Using drones: principles, tactics and results (amended title)

[SWJED]

Moderator's Note

This thread has several smaller threads merged in February 2013 and two in August 2013. On Xmas Eve 2013 two SWJ Blog and two small SWC threads were merged to here. The title was amended from 'The drone paradox' to 'Using drones: principles, tactics and results' (June 2011). November 2015 two SWJ Blog threads merged in.(ends)


7 March AP - Israel Unveils Newest Unmanned Aircraft (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/03/07/AR2007030701815.html).


The Israeli air force unveiled its newest unmanned aircraft Wednesday, saying the plane can fly longer, faster and higher than any other surveillance aircraft.

The drone, called the Heron, already saw combat during last summer's war in Lebanon, where Israeli officials said a prototype performed well, seeking out Hezbollah arms and directing airstrikes.

The Heron has a 54-foot wingspan and can fly up to 30 hours at a speed of 140 mph and a height of 30,000 feet. That would give it a range of 4,200 miles and the potential to reach as far as Iran, considered Israel's most serious strategic threat because of its nuclear program and its president's calls to wipe Israel off the map.

Air force officers said the Heron was Israel's most advanced weapon in the booming field of drone technology...

[120mm]

Iran: PM sent, check your Inbox
-Israel

[Entropy]

Looks interesting. (http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story.jsp?id=news/AVENGER041709.xml&headline=Predator%20C%20Avenger%20Makes%20First%20 Flights&channel=defense) We should be doing more of this:


Cassidy has earned a unique reputation by using company funds to develop what he believes the military needs rather than chasing Pentagon requirements that shift with disheartening regularity to produce cost increases and production delays. The result is a family of Gnat and Predator designs that are used by all the services and intelligence agencies.

[Stu-6]

Ok it has been awhile so I will reintroduce my self in the appropriate thread but right now I have question that has been bugging me for a awhile now.

Conducting missile strikes in Pakistan undermines the Paki government therefore it is, to put it mildly, strategically undesirable. But to allow al-Qa'ida sanctuary in Pakistan is also undesirable. So the question is: is one really better than the other or is there a third way?

[IntelTrooper]

But to allow al-Qa'ida sanctuary in Pakistan is also undesirable. So the question is: is one really better than the other or is there a third way?

Give me the money it cost for the drone flight and rocket(s) and I will raise a platoon of indigenous troops and wreak havoc with any Taliban or al-Qaeda trying to cross into Afghanistan without ticking off the locals. Give me money and discretion to commission construction projects and I'll make the population permanently hostile to the Taliban. Eventually word will get out across the border and we'll be invited to do the same thing in their neighborhood.

Of course, the locals could always just figure out that I have money, kill me, and take the money...

[Entropy]

Conducting missile strikes in Pakistan undermines the Paki government....

If that were true, then why does the Pakistani government allow it? The drones, as was recently revealed, operated from a Pakistani military base.

[Ron Humphrey]

If that were true, then why does the Pakistani government allow it? The drones, as was recently revealed, operated from a Pakistani military base.

They fight and you might have part of your answer

[Stu-6]

Of course, the locals could always just figure out that I have money, kill me, and take the money...


And there is the catch, locals only work as long as your interest overlap.

[IntelTrooper]

And there is the catch, locals only work as long as your interest overlap.
So true.

[tequila]

If that were true, then why does the Pakistani government allow it? The drones, as was recently revealed, operated from a Pakistani military base.


Because the Pakistani government and its military understand that allowing the drone attacks represents a critical element of its relationship with the U.S., especially the CIA and the U.S. military. For now the government is willing to take the hit that its public image suffers because of the drone strikes, knowing that the far greater damage is to the U.S.' reputation inside Pakistan, which could actually come in handy for itself in the future.

[carl]

Because the Pakistani government and its military understand that allowing the drone attacks represents a critical element of its relationship with the U.S., especially the CIA and the U.S. military. For now the government is willing to take the hit that its public image suffers because of the drone strikes, knowing that the far greater damage is to the U.S.' reputation inside Pakistan, which could actually come in handy for itself in the future.

That is about the most astute and cogent thing I've ever read on this subject.

[davidbfpo]

Forwarded by an observer: http://www.tnr.com/politics/story.html?id=b951d70b-db5e-4875-a5b9-4501e713943d&k=40024&p=1

It is very well written and full of facts, although I note it slid over the fact the drones fly from a Pakistani airfield.

Yes, drones are an option and on reflection IMHO useful when successful and the local political impact is minimal. Now maybe the time to reduce their use, as David Kilcullen mooted.

Have they changed the Pakistani Army's stance on confronting the Taliban plus? Or, assisted the Pakistani government in creating the conditions to make decisions?

I think not. Conclusion: Tactically useful and strategically dangerous.

davidbfpo

[William F. Owen]

Conclusion: Tactically useful and strategically dangerous.

Makes you ask, as I often do, if something strategically dangerous, can be tactically useful.
Personally, I think the idea of "tactical success" but "operational/strategic failure" is not an intellectually or practically defensible position.

[Umar Al-Mokhtār]

Because the Pakistani government and its military understand that allowing the drone attacks represents a critical element of its relationship with the U.S., especially the CIA and the U.S. military. For now the government is willing to take the hit that its public image suffers because of the drone strikes, knowing that the far greater damage is to the U.S.' reputation inside Pakistan, which could actually come in handy for itself in the future.

it allows the Pakistanis to leverage on our capability yet have plausible deniability in the political dialogue of being the actual operators. This is also a bit of a cunundrum given that the government is accused in some circles of being merely a lackey of the United States.

[slapout9]

Personally, I think the idea of "tactical success" but "operational/strategic failure" is not an intellectually or practically defensible position.

You old systems thinker you:) that is exactly right, it all has to align together or it you will just create another/bigger problem.

[SethB]

I think the idea of "tactical success" but "operational/strategic failure" is not an intellectually or practically defensible position.

I'd be interested to hear you expand on this, if you don't mind.

[davidbfpo]

A non-SWJ member's response to my viewpoint was:

1) Armed UAV (drone) attacks can only be of tactical significance and are unlikely to lead to strategic gain.

2) The downstream effects of Damadola far outweighed any possible gain (and there was none). A few days after the strike, a Pakistani Taliban leader called a meeting and asked for volunteers for suicide missions. Sixty-five young men put their hands up; a bit later a young soldier in the Frontier Corps shot an American officer at a bi-lateral border meeting. His family came from Damadola. He had no option under the code of revenge in Pushtun lore. (Damadola: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Damadola_airstrike )

3) In the beginning the use of UAVs in Pakistan was a one-sided (US) attempt to decapitate the al-Qaeda leadership taking no account of the downstream effects mentioned above and breaking a US law of no targeted assassination except in time of war (the author is not a lawyer).

4) That said a Predator over the Yemeni desert targeting a verifiable target with no risk to civilians can be justified. In fact the mission in 2002 that killed an AQ operative also impressed the Yemenis with its precision and careful targeting. So the downstream effect in this case was positive.

5) Finally when in Peshawar in 2008 perfectly sane, educated and reasonable Pakistanis living under Taliban threat spared no air in rejecting the use of combat UAVs on the grounds that they helped a then growing Pakistani Taliban to become more radical and to recruit.

davidbfpo

[davidbfpo]

Makes you ask, as I often do, if something strategically dangerous, can be tactically useful.
Personally, I think the idea of "tactical success" but "operational/strategic failure" is not an intellectually or practically defensible position.

Wilf,

I think those who have a short-term view would see drone attacks as a tactical success and meeting the imperative for taking action (shared by many actors). With their limited strategic horizon, or situational awareness, such actors do not consider the fuller picture and risks of operational or strategic failure.

Staying with the Pakistani historical example; given the frustration with Pakistani in-action drone attacks appear an option and who say in 2006 would have objected to the impact on radicalising the FATA tribes? Striking the No.2 in AQ would be too tempting.

All from my armchair faraway.

davidbfpo

[M Payson]

IISS (http://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-comments/past-issues/volume-15-2009/volume-15-issue-4/the-drones-of-war/) has an interesting article on drones that I saw referenced at Abu Muqawama. It provides some technical detail as well as insight into operational roles and operators.

[slapout9]

New issue of Air and Space Power Journal...whole bunch of stuff about Drones in it. Also article about the Army and there expanding use of aircraft,link is below.


http://www.au.af.mil/au/cadre/aspj/airchronicles/apje.html

[Ken White]

Air Force centric views, to be sure -- but it's an AF magazine so that's to be expected. I particularly enjoyed the rather parochial graphic below from "The Army’s “Organic” Unmanned Aircraft Systems: An Unhealthy Choice for the Joint Operational Environment" which implies -- wrongly -- that Close Air Support is a part of Global Strike, a core AF function (among other things that are the author's opinion). That part is true -- however, that all CAS is subsumed by that is or should be open to question.

One could and should also question the AF perception that they retain totally the Forward Air Controller function. That makes little sense in the coming era of more distributed operations. There is no reason the average Infantry Squad Leader cannot control CAS.

My point in citing these things is to question whether the USAF really wants to get in the business of supporting an ODA in a minor contact per the quoted article scenario; yes, it's a TIC but it is imminently possible that the operation that was canceled may have been far more important from the Operational and thus Joint standpoint. Another article in the journal also cites the Army's use mortars and artillery support but both miss the point that given the potential of greater geographic dispersion than has been the norm, that fire support will not have the range and pressure will be on the AF -- or someone -- to reliably provide fire support...

Pressure not applied by me or by the Army -- pressure applied by Congress and the Mothers of America.

The AF solution of central control of limited assets is inimical to an effective solution to the problem. It is undeniably efficient -- it is not effective.

Hopefully, someone will realize that attitude toward CAS is a large part of the reason why the AF has some of the lack of respect they seem to endure...

[Stu-6]

it allows the Pakistanis to leverage on our capability yet have plausible deniability in the political dialogue of being the actual operators. . .

I am not sure there is plausible deniablity here, it seems to me that some/many/most of the population doesn't find their denial plausible at all. Which compounds the problem since now the Paki government can appear to be accidentally killing civilians, a lackey of the US and still wishy washy when it comes to AQ, Taliban, etc, all.

I can see the use of drones like this (sparingly) but the situation with the Paki government's denials seem to be the worst of all solutions. I understand that the government thinks it is protecting itself but long term I have major doubts.

[Entropy]

which implies -- wrongly -- that Close Air Support is a part of Global Strike, a core AF function (among other things that are the author's opinion). That part is true -- however, that all CAS is subsumed by that is or should be open to question.

I think you're reading to much into that. All AF tasks fall under one of the 12 Air Force core functions (Yes, they changed again recently (http://www.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-090522-062.pdf), global strike is gone - yes the AF need to reinvent the wheel at any opportunity is annoying). Conventional air-to-ground stuff s now categorized under "global precision attack" and that includes CAS.


One could and should also question the AF perception that they retain totally the Forward Air Controller function. That makes little sense in the coming era of more distributed operations.

Not sure how you're getting that perception. There's joint CAS doctrine now and the Army fully intends to train its own controllers to Marine/USAF (now joint) standards. Last I heard, the 13F MOS was designated to fill this role. The problem for the Army, based on what I read a year or two ago, is getting personnel trained. I haven't heard much since then, though I recently read that the UK, Australia, Netherlands and Canada all have schoolhouses now and are training and deploying qualified JTACs.


There is no reason the average Infantry Squad Leader cannot control CAS.

That depends on what you mean by "control" CAS.

[Ken White]

On the Global Precision Attack, forgive me but years of pentagram watching have taught me to be leery of any service (all the services are guilty of this) innocently couching their mission sets in new terms. Assuming they are not challenged away by others, suddenly, a few years later you get a "...that's MY job; you leave it alone." We'll see. ;)

Not sure how the switch to joint for terminal controllers is progressing. There was some Army resistance on the rationale that it was too much on the 13F plate (foolish); the personnel bureaucracy was rebelling at having to identify and select personnel and divert them to training and they set the standards high which will make selection even more difficult (valid but probably over cautious); they've got to get a school up and running (very valid); and, lastly, the bean counters gripe about having to equip these Army folks to 'support an AF mission' (that's also dumb but bean manipulators are like that...). Hopefully, it'll get sorted and get going, not really critical now but it could be in the future.

Having said that, do recall I said a Squad Leader -- not a 13F. That is an intra Army turf battle probably driven by AF concern on excessive dropping of stuff on friendlies -- no worries though, if we get in a big war, it'll be back to first Co Cdr and JTAC 13Fs -- then to Platoon Leaders and after a year, it'll be down to Squad leaders again. :wry:

I meant terminal attack control; that means requesting and pointing (given ROVER and, more importantly, other stuff in the pipeline, it's even easier than it used to be) -- the pilot will do the controlling. Airborne FACs can help but they aren't always available. Infantry folks used to call in air and direct strikes all the time -- until it got to be a peace time budget and turf issue. Last one I called was in June of '68; two sets of Fox 4s at 200 feet or so and two A4s at 50 feet, all with nape and HE -- right bird for the job helps. I know, I know, those days are gone, Angels 15, PGM, Litening AT, Sniper XR, the rotating shifts at Creech, etc, etc. Good stuff, life is mo' better -- until you run out of 'em... :D

[William F. Owen]

I have the greatest curiosity as to why the "Drones" are being used all. Bearing in mind the circumstances of their employment, and the lack of air defence, why are they deemed better than a manned aircraft - and by that I mean the right manned aircraft. An P-3 can fire AGM-114, and carry a much higher resolution sensor.

Now, I can see quite a few good roles for UAVs, but they are pretty specific and mainly a function of political concerns. Yes there are sound operational reasons, but personally, I can't see it in the circumstance we are discussing.

[Mark O'Neill]

I have the greatest curiosity as to why the "Drones" are being used all. Bearing in mind the circumstances of their employment, and the lack of air defence, why are they deemed better than a manned aircraft - and by that I mean the right manned aircraft. An P-3 can fire AGM-114, and carry a much higher resolution sensor.

Now, I can see quite a few good roles for UAVs, but they are pretty specific and mainly a function of political concerns. Yes there are sound operational reasons, but personally, I can't see it in the circumstance we are discussing.

You cited a certain platform: Work out the accurals on a P-3 and crew.............. and that is without getting one 'lost'. 'Robot spuds in' makes a far better headline for any government than '13 aircrew die a horrible death' , even before one calculates any other costs

Cheers

Mark

Mark

[William F. Owen]

You cited a certain platform: Work out the accurals on a P-3 and crew.............. and that is without getting one 'lost'. 'Robot spuds in' makes a far better headline for any government than '13 aircrew die a horrible death' , even before one calculates any other costs


Well aware and that's all pretty obvious, but what if you have P-3 in theatre anyway? The issues related to cost, is that you have P-3s anyway, and they cost what they cost. You can't stack them and see a reduction is cost without loosing big time in capability and skills fade.

I just used the P-3 as an example, but put another way, "Big War" mission, chasing subs. "Small War " mission, -something else. Could me good to ask the same question of the MQ-9s?

[davidbfpo]

Link goes to an article in The Spectator, 7th May 2009, whcih touches upon the use of drones and as an Indian viewpoint is interesting IMHO we rarely see: http://www.spectator.co.uk/the-magazine/features/3573376/india-is-in-peril-obama-is-making-it-worse.thtml

A glimpse at the authors background: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brahma_Chellaney

davidbfpo

[Entropy]

Wilf,

P-3's are extensively employed in both Iraq and Afghanistan and are valuable platforms for a variety of functions. The problem is that there are simply not enough ISR platforms to meet demand, P-3's included. I have a friend who is a P-3 pilot and their optempo is quite high.

UAV's have advantages because they can be fielded faster and provide more ISR for a given amount of resources - they have longer loiter times and one can get more flight-hours per aircrew than what you'd get with a manned aircraft. It's also easier to covertly monitor a target with a UAV than a large-multi-engined aircraft. For Afghanistan in particular, lack of ramp space and logistics favor UAV's, especially those operated from distributed locations.

[William F. Owen]

Wilf,

P-3's are extensively employed in both Iraq and Afghanistan and are valuable platforms for a variety of functions. The problem is that there are simply not enough ISR platforms to meet demand, P-3's included. I have a friend who is a P-3 pilot and their optempo is quite high.

UAV's have advantages because they can be fielded faster and provide more ISR for a given amount of resources - they have longer loiter times and one can get more flight-hours per aircrew than what you'd get with a manned aircraft. It's also easier to covertly monitor a target with a UAV than a large-multi-engined aircraft. For Afghanistan in particular, lack of ramp space and logistics favor UAV's, especially those operated from distributed locations.

Mate, all good points. Especially the ramp space, and FOB operations.

[Ken White]

Mildly off thread comment by me on the last paragraph of the linked article:
"Unwittingly, Obama’s strategy may end up repeating the very mistakes of American policy over the past three decades that have come to haunt US security and that of the rest of the free world. In seeking narrow, tactical gains, the Obama team risks falling prey to a long-standing US policy weakness: the pursuit of short-term objectives without much regard for the security of friends. It must abandon its plan regionally to contain rather than defeat terrorism, or else an Islamist takeover of Pakistan is inevitable."The on-thread aspect is that Mark O'neilcorrectly pointed to the why of Drones; the article points out that the application of Drone power can be quite, uh, selective -- and the quoted paragraph ties all that together with American short-termism.

Our failure to heed History and take the long view is well known. Hopefully we can do better this time. Given the callow nature and venality of many of our politicians from all parties, whether we can or will do so is worrisome.

Which gets back to Drones. A strong point is lessened cost in many aspects. Another is is their ease of use in dangerous or problematic situations.

A shortfall is that very ease of use can lead to flawed decisions and uses...

[davidbfpo]

IMHO a good article in The New Yorker drawing together many of the issues, without citing David Kilcullen though and especially on the legal aspects: http://cryptome.org/0001/predator-war.htm

Note the full article is behind a 'pay wall' and is an update on a previous article (incomplete): http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2009/10/26/091026fa_fact_mayer and a follow-up (complete): http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/newsdesk/2009/10/jane-mayer-predators-drones-pakistan.html

There is a further article (with stats in appendices): http://www.newamerica.net/publications/policy/revenge_drones

davidbfpo

[davidbfpo]

Hopefully fits here, although there are many threads on drone attacks in Pakistan and hat tip to a newly discovered blogsite recommendation (thanks Leah).

Near-exact locations of US drone strikes in Pakistan item, which links to Google maps :http://circlingthelionsden.blogspot.com/ posted 18th January

[davidbfpo]

Two items found today. A comment piece by an Indian postgrad student on the RUSI website: http://www.rusi.org/analysis/commentary/ref:C4B702AC47A4BF/

Has this on polling in the FATA, yes I concede a few issues with that:
A survey of 550 FATA residents by a Pakistan based organisation found that 52 per cent of those surveyed considered the drones accurate. 58 per cent did not think anti-American sentiment had been inflamed by drone attacks, 70 per cent thought the Pakistani military should carry out targeted strikes, and 60 per cent judged that militant organisations were being damaged. If accurate and reliable, these figures fly in the face of popular reports. Farhat Taj, a researcher from the organisation conducting the study, argued that the people of Waziristan 'see the US drone attacks as their liberators from the clutches of the terrorists into which, they say, their state has wilfully thrown them'.

Plus the author and group doing the polling are not fully id'd.

Again in the UK, a report in The Guardian on the RAF use of drones, which is unusual. Apparently based on FOI requests: http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2010/feb/07/raf-drones-afghanistan and the:
The MoD says there have been no reports of RAF drones killing civilians.

[carl]

The biggest advantage of a drone is endurance. As everyone know they can stay up a long time. They have a lot of disadvantages too.

They tend to crash a lot. The article David provided stated that 1 of 6 British Reapers in operation since 2008 has crashed. That is about par from what I read.

They are not as cheap as people like to think. A Reaper is 10 million and up and a Predator variant is 4.5 and up. That is a lot of money, especially when they crash a lot.

They may do what they are told but sometimes they don't. This is one reason manned aircraft don't like to fly too close to them. That makes a difference when there are a lot of aircraft over a target.

They are slow, very very slow, a least the Predators are. If they are working an area and something critical happens 60-80 miles away, it will take them a long time to get there. If there is a strong headwind, forget it. The Reaper is a lot faster but it is a lot more expensive and they crash a lot.

They may not take up ramp space like a P-3 but the Predator isn't that small and the Reaper is a big airplane. You can't just put them in a corner. They will require ramp space, taxiways and a smooth runway like most planes.

In order to get that endurance, you have to have a pretty lightly loaded wing. This, I think, will give you problems in heavy weather. An F-104 rode out the bumps better than a Cessna 150. The same probably applies to the drones.

I don't know what their crosswind restrictions are but I would be surprised if they matched those of most manned aircraft.

Their absolute biggest disadvantage is one I don't often, if at all, see addressed. They are controlled by radio. If you can control them from far away, couldn't some real smart guy on the other side overpower your signal and take your drone from you? I know it is hard to do, but can somebody truthfully tell me it is impossible.

On the cost question, comparing a drone to a P-3 or such is a false comparison. You should be comparing it to a civilian light fixed wing aircraft like a King Air or a Caravan. Those airplanes new are rather cheaper to buy and used ones are way cheaper. They have fair endurance and if you put in extra fuel tanks they can have good endurance. They don't crash much and they can fly in heavier weather and probably greater crosswinds.

Even a Caravan is faster than a Predator and a King Air is as fast as a Reaper and much cheaper. If called to go support a situation 80 miles away, a King Air can get there in about 20-25 minutes. Civilian manned aircraft last for decades. I doubt anybody will be flying a 2010 model Reaper in 2040.

If you wanted a manned airplane that will approach the endurance of a drone take an old regional airliner like an ATR-42, which unmodified can have up to 10 hours endurance, and modify it with some internal fuel tanks. Then you would have an manned airplane with that would would approach the practical endurance of a drone without the disadvantages. You could do the same thing with a Dash-8 or a Saab 340. You would however, have to avoid overloading it with sensors.

You can also fly these airplanes with civilian crews which would be much cheaper.

There are alternatives to drones out there that can do aspects of the job better.

[William F. Owen]

A survey of 550 FATA residents by a Pakistan based organisation found that 52 per cent of those surveyed considered the drones accurate. 58 per cent did not think anti-American sentiment had been inflamed by drone attacks, 70 per cent thought the Pakistani military should carry out targeted strikes, and 60 per cent judged that militant organisations were being damaged. If accurate and reliable, these figures fly in the face of popular reports.
...so why was anyone ever listening to "popular report" not based on empirical evidence?


Even a Caravan is faster than a Predator and a King Air is as fast as a Reaper and much cheaper. If called to go support a situation 80 miles away, a King Air can get there in about 20-25 minutes. Civilian manned aircraft last for decades. I doubt anybody will be flying a 2010 model Reaper in 2040.
Concur. the IDF has a large fleet of King Airs and has done for 20 years. They are actually far more useful than the UAVs for some missions.

If you wanted a manned airplane that will approach the endurance of a drone take an old regional airliner like an ATR-42, which unmodified can have up to 10 hours endurance, and modify it with some internal fuel tanks. Then you would have an manned airplane with that would would approach the practical endurance of a drone without the disadvantages. You could do the same thing with a Dash-8 or a Saab 340. You would however, have to avoid overloading it with sensors.
Again, concur. The case of UAVs is, just like "air power" vastly over stated.

[Entropy]

Like anything else, various UAV's and manned aircraft have advantages and disadvantages. Ideally you want a mix of capabilities.

The Air Force has the MC-12 "project liberty" aircraft deployed to do the manned-ISR mission. They are certainly better in some cases than UAV's.

[Woland]

Just to make a brief foray into the realms of hypothesising (I am J2, after all), how would the strategic - and tactical, for that matter - calculus alter if the Americans decide they would like to look at ways extending these drone strikes into the Quetta area? Could that policy co-exist with the reconciliation bribery initiative? Are the Taliban cammnders resident in Quetta more or less likely to reconcile if the threat of being killed in Quetta is real? At this stage I would think strikes would be a step too far for the Pakistanis, but I'd be surprised if it's something the Americans are not looking at.

[omarali50]

IF the US were to strike as far as Quetta, it would mean one of two things, and BOTH make actual drone targeting and tactical issues pretty much irrelevant:
1. Pakistan has agreed to such strikes. In that case, it means Pakistan has given up the "good taliban" (betrayed them?) and in that case, you dont really need drones, low paid pakistani police officers could do the job (and the surviving members of the "shura" would escape to the badlands or back into afghanistan, not stay in quetta). Individual terrorists can certainly hide in big cities, but then they are much more hidden to drones than they are to the local police.
My point is, if the Pakistani state ever decides to betray their friends, then its not a drone issue in big cities like Quetta (this is NOT the case in the tribal areas..there the pakistani state may have even less reach than the drones, so drones may be needed even if Pakistan is one hundred percent cooperative, as is maybe the case in South Waziristan?)
2. Pakistan has NOT agreed and the US has decided it doesnt care. In that case, the US has many more direct ways of making Pakistan change their mind and those would probably be much more important than hunting for a needle in haystack in a country where you dont have too much good intelligence. In other words, why look for an invisible shura in a "hostile" country when you can look for the very visible prime minister and have HIM change his mind about cooperation....
Just my amateur thoughts

[davidbfpo]

Dead Terrorists Tell No Tales:Is Barack Obama killing too many bad guys before the U.S. can interrogate them? is an article in FP: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/02/08/dead_terrorists_tell_no_tales

It is a good read and this is a 'taster':
Hold the applause. Obama's escalation of the "Predator War" comes at the very same time he has eliminated the CIA's capability to capture senior terrorist leaders alive and interrogate them for information on new attacks. The Predator has become for President Obama what the cruise missile was to President Bill Clinton -- an easy way to appear like he is taking tough action against terrorists, when he is really shying away from the hard decisions needed to protect the United States.

And ends with:
The fact that Obama's administration no longer does this when it locates senior terrorist leaders today means the president is voluntarily sacrificing intelligence that could protect the American people -- and that the U.S. homeland is at greater risk of a terrorist attack.

I trust that this aspect of CT has been fully debated inside government, although I am sceptical that any leader living in the FATA could be captured for interrogation.

Hypothetical scenario: the Nigerian bomber-to-be is id'd in a Yemeni city, shortly before he starts his journey to what we now know was Detroit. Attempt to capture or strike with high explosive?

[William F. Owen]

Hypothetical scenario: the Nigerian bomber-to-be is id'd in a Yemeni city, shortly before he starts his journey to what we now know was Detroit. Attempt to capture or strike with high explosive?
Give me the briefing pack and I'll give you an answer.... :wry:
Since he'll turn up at an airport, it seems like that might be a good place to give " 'im a tug" - a phrase I'm sure David is familiar with!

[tequila]

Dead Terrorists Tell No Tales:Is Barack Obama killing too many bad guys before the U.S. can interrogate them? is an article in FP: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/02/08/dead_terrorists_tell_no_tales

It is a good read and this is a 'taster':



I disagree - the article has little value except for partisan talking points. Note that complete and utter lack of any sort of question of whether or not snatch missions are even feasible. He simply asserts that they are not being tried or even considered because the President does not value intelligence for unknown reasons.

Thiessen's expertise comes via his experience as a speechwriter rather than an intelligence professional, and the title of his book gives his perspective. He is a torture advocate, and his primary problem is that Obama has ended the practice.

[S-2]

"Plus the author and group doing the polling are not fully id'd."

You reference a survey conducted by Ms. Farhat Taj of the Univ. of Oslo and a non-profit group called AIRRA (Mod's note their webpage is:http://www.airra.org/home/). Ms. Taj is an pashtun womens rights specialist and researcher from FATAville whose work is rapidly morphing into a crusade for the use of drones. I've had numerous e-mail conversations with her and she's done some interesting op-eds in the Pakistani dailies. Here are some of them to include the original survey-

Drone Attacks: A Survey-The NEWS March 5, 2009 (http://thenews.jang.com.pk/daily_detail.asp?id=165781)

Analysis: Drone Attacks-Challenging Some Fabrications NEWS Jan. 2, 2010 (http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2010\01\02\story_2-1-2010_pg3_5)

ANALYSIS: Drone attacks and US reputation-DAILY TIMES Feb. 6, 2010 (http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2010\02\06\story_6-2-2010_pg3_4)

Her cry was picked up by one op-ed columnist of whom I'm aware in Pakistan named Irfan Husain. His editorial is also worth the read-

Howling At The Moon-DAWN Irfan Husain Jan. 9, 2010 (http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/the-newspaper/columnists/14-irfan-husain-howling-at-the-moon-910-zj-11)

Ms. Taj contends that she's access to FATA IDPs inside camps in NWFP as well as other sources via phone. It makes for interesting reading. Still, I appreciate her perspectives and find that some of our leading voices in military academia to lack certain knowledge of target effect and populace reaction. In short, the area is highly isolated so claims of collateral damage and threats to Pakistani sovereignty strike me as fallacious and somewhat skewed.

Only the taliban know for certain who's been killed. Our intel have some idea. I doubt anybody else lacking special access has a clue.

Thanks.

[William F. Owen]

Ms. Taj contends that she's access to FATA IDPs inside camps in NWFP as well as other sources via phone. It makes for interesting reading. Still, I appreciate her perspectives and find that some of our leading voices in military academia to lack certain knowledge of target effect and populace reaction. In short, the area is highly isolated so claims of collateral damage and threats to Pakistani sovereignty strike me as fallacious and somewhat skewed.
When has ever killing the enemy ever been counter-productive?
Until serving officers and other other academics gather the collective balls to start questioning these "leading voices", about the rubbish they peddle, they frankly deserve to conned.

[S-2]

"Until serving officers and other other academics gather the collective balls to start questioning these "leading voices", about the rubbish they peddle, they frankly deserve to conned."

Well William, I've e-mail with one at U.S. Naval Post-Graduate School who's a department chair who's opposed named John Arquilla. His buddy Tom Johnson is opposed. Killcullen gave the classic testimony before Congress last April about only killing 12 HVTs and, I believe, Andrew Exum. Most seem to either fear some paktunwali-based backlash or violations of Pakistani sovereignty. The former seems overstated and the later duplicitous given the violations of Pakistani sovereignty by OBL, Haqqani, Hekmatyar, and Omar nevermind the various, chechyan, uighars, uzbeks and others scattered throughout FATAville.

Ms. Taj is embittered at the abandonment of the FATA people into the hands of these animals by the GoP. I suspect that's true. Most are aware of the devastation to the tribal maliks and I believe that represents only the tip of the iceberg there.

In anycase, I believe there is a subtle but discernable shift underway among the Pakistani polity from blatant opposition and into some more neutral ground. Most self-serving and largely a function of H. Mehsud's whacking. I spend a fair amount of time on a Pakistani defense board which caters to a rather "vibrant" crowd. We're hated but they're not often really sure why except that's the way it's supposed to be...oh, and Israel.:D

Thanks.

[William F. Owen]

Well William, I've e-mail with one at U.S. Naval Post-Graduate School who's a department chair who's opposed named John Arquilla. His buddy Tom Johnson is opposed. Killcullen gave the classic testimony before Congress last April about only killing 12 HVTs and, I believe, Andrew Exum.
I'll fully confess to not knowing the who said what or when, - but I cannot for the life of me work out how someone contends that killing your enemies (people who would kill you) is counter-productive because this breeds "more enemies," or "drones = cowardice" or any of the other "wonderfully insightful because it's counter-intuitive" twaddle gets peddled. If about end-state, not style!
Killing the enemy leadership is a sure fire proven, works 9 times out of 10, if done well, useful. The only time it could backfire is if you are killing people who are not your enemies.
IIRC some genius actually said, we shouldn't kill the enemies leaders becuase that leaves no one to negotiate with... seriously.... :mad:

[Fuchs]

I'll fully confess to not knowing the who said what or when, - but I cannot for the life of me work out how someone contends that killing your enemies (people who would kill you) is counter-productive because this breeds "more enemies," or "drones = cowardice" or any of the other "wonderfully insightful because it's counter-intuitive" twaddle gets peddled. If about end-state, not style!
Killing the enemy leadership is a sure fire proven, works 9 times out of 10, if done well, useful. The only time it could backfire is if you are killing people who are not your enemies.
IIRC some genius actually said, we shouldn't kill the enemies leaders becuase that leaves no one to negotiate with... seriously.... :mad:

The world seems to be more difficult than that.

Let's take the leader assassination thing:
The paralyze effect is only temporary. It's in a long conflict only valuable if you can exploit is well.
The loss of competence effect is considerable, but you may also have the adverse effect if you kill a leader who's relatively incompetent.
You lose your understanding of the enemy's habits, preferences, ability and possibly even intent. You need to re-learn about the opposing mind because a new mind replaces the old one.

Finally one complication that should be very familiar in your neighbourhood; the replacement leaders tend to be more extreme, aggressive and young than the original ones.


So yes, killing an enemy leader may actually be counter-productive.
Imagine Alexander had killed Darius in the first battle; someone better, less cowardly, might have replaced Darius and bested Alexander in the next battle.


Killing leaders is no surefire thing to anything if the enemy organization has prepared for this contingency. Think of the thousands of officers lost in battle during the World Wars. Organizations can often replace such losses - and even raise the competence level while doing so.


Furthermore, I subscribe to the Hydra theory in regard to Afghanistan.
It's a bit complicated, though. I dislike the whole high visibility approach to the meddling in AFG. To have many troops in place, to let them patrol, fight and kill adds arguments to the enemy's arsenal.
It would be much tougher to agitate against infidel foreigners if the villagers had never seen a foreigner or a bomber's contrail.
The more we intervene the more troubles are added to the problem (and the more we become their enemy instead fo merely an exogenous influence) and the lesser the efficiency of our intervention.

To kill more enemies isn't necessarily leading to a significantly better end state anyway. Few (para)military powers of history seem to have lasted till their point of total destruction.
The German military of 1945 had more tanks, aircraft and submarines in its arsenal than in 1939. The tremendous attrition of almost six years warfare was often overestimated in its significance. The exhaustion of the important age group (young, healthy males) by late '42 (physical and psychical exhaustion) coupled with the enemies' superiority in material and personnel quantities caused the turn of the war (just as in 1918). The absolute power of the German military (measured in hardware and personnel quantity) didn't really decline significantly in 1941-early1945.

The exhaustion is linked to attrition AND replacements - any move that adds more to replacements than to attrition is not going to help.

The physical destruction of Taliban may be necessary for the mopping up phase, but it would likely be a minor contributor to a turn of the war's course.
Meanwhile, the troubles associated with pushing up attrition may very well prevent such a turn.

[Rex Brynen]

There's no clear and unequivocal answer to this issue--the impact of leadership assassination (whether by drone or otherwise) is entirely contextually dependent.

On the positive side, it not only causes attrition of those who (may have) shown considerable skill in order to rise to their current level of command, but it also frequently causes a degree of internal paralysis as the organization concerned assesses how its security might have breached. In highly compartmentalized organizations, some information may be lost with the target. It may also send signals about who has the upper hand, or about the reach of the instigating country/organization, that have morale effects on the organization or the general population. It can deter.

On the other hand, it can backfire. It can be seen by the local population as a violation of local sovereignty. It can cause radicalization. It can be used as an aid to recruitment. It can have unforeseen second and third order effects. It can result in even more skilled leaders emerging, as Fuchs notes (Hizbullah/Nasrallah being a case in point). It can cause ###-for-tat killings, an expansion of the geography of confrontation, or uncontrolled escalation.

I can think of cases where the death of a leader had devastating consequences on an organization (Savimbi/UNITA, Zarqawi/AQI). It would have been pretty good too if someone had taken Hitler down before 1945. I can think of cases where assassination paid major operational dividends, but also somewhat strengthened the target organization politically (Ayyash/Hamas, Mughniyah/Hizbullah). There are cases where the operational effect was marginal, but the countervailing PR gains for the targeted organization were substantial (Israel's 1973 assassination of three PLO leaders in Beirut; Yassin/Hamas, or for that matter the PFLP assassination of Rehavam Ze'evi). There are cases where the diplomatic cost of the assassination outweighed the potential gain (Mishal/Hamas). There are cases where the short-term operational effects benefited the attacker, but there were unforeseen longer-term effects that offset these (Khalil al-Wazir/Fateh).

The point here is that this where diplomats, intel analysts, politicians, and perhaps even lawyers ought to earn their pay by doing some solid analytical thinking about costs, benefits, precedents, and contingencies, rather than reflexively adhering to the position that leadership assassination is always "good" or "bad."

[William F. Owen]

Finally one complication that should be very familiar in your neighbourhood; the replacement leaders tend to be more extreme, aggressive and young than the original ones.
OK, but since you can never tell the future, that's not a reason not to do it. The times where it does turn out to be counter-productive are not foreseeable and are very rare.

So yes, killing an enemy leader may actually be counter-productive.
Imagine Alexander had killed Darius in the first battle; someone better, less cowardly, might have replaced Darius and bested Alexander in the next battle.
Can you give me an actual example? - Which the enemy could have reasonably predicted?

Killing leaders is no surefire thing to anything if the enemy organization has prepared for this contingency. Think of the thousands of officers lost in battle during the World Wars. Organizations can often replace such losses - and even raise the competence level while doing so.
Nothing is war is "surefire." Killing enemy commanders is 9 out of 10 times works, and works well. There is simply no body of evidence to suggest it is not something you should not pursue aggressively.

To kill more enemies isn't necessarily leading to a significantly better end state anyway. Few (para)military powers of history seem to have lasted till their point of total destruction.
Sure. The German Army was 1 Million plus men when it surrendered, but it's will to fight was broken and killing achieved 90% of that.

The exhaustion is linked to attrition AND replacements - any move that adds more to replacements than to attrition is not going to help.
Sure. Tell Hannibal. Sooner or later you have to break the collective will to fight. You have to destroy more than they can replace and/or destroy the replacement mechanism.

The physical destruction of Taliban may be necessary for the mopping up phase, but it would likely be a minor contributor to a turn of the war's course.
The best way to "defend a population" is to kill those people seeking to harm it.

There's no clear and unequivocal answer to this issue--the impact of leadership assassination (whether by drone or otherwise) is entirely contextually dependent.
Agreed, but the context which makes counter-productive is rarely if ever foreseeable.

On the other hand, it can backfire. It can be seen by the local population as a violation of local sovereignty. It can cause radicalization. It can be used as an aid to recruitment. It can have unforeseen second and third order effects. It can result in even more skilled leaders emerging, as Fuchs notes (Hizbullah/Nasrallah being a case in point). It can cause ###-for-tat killings, an expansion of the geography of confrontation, or uncontrolled escalation.
Agreed, but all unknowable, but never a reason not do it.

....earn their pay by doing some solid analytical thinking about costs, benefits, precedents, and contingencies, rather than reflexively adhering to the position that leadership assassination is always "good" or "bad."
It's not a reflex. Evidence shows that 90% of the time it is better rather than worse, and the times when it is worse cannot be predicted with any certainty.

[Bob's World]

Killing leaders will indeed suppress current capabilities. It will at the same time largely add fuel to the larger causal issues of the insurgency, so that when it brews back up with new leaders it will be even more powerful of a threat the next time you have to deal with it.

There are no historical examples of where merely killing insurgents or their leadership has solved an insurgency, but it will suppress one. (threat-centric COIN)

Similarly there are no historical examples where an external party can come in and essentially buy off the populaces support to a government that they perceive as illegitimate. (Population-centric COIN) They'll take your money and smile, sure, and cut your throat with that same smile on their face.

These are both very symptomatic approaches that are far more likely to create short term, measurable effects than they are to create any kind of enduring solution.

A "Populace-Centric strategy" however, as often proposed by yours truely, suggests that we must look past our tactical noses and recognize that the enabling of effects that support and have the blessing of the populace are the key to success. Governments will come and go, we should not lash ourselves too tightly to any one of them. Threats will come and go, let them. The popualce, however, endures, and is the basis of our relations with any nation. We've been able to ignore them historically, and make good use of "Friendly Dictators" to service our national interests. It's a new world. We need to get out of the Dictator support business, and get into the populace empowerment business. The governments those empowered populaces devise will most likely be quite willing to work with us.

[William F. Owen]

There are no historical examples of where merely killing insurgents or their leadership has solved an insurgency, but it will suppress one. (threat-centric COIN)

So? That is the whole point! The military objective when working against insurgents is to ensure that do no gain their objective by military means/violence. That is sole aim of the military campaign!

The aim is to break the will of insurgency (the use of military/violent means) to pursue policy by violence and to force them to use non-violent political and diplomatic means.

[Fuchs]

Hmm, new words for a more clear message:

I understand Wilf's line as basically "kill the irreconcilables for victory".

My line is "You don't need to kill what's left of the enemy to defeat him."


Killing is an integral part of warfare, but it's usually overestimated in its importance. A military or warrior force that has fought for years won't suddenly have its will broken for fear of their lives. That works differently.

- enemies grew too powerful, numerous
- too many hopes (offensives) were disappointed
- too many days in combat have broken the veteran's utility for offensive actions
- attrition in the most critical group of men (young, healthy, aggressive) by several means (including POW, WIA) had critical influence on the force's ability to succeed in battle
- loss of too much terrain, no chance of further withdrawal
- insufficient logistical support for a long time
- enemy propaganda, internal political agitation
- disillusionment about the own leaders / leading class


Killing is a very usual component, but it's usually not sufficient in itself and there were few conflicts in history that led to total death of the enemy.
I think Wilf would furthermore be unable to show that any force has ever surrendered for exclusively the fear of getting killed otherwise - after having proved its courage in battle before.

There are on the other hand many examples where very different factors have led to victory. This is especially true in conflicts where the loser still had much to lose and thus strived to protect what was left.

In short; it's unnecessary to kill all or most of the irreconcilables. Nominal "victory"* can be achieved with better odds through other means - treating the killing as a side effect, some kind of cost of other actions.




I part the actions of war into three categories;
- supporting actions
- decisive actions
- unimportant actions

The unimportant ones create the huge noise and much of the cost of war. The hope is usually that their sum will help to win a war, but that's unlikely.
A sniper does not need to kill soldiers of an encircled unit that will surrender anyway once its water reserves run out, for example.

To kill much of the enemy (and at a faster rate than he can replace losses) would raise the cost of war and add many problems to the war. This includes the risk of creating resentment by sheer presence of foreigners.
Everyone here knows that polite soldiers in a war zone are the exception, especially in traffic and searching. It doesn't help that the only Muslim NATO ally, Turkey, doesn't provide a large force for the war (I wonder why there's almost no critique of this, but much critique on those who provide many, but not as many as wished auxiliary troops?).


I would be content with the military balance in place - the Taliban are incapable of using about 99% of war's repertoire because of the extreme difference in capabilities. Meanwhile, the foreigners are incapable of about 90% due to logistical, geographical and political issues.
The little remaining combat - minelaying, occasional attacks on outposts, occasional ambushes, harrassing fires - represents a very low level of activity in comparison to other wars. I doubt that much more can be achieved militarily without actually worsening the situation in other regards.

The reason is simple; the initiative is theirs. THEY decide on the intensity of warfare, on the degree of their exposure to their enemies' strengths.
They can reduce their exposure whenever they cannot stand the pain any more. They can increase their activity (and thus exposure) when they have recovered and regained confidence.
Their political strength isn't much in danger when they decide to expose themselves to achieve more in combat.

A fencer in the dark will not succeed to kill all cats around him unless they close in voluntarily.

The "kill" path is a short dead end. It doesn't lead to their defeat.
Other routes whose vector includes partially the same direction may still be open and lead to nominal 'victory',


----------
*: I doubt that OEF/ISAF will ever be able to claim that they met the most rational definition of victory; they will never be able to claim that waging the war post '02 was better than not to wage it at all.
They may sometime be able to claim a lesser type of victory; the lack of success of the enemy, possibly even meeting the (ill-conceived) political goals for the conflict.

[S-2]

"A "Populace-Centric strategy" however, as often proposed by yours truely, suggests that we must look past our tactical noses and recognize that the enabling of effects that support and have the blessing of the populace are the key to success. Governments will come and go, we should not lash ourselves too tightly to any one of them. Threats will come and go, let them. The popualce, however, endures, and is the basis of our relations with any nation."

So Bob, in the absence of solid data indicating that PREDATOR is killing vast sums of innocents for a paucity of terrorists and in light of Ms. Taj's contentions otherwise, what's your view on drone strikes in FATAville?

Thanks.

[Bob's World]

So? That is the whole point! The military objective when working against insurgents is to ensure that do no gain their objective by military means/violence. That is sole aim of the military campaign!

The aim is to break the will of insurgency (the use of military/violent means) to pursue policy by violence and to force them to use non-violent political and diplomatic means.

And I agree that over the past span of recorded history such temporal success have been sufficient to allow the National interests to be serviced with little threat of popular blowback on the folks back home. A deployed army and a Friendly Dictator took care of the occasional dust up.

I just don't think these are tactics that work in the modern age. Info has everyone too linked; and Jet travel has us too close to each other. What happens on the edges of the empire no longer stays on the edges of the empire.

It lands on your front stoop like a burning bag of ####.

[William F. Owen]

Killing is an integral part of warfare, but it's usually overestimated in its importance. A military or warrior force that has fought for years won't suddenly have its will broken for fear of their lives. That works differently.

I agree and that is not my point.

I just adhere to history and Clausewitz. Killing is what breaks will. Defeat occurs when either the People, Leadership/Government, or Armed Force, (The trinity) cannot continue armed operations.

In Vietnam, the US Army was happy to go on fighting. The US People were not. Why? 57,000 dead. In Mogadishu, 18 dead broke President Clinton's will to persist with military action.

In the Falklands the Argentine Government and People wanted to fight on, the Army could not/would not.

Hannibal killed lots of Romans. He never broke their "trinity's" collective will to fight and in the end his Army was destroyed - via killing.

In 1945 Japan's Army and people were prepared to fight. Not so the Japanese Government after 2 x Atom Bombs - and they lost more civilians dead to conventional bombing.

Killing is the primary mechanism in the breaking of will. You may not have to kill that many to break will (Moa: Kill one, frighten a thousand) but you do have to kill. The skill in warfare is how effectively (and efficiently) you kill to secure the political purpose set by your leadership. That has always been the case and it will never change.

[Bob's World]

So Bob, in the absence of solid data indicating that PREDATOR is killing vast sums of innocents for a paucity of terrorists and in light of Ms. Taj's contentions otherwise, what's your view on drone strikes in FATAville?

Thanks.

To me, the greatest insights into the minds of those who live in the FATA were the words of a village elder there to one of our guys during the first operation of the Pakistani military up into that region back in 2002:

"You must appreciate, we really do not like the government forces coming up into our territory; but you we do not mind, because you are here for revenge...and revenge we understand."

But this was back when Pakistan was a largely stable country, and the government forces largely restricted their activities to the Indus River valley.

[William F. Owen]

I just don't think these are tactics that work in the modern age. Info has everyone too linked; and Jet travel has us too close to each other. What happens on the edges of the empire no longer stays on the edges of the empire.

It lands on your front stoop like a burning bag of ####.

It never did. Information is information. The Victorians had Telegraph. We've had radio since the 1920's. The catastrophic effect of Amritsar Massacre (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jallianwala_Bagh_massacre) would be as decisive today as it was then. The actions of the British Army torture gangs in Ireland, basically lost the UK the war.
The bombing of Guernica caused outrage, as did the sacking of Peking. Martin Luther set Europe on fire by word of mouth.

Mai Lai massacre? - covered up for 18 months. There is no proof the internet would have made that less likely. Youtube footage of atrocities in Darfur?

The modern information age has not made the violence in Darfur, Bosnia, Sri-Lanka, or even Gaza any less likely in the future.

The idea that the information age has made changed "War" is faith based and evidence free. The sheer quantity of information has not changed it's quality. or it's meaning.
The information age, has not shown UFO's exist or that ET walks amongst us.

[Fuchs]

I agree and that is not my point.

I just adhere to history and Clausewitz. Killing is what breaks will. Defeat occurs when either the People, Leadership/Government, or Armed Force, (The trinity) cannot continue armed operations.

In Vietnam, the US Army was happy to go on fighting. The US People were not. Why? 57,000 dead. In Mogadishu, 18 dead broke President Clinton's will to persist with military action.

In the Falklands the Argentine Government and People wanted to fight on, the Army could not/would not.

Hannibal killed lots of Romans. He never broke their "trinity's" collective will to fight and in the end his Army was destroyed - via killing.

In 1945 Japan's Army and people were prepared to fight. Not so the Japanese Government after 2 x Atom Bombs - and they lost more civilians dead to conventional bombing.

Killing is the primary mechanism in the breaking of will. You may not have to kill that many to break will (Moa: Kill one, frighten a thousand) but you do have to kill. The skill in warfare is how effectively (and efficiently) you kill to secure the political purpose set by your leadership. That has always been the case and it will never change.

I doubt that these examples are relevant to the AFG case.

The U.S. withdrew from conflicts when its interest in the region was little more than a delusion.
The TB's interest in the reason is almost a question of existence (I doubt that the Pakistan TB would last long as an important player if the AFG TB failed).

It's excessively difficult to break the enemy's will by killing under such conditions. KIA can be replaced and the fight can go on.
I already explained why I don't believe in a sustained higher KIA rate than replacement rate in this conflict.

The will needs to be broken by other means. The overall situation needs to become hopeless. High casualties that can be replaced are no indicator for hopelessness.

A radio series of a very high-ranking and charismatic cleric who explains that god doesn't influence wars - neither in favour nor against Muslim fighters - might be more helpful than 20,000 dead TB.



By the way; the decisive factor that lead to Carthago's defeat in the 2nd Punic War was the defection of their Nubian allies. The war was won by diplomacy long before Scipio was capable of doing so by force.

[William F. Owen]

It's excessively difficult to break the enemy's will by killing under such conditions. KIA can be replaced and the fight can go on.
I already explained why I don't believe in a sustained higher KIA rate than replacement rate in this conflict.
It is difficult, but not excessively so. I just depends how good you are at doing it. If you do not have enough troops with the right training, it may actually be impossible - so you are out of the Warfare business altogether - the reason why NATO is hand-wringing over EBO/Influence Operations is not because they are proven more effective, but they are not prepared to commit and risk the resources to do what is known to work.

The will needs to be broken by other means. The overall situation needs to become hopeless. High casualties that can be replaced are no indicator for hopelessness.
What "other means" break will? Persuasion and negotiation do not "break will" - Breaking of will means a decision forced upon you, via violence or the effects of violence. How do you make a situation hopeless without killing or threatening to kill?

A radio series of a very high-ranking and charismatic cleric who explains that god doesn't influence wars - neither in favour nor against Muslim fighters - might be more helpful than 20,000 dead TB.
OK, all good. Essentially it's their leadership telling them to desist from violence. How do you force him to say that?

By the way; the decisive factor that lead to Carthago's defeat in the 2nd Punic War was the defection of their Nubian allies. The war was won by diplomacy long before Scipio was capable of doing so by force.
...and Nubians changed sides why? Political conditions set by violence.

Seriously, what is the argument here? What in Clausewitz's basic dictum is incorrect? Diplomacy and warfare are closely related, yet utterly distinct from each other.

Killing the enemy's armed force may be very difficult and hard to do. If you lack the ability to do it well, then it's useless. If you are skilled and committed, then it is never counter-productive, given a strategic aim that can be obtained via violence, and that aim is worth the price of the resources needed.

[S-2]

"You must appreciate, we really do not like the government forces coming up into our territory; but you we do not mind, because you are here for revenge...and revenge we understand."

Yeah, vendetta runs strong in dem dar hills but, as you said, that was a while ago. Ms. Taj says the tribals feel squeezed between the army and the militants. She suggests the Pakistani army slings a lot more hardware without regard than the drones might ever do.

Of course, we wouldn't know as the ISPR has put the press damper on every op from Bajaur, SWAT/Buner, S. Waziristan and into Orakzai now. No way to tell.

Anyway, great quote.

Thanks.

[davidbfpo]

Leaving aside the timing of the story, an interesting development reported by the BBC:http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/8527268.stm


The Israeli Air Force has introduced a fleet of pilotless aircraft that can stay in the air for nearly a day and fly as far as the Gulf.

[davidbfpo]

Regarding my post No.31 on an opinion poll in the FATA, thanks to S-2 for fully identifying the research and I've now found that the polling appeared on another thread far earlier in 2009:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=6801

That thread has more details on the polling if it helps the discussion.

[William F. Owen]

Leaving aside the timing of the story, an interesting development reported by the BBC:http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/8527268.stm

IT was announced 5 years ago!! I've touched the damn thing 4 years ago and walked all around it. This is an old, old story. - You can even see it on Wikipedia 3 years ago.

[davidbfpo]

Clearly the BBC editorial team need to be asked - why publicise now this old news? Very odd given the Dubai furore at the moment.

[davidbfpo]

A short paper The Year of the Drone: An Analysis of U.S. Drone Strikes in Pakistan, 2004-2010 by Peter Bergen and Katherine Tiedemann, which appears on: http://counterterrorism.newamerica.net/PRIVOXY-FORCE/sites/newamerica.net/files/policydocs/bergentiedemann_0.pdf

My web access defences inserted the Privoxy Force text, so readers may need to access the website as:http://counterterrorism.newamerica.ne (http://counterterrorism.newamerica.net)

Within I noted:
In total, between 100 and 150 Westerners are believed to have traveled to the FATA in 2009.25 So far, however, none of these militants has been able to carry out an attack in the West.

The paper concludes:
The drone attacks in the tribal regions seem to remain the only viable option for the United States to take on the militants based there who threaten the lives of Afghans, Pakistanis, and Westerners alike.

[Pete]

Ben Macintyre of The Times of London argues that American drone strikes are a de facto policy of state-sponsored assassination. Rather than condemning the practice outright, his commentary in The Times of March 25, 2010 asks that the policy be publicly acknowledged and justified as a legitimate policy instrument.


President Obama has ordered more drone strikes on terrorist targets in his first year in office than President Bush did in two terms. Of the 99 drone attacks carried out in Pakistan since 2004, 89 occurred after January 2008; last year there were a record 50 drone strikes, up from 31 the year before.

America’s preferred euphemism is “targeted killing”; on the ground the procedure is called “find, fix and finish”. The Obama Administration prefers the term “elimination” to “assassination”, yet that is what is taking place.

The CIA’s targeted killings may be justified on legal, ethical and practical grounds: if a gun it pointed at your head, violent self-defence is a reasonable response. The problem is that the Obama Administration has not sought to justify, or even properly acknowledge, its tactics, just as Israel has neither admitted nor defended the al-Mabhouh hit.

The entire piece can be read by clicking here (http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/columnists/ben_macintyre/article7074776.ece).

[jmm99]

that we are at war with a number of groups (AQ-Taliban as a generalized tag), one finds it very difficult to justify direct action whether via a drone or a .338 Lapua Mag. Targeted killing cannot be justified under a pure law enforcement approach. It can be and is justified under Military Law.

[William F. Owen]

Ben Macintyre of The Times of London argues that American drone strikes are a de facto policy of state-sponsored assassination. Rather than condemning the practice outright, his commentary in The Times of March 25, 2010 asks that the policy be publicly acknowledged and justified as a legitimate policy instrument.

This is like listening to an 8-year old (Ben Macintyre) discuss sex. The object in war is to kill the enemy. Is it "ethical" to kill the enemy? War is done by states, against states, or within states (of societies/groups constituted as such). War is killing for political purpose. Is that ethical?

Politics is what people believe to be ethical, so War is always ethical in the eyes of those setting forth the policy.

[jmm99]

HT to NRO's Weekend "The Corner", Friday, March 26, 2010, Harold Koh on Targeted Killing of Terrorists (http://corner.nationalreview.com/post/?q=MTljNjE0OTIxN2VlYTA3NTg3NjZmY2JkZWYxZGE3NGU=), by Ed Whelan, re: yesterday's speech to the American Society of International Law by Harold Koh, DoS Legal Adviser.

From the ASIL Press Release (http://www.asil.org/files/KohatAnMtg100325.pdf), as summed by NRO:


[I]t is the considered view of this administration…that targeting practices, including lethal operations conducted with the use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), comply with all applicable law, including the laws of war….As recent events have shown, Al Qaeda has not abandoned its intent to attack the United States, and indeed continues to attack us. Thus, in this ongoing armed conflict, the United States has the authority under international law, and the responsibility to its citizens, to use force, including lethal force, to defend itself, including by targeting persons such as high-level al Qaeda leaders who are planning attacks….[T]his administration has carefully reviewed the rules governing targeting operations to ensure that these operations are conducted consistently with law of war principles, including:

- First, the principle of distinction, which requires that attacks be limited to military objectives and that civilians or civilian objects shall not be the object of the attack; and

- Second, the principle of proportionality, which prohibits attacks that may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, that would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.

In U.S. operations against al Qaeda and its associated forces – including lethal operations conducted with the use of unmanned aerial vehicles – great care is taken to adhere to these principles in both planning and execution, to ensure that only legitimate objectives are targeted and that collateral damage is kept to a minimum.…

[S]ome have suggested that the very use of targeting a particular leader of an enemy force in an armed conflict must violate the laws of war. But individuals who are part of such an armed group are belligerent and, therefore, lawful targets under international law….[S]ome have challenged the very use of advanced weapons systems, such as unmanned aerial vehicles, for lethal operations. But the rules that govern targeting do not turn on the type of weapon system involved, and there is no prohibition under the laws of war on the use of technologically advanced weapons systems in armed conflict – such as pilotless aircraft or so-called smart bombs – so long as they are employed in conformity with applicable laws of war….[S]ome have argued that the use of lethal force against specific individuals fails to provide adequate process and thus constitutes unlawful extrajudicial killing. But a state that is engaged in armed conflict or in legitimate self-defense is not required to provide targets with legal process before the state may use lethal force. Our procedures and practices for identifying lawful targets are extremely robust, and advanced technologies have helped to make our targeting even more precise. In my experience, the principles of distinction and proportionality that the United States applies are not just recited at meeting. They are implemented rigorously throughout the planning and execution of lethal operations to ensure that such operations are conducted in accordance with all applicable law….Fourth and finally, some have argued that our targeting practices violate domestic law, in particular, the long-standing domestic ban on assassinations. But under domestic law, the use of lawful weapons systems – consistent with the applicable laws of wear – for precision targeting of specific high-level belligerent leaders when acting in self-defense or during an armed conflict is not unlawful, and hence does not constitute ‘assassination.’

The full text is at The Obama Administration and International Law (http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/139119.htm) (Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of State Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law, Washington, DC, March 25, 2010).

This speech surprised some because of Mr Koh's prior views (before entering the Obama Administration). E.g., see Kenneth Anderson, Bleg for Harold Koh’s ASIL Speech (http://opiniojuris.org/2010/03/25/bleg-for-harold-kohs-asil-speech/), vs. Kenneth Anderson, Predators Over Pakistan (http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1561229).

Both legal and practical aspects are covered more fully in this thread, HVTs/Political Assassination (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=4025&highlight=Targeted+Killing), and its many links.

Regards

Mike

[davidbfpo]

Hat tip to Abu M. A report on a debate at the International Spy Museum, Washington DC and in particular Bruce Riedel's comments.

Link:http://www.cnas.org/blogs/abumuqawama/2010/04/drone-strikes.html

[davidbfpo]

An odd story in the UK, from a Russian company:
Defence experts are warning of a new danger of ballistic weapons proliferation after a Russian company started marketing a cruise missile that can be launched from a shipping container.

Link, with animated video:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/russia/7632543/A-cruise-missile-in-a-shipping-box-on-sale-to-rogue-bidders.html

[GI Zhou]

Definitely odd especially these so called defence experts? Cruise misiles have been launched from containers for decades.

[William F. Owen]

Definitely odd especially these so called defence experts? Cruise misiles have been launched from containers for decades.
Concur. I know both Rob Hewson and Reuben Johnson, very well. The problem is Robert Harding's is looking for a story that is entertaining, not factual.

[slapout9]

I had a different take on the article. The technology is not new but it is becoming more affordable to 3rd world countries and/or non-country terrorist organizations. If the Russian company is willing to sell it to them.

[William F. Owen]

Club in a box (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rqwMzQiXlK0)

Very Toyota Horde!

[OccamsRazor]

Yes - I suppose that's a rather broad hypothesis, but I hope that I explain my stance a bit clearer here (http://www.currentintelligence.net/features/2010/6/16/obamas-guantanamo-bay.html).

Also, if you haven't checked out Current Intelligence, it has some interesting analysis that tends to complement SWJ.

I'd be interested in hearing any feedback on the article.

Bill

[Polarbear1605]

I agree with what you state but in my opinion we are getting back to a fundamental debate that either we use the Rules of Law or the Laws of War in the War on Terrorism. Recognizing that neither is a perfect fit, you have to make a call and once you make that call you adapt that system (work to change either the Rules of Law or the Laws of War) to the War on Terrorism. To a certain extent, I think we saw this immediately after 9/11 in the Bush administration. They picked the Laws of War and then extended the Executive Branch powers in an attempt to cover some of those gaps. Of course the SCOTUS, pulled those powers back or limited them in a couple of SCOTUS Cases (e.g. - Whoever-vs- Rumsfeld). Good examples of the Executive and Judicial Branch working in contention … like it should. I have also seen arguments that the Bush administration was not consistent with this approach and agree. Of course then we have Congress and our two party system. Picking one of two non-perfect systems means the opposition party will always rail against the picked system on the basis of the other. For example, when a drone pilot kills a bad guy and “others” a case for murder (elements of proof) can be made using the Rules of Law. Intent is certainly there along with a plan and bodies. Under the Laws of War both the target and the collateral damage can be justified under the principle of military necessity.

[OccamsRazor]

I think in many ways you're correct. You can probably make this fit into that construct - the "which rule of law do we use" debate.

If anything, I think it's an interesting butterfly effect. You make certain declarations and actions about due process domestically, and all of a sudden you don't have any type of working system for foreign HVTs.

What's an administration to do? Keep calm and carry on - fire up the drones - much like the Bush administration did with Gitmo, until it reared up and backfired in the second half of his presidency.

I think it's likely that this may do the same.

[slapout9]

I think Drone Strikes are Maneuver Warfare, and like Colonel Wyly says "War has no truck with rules" it is just a fight for survival.

[jmm99]

I can't answer the question asked (as the title of this thread) because I don't have the foggiest idea what rationales drive the Obama administration to do what they do.

I can say firstly the drone strikes (and implicitly all direct action taken against HVTs) are based on the Laws of War. See this post, A timely response from the Obama Administration (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=95582&postcount=66), in the Drone Paradox thread (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?p=95582). Just a snip from LA Koh's statement:


[I]t is the considered view of this administration…that targeting practices, including lethal operations conducted with the use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), comply with all applicable law, including the laws of war….As recent events have shown, Al Qaeda has not abandoned its intent to attack the United States, and indeed continues to attack us. Thus, in this ongoing armed conflict, the United States has the authority under international law, and the responsibility to its citizens, to use force, including lethal force, to defend itself, including by targeting persons such as high-level al Qaeda leaders who are planning attacks….[T]his administration has carefully reviewed the rules governing targeting operations to ensure that these operations are conducted consistently with law of war principles, including:

- First, the principle of distinction, which requires that attacks be limited to military objectives and that civilians or civilian objects shall not be the object of the attack; and

- Second, the principle of proportionality, which prohibits attacks that may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, that would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.

In U.S. operations against al Qaeda and its associated forces – including lethal operations conducted with the use of unmanned aerial vehicles – great care is taken to adhere to these principles in both planning and execution, to ensure that only legitimate objectives are targeted and that collateral damage is kept to a minimum.…

Both legal and practical aspects are covered more fully in this thread, HVTs/Political Assassination (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=4025&highlight=Targeted+Killing&page=2), and its many links.

I can say secondly that our detention policy is also firmly based on the Laws of War - e.g., take a look at these posts in the War Crimes thread (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=4921&page=12) (all on page 12):

222 - Obama DoJ "refines" the standard for detention !!

223 - Statements about the new standard ...

225 - DoJ Memorandum re: detention

226 - continuation of DoJ memo ...

227 - Well, George, if you are asking my opinion on this ...

The key statement in this package is from #226:


Moreover, the Commentary to Additional Protocol II draws a clear distinction between individuals who belong to armed forces or armed groups (who may be attacked and, a fortiori, captured at any time) and civilians (who are immune from direct attack except when directly participating in hostilities). That Commentary provides that “[t]hose who belong to armed forces or armed groups may be attacked at any time.” See ICRC, Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 Aug. 1949 and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Additional Protocol II), ¶ 4789.

(emphasis added). Thus, both direct actions and detentions have the AUMF as their base and are clearly based on the Laws of War.

The Rule of Law (domestic laws, whether in the US or in foreign countries) has nothing to do with either direct actions or detentions.

How did the Rule of Law get into this discussion ? Because folks in the Bush II and Obama administration wanted, or felt it necessary, to go beyond detention and prosecute crimininally. The criminal prosecution approach (going back to the Clinton administration) could go either of two routes: military commissions (Bush II prime choice) or Federal courts (Obama prime choice). In either, the procedures (due process) are spelled out.

Regards

Mike

[jmm99]

O'Hara aka OccamsRazor has an article at SWJ linked by SWJBlog, Drone Attacks and Just War Theory (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/541-ohaire.pdf) (link to pdf). Its BLUF:


Final Thoughts

The principles of distinction and proportionality are integral to the premise that wars should be conducted in a limited fashion. Derived from theologians in the just war and natural law traditions, these principles have made their way into statutory law, as exemplified by Additional Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions. But what is the best way to interpret these provisions? Does one trust the ICRC guidance, or guidance provided by either hawkish or pacifistic legal scholars? This paper‟s answer was to evaluate which perspective best fit the construct of JWT. While perhaps not always the perfect answer, it is a useful guide in sorting through the various interpretations of distinction and proportionality held in international law. Now, more than ever - with the Obama administration‟s use of targeted killing so prevalent - does this dialogue about drone attacks need to occur.[111]

111 See Jane Perlez and Pir Zubair Shah, Drones Batter Al Qaeda and Its Allies Within Pakistan, N.Y. Times, April 4, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/05/world/asia/05drones.html?ref=instapundit.

This thread seems more appropriate for this article than the Drone Paradox thread (which deals more with the military and political aspects) - and it is O'Razor's thread.

Some general articles on "Just War Theory" (which has a large theological component):

Just War - Wiki (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Just_War)

Just War Theory - IEP (http://www.iep.utm.edu/justwar/)

JustWarTheory.com (http://www.justwartheory.com/) (many links to multi-variant sources)

War - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/war/)

Principles of the Just War (http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/pol116/justwar.htm)

The concepts governing a "just war" can certainly vary - even within the same religious tradition. E.g., compare these Roman Catholic resources:

The Just War Theory: A traditional Catholic moral view (http://www.the-tidings.com/2006/0825/benson.htm)

Catholic Just War (http://www.catholicjustwar.org/doctrine.asp)

There Can Be A Just War: Teaching of St. Thomas Aquinas (http://www.christendomisfightingback.com/Christian_War_Doctrine/St._Thomas_Aquinas.html)

There Can Be A Just War: Teaching of St. Augustine (http://www.christendomisfightingback.com/Christian_War_Doctrine/St._Augustine.html)

Thus, no easy answers exist here; and one must credit Bill for tackling this subject (which I would duck).

Speaking of tackling, how many days to go until Navy beats Army ? :D

Regards

Mike

[Bob's World]

Damn the lawyers anyway! :D

We say we are "at war" so that we can invoke wartime authorities to do things that would not be allowed if we were "at peace" and operating under law enforcement authorities. Not only would we not be able to do these drone strikes, but arguably would have to pack up our tent in Afghanistan and go home from there as well.

Yet logic tells us that we are not really at war. If we were in the beginning, the ends that justified that status have long been met. So while we open ourselves up to the tremendous strategic risk of "losing a war," we don't dare call it over for concern over the tactical risks of losing wartime authorities....

Hmm. We've made a sticky mess of this.

Personally, my vote is drop the war facade. We really don't need it. Anyone who really needs killing will still get killed, and we will have set the legal and strategic framework for moving on to a broader approaches that are less likely to violate the sovereignty of others in ways that tend to validate the very points that AQ makes about the US to fuel acts of terrorism against us in the first place.

Constraints can be good. It was the lack of constraints in Iraq and Afghanistan that got us so deep in those two theaters, and it was the presence of constraints that kept us from overreacting in places like the Philippines and Indonesia. Constraints help one to make the right decisions, while the lack of constraints often enables poor decision making. The US has been operating without effective restraint for too long now. Since about 1989, in fact.

I remember when it was a big deal when the U.S. violated another nation's airspace, or dropped a bomb on some sovereign nation or another. We should make it a big deal again.

[jmm99]

(1) We are engaged in an armed conflict with AQ - and you yourself have stated that AQ is engaged in unconventional warfare against us. Under LE rules, direct actions to kill would be illegal - period, full stop.

(2) The argument about the US violating other national sovereignty is a red herring - at least to the extent that it seeks to make direct actions illegal vice the persons attacked. If we violate sovereignty, the violated nation (not the terrs we kill) have remedies under I Law. In most cases, they seem to have exercised the remedy of diplomatic protest. Fine; once the protest is made, I Law is satisfied. Or, the violated nation could sue for damages, etc.; but they seem not to do that. Instead, they take our billions in foreign aid. :(

Your construct seems to include only "war" (in an all-out sense) or "peace" (which involves only LE rules). I'd say that TVNSAs (Transnational, Violent, Non-State Actors) present us - by their choice, not ours - with a middle ground (armed conflicts, usually of lower intensity than conventional war).

Regards, despite definite disagreement

Mike

[Bob's World]

Mike, perhaps you can agree with me. I have no problem with declaring an open season on AQ, so long as we have the wisdom to not allow the intel guys to slap that label on every nationalist insurgency movement they assoaciate with. And also the wisdom to not be manipulated by shady allied leaders who just want us to help them but the beat down on their own insurgent populace. I just think its time to retire the "We are at war" mantra. It makes us sound weak and scared, and enables thinking that makes us act like a bully with allies and opponents allike.

Wars carry too much strategic risk; and law enforcement does not work well on those who take their primary sanctuary in being outside the law. To paraphrase Huey Lewis: "I want a new construct." Like Huey's problem, our current program may make us feel good in the short term, but the side effects are brutal.

(I want a new drug One that won't make me sick One that won' make me crash my car Or make me feel three feet thickI want a new drug One that won't hurt my head One that won't make my mouth too dry Or make my eyes too redOne that won't make me nervous Wondering what to do One that makes me feel like I feel when I'm with you When I'm alone with youI want a new drug One that won't spill One that don't cost too much Or come in a pillI want a new drug One that won't go away One that won't keep me up all night One that won't make me sleep all dayOne that won't make me nervous Wondering what to do One that makes me feel like I feel when I'm with you When I'm alone with you I'm alone with you babyI want a new drug One that does what it should One that won't make me feel too bad One that won't make me feel too goodI want a new drug One with no doubt One that won't make me talk too much Or make my face break outOne that won't make me nervous Wondering what to do One that makes me feel like I feel when I'm with you When I'm alone with you)

[davidbfpo]

Sub-titled:
President Obama is ordering a record number of Predator strikes. An exclusive interview with a man who approved ‘lethal operations.

Link:http://www.newsweek.com/2011/02/13/inside-the-killing-machine.html

An odd article from Newsweek, largely around the ex-CIA senior lawyer talking; yes a book is coming. Nothing startling, especially having heard another ex-CIA lawyer talking.

[jmm99]

but the picture I glean from the Newsweek article is that he is something of a legend in his own mind.

NYT search on John A. Rizzo (http://topics.nytimes.com/topics/reference/timestopics/people/r/john_a_rizzo/index.html)

John A. Rizzo Confirmation Hearing Statement (https://www.cia.gov/news-information/speeches-testimony/2007/john-a-rizzos-opening-statement-at-confirmation-hearing.html) - an outline of the branches in the agency's Office of General Counsel at end.

The article adds nothing to the serious legal discussion re: targeted killings and the AUMF.

Regards

Mike

[jmm99]

Here is a pre-publication draft by Bobby Chesney (one of the folks at Lawfare (http://www.lawfareblog.com/)), Who May Be Killed? Anwar al-Awlaki as a Case Study in the International Legal Regulation of Lethal Force (http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1754223).

Its abstract:


Anwar al-Awlaki is a dual Yemeni-American citizen who has emerged in recent years as a leading English-language proponent of violent jihad, including explicit calls for the indiscriminate murder of Americans. According to the U.S. government, moreover, he also has taken on an operational leadership role with the organization al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), recruiting and directing individuals to participate in specific acts of violence. Does international law permit the U.S. government to kill al-Awlaki in these circumstances?

Part I opens with a discussion of what we know about AQAP, about al-Awlaki himself, and about the U.S. government’s purported decision to place him on a list of individuals who may be targeted with lethal force in certain circumstances.

Part II then explores objections to killing al-Awlaki founded in the U.N. Charter’s restraints on the use of force in international affairs. I conclude that a substantial case can be made, at least for now, both that Yemen has consented to the use of such force on its territory and that in any event the conditions associated with the right of self-defense enshrined in Article 51 can be satisfied.

Part III then turns to objections rooted in IHL and IHRL, beginning with the question whether an attack on al-Awlaki would fall within IHL’s field of application.

I conclude that the threshold of armed conflict has been crossed in two relevant respects. First, it has been crossed in Yemen itself as between AQAP on one hand and the U.S. and Yemeni governments on the other. Second, it has been crossed as well with respect to the United States and the larger al Qaeda network – and not only within the geopolitical borders of Afghanistan. Building from these premises, I then proceed to consider whether al-Awlaki could be targeted consistent with IHL’s principle of distinction. I conclude that he can be if he is in fact an operational leader within AQAP, as this role would render him a functional combatant in an organized armed group.

Should the analysis instead turn on IHRL, however, the central issue becomes the requirement of necessity inherent in IHRL’s protection for the right-to-life, and in particular the notion of temporal necessity. I conclude that this requirement is not an obstacle to attacking al-Awlaki insofar as (i) there is substantial evidence that he is planning terrorist attacks, (ii) there is no plausible opportunity to incapacitate him with non-lethal means, and (iii) there is not good reason to believe that a plausible non-lethal opportunity to incapacitate him will arise before harm to others occurs.

A second question then arises, however. Must al-Awlaki be linked to a specific plot to carry out a particular attack, or is it enough that the evidence establishes that he can and will attempt or otherwise be involved in attacks in the future without specificity as to what the particulars of those attacks might be? The former approach has the virtue of clarity, yet could rarely be satisfied given the clandestine nature of terrorism. The latter approach necessarily runs a greater risk of abuse and thus perhaps justifies an especially high evidentiary threshold, but in any event it is a more realistic and more appropriate approach (particularly from the point of view of the potential victims of future terrorist attacks).

Prof. Chesney asks a fairly narrow question: "Does international law permit the U.S. government to kill al-Awlaki in these circumstances?" Placing that question front and foremost gives too much primacy to the "law" as the decisive factor in dealing with Mr al-Awlaki and others in his group.

A different approach (which eventually gets to the "law") would start with the policy choice between the packages of strategy and tactics, available or which could be developed, to neutralize (kill, capture or convert) the target group. The policy choice could range from a purely "law enforcement" approach (in which targeted killing is far from the norm) to a purely "military" approach (in which targeted killing is the norm - in the setting of a conventional war under the least restrictive ROEs ) - with mixtures of those approaches along the spectrum.

Having decided on a package of strategy and tactics, one then should approach the "law" to see what is available "off the shelf". One should fully realize that the "law" is not an immutable omnipresence in the sky; and often can be shaped or even changed to meet the needs of the strategy and tactics selected. Good lawyers shape (or at least try to shape) the "law" every day.

Of course, if you believe that the "law" is simply immutable, then you cannot accept my suggestion.

A similar disconnect involves who decides what the "law" is (lots of room for some Clintonesque parsing of "is"). My position is that that decision is a policy decision which belongs to the governmental branch or branches constitutionally empowered to decide.

In matters of foreign and military policy, the courts should rarely be involved with those political questions. They should not be decided by legal academics; e.g., The Lexington Principles Project (http://law.wlu.edu/lexingtonprinciples/):


A Transnational Legal Process Approach to Due Process

The Lexington Principles on the Rights of Detainees is a new body of international due process principles reflecting the prevailing transnational norms in the area of detainee treatment. The final principles were completed on April 1, 2009.

The "prevailing transnational norms" are, of course, as seen by the folks (mostly academics) who constitute the project's principals.

Regards

Mike

----------------------

E.g., Germans vs US in 1944. To a German sniper, my dad was a legal target, whether armed or unarmed, at any time or any place, whether or not he himself was or was not an immediate hostile threat to anyone. The German can shoot because dad (1/117-30ID) was an enemy combatant.

In the case of a irregular force, the question of who is a "combatant" is a tougher factual question - as also the treshhold question of whether an "armed conflict" exists between the irregular force and the state considering use of targeted killing.

[davidbfpo]

I missed this NYT article and found it viahttp://legalift.wordpress.com/ .


When military investigators looked into an attack by American helicopters last February that left 23 Afghan civilians dead, they found that the operator of a Predator drone had failed to pass along crucial information about the makeup of a gathering crowd of villagers.

But Air Force and Army officials now say there was also an underlying cause for that mistake: information overload.

Link:http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/17/technology/17brain.html?_r=2&scp=1&sq=In%20New%20Military,%20Data%20Overload%20Can%20 Be%20Deadly&st=cse

[OccamsRazor]

Jimm99 - I just saw this thread now. I had a blast writing that paper for my Law of War class last spring, and I'm glad that you had a chance to take a look at the final product.

Also, O'Razor is awesome. I think it might be my new handle :-)

[davidbfpo]

Again from WaPo:
reports that, according to independent estimates, few high-value targets are being hit successfully by U.S. drone strikes in Pakistan, despite a sharp increase in strikes last year. The report says 118 drone strikes in 2010 killed an estimated 581 militants, only two of whom appeared on a list of most-wanted terrorists. CLS Fellow Peter Bergen is cited in the report as suggesting that “data on the strikes indicate that 94 percent of those killed are lower-level militants".

Link:http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/02/20/AR2011022002975.html?hpid=topnews

One does wonder if the ISI-provided intelligence, pre-Raymond Davis, which has previously been reported as the main source for targeting, has been accurate and if the motives have been clear.

[gbramlet]

http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/n/a/2011/03/17/international/i025538D16.DTL

I read a comment on this topic on LWJ claiming Sharabat Khan was "good Taliban", and had attempted to liberate Afghanistan from ISI control. Wasn't aware that there was a tiered system within the Taliban based off your level of "good" and your priorities. These guys should really issue badges out so we don't mistake them...

Grant Bramlett
http://www.bramlist.com

[Bob's World]

The Taliban are not, and have never been the enemy of the United States. IAW principles of Pashtunwali they refused to give up AQ to the US when we asked them to, so we put our weight behind their enemies, lifting the Northern Alliance into power.

Now the Taliban hold the keys to Al Qaeda's sanctuary in Pakistan. That is an essential, and too often overlooked fact.

It is not within the Government of Afghanistan's power to deny sanctuary to Al Qaeda.

It is not within the Government of Pakistan's (or the ISI or their Army for those who demand granting the government amnesty for the actions of its arms, and to also grant sanctuary from consequence to those arms as well) power to deny sanctuary to Al Qaeda.

The mission given to the U.S. by the President is:

“to disrupt, dismantle, and eventually defeat al Qaeda and to prevent their return to either Afghanistan or Pakistan.”

Now maybe it is more effective to build Afghanistan into a modern State, while suppressing that element of their populace that is not particularly down with the form of government put together by Mr. K and his friends.

Maybe it is more effective to disrupt the balance between India and Pakistan by destabilizing the shaky hold that the Pakistani government has on the reins of power there.

Maybe. Personally, I think it is probably smartest to go straight to the Taliban and cut a deal with them. That does not mean giving them the keys to Kabul, as many will immediately jump to. But it does mean not dedicating ourselves to denying them the opportunity to once more engage in the political process of their own country.

This should be fairly obvious, but clearly it is not.

[carl]

http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/n/a/2011/03/17/international/i025538D16.DTL

I read a comment on this topic on LWJ claiming Sharabat Khan was "good Taliban", and had attempted to liberate Afghanistan from ISI control. Wasn't aware that there was a tiered system within the Taliban based off your level of "good" and your priorities. These guys should really issue badges out so we don't mistake them...

Grant Bramlett
http://www.bramlist.com

The Pak Army/ISI are the ones who should be issuing the IDs. Good and bad Taliban is their concept. "Good" attack us and the Indians. "Bad" attack things in Pakistan. The trouble with the idea is the good work with the bad who work with the good who are buddies with the bad and they all believe in about the same thing anyway. The ISI think they can control the whole thing and keep track of who is good or bad. In the past they have used our drones to kill bad Taliban. Apparently they are upset that our guys slipped the leash for once and killed some of the good Taliban.

Bob's World: It might indeed be a good idea to talk to the Taliban, though which part you would talk to may cause a bit of confusion. It would help us peel them away from the Pak Army/ISI. The trouble is of course, all the top leaders of Taliban & company live in Pakistan and if they tried talking to us they would get picked up right away, as happened in early 2010.

Also which part of the Taliban are sheltering AQ, the good or the bad? If it is the bad, why should they care what happens in Afghanistan?

I have a question. Does Pashtunwali require the host to allow the guest to murder others while he is a guest? That is what essentially happened in 2001. AQ wasn't running and seeking refuge, they perpetrated an outrage while they had refuge. A rather big difference.

[Bob's World]

"good" and "bad" are assessments that are not particularly helpful; unless by "good" one means willing to work with us toward mutually beneficial ends.

When we decide some guy or his organization is "beyond the Pale" we mostly serve to limit our own options. The real key is to identify and reconcile key issues rather than people. Some of these guys are never going to get a seat at the table, but that does not mean that a guy they trust from their organization or a related one cannot carry their issues to the table.

[carl]

The "good" and "bad" refer to how it seems the General sahibs view Taliban & company. Good quickly turn to bad in the eyes of the Pak Army/ISI if they show signs of bolting the reservation. So from our standpoint if somebody showed signs of wanting to seriously talk independent of their masters at GHQ, to us they would be good; to GHQ, they would be bad and they would get picked up quickly making the whole thing moot.

[Pete]

Well before 9/11 the Pakistani government tolerated paramilitary organizations that are willing to take the law into their own hands, particularly over the long-simmering feud with India over Kashmir. When particularly outrageous acts of terrorism took place the response of Pakistan's government would usually be to detain a few people for a few days and then let them go. There was a period in 1999 or 2000 when it seemed that Pakistan and India might go to war over Kashmir because of incidents there.

[Pete]

When we finally pull out the last of our troops in Afghanistan we ought to end our funding to Pakistan -- I mean the whole nine yards, DoD, State, AID, whatever else. The country has been jacking us around for 30 or 40 years by saying if we don't support it financially dangerous radicals might take control of the country. That's two-faced -- they've been supporting terrorist groups for decades, and only by a deliberate act of the U.S. Government burying its head in the sand could we pretend it's not so. Let's cut Pakistan off -- they've been pushing the limits for years. Let them be a failed state.

[davidbfpo]

Pete,

You are being unduly harsh on Pakistan:
The country has been jacking us around for 30 or 40 years by saying if we don't support it financially dangerous radicals might take control of the country.

The religious radicals / extremists have been there throughout its short history and only recently have had significant influence, rarely power IMHO. We have debated the radicals empowerment by the state, notably by ISI, the Army and others before.

So what is the 'jacking about' since 1970-1980? When the USSR invaded Afghanistan in 1979, leaving in 1988, Pakistan quickly decided on opposition, yes with some US largesse; without Pakistani support the Mujahhedin anti-communist insurgency would have been far harder, if not impossible.

After the USSR exit an active US role in Afghanistan disappeared and shortly afterwards the Taliban era began. Only after 9/11 did the USA return to Afghanistan, when Pakistan's leader made a decision to back the USA and more funding commenced. Again without that support - however convoluted - the USA would then have struggled in Afghanistan.

Perhaps the USA has been "lead by the nose" by the Pakistani state, it is clear to me the US decision-makers were aware what Pakistan was doing, hard choices were made.

Today though I agree referring to a 'radical takeover' is well past it's use by date and in other threads SWC has debated Pakistan's failings.

[davidbfpo]

Hat tip to CLS e-briefing to a report in The Guardian:
Britain’s Ministry of Defence commissioned an in-house study last month examining the ethics of drones, according to the Guardian, and is urging policymakers to consider norms and rules that would govern the use of the rapidly developing technology and robotic warfare. According to the Guardian, the report states that “the recent extensive use of unmanned aircraft over Pakistan and Yemen may already herald a new era,” and that “every time a mistake is made,” insurgents are able to cast themselves “in the role of underdog and the west as a cowardly bully that is unwilling to risk his own troops, but is happy to kill remotely.” The report continues that the authors hope policymakers will engage in a conversation about the implications of remote warfare, including whether individuals operating drones are considered combatants.

Link to article:http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/apr/17/terminators-drone-strikes-mod-ethics

There is a superb commentary on the issues involved, which I hesitate to select a quote from on Leah Farrell's blog:http://allthingscounterterrorism.com/2011/04/18/some-thoughts-on-the-implications-of-using-drones/

[SWJ Blog]

Do Drones Make Warfare Too Easy? (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2011/04/do-drones-make-warfare-too-eas/)

Entry Excerpt:

Are Drones a Technological Tipping Point in Warfare? (http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/are-predator-drones-a-technological-tipping-point-in-warfare/2011/04/19/AFmC6PdE_story.html?hpid=z2) by Walter Pincus, Washington Post.


"Debates are growing at home and abroad over the increasing use of remotely piloted, armed drones, with a new study by the British Defense Ministry questioning whether advances in their capabilities will lead future decision-makers to 'resort to war as a policy option far sooner than previously.'"Are Drones a Technological Tipping Point in Warfare? (http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/are-predator-drones-a-technological-tipping-point-in-warfare/2011/04/19/AFmC6PdE_story.html?hpid=z2).



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[jmm99]

Here's one for you, David - since it apparently originates in the UK.

Reprieve’s (http://www.reprieve.org.uk/about) director, Clive Stafford-Smith (http://www.reprieve.org.uk/clivestaffordsmith), is well-known to us from his role in a number of Gitmo cases. Those cases, from the detainees' standpoint, seem to have largely run out of gas in the DC Circuit. Thus, my British "colleague" :rolleyes: has moved to a new theater of Lawfare operations.

From the Miami Herald, Group threatens legal trouble for US over drones (http://www.miamiherald.com/2011/05/09/2208759/group-threatens-legal-trouble.html):


.....
"There are endless ways in which the courts in Britain, the courts in America, the international courts and Pakistani courts can get involved," director Clive Stafford-Smith told journalists in London. "It's going to be the next 'Guantanamo Bay' issue."
.....

Stafford-Smith said he was exploring options ranging from civil litigation to criminal prosecution but gave few details. Reprieve's legal director, Cori Crider, said the group might try to pursue individual drone operators in the United States or file suit against the British government if it could show that U.K. intelligence had been used to help target a drone strike.

But Crider acknowledged that U.S. rules which shield government officials from lawsuits would be a formidable obstacle.
.....

Stafford-Smith seemed to acknowledge that how any prospective lawsuit played in the media could be more important than a lawsuit in court.

"The crucial court here is the court of public opinion," he said.
And, so it (the court of public opinion) is.

Regards

Mike

[motorfirebox]

"It's going to be the next 'Guantanamo Bay' issue."
So it will be the subject of great outcry that falls largely silent when those who cry about it the most refuse to have anything to do with the realities of fixing it?

Not that I'm bitter or anything...

[SWJ Blog]

Bin Laden mission signals the end for the Predator drone (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2011/05/bin-laden-mission-signals-the/)

Entry Excerpt:

Today’s Washington Post discussed (http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/cia-flew-stealth-drones-into-pakistan-to-monitor-bin-laden-house/2011/05/13/AF5dW55G_story.html) how the CIA used a stealthy drone – the RQ-170 Sentinel – to collect overhead imagery and signals intelligence on Osama bin Laden’s compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan. The RQ-170 was dubbed “the Beast of Kandahar” after it was spotted at the nearby military airbase as early as 2007, according to (http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story_channel.jsp?channel=defense&id=news/BEAST121409.xml)Aviation Week & Space Technology. Intelligence preparation for the bin Laden raid demonstrated the requirement for a persistent overhead reconnaissance platform that also had to be stealthy. This requirement for the bin Laden mission foreshadows a rapid change in required drone capabilities, which implies a need to change the government’s current drone investment plans. After just coming into their own, the Pentagon and CIA should consider ending purchases of the non-stealthy Predator, Reaper, and Global Hawk drones and redirecting those funds to their stealthy drone successors.

Click below to read more ...



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[davidbfpo]

Added as a resource for the casualties caused by drone attacks:http://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/sites/default/files/WorkingPaper-Pakistan2010-SecondVersion.pdf

A very short introduction:
In Pakistan, the use of unmanned aerial vehicles (‘drones’) has preceded and succeeded the death of Osama bin Laden. Drones’ use, in particular by the US within Pakistan, is surrounded by debate over their dubious legality. All the while, civilian and militant deaths continue on. Jacob Beswick, Project Officer for ORG’s Recording Casualties in Armed Conflict (RCAC) programme, has written a Working Paper comparing the methodologies and findings of the organisations dedicated to reporting on casualties caused by drones within Pakistan. The paper highlights and discusses why gaps in data exist and what can be done to address them.

From:http://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/publications/briefing_papers_and_reports/working_paper_drone_wars_and_pakistan%E2%80%99s_co nflict_casualties

[SWJ Blog]

Advisers Urge Military to Rely Less on Drones, More on Expertise (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2011/06/advisers-urge-military-to-rely/)

Entry Excerpt:

Advisers Urge Military to Rely Less on Drones, More on Expertise (http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/may/31/advisers-urge-military-to-rely-less-on-drones-more/) - Eli Lake, Washington Times. BLUF: "Military operations in Afghanistan rely too much on intelligence gathered by unmanned drones, often exclude important publicly available data and do not focus enough on the recruitment of human agents, a Pentagon report says."



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[davidbfpo]

Moderator's Note

I plan to amend the thread's title from 'The drone paradox' to 'Using drones: principles, tactics and results'. This will reflect the discussion to date better.

[davidbfpo]

Professor Paul Rogers in a wide ranging commentary, with useful links and is sub-titled:
The repositioning of the United States’s military strategy includes a great expansion in the use of armed-drones to attack targets in Pakistan and Yemen. But this development raises profound legal and ethical questions that are now entering the public arena.

Link:http://www.opendemocracy.net/paul-rogers/drone-warfare-cost-and-challenge?utm_source=feedblitz&utm_medium=FeedBlitzEmail&utm_content=201210&utm_campaign=0

In particular he refer to a new report by the Oxford Research Group 'Drones Don't Allow Hit & Run' and he writes:


The key conclusions of Drones Don't Allow Hit and Run are simple - but their implications are huge:

“There is a legal requirement to identify all casualties that result from any drone use, under any and all circumstances”

“The universal human right which specifies that no-one be 'arbitrarily' deprived of his or her life depends on the identity of the deceased being established as to reparations or compensation for possible wrongful killing, injury and other offences.”

The words sound straightforward, but they strike right at the heart of armed-drone operations precisely because these are remote operations in which the exact identities of many of those killed are neither known nor even sought (cites a link). They imply that the very unwillingness, and even the inability, of the attackers to identify the people they kill amount to infringements of international law. This judgment, moreover, applies both to a state that carries out drone-attacks and to a state that allows its territory to be used for them.

Link to ORG press release and report:http://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/news/2011/06/press_release_drones_dont_allow_hit_and_run

I am not a lawyer, but I'd expect some will "beat the drum" citing this and others, especially in governments, will look away. Secondly I have no idea what international law is being used in the ORG report, which for a layman seems odd to have such clauses - notably about the identification of targets.

[motorfirebox]

Yeah, it's gonna be hard to get any recognition for those killed by drones (righteous targets or bystanders, either one) when we're not even officially fessing up to using them, in most cases.

[jmm99]

The two pdf files:

DISCUSSION PAPER (http://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/sites/default/files/1st%20legal%20report%20formatted%20FINAL.pdf): THE LEGAL OBLIGATION TO RECORD CIVILIAN CASUALTIES OF ARMED CONFLICT, by Professor Susan Breau, Rachel Joyce (June 2011)

DISCUSSION PAPER 2 (http://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/sites/default/files/1st%20legal%20report%20formatted%20FINAL.pdf): DRONE ATTACKS, INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND THE RECORDING OF CIVILIAN CASUALTIES OF ARMED CONFLICT, by Professor Susan Breau, Marie Aronsson, Rachel Joyce (June 2011)

go into some detail re: the sources on which they rely (in summary, they are):


The various sources of law drawn upon to identify this right include the Geneva Conventions; the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the European Convention on Human Rights, and other human rights instruments; reports and statements of the United Nations; case law of the European Court of Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights; and the principles of customary international law.

These sources are quoted or linked in the pdfs.

The conclusions (bold in the original) were:


THE CONTENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL OBLIGATION TO RECORD EVERY CIVILIAN CASUALTY OF ARMED CONFLICT

1. There are binding international legal obligations upon parties to armed conflict to:

a) search for all missing civilians as a result of hostilities, occupation or detention;

b) collect all of the casualties of armed conflict from the area of hostilities as soon as circumstances permit;

c) if at all possible, the remains of those killed are to be returned to their relatives;

d) the remains of the dead are not to be despoiled;

e) any property found with the bodies of the dead is to be returned to the relatives of the deceased;

f) the dead are to be buried with dignity and in accordance with their religious or cultural beliefs;

g) the dead are to be buried individually and not in mass graves;

h) the graves are to be maintained and protected;

i) exhumation of dead bodies is only to be permitted in circumstances of public necessity which will include identifying cause of death;

j) the location of the place of burial is to be recorded by the party to the conflict in control of that territory;

k) there should be established in the case of civilian casualties an official graves registration service.

2. These international legal obligations taken together constitute a binding international legal obligation upon every party to an armed conflict to record every civilian casualty of armed conflict whether in an international or Non-International Armed Conflict.

I'm not going to debate the merits of this proposal from I Law Academia. If they believe their proposal has so much merit, they should find a Representative and a Senator to introduce it as legislation. Or, find someone from the Obama WH to seek its incorporation as an Executive Order.

Regards

Mike

[SWJ Blog]

Global Race to Match US Drone Capabilities (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2011/07/global-race-to-match-us-drone/)

Entry Excerpt:

Global Race On to Match US Drone Capabilities (http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/global-race-on-to-match-us-drone-capabilities/2011/06/30/gHQACWdmxH_story.html?hpid=z1) by William Wan and Peter Finn, Washington Post. BLUF: "More than 50 countries have purchased surveillance drones, and many have started in-country development programs for armed versions because no nation is exporting weaponized drones beyond a handful of sales between the United States and its closest allies."



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[davidbfpo]

An article which opens with:
In late June, President Obama's chief Terrorism adviser, John Brennan, made an extraordinary claim about drone attacks in Pakistan: "in the last year, 'there hasn't been a single collateral death because of the exceptional proficiency, precision of the capabilities that we've been able to develop." He added: "if there are terrorists who are within an area where there are women and children or others, you know, we do not take such action that might put those innocent men, women and children in danger." The London-based Bureau of Investigative Journalism had heard similar claims from Obama officials over the past several months, and thus set out to examine the relevant evidence to determine if those claims are true.

The report for example finds:
Contrary to Brennan's public assertions, "a detailed examination by the Bureau of 116 CIA 'secret' drone strikes in Pakistan since August 2010 has uncovered at least 10 individual attacks in which 45 or more civilians appear to have died.

Link:http://www.salon.com/news/opinion/glenn_greenwald/radio/2011/07/19/drones

[Ken White]

Proving yet again that smooth political playing in Washington is far more important for advancement to high places than is competence... :rolleyes:

[Bob's World]

Where all combatants are civilians, when is a casualty not a "civcas"?

Far more accurate distinction is that of "combatant" vs "non-combatant"

The next sticky issue to work through is that is "liability."

Clearly an armed fighter, male or female, young or old, is a combatant, and if engaged in operatons is also clearly liable. Such personnel should be fair game.

Then there is that wonderful concept of "accomplice liability" that we do not apply in our current operations. If a white toyota pickup truck racing away from an ambush site, or toward some coalition unit is identified by a mix of radio chatter and eyes on assessment to have 5 armed anti-governmental forces on board; but also carries two unarmed females, and three adolecents;

How many civilians are there? 10

How many have direct liability? 5

How many have accomplice liability? 5

How many "civcas" if this truck is engaged by a drone or otherwise?
Under current rules: 5

Under the rules that apply fundamental concepts of Western law enforcement: 0

I am no fan of the broad use of drones to engage targets where we do not have boots on the ground, such as in the FATA. Drones are great, like an aerial sniper, for the tactical ground commander to support his troops where less accurate means of firesupport are reasonably restricted.

There is a bigger issue of how we define civcas, and that needs to be addressed as well if we are going to continue to engage in these kinds of operations.

[Fuchs]

Under the rules that apply fundamental concepts of Western law enforcement: 0

I think you got this very wrong.

[jmm99]

I get the basic facts:


If a white toyota pickup truck racing away from an ambush site, or toward some coalition unit is identified by a mix of radio chatter and eyes on assessment to have 5 armed anti-governmental forces on board; but also carries two unarmed females, and three adolecents.

but this conclusion is unclarifying:


Under the rules that apply fundamental concepts of Western law enforcement: 0

First off, what is "Western law enforcement" ? US and EU differ on some fundamentals (as the UK learned in the recent Human Rights cases involving detainees in Iraq), which cannot be bridged.

Secondly, if you are applying US law (Tennessee v Garner, etc.), I could come up with 10 civcas, 5 civcas or 0 civcas - just by supplying three different sets of underlying facts which are not supplied explicitly in your hypothetical.

I don't say you're "very wrong" - but, simply that the example and conclusions are incomplete.

[Bob's World]

First, as those who follow anything I have posted know, I am not a big fan of waging war against one's own populace and believe that insurgency is best treated as a civil emergency rather than as warfare.

Killing and controlling the populace may buy suppression of illegal action, but it will not buy resolution of the underlying grievances.

My hastily laid out example above (admittedly I see plenty of wiggle room in those facts as well) comes from a mix of my experience as a criminal prosecutor in civilian life, and my recent experience in Afghanistan where we not only kill far more "non-combatants" than we should and call that civcas; but also destroy careers and drive actions that put our servicemen at unnecessary risk over incidents that clearly involve combatants, and those who are knowingly and willingly associating with combatants over what I see as largely immaterial criteria rooted in Gender or Age over time, manner and place.

A friend of mine on a 4-man patrol as a LRRP in the Central Highlands of Vietnam in 1967 got his first two combat kills with a single burst at close range. Ducking behind cover of of a major trail to allow a VC patrol to pass, the VC stopped so that two of their members could relieve themselves. As my friend squatted, back agaist a large tree, M-16 across his chest, the two VC came around the tree and met him eye to eye. The beautiful young VC swung her French bolt action rifle down to engage him and he quickly swung is M-16 up in response. He got there first, firing a long burst through her and the baby on her back. A tragedy by any definition, civilians by any definition, but also an insurgent fighter who knowingly took her child on an armed patrol.

Fast forward to last year, a partial ODA on patrol is enagaged by 4 armed men at nightfall who then flee toward a nearby compound. The ODA aggressively follows in hot pursuit into the compound where the fire fight continues. At some point the wife of one of the fighters, standing somewhere in the dark behind a gunman in a doorway, is struck and killed by a stray round. A "civcas" event, a blackeye for the unit, and stern directives to next time stop, cordon the compound, and resolve in the morning. Perhaps a rifle company has that luxory, but not 6 guys deep in Indian country miles from any friendly support.

This is messy stuff. Our current rules are illogical and make it messier.

[Ken White]

Under the rules that apply fundamental concepts of Western law enforcement: 0I'm in agreement with Fuchs and Mike -- this seems awfully dubious to me.
I am no fan of the broad use of drones to engage targets where we do not have boots on the ground, such as in the FATA. Drones are great, like an aerial sniper, for the tactical ground commander to support his troops where less accurate means of firesupport are reasonably restricted.Agreed and I predict that our rather too liberal use of the aircraft and their weaponry will have two ill effects. They and the technique will lose their net value due to that over use and we will develop some significant, legal, civcas problems...

On the issue of civilian casualties, I'm neither a law enforcement officer nor an attorney, however, I did soldier for a while and doing that I learned that this:
There is a bigger issue of how we define civcas, and that needs to be addressed as well if we are going to continue to engage in these kinds of operations.is quite true, is extremely problematic -- and is yet another reason aside from costs and ineffectiveness such operations should be diligently avoided.

[jmm99]

What impact (if any; and if so, positive or negative ?) will the two judgments of the European Court of Human Rights, sitting as a Grand Chamber, have on EU military operations (say, UK and German) ?

In the case of Al-Skeini and Others v. the United Kingdom (http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?action=html&documentId=887952&portal=hbkm&source=externalbydocnumber&table=F69A27FD8FB86142BF01C1166DEA398649) (7 July 2011)

In the case of Al-Jedda v. the United Kingdom (http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?action=html&documentId=887954&portal=hbkm&source=externalbydocnumber&table=F69A27FD8FB86142BF01C1166DEA398649) (7 July 2011)

Al-Skeini covers shoot-kill situations. Al-Jedda covers capture-detain situations.

These decisions are roughly 180 degrees out of phase with the US cases decided within the last year covering the same situations. So much for any "Western" standard.

Regards

Mike

[Bob's World]

More to the point of the thread, I think it is important that we see drones as a tool rather than as a strategy that can be applied to some problem.

In a future where we are not attempting to fix Afghanistan or artificially prop up any particular form of government that we think is best for us, drones could be a great tool to be used to support a small CT force that is focused on true transnational non-state actors with an intent to export illegal violence (rather than nationalist insurgents, who never were, are not now, and will not be, our business).

I thought the Afghan Commandos with a small SF presence (one ODA per Battalion of Commandos); supported by a host of enablers (ISR, Intel, Lift, drone support, etc) was a very effective and sustainable model from my time in Southern Afghanistan. A future regional force with a mix of Pakistani and Afghan Commandos with such enablers to work both sides of the Durrand line to me seems viable. Far more so than a large contingent of JSOC or fleet of CIA drones.

The commandos are very effective in planning and leading their own operations; and have a tremendous effect on a populace as they move through a populated area, conducting ad hoc shuras as they go; and very effectively sorting out the "bad guys" from those who just happen to live on the objective. Drones don't do that. Neither do Rangers, or Marines, or any other force of amped up foreigners dropping into some unsuspecting neighborhood on such a mission.

[davidbfpo]

Id'd late and not listened to the talk in Aspen by Dennis Blair, although I have read the article cited: http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2011/07/call-off-the-drone-war/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=twitter&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+kow-reading+%28Kings+of+War-Reading%29

The full title is 'Former Intel Chief: Call Off The Drone War (And Maybe the Whole War on Terror)' and I cite two paragraphs:
Starting with the drone attacks. Yes, they take out some mid-level terrorists, Blair said. But they’re not strategically effective. If the drones stopped flying tomorrow, Blair told the audience at the Aspen Security Forum, “it’s not going to lower the threat to the U.S.” Al-Qaida and its allies have proven “it can sustain its level of resistance to an air-only campaign,” he said.

It’s one of many reasons why it’s a mistake to “have that campaign dominate our overall relations” with countries like Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia. “Because we’re alienating the countries concerned, because we’re treating countries just as places where we go attack groups that threaten us, we are threatening the prospects of long-term reform,” Blair said.

The last question he posed, without answering was:
What is it that justifies this amount of money on this narrow problem?

Quite timely as the US had a budget crisis or is it a budget moment?

[slapout9]

Interesting link about Rich people being so scared of a revolt they are now buying military style drones for surveillance, so far they have not been armed.


http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=R0QVjJSP8XI&feature=feedu

[Fuchs]

Let me share a thought about the targeted killing stuff - drone or not. And this includes permanent arrest of 'leaders':

Isn't it quite the same as throwing the dice (with dozens of dice at once) again and again?


Shouldn't we know which dice numbers we want to have, in order to have some desired outcome?

Throwing the dice again and again sounds like a suppression of a problem, or like delaying a conclusion, to me.

After all, we know(!?) that taking out leaders of extremists leads more often to a more extreme and more courageous successor than not.


I mean - do we wait till a local leader replacement turns out to be ineffective or at most mildly problematic and then end the targeted killing in that region or do we go after him as well, simply because he's 'leadership'?


How could we know enough about the person if we cannot hit him better than with an unmanned drone flying thousands of metres high?

What's about the old multiple rings/levels of guerilla organisations thing again? Don't the Taliban resemble a mobile forces - local forces - local support base structure in which taking out leaders means little?

[AdamG]

Interesting twist - the drone as a round of munitions (like a LAW).


The backpack-size "Switchblade" drone and its launch tube give individual soldiers a new level of precise control over an explosive weapon. Rather than calling in supporting artillery fire or airstrikes, soldiers can simply launch the Switchblade from out of sight, confirm a target on a live video feed from the drone, and then command the robotic device to arm itself and fly into the target at high speed.
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/44412133/ns/technology_and_science-innovation/t/us-army-orders-its-first-batch-suicide-drones/#.Tmt-qnODo39

[Fuchs]

It may need a less elaborate launch apparatus, but it's pretty much the same as the fibre-optic guided mode of some Spike versions (Israeli ATGM) or ATGMs in general. An employment without at least initial line of sight is rather unlikely.
Cheap seekers don't suit themselves well to lock-on-after-launch as standard procedure.

[Ulenspiegel]

Let me share a thought about the targeted killing stuff - drone or not. And this includes permanent arrest of 'leaders':

Isn't it quite the same as throwing the dice (with dozens of dice at once) again and again?


Shouldn't we know which dice numbers we want to have, in order to have some desired outcome?

Throwing the dice again and again sounds like a suppression of a problem, or like delaying a conclusion, to me.

After all, we know(!?) that taking out leaders of extremists leads more often to a more extreme and more courageous successor than not.


I mean - do we wait till a local leader replacement turns out to be ineffective or at most mildly problematic and then end the targeted killing in that region or do we go after him as well, simply because he's 'leadership'?


How could we know enough about the person if we cannot hit him better than with an unmanned drone flying thousands of metres high?

What's about the old multiple rings/levels of guerilla organisations thing again? Don't the Taliban resemble a mobile forces - local forces - local support base structure in which taking out leaders means little?

A good analogy from real life is the efficient developement of bacteria strains with multiple resistances against anti-biotics.

The application of anti-biotics over a too short period of time, without sufficient concentration and without correct target identification lead to the so called "super-bugs", i.e. the surviving bacteria are a more formidable opponent than the ones we tried to kill.

[slapout9]

Let me share a thought about the targeted killing stuff - drone or not. And this includes permanent arrest of 'leaders':

Isn't it quite the same as throwing the dice (with dozens of dice at once) again and again?




Fuchs, I think you are talking about Wilf's article and in his case he was talking about a specific situation where it was used(with great effect) to achieve that particular Policy Objective. When I use the term targeted killing I mean killing those people and only those people that will lead you to your final Objective, that may be 1 or it may be 100,000.

[Fuchs]

Fuchs, I think you are talking about Wilf's article and in his case he was talking about a specific situation where it was used(with great effect) to achieve that particular Policy Objective. When I use the term targeted killing I mean killing those people and only those people that will lead you to your final Objective, that may be 1 or it may be 100,000.

Does it? What final objective?

I figure it's extremely rare that one or few persons are important enough that taking them out of the situation is a major and lasting improvement. There are usually effective replacements. I guess even Castro could have been replaced in '59 by someone else, for example.
Look at the infamous "AQ #3" thing, for example. It looks as if that's an endless line of martyrdom aspirants who are ready to move up into this position.

In the end, assassinations can become detrimental rather than advantageous - by virtue of millions of side-effects.


Look at AQ, for example. Final objective? Discourage AQ terrorism. Whom to kill for this objective? I figure this would first require to kill the motivators (the ideology preachers), then the terror organisers that are still acti8ve after ideology has run dry.
Feasibility? Near zero. Resemblance to actual campaign? 50% - the non-crucial 50%.

Look at the TB example. Final objective? TB shall subjugate to the rule of (central government's) law in AFG or stay out.
Whom to kill? All TB who oppose central government rule in AFG. Feasibility? Hopeless. Resemblance to actual assassination/grabbing campaign? 50%. The other half of the campaign happens to kill TB who at the time actually stayed out of AFG.


This assassination campaigning is to me an outgrowth of the non-Clausewitzian "center of gravity" version (http://defense-and-freedom.blogspot.com/2010/01/schwerpunkt-and-center-of-gravity.html) and the EBO thinking.

The U.S. is somehow obsessed with the military version of the G-Spot; fumbling and fumbling and fumbling, all the time pretending that it's trying to score at the one spot where fumbling leads to something huge.
Meanwhile, it's debatable whether such a spot exists at all.

[Umar Al-Mokhtār]

In the end, assassinations can become detrimental rather than advantageous - by virtue of millions of side-effects.

Assassination is fraught with repercussions. Even more so when the assassin uses a missile that often kills others in proximity. While assassinations may be useful, if very, very carefully targeted, there are too many unknowns to warrant them on a grand scale. They also should be carried out with the precision of a rifle, not through explosives. That is where drones would be most effective, in tracking the target.

Targeting leadership can throw an organization off balance temporarily, but that is only advantageous to the assassin if boots are on the ground to take advantage of the confusion. To believe that assassinations will dissuade others from occupying leadership positions out of fear of being killed themselves ignores much of history.

Fuchs also makes a great point vis-a-vis AQ. As he notes, AQ is more idea than organization so it matters little who is in charge at HQAQ, as long as the idea stays alive, and one cannot kill ideology with Predators. Also, death is only a deterrent to those who want to live.

Taking out Castro in '59? Intriguing. Would Raul have been strong enough to step in? Or would leadership have fallen to Camilo Cienfuegos or Juan Almeida? Would the M-26-7 have accepted Che as its leader?

I’m pretty sure taking Castro out would not have allowed Batista to regain power, once he left Cuba he lost it, but the repercussions of Castro’s death are intriguing. Maybe no “Bay of Pigs” or “Cuban Missile Crises”? Maybe I could buy Cuban cigars without having to go to Canada. Hopefully that silliness ends soon.

I think a bigger impact to the revolution would have been in ’56, if he had been killed shortly after the landing at Playa Las Coloradas. Fidel was the soul of M-26-7 and it was very small then, the survivors may not have been able to rally. I think even then there probably still would have been a revolution, but later, early ‘60s perhaps.

[slapout9]

Does it? What final objective?



1-It does matter, but like I have said before this is America we don't do Objectives, we don't do planning because that is the equivalent to Communism and that ain't allowed. So we do the Invisible Hand. That means if you offend our sense of what is right and wrong.......we will come beat you up.:D which is why we always end up in such a big mess.......that's it, we use the big mess theory of everything.

2-I believe we made a serious mistake by not pursuing EBO although I understand why they stopped and I even agree with why they stopped it but it should have been fixed instead of abandoned. I am probably the only one here that believes that.

3-The article on Targeting theory over at that journal is about the only way out IMO. But even that will not work unless you understand the Political Motive for the war.

[Marc]

When I use the term targeted killing I mean killing those people and only those people that will lead you to your final Objective, that may be 1 or it may be 100,000.

I do not buy that. Let us assume that some kind of enemy emerges who wants to destroy democracy. Let us also assume this enemy is smart enough to understand EBO. Let us even assume that somehow this enemy is capable of achieving air superiority allowing him to strike from the air at will.

Can somebody tell me who this enemy has to kill to achieve his final Objective (with capital O) of destroying democracy? Whoever answers this question may list between 1 and a 100,000 people.

[motorfirebox]

I do not buy that. Let us assume that some kind of enemy emerges who wants to destroy democracy. Let us also assume this enemy is smart enough to understand EBO. Let us even assume that somehow this enemy is capable of achieving air superiority allowing him to strike from the air at will.

Can somebody tell me who this enemy has to kill to achieve his final Objective (with capital O) of destroying democracy? Whoever answers this question may list between 1 and a 100,000 people.
Er, I don't think slapout suggested that any objective could be achieved by killing 100,000 people or less. In this case, though, I'm pretty sure any 100,000 American civilians, killed in groups of 50 or more by a single enemy over a period of a few years, would be enough to effectively destroy democracy. Hell, even 10k might be enough.

[slapout9]

Can somebody tell me who this enemy has to kill to achieve his final Objective (with capital O) of destroying democracy? Whoever answers this question may list between 1 and a 100,000 people.

Yes I can tell you, anybody that supports Democracy, which in this case your targeted killing will probably be in the millions. The point is to kill the enemy and only the enemy that is what makes it targeted. I chose 1 to 100,000 just to show that the number does not have to be a small number(targeted killing for some reason has always been associated with small numbers) but can in fact be very large.

[Marc]

in this case your targeted killing will probably be in the millions.

In that case, I do not have any other comment than that I do not share your opinions.

[motorfirebox]

Er, you don't think killing everyone who holds a certain belief will eradicate that belief? Who exactly is going to be around to hold that belief after everyone who holds it is killed...?

[Fuchs]

Now leave the 66th sub-level of human morale and get back to Western civilization, please.

We don't practice killing everybody who has a certain belief.
In fact, we kill NOBODY for his or her beliefs.

Even in case that a belief is extremely harmful, we tolerate it.

In case that there is an aggressive intent coupled with capability of fulfilling it,
we can face the threat with rule of law or on the battlefield -
depending on how it suits the purpose better.


Repeat, to be absolutely clear:
To even think of 'killing everybody with a certain belief' is waaaaayyyy out of bounds.
That attitude is worthy only of the biggest evil assholes of history. PERIOD.

[jmm99]

1. How do you determine "everyone" who holds a certain belief ? A data mining operation ? - "1984" ?

2. How do you strike all those "everyones" without unacceptable collateral damage ? - death ray ?

Perhaps, THE MULE from Asimov's Foundation ?

Regards

Mike

[slapout9]

1. How do you determine "everyone" who holds a certain belief ? A data mining operation ? - "1984" ?

2. How do you strike all those "everyones" without unacceptable collateral damage ? - death ray ?

Perhaps, THE MULE from Asimov's Foundation ?

Regards

Mike

Hitler had a pretty extensive system to do it. In a Democracy(which implies voting)voter registration records,maybe.

[davidbfpo]

Moderator's Note

I am not convinced this discussion is on track and mass killing is far from what SWC is about. As indicated by Fuch's comment.

[davidbfpo]

Update

The consensus amongst the moderators is that the discussion is within SWC rules and the thread is now unlocked.

[SWJ Blog]

Addicted to Drones (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/addicted-to-drones)

Entry Excerpt:



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[slapout9]

Now that everyone has calmed down some, this just came over the news. A Massachusetts man was arrested for planning to use large scale Radio Controlled models (drones) to attack the Pentagon and possibly the Capitol.
The man was allegedly radicalized at online jihad website.

http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/44705648/ns/us_news-security/


My point was and always has been that just because we(USA,Israel,etc.) use precision targeted killing does not mean that our enemies are going to, it is likely to be just the opposite IMO.

[SWJ Blog]

Drones help Washington win a war of perceptions (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/drones-help-washington-win-a-war-of-perceptions)

Entry Excerpt:



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[slapout9]

Link to article on Drone Virus.



http://technolog.msnbc.msn.com/_news/2011/10/07/8209084-military-drones-hit-by-computer-virus

[Bob's World]

Now that everyone has calmed down some, this just came over the news. A Massachusetts man was arrested for planning to use large scale Radio Controlled models (drones) to attack the Pentagon and possibly the Capitol.
The man was allegedly radicalized at online jihad website.

http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/44705648/ns/us_news-security/


My point was and always has been that just because we(USA,Israel,etc.) use precision targeted killing does not mean that our enemies are going to, it is likely to be just the opposite IMO.

When a person attacks their own government, they may have been influenced by a variety of sources, but they were most likely "radicalized" by their government. Step one is admitting responsibilities for one's actions. Most addicts, and most governments, never get to step one. Far easier to rationalize such things off on others.

[slapout9]

When a person attacks their own government, they may have been influenced by a variety of sources, but they were most likely "radicalized" by their government. Step one is admitting responsibilities for one's actions. Most addicts, and most governments, never get to step one. Far easier to rationalize such things off on others.

That is deep Bob...really deep. How many people in the government could even realize that?

[davidbfpo]

Slap,

Yes Bob is on target and you asked:
How many people in the government could even realize that?

Very few I would contend, it would be a rare politician who would admit this:
..they were most likely "radicalized" by their government..

Try this September 2005 article, based on talking to John Denham, a Labour minister who resigned over the Iraq War:http://www.spectator.co.uk/essays/all/14199/race-and-culture-israels-actions-affect-our-security.thtml

There are some civil servants who have advised government here, the most often cited example being the Foreign Office and Home Office advice in 2004 that foreign policy decisions could alienate young Muslims. We know that advice was rejected, yes by Tony Blair and his government.

As the "smoke" cleared from Northern Ireland more civil servants have talked, with regret, over decisions taken that were counter-productive; I am only aware of local politicians talking in the same terms, such as Geoffrey Donaldson:http://www.jeffreydonaldson.org/

[SWJ Blog]

Does U.S. Drone Use Set a New Precedent for War? (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/does-us-drone-use-set-a-new-precedent-for-war)

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[SWJ Blog]

Drone Wars? Not Quite. (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/drone-wars-not-quite-0)

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[SWJ Blog]

Unfounded Drone Fears (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/unfounded-drone-fears)

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[SWJ Blog]

The Drone Delusion (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/the-drone-delusion-0)

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[Kiwigrunt]

Not sure this is the best place for it but it does kinda fit.

Malcolm Gladwell (http://www.ted.com/talks/malcolm_gladwell.html) in a 16 min TED talk on military technology and precision and the utility of it.

[davidbfpo]

Kiwi,

Thanks for the TED link. I thought the last few minutes the most poignant. Gladwell cited a 95% accuracy for drone strikes in NW Pakistan and a ten-fold increase in attacks by those made angrier and angrier. We assume the things we make will solve our problems.

[davidbfpo]

An article that looks back to arrive at today:
The problems with remote-controlled warfare are legion. The human operator ‘is terribly remote from the consequences of his actions; he is likely to be sitting in an air-conditioned trailer, hundreds of miles from the area of battle.’ He evaluates ‘target signatures’ captured by various sensor systems that ‘no more represent human beings than the tokens in a board-type war game.’

The rise of this new ‘American way of bombing’, as it’s been called, has two particularly serious consequences. First, ‘through its isolation of the military actor from his target, automated warfare diminishes the inhibitions that could formerly be expected on the individual level in the exercise of warfare’. In short, killing is made casual. Secondly, once the risk of combat is transferred to the target, it becomes much easier for the state to go to war. Domestic audiences are disengaged from the violence waged in their name: ‘Remote-controlled warfare reduces the need for the public to confront the consequences of military action abroad.’

(My emphasis)All familiar stuff, you might think, except that these warnings were not prompted by the appearance of Predators and Reapers in the skies over Afghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia or Yemen. They appeared in Harper’s Magazine in June 1972, the condensed results of a study of the US air war in Indochina by a group of scholar-activists at Cornell University.1 As they suggest, crucial elements of today’s ‘drone wars’ were assembled during the US bombing of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. There were three of them: drones, real-time visual reconnaissance, and the electronic battlefield.

Link:http://www.opendemocracy.net/derek-gregory/american-way-of-bombing

This essay is part of Derek Gregory's current research on ‘Killing space: cultural and political histories of bombing’. Next week: Look out for his detailed account of the path that led us from bombing cities, forests and target boxes to putting 'warheads on foreheads' in Pakistan and Afghanistan, 'Lines of Descent'.

[davidbfpo]

Hat tip to the Lowry Institute.


The Bureau of Investigative Journalism (based at City University in London) is conducting a project where they monitor all reported drone attacks in Pakistan. Based on their documentation of 306 missile strikes from remotely piloted drones in Pakistan (as of November 2011), there are reports of at least 2,349 deaths with, at minimum, 392 civilians killed — including 175 children.

Link to cited research, which is more than casualties:http://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/category/projects/drone-data/

[davidbfpo]

I may have missed allegations that UK citizens / residents were the target of a drone strike, so I read this press report with interest 'Britain's 'most wanted' killed in drone attack':http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terrorism-in-the-uk/8900443/Britains-most-wanted-killed-in-drone-attack.html


He was killed in the tribal region of Waziristan alongside Mohammed Azmir Khan, 37. Both men and their brothers were believed to be part of an established network of radicals from Ilford, East London with connections to al-Qaeda. Adam's father confirmed that his son had been killed and a close friend of Khan's family, who did not want to be named, said: "They have taken it very badly - this is the second son who has been killed in a drone strike."

As Slap has said long ago watch the family members (or similar) as they will be the first to be radicalised and join the violent Jihad.

He is not the first UK target hit, as the "mastermind" Rashid Rauf was killed in November 2008, his name appears in today's article too and there is some background on:http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rashid_Rauf

[SWJ Blog]

Iranian Video of Alleged U.S. Drone (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/iranian-video-of-alleged-us-drone)

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[SWJ Blog]

Why COIN Principles Don't Fly with Drones (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/why-coin-principles-dont-fly-with-drones)

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[davidbfpo]

A short BBC News report:
President Obama's counter-terrorism adviser has given the most detailed explanation so far of America's use of drones to kill members of al-Qaeda....Brennan has gone further than anyone so far in laying out the rationale for a policy that remains controversial.

Slightly off-topic, no 100%, but needs a mention:
Mr Brennan also said that documents found at the compound where Osama Bin Laden was killed in Pakistan last year would go online later this week.

Link:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-17901400

[slapout9]

Link to Gadsden,AL Police Chief's story about drones, includes some video to.


http://www.theblaze.com/stories/ala-police-chief-shocked-to-find-out-his-dept-owns-drones/

[BushrangerCZ]

There is one result I do not like: All recce units got issued mandatory ballistic plate carriers and helmets, and no one does covert dismounted long range recce ops for multiple days any more. And it´s needed there. Drones are amazing, but they can´t win alone in counterinsurgency campaign, while the rest is carrying their armoured bodies in vehicles and get blown up on IEDs daily.

[carl]

There is one result I do not like: All recce units got issued mandatory ballistic plate carriers and helmets, and no one does covert dismounted long range recce ops for multiple days any more. And it´s needed there. Drones are amazing, but they can´t win alone in counterinsurgency campaign, while the rest is carrying their armoured bodies in vehicles and get blown up on IEDs daily.

I find this kind of thing ironic because years ago I read of the Russians going into Grozny and the stories most always had an arch tone of disapproval when noting that they were reluctant to get out of their vehicles.

[slapout9]

Link from John Robb's Global Guerrila's on the new small drone weapons system...about 11 pounds:eek:



http://globalguerrillas.typepad.com/

[Hoplite99]

It depends how you do it. If you accompany your Drone strike with a "Courteous by your leave Sir!" - then sure you can conduct your strikes at will. Which is in essence what we are doing. By providing foreign aid to the tune of $2B USD per year, the US has essentially "purchased" the requisite permissions for its occasional transgressions. The Proof? Merely the acquiesence of the Paki's...

[Bill Moore]

Posted by slapout


Link from John Robb's Global Guerrila's on the new small drone weapons system...about 11 pounds

We will only determine the rules and tactics for how we employ UAVs our UASs, as this technology continues to proliferate to both state and non-state actors they will employ them in unique ways to achieve their objectives. Imagine the challenges for protecting the homeland, our troops, our civilian leaders, our industries, and so forth. The fence, the wall, the counter sniper ops, etc. will provide little protection. Traditional air defense will also become obsolete, but air defense against these small to mini armed UAVs will take on a new importance.

We developed the atom bomb and that gave us a strategic edge for how many years? Now it is existential threat. We celebrate advances in UAV technology, but perhaps we're celebrating prematurely?

[carl]

I don't see the difference between this thing and the Pred/Hellfire combination except the Shadow Hawk munition will have a smaller explosive payload. The article doesn't say what that is. It is a pretty complicated way to deliver a bang that may not be so big.

The article was quite breathless about this but imagine employing it against the kind of camoflauged (sic) bunkers the VC and the Japanese made. You probably couldn't see them and even a direct hit by a munition that weighed 11 pounds total might not do anything at at all.

Drones like this are great big RC airplanes. If you interrupt the radio signal it wanders where it will. Taking advantage of that would be a way to defend against it.

Also if you took small, cheap, manned airplane like this (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cassutt_Special), put in a 12 gauge shotgun in a schrage music installation, you could shoot down Shadows and Preds and there wouldn't be a thing they could do to defend themselves. It would cost just a small fraction of the price of those drones.

Everybody gets excited about drones but something like a GPS guided 120 mm mortar shell is a lot scarier, at least to a civilian like me.

[slapout9]

We celebrate advances in UAV technology, but perhaps we're celebrating prematurely?

Yep, I don't hink anybody knows where this is going to end up except it is likely to be very nasty both for those with this technology as well as those without it.

[slapout9]

I don't see the difference between this thing and the Pred/Hellfire combination except the Shadow Hawk munition will have a smaller explosive payload. The article doesn't say what that is. It is a pretty complicated way to deliver a bang that may not be so big.




carl, they are trying to get small on purpose. Hand Grenade small from 30,000 feet with close to zero margin of error at the strike point.

[Bill Moore]

Carl, you making assumptions off dated information, and based on the rate of technological evolution, we all risk being outdated from week to week, which is why we face an ever greater risk of strategic surprise.

Check out Do It Yourself Drones

http://diydrones.com/profiles/blogs/optical-no-gps-navigation-in-new-eth-research-copters

[davidbfpo]

This sentence by Bill Moore led me to think:
..as this technology continues to proliferate to both state and non-state actors they will employ them in unique ways to achieve their objectives.

We are aware of the considerable investment made in drug smuggling submersibles. Is there any evidence - in the public domain - of drug smugglers using this aerial technology?

Imagine a "swarm" of UAS carrying high-value drugs across the US border. Some I suspect would fail.

Then I recalled reading predictions about the possible impact of naval missiles, after the sinking of the Israeli destroyer Eilat in 1967 by Styx SSM and many years later cruise missile technology. Yes they have made a difference, IMHO not on the predicted scale.

It is when non-lethal uses are made of such technology, principally by commerce and criminals that the state lags behind.

[carl]

Slap and Bill:

If you drop a hand grenade accurately from however high you choose, it is still just a hand grenade. And you may be able to put it precisely on a target but you have to be able to see and identify a target. If there is something between your sensor and what you want to hit, a tree a roof or a rainstorm, it won't matter how deadeye you can be because you can't hit what you can't see. No matter anything else, it is still a very expensive way to deliver a munition.

I realize the tech is advancing quickly but certain things don't change. The item Bill referenced still needed radio reception and transmission to work. It was powered by batteries which severely limit the payload and endurance of any aircraft. Something little like that will work in well inside a building but can it handle a 20 knot gusty wind? Computational power and control tech advance but there are still the problems of power, weight, weather and being able to find something that is hiding. David is right, all this may be what it is cracked up to be someday, but that day may be a ways off.

David, an even better example of the phenomenon you mention are air to air missiles. They are quite deadly now but in the 50s people expected them to quite deadly immediately and made decisions based on belief. It took 40 years for the missiles to get there.

[Bill Moore]

Imagine a "swarm" of UAS carrying high-value drugs across the US border. Some I suspect would fail.

Moving drugs is a business, and I'm not sure it would be profitable to move narcotics this way, and furthermore I'm not sure how a swarm would land in a consolidated location where the drugs could be received by the next link in the network without being detected? I can see the potential of criminals using UAVs for surveillance prior to moving their load in some cases, but so far spotters seem to be working. I suspect that UAVs will be used to fill a need, and if there isn't a need criminals won't adapt the technology. The same holds true for states and terrorists. States have the means to experiment and expand the realm of the possible. Criminals and terrorists will generally adapt existing technologies instead of developing new technologies.

I remain concerned about what creative terrorists will be able to do with this technology as it evolves, and while I'm thinking bigger than a hand grenade, one can't downplay the psychological effect of a handgrenade dropped on a target from a UAV in someplace like the UK, Canada, or the U.S..

However, to put things in perspective the non-lethal potential of UAVs to support social needs such as search and rescue, delivering supplies, fighting fires, supporting law enforcement, collecting various forms of data to support non-military planning, etc. is far greater than its potential negative impact.

This isn't much different than the bio-sciences in that regard, for the most part this science has greatly improved the lot of man, but there are elements of this science that could be used by state and non-state actors alike to threaten or harm.

[bourbon]

This sentence by Bill Moore led me to think:

We are aware of the considerable investment made in drug smuggling submersibles. Is there any evidence - in the public domain - of drug smugglers using this aerial technology?

Imagine a "swarm" of UAS carrying high-value drugs across the US border. Some I suspect would fail.
Some of the first submersibles used by the cartels were unmanned. Ultralight aircraft are used on the US-Mexico border to smuggle drugs; it wont be long until the cartels utilizing drones somehow – if they haven't already.

I think they will probably first be used for diversionary purposes; divert the border patrols attention, then bring loads over using the standard means.

[bourbon]

If you drop a hand grenade accurately from however high you choose, it is still just a hand grenade. And you may be able to put it precisely on a target but you have to be able to see and identify a target. If there is something between your sensor and what you want to hit, a tree a roof or a rainstorm, it won't matter how deadeye you can be because you can't hit what you can't see. No matter anything else, it is still a very expensive way to deliver a munition.
A couple points:

- The problem we face today is not being unable to put enough ordnance on a target, but rather putting too much ordnance on target and the collateral damage it produces.
- Sensors these days are pretty amazing; not being able to see things is less and less of a problem.
- Just because DOD has a corrupt procurement system that gold-plates the hell out of everything, it does not necessarily mean that drones are expensive –- in-fact the technology is incredibly cheap.

[Fuchs]

Using drones: principles, tactics and results (amended title)

Isn't it remarkable how much this thread is focused on assassination?


Drone tactics are so much more.

For example: It's tricky to keep them from getting shot down when you face a somewhat capable enemy. The French were dumb enough to fly their Cerecelle (?) type UAVs on a predictable schedule and course in 1999 and lost several of them to Yugoslav ManPADS.

Another aspect of drone tactics are the interesting games played with decoy drones, such as MALD (?) or the Ryan models over North Vietnam.

There's also a huge tactical problem associated with the use of loiter munitions - kamikaze drones that cannot be recovered and should thus not be launched without a good reason. Worse; at least some types of them were autonomous (a German model, for example - and the British Brimstone missile is similar).

There are also interesting problems associated with transport drones, such as the Kaman K-Max-based drone (a helicopter with external payload). How could they be used in other than flat terrain?

There are also EW drones, most notably some radio comm jamming drones which were developed to do radio comm jamming in incredible depths (up to 150 km IIRC). How could you keep such a electromagnetic lighthouse from getting shot down against an opponent who warrants such a jamming effort?

Or superficially simple operational analysis problems regarding the slow cruise speed of a Predator or (still slow) Reaper when facing an opponent who is smart enough to learn the reaction time and break off his actions after a few minutes? You may be able to loiter over an area for hours with such drones, but not over all areas!

How about deconfliction? Shouldn't it be possible to fly drones at a few narrow altitude bands and free them this way from deconfliction concerns? Mortars, artillery, fighter-bombers - they all should not have any deconfliction concerns with drones, but last I heard is there are such concerns. And they keep especially the very small drones in practice almost always on the ground. Should a huge country ("airspace") like Afghanistan with few hundred manned aircraft in-theatre really have an elaborate deconfliction regime at all? I was especially astonished by the huge effort spent on having a flying deconfliction clearing house in form of AWACS aircraft...it doesn't get more expensive than that.

[carl]

A couple points:

- The problem we face today is not being unable to put enough ordnance on a target, but rather putting too much ordnance on target and the collateral damage it produces.
- Sensors these days are pretty amazing; not being able to see things is less and less of a problem.
- Just because DOD has a corrupt procurement system that gold-plates the hell out of everything, it does not necessarily mean that drones are expensive –- in-fact the technology is incredibly cheap.

For certain applications, putting a little bit of explosive on a target is great. I just don't think it changes the game radically. And I still contend it is quite expensive when you factor in all the costs associated with operating a drone. It takes a lot of people on the ground to support one of those things and that costs. The drones crash a lot too and have to be replaced. The fact that procurement system is busted is immaterial. It is what we have and it is not going to change. Drones ain't cheap.

Sensors are amazing but can they easily see through the forest canopy, or a rainstorm or into a bunker? To my knowledge they can't. Some can't even do very well with a bush or a stand of cattails. When they can do as well as the Rhodesian pilots used to do, picking out footprints in the dust, in addition to what they do now, I'll be truly impressed. When they can do what a Pygmy tracker does, I'll be even more impressed.

None of the drones handle weather very well, especially the tiny ones. Weather is something you have to be concerned about if you are going to fly anything, big or tiny.

Fuchs: Deconfliction is a problem when the drones are in control. It is an impossible problem when they go out of control, which they do. So to account for that you have to give them more airpspace to operate in. As you said, that's expensive

[Fuchs]

A story about airspace deconfliction:

During WW2 the British Bomber Command bombarded German cities, German anti-air artillery shot back. The effectiveness of the AAA was nearly proportional to the time they were able to shoot at targets.

Bomber command decided after some operational research that a different manoeuvring scheme would allow to drastically cut down the duration of bombers over a city.

Some afternoon the bomber fleet's cockpit crews were briefed about the flight plan and they began to protest: A thousand bombers dropping bombs over a city in only a few minutes would lead to collisions.
The OR people replied that they had calculated that most likely two bomber crews would be lost by collision, but many more would be saved because of the AAA's reduced lethality.
The bomber fleet sortied, executed the plan, returned home - and only two bombers had collided over the target. Losses to AAA were unusually low.


I regret today's deconfliction craze would not allow for this. It has become a self-licking ice cone, an end in itself.

[Entropy]

I regret today's deconfliction craze would not allow for this. It has become a self-licking ice cone, an end in itself.

Fuchs,

Deconfliction will always be necessary, even in Afghanistan. Afghanistan does have a lot of airspace, but aircraft tend to congregate in certain areas. If there is, for example, a big firefight going on then a variety of aircraft need to operate in the vicinity of that event and those aircraft have to be deconflicted. You are also misinformed about AWACs in Afghanistan.

[Fuchs]

Really?



As a result, AWACS crews pulled double duty, providing deconfliction and radar control to aircraft transiting the airspace while simultaneously responding to numerous requests for CAS. Providing command and control and establishing communications with battlespace participants proved difficult. There were instances of preplanned strike aircraft flying through the formation of aircraft attempting to support ground forces.

my emphasis


(JFQ)
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/1438.pdf

[Entropy]

Really?

You realize that portion of the article is talking about the war in 2001 and early 2002, before there were aircraft stationed in theater (in any significant numbers), and before there was an ATC system to do basic deconfliction and before there was an ASOC in Afghanistan?

If you think AWACs are doing any of that today then you are mistaken.

[slapout9]

1-All,Used to be Drones were targets that you practiced on. This is a remote controlled weapons system! From a 1950's systems analysis point of view ... you have a mobile launch platform, a delivery system, a guidance system and a "War Head". You want see drug dealers use it much because it has no designed "Pay-Load" capacity. But as Bill Moore points out Terrorist will really be interested it. Also the tecnology is getting cheaper all the time,not good for us.

2-carl, don't get hung up on the grenade analogy my point was that the (mystery Force of the future) wants to be able to "Put The Warhead On The Forehead." We can already do the "Big Bang".....what we need are smaller and more precise warheads.

3-davidpro,during the 1980's drug dealers in Florida tried modified R/C Aircraft for smuggling but they just couldn't haul the weight needed and at the time they still needed be controlled by line of sight (no on board cameras). The person operating the Plane had to be able to see where it was going to land, which really didn't help much. The only thing that halfway worked was when the drugs were wrapped watertight and dropped into a lake and recovered by other means, but that didn't work because they(dealers) became vulnerable to traditional LE methods. This is in contrast to subs which can carry huge loads and be offloaded at sea points to fast moving cigarette boats or simply sailed into a covered boat house or other concealed point and off loaded in a more traditional manner.

4-What Fuchs says about the tactics being a lot more than what is normaly talked has a lot of merit. This truly is 60 year old technolgy invented by the Germans in late WW2. There is a lot that is already known but itsn't being talked about as far as these weapons systems go.

[carl]

Slap:

A culinary artist is a cook, a corrections officer is a prison guard, a maintenance technician is a mechanic and a drone is still a drone.

[slapout9]

Slap:

A culinary artist is a cook, a corrections officer is a prison guard, a maintenance technician is a mechanic and a drone is still a drone.


They will take over the world in 10 years or so...It started with Satellites....link to a video on what Drones are?
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=b1wgV9DPQV8

[slapout9]

link to a FOX new relaeae about a granade launching,baton shooting,taser firing drone in Houston, Texas :eek:


http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Yfr140hB1qM&feature=related

[davidbfpo]

Hat tip to Leah Farrell for the pointer to this Harper's Magazine article, based on interviews and statements collected in North Waziristan.


The tribal elders are afraid to gather together in jirgas, as had been our custom for more than a century. The mothers and wives plead with the men not to congregate together. They do not want to lose any more of their husbands, sons, brothers, and nephews. People in the same family now sleep apart because they do not want their togetherness to be viewed suspiciously through the eye of the drone. They do not want to become the next target.

Link:http://harpers.org/archive/2012/06/0083923

[davidbfpo]

Two comments in The Daily Telegraph on drone strikes, after the revelations in the NYT on the procedures involved:http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/29/world/obamas-leadership-in-war-on-al-qaeda.html

In Peter Oborne's article 'It may seem painless, but drone war in Afghanistan is destroying the West's reputation' he writes:
We need a serious public debate on drones. They are still in their infancy, but have already changed the nature of warfare. The new technology points the way, within just a few decades, to a battlefield where soldiers never die or even risk their lives, and only alleged enemies of the state, their family members, and civilians die in combat – a world straight out of the mouse’s tale in Alice in Wonderland: “ 'I’ll be judge, I’ll be jury’, said cunning old Fury. 'I’ll try the whole cause and condemn you to death.’ ” Justice as dealt out by drones cannot be reconciled with the rule of law which we say we wish to defend.

Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/9300187/It-may-seem-painless-but-drone-war-in-Afghanistan-is-destroying-the-Wests-reputation.html

From 'Choosing who lives and who dies', which is a strange article IMO, but the following quote does accurately describe that parts of the world have moved on:
Whenever Israel assassinated a Hamas leader, the world would voice its outrage. Pretty much every country – including America – would issue a statement of condemnation. The US would say that it disapproved of extra-judicial killings. Meanwhile, Britain would get quite worked up. I remember Jack Straw, then Foreign Secretary, expressing great indignation when Rantissi was dispatched by an Israeli missile within weeks of succeeding Yassin as Hamas leader in 2004.

The fact that targeted assassinations are now happening on a far wider scale – with a fraction of the protest – shows how much the world has changed.

Link:http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/news/davidblair/100161679/choosing-who-lives-and-who-dies-the-methodical-assassinations-of-barack-obamas-kill-list/

[Fuchs]

Yes, but this salami slicing towards extremism and away from long-established cultural (and constitutional) norms can be stopped, though.

Germany made a full stop when with the last federal election the (European-style) liberals joined the government. There was only one thing good about them joining the government; the new minister of justice (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Leutheusser).
She had voluntarily resigned the same post more than a decade ago in protest against a new wiretapping law. She appears to be a predictable, reliable and effective person and was just the right person to get the job of stopping the stupidity done.



On a related note:
How extremism is normalized (http://www.salon.com/2012/05/30/how_extremism_is_normalized/singleton/)

[davidbfpo]

Thanks Fuchs for the pointer to 'How extremism is normalized', which prompted me to think.

The traditional political argument underpinning Western CT strategy, policies and actions is that they are to create or gain time by curtailing violence and so enable political changes – when those who use violence desist.

Drones in their selective assassination mode (hat tip to Fuchs for that) do gain time by decapitation - by disrupting enemy leadership, but require to be reviewed in the light of their impact and actual / potential downsides.

With the core AQ and their strongest affiliates I see no prospect of their campaign based on hatred and more reaching a point where the traditional strategic assumption that political changes can occur will happen. This is a point IMO in the West that is understood by the public, but is rarely articulated outside government and instead we just have the slanging match over "Is Islam an enemy". Illustrated by many of the comments made on the two Daily Telegraph articles.

What is needed is a clear, repeated explanation why each drone strike was used – akin to “These people plotted murder in a place where law enforcement was not available, nor local action available and the risk was too high to let them continue”.

This may not suit lawyers, with due process, oversight and much more.

Alongside when a mistake is made, accept it was so and enable compensation or what works locally.

On a far wider point we face the apparently increasing ability to kill more people, which may range up to mass killings, at a cheaper cost and by smaller minorities than seen before, plus by individuals and groups. For a long time the nation-state has been able to prevent such killings, so maintaining credible public safety and national security. Telling the public the nation-state is struggling to maintain security is not something politicians are going to admit. Politicians must be seen to "do something" and so we invariably retain 'emergency' legislation and whatever follows.

[Fuchs]

Terror movements seem to cease being a problem when their supporters lose confidence, interest or become too scared. I have yet to read about a terror movement that failed due to management incompetence or elimination of its hard core.

All the Americans are doing is the opposite of what they should be doing if they agreed on the above.

[davidbfpo]

Fuchs:
I have yet to read about a terror movement that failed due to management incompetence or elimination of its hard core.

Many would argue that the Provisional IRA eventually failed due to infiltration by informers, would that count as management incompetence?

[Fuchs]

Dunno remember that, but I'd count it as lack of availability of a good enough base of supporters as reason.

With cells of 4-6 and a good enough base of supporters, you won't have too many cells fail like that.

[SWJ Blog]

Drone Worrier (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/drone-worrier)

Entry Excerpt:



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Read the full post (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/drone-worrier) and make any comments at the SWJ Blog (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog).
This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.

[SWJ Blog]

Drones Revolutionize US Warfare (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/drones-revolutionize-us-warfare)

Entry Excerpt:



--------
Read the full post (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/drones-revolutionize-us-warfare) and make any comments at the SWJ Blog (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog).
This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.

[davidbfpo]

I am aware that for a few weeks now the issue of drones has been a "hot" topic within 'The Beltway', possibly inspired by the NYT reporting. Incidentally very little of this public policy debate appears on my "radar" here, even if Italy is acquiring drones with weapons - which comes up in the linked podcast.

Thanks again to CWOT and his article, which ends with:
Counterterrorism remains a challenge and no perfect blend of tools, policy and options can be outlined – for in all scenarios there will be risks, costs and unintended casualties. But I encourage those critics to ask two questions as they rightfully critique U.S. counterterrorism options:

If you advocate the end of counterterrorism policy, option or tool (drones being only one example), what are the consequences and resulting effects of your objections?

The U.S. should and will pursue terrorists around the world. The U.S. should protect its values while protecting its citizens. If you are not comfortable with how the U.S. conducts its counterterrorism, what counterterrorism strategy would you be comfortable with? And would that strategy protect U.S. citizens while suiting your values?

Link:http://selectedwisdom.com/?p=685

[SWJ Blog]

What Drones? Philippines is Not Afghanistan (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/what-drones-philippines-is-not-afghanistan)

Entry Excerpt:



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This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.

[davidbfpo]

Steve Coll adds his views, the catalyst appears to be a new book:
Kill or Capture....by Daniel Klaidman, a former deputy editor of Newsweek.


The more recent addition of Klaidman’s reporting, however, calls attention to one area... that 'capture is not feasible'.

(later) Even more disturbing is the evidence in Klaidman’s narrative suggesting that the Obama Administration leans toward killing terrorism suspects because it does not believe it has a politically attractive way to put them on trial.

He ends with the really hard question, a political one:
Is “kill or capture” a policy, or are the words just a screen for politically convenient targeted killings?

Link:http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/comment/2012/08/kill-or-capture.html

[SWJ Blog]

Why There's Nothing Illegal about CIA Drone Pilots (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/why-theres-nothing-illegal-about-cia-drone-pilots)

Entry Excerpt:



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[bourbon]

Ultralight aircraft are used on the US-Mexico border to smuggle drugs.....
Feds Drop $100 Million to Spot Flying, Homebrew Cocaine Mules (http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2012/08/ultralight/), by Robert Beckhusen. Wired Danger Room, August 20, 2012.

That’s why the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is spending $100 million on new sensors that can detect ultralight aircraft. The giant contract — awarded to New York defense company SRCTec earlier this month — comes as the cartels have been using more of the planes to elude Border Patrol agents. The cartels also seem to have become pretty good at it. The Air Force has chased them with jets, and the Border Patrol has pursued them with Black Hawk helicopters.

Closer to gliders than complete planes; ultralight planes are small, cheap and their engines are relatively quiet. They move slowly, but are flown low to blend in with the southwest border’s rugged and hilly terrain, which the smugglers use to hide from radar. The last available data on ultralight incursions is from 2011, when the CBP detected 223 flights, double from two years prior. It stands to reason the real number is much higher, owing to the diminutive aircraft’s sneakiness.

You could outfit some CBP trucks with DshKs for a fraction of that $100 million.

[SWJ Blog]

Necessary (Perhaps) But Not Sufficient: Assessing Drone Strikes Through A Counterinsurgency Lens (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/necessary-perhaps-but-not-sufficient-assessing-drone-strikes-through-a-counterinsurgency-lens)

Entry Excerpt:



--------
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This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.

[davidbfpo]

Hat tip to FP Blog's article 'What's Not Wrong With Drones? The wildly overblown case against remote-controlled war, for this statistic and the quote is slightly edited:
If anything, drone operators may be far more keenly aware of the suffering they help inflict than any distant sniper or bomber pilot could be.....a former Air Force pilot: "I used to fly my own air missions.... I dropped bombs, hit my target load, but had no idea who I hit. [With drones], I can look at their faces... see these guys playing with their kids and wives.... After the strike, I see the bodies being carried out of the house. I see the women weeping and in positions of mourning. That's not PlayStation; that's real."

Increasingly, there's evidence that drone pilots, just like combat troops, can suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder....A recent Air Force study found that 29 percent of drone pilots suffered from "burnout," with 17 percent "clinically distressed."

Link:http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/09/05/whats_not_wrong_with_drones?page=full and to a report on the cited USAF study:http://www.npr.org/2011/12/19/143926857/report-high-levels-of-burnout-in-u-s-drone-pilots

The article raises other matters, just that the statistics had more impact.

[davidbfpo]

A longer article than most I've seen in the UK press on the RAF's drones, nothing spectacular, but two points of note:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/9552547/The-air-force-men-who-fly-drones-in-Afghanistan-by-remote-control.html


The RAF is moving some pilots from three years in Nevada back to three more years on operations in a new Reaper control centre in Britain, where they will also pilot Reapers over Afghanistan.....

However, there are practical difficulties to overcome first. It remains unclear where the UK Reapers will be legally able to take off and land when combat operations end in Afghanistan in 2014. Civil Aviation Regulations prevent them from flying in British airspace since reaction times might not be fast enough to avoid collisions.

[davidbfpo]

A new report by Stanford & NYU, so its own website and much to read.

This not an impartial report from the BBC:
London-based human rights group Reprieve, which commissioned the report, said it was taking legal action in an attempt to force the UK government to clarify its policy of sharing intelligence in support of the CIA's drone-strikes.A very short account:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-19704981

This probably gives an introduction:
In the United States, the dominant narrative about the use of drones in Pakistan is of a surgically precise and effective tool that makes the US safer by enabling “targeted killing” of terrorists, with minimal downsides or collateral impacts. This narrative is false.Four points and a recommendation:
First, while civilian casualties are rarely acknowledged by the US government, there is significant evidence that US drone strikes have injured and killed civilians.

Second, US drone strike policies cause considerable and under-accounted-for harm to the daily lives of ordinary civilians, beyond death and physical injury.

Third, publicly available evidence that the strikes have made the US safer overall is ambiguous at best.

Fourth, current US targeted killings and drone strike practices undermine respect for the rule of law and international legal protections and may set dangerous precedents.

In light of these concerns, this report recommends that the US conduct a fundamental re-evaluation of current targeted killing practices, taking into account all available evidence, the concerns of various stakeholders, and the short and long-term costs and benefits.Link:http://livingunderdrones.org/

A commentary by Glenn Greenwald:https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/sep/25/study-obama-drone-deaths?

[davidbfpo]

A short article, with many short videos, 'Everyone Who Wants a Drone Will Have One Soon':http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2012/09/everyone-who-wants-a-drone-will-have-one-soon/262882/

The focus is on the 'home front':
The upshot of all this is that it's not going to take much to procure a drone and do anything you want with it. And if you try to outlaw them, then, well, only the outlaws (and government) will have drones.....Drones will make traditional fences as obsolete as gunpowder and cannons made city walls.

[davidbfpo]

JMM has added several posts on the separate thread that watches HVT policy under Obama:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=13239&page=7

Hat tip to Abu M for the comments by 'Drunken Predator Drone', where this sentence struck me:
Sovereignty is the inherent right to control your territory, and that right isn’t solely dictated by your capacity to do so

Link:http://gunpowderandlead.org/author/drunkenpredator/

'Drunken Predator Drone' writes in the context of Pakistan. What would happen if another 'ally' of the USA was repeatedly hit by drone strikes? Say Italy, where the US pursued a suspect AQ member and illegally rendered him.

I have long thought the use of an apparent drone only approach / tactic primarily, if not only gains time through the impact of violent, leadership decapitation. Often there appears to be no other US tactic in use.

Clint Watts again asks what are the alternatives to drones in a wider CT strategy:http://selectedwisdom.com/?p=813

Clint was writing after an extensive WaPo article, mainly on the targeting process last week:http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/plan-for-hunting-terrorists-signals-us-intends-to-keep-adding-names-to-kill-lists/2012/10/23/4789b2ae

[davidbfpo]

A column by Professor Paul Rogers:
The United States and Israel see armed drones as a valuable tool of "remote control". But Iran, China and Russia - and non-state actors - are working to achieve their own capacity. The emerging era is one of drone proliferation.

Near the end:
If the United States can persist with targeted assassinations in northwest Pakistan, acting with seeming impunity as it rewrites the laws of war, and if Israel can do the same in Gaza - why should other countries not follow suit?

Link:http://www.opendemocracy.net/paul-rogers/drone-wars-new-blowback

Interesting points made over the Iranian drone that flew from the Lebanon, down to Gaza and then across the Negev Desert before being shot down.

[carl]

Here is a story about the latest victim of a drone strike in Yemen.

http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2012/11/28/175794/family-neighbors-of-yemeni-killed.html#emlnl=Weekly_World_News_Update

It is interesting because according to the story it would have been quite easy to pick the guy up. He was living in his home town which was not very far from the capital of Yemen. He had been arrested before and in 2011 had served as a go between between the gov and some rebels of some kind. And he was killed the day after the election.

So we kill a guy we could have probably picked up the day after the election. We are not covering ourselves with glory here. The way my cynical eye sees it either 1. We got played by somebody in the Yemeni gov to knock off an enemy for them. 2. Some of our guys are really lazy and decided it would be too much trouble to drive someplace and grab the guy. Or 3. The powers that be inside the beltway needed a drone kill to make a statement right after the election and this guy was easy to get.

The more I read about all this drone/Tantalus device killing the more I think this will ultimately be very bad for us.

(Tantalus device is a reference to...?)

[Fuchs]

or
4. Capturing is too much hassle because there's no evidence or even only crime to justify detention.

[carl]

or
4. Capturing is too much hassle because there's no evidence or even only crime to justify detention.

Indeed. Which means we are killing people just on general principles. This is not going to end well.

[davidbfpo]

Carl,

Gregory Johnsen, a Yemen expert and Clint Watts have been "ding, dong" on Twitter on this latest drone strike in Yemen. I posted Gregory's recent comments on US intell in Yemen, see Post 74:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=12784&page=4

[davidbfpo]

The thread title includes results, so here are some.

Notwithstanding the Twitter and elsewhere traffic on the recent spike in drone strikes in the Yemen; now with a third failure to get their target - there is this CNN roundup:http://security.blogs.cnn.com/2012/12/31/taken-down-the-top-terrorist-threats-killed-or-indicted-in-2012/?hpt=hp_bn2

It shows ten deaths, with seven attributed to drones, although I'd add one in the Phillipines which few thought the Phill. AF did IIRC.

[davidbfpo]

..a look at U.S. actions in the past makes it possible to reverse-engineer a rough decision tree for certain types of suspects.

Link:http://www.theatlantic.com/misc/disposition-matrix/

[jmm99]

If the answer to their question #10 ("Is US capture plausible?") is negative, then we proceed to either a personality strike or a signature strike as hypothesized here, One Strike You're Out ?? (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=141988&postcount=131)

Regards

Mike

[Fuchs]

Link:http://www.theatlantic.com/misc/disposition-matrix/

Wasn't there some propaganda-only guy killed in Yemen a year or so ago?
That case would not fit into this scheme at all.

[omarali50]

btw, re the latest high profile victim, Mulla Nazir: http://www.brownpundits.com/2013/01/04/mulla-nazir-speaks/

[jmm99]

(wiki (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Samir_Khan)), perhaps - who picked the wrong traveling companion at the wrong time ?

As to "propaganda-only", the burden of proving that assertion lies on its proponent. But, one must admit that concept is immaterial here because no trier of facts is authorized to decide whether the burden is met or not. Thus, discussion is usually a waste of time.

Regards

Mike

[davidbfpo]

A BBC report, with a photo:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-21313323


The Norwegian-designed Black Hornet Nano features a tiny camera and relays video and still images to a handheld control terminal. It measures about 10cm by 2.5cm (4in by 1in) and weighs 16g (0.6oz). ....Powered by battery, the Black Hornet is reported to have a range of about half a mile (800m), a top speed of 22mph (35kph) and can fly for up to 30 minutes.

[CWOT]

SWC members: I made a post at my blog today (http://selectedwisdom.com/?p=965) reference the debate over the use of drones, which has reached its zenith this week. I've cross-posted some of the points here from the entire post and would enjoy the intelligence discussion of all those wise folks here at Small Wars. Here's the introduction and the policy recommendations are at this link: http://selectedwisdom.com/?p=965

"The much anticipated Department of Justice memo authorizing the use of drones to target Americans....scratch that. A white paper from the Department of Justice outlined what might be the U.S. government's position with regards to the killing of Americans via the use of unmanned drones.

Twitter erupted with claims that this memo provided the President unprecedented powers to kill any American, anywhere, for any reason. Well, I read the memo, and I'm fairly certain that is not what it said. (I think @blakehounshell was the first to point this out.) However, in reading this memo, which may or may not exactly detail U.S. policy, I did identify four important points for Americans if they want to avoid getting a warhead to the forehead.

Americans, if you are trying to avoid being transformed into a red mist;

--Don't join al Qaeda outside the United States- Who knew that if you are an American and you decide to join al Qaeda that you might get smacked in the face with a Hellfire missile. Unbelievable, the nerve of the American government to hold a grudge for so long. Can you believe the Executive Branch would be willing to kill members of the terrorist organization, including American members, that committed the largest terrorist attack in history on American soil? Absolutely absurd! However, simply being a member of al Qaeda won't necessarily get a drone sortie on your hut.

--Don't become a Senior Leader of al Qaeda overseas - Even more shocking, if you are an American citizen and you join al Qaeda, and then later, you become one of the senior leaders of that organization, you might just wake up to a mouthful of hell's fire! Unbelievable! To think that you could join a terrorist group and openly advocate for the killing of your fellow citizens, and then be so good at promoting terrorism against your homeland that you would be honored by al Qaeda with a promotion....to think you could then be killed for that promotion. I can't imagine. Who are these barbarians?

--Don't actively plan to kill or actually attempt to kill Americans - It turns out that if you are an American and you join al Qaeda overseas and then you plan to kill or actually try to kill Americans, you could get shot in the face with a missile. Ridiculous. What right do U.S. citizens have to try and prevent terrorists from attacking them? Surely if you join al Qaeda, recruit a guy off the Internet, and then help wrap his junk with explosives before setting him off to take down an airplane over Detroit on Christmas day, you should be allowed to hide out overseas and enjoy another opportunity to try a better, more sophisticated attack against the U.S., right?

-- Don't make it difficult to be arrested - This is where the white paper gets completely ludicrous. It seems that if the U.S. government cannot figure out a way to arrest you since you've joined al Qaeda, been promoted, tried to attack the U.S. and have been hiding in a failed state with no functioning law enforcement, they will then maybe send a drone after you. How insulting! How is this possibly fair to American terrorists that join al Qaeda?

Unlike the folks I witnessed on Twitter suggesting this document provides the President unbounded power to kill Americans, I see the inverse - a legal opinion particularly crafted to pursue one Anwar al-Awlaki. As has been seen in other public domains, Awlaki, an American, served as the head of external operations for AQAP in Yemen (a senior leader position), was being considered for promotion to head of AQAP (a more senior position) and was actively participating in plots to attack the U.S. (See Underwear Bomber). This uniquely qualifies him for targeting according to this white paper. The question should now be: what other Americans could be legally targeted by the U.S.? Adam Gadahn maybe? The list seems to be fairly short and not expansive in the way suggested by drone conspiracy theorists.

Drone critics - what do you want? - see policy recommendations here: http://selectedwisdom.com/?p=965

[jmm99]

My take (strictly hypothetical), from here (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=141988&postcount=131).

Strikes (whether drone or other air, or boots on the ground direct actions) can be divided into two catagories, depending on what is known and unknown re: the target.

A "personality strike" is one targeting an individual whose identity and past and current activities are known. When the strike is conducted, those making the decision to engage are primarily concerned with (1) the degree of confidence that the particular individual is present; and (2) the extent of collateral damage that can be tolerated. UBL and al-Awlaki, for example.

A "signature strike" is one targeting an individual (or individuals) whose precise identity is (precise identities are) unknown or uncertain. Instead, the individual or individuals must match a pre-identified “signature” (a behavior set) that the targeter links to terrorist activity or association.

I expect we'll be hearing much more about "signature strikes".

The signature strike matrix below is strictly hypothetical (presented as a quote only to set it off):


A Signature Strike Matrix

(1) Individual(s) Planning Attacks

(2) Individual(s) Transporting Weapons (not incl. legal weapons ?)

(3) Individual(s) Handling Explosives

(4) Individual(s) in Terrorist Compound

(5) Individual(s) in Terrorist Training Camp

(6) Military-Age Male(s) in Known Terrorist Activity Area

(7) Individual(s) Consorting with Known Militants

(8) Armed Man(Men) Traveling (on foot)(in vehicles) in Terrorist-Controlled Area

(9) Individual(s) in Suspicious Camp located in Terrorist-Controlled Area

(10) Group(s) of Armed Men Traveling Toward Conflict Area

(11) Individual(s) Operating a Terrorist Training Camp

(12) Individual(s) Training to Join a Terrorist Group

(13) Individual(s) Facilitating a Terrorist Group

(14) Individual(s) in Terrorist Rest Facilities (Safe Houses)

Discuss, if you wish, the plusses and minuses of the matrix as written

- as well as

(1) the test you would use to include a factor (e.g., "more likely than not", "reasonable certainty", "high degree of confidence", etc., etc.);

(2) whether you would include or exclude each factor separately without considering the other factors (strict "must stand on its own" test); or would you aggregate all factors supported by some evidence, even where each such factor would not "stand on its own" ("conditional probability"); and

(3) whether other factors should be added to the matrix.

This doesn't require legalese.

Regards

Mike

[John T. Fishel]

Hi Mike--

Long time no see.:) I think you defined both pretty well and have a reasonable matrix for signature strikes. to me however, the issue is not one of legality but rather one of effectiveness, Both kinds of drone strikes suffer in two areas:

Dead insurgents or terrorists who have been blown to bits cannot provide much if any intelligence. You certainly can't ask them any question so there is absoulutely no HUMINT to be gained.

Second. there is every likelihood that these strikes - both kinds - will kill some civilian non-combatants and both combatants and non-combatants heve friends and relatives who are sure to be pissed off. so, the question then is how many more bad guys do you create with each drone strike? Do you kill more than you create? or the reverse? In other words, what are the costs v. the benefits of the program - on both issues?

I have no moral qualms about killing bad guys with drones and even with some of what we euphemistically call collateral damage. But I do think that this tool can be and has been very over used to our detriment.

Cheers

JohnT

PS The prior analysis of how not to get killed by a drone if you are an American is spot on - with the qualification in #1 that if you join AQ in the US you should not leave the country and should surrender to the FBI when they com knocking on your door. (No hellfires here but certainly a hail of bullets is most likely. )

[jmm99]

I've stayed in plain sight. :) :cool:


from JTF

Dead insurgents or terrorists who have been blown to bits cannot provide much if any intelligence. You certainly can't ask them any question so there is absoulutely no HUMINT to be gained.

Second. there is every likelihood that these strikes - both kinds - will kill some civilian non-combatants and both combatants and non-combatants heve friends and relatives who are sure to be pissed off. so, the question then is how many more bad guys do you create with each drone strike? Do you kill more than you create? or the reverse? In other words, what are the costs v. the benefits of the program - on both issues?

I have no moral qualms about killing bad guys with drones and even with some of what we euphemistically call collateral damage. But I do think that this tool can be and has been very over used to our detriment.

Agree; except as to this: "... and has been very over used to our detriment." The "jury" is not yet in on that.

As far as the Bureau of Investigative Journalism (http://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/) is concerned, the first drone strike was "to our detriment" - as if that "esteemed body" gives a damn.

Regards

Mike

PS to PS: "hail of bullets" - not probable, but I'll admit the possibility (e.g., Ruby Ridge (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ruby_Ridge)). Almost all FBI arrests of terrs in US have gone off without bullets flying (several hundred cases).

[CWOT]

The past week has brought a flurry of debate sprinkled with intermittent anger over how the U.S. utilizes unmanned, armed drones to target al Qaeda members around the world. After I wrote the post, “Americans: If you don’t want to get killed by a drone, avoid these 4 things (http://selectedwisdom.com/?p=965)!”, I received a flurry of hate mail (of which a fraction actually dealt with drone policy) and some positive discussion. The debate on whether the U.S. should use drones to kill al Qaeda members hinges on two separate points of contention.

--Legal/Moral: Can the U.S. legally use drones to engage al Qaeda members (American or non-American)?
--Efficacy: Do drones eliminate more al Qaeda members than they create?

Today, I’ll focus on the latter question and save the legal/moral/ethical debate for later.

So are drones effective? Osama Bin Laden noted in his internal documents the devastating impact of drones on al Qaeda in Pakistan. However, Gregory Johnsen, Jeremy Scahill and other Yemen journalists/analysts see drones not as the great killer of al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) but instead the primary radicalizing force for new recruits to AQAP. So which is it? Do drones eliminate al Qaeda or do they create al Qaeda? I’d love to hear your thoughts.

Please cast your votes on the efficacy of drones and the results should show up after you cast your ballot. Note, this question is only about the efficacy of drones – save your moral/legal arguments for later. And no hedging! Is it worth continuing drone operations or not? Don’t qualify with “Sometimes” or “Depends on the conditions”. Assume that regardless of the context, the drone program will be conducted in roughly the same way with the same results.

Here is the link to the survey: https://www.surveymonkey.com/s/5JGSVMC

And here is the link to the post at Selected Wisdom: http://selectedwisdom.com/?p=977

[CWOT]

Thanks for your excellent comments.

I've posted a question on the efficacy of drones, related to this post, if anyone is interested. Here's the link: https://www.surveymonkey.com/s/5JGSVMC

Do "Drones Kill al Qaeda" or do "Drones Make al Qaeda"?

http://selectedwisdom.com/?p=977

[davidbfpo]

To lose a weapons system is expected, this many is startling:
Almost 450 drones operated by the British military have crashed, broken down or been lost in action during operations in Afghanistan and Iraq over the last five years, figures reveal.

The Ministry of Defence has disclosed for the first time the five Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) systems used in the conflicts and the number that have perished due to pilot error, technical faults or the undesirability of retrieving them from hostile areas.

Link:http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2013/feb/12/450-british-military-drones-lost

An interesting contrast to CWOT's latest threads on using (American) drones.

There is a long running main thread on drones, into which this will be merged one day: 'Using drones: principles, tactics and results':http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=7385

[SJPONeill]

It's a bit misleading as the article user perished and crashed interchangeably. While at the large NATO Class II/III end of the scale these may be close to one and the same, in the Class I mini/micro/nano categories, a crash might be something from which the UAV is picked up dusted off and relaunched, possibly not even requiring any repairs.

What this article chooses to ignore is the large number of hobbyist remote control air craft already operating freely in the UK, and most other Western nations, that have similar if not higher incident rates. Most military operated UAS are constructed to higher and more consistent standards than their hobby equivalents; and their operators are also trained to higher and more consistent levels.

I think this article is yet more fear-mongering from those who just feel the need to fear-monger about anything.

[davidbfpo]

I agree with this:
I think this article is yet more fear-mongering from those who just feel the need to fear-monger about anything.

I added the post as reliability of drones appears on SWC sometimes and it is part of the debate at home over drones.

[Fuchs]

Back in the 80's and 90's part of the sales pitch for drones was that they didn't need to have the super flight safety required for manned aviation. Less redundancy and less costs of testing were supposed to be major advantages of drones.
The focus on being able to use tiny spotter drones and extremely long endurance drones (with Global Hawk as gold-plated example or giant proportions) is only about a decade old. Previously, drones were widely understood to be expendable, and I think we still understand the tiny ones are indeed still expendable.

[carl]

I think this article is yet more fear-mongering from those who just feel the need to fear-monger about anything.

I don't know if it is fear mongering or not, but the article serves a useful purpose, to highlight the fact that drones crash a lot. They can't help but crash a lot given the limited view of the world the drivers have, the lag time between control input and response, what appears to me (viewing from the outside) to be limited control response, they are underpowered and the drivers have zero kinesthetic (sic) feedback. They are going to be crashing a lot until all those things are fixed.

And of course sometimes they decide to go walkabout. I'll never forget the bemused look on the face of a battle captain once. I asked him what was up and he said "The drone." "Oh yeah. Where's it going?" "We don't know exactly, but it's on its way."

[davidbfpo]

A NYT article Drone Pilots Are Shown to Have Stress Disorders, which refers to a new DoD report:
In the first study of its kind, researchers with the Defense Department have found that pilots of drone aircraft experience mental health problems like depression, anxiety and post-traumatic stress at the same rate as pilots of manned aircraft who are deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan. The study affirms a growing body of research finding health hazards even for those piloting machines from bases far from actual combat zones.

Note the DoD report is not readily found, that maybe because it is due to presented at a conference this week.

Link to NYT article:http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/23/us/drone-pilots-found-to-get-stress-disorders-much-as-those-in-combat-do.html?nl=todaysheadlines&emc=edit_th_20130223

[davidbfpo]

In July 2012 the University of Surrey's Centre for International Intervention held a conference 'Hitting the Target?" How New Capabilities Are Shaping Contemporary International Intervention'; I am sure there are plenty of similar conferences elsewhere.

There is something different about this as the principal academic comes from the 'Critical Studies on Terrorism' school:
The workshop’s objective was to explore how new selective precision strike capabilities available to military and intelligence forces are shaping approaches to international intervention. It aimed to be a forum for dialogue between different academic disciplines, as well as between academia and policy-makers/practitioners.... it became apparent that the principal focus would be on the increasing offensive use of unmanned aerial vehicles, or “drones”, a topic of increasing public debate as well as policy relevance.

There are some PPT on a link.

The conference is in partnership with RUSI, with an event next month in London, to launch a report and is decidedly optimistic that:
Military action in Mali, Libya and elsewhere have demonstrated the continuing, critical reliance on advanced technological capabilities in modern Western intervention.

Link:http://www.ias.surrey.ac.uk/workshops/intervention/report.php

Link to RUSI event (for members):http://www.rusi.org/events/ref:E511BB3D16FB0F

[slapout9]

Video of what some of the new capabilites are.... identifyitng your cell phone from 20,000 feet:eek: and theses are only the ones that they are admitting to..


http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QGxNyaXfJsA&feature=player_embedded

[ganulv]

Video of what some of the new capabilites are.... identifyitng your cell phone from 20,000 feet:eek: and theses are only the ones that they are admitting to..

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QGxNyaXfJsA&feature=player_embedded

A million terabytes a day? The Intelligence Community is apparently drafting a 1:1 map of the world.

http://www.bday.net/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/world-of-data.jpg

[carl]

A NYT article Drone Pilots Are Shown to Have Stress Disorders, which refers to a new DoD report:

The article says that the primary thing stressing the drone drivers is schedules. That is exactly the same thing the most bugs any commercial pilot. The article hinted the person doing the study was a bit disappointed by that because this person seemed to be looking for a more dramatic reason, angst about taking life anonymously, touchy-feely stuff like that.

The reason pilots are almost always stressed about schedules is two fold. First, unless you're lucky it isn't a 9-5, or 3-11 or 11-7 job. It always varies and it makes it hard to fit into a 9-5. Monday to Friday world.

Second, (and I don't know how much this goes for drone drivers) flying is a lot more fatiguing and fatiguing in a different way than people think. Prepping the plane, figuring the weather, delaying for two hours for weather and then flying two hours dodging weather to land in a snowstorm at an airport with moderate braking wears you out and then the day may only be half done. The suits don't see that. They only see you've been on duty for 7 hours. Dealing with an attitude, year after year, that equates 7 hours of blue skies and calm winds with 7 hours of blizzards stresses a guy.

[SWJ Blog]

Drones, Covert Action, and Counterterrorism: Why UAV Strikes should be Exclusively Military (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/drones-covert-action-and-counterterrorism-why-uav-strikes-should-be-exclusively-military)

Entry Excerpt:



--------
Read the full post (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/drones-covert-action-and-counterterrorism-why-uav-strikes-should-be-exclusively-military) and make any comments at the SWJ Blog (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog).
This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.

[davidbfpo]

The link is to a short article by a US law professor, on a blog I've heard of, but do not visit:http://www.lawfareblog.com/2013/03/are-drone-strikes-strategically-counterproductive-in-yemen/#.UTpcV5nDLls.twitter


Greg Johnsen, author of 'The Last Refuge: Yemen, Al-Queda, and America’s War in Arabia'...often read as arguing that American drone strikes in Yemen do more harm than good, because they spawn increased membership in the jihadi forces there....Based on his experience, he believes that a more refined drone program remains necessary — not that the US should end its drone program altogether. In particular, he believes that targeted killing in Yemen of high-level figures in AQ and associated forces does not tend to generate greater support and membership for these forces. Most Yemenis do not support these figures, are not outraged when they are killed, and do get mobilized against the US or the Yemeni government as a result.

The key point is, using Yemen as an example, that drones strikes should be concentrate on high-level figures.

[davidbfpo]

Via FP a report of a speech by the Pentagon's former top lawyer, Jeh Johnson:
Our government finds itself in a lose-lose proposition: it fails to officially confirm many of its counterterrorism successes, and fails to officially confirm, deny or clarify unsubstantiated reports of civilian casualties. Our government's good efforts for the safety of the people risks an erosion of support by the people. It is in this atmosphere that the idea of a national security court as a solution to the problem -- an idea that for a long time existed only on the margins of the debate about U.S. counterterrorism policy but is now entertained by more mainstream thinkers such as Senator Diane Feinstein and a man I respect greatly, my former client Robert Gates - has gained momentum... But, we must be realistic about the degree of added credibility such a court can provide."

Fuller remarks and the speech are on:http://e-ring.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/03/18/jeh_johnson_drone_court_skeptic_argues_targeted_ki lling_best_left_to_military

[Firn]

From my humble point of view the economics and the bigger technological trends are strongly in favour of drones&Co and their use. It will be quite interesting to watch how it evolves.

[jmm99]

We start with Fox News Poll: Majority supports use of drones (http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2013/03/04/fox-news-poll-majority-supports-use-drones/) (by Dana Blanton, March 04, 2013) (interviews conducted 25-27 Feb 2013, before Rand Paul's filibuster) (poll internals (http://www.foxnews.com/politics/interactive/2013/03/04/fox-news-poll-majority-supports-use-drones/)):


Do you approve or disapprove of the United States using unmanned aircraft called drones:

To kill a suspected terrorist in a foreign country?

Approve 74%
Disapprove 22
(Don’t know) 4

To kill a suspected terrorist in a foreign country if the suspect is a U.S. citizen?

Approve 60%
Disapprove 36
(Don’t know) 5

To kill a suspected foreign terrorist on U.S. soil?

Approve 56%
Disapprove 40
(Don’t know) 4

To kill a suspected terrorist who is a U.S. citizen on U.S. soil?

Approve 45%
Disapprove 50
(Don’t know) 5

However, three weeks later, we have Gallup with In U.S., 65% Support Drone Attacks on Terrorists Abroad - Less than half of Americans are closely following news on drones (http://www.gallup.com/poll/161474/support-drone-attacks-terrorists-abroad.aspx?version=) (by Alyssa Brown and Frank Newport, March 25, 2013) (after Rand Paul filibuster) (poll internals (http://www.gallup.com/file/poll/161477/130325Drones.pdf)):

http://sas-origin.onstreammedia.com/origin/gallupinc/GallupSpaces/Production/Cms/POLL/rxh_fv1ybugjsp_j_cwdtg.gif

(much more in article).

Two factors are probably at play here: (1) The legislative hearings re: drones, including the Rand Paul filibuster; and (2) The methodological variation in the two polls - Gallup ran two separate polls.

Regards

Mike

[davidbfpo]

Steve Coll comments on drone policy via reviewing two books:
The return of Presidentially sanctioned assassinations is described in two new books of investigative journalism, “The Way of the Knife” (Penguin), by Mark Mazzetti, a Times reporter; and “Dirty Wars” (Nation), by Jeremy Scahill, of The Nation.

He concludes, referring to issues we have discussed here a CIA official:
America’s drone campaign is also creating an ominous global precedent. Ten years or less from now, China will likely be able to field armed drones. How might its Politburo apply Obama’s doctrines to Tibetan activists holding meetings in Nepal?

Mazzetti closes his narrative with an interview with Richard Blee, a retired C.I.A. operations officer who worked aggressively against Al Qaeda at the Counterterrorist Center before and after September 11th, and who, like the Shin Bet directors in “The Gatekeepers,” has since developed doubts about tactics he once embraced. “In the early days, for our consciences we wanted to know who we were killing before anyone pulled the trigger,” Blee told the author. He continued:

Now, we’re lighting these people up all over the place. Every drone strike is an execution. And if we are going to hand down death sentences, there ought to be some public accountability and some public discussion about the whole thing. . . . And it should be a debate that Americans can understand.

[jmm99]

Oxford Union Debate

The Proposition: This House Believes Drone Warfare is Ethical and Effective.

Speaking for the proposition were Benjamin Wittes, senior fellow at the Brookings Institution; Kenneth Anderson, law professor at the American University, and journalist and author David Aaronovitch. Opposing the motion were Chris Cole of Drone Wars UK; Naureen Shah of the Columbia Law School Human Rights Institute, and Jeremy Waldron, legal and political theorist of Oxford and NYU.

The YouTube presentation (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_CBxRTZ48cg&list=PLOAFgXcJkZ2wylFe6-DvegKVh4WEHm0bC&feature=player_embedded#!) will take you about an hour.

Regards

Mike

[slapout9]

Oxford Union Debate

The Proposition: This House Believes Drone Warfare is Ethical and Effective.

Speaking for the proposition were Benjamin Wittes, senior fellow at the Brookings Institution; Kenneth Anderson, law professor at the American University, and journalist and author David Aaronovitch. Opposing the motion were Chris Cole of Drone Wars UK; Naureen Shah of the Columbia Law School Human Rights Institute, and Jeremy Waldron, legal and political theorist of Oxford and NYU.

The YouTube presentation (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_CBxRTZ48cg&list=PLOAFgXcJkZ2wylFe6-DvegKVh4WEHm0bC&feature=player_embedded#!) will take you about an hour.

Regards

Mike

Great post Mike.

[jmm99]

I'm gratified that you liked the debate. The presenters - both pro and con - brought their very different positions home without getting too far down into the legal weeds.

For the most part, the "targeted killing" materials (like the "indefinite detention" materials) tend to the academic and are more than a bit tedious. In fact, the best source, Lawfare's Targeted Killing Resources: A Bibliography (http://www.lawfareblog.com/wiki/targeted-killing-resouces-a-bibliography/), is to me quite overwhelming.

That bibliography covers five major areas which are material here:

I. Articles/Books About International Law Implications of U.S. Government Targeted Killings.

II. Articles/Books Analyzing U.S. Government Targeted Killings Under U.S. (Domestic) Law.

III. Articles/Books Making Policy-Related Arguments About U.S. Government Targeted Killings.

IV. (omitted)

V. Proposals To Enhance Oversight of U.S. Government Targeted Killing Policy.

VI. Articles/Books Related to Civilian Casualty Rates Associated with U.S. Government Targeted Killing Policy.

Regards

Mike

[Fuchs]

Keep in mind the legal / law stuff is only about quite arbitrary rules once set and newly interpreted. It is NOT about what's right or wrong, or about what should be done and what shouldn't.

Policymakers need to make up their minds about the assassination and accompanied negligent mass homicides and then they need to define what's not legal.
Likewise, the citizens should make up their mind as well, as they're the source for the policymaking's legitimacy through elections. They need to hold the politicians' feet to the fire if they come to the conclusion that they don't want assassinations and negligent mass homicide be done in their name.


This is only in the second order about effectiveness of the tactics and techniques employed. First, it's about ethics. The ends don't justify the means - that is as far as I know a consensus in Western civilisation.
In case you disagree about the means and ends thing: Get ready for getting killed by your government in order to salvage your organs for several life-saving organ transplantations.

______
You probably noted that my vocabulary differs from the official ones.
targeted killing = assassination
collateral damage = negligent homicide

Face it; that's what it is. The whitewashed terminology is meant to deceive and manipulate.
I understand the art of manipulating and deceiving through focus group-tested and optimised language is quite sophisticated in the U.S. (don't export it, please). One should be able to see through such manipulation, though.

[jmm99]

I'm gratified to see that we disgree on all material points. :D:):D

Regards,

Mike

[jmm99]

Witness List

Hearing before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil Rights and Human Rights On “Drone Wars: The Constitutional and Counterterrorism Implications of Targeted Killing”; Tuesday, April 23, 2013, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Room 226, 4:00 p.m.

General James Cartwright, United States Marine Corp (Ret.), Washington, DC.

Farea Al-Muslimi, Sana’a, Yemen

Peter Bergen, Director, National Security Studies Program, New America Foundation, Washington, DC.

Rosa Brooks, Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center, Washington, DC

Colonel Martha McSally, United States Air Force (Ret.), Tucson, AZ

Ilya Somin, Professor of Law, George Mason University School of Law, Arlington, VA.

You have a choice between the USG clip (http://www.senate.gov/isvp/?comm=judiciary&type=live&filename=judiciary042313p) and the C-SPAN clip (http://www.c-spanvideo.org/program/SDron#) (both over 2 hours).

Regards

Mike

[davidbfpo]

JMM,

Twitter was abuzz with positive comments when Farea Al-Muslimi gave his evidence; his blog site is:http://yemeni-motanen.blogspot.com/

[jmm99]

Neither al-Muslimi's testimony nor his two blog posts concerning drones were surprising to me - nor, should they be, to anyone else who has followed the Pew International polls of the Muslim countries since 2001. Of course, would the reaction be the same if the drones were really and truly Yemenese, without the US being in the picture at all ? Or, flown by Muslim nations, such as Saudi, Iran and Turkey. I suspect we'll see some evidence on that question in the not so distant future.

One point emphasized in al-Muslimi's testimony was "why not just capture the man ?". That issue has been debated from at least the 1970s; specifically as to drones, but more generally as to the use of lethal force in tomorrow's warfare.

The basic argument by the "capture" proponents is to create a mandatory spectrum of force escalation - e.g., capture without physical force, capture with physical force, light wounding, heavy wounding, killing:


During wartime a critical legal question involves the scope of authority to choose whether to kill or capture enemy combatants. An important view, expressed by many contemporary experts, maintains that a combatant can be subject to lethal force wherever the person is found—unless and until the individual offers to surrender. I argue that, in certain well-specified and narrow circumstances, the use of force should instead be governed by a least-restrictive-means (LRM) analysis. That is, I contend that the modern law of armed conflict (LOAC) supports the following maxim: if enemy combatants can be put out of action by capturing them, they should not be injured; if they can be put out of action by injury, they should not be killed; and if they can be put out of action by light injury, grave injury should be avoided. Admittedly, there are all manner of caveats and conditions that will qualify the application of this maxim. However, the general formula—and its key components—should be understood to have a solid foundation in the structure, rules and practices of modern warfare.

from Ryan Goodman on The Power to Kill or Capture Enemy Combatants (http://www.lawfareblog.com/2013/02/ryan-goodman-on-the-power-to-kill-or-capture-enemy-combatants/).

Lawfare links Goodman, and those arguing against his proposition, earlier this year, The Capture-or-Kill Debate #11: Goodman Responds to Ohlin (http://www.lawfareblog.com/2013/03/the-capture-or-kill-debate-11-goodman-responds-to-ohlin/).

I found it interesting that al-Muslimi was on the cutting edge of "modern lawfare" (more so than the other panelists).

Regards

Mike

[slapout9]

Link to an article from a new Jihad magazine requesting help against Drone attacks.

http://preview.reutersnext.com/2013/5/6/new-jihadi-magazine-appeals-for-help-against

[jmm99]

Lawfare, Lawfare Podcast Episode #31: Special Edition: Ben Emmerson Discusses His Investigation (http://www.lawfareblog.com/2013/05/lawfare-podcast-episode-31-special-edition-ben-emmerson-discusses-his-investigation/) (by Benjamin Wittes and Ritika Singh, May 14, 2013) (audio, just over 40 min.)

A couple of key snips:


There is a really wide spectrum of informed, intelligent and reasonable opinion on what the basic framework issues are. And I’ve taken part now in too many high-level seminars with people who are all genuine experts in their fields addressing a problem which has multi dimensions and within each dimension multiple facets, in which it is it almost impossible to find a common agreement on the core principles. . . . There are fundamental differences on first principles, but there are also fundamental differences on all of the refinements within those principles. I am unable amongst informed opinion at present to discern a critical mass of concurrent opinion, which to me in itself is a conclusion—and is also a conclusion which points towards the need for some fairly urgent discussions in the face of a technology that is ... technology that is proliferating . . . at a remarkable speed.
...
I think it’s absolutely fair for me to acknowledge that . . . I did start from a position in common with other international lawyers from my side of the world, which found the new paradigm [the U.S. view] difficult to accept and follow. But I have to say that like all good conversations, the moment one begins to talk to others and see things from a different point of view, what has become clearer and clearer to me is that we get nowhere by the continuance and maintenance of entrenched positions and that, crucially, we need to listen to one another’s point of view and see what is the way forward.

Mr. Emmerson's last public statement as UNSR, Statement of the Special Rapporteur following meetings in Pakistan (http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=13146&LangID=E) - UN Counter-Terrorism Expert meets victims of drone strikes in Waziristan and receives clear statement from the Government of Pakistan that it considers US drone strikes to be counter-productive, contrary to international law, and a violation of Pakistan's sovereignty and territorial integrity (March 14, 2013), was more hardcore Emmerson.

Regards

Mike

[davidbfpo]

Drones are useful, but not the solution or the problem

The headline of a short article on 'The Hill' and the author? Harold Brown, ex-Sec. of Defence.

Link:http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/homeland-security/299655-drones-are-useful-but-not-the-solution-or-the-problem

[jmm99]

From New America Foundation, Drone Wars: Counterterrorism and Human Rights (http://www.newamerica.net/events/2013/drone_wars_human_rights) (May 14, 2013) (video, just over 1-1/2 hours).

Participants

Ben Emmerson, Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms while Countering Terrorism, United Nations Commission on Human Rights

Peter Bergen, Director, National Security Studies Program, New America Foundation

Regards

Mike

[M-A Lagrange]

Content became a separate thread as a RFI and author updated.