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SWJED
05-07-2006, 05:52 PM
Counterinsurgency Reading List for Marines Deploying to Iraq or Afghanistan (http://www.smallwarsjournal.com/documents/usmccoinreadinglist.pdf)

Supplemental Reading List for Majors and Lieutenant Colonels Deploying to Iraq or Afghansitan (http://www.smallwarsjournal.com/documents/usmcsupplementalreadinglist.pdf)

SWJED
11-17-2006, 10:38 PM
A Military Review Special Edition (October 2006) - Counterinsurgency Reading (http://usacac.leavenworth.army.mil/CAC/milreview/English/CAC-COINFILES/COINREADER_WEB.pdf):


http://www.smallwarsjournal.com/images/coinreadinglistpreface.jpg

Jedburgh
09-05-2007, 12:53 PM
RAND, 4 Sep 07: Money in the Bank: Lessons Learned from Past Counterinsurgency Operations (http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/2007/RAND_OP-185.pdf)

This paper is a product of one of several RAND Corporation research projects examining U.S. political and military capabilities for fighting a spectrum of current and future insurgency threats. It should be of interest to academics, policymakers, military science specialists, intelligence analysts, and laypersons within the United States and elsewhere who may be interested in learning the applicability of lessons from past counterinsurgency (COIN) operations to the insurgencies the United States faces today and may face in the future. The six cases profiled in this paper include the Philippines (1899–1902), Algeria (1954–1962), Vietnam (1959–1972), El Salvador (1980–1992), Jammu and Kashmir (1947–present), and Colombia (1963–present). They were selected to explore COIN operations in regions with varied characteristics relating to geography, historical era, outcome, type of insurgency, and the level of U.S. or foreign involvement, among others. The issues addressed in this paper pertain to the success or failure of several counterinsurgency operations, the counterinsurgents’ ability to innovate and adapt, and the need for a way to recognize the threat and determine what is needed to confront it.....

Jedburgh
09-12-2007, 12:33 PM
RAND, 11 Sep 07: Understanding Proto-Insurgencies (http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/2007/RAND_OP178.pdf)

Small bands of fighters and terrorist groups usually seek to become full-blown insurgencies as part of their strategy for victory. But their task is difficult. The groups often start out with few members, little funding, and limited recognition, while the governments they oppose enjoy coercive and financial advantages and are seen as legitimate by most domestic and international audiences. Despite these difficulties, some groups do make the successful transition to full-blown insurgency. That transition is the focus of this paper.....

Kreker
10-22-2007, 06:06 PM
SWJ members,
While attending the AUSA Convention I ran into an old friend, John Antal. He represents EFW (publishes articles pertaining to the Warfighter). For 2008 EFW is looking to publish articles on COIN in SWA. Fom the many and varied posts here at SWJ there are those who deserve to be read. Here is the link: http://www.efw1.com.
Good luck.
Best regards--
Kreker

Cavguy
10-23-2007, 05:06 AM
SWJ members,
While attending the AUSA Convention I ran into an old friend, John Antal. He represents EFW (publishes articles pertaining to the Warfighter). For 2008 EFW is looking to publish articles on COIN in SWA. Fom the many and varied posts here at SWJ there are those who deserve to be read. Here is the link: http://www.efw1.com.
Good luck.
Best regards--
Kreker

Is COL Antal doing a "Choose your own adventure" book for COIN? He was the Armor School Head (16 CAV) when I went through CCC. Would be a neat concept.

Kreker
10-23-2007, 01:05 PM
Is COL Antal doing a "Choose your own adventure" book for COIN? He was the Armor School Head (16 CAV) when I went through CCC. Would be a neat concept.

Hi Cavguy,
John was signing copies of the 2007 Forests of Steel, Modern City Combat From the War in Vietnam to the Battle for Iraq. That book is a collection of articles written by current Soldiers and retired Soldiers. He's trying to get more interest from the Army in providing articles to the 2008 book.
John is a good guy and is doing his part to maintain currency with the Army at war.
Best regards,
Kreker.

Cavguy
10-23-2007, 02:22 PM
Hi Cavguy,
John was signing copies of the 2007 Forests of Steel, Modern City Combat From the War in Vietnam to the Battle for Iraq. That book is a collection of articles written by current Soldiers and retired Soldiers. He's trying to get more interest from the Army in providing articles to the 2008 book.
John is a good guy and is doing his part to maintain currency with the Army at war.
Best regards,
Kreker.

I've read a number of his books, being an Armor Officer and such. I remember at Knox he always walked around carrying a saber. The reason I asked was your post jogged my memory about his tactical decision book about NTC, and I just realized that something like that would be useful for COIN.

Steve Blair
10-23-2007, 03:24 PM
I've read a number of his books, being an Armor Officer and such. I remember at Knox he always walked around carrying a saber. The reason I asked was your post jogged my memory about his tactical decision book about NTC, and I just realized that something like that would be useful for COIN.

I thought that name was familiar...[insert forehead-slapping smilie here]

SWJED
12-03-2007, 11:10 AM
COIN Academy Reading List (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2007/12/coin-academy-reading-list/)

Small Wars Journal and Abu Muqawama (http://abumuqawama.blogspot.com/) recently commented on the formation of the new U.S. Army Counterinsurgency (COIN) Academy in Afghanistan. We were particularly interested in the Academy’s pursuit of building a first-class COIN library.

So… SWJ and AM have decided to aid in building the library with a little help from our friends. We e-mailed the COIN Academy requesting their reading list. They responded with titles of books and movies that once in hand would go a long way in establishing a world-class COIN library.

To streamline our effort we have set up the Afghanistan COIN Library page (http://www.amazon.com/gp/registry/wishlist/1R33SW0L8NIUS) on Amazon.

The books and movies you purchase there and send on to Afghanistan will seed the COIN Academy’s library with a few titles that will allow the staff to better appreciate history, culture, and insurgency in Afghanistan. Eventually the titles will make their way to the library of the Afghan Defense University of which the COIN Academy will become a part. The shipping address (while hidden at Amazon) is direct to the Academy and we will track to ensure your book or movie makes it way to Afghanistan.

A tip of the hat to Small Wars Council member Carl (currently a private sector pilot in Iraq and blogger at Because We're Here Boy, No One Else; But Us (http://becausewerehereboy.blogspot.com/)) who started the ball rolling by e-mailing us an offer to send multiple copies of FM 3-24 to the Academy.

Thanks much for helping us out on this project. What do we get out of this? A pretty darn good COIN reading list!

SteveMetz
12-03-2007, 12:31 PM
If you'll PM or email me the mailing address for the academy I'll make sure they're on the distribution list for Strategic Studies Institute publications.

skiguy
12-03-2007, 02:34 PM
Coupla questions to clarify. What do you do? Just go to that wish list link and purchase it normally, then everything's all automatic?

And about the amazon search: Do you just have to use the search feature here, then buy it as you regularly would, or does something else need to be done? (Does SWJ gets something for any purchase at Amazon by using this method)

SWJED
12-03-2007, 03:43 PM
Coupla questions to clarify. What do you do? Just go to that wish list link and purchase it normally, then everything's all automatic?

And about the amazon search: Do you just have to use the search feature here, then buy it as you regularly would, or does something else need to be done? (Does SWJ gets something for any purchase at Amazon by using this method)

Gets shipped direct to the Academy. Just make sure you check the wish list shipping address before you check out. And no, we do not get a referral fee as this list is not linked to our normal SWJ / SWC Amazon account. We tried to link it and planned on using the fee to buy even more books but using that method would not allow us and potential buyers to track which books were already purchased.

Any other purchases through our normal Amazon account - or a donation of course would be most appreciated. Lots or work goes on here at no cost to the members and site visitors...

Schuld
12-13-2007, 07:01 PM
For those interested, in addition to the FM on the list, another volume on the list, Mao's Basic Tactics, is available on the web ( http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-6/mswv6_28.htm ). In fact, this site has also published Long Live the Victory of People’s War ( http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/lin-biao/1965/09/peoples_war/ ), etc. Another good volume in that genre is, 'The Chinese Army Its Organization and Military Efficiency' by Evans Carlson (of USMC Raider fame).

SWCAdmin
12-13-2007, 08:04 PM
.... And no, we do not get a referral fee as this list is not linked to our normal SWJ / SWC Amazon account. We tried to link it and planned on using the fee to buy even more books but using that method would not allow us and potential buyers to track which books were already purchased.
CORRECTION.

Just in the interest of full disclosure. We have subsequently managed to adjust the linkage on the COIN Academy's reading list, and it does now generate an explicitly tagged referral fee within our account at Amazon. Small Wars Journal is reinvesting the referral fees from this effort to purchase additional books on the reading list.

Thanks also to Abu Muqawama, who has made the same modification and is similarly committed to passing on those referral fees to reinvest in the cause.

Note - you get the same low Amazon price no matter how you buy. The referral fee is effectively a slice out of Amazon profits, back to the little guys. Like us. And the COIN Academy. So thanks, Jeff Bezos. And thanks to those of you who choose to modify your Amazon purchasing behavior ever so slightly (i.e. click into Amazon through our site) and thereby help us out. It's a big boost to our tiny coffers.

Note 2 - to any of our coalition partners in this effort (see list at end of entry here (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2007/12/coin-academy-reading-list/)), if we haven't gotten the how-to on this fee-generating re-linking to you, let me know. Contact by PM or webmaster@smallwarsjournal.com.

Charlie Foxtrot
12-26-2007, 08:25 PM
What happened to the list? On Christmas Day, there were plenty of titles left. When I went back this morning to actually purchase/contribute one, it said that all of the titles have been purchased! :confused:

Did some grand benefactor swoop in and buy them all for you?

Charlie Foxtrot

SWJED
12-26-2007, 10:58 PM
... it does seem that all the remaining titles were purchased.

SWJED
06-07-2008, 06:02 PM
COIN Library (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2008/06/coin-library/) by Dave Dilegge, SWJ Blog

This morning I stumbled across (actually it appeared in the left sidebar under Google Ads) what looks like a pretty good resource for students and practitioners of COIN – The Counterinsurgency Library (http://www.counterinsurgencylibrary.org/). The site is pretty well organized and contains a lot of historical and recent content. Reminds me of what I had (and still have) planned for our own SWJ library. Until we get there take a look around the COIN library.

Here’s the library’s about statement:


Counterinsurgency has become a subject of great interest in the last few years, and this website is intended to bring together the literature on this vitally important subject in a single location. This is a collaborative website, in which anyone can enter bibliographical references. A user can – and is indeed encouraged to – annotate the entries. Visitors can also search by topic to find a list of articles about specific insurgencies or issues in counterinsurgency.

Counterinsurgency is a complex subject, as it rests at the intersection of history, economics, military strategy, and even political theory. This site attempts to collect articles on all of these aspects of counterinsurgency. In this respect it is different than other reading lists on, or bibliographies of, counterinsurgency. Some reading lists focus on military issues; others look at specific historical examples.

What makes this site unique is that it is both collaborative and dedicated to both the practical and deeply philosophical issues surrounding counterinsurgency. Many of the articles included here deal with specific counterinsurgencies, ranging from Iraq to Malaysia to Vietnam; other articles address practical questions such as the role of indigenous police forces in counterinsurgency. Still others deal with the theoretical foundations of the state, a subject that, even while largely unacknowledged, underlies all counterinsurgency efforts. At all times, this site is interested in a holistic view of success in counterinsurgency.

Please help us create a resource that can be of use to both scholars and soldiers, to those who are paid to think about counterinsurgency and to merely concerned citizens, and to all who hope for success in the difficult art of counterinsurgency.

The site is divided into two sections - Hot Topics and What's New. The hot topics include posts by country, other categories, Iraq, COIN tactics and theorists.

bismark17
06-07-2008, 07:15 PM
Thanks for posting this! The paper by Lawrence Cline on Pseudo Operations is worth it alone.

Jedburgh
08-20-2008, 06:07 PM
Military Review Special Edition, August 2008: Counterinsurgency Reader II (http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/COINReaderII.pdf)

Although most of these articles have been previously posted individually, in their respective focused topic areas on the board, this collection is being posted in the specific context as noted below:

In October 2006, the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center published a volume of selected articles (http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/COINReader.pdf) in conjunction with the release and distribution of the Army/Marine Corps Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency. Subsequently, numerous articles have been written exploring other dimensions of counterinsurgency not treated, or not well understood, when the first volume was published. These articles reflect both the vastly expanded range of knowledge and experience that U.S. land forces have obtained as well as the painful cost of such lessons with regard to fighting and defeating insurgencies in Iraq, Afghanistan, the Philippines, and elsewhere. Many outline the first-hand lessons learned in the current operational environment. As the Intellectual Center of the Army, the Combined Arms Center recognizes the importance of sharing these first-hand documents. The Counterinsurgency Center (COIN Center) and editors of Military Review have designed this second collection to complement the recently released FM 3-0, Operations and the soon to be released Counterinsurgency Handbook (produced by the COIN Center); FM 3-24.2, Counterinsurgency Tactics; FM 3-07, Stability Operations; and FM 3-28, Civil Support. While doctrinal field manuals lay out principles and supporting theory for dealing with the asymmetric aspects of warfare inherent in insurgency conflicts, these articles are intended to provide specific lessons and observations drawn from operations in the field.
Combined Arms Center Special Edition—Counterinsurgency Reader II

America’s Frontier Wars: Lessons for Asymmetric Conflicts
Congressman Ike Skelton

Developing a National Counterinsurgency Capability for the War on Terror
John Hillen, Ph.D.

Phase IV Operations: Where Wars are Really Won
Lieutenant Colonel Conrad C. Crane, U.S. Army, Retired, Ph.D

Linking Doctrine to Action: A New COIN Center-of-Gravity Analysis
Colonel Peter R. Mansoor, U.S. Army, and Major Mark S. Ulrich, U.S. Army

Using Occam’s Razor to Connect the Dots: The Ba’ath Party and the Insurgency in Tal Afar
Captain Travis Patriquin, U.S. Army

Anatomy of a Successful COIN Operation: OEF-Philippines and the Indirect Approach
Colonel Gregory Wilson, U.S. Army

A Model Counterinsurgency: Uribe’s Colombia (2002–2006) versus FARC
Thomas A. Marks, Ph.D

Anbar Awakens: The Tipping Point
Major Niel Smith, U.S. Army, and Colonel Sean MacFarland, U.S. Army

Addendum: Anbar Awakens
Colonel Sean MacFarland, U.S. Army

Commander’s Assessment: South Baghdad
Lieutenant Colonel Ross A. Brown, U.S. Army

Fighting “The Other War”: Counterinsurgency Strategy in Afghanistan, 2003–2005
Lieutenant General David W. Barno, U.S. Army, Retired

Combating a Modern Insurgency: Combined Task Force Devil in Afghanistan
Colonel (P) Patrick Donahue, U.S. Army, and Lieutenant Colonel Michael Fenzel, U.S. Army

HUMINT-Centric Operations: Developing Actionable Intelligence in the Urban Counterinsurgency Environment
Colonel Ralph O. Baker, U.S. Army

Human Terrain Mapping: A Critical First Step to Winning the COIN Fight
Lieutenant Colonel Jack Marr, U.S. Army; Major John Cushing, U.S. Army; Major Brandon Garner, U.S. Army; and Captain Richard Thompson, U.S. Army

Paper and COIN: Exploiting the Enemy’s Documents
Major Vernie Liebl, U.S. Marine Corps, Retired

Everything Old is New Again: Task Force Phantom in the Iraq War
Lieutenant Colonel Robert P. Whalen Jr., U.S. Army

A Synchronized Approach to Population Control
Brigadier General Joseph Anderson, U.S. Army, and Colonel Gary Volesky, U.S. Army

The Art and Aggravation of Vetting in Post-Conflict Environments
Sean McFate

Iraq: The Social Context of IEDs
Montgomery McFate, J.D., Ph.D

Iraq: Tribal Engagement Lessons Learned
Lieutenant Colonel Michael Eisenstadt, U.S. Army Reserve

Money as a Force Multiplier in COIN
Lieutenant Colonel Leonard J. DeFrancisci, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve

Stabilizing Influence: Micro-Financial Services Capability
James E. Shircliffe Jr.

From Enduring Strife to Enduring Peace in the Philippines
Major Gary J. Morea, U.S. Army

Protection of Arts and Antiquities during Wartime: Examining the Past and Preparing for the Future
Major James B. Cogbill, U.S. Army

Multi-National Force-Iraq Commander’s Counterinsurgency Guidance
General David H. Petraeus, U.S. Army

Cavguy
08-21-2008, 05:42 AM
Big props to COL (Ret.) Bill Darley who put this thing together and pushed through funding (thanks for the assist Dr. Jack!) from CAC to make it happen, and to the Mil Review staff for compiling it. It's a well balanced compilation of the best Military Review articles on COIN over the past two years.

Jedburgh
11-10-2008, 05:57 PM
Armor Magazine, Sep-Oct 08: Counterinsurgency: Selected Works (http://usacac.leavenworth.army.mil/cac2/coin/repository/Armor_COIN_Selected_Works.pdf)

The U.S. Army/U.S. Marine Corps Counterinsurgency (COIN) Center at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, would like to thank the editor and managing editor of ARMOR for their agreement to publish this special counterinsurgency edition. Several months ago, the COIN Center and staff of ARMOR agreed that the time was right to consolidate in a single edition a selection of the most valuable and instructive recently published articles on the use of armor in a counterinsurgency environment. These articles will provide units preparing to deploy a quick overview of the “best practices” associated with the use of armor in a COIN environment and perhaps lay the groundwork for future doctrinal revisions.....
Counterinsurgency: Selected Works

Welcome to the Counterinsurgency Century
by Retired General Donn Starry

Sadr City: The Armor Pure Assault in Urban Terrain
by Captain John C. Moore

Task Force Iron Dukes Campaign for Najaf
by Lieutenant Colonel Pat White

Integrating Armor into Personnel Recovery Operations
by Captain Romeo P. Cubas, U.S. Marine Corps

Retaking Sa’ad: Successful Counterinsurgency in Tal Afar
by Major Niel Smith

The Roots of Insurgent Warfare
by Captain Christopher L. Center

Armor in Urban Terrain: The Critical Enabler
by Major General Peter W. Chiarelli, Major Patrick R. Michaelis, and Major Geoffrey A. Norman

Platoons of Action: An Armor Task Force’s Response to Full-Spectrum Operations in Iraq
by John P.J. DeRosa

A Report on the 11th Armored Cavalry in Southeast Asia 1969-70
by Colonel Donn A. Starry

The Battle of Suoi Tre: Viet Cong Infantry Attack on a Firebase Ends in Slaughter When Armor Arrives
by First Sergeant Christopher P. Worick

Armor Task Force to Khe Sanh
by Lieutenant Colonel Carmelo P. Milia

The Battle of An Bao II
by Captain Timothy J. Grogan

Pattonmat89
01-29-2009, 06:24 AM
I paged through the threads about books on here, but I didn't exactly find what I was looking for. Specifically, I'd like recommendations on good introductory books for COIN. Note two things, please:

1. I already own FM 3-24. I bought it two years ago, and it came along with me to college.

2. I'm in college. So I prefer free things. Free things are nice.

Any other recommendations on books that relate to this sort of thing are welcome (history of radical Islam, history of Afghanistan, etc.).

Thanking you in advance.

William F. Owen
01-29-2009, 06:47 AM
I would suggest you start with Clausewitz on War (http://www.amazon.com/CLAUSEWITZ-Edited-Translated-Michael-Clausewitz/dp/B0010QEXRE/ref=sr_1_13?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1233210954&sr=8-13). Get the Howard Paret translation. THis is THE standard. Yes, it's heavy and not easy to understand, but COIN is merely a style of War. if you don't understand war - and very many do not - then you won't understand COIN at the level that is actually required.

After, that a liberal spread of Mao-Tse-Tung, Kitson, Julian Paget (http://www.amazon.com/COUNTER-INSURGENCY-OPERATIONS-Techniques-Guerrilla-Warfare/dp/B000NTK8K0/ref=sr_1_2?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1233211145&sr=1-2)(if you can find any) - those are the British Army classics, and of course, William Gwynne's Imperial Policing. - again out of print, but there are copies out there.

Hope that helps. Actually reading this board, will equip in way that many would and should pay money for!

Van
01-29-2009, 07:42 AM
USMC Small Wars Manual (http://www.smallwars.quantico.usmc.mil/sw_manual.asp) Available in soft copy for free. More of a TTPs and users' guide than a theoretical base, but much can be infered from what they chose to document.

SethB
01-29-2009, 08:55 AM
If you do a search you can find Roger Trinquier's work online.

Just be sure to keep it in perspective.

This site also has an extensive library of resources, and a number of links to other sources.

Starbuck
01-29-2009, 11:04 AM
T.E. Lawrence's Seven Pillars of Wisdom (http://www.amazon.com/Seven-Pillars-Wisdom-T-E-Lawrence/dp/0385418957). He assisted in developing many of the insurgent tactics now used by many of the groups in Iraq (notably the IED, economy of force, blending into the surrounding territories, de-centralization of command, etc). He also makes comments on the organizational culture of the British Army that are actually quite similar to the organizational culture of the US Army in the War on Terror, which followed a long period of peacetime.

kaur
01-29-2009, 11:50 AM
Modern Irregular Warfare (originally published 1972).

http://www.wlym.com/pdf/iclc/modernwarfare.pdf

William F. Owen
01-29-2009, 12:33 PM
T.E. Lawrence's Seven Pillars of Wisdom (http://www.amazon.com/Seven-Pillars-Wisdom-T-E-Lawrence/dp/0385418957). He assisted in developing many of the insurgent tactics now used by many of the groups in Iraq (notably the IED, economy of force, blending into the surrounding territories, de-centralization of command, etc).

I have great deal of difficulty in believing T.E. assisted in developing any tactics at all, despite that which he claims. The Jordanians certainly make no claim to his expertise, other than he knew how to use explosives. Command detonated IEDs had been widely used in the Boer War, against rail networks.

The real power behind T.E. was General Allenby and a small team of British Intelligence experts who told him what to do and when to it. T.E. was actually only a small part of far larger picture, conceived and executed by that small team. There is ample evidence to suggest Lawrence was wise after the fact, and greatly "gilded the lily," which the OPSEC controls of 1927 as quite happy for him to do, in order to disguise the other means used.


He also makes comments on the organizational culture of the British Army that are actually quite similar to the organizational culture of the US Army in the War on Terror, which followed a long period of peacetime.

I'd take T.E. with a huge pinch of salt. He's another poster boy for the post modern avant-garde, that was as bad in 1930's as they are today.

Gian P Gentile
01-29-2009, 01:00 PM
Wilf as usual is spot-on and has it right with the recommendation to read Clausewitz first!! Ironic though that FM 3-24 chose to leave Clausewitz off of the classics bibliography list in the back of the manual. The purpose of this action was to bludgeon the American Army out of its perceived "conventional mindset."

Also strongly suggest reading CE Callwell's "Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice." The intro in the University of Nebraska edition by historian Doug Porch is superb.

MikeF
01-29-2009, 03:19 PM
Patton,

I've been given some thought to this question as of late. Specifically, we've been debating how to teach the institutional army about COIN. I learned from On the Job Training followed with my current academic pursuits. With that in mind, I'd suggest starting with the basics of how and why.

1. To answer the Why, I'd recommend two books.

A. Why Men Rebel- Ted Gurr
B. Revolutionary Change- Chalmers Johnson

Summary of Gurr...

Amazon Review (http://www.beyondintractability.org/booksummary/10680/)
In this book, Gurr examines the psychological frustration-aggression theory which argues that the primary source of the human capacity for violence is the frustration-aggression mechanism. Frustration does not necessarily lead to violence, Gurr says, but when it is sufficiently prolonged and sharply felt, it often does result in anger and eventually violence.
Gurr explains this hypothesis with his term "relative deprivation," which is the discrepancy between what people think they deserve, and what they actually think they can get. Gurr's hypothesis, which forms the foundation of the book, is that: "The potential for collective violence varies strongly with the intensity and scope of relative deprivation among members of a collectivity."(p.24) http://www.beyondintractability.org/booksummary/10680


John T. Fischel SWJ summary (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=6613#post65464)- excerpt from another thread
1. The absolutely deprived/oppressed do not rebel.
2. Neither do those who are doing well.
3. Rebellion happens after a period of social/political/economic improvement is followed by a sudden and relatively steep downturn causing the government to lose its legitimacy.
Gurr calls this "perceived relative deprivation."
It's still the best theoretical explanation for insurgency out there.

COL Bob Jones adds

A couple of points worth considering:

In general, insurgency occurs when a government "fails" its populace. Failure being not meeting some issue or issues that can fall across the full range of Maslows heirarchy that a significant segment of the populace feels is important enought to fight over, and where legitimate means for addressing the failure are not available. Not the same as effective governance, as government can be effective (British governance of American Colonies) and fail; or it can be ineffective and succeed. The only metric that matters is how he populace feels about its governance.

Insurgency falls into three broad categories: Revolution, to change the governance of the entire state; Separatist, to break some segment of the state off and form a new state; and Resistance. (In Iraq you see all three forms at the same time, and each requires a tailored approach to resolve).

COIN efforts tend to be long, drawnout affairs largely because Governments (politicians) are even worse than most people at taking responsibility for their shortcomings. Far better to blame such failures on others and focus on "fixing them," rather than being introspective and adjusting your own actions as your main effort, and addressing the symptoms of that failure as a supporting effort.

Finally, outbreaks of insurgency tend to occur after any major disruption ends a period of major governmental control that has suppressed the ability of a wide range of populaces to self-determine their own governance. As Spain crumbled as a major power at the turn of the century (led to popular uprisings and also a scramble by other states to take over payments on old colonies), At the end of WWI a major disruption of the European Colonial system occured with similar effect. The end of WWII led to many African and Asian uprisings. Concept of a common ideology for distinct events occurs as many of these populaces turn to an ideology of communism to rally the populace for change. Post Coldwar the areas released from suppression were central europe, the middle east. Russia in large part opted not to resist, so change was relatively bloodless in Central Europe. In the Middle East the US led west is resisting such changes to the political structures the worked so hard to shape and sustain, so there is conflict. Most of these populaces are majority Muslim, so it makes a convenient ideology to rally the populace for change.

Summary of Johnson...

CHPT 8 PG 156-157

"by demonstrating through apparently indiscriminate violence that the existing regime cannot protect the people nominally under its authority. The effect on the individual is supposedly not only anxiety, but withdrawal from the relationships making up the established order of society. .... usually has the opposite effect of calling people's attention to the seriousness of the situation and encouraging them to support any strong reassertion of authority"

"..provoke the ruling elites into a disastrous overreaction, thereby creating widespread sentiment against them. ...transform the political situation of the country into a military situation. That will alienate the masses, who, from then on, will revolt against the army and the police and blame them for this state of things."


More to follow...

Mike

MikeF
01-29-2009, 03:22 PM
To understand How men rebel, you gotta go with Chairman Mao...

Here's a quick summary with a little help from Dr. Gordon McCormick and David Kilcullen...

KEY POINTS*:

1. In this ‘game’ of IW, the goal of the state or counter-state is control of the populace. The counter-state is an organization that seeks to take over the responsibilities of the state. The counter-state can be a tribe, gang, insurgent, terrorist, or drug lord.

2. Control is dictated by the perceived security level of the populace. In this type of conflict, control is often coerced as the state and counter-state battle for the physical and psychological so-called “hearts and minds.”

3. If the government stops providing essential services, security, and governance to the populace, then the counter-state will fill the void. For example, an area in Iraq where coalition forces mass in large FOBs and the government does not govern. These areas are often dubbed “denied areas.”

4. The point at which the state cedes an area to the counter-state is defined as the break point. This break point is “achieved by establishing a local military advantage, displacing (or neutralizing) the residual presence of the old regime, and creating an alternative set of administrative and governing institutions” (McCormick, 1999, pp. 26-27).

* These key points are a portion of Dr. Gordon McCormick’s Mystic Diamond Model from his seminar on Guerilla Warfare. Dr. David Kilcullen used the model to introduce his conflict eco-system.

ENEMY COURSE OF ACTION:

Chairman Mao set the ultimate playbook for the counter-state. The Vietcong, NVA, Hezbollah, Hamas, JAM, and Al Qaeda adapted it for their own purposes.

1) Clandestine Organization

2) Psychological Preparation of the People
(a) Propaganda
(b) Reduction of Prestige
(c) Peasant Resistance
(d) Destruction of the Opposition

3) Expansion of Control
(a) Destruction of the Oppression
(b) Land Reform as a Tactic of the Party

4) Consolidation of Power
(a) Paramilitary Forces
(b) Mutual Surveillance
(c) Movement Controls

In China, the Maoist Theory of People's War divides warfare into three phases. In Phase One, the guerrillas earn population's support by distributing propaganda and attacking the organs of government. In Phase Two, escalating attacks are launched against the government's military forces and vital institutions. In Phase Three, conventional warfare and fighting are used to seize cities, overthrow the government, and assume control of the country. Mao's doctrine anticipated that circumstances may require shifting between phases in either directions and that the phases may not be uniform and evenly paced throughout the countryside. Mao Zedong's seminal work, On Guerrilla Warfare,[4] has been widely distributed and applied most successfully in Vietnam, by military leader and theorist Vo Nguyen Giap, whose "Peoples War, Peoples Army"[5] closely follows the Maoist three-phase approach, but emphasizing flexibility in shifting between guerrilla warfare and a spontaneous "General Uprising" of the population in conjunction with guerrilla forces (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Guerrilla_Warfare#The_.27classic.27_three-phase_Maoist_model)

I hope this helps...

Mike

John T. Fishel
01-29-2009, 03:30 PM
at self promotion, I'd recommend my own (with Max G. Manwaring) Uncomfortable Wars Revisited (http://www.amazon.com/Uncomfortable-Revisited-International-Security-Affairs/dp/0806139889/ref=ed_oe_p), OU Press, 2008 (paperback edition) which is a "reasonable" price.

Cheers

JohnT

carl
01-29-2009, 05:07 PM
RAND (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=1104) has many many things on line, including Galula's first person account of his time in Algeria. And it's all for free.

Hacksaw
01-29-2009, 08:17 PM
Gian and WILF...

While I too enjoy an occassional perusal of St Carl's treatment on war, we might consider the context of the request... Soph in College with no personal reference point for the nature of warfare.

Directing him to Carl first is akin to telling a young child to learn the history of the Jewish nation by picking up a copy of the Old
Testament and following the story.

Can it be done, yeah but....

I think its a poor place to direct a neophyte "first"...

Live well and row

Bob's World
01-29-2009, 08:43 PM
I highly recommend:

"1776 (http://www.amazon.com/1776-David-McCullough/dp/0743226712)" by David McCullough.
Very successful insurgents like Mao and Ho Chi Minh studied this insurgency very closely. This one year snapshot really does a great job of covering the play by play of a government making bad decisions in the face of a dissatisfied populace, and the resultant insurgency. Plus everyone needs to refresh themselves on who we are as Americans, and by studing the errors of our British "parents," we can hopefully break the cycle and not make the same mistakes they did as we find ourselves in very similar situations today.

Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory & Practice (http://www.amazon.com/Counterinsurgency-Warfare-Practice-David-Galula/dp/0976738007) David Galula's

From theory to strategy to operations to tactics. A guy who gets it does a great job of breaking it down.

Lastly, unless you are a hardcore academic, I strongly urge you not to attempt to read and understand Clausewitz. This is in no way a criticism of my Prussian friend. To understand insurgency you must first seek to understand fundamental human dynamics, and THEN to understand war. The reasons why states wage war against each other and the dynamics of that are very different than the dynamics of why a populace wages war against its own government. This is one reason why conventional military forces often start off on the wrong foot when tasked to deal with an insurgency. They do what militarys do: Defeat the Threat. So I will respectfully disagree with WILF and COL G. as to "Clausewitz first."

(By the same token, I would never recommend to a Lieutenant or even a Captain to read Clausewitz either. Read what is relevant to your success at the level you are at. Read classics like "Platoon Leader (http://www.amazon.com/Platoon-Leader-Memoir-Command-Combat/dp/0891418008/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1233262216&sr=1-1)" and "Company Commander (http://www.amazon.com/Company-Commander-Classic-Infantry-Memoir/dp/1580800386/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1233262349&sr=1-1)"; hell read "Devils in Baggy Pants (http://www.amazon.com/Those-Devils-Baggy-Pants-Carter/dp/1886681201/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1233262396&sr=1-1=)" and other great reads on small unit actions and leadership. Then read Galula and think about how you apply those leadership skills to an insurgency).

wm
01-29-2009, 08:57 PM
Gian and WILF...

Soph in College with no personal reference point for the nature of warfare.

Directing him to Carl first is akin to telling a young child to learn the history of the Jewish nation by picking up a copy of the Old
Testament and following the story.

Can it be done, yeah but....

I think its a poor place to direct a neophyte "first"...


Not to pile on, but to really understand St Carl, one ought to read and understand Hegel first, since On War is largely a practical application of the Hegelian dialectic to the world of human conflict, representing one instantiation in the world of human activities of the dialectic movement by which the Absolute Ideal becomes concrete--again not a task I'd recommend to your average college sophomore, especially one who may be embarking on this endeavor as a solo venture.

Have you guys read Hegel's Logic or Phenomenolgy of the Spirit ? It makes reading Carl seem like a cakewalk.

Ken White
01-29-2009, 09:00 PM
a Corporal in 1952. Who knew I'd offend so many people. To make matters worse, it was the 1940s Maude translation and not Wilf's recommended Paret edition (after my time...). :D

Brins
01-29-2009, 11:23 PM
For today's (and likely a LOT of tomnrow's) relevance, go to this site and search for "Milestones": http://web.youngmuslims.ca/

Tons of people have actually gone to Amazon and bought this...the great thing about the site, above, it you can also get links to places where people discuss Qutb. To me, that is even more valuable than the having a book between two pieces of paper.

As someone already mentioned, RAND has a lot of free info.

Another place, obvious, but strangely not often thought of is google books:

http://books.google.com/books?q=counter+insurgency&btnG=Search+Books

This should get you to it.

Keep in mind that books are, by nature overcome by events. Therefore, if I were you, I'd also look at online journals, magazines, and such. These are much more timely, especially for college paper purposes. If you decide to suck it up and actually BUY some books (VERY highly recommended), I'd go to Barnes and Noble right now...they were having a HUGE sale on books, and a LOT were COIN-related.

One of the problems you will constantly run into is that the entire notion of COIN--most especially these days--is constantly gainining more and more of a database. Much of it is crap...the key is to find vetted authors. So, to develop good papers and good ideas, you will need to include research on the authors who write all of this stuff.

Do not let any of this discourage you, though. Keep in mind that many of the BEST practioners of COIN (and I'm begginning to HATE that term, by the way) were not even military men. In fact, a significant amount of insight can be gained through anthropological venues...probably even BETTER than the majority of "COIN Expert" books out there.

More than anything else--IMHO--the study of insurgency is about people and societies, and NOT about military arts. In fact, many who are/were acknowledged military experst have fallen (and will continue to fall) short when confronted with an insurgency dynamics.

One final note. As you look through all of this, you will likely begin to find more and more on "irregular warfare." Don't let this distract you because you risk getting lost in endless discussions of what, exactly, that term means.

Good luck!:)

Cavguy
01-29-2009, 11:50 PM
Do not let any of this discourage you, though. Keep in mind that many of the BEST practioners of COIN (and I'm begginning to HATE that term, by the way) were not even military men. In fact, a significant amount of insight can be gained through anthropological venues...probably even BETTER than the majority of "COIN Expert" books out there.

Curious, who would you cite as civilian "best practitioners?" Case examples?

ODB
01-30-2009, 12:16 AM
I have been curious the past few days about the number of colleges teaching COIN courses, who are the teachers? Do they have guest speakers? How can get on board to be one of the guest speakers?

Not questioning the ability of academics, but sometimes find it interesting that the so called experts have no practical experiences. Is this view point to harsh on academics?

Ken White
01-30-2009, 01:47 AM
here and there on the ol' internet -- not too harsh, that is...:D

John T. Fishel
01-30-2009, 02:19 AM
Cavguy, I nominate Ambassadors Deane Hinton, Tom Pickering, and Ed Corr, who, with their MILGP commanders and several Southcom CINCs, helped the Govt of El Salvador defeat the FMLN. Their civilian "counterparts" Presidents Jose Napoleon Duarte and Alfredo Cristiani (although he worked with Amb Bill Walker) were also outstanding civilian practitioners of COIN and FID/SFA.

ODB, I'm one of the guys who teaches a course on Small Wars/LIC which is COIN heavy. Next semester (Fall 09) I have funding for guest speakers. If you are really interested send me a resume by PM or email.

Cheers

JohnT

Cavguy
01-30-2009, 04:36 AM
Cavguy, I nominate Ambassadors Deane Hinton, Tom Pickering, and Ed Corr, who, with their MILGP commanders and several Southcom CINCs, helped the Govt of El Salvador defeat the FMLN. Their civilian "counterparts" Presidents Jose Napoleon Duarte and Alfredo Cristiani (although he worked with Amb Bill Walker) were also outstanding civilian practitioners of COIN and FID/SFA.

ODB, I'm one of the guys who teaches a course on Small Wars/LIC which is COIN heavy. Next semester (Fall 09) I have funding for guest speakers. If you are really interested send me a resume by PM or email.

Cheers

JohnT


Excellent!

William F. Owen
01-30-2009, 06:49 AM
Gian and WILF...
While I too enjoy an occassional perusal of St Carl's treatment on war, we might consider the context of the request... Soph in College with no personal reference point for the nature of warfare.

He's a Soph. Good enough. CvC is the best guide to understanding conflict in the round. COIN is War, therefore understanding it's nature is essential, to my mind.


Directing him to Carl first is akin to telling a young child to learn the history of the Jewish nation by picking up a copy of the Old Testament and following the story.
Worked for me! :D


I think its a poor place to direct a neophyte "first"... There is a standard, and it' not easy. If you know a better book, that explains the roots and dynamics of conflict better than CvC, then I am all ears.

wm
01-30-2009, 01:54 PM
There is a standard, and it' not easy. If you know a better book, that explains the roots and dynamics of conflict better than CvC, then I am all ears.

How about Machiavelli--The Art of War and The Prince available together here (http://www.amazon.com/Art-War-Prince-Niccol%C3%B2-Machiavelli/dp/160459361X) in one volume.

William F. Owen
01-30-2009, 02:29 PM
How about Machiavelli--The Art of War and The Prince available together here (http://www.amazon.com/Art-War-Prince-Niccol%C3%B2-Machiavelli/dp/160459361X) in one volume.

Good points. I really wouldn't bother with Mack's Art of War, unless you are really interested in Renaissance Military Thought. Some of the homo-erotic observations and the dismissal of gun powder, make it a hard going.

The Prince is certainly useful, but again not required. It was written as an advertising document or basically a CV, for Mack to get back into Politics and while very insightful, is not really going to add that much.

IMO, and many other folks, CvC is required reading if you going to study any form of conflict. Warfare has few if any standard works, but CvC is as close as we currently have.

Steve Blair
01-30-2009, 03:54 PM
For a good comparison and synthesis of many of the classic writers on war, "Masters of War" (http://www.amazon.com/Masters-War-Classical-Strategic-Thought/dp/0714681326/ref=pd_bbs_sr_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1233330735&sr=8-1) is really hard to beat, IMO. Handel does a great job of bringing CvC, Sun Tzu, Mach, and others together in a way that can help even the most novice thinker.

William F. Owen
01-30-2009, 03:56 PM
For a good comparison and synthesis of many of the classic writers on war, "Masters of War" (http://www.amazon.com/Masters-War-Classical-Strategic-Thought/dp/0714681326/ref=pd_bbs_sr_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1233330735&sr=8-1) is really hard to beat, IMO. Handel does a great job of bringing CvC, Sun Tzu, Mach, and others together in a way that can help even the most novice thinker.

Concur. This is an excellent book! Good call Steve!

Steve Blair
01-30-2009, 03:59 PM
I'm actually surprised it isn't mentioned more often. I've found it an invaluable starting point for many people trying to get their minds wrapped around strategic concepts.

William F. Owen
01-30-2009, 04:16 PM
I'm actually surprised it isn't mentioned more often. I've found it an invaluable starting point for many people trying to get their minds wrapped around strategic concepts.

As concerns "Strategic Concepts," I would also strongly recommend this (http://www.amazon.co.uk/War-Peace-International-Relations-Introduction/dp/041538639X) by Colin Gray. It is excellent and I clearly draws a line between the three subjects, which seem to cause so much confusion here.

AmericanPride
01-31-2009, 02:49 AM
For beginners, I'd recommend Insurgency and Terrorism: From Revolution to Apocalypse by O'Neill. IMO, it's very simple and easy to understand, and while I disagree with many of his definitions (and consequently the concepts, how they interact with one another, and his conclusions), it's a good, first step until jumping from this cliff.

SethB
01-31-2009, 05:19 AM
I have been curious the past few days about the number of colleges teaching COIN courses, who are the teachers? Do they have guest speakers? How can get on board to be one of the guest speakers?

Not questioning the ability of academics, but sometimes find it interesting that the so called experts have no practical experiences. Is this view point to harsh on academics?

I took an undergraduate capstone seminar with Yoav Gortzak (http://scholar.google.com/scholar?q=yoav+gortzak&hl=en&lr=&btnG=Search). He was in the IDF for a few years in the 1990s and that gave him experience and perspective. He had some interesting stories.

We also had a Cavalry Scout who was at the same OCS board as I and a Marine 8541.

Interesting class.

Pattonmat89
02-03-2009, 11:05 PM
I'd like to thank everyone who contributed to this thread, and all the suggestions that you've made. I now have some interesting things to read, and some new stuff to add to my to-be-read list.

Just to clear up a few things:

1. I asked for this because I wanted something to read, about a subject that I think is relevant to current military affairs. In other words, this is a pleasure read. Yes, I have strange ideas of pleasure.

2. I am actually a freshman, not a sophomore. So I'm even younger than you thought I was.

3. I have On War, though I have the Rapoport translation, not the Paret. Ah, well.

Any way, thanks.

CR6
02-04-2009, 04:25 AM
3. I have On War, though I have the Rapoport translation, not the Paret. Ah, well.



You can access Graham's original English translation here (http://www.clausewitz.com/CWZHOME/VomKriege2/ONWARTOC2.HTML) at Professor Christopher Bassford's excellent Clausewitz homepage. The ISBN for the Paret/Howard version (in paperback) is 9780691018546. You should be able to get it at your school's library (at least through interlibrary loan).

Bassford considers Rappaport's edition (which is an abridgement of Graham's translation) "seriously defective" for the following reason:

Rapoport approached On War with considerable philosophical sophistication. He also had a set of political biases, particularly against the nation-state system, which he considered obsolete. These rendered his analysis rather unrealistic. (4) He rejected war as a legitimate tool of state policy, arguing that Clausewitz's definition of war as an extension of politics meant that "peace is the continuation of struggle by other means."

Rapoport argued that this unfortunate and unnecessary struggle needed no justification in Clausewitz's view, not only because the Prussian writer had seen it as fundamental to the human condition but also because his own professional advancement had depended on it. Rapoport appreciated Clausewitz in terms of his historical contribution, but he sought to discredit what he called the "neo-Clausewitzian" school of modern strategists. (5)

(excerpted from Bassford's Clausewitz in English, available for free here (http://www.clausewitz.com/CWZHOME/Bassford/TOC.htm).

Ditch the Rapoport version. It's not a faithful translation.

jmm99
02-04-2009, 05:35 AM
don't throw Rapaport's edition in the garbage quite yet - if it's the same as mine (Penguin 1968), which was a textbook at the U of Mich back in those days when Rapoport taught there.

Rapoport wrote a 70 page introduction (criticized by Bassford), but otherwise used the "New and Revised Edition (edited by Col. F.N. Meade) of Col. J.J. Graham's Translation", which goes back to 1908 - included almost all of Vol I, omitted Vol II, and included only 2/3 of Book 8 (part of Vol III).

Rapoport's interest was MAD, etc., and his introduction and endnotes represent one view from the 60's on the philosophies underlying war and the strategies underlying nuclear warfare. Rather a period piece keyed to part of CvC - not likely a collector's item, but I haven't checked. Reading the intro is good nostalgia for old men reliving the verbal battles of their youth. :D

Rapoport's Wiki is here (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anatol_Rapoport) - a bit to the left of the political spectrum, one might say.

Yank in Germany
03-09-2009, 07:54 AM
Don't confuse radical Islam and Afghanistan with COIN. Insurgency/terrorism is a tactic used by a weaker force against a stronger force. A few months ago I wrote a survey of COIN theory to include Galula, Thompson and others.
I enclosed it and would welcome any comments.

William F. Owen
03-09-2009, 10:23 AM
Don't confuse radical Islam and Afghanistan with COIN. Insurgency/terrorism is a tactic used by a weaker force against a stronger force. A few months ago I wrote a survey of COIN theory to include Galula, Thompson and others.
I enclosed it and would welcome any comments.

I don't think anyone here is confused as to the fact issue that Insurgency/terrorism is merely a tactical or operational form.

Interesting paper. I've read it, and will keep it - which is rare! - I can see why you cite Nagl, but I feel he is fundamentally wrong, about both the UK in Malaya, and the US in Vietnam.

SWJ Blog
10-05-2013, 11:41 AM
Gangs, Slums, Megacities and the Utility of Population-Centric COIN (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/gangs-slums-megacities-and-the-utility-of-population-centric-coin)

Entry Excerpt:



--------
Read the full post (http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/gangs-slums-megacities-and-the-utility-of-population-centric-coin) and make any comments at the SWJ Blog (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog).
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