for metal fence post in a dark patch of swamp 5 miles away. Yet I always saw other guys do a quick plot, ruck up and move out.

I also learned, that when you're lost in that swamp, its never too late to go back to your last known position, replot, and try again with a smarter approach.

jmm99

05-25-2009, 07:08 PM

sayeth the honorable Chinese gentleman: "It seems there may just be three independent constructs (of Initial Grand Strategy) in one armed conflict, with adaptations and changes to come. Obviously, a product of the inscrutable Western mind."

We should have Geoff Corn in this discussion (crediits there for the basic three ring intersection, which I keep using for stuff).

Who is screwing (conning, assisting) whom ? That is the question, sayeth the Bard.

jmm99

05-25-2009, 07:23 PM

from BW
Back in the days before GPS I learned the hard way that spending at extra 5 minutes plotting my next move twice, and studying the map for the type of terrain and vegetation I was likely to encounter, looking for that creek or hardball road that would allow me to update my pacecount or varify azimuth, etc all saved me from potentially hours of frustration hunting for metal fence post in a dark patch of swamp 5 miles away.

and it provided an opportunity to smoke a Camel (parental guidance - from my dad, love of maps & charts - and smoking Camels).

But, life is easier and no get lost by sticking to local swamps. But, if you have to go into a furriner swamp, then this makes sense:

I also learned, that when you're lost in that swamp, its never too late to go back to your last known position, replot, and try again with a smarter approach.

where I will stop - cuz a rant is about to gush forth about a few furriner swamps.

Rob Thornton

05-25-2009, 07:57 PM

Bob's World wrote:

Our problem is we're like a mechanic who fixed an engine using three particular wrenches, they aren't doing the job on a couple of cars that just came into the lot. Someone said "have you tried this new SFA wrench? It looks just like the FID wrench your holding there, but its very different and sure to work." So you get all excited and go back to wrenching away at the engine now with this new tool worked into the mix.

If it comes down to confusing FID with SFA ala wrenches, then I think we're missing the point. Recently some folks came up to participate in a BCBL experiment with the guidance " when someone says SFA you say FID", after we were done they understood that when FID is called for as a mission based on its definition - then call it FID. FID is still a very useful construct.

If we are going to use this analogy, then SFA might better be described as the range of sockets for building sustainable security forces capability and capacities with the missions and authorities as the wrench - and at least with respect to our policy objectives - the USG as the head mechanic. In this analogy - you may or may not own the garage, but you are sure to have to work on many types and makes of vehicles, and under a variety of conditions - as such SFA is about having the right tool(s) available at the right time. FID is still very relevant as a policy tool when the objectives and conditions require it as a mission - as such it might be considered in this analogy as the way the mechanic works on the car, or the end his work supports .

We may just have to agree to disagree - which is OK - ultimately the distinction matters far less then being able to fully meet the operational requirements in this area, and there is more preventing us from doing that then just terminology.

Best, Rob

PS- JMM - good stuff on Laura Secord - I got interested in her after I heard her story. The Canadian perspective on North American military history is one we don't get much of down here.

Ken White

05-25-2009, 08:31 PM

I started off with a reply to you, then switched gears into a tutorial for the broader SWJ audiance. Realized it looked like I was preaching to the choir, but certainly wasn't the intent.Us elder statespersons are s'posed to dispense all our hard earned wisdom... ;)
looking for that creek or hardball road that would allow me to update my pacecount or varify azimuth, etc all saved me from potentially hours of frustration hunting for metal fence post in a dark patch of swamp 5 miles away.Agree with all that save the pace count and azimuth -- never used the former and only very,very, rarely the latter. Study that map well enough and you don't need such marginal aids, the terrain will guide you. :D
I also learned, that when you're lost in that swamp, its never too late to go back to your last known position, replot, and try again with a smarter approach.Agreed. Time and politics permitting...

No on can ignore time constraints (real or imposed). You and I can ignore politics. Governments cannot.

Bob's World

05-25-2009, 09:35 PM

I guess we should bring this back to Rob's initial thoughts about the use of SFA in campaign design; and tie that up with the discussion about the American Revolution.

So, how could this tool of SFA helped England in successfully resolving the Separatist Movement in the American Colonies?? Would building the capacity and capability of the loyalist security forces have made a significant difference in the outcome of this whole affair?

My opinion? No. Because it is just one more approach designed to address the symptoms of insurgency.

The British Army didn't fail because it was incompetent; and certainly the American military did not prevail because it was competent either. At the end of the day the success or failure of the revolution was not really about either one.

A successful apporach would have had to address the express concerns of the Colonists; granting them not only full rights of citizenship, but also recognizing that due to their distance from the throne that they would not only require representation in Parliment from each colony; but that they having tasted freedom would require some degree of governmental atonomy separate from the King and parliment to decide over a body of laws that covered their day to day lives.

So, my cautionary close then is that while it is very true that one can't do much without security first; if one focuses on understanding and addressing the causal issues of poor governance first (most of which are intangible perceptions rather than physical issues of ineffectiveness), then you won't have nearly so many to secure against.

This is the real reason the Surge in Iraq had the effects it had, key segments of the populace were egaged and either felt their issues were addressed, or were assured that they were going to be addressed sufficiently so that they agreed to stop fighting the government to give it a chance to prove itself to them.

But like Ken says, were not politicians. And the cold hard fact is that insurgency happens when politicians fail, and insurgencies often turn into long drawn out uses of security forces to beat the popluace back into submission because those same politicians just don't have the moral courage to admit and address their failures.

(Ok, they also get bad advice from well intended intelligence communitiies that think in terms of "threats"; and from a conventional military community that is designed and trained to "defeat" those threats; so one can see how easy it is for everyone to slide down this slippery slope...)

slapout9

05-25-2009, 09:43 PM

slapout9

05-25-2009, 11:22 PM

Here goes. There is your system....the enemy system(s) and the system in which the conflict/event will take place. You should start with the largest system and work down. If you did this the security force I would support would be the INDIANS!!!

The 3 rings map is good, (ASCOPE or Warden;s Rings would have been better)I would have drawn a LARGER circle around all of them and start putting in what is already there(you would have found the Injuns this way). This is a common error to skip the largest system and get right down to the ops and tactics. But I have a 3x5 (really) card to follow on Grand Strategy to catch myself.

The problem started on step 4:eek: not the best place to begin. But I don't know how the Army does Design.

Burp....full of BBQ.:)

Rob Thornton

05-26-2009, 12:32 AM

Bob's World wrote:

My opinion? No. Because it is just one more approach designed to address the symptoms of insurgency.

Here we do agree. Building sustainable capabilities and capacities of foreign security forces that do not represent a legitimate authority by may buy you some time, but probably will not in itself resolve internal political problems.

Context Matters -

Although that may not have been your objective - I say may not because your objective may have nothing to do with defeating an insurgency - but may be in fact to offset a regional actor, disrupt transnational LOCs, create additional capacity in a partner. Once you increase sustainable capability and capacity it may get used in a number of ways, some you probably did not anticipate -here again design may help you look at the range of possible outcomes and even if the policy course is set, at least you will have a better idea of what might be on the horizon.

WRT to the design guide here - this case this was mostly a functional design, meaning that while it did lay out some elements of an operational approach, the details of what to do and why have to come from the hard work of doing a full blown operational design (this is where you inject context) complete with all the relevant LOEs.

Part of the reason I thought a focus on identifying the functional requirements was useful is because it helps you consider the organizational, environmental, and institutional requirements of the FSF to generate, employ and sustain. It seems we often get caught up in a "generate enough for us to employ" loop since it suits our immediate objectives while not looking at the long term requirements.

One of the things that does come to light using operational design for any LOE is the issue of contingent objectives - e.g. you get to points where its unlikely the next thing you want to accomplish in one LOE can occur until there is progress in another LOE -could be economics, could be politics or governance. Doing this ahead of time in an operational design would seem to support unity of effort across the USG and multinational partners.

This may be one of the reasons (there are others) we seem to be having a hard time meeting operational requirements in Iraq and Afghanistan where we are doing this on a large scale and by extension one where our internal political clock has such an impact. I'm not sure we fully understand this issue of contingent development in its operational context. In smaller operations where the footprint is small and largely flys under the domestic political radar (meaning its not threatening anyone's re-election), and where normal USG support has not been subject to the type of contingency where it is truncated or diminished to the point where we now feel compelled to act immediately - the issue of contingent development has more time to surface and be addressed. When it is a matter of the converse, such a misstep can result in a major set back that makes further development more difficult as both internal pressures compounded by enemy activity, and regional politics as well as our own domestic politics compound the issues.

Best, Rob

jmm99

05-26-2009, 01:19 AM

The Indians were:

1. not the largest system - lots of land over the mountains; but not that many Indians, and those divided into many bands - not even Pontiac and Tecumseh could put Humpty together for long.

2. not numerous at all east of the mountains, since the Chimoukimaanig ("long knives") had pretty much killed or driven most of them out.

3. mercurial as all get out - the French-Canadian Marines found them inconsistent allies, even if led by the officiers and sous-officiers who were part Indian.

Since the RW became widespread, I suppose you could consider large parts of the Earth as the larger surrounding circle.

But, I don't see where that addresses BW's comments:

So, how could this tool of SFA helped England in successfully resolving the Separatist Movement in the American Colonies?? Would building the capacity and capability of the loyalist security forces have made a significant difference in the outcome of this whole affair?

My opinion? No. Because it is just one more approach designed to address the symptoms of insurgency.

And, my gosh (and I'm sober) - I agree with COL Jones:

A successful approach would have had to address the express concerns of the Colonists; granting them not only full rights of citizenship, but also recognizing that due to their distance from the throne that they would not only require representation in Parliment from each colony; but that they having tasted freedom would require some degree of governmental autonomy separate from the King and parliment to decide over a body of laws that covered their day to day lives.

But, if that happened (and merging the commerces on an equal basis), what would have happened once the colonies developed as they did (plus having Canada) ? Move the capital to New York, I suppose.

There is a alternative history on the RW, except its foundation is a Burgoyne victory at Saratoga. Robert Sobel, For Want of a Nail (http://www.amazon.com/Want-Nail-Burgoyne-Greenhill-Paperback/dp/1853675040) - complete with extensive footnotes (as fictional as the story). Very imaginative.

Sgt. York is on - guess I'll watch it for the umpteenth time.

slapout9

05-26-2009, 01:28 AM

I am watching SWAT:)jmm99 The largest system is the geographic area and the people together. What did Ghandi fear and why did he support the UK in WW2....Hitler. Insurgency does not work against a ruthless op pent who will kill anybody and destroy anything to win. So if the King supported the Indians against the White Boy invaders he stood a good chance of winning. Not a guarantee but a good chance. The Indians if supported and advised had no qualms about killing anybody not wearing a Red coat and Burning anything not flying the Union Jack.

Bob's World

05-26-2009, 01:49 AM

Rob - "Bingo" that knowing what ones intended ends are is critical when determining what ways one will apply to achieve them. (Easy to say, much more difficult to actually do properly).

JMM - Just take a deep breath, it'll be ok. (Though agreeing with such an observation is the first step to entering Bob's World...really no going back once that happens!)

As to the Indians, gotta agree with JMM. Too few, to different. Their perspective on warfare was as different from ours as their perspective on land ownership was. The Brits worked that line of operation pretty hard, and it just didn't work. Certainly 1777 ("year of the bloody 7s") was a very difficult time for the hardy few who had crossed the mountains; but the draw of cheap land and opportunity was about to draw a mob of settlers that even the very real dangers of Indian attacks could not slow.

No, that war was started and lost in London. JMM is right too about his speculation about moving the Capital to NY. That, in fact, is probably the only COA that would have kept the new world under a British flag. Macciavelli would approve! One of his recommended COAs for how to hold a new principality is for the Prince to move to there.

slapout9

05-26-2009, 02:22 AM

BW, I always got in trouble for coloring outside the lines in school and I told them the crayons were to big for coloring those little bitty pictures they gave me.:D

When Rob sent me his PPT he told me it was functional so I thought the problem was to choose the best available force in the AO and then do the DLOPthing as SFA, which I still believe was the Indians.

The fighting style of the Indians was a plus in my mind not a minus so the numbers were not going to matter as much.

Step one at least in the Grand Strategy System would have been to answer the question of who is the most committed? England was not and really couldn't be. The war was more about economics and money(we developed our own Continental Script,currency) then anything. That was where any negotiated settlement would have had to have happened IMO.

marct

05-26-2009, 02:27 AM

Leave you guys alone for a bit and you run with it :D!

Honestly, I've often though the American Revolution should be used as a standard test case for pretty much any theory / model of insurgency used by the US. Partly, as Rob noted, 'cause you don't get too much of the Canadian side south of the border. But, more importantly, because it is a really nasty and really complex conflict that crosses so many of the neat little terminological boxes in use.

I think one of the key observations Rob made was

Building sustainable capabilities and capacities of foreign security forces that do not represent a legitimate authority by may buy you some time, but probably will not in itself resolve internal political problems.

But what, as JMM noted, was the source of legitimacy (hence the characterization as a civil war)? The RW was, for its time, as confusing, twisty, and complex as Iraq or Afghanistan is today. As for JMM's comment about hiring Pastun genealogists, it's already done :eek:!

Cheers,

Marc

ps. Rob, Laura Secord has also been appropriated by a really decent chocolate company!

jmm99

05-26-2009, 02:39 AM

populace-centric counter-insurgency ...

from Slap
Insurgency does not work against a ruthless op pent who will kill anybody and destroy anything to win. So if the King supported the Indians against the White Boy invaders he stood a good chance of winning. Not a guarantee but a good chance. The Indians if supported and advised had no qualms about killing anybody not wearing a Red coat and Burning anything not flying the Union Jack.

extermination - which is indeed a tried and true method.

Assuming all those Indians (we should check out the actual numbers) were united vs the "white boys", virtually all of the latter (Rebels, Neutralists and Loyalists) would probably have united against the Indians. At best, the King would have gained a wasteland - and a bunch of united Indians who would say: we can beat these guys ! Insurgency No 2 ! Hey, UBL said something like that after HE beat the SovComs.

The Brits did try to employ another group - the African-Americans, with varying results. That is another story - about the promises of the Declaration of Independence (believed by many whites to apply to blacks) being left by the wayside once the threat was over.

--------------------
Why Bob,

What a nice invitation to enter your world. I'll bring my wife and we will never think of leaving and going back.

slapout9

05-26-2009, 02:57 AM

Posted by jmm99

extermination - which is indeed a tried and true method.

Assuming all those Indians (we should check out the actual numbers) were united vs the "white boys", virtually all of the latter (Rebels, Neutralists and Loyalists) would probably have united against the Indians. At best, the King would have gained a wasteland - and a bunch of united Indians who would say: we can beat these guys ! Insurgency No 2 ! Hey, UBL said something like that after HE beat the SovComs.

The Brits did try to employ another group - the African-Americans, with varying results. That is another story - about the promises of the Declaration of Independence (believed by many whites to apply to blacks) being left by the wayside once the threat was over.

You very well could be right but, I thought it was the best SFA type option.

Rob Thornton

05-26-2009, 11:56 AM

Slap - probably worth me addressing the use of functional:

When Rob sent me his PPT he told me it was functional so I thought the problem was to choose the best available force in the AO and then do the DLOPthing as SFA, which I still believe was the Indians.

In this case functional only meant addressing the functional capabilities required to support the development of sustainable capability and capacity of a particular FSF to generate, employ and sustain given conditions and objectives. I tried to identify what key capabilities would be required such as the various types of teams while keeping their composition relative to their intended function.

What we often do is look to our existing menu first, then plug the available capabilities into the holes - the problem is we often have not done the work to determine the shape, size or depth of the hole and we wind up with a bad fit - hence the idea of "filling" a requirement vs. "fully meeting" requirement.

This functional design does not mean you that you will be able to fully meet the requirement - it would be nice, but those capabilities may be committed elsewhere, not resident in sufficient capacity in your force(s), or simply not an option. However the functional requirement does not go away, and knowing where you have or have not fully met the requirement allows you to know where you are accepting risk, and put measures in place to either mitigate or watch it more closely so if need be you can reallocate resources.

It is also useful I think in looking further out and beginning a conversation with those who generate capabilities to identify when and how much of a discreet capability you may require so it can be developed in a holistic way and accounted for across the DOTMLPF and policy. In an era of thousands of individual replacements in theater doing a myriad of tasks that were not anticipated in a manner that allowed them to be generated as capabilities matched to functional requirements, I think a functional breakdown of the capabilities required to enable a chosen operational approach could help us both reduce the risk to the policy objective and retain balance in our capability generator.

So the function is not really in terms of you picking the right potential FSF to achieve your objective (in the case of the functional design .ppt), but in terms of matching the required capabilities on your end to develop sustainable capability and capacity in the partner FSF. Now - in an operational design if your end were to prevent the American colonies from gaining an independent state you might have a LOE where you were looking for a partner FSF - and in this case you might rest upon (some of) the indigenous tribes of North America and support the development of capability and capacity in their FSF. But... back to the law of unintended consequences - you better have your ends firmly in mind because as stated, once you develop those sustainable capabilities and capacities they may be used in ways you did not anticipate to ends which run counter to your own.

This is I think one of the values in an operational design in that it helps identify a range of possible outcomes, and where interests converge and diverge. From my read of history neither side was ever really interested in getting past the generate and employ functions wrt the indigenous N. American tribes to be used to support their own ends. To do so would not have supported their own ends - this is something I think many indigenous leaders figured out in due time and as such only bought into the bargain as far it supported some of their own immediate ends.

This brings us back to one of Marc's issues with the lack of a grand strategy - I think you have to balance your desire for an immediate solution to your problem with the needs of your partner's in order to create a broader overlap of what is tolerable and why. What you are looking for ultimately is something more sustainable with less costs so that it goes back under the domestic political radar. Unfortunately, this means often going slower or making a better investment up front so that you don't have to go back and re-do something you did inadequately or poorly under pressure to get things moving (or pressure to reduce risk in other areas). This goes back to one of my original comments that the road to efficiency is through being effective.

Where functional design supports this is by identifying what right and "right sized" capabilities are needed to meet operational requirements based on conditions and objectives. Unfortunately, we tend to gravitate toward addressing the pressures we perceive as the immediate ones and "satisfice" with sub-optimal capabilities without fully understanding what risks that creates to the policy objective, or to the capability generator as a result of indefinitely having to source ad hock capabilities until either we exhaust ourselves (again Thucydides provides a great example where the Athenians melted down their reserve in Athena's armor to coin talents), or lose our will - or wait for the situation to resolve itself.

Time to go get a run in - Best regards, Rob

slapout9

05-26-2009, 02:26 PM

Hi Rob, like I said if I get a big crayon I will color out of the lines. jmm99 asked what would I do as the King. Since Kings get pretty pissed off when their power is questioned...if he could find an indigenous force and support it through SFA process I thought that would be a good application of applying your functional assessment process and show that it might be feasible. By doing what you just listed in your above post. It was an example of how to use your very good systems maps to calculate the stuff and people required to do the mission.

Did not mean it to be a real world option....however thinking about it overnight and listening to some of the objections I am not so sure anymore. A lot of the objections were more assumptions especially since my objective would have been very simple train an indigenous force to do as much damage as possible (St. Carl do him damage in a general way). Deny the spoils of rebellion against the good king....maybe they would knock that stuff off and start being good little subjects of the crown.

Rob Thornton

05-26-2009, 03:45 PM

Slap - its all good - this is a good environment to tug on stuff.

I was thinking about it later this morning and considered that given we have quite a bit of historical information and analysis – could we look at a broader operational design from the British perspective? You’d have to start by identifying the problem correctly and lining it up against your desired ends. It would be interesting because it may lead you t o a better understanding of the range of outcomes, and the possible policy adjustments you might make to achieve the one closest to your own – not sure that is something King George would have wanted to hear, but it is still useful – and pragmatism is not without precedent.

It may in fact lead you to compromises that do not involve favoring indigenous populations over your colonists, but involve greater political and economic compromise, and then later greater cooperation with those former colonists in political, economic, and military matters – such special relationships are also not unheard of.

However, let us assume for a moment that the King’s object in view was irresistible and he was willing to faithfully establish a policy with the indigenous N. American tribes – what is on the table? Is it within the possible boundaries of those nations with contiguous contact with the colonies, or is it more broad and also with nations who are in contiguous contact with Canadian colonies – keeping in mind this is somewhat an arbitrary distinction given indigenous cultures, etc.

OK – so England’s campaign design calls for security LOE that requires the development of FSF (indigenous N. American tribes) capabilities and capacities to a point where they can both participate in operations with British and Loyalist forces, and ultimately where they can sustain those capabilities and capacities – e.g. generate, employ and sustain them.

You (as the King) decide to appoint a British TF under a general officer who has the right qualities, experiences, attributes and experience to work with the indigenous nations, and the Tories (as they will become you future legitimate Colonial security forces. You now have to go through your assessment methodology (organizational, operational environment, and institutional) and with the understanding that you are supporting the development of capability and capacity in a FSF that may not have much in common with your own requirements – you must bilaterally establish developmental objectives. Out of this you start to align how you are going to align your own efforts in terms of the developmental tasks of Organize, Train, Equip, Rebuild/Build and Advise to help them achieve those objectives. You are also going to have to consider how you may need to assist them by providing operational support (such as movement or basing) and tactical support such as artillery (BTW there is a good example of “assist) during employ in Robert Morgan’s bio on Boone where British cannon were employed to support indigenous force raids on KY settlements).

Ultimately (arguably concurrently) you have to also put in place the economic and political framework that secures your objective – this may mean restraining your colonies from westward expansion and violations of your other agreements with the various indigenous peoples, sustaining the new requirements of the indigenous FSFs who may not have the ability to sustain their new capabilities and capacities – but are veterans at employing them, or keeping in tune with new indigenous political leadership who may consider y9ur former arrangements as null based on their desires, or their understanding.

Ultimately you may decide that it is just not worth it, and would not prevent the inevitable anyway - and since you have other colonies, troubles on the continent and the perception that because you have little in common with the indigenous American tribes – it is better just to accommodate what colonists were asking for and avoid the additional uncertainty and expenditure. – and maybe you work to coopt the colonists into your overlapping tolerances.

So you could look at it in a number of different ways, much depends on how wedded you are to the objective.

Best, Rob

slapout9

05-26-2009, 04:12 PM

Ultimately you may decide that it is just not worth it, and would not prevent the inevitable anyway - and since you have other colonies, troubles on the continent and the perception that because you have little in common with the indigenous American tribes – it is better just to accommodate what colonists were asking for and avoid the additional uncertainty and expenditure. – and maybe you work to coopt the colonists into your overlapping tolerances.

Best, Rob

Point 1.What you just wrote is what I thought Step one of Grand Strategy should be. Using your excellent systems mapping methodology......sketching the external environment (AO) these factors would/could have become apparent. As opposed to just confining it to 3 rings. To start you have to map the system as it is! Then begin to map it as you want it to be and that becomes your plan if it proves feasible.

Point 2.Francis Marion-The Swamp Fox was one of Americas greatest guerrilla fighters during the Revolution and he fought like and with the Indians against the UK because they failed to co-opt them allowing the opportunity for the Colonists to do so. Some Green Beret stuff going on there:wry: So either way the indian indig population was a factor that would have had to have been dealt with and should appear someway somehow in the Design process whichever side you are on. At least that is my opinion.

jmm99

05-26-2009, 05:16 PM

we have to be careful not to mix levels here - I could see Slap and I were doing that yesterday. A picture speaks a 1000 words - so I attach my thoughts in one below.

Slap introduced me to Warden's rings (went back and searched for Slap's cite of what he considered the best article, which is linked here (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=38482&postcount=30)). From that, I took Figure 1 in the chart below.

Warden's rings are a targeting model; and so, they feed into the Operational Requirements ring of Geoff Corn's model (which is on the national policy level). LTC (ret.) Corn is now a law prof, but as a JAG officer was involved in high level military and international law issues, including developement of SROEs, etc.

I hope the following will clear up any confusion. The two models can be used together. For that matter, any operational model can be tied in at Corn's Operational Requirements level. So, also various models feeding into the Diplomacy, etc. ring and the Law ring. So, Corn's model is one way of looking at things if you're at the NSC-JCS level of planning.

slapout9

05-26-2009, 06:11 PM

Theme from The Swamp Fox.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NT-3V3Lv-so

slapout9

05-26-2009, 06:17 PM

jmm99

05-26-2009, 07:08 PM

Here are some quotes from the article you cited, "FUTURE ROLES OF AIR AND SPACE POWER IN COMBATTING TERRORISM" (1997), which is here (http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/acsc/97-0393.pdf).

From chap.1, Introduction

Design

The paper begins with a brief overview of US national policy to combat international terrorism and the Department of Defense (DOD) counterterrorism policy. It then applies Colonel John Warden’s system model to analyze a state-sponsored terrorist organization and identify its centers of gravity. Next, the paper discusses the current, traditional roles of air and space power in combatting terrorism, and divides them by phase of application. The paper concludes by suggesting future roles and applications of air and space power in the battle against terrorism, and recommends some areas for future study.

I read this as saying: We start with a national policy model (Corn's rings or some other model); and then, if we are in the Operational Requirements area (in Cornian terms), we develop a targeting model (Warden's rings or some other model). That model (once developed) feeds back into the national policy model (in Corn's model, into Operational Requirements) - where, if the targeting model is not rejected at gitgo, changes may or may not have to be made in the overall national policy model. So folks concerned with the other two of Corn's rings have to go out and check the various bases for their ring. They come back with yays, nays or need changes. And the process goes on..........

The article seems to employ that sequence:

Chapter 2 US Policies to Combat Terrorism

National Policy

Current US policy on countering international terrorism was first fully iterated in the Reagan Administration and has been reaffirmed by every president since. It follows three basic rules:

* The US will make no concessions to terrorists
* The US will treat terrorists as criminals and apply the rule of law
* The US will apply maximum pressure on state sponsors of terrorism

The Clinton Administration added a corollary to these rules: helping other governments improve their capabilities to combat terrorism. This is sometimes addressed as an example of US Government cooperation with other governments in an international effort to combat terrorism, while at other times it is included as a fourth rule of policy.

Chapter 3 Targeting a Terrorist Organization (from whence Figure 1).

Chapter 4 Current Roles of Air and Space Power in Combatting Terrorism

Chapter 5 Future Roles of Air and Space Power in Combatting Terrorism

Chapter 6 Conclusion

There is an effective response to terrorism: a coherent national strategy integrating all the instruments of power to combat terrorists and their sponsors. The US has this, but its effectiveness can be improved and the options available to the NCA expanded.

As a component of the military instrument, air and space power already contributes to our nation’s current counterterrorism capabilities by providing global mobility for special operations counterterrorist forces, air superiority to protect those forces, and precision strike capability to target terrorist infrastructures.... [continues on with their pitch]

The point being that Warden's rings are part of the Operational Requirements (the "military instrument" in these authors' words - i.e., part of military strategy, operations and tactics). Corn's rings are one way to illustrate "all the instruments of power". I like them. Others may have an even better graphic means of conveying the concept.

I can see how Warden's rings are used as a targeting model. I fail to see how they (at least in the form given in Figure 1) can be used to illustrate the interplay and necessary compromises at the national policy level (NSC-JCS).

slapout9

05-26-2009, 07:38 PM

I read this as saying: We start with a national policy model (Corn's rings or some other model); and then, if we are in the Operational Requirements area (in Cornian terms), we develop a targeting model (Warden's rings or some other model). That model (once developed) feeds back into the national policy model (in Corn's model, into Operational Requirements) - where, if the targeting model is not rejected at gitgo, changes may or may not have to be made in the overall national policy model. So folks concerned with the other two of Corn's rings have to go out and check the various bases for their ring. They come back with yays, nays or need changes. And the process goes on..........

The article seems to employ that sequence:

(NSC-JCS).

jmm99, you seem to understand it perfectly, so I am not really sure what your question is.:confused:

jmm99

05-26-2009, 08:44 PM

the Warden rings model is part of the Operational Requirements ring in the Cornian model (or for that matter in any national policy model including non-military inputs). Or, phrased another way, the Warden rings model is not intended to be a national policy model, but is intended to develop inputs into a segment of that model.

I think of the Corn model as including some very broad inputs. The "Law" ring includes many different people in many systems (e.g., you and me in the justice system), and various kinds of law. It could, without much problem, be expanded to include that part of our societal structure (many systems) which is evolutionary and which changes slowly. The "Diplomacy" ring encompasses more changeable aspects - subject more to the election cycles and political wind shifts.

You could use both models in the law enforcement context. The police models (for police strategy, operations and tactics) fit into Operational Requirements. There you could use the Warden model or anything else you wanted to use. The other two rings depend on the jurisdiction (e.g., State of Michigan, County of Houghton, City of Hancock), where the "Law" is fairly stable, but local politics (the "Diplomacy" ring) is often not.

A change in one ring probably requires changes in the other rings (clearly so where they intersect). E.g., today's decision in Montejo (http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/court-overruled-michigan-v-jackson/).

Court overrules Michigan v. Jackson
Tuesday, May 26th, 2009 10:09 am | Lyle Denniston
....
Splitting 5-4, the Supreme Court on Tuesday overruled its 23-year-old ruling in Michigan v. Jackson on the rights of a criminal suspect in police custody who has asked for a lawyer. The Court did so in Montejo v. Louisiana (07-1529), in an opinion written by Justice Antonin Scalia. ...
....
The Court had signaled in late March that it was considering overruling the Jackson decision, a decision designed to assure that the right to a lawyer is not lost during police questioning of a suspect they are holding, resulting in a confession to the crime. The Court ruled there [Michigan v. Jackson] that, once a suspect has claimed the right to a lawyer, any later waiver of that right during questioning would be invalid, unless the suspect initiated communcation with the officers.

Michigan v. Jackson, as an ironclad rule, seemed dumb to me. This moves the test more to a totality of circumstances approach - IMO a good thing.

Written opinion will probably come later today or tomorrow.

This change in the "Law" ring will require some changes in the Operational Requirements ring - and also in the "Diplomacy" ring (How will the local politicians handle it or spin it ?).

slapout9

05-26-2009, 08:55 PM

Bob's World

05-26-2009, 09:05 PM

JMM,

As a huge skeptic of models in general (more of a principles guy myself...), and of applying Air Force targeting strategy to anything that I don't want destroyed, here are my thoughts on these two models working together:

In the Warden rings I see a fair breakdown of who or what you need to be aware of/engage; but it does not offer any clues based on an understanding of the nature of the problem what the nature of that engagement should look like. In other words, you may go out and kill someone who you probably should have invited over for lunch; or you may develeop a lot of infrastructure that has little to do with the actual grievances (causation) of the particular populace you are working within.

Then I slide over to the other model, and if this is developed by a team that is very savvy on the nature of insurgency, versed in the local populace where they are engaging, and also supported by not just intel, but some really good polling; this could be the feeder that then suggests the "how" to feed the Warden model.

(My 15 minute analysis and writeup sitting in an airport, so grade me on a curve please. and no dinosaurs!) (No shot at Ken intended)

jmm99

05-26-2009, 09:06 PM

Will await your research.

Bob's World

05-26-2009, 09:33 PM

I think the BL is that there is a missing link. Something needs to feed in an understanding of both the local populace and any insurgent/terrorist networks (with their unique motivations addressed), and feed that into your targeting models so that you know what might work to achieve your ends. The Cornholes model would then provide your limits as to how far you could go without getting outside your legal authority.

The three would then work together. May turn out you need to ask for more authorities. (though my experience and study is that the more authority one has to act without constraints, the less likely they are to develop a successful COIN program). Or it may turn out you have authority to do far more than what actually needs to be done to be successful (less is always more for the intruding party - gotta avoid that damn Legitimacy monster.)

The COG-based targeting models for CT and COIN that I offered a few months back could work to provide this needed third input.

jmm99

05-26-2009, 09:46 PM

(but my wife is just a huggy-wuggy person, who for some strange and unfathomable reason likes airborne types)

Geoff Corn's graphic model is simply demonstrative evidence of some things that have to come together - puts a picture in your head, so that the principles do not become lost in verbosity.

Examples of his recent writings are:

Hamdan, Lebanon, and the Regulation of Armed Hostilities: The Need to Recognize a Hybrid Category of Armed Conflict (2006), download from here (http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=942070#).

Untying the Gordian Knot: A Proposal for Determining Applicability of the Laws of War to the War on Terror (2008), .pdf here (http://law.huji.ac.il/upload/Corn_Untying_the_Gordian_Knott.pdf).

Lots of principles discussed in those articles, as you wearing your lawyer's coif will appreciate.

He discusses the three ring diagram (p. 46) in the second article as follows (footnotes omitted):

ROE have become a key issue in modern warfare and a key component of mission planning for U.S. and many other armed forces. In preparation for military operations, the President and/or Secretary of Defense personally review and approve the ROE, ensuring they meet the nation’s military and political objectives. Ideally, ROE represent the confluence of three important factors: Operational Requirements, National Policy, and the Law of War. This is illustrated by the diagram below.

[diagram posted above]

It is particularly important to note while ROE are not coterminus with the laws of war, they must be completely consistent with the laws of war. In other words, while there are laws of war that do not affect a mission’s ROE, all ROE must comply with the law of war. This is illustrated by the diagram above, which reflects the common situation where the authority to use force provided by the ROE is more limited than required under the laws of war. ....

Both of you are aware that the illustration is an ideal model:

BW
Then I slide over to the other model, and if this is developed by a team that is very savvy on the nature of insurgency, versed in the local populace where they are engaging, and also supported by not just intel, but some really good polling; this could be the feeder that then suggests the "how" to feed the Warden model.

The practical question is where the feeds come from - one ring (as I am using the Cornian model) is military; the other two are civilian. Regardless of where the specifics (e.g., as in your illustration above) come from, the results must be consistent within the relevant intersection of the three input rings.

There is no magic to this construct - it is simply a visualization tool.

(Watch out for them velociraptors !) :D

-----------------------------

Assistant Professor of Law at South Texas College of Law. Prior to joining the faculty at South Texas, Mr. Corn served as the Special Assistant to the US Army Judge Advocate General for Law of War Matters, and Chief of the Law of War Branch, US Army Office of the Judge Advocate General International and Operational Law Division. Mr. Corn also served as a member of the US Army Judge Advocate General’ Corps from 1992 - 2004. Previously, he was a supervisory defense counsel for the Western United States; Chief of International Law for US Army Europe; and a Professor of International and National Security Law at the US Army Judge Advocate General’s School. Mr. Corn has served as an expert consultant to the Military Commission Defense team, and has published numerous articles in the field of national security law. He is a graduate of Hartwick College and the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, and earned his J.D., highest honors at George Washington University and his LL.M., distinguished graduate, at the Judge Advocate General’s School. He frequently lectures on law of war and national security law topics.

PS: BW - as to your second post, it's beginning to sound like the main inputs are into the Operational Requirements ring - although some of them could well come from the civilian rings; or from civilian agencies included in the OR ring. At some point, you could end up with a multi-dimensional Olympic Rings structure - in which result, the principles would be lost in graphic verbosity. As you well know, simple diagrams work best with juries (and judges for that matter).

Ken White

05-26-2009, 10:25 PM

(My 15 minute analysis and writeup sitting in an airport, so grade me on a curve please. and no dinosaurs!) (No shot at Ken intended)This dinosaur's * five minute analysis agrees totally with your fifteen minute analysis.
...The COG-based targeting models for CT and COIN that I offered a few months back could work to provide this needed third input.That, too...

* Motto: Proudly and happily Jurassic -- as I look at the mess you kids have made. ;)

Ken White

05-26-2009, 10:27 PM

(Watch out for them velociraptors !) :Drapture than raptors... :cool:

slapout9

05-26-2009, 11:33 PM

The Cornholes model

BW...the Cornholes Model? :eek: I don't know that one.

slapout9

05-26-2009, 11:45 PM

Here we go.

http://publications.campaignroom.com/Shared%20Documents/Prometheus%20Concept%20Summaries%20wCover.pdf

PDF pages 38 and 39 under Guiding Precepts and Rules of Engagement.

jmm99

05-27-2009, 02:59 AM

BUT then: "Up and away, junior birdmen ...." And a brawl ensues.

Well, no brawl here. I did read about Guiding Precepts and Rules of Engagement, which are introduced as follows:

Guiding Precepts

Concept Overview

Left to own devices, people will behave in remarkably different ways and what seems bizarre behavior to one person may appear quite normal and proper to another. If an organization wants to channel behavior in a certain way, it needs to be explicit about what behavior it wants. In other words, it needs to have Guiding Precepts. Guiding Precepts tell the people in an organization what they should and should not do and the reasons behind either. To get the highest level of acceptance and adherence, Guiding Precepts should be developed (or discussed extensively after the fact) in an Open Planning environment. For simplicity, you divide Guiding Precepts into two categories: Prime Directives and Rules of Engagement. The former are the very high level behaviors that an organization sees to be at its very core. Members will do whatever it takes to follow positive Prime Directives and face extreme censure if they violate those that are negative. Prime Directives help move people in the right direction and help keep them from moving in the wrong direction. They apply generally and are independent of time and place.

Rules of Engagement are similar to Prime Directives but are somewhat more flexible and may only apply to certain circumstances. They may also change over time as circumstances change as opposed to a Prime Directive which should not change unless the organization consciously decides to make major changes in its strategy to include its culture.

If Guiding Precepts are to be effective, everyone in an organization must know them and they must be enforced—either positively with rewards for positive precepts or with punishment of negative precepts.

I also searched through the document to see if either Prime Directives or ROEs were either developed by use of Warden rings, or whether they were incorporated into the Warden rings illustrations. I could find none.

What this article seems to say (to me) is something like this:

Highest Level: Guiding Precepts (incl. Prime Directives & Rules of Engagement)

Lower Level: Warden rings (and other targeting models, for that matter) - are part of the Operational Requirements (in my jargon used above) - which will be accepted only if they are consistent with the higher Guiding Precepts.

That's the way I read it. Now that I have both the 1997 and 2007 articles on this HD, I'll read them with more thought.

A thought on models. Before entering the legal racket, I did have a valid trade (in chemistry, where models are used for everything). BUT, chemists realize that models are at best approximations - and subject to constant updating (and perhaps discarding) because of new lessons learned. AND, that, models are very much subject to the GIGO rule.

-----------------------------
Rob has (for me) an interesting post here (#65 (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=72755&postcount=65)).

Georgie III actually did some "SFA" in the RW, using the still-existing structure of the CFM-Canada in the Great Lakes. By then, those remaining Canadian Marines (and their engagés) were the backbone of the fur trade. Similar activities took place among the Six Nations, both north and south of the St. Lawrence.

Might be worth a write-up; but this stuff is all over my genealogical-historical-SWC harddrive. If I do (which is no promise or threat), I'd do it as an attached file. Already have a lead character in mind - 1st cousin (as I calculate them) to the gal who married my ancestor Nick the Grenadier. Some historical "comparative SOF" might be fun.

------------------------

Not a war story from my dad, but from some WWII flick (Audie Murphy ?).

After he got out of the Paris and London hospitals, he was TDY'd to an 8AF-RAF base at Cardiff, Wales (where he stayed into 1946). So, he wore an 8AF patch on the left and a 30ID patch on the right ("combined arms" ;)). Had the greatest respect for the AAC and RAF guys who flew the bloody (literally) bombers.

BTW: Wilf, if you happen to read this, I DL'd Oliver's article and, so, read it more carefully. Dads. :)

slapout9

05-27-2009, 04:04 AM

jmm99, The rings are just one part of the entire strategy development process. Guiding precepts and ROE are a separate step under Design the future. You should have those before you get to Targeting because they will guide what you pick as targets and what and how you will try to affect them. Strike don't strike target lists, lethal vs. non lethal attacks.

The 5 rings model. According to the theory all systems have 5 rings.

1-Leadership
2-System Essentials (processes)
3-Infrastructure
4-Populations
5-Fielded Forces(action units)

The stuff(targets)that goes into each ring are supposed to be put in by you or whoever is doing the analysis and they will be different on each system being analyzed. There are no predetermined targets to go under each ring
unless you are dealing with identical systems. Example if I choose to target Corn's model (which I thought you were asking me about) I would put operational requirements under the Process ring. The Law and ROE would go under Infrastructure because it is a constant,dosen't change much so it provides a conceptual infrastructure as opposed to a physical one. Highways are physical infrastructure, rules of the road are conceptual infrastructure.

Further once Corn's targets were on the initial map I would do a fractal analysis with another 5 rings model until I got to a level where I could develop an action plan to affect the target in order to achieve my desired effect.

Make any since now?

jmm99

05-27-2009, 06:22 PM

from Slap
Example if I choose to target Corn's model (which I thought you were asking me about) .....

and I didn't even know it - stealth technology. :) OK, that makes the situation clearer. We are at war. ;)

Waging "war" on conceptuals (e.g., US Law, UK Law or Sharia Law, for that matter) is an interesting topic - about which, I'd expect all kinds of different views. Not sure where that fits into Rob's SFA stuff, though.

I do get the 2007 article you cited. I was viewing both concepts (Warden and Corn) from the viewpoint of the attacker - not the attackee.

marct

05-27-2009, 06:40 PM

Hi JMM,

Waging "war" on conceptuals (e.g., US Law, UK Law or Sharia Law, for that matter) is an interesting topic - about which, I'd expect all kinds of different views. Not sure where that fits into Rob's SFA stuff, though.

I think it gets right to the heart of the concept(s?) of "legitimacy" which is a major part of the SFA conceptual base. Just as one example, think about the concept of "Rule of Law" - Which law? Which legal system? Which fundamental postulates? "Law", as it is used in a lot of places, is held out as an absolute when it isn't one which, IMO, creates all sorts of problems in all sorts of areas.

One which pops to mind, and this is just jotting down the brain-fart before I rush off to sing a concert, is in how institutions of governmentality are viewed. For example, pre-~2004 FATA was "governed" by relying on tribal institutions of governance backed up by a threat of punitive expeditions. These institutions, however, were not recognized as "existing" by many Western governments which pushed the Pakistani Army into trying to extend governmentality to the region. Needless to say, the effort failed pretty miserably and, as part of the failure, the potentiality of the threat to mount punitive raids by the Pakistani Army has lost its relevance since they've been beaten several times.

slapout9

05-27-2009, 07:16 PM

and I didn't even know it - stealth technology. :) OK, that makes the situation clearer. We are at war. ;)

jmm99, No, and this is important..... Corn has been mapped and targeted...I could then figure out my Strategy to support the Corn model as well as destabilize it.

jmm99

05-27-2009, 08:27 PM

from Marc
"Law", as it is used in a lot of places, is held out as an absolute when it isn't one ......

No argument with that. What is interesting, I think, is how law permeates a society without the society thinking about it. Morning coffee and roll ordered, served and paid for - contract made and performed. Next stop at gas station; gas pumped and sandwich picked up for lunch; both paid for - contract made and performed. And so on through the day.

That is why "legitimacy" is such a tough topic - wiping away 100s of years of development (much of it informal) by substituting new formal rules looks like a very hard uphill slog to me.

Hey JMM, write a new constitution for Whatwackistan. Yeh, right.

--------------
OK, Slap, now that you've attacked me, show me how you'd defend me. Seriously.

slapout9

05-27-2009, 10:06 PM

--------------
OK, Slap, now that you've attacked me, show me how you'd defend me. Seriously.

Since I have colored all over Rob Thornton's thread and he probably want send me anymore good stuff because of that,maybe you should start a new thread and I will see what I can do. Sorry Rob:o

marct

05-28-2009, 12:42 AM

Hi JMM,

No argument with that. What is interesting, I think, is how law permeates a society without the society thinking about it. Morning coffee and roll ordered, served and paid for - contract made and performed. Next stop at gas station; gas pumped and sandwich picked up for lunch; both paid for - contract made and performed. And so on through the day.

Yup - it really is amazing. For me, one of the most fascinating things is the "slipperiness" of how "law" moves between custom and formalization, especially since the formalization is, in most cases, controlled by a very small group of people. It's interesting that you used contract examples, whereas I would use reciprocity examples; different relationships, but the same social function.

Back when I was doing the fieldwork for my doctorate (on the Career Transition industry), one of the things I noticed was the growing split between the formal / legal systems for getting a job and the informal, soon-to-be customary systems. A couple of days ago, I was chatting with the person running a bridging program for foreign trained engineers here in Ottawa, and she was telling me about one of her students who was having a reality shock: he had been offered a job and was only asked for his resume as an after though for the "HR dweebs".

That is why "legitimacy" is such a tough topic - wiping away 100s of years of development (much of it informal) by substituting new formal rules looks like a very hard uphill slog to me.

Hey JMM, write a new constitution for Whatwackistan. Yeh, right.

Hah! Not a problem, mon! Start with the Hittite legal code and go from there :D....

Rob Thornton

05-28-2009, 01:38 AM

Marc, JMM - just wanted to chime in and say I like the discussion on law. Wrt institutional development in places where there may be multiple legal codes, where one may be formal and another informal, and where one may hold more influence than another it has some significant implications.

Best, Rob

jmm99

05-28-2009, 03:09 AM

after reading certain articles, I can see why you are interested in the Code of the Nesilim (http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/ancient/1650nesilim.html).

The Hittite "recruiting station" is outlined here (actually makes some sense in a feudal land holding system, based on military tenure ):

40. If a soldier disappear, and a vassal arise and the vassal say, "This is my military holding, but this other one is my tenancy," and lay hands upon the fields of the soldier, he may both hold the military holding and perform the tenancy duties. If he refuse the military service, then he forfeits the vacant fields of the soldier. The men of the village shall cultivate them. If the king give a captive, they shall give the fields to him, and he becomes a soldier.

I'll let you write the constitution for Whatwackistan from the Hittite Code.

-----------------------------

Does anything like this exist today in Iraq or Astan ? Fight for the tribe & you get land (or whatever). That would seem a hard system to break. In a way, the Viet Minh did this via their land reform program (from 1946 on). For various reasons, the RVN did not fight fire with fire. The bulk of ARVN was peasant, who if they survived had little to look forward to. This actually is a SFA issue - non ?

marct

05-28-2009, 12:43 PM

after reading certain articles, I can see why you are interested in the Code of the Nesilim (http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/ancient/1650nesilim.html).

It does seem wonky on the face of it, but it makes a lot of sense. The Code itself was aimed at cracking the power of the Hittite lineage factions in the Old Kingdom as part of an effort to centralize governmental institutions.

I'll let you write the constitution for Whatwackistan from the Hittite Code.

Works for me, as long as YOU take on the task of "selling it" to the international community and USG :D!

Does anything like this exist today in Iraq or Astan ? Fight for the tribe & you get land (or whatever).

From my understanding, not as a direct, formal system - fighting for the lineage group (family, tribe, clan, whatever segment [and it varies significantly between Iraq and Astan]) is an expectation - a matter of customary "law", as is being able to access resources (including land) that are help by the lineage group. What the Hittite Code tried to do was to formalize it and abrogate the source of formal legitimation to the Crown and away from the lineage.... There are some similar proviso's in the 8th-9th century ce German codes as well.

Rob Thornton

05-28-2009, 01:26 PM

I know from the interviews we've done (such as the Reid Pixler interview in the Mosul Case study) that military and civilian lawyers are playing a role in reconstructing legal systems, and in supporting local processes, but as I read JMM and Marc's discussion, I'm thinking of the requirement differently wrt development.

This does not just get into design, but back into the threads on SFA as an individually based capability and into the Plan, Train and Organize (particularly the Organize piece).

I know Marc's interests and areas of specialty from conversing over multiple beers - his interests are diverse for sure:wry: JMM has expressed a range of relevant knowledge on law - but what I really find intriguing is the ability to apply it to multiple area. I did not expect the Code of the Nesilim to show up, in fact I did not know there was such a thing, but it is precisely the kind of conversation and knowledge I think you want coming out of the design process.

The link back to the other threads is that the ability to get the most out of design has a great deal to do with the caliber and knowledge of the people involved, the breadth of their combined knowledge and the ability and strength of the leadership to fully employ it. I'm not saying every design team needs to be fully staffed with all Marcs and JMMs - it might be resource prohibitive, however having one or two on the team would seem a worthy investment. What might be a balance between effectiveness and efficiency would be able to assemble talent outside of the immediate organization to form design teams relevant to the conditions and objectives.

I might also add we still have trouble remembering the swivels work on our office chairs, and that we still have issues with parochialism - e.g. the not invented here, and/or outside threat effects. When we start to think that somehow a problem or a solution is only the purview of a staff section or small part of the organization we begin to suffer from self-constrained thinking. It would seem we could adopt a best practice from the SWJ SWC.

Best, Rob

slapout9

05-28-2009, 01:42 PM

Link to newest issue of JFQ with article by Charles Dunlap on how Lawfare can be a decisive element in future wars. Rob, me, you and Lawvol had a similar discussion a while back about this very subject or something similar.

http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Press/jfq_pages/editions/i54/12.pdf

jmm99

05-28-2009, 07:32 PM

this post (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=72342&postcount=4) to MG Dunlap's 2001 article (which is more technical) and also to some other links to "Lawfare" articles. Also COL Newell's thesis, which I summed in this post (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?p=72579&highlight=newell#post72579), seems relevant.

------------------
The Hittites weren't that wonky - they had a realistic view of the facts of life:

191. If a free man picks up now this woman, now that one, now in this country, then in that country, there shall be no punishment if they came together sexually willingly.

Seriously, most of the Hittite Code involves the "Code of Personal Life", which is in place everywhere in one form or another (formal, informal or mixed). It's important to know the cousinage rules in the ME - I have for clients an Assyrian family. If the size of their present-day males is any indication of the size of the ancient Assyrians, I can see why they were feared soldiers. :)

---------------------
Personally, I think it is very important for there to be officers such as COL Newell, who are willing to dive into legal, moral & ethical issues themselves - and not leave it up to such as Marc and JMM (who might spend too much time drinking beer and talking about the Windmill ;) ). COL Newell noted that he spent a lot of time with a JAG officer discussing and arguing many of the points made in his thesis.

For such conversations to be meaningful, both participants have to have a knowledge of each other's specialities - a point also made by MG Dunlap ...

in 2001:

This essay critiques aspects of LOAC as currently practiced, but it is not meant to denigrate its fundamental importance. Americans would not be Americans if they waged war unconstrained by the ethical values LOAC represents. Rather, this paper is intended as a reminder that those interested in promoting law as an ameliorator of the misery of war are obliged to ensure it does not become bogged down with interpretations that are at odds with legitimate military concerns. LOAC must remain receptive to new developments, especially technological ones that can save lives – even if that means breaking old paradigms.

We also must have a better linkage between those knowledgeable of military affairs and those civilian specialists expert in LOAC. Only productive cooperation can achieve the critical mass necessary to sustain international law as a guiding element in military interventions. We should encourage other nations to develop a robust cadre of uniformed lawyers ready to provide insightful advice to commanders in the field. Finally, we must not allow thoughtless, ill-informed, and politically motivated accusations to trivialize LOAC’s fundamental principles. If it does, LOAC will lose its credibility with the very people – and the very nation - it most needs to make certain it is observed and, more importantly, preserved.

and in 2009:

Lawfare has become such an indelible feature of 21st-century conflicts that commanders dismiss it at their peril. Key leaders recognize this evolution. General James Jones, USMC (Ret.), the Nation’s new National Security Advisor, observed several years ago that the nature of war has changed. “It’s become very legalistic and very complex, ”he said, adding that now “you have to have a lawyer or a dozen.” Lawfare, of course, is about more than lawyers; it is about the rule of law and its relation to war.

and about regular soldiers who are willing and able to see law as a tool of their profession.

Bob's World

05-28-2009, 10:58 PM

and about regular soldiers who are willing and able to see law as a tool of their profession.

That it may be law that makes soldiers a usable tool...

Violence unconstrained by law (formal or informal, many "failed states" are functioning quite well within tribal law at a level our white eyes can't seem to appreciate) is chaos. Just violence (or the certain threat of it) constrained by law brings order.

jmm99

05-29-2009, 02:51 AM

from BW
That it may be law that makes soldiers a usable tool...

and my answer is that I hope not - my problem is with the word "makes".

Are you suggesting that law imposed on soldiers makes soldiers usable tools. My perception is that kind of externally-imposed constraint will fall away under stress - although I suppose if it is drilled in enough, it might well hold up under lots of stress (just as our ancestors stood line to line at 30 yards & fired musket volleys). I don't have a dogmatic stance.

My statement:

...and about regular soldiers who are willing and able to see law as a tool of their profession.

was made in the context of MG Dunlap's articles concerning "Lawfare" - use of law as a tool in operations.

-----------------------------

Your question (on violence and law) goes more to ethics & morality in war - reflected in part in the formal laws of war. And to a pool league nite discussion (a Todd-JMM discussion cuz of a Vietnam book he was reading), where the question was: what do you, as a newbie unit commander, do (if anything) about your unit (a boondocks unit) which takes ears to keep count. Discussion terminated without a brilliant doctrinal rule because we had to get up and play our 3 games. :)

marct

05-29-2009, 11:09 AM

Hi Guys,

Just back from chairing a session at the Canadian Political Science meetings - interesting one dealing with COIN and radicalization, and with some direct relevance to this thread.

I know from the interviews we've done (such as the Reid Pixler interview in the Mosul Case study) that military and civilian lawyers are playing a role in reconstructing legal systems, and in supporting local processes, but as I read JMM and Marc's discussion, I'm thinking of the requirement differently wrt development.

This does not just get into design, but back into the threads on SFA as an individually based capability and into the Plan, Train and Organize (particularly the Organize piece).

Agreed, Rob. I'm beginning to think we need a separate thread on the ontology of SFA (I know, John, you're running away :D). It strikes me, and this was really hammered home as I listened to a great paper by Colleen Bell today, that we have to do some serious thinking about the implications of our terminology. Okay, I was predisposed this way already, but I really do think it is crucial.

Back to the Marc - JMM discussion part, the key linguistic term there is really "rule of law". As we pulled out, the crucial questions are "Whose law?" and "What form(s) does it take?" which, in a round about manner, get's us back to Robs point about endstates as the starting point for design. We want to achieve an endstate with qualities X, Y and Z, then we design the SFA mission to achieve them. The critical danger, and actually where I see sierra disturbers like me playing a key role, is asking those questions.

Let me take an extremely pragmatic argument line on this (I don't necessarily believe it, but it is a decent rhetorical device). If the endstate in nation X that is desired is that it will not be a safe-haven for terrorist attacks on Western targets, the the crucial goal must be some form of agreement whereby if attacks are made, then the reprisal for those attacks will be more costly for the attackers that those commiting the reprisal.

This goal is defined by several factors. First, the absolute reality that there can never be a 100% "Terrorist Free" zone. Or, to be somewhat snarky and use a favorite meme, "the only things in life that are 100% are death and taxes". Second, given that a 100% terrorist free zone is impossible, what deterents are available that have the highest probability of operating? It strikes me that the best form of "community policing" (for want of a better term) is policing carried out by the community itself rather than by an externally imposed force.

Third, and this flows from the previous two points, if this is so, then the source of legitimacy within such forms of community policing must flow from the community themselves. Or, in other words, "how do we get them to stop wanting to kill us".

The corroloary, and this is where we get into things like the Hittite code, is that constructing a desire to not attack us and, indeed, to beat the snot out of people who want to attack us, relies on culturally specific logics. Let me give an example of this.

In Kilcullen's recent book, he talks a lot about "accidental guerillas" - people who are attacking co-alition forces who are locals, but who have not bought in to the Takfiri [psychotic] world view. Within his broader discussion, he deals with a number of different mechanisms which varying cultures have developed to stop conflicts - Shura's being one. These are systems of "customary law", i.e. they will bring community self-policing functions into play if their results are not accepted.

Now in Afghanistan and, to a lessor degree Iraq and other places (Somalia, Kenya, the Sudan, etc.), these customary law sites (actually rituals) have been degraded by years of conflict: the concepts may still be there, but they are assuming an almost "Golden Age" quality (much along the same lines as AQ's Caliphate....). We should be able to take the "best" of the old customary law systems and "tweak" them, putting some teeth back in them, but part of this "tweaking" would involve tying them in to some form of centralized source of legitimacy (which is what the Hittite Code was trying to do).

What, I can hear people asking, does this have to do with SFA? Well, part of it is that people engaged in SFA require not only those personal "qualities" - that individual capability that Rob talks about - but, also, require enough mental (and, dare I say it, "spiritual") flexibility to say "Hey, wouldn't work for me, but if it works for you, go for it...". Being blunt about it, it requires the ability to cut through not only the other cultures BS, but you own cultures BS. For me, this requirement was hammered home in the interview with COL Brackney in the Mosul Case Study:
There were some formal assessment tools that had come down through both the embassy office and the division that they would… I’m trying to think what the name was of the actual assessment tool, and I’ve got that image but it escapes me right now, but anyway, it was a very long form with all kinds of bubble charts about is it red, green, or yellow in different areas from how many educators were online, how many kids were in school to the quality of the services, was there X amount of electricity, and sewage treatments; and was the governor in place for more than six months, and did he have an actual council? There were all kinds of metrics that way, but there was kind of the underlying metric we had, which was how we were doing in a few key areas. Number one is, “are we seeing an impact, and are we seeing some democratic processes actually taking place within the provincial council and government?” [emphasis added]
It is the ability to "cut to the chase" and whipe away the BS. What is crucial, i.e. the minimally acceptable requirements?

I know Marc's interests and areas of specialty from conversing over multiple beers - his interests are diverse for sure:wry:

LOLOL - Oh, that's definitely true, Rob :D.

JMM has expressed a range of relevant knowledge on law - but what I really find intriguing is the ability to apply it to multiple area. I did not expect the Code of the Nesilim to show up, in fact I did not know there was such a thing, but it is precisely the kind of conversation and knowledge I think you want coming out of the design process.

Absolutely agree, there.

The link back to the other threads is that the ability to get the most out of design has a great deal to do with the caliber and knowledge of the people involved, the breadth of their combined knowledge and the ability and strength of the leadership to fully employ it. I'm not saying every design team needs to be fully staffed with all Marcs and JMMs - it might be resource prohibitive, however having one or two on the team would seem a worthy investment. What might be a balance between effectiveness and efficiency would be able to assemble talent outside of the immediate organization to form design teams relevant to the conditions and objectives.

Okay, I'll admit to being biased, but I think that is a good idea. Building a design team of Marc's and JMM's would, in all honesty, be a freaking disaster :(! A really good design team, and it doesn't matter what the "product" is, is, in many ways, like controling a nuclear reaction (hat tip to Christopher Anvil (http://www.webscription.net/chapters/0671318616/0671318616.htm?blurb) for the anaology) - JMM and I are like fissionable material in the realm of ideas, without "dampening rods", all you will get is an explosion .

------------------
The Hittites weren't that wonky - they had a realistic view of the facts of life:

Seriously, most of the Hittite Code involves the "Code of Personal Life", which is in place everywhere in one form or another (formal, informal or mixed).

Yup, and it's another good reason to go back to the early codes and, in some ways, the earlier the better. BTW, I never said that the Hittites were wonky, just that the idea of bringing them (and their legal code) into a discussion of modern SFA might be seen as wonky.

jmm99

05-29-2009, 07:40 PM

from marc
JMM and I are like fissionable material in the realm of ideas, without "dampening rods", all you will get is an explosion ...

but understandable, since all you can know is what you see here.

If we were working on a project in "real time and space" involving me, you would find that explosions would not occur within the project.

-----------------------
I'd amend this, with respect to white space and gray space regions (where lack of governance allows violent non-state actors to roam)...

...."how do we get them to stop wanting to kill us".

to something like this ...

..."how do we get them (anti-violence types) to control or prevent them (VNSAs) from trying to kill us."

While I will accept any and all real conversions from VNSAs (from "wanting to kill us" to "not wanting to kill us"), my perception is that's very utopian.

What I perceive not to be as utopian would be working toward governance in white space and gray space areas, which (1) avoids folks becoming "accidental guerrillas" (still waiting for that book); and (2) allows formation of a governing structure (indigenous) which is willing to control or prevent VNSAs from operating transnationally from the region. I'd expect there would be lots of quid pro quos in such an arrangement - as well as the need for real reciprocity.

----------------------------
I do have some questions about the scope of SFA, but my "stuff" on that is at home. Maybe later.

PS: What is ontology ? The study of Ontos ? They were neat (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontos).

slapout9

05-29-2009, 07:53 PM

Guess I will have to get my crayons back out. Ring2 Processes. The Process of creating the Law is going to be far more important than the final legal code you come up with. Ring1 leadership....who will be the great Lawgiver is the most important as Marct pointed out.

marct

05-29-2009, 08:06 PM

If we were working on a project in "real time and space" involving me, you would find that explosions would not occur within the project.

:cool:

What I perceive not to be as utopian would be working toward governance in white space and gray space areas, which (1) avoids folks becoming "accidental guerrillas" (still waiting for that book); and (2) allows formation of a governing structure (indigenous) which is willing to control or prevent VNSAs from operating transnationally from the region. I'd expect there would be lots of quid pro quos in such an arrangement - as well as the need for real reciprocity.

I could accept that and, you're right, it is less Utopian.

PS: What is ontology ? The study of Ontos ? They were neat (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontos).

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontology

"Ontology (from the Greek (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greek_language) ὄν, genitive ὄντος: of being <neuter participle of εἶναι: to be> and -λογία (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/-logy): science, study, theory) is the philosophical (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophy) study of the nature of being (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Being), existence (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Existence) or reality (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reality) in general, as well as of the basic categories of being (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Category_of_being) and their relations."

But I like your version of ὄντος better :D!

jmm99

05-30-2009, 03:58 AM

of the target HN security forces with development of an indigenous ethos - as in this post (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=73115&postcount=1). Seems a logical approach to answer the initial question "Where am I ?"

-----------------------------
Now, if someone will critique my own KG lesson so-far learned in SFA. My perception of Figure 1-3 (attached) from FM 3-07.1 (http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/Repository/FM3071.pdf) Security Force Assistance (May 2009) is that SFA has a very broad charter, which cuts across a number of other charters.

Looking at the legal basics only, I get this (leaving aside a lot of Titles 10 & 22 stuff which is inside baseball - political hardball) from FM 3-07.1:

LEGAL AUTHORITY FOR SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE

B-2. If the Secretary of State requests and the Secretary of Defense approves, U.S. forces can participate in security force assistance. The request and approval can go through standing statutory authorities in Title 22, U.S. Code. Title 22 contains the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, and other laws. It authorizes security assistance, developmental assistance, security force assistance and other forms of bilateral aid.

B-3. The request and approval for security force assistance might also occur under various provisions in Title 10, U.S. Code. Title 10 authorizes certain types of military-to-military contacts, exchanges, exercises, and limited forms of humanitarian and civic assistance in coordination with the U.S. ambassador to the host nation. In such situations, U.S. forces may be granted status as administrative and technical personnel based on a status-of-forces agreement or an exchange of letters with the host nation. This cooperation and assistance is limited to liaison, contacts, training, equipping, and providing defense articles and services. It does not include direct involvement in operations.

Assistance to police by U.S. forces is permitted but, generally, Department of Defense (DOD) does not serve as the lead government department. Without receiving a deployment or execution order from the President or Secretary of Defense, U.S. forces may be authorized to make only limited contributions during operations that involve security assistance.
....
LEGAL CONSTRAINTS ON THE SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE MISSIONS

B-18. U.S. law and regulation play a key role in establishing the parameters by which military forces may conduct security force assistance missions. These parameters tend to constitute constraints on the activities of military units. They range from the rules of engagement in combat situations to the ability to spend government funds in furtherance of a training or support mission.

GENERAL PROHIBITION ON ASSISTANCE TO POLICE

B-19. Historically, DOD is not the lead government department for assisting foreign governments. DOS is the lead when U.S. forces provide security assistance-military training, equipment, and defense articles and services-to host-nation governments. The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 specifically prohibits assistance to foreign police forces except within specific exceptions and under a Presidential directive. When providing assistance to training, DOS provides the lead role in police assistance through its Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. The President, however, may delegate this role to other agencies. This was done in 2004, when the President signed a decision directive granting the commander, United States Central Command, authority to train and equip Iraqi police.

TRAINING AND EQUIPPING FOREIGN SECURITY FORCES

B-20. All training and equipping of foreign security forces are specifically authorized. U.S. laws require Congress to authorize expenditures for training and equipping foreign forces. The laws of the United States also require DOS to verify that the host nation receiving the assistance is not in violation of human rights. The Secretary of Defense may authorize deployed U.S. forces to train or advise host-nation security forces as part of the mission. In this case, DOD personnel, operations, and maintenance appropriations provide an incidental benefit to those security forces. Numerous other programs to assist foreign forces are paid for with funds appropriated by Congress for that purpose. Consultation with a staff judge advocate or legal advisor early in the planning ensures the availability of funds for missions to train and equip foreign forces.

Am I on target for the scope (attached diagram) and the basic legal charter ? Any adds or caveats ?

------------------------------
The next thing is a question - answer not found in FM that I could see; and question coming from the definition in the Commander’s Handbook (http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/Repository/Materials/SFA.pdf) for Security Force Assistance (JCISFA 14 Jul 2008)

1.1 Security Force Assistance (SFA) is defined as unified action to generate, employ, and sustain local, host nation or regional security forces in support of a legitimate authority.
....
Security forces include not only military forces, but also police, border forces, and other paramilitary organizations at all levels of government within a nation state, as well as other local and regional forces.

Is it the intent for SFA to include militias ("other local and regional forces") within the charter ? How about "irregular forces" that cannot meet the GC III Art. 4 test ?

E.g.,

Convention (III) (http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/FULL/375?OpenDocument) relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War. Geneva, 12 August 1949.

Art 4. A. ....

(1) Members of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict, as well as members of militias or volunteer corps forming part of such armed forces.

(2) Members of other militias and members of other volunteer corps, including those of organized resistance movements, belonging to a Party to the conflict and operating in or outside their own territory, even if this territory is occupied, provided that such militias or volunteer corps, including such organized resistance movements, fulfil the following conditions:

(a) that of being commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates;
(b) that of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance;
(c) that of carrying arms openly;
(d) that of conducting their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war.

Militias could come under 4A(1) or 4A(2), but could also be a GC Common Article 3 organization, depending on how far out you want to go. Military forces are obviously under 4A(1), but police, border forces, and other paramilitary organizations may or may not, depending on the HN's domestic laws. Police, for example, are normally considered civilian under the GCs.

Rob Thornton

05-30-2009, 04:30 AM

Hey JMM,
As with other Joint and Service pubs there are sometimes going to be some inconsistencies and disconnects. The original idea as a force employment concept was that it did not matter who was doing the assistance as long as it was oriented on a security force which represented a legitimate authority. From JCISFA's perspective this means:

Security Forces Assistance (SFA) is defined:

as unified action to generate, employ, and sustain local, host nation or regional security forces in support of a legitimate authority.

• Unified action comprises joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational community activity in cooperative effort with non-governmental organizations, international organizations, and private companies to ensure and support unity of effort in SFA.

• Security forces include not only foreign security military forces, but also police, border forces, and other paramilitary organizations at all levels of government within a nation state, as well as other local and regional forces.

• Foreign Security Force Partners are developed to operate across the spectrum of conflict -- combating internal threats such as insurgency, subversion and lawlessness (FID), defending against external threats, or serving as coalition partners/peacekeepers in other areas.

• To be successful, SFA must be based on solid, continuing assessment and include the organizing, training, equipping, rebuilding and advising of the forces involved. It is critical to develop the institutional infrastructure to sustain SFA gains.

• The resulting forces must possess the capability to accomplish the variety of required missions, with sufficient capacity to be successful and with the ability to sustain themselves as long as required.

Now - wrt authorities, again it goes back to conditions and objectives. The authorities in U.S. code exist for reasons, but there may be cases when exceptions must be made in order to meet the objectives. This can get tricky, as you may not know you need to see k those exceptions until its too late, or until you really need it. Paragraphs 1206 and 1207 are historical examples of how exceptions were made and then reviewed for re authorization. I'm not sure we need permanent exceptions, but we do need a better understanding of what constraints and limitations they impose on our broader strategy to see if they still fit, or should be adjusted. An option I think wrt to design is that it may give you a far enough outlook to anticipate where you need exceptions and then be able to go forward to the law makers with case in hand. An alternative would be to create the means in other USG agencies to reduce the amount of exceptions required, however, this seems harder then anticipated, and almost everybody runs out of Schlitz before DoD.

Hope that answered more questions than it created, but its late and I need to put my kids to bed:)

Best, Rob

jmm99

05-30-2009, 05:07 AM

from Rob
Hope that answered more questions than it created, but its late and I need to put my kids to bed ...

No - as to questions answered; but, yes, as to paying attention to family - not one of my strong points at your age.

Anyway, 1st question was whether I had basic legal framework right.

Next question was legal scope of forces to be assisted. Different legal rules in play depending on legal status:

1. Regular armed forces (can include incorporated militias)

2. Unincorporated militias (if standards of 4A(2) are met)

3. Irregular militias (not under 4A(2); maybe GC CA 3 ?)

4. Police, border guards & paramilitary (gendarmerie ?) - may be military, but often considered civilian.

Is SFA intended to include all of the above ?

No more complex than that.

Don't know what Paragraphs 1206 and 1207 are; and from whence ?

Old Eagle

05-30-2009, 01:29 PM

Yep. Basically includes the whole shooting match.

The expansion of the definition of target security forces is a major component of the SFA concept, since there were previously serious restrictions on target FSF. Additionally, doctrine writers outside the special forces community inadvertently (I hope) hemmed us in to dealing only with "host nation" forces. These restrictions proved unmanageable when we faced the enormity of the efforts in Afgh and Iraq.

Sections 1206 and 1207 (and now others, I believe) refer to sections of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), but you're the lawyer. As Bob's World (sorry to have to agree w/him again, Rob) mentioned in an earlier post, these temporary measures need to be codified more permanently in legislation such as the Foreign Assistance Act or the Arms Export Control Act.

Look all that up and tell us what you think.

Rob Thornton

05-30-2009, 02:55 PM

COL Jones is a smart guy, a valued contributor to the discussion and we are lucky to have him here (and back in uniform).

As to the point...

As Bob's World (sorry to have to agree w/him again, Rob) mentioned in an earlier post, these temporary measures need to be codified more permanently in legislation such as the Foreign Assistance Act or the Arms Export Control Act.

I'm just not sure. Sometimes I think we need a restructuring to make things more permanent, but at other times I wonder what 2nd and third order effects will accompany such changes. What I mean is that its just not the question of "what" that is at issue, but its the discussion of "why", and what the implications are that also must be discussed. Too many things are just "changed" without the type of due deliberation that makes them work right as opposed to just different. Part of what bothers me is the idea that legislators might make changes without understanding why, and what that means wrt national security, executive vs. legislative authorities, etc. While the current system is not as effective as we require, and as such is not efficient, it does keep the discussion between Congress and the Executive going. I was watching such a discussion recently (last month) between (I think it was the HASC) and Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Flournoy, GEN Petraeus and ADM Olsen. There were a number of discussion points that came up that I think keep Congress learning.

The stakes are however not one sided, there are serious implications for not being as effective as we might be. However, one could also argue that making the $$$ and authorities readily available have not always proven wise either and sometime result in expenditures that don't really buy much, don't contribute to the objective, and as such serve to erode domestic political will - how may zeroes in 9 trillion:eek:?

How does this relate back to design? I think if you are looking further out you can begin the education further out, and start to way the costs associated with the objective to shape expectations. Wrt OTERA, the map to the policy objective should be at least laid out with the big objectives, and those should be scrutinized to ensure they make sense in the context of the broader campaign plan and areas of contingent development.

If it is a crisis, and there are extraordinary requirements then the discussion between Congress and the Executive should dress them as such.

This may not make for the most effective SFA, but I do think it makes for us thinking it through. Development of another state's or organization's FSF capabilities and capacities, for purposes that may out live your own needs to be thought out. As such maybe, just maybe the appropriation of the means to do so should be thought out, and should be seen in light of the domestic political context as well.

Taking the kids to Watkin's Farms today - just NE of K.C. should be neat, but will be off the net for the rest of the day I think.

Best, Rob

jmm99

05-30-2009, 11:02 PM

Hyvää päivää. Olen tietämätön lakimies metsässä. Kiitos paljon, avuksi.

(trans) Hey, Old Eagle ... Good day. I am an ignorant lawyer in the woods. Thanks much, for the help.

The fact that you know the "good morning" greeting implies one of two things: (1) you got up early in those Helsinki mornings; or (2) you stayed up very late to reach those Helsinki mornings.

Anyway, I will proceed as directed - Olen hyvä poika. But, I am starting on the Accidental Guerrilla.

Bob's World

05-31-2009, 01:01 PM

Here is my one big caution on SFA.

I believe there is direct analogy between Poplace based conflicts within and between states to the dynamics of populace based conflicts that we are all far more familiar with within and between households.

So, travel if you will to a typical neighborhood in Bob's World. Down the street there is a house where the husband is a bit of a jerk. The kids are in trouble a lot at school, and the wife feels neglected and misunderstood and has a bit of a wandering eye these days... Everyone in the nieghborhood knows and talks about this particulalr family, and truth be told are closer to the same situation in their own homes than they would care to admit. Maintaining a healthy household is continuous business, and the happiest households are those with the best communications and mutual respect, not the ones that are the richest or most effectively run.

So, you decide you want to help out this poor sap down the street. He is the COIN conducting party, and his family is the insurgent party. The guy at the grocery store who chats up the wife is conducting UW, and so are those bad influences at school that talk the kids into much of the trouble they find themselves in. As a concerned neighbor helping a fella out, you are the FID party.

So, you decide to focus on SFA. That if this guy just had better skills at keeping his wife and kids in line, then it would solve the problems...

If you don't fully appreciate the nature of populace based conflicts, and are not tuned in on the particulars of the household you are stepping in to "help," you could be simply making this guy way more effective at being the controlling jerk he has always been, and exacerbating the very problem you were seeking to cure.

So, is SFA a valuable tool that we need to devleop? Absolutely. Do we already have a bag of tools being used improperly? Equally absolutely. I just wish we would put as much effort into understanding the problem we are seeking to fix as we do into developing new tools to fix it with.

Starting with, why are we the ones going around and meddling in the household affairs of so many of our neighbors in the first place? Oh, 65 years ago it was a rough neighborhood, and we stood up and led a neighborhood watch program and saw the neighborhood through a very rough time? Ok. Good on us. But that problem cleared up some 20 years ago and now our efforts are a lot less appreciated. We still have a role, we just need to tailor it to the current environment.

slapout9

05-31-2009, 04:19 PM

Here is my one big caution on SFA.

I believe there is direct analogy between Poplace based conflicts within and between states to the dynamics of populace based conflicts that we are all far more familiar with within and between households.

So, travel if you will to a typical neighborhood in Bob's World. Down the street there is a house where the husband is a bit of a jerk. The kids are in trouble a lot at school, and the wife feels neglected and misunderstood and has a bit of a wandering eye these days... Everyone in the neighborhood knows and talks about this particularly family, and truth be told are closer to the same situation in their own homes than they would care to admit. Maintaining a healthy household is continuous business, and the happiest households are those with the best communications and mutual respect, not the ones that are the richest or most effectively run.

So, you decide you want to help out this poor sap down the street. He is the COIN conducting party, and his family is the insurgent party. The guy at the grocery store who chats up the wife is conducting UW, and so are those bad influences at school that talk the kids into much of the trouble they find themselves in. As a concerned neighbor helping a fella out, you are the FID party.

I have been pushing this since I came here. The most modern doctrine or lessons learned are in the realm of Domestic Violence/Stalking type situations (including a lot of failures). The neighborhood you described is one I worked in for a long time and points out how dynamic and changing the situation is and you have to address all the variables to have any chance at success.

Where I disagree is so many separate doctrines FID,UW,COIN,SFA understand it as a violent system and address the root causes, which is always the people.

Ken White

05-31-2009, 07:58 PM

Starting with, why are we the ones going around and meddling in the household affairs of so many of our neighbors in the first place?is that tired but still true 'someone's gotta do it.' The last 20 years have shown that it isn't likely to get done if we do not engage the issue.
Oh, 65 years ago it was a rough neighborhood, and we stood up and led a neighborhood watch program and saw the neighborhood through a very rough time? Ok. Good on us. But that problem cleared up some 20 years ago and now our efforts are a lot less appreciated. We still have a role, we just need to tailor it to the current environment.It was my observation 65 years ago a lot of the neighbors we were helping did not like us one little bit. Five years later I was a bit older and realized that a lot of them really didn't like us much at all -- but were quite willing to seek our aid in any form, take it and still not like us. As time has passed, I've seen little change. People will take what we offer and will try to use and manipulate us. Our nominal 'enemies' have done that for over a century -- and they have been and are today tacitly if not sometimes actively aided by many of our nominal 'friends' who distrust us. Many with good cause as we, like every nation, have simply pursued our own interests as we should. The problem is that we are quite large, rambunctious and have a ripple impact on too many.

We've been interfering with others for over 200 years; this is not a recent or Cold War thing and to try to say it is to deliberately obscure a rational view of history. That 200 plus year legacy will never go away, it is the cause of much hatred of the US around the world and we will try to act like it might be mitigated only at great cost. Your prescription is dangerous.

Bob's World

05-31-2009, 10:28 PM

Ken,

You can't compare America's engagement 200 years ago with our engagement 65 years ago. The former we were a little tiny maritime nation focused on commerce and expanding beyond the Blue Ridge to settle the Ohio valley and Gulf states. 65 Years ago we took the baton from England to lead the western effort to contain the Soviets and lead the free world.

To keep implementing a family of policies, programs, institutions and perspectives with a government system all designed to address a world that was emerging out of WWII is what is dangerous.

America has a major role in the world, that has not changed. We just need to adapt that role for the current environment.

As I look back on history every major power has collapsed under the efforts of attempting to maintain a Status Quo that was favorable to them in the face of a changing environment that all of the rising powers were taking advantage of to fuel their own rise. This is how we displaced the Brits. If we do not learn from history and embrace change it will be how the Chinese displace us.

When you are caught in a rip tide and you are young and strong you figure "sure, they say go parallel to the shore and conserve your strength and swim to shore once you are free of the current, but I know I am different and I can just power through this."

Well we have been swimming hard against the current and it is tiring us far faster than anyone would have predicted. Time to get out of the rip, and then chart a new course to a better future. A lot of people on the shore are watching with great interest, but I don't see any of them risking their own hide to come out and help us.

Rob Thornton

05-31-2009, 11:57 PM

I see allot of the last few posts leading back to Marc's desire to see a "grand strategy" that employed all the resources, not in raw sum, but in the right proportion to the objective(s). This might require the Will to follow a totally pragmatic and apolitical (in the sense of U.S. domestic turbulence) vision. There is something approaching total commitment at that point maybe, to the point where all else falls away from the desire for the objective.

I think the only way you get there - meaning the big "W" will, is you face an existential threat (or perceived and hyped to become one) because preservation of one's primary interests trumps all else (unless you can't see it); fear from being politically isolated (think the post 9/11 USG - and for that matter most western democracies) is also a good motivator.

If you really do have an existential threat, then the cost are probably justified, even if your political enemies undermine you when things cool off, or when they think they understand enough to assume the risks of doing so (not personal, just politics).

I guess my point is two fold with that:

1) goes to the former HASC member who remarked that we were going to have to explain it to the public in such a way that it was politically safe

2) goes to the fact that I don't see any member of Congress rushing to give up any power, the collection of which is how they stay in power, and it is only when such an apparent transfer of power would benefit them by giving them more power elsewhere that they will cede it (there are probably a few exceptions - maybe)

OK - I know there are some great work groups out there trying to address some of this, they may have luck on the Executive side - as long as it gives the executive more power - or allows him to use existing power better, but I did not see any members of Congress in that last interview I mentioned earlier asking which laws DoD would like to see permanently weakened, abolished or changed to make DoD more effective at winning the wars (or contingency ops abroad or whatever is the proper political terminology for war). I could have missed it, it could have went down behind the scenes, but I did not see it on C-Span. I know there are HASC and SASC staffers who are aware of the problems so I'm guessing their bosses are as well, but still no new news?

Back to Marc's point about a grand strategy that links theater and regional objectives together and results in the all the right tools being employed in ways that support their effectiveness - I can't see it until the threat justifies it, or until Palpatine takes over.

Back to design, I guess we need to get better at working inside the existing legal framework, and I think design supports that.

Best, Rob

slapout9

06-01-2009, 12:19 AM

Rob, you may see you theory implemented here (US). The effects of the auto industry layoffs will really start hitting shortly and we may have a long hot summer. Security Force Assistance may be required. I bet DHS has already downloaded your paper.... they need some strategic thinkers over there.

Is Design Systems Thinking sure looks like it?

marct

06-01-2009, 12:22 AM

Hi Rob,

Back to Marc's point about a grand strategy that links theater and regional objectives together and results in the all the right tools being employed in ways that support their effectiveness - I can't see it until the threat justifies it, or until Palpatine takes over.

Honestly, I'm as cynical about it as you are - at least in terms of actual design and implementation. What I think can and, honestly, must be done is to get that grand strategy together at the level of principle, and then make certain that all missions meet the criteria of those principles; obviously modified by circumstances.

Outside of any particular issues of effectiveness, this serves to establish a moral justification / baseline for the world to see.

Rob Thornton

06-01-2009, 02:04 AM

Hey Marc - I know you are:D - I just thought it was great that we'd been working several angles and came back to a point you made earlier but one we did not fully explore at the time because we may not have had all the pieces on the table.

Best, Rob

Rob Thornton

06-01-2009, 02:31 AM

Ken White

06-01-2009, 04:31 AM

You can't compare America's engagement 200 years ago with our engagement 65 years ago. The former we were a little tiny maritime nation focused on commerce and expanding beyond the Blue Ridge to settle the Ohio valley and Gulf states. 65 Years ago we took the baton from England to lead the western effort to contain the Soviets and lead the free world.In reverse order, I'm quite aware of that. I'm also aware of the fact that you used the correct word; 'took.' Because that's exactly what we did and FDR masterminded it -- and they know it; so do the French -- and both those nations recall Suez. Not fondly, either.

I did not attempt to compare Americas engagement 200 years ago to 65 years ago (aside from the fact that 65 is included in the 200...). What I did was remind you that we have been interfering in other nations for that period and they all remember it -- again, not fondly -- no matter how much you want to downplay it. Those hard feelings have been inculcated over many years, including the last 65 and they are not going away. So I didn't make any such comparison -- you elected to misunderstand or misstate what I did write. For proof of an attitude toward us that was engendered more than 65 years ago, talk to South Americans...

We are seen as a looming threat by almost everyone; that in my observation in over 20 nations for over 60 years has always been true. It waxes and wanes but it never completely goes away.

So anyone who thinks a nice new shiny USA will win friends and influence people is, I believe, quite mistaken -- and as I said, dangerously so.
To keep implementing a family of policies, programs, institutions and perspectives with a government system all designed to address a world that was emerging out of WWII is what is dangerous.I do not think we are doing that. I in 45 years of guvmint service witnessed a lot of changes -- slow, to be sure -- but changes.
America has a major role in the world, that has not changed. We just need to adapt that role for the current environment.I'm comfortable that is being done and comfortable that it does not appear to be in accordance with your model; as I said, the neighborhood really is no better. It's really worse, in many ways.
As I look back on history every major power has collapsed under the efforts of attempting to maintain a Status Quo that was favorable to them in the face of a changing environment that all of the rising powers were taking advantage of to fuel their own rise. This is how we displaced the Brits. If we do not learn from history and embrace change it will be how the Chinese displace us.Heh. Are you serious? You hope to stop that? Do the math -- and do not forget India...

Neither need be a threat unless we make them one.
Well we have been swimming hard against the current and it is tiring us far faster than anyone would have predicted. Time to get out of the rip, and then chart a new course to a better future.Better future? Not likely in your lifetime; resource allocations among other things will mess that up
A lot of people on the shore are watching with great interest, but I don't see any of them risking their own hide to come out and help us.Heh. Thank you for making my point; you did not comment on the most important element in my post above so you may have missed the import of of it. Recall what I wrote on that topic:

""Our nominal 'enemies' have done that for over a century -- and they have been and are today tacitly if not sometimes actively aided by many of our nominal 'friends' who distrust us. Many with good cause as we, like every nation, have simply pursued our own interests as we should. The problem is that we are quite large, rambunctious and have a ripple impact on too many."" (emphasis added / kw)

You can totally ignore that as a comment from me -- if you ignore that FACT in your strategic planning, you will do this nation a grave disservice.

slapout9

06-01-2009, 06:42 PM

Salp - I do think design theory can be used on any number of complex issues - I'd made a recommendation on the CAC blog (CAC had put up a blog about the reasons there may be a shortage of 04s) that HRC use the process of design to look at their HR strategy for FGs. Initially the naming convention had been the Operational Design Process (at least when I was introduced to it last year), and ultimately the Army had decided to go with just "Design". I like this better, because the nature of what your "designing" should characterize what your are doing, e.g. "functional" vs. "operational".

I'm not sure it will work for our auto industry problem as a problem unto itself. I think the auto industry problem a part of a much larger economic and domestic political issue:(. I think this is the limitation of design, or any other type of applied theory, as long as you are predisposed to an outcome then everything you observe can be bent to support that outcome. This is where trying to pursue what could be a discreet end in the context of social engineering (all politics) (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Social_engineering_(security)) can protract and exacerbate the problem - people start reacting when what they value is put at risk. If done before hand, design might tell you that and give you an indication of the most likely outcomes, however if the object of desire is too irresistible, or the political tolerance is insufficient, then its just static.

Best, Rob

Rob, Dr. Jack just released a Design Handbook which I am reading now. Design is going to be a big hit. It is Systems Thinking without the baggage that goes with the term. Seems to have kept some of the SOD stuff and gotten rid of the confusing parts. Today Systems Thinking is almost automatically associated to computers that nobody knows what it means anymore. :confused: The Design theory will probably take care of that plus it sounds cooler and more human friendly.

You are definitely right about the economy, deign would work only if the higher level policy issues(mainly energy) were solved first so the auto industry could do some type of intelligent designing and planning.

Sometimes I think we actually lost the Cold War because planning was so associated with Communism that we just decided to just let stuff happen, very bad move. We know longer hold any type of initiative over our Economic situation because of this ,we just react from one crisis to another. I don't the present administration understand the true magnitude to this. I keep waiting for the Army Greenmen party to hook up with the other Green party and then we might have a chance.:)

One last question just exactly what does Operational mean as you use it? Does it mean the organization has come to life and is now working?