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Stu-6
10-10-2006, 10:21 PM
Steven Pressfield
Forget the Koran. Forget the ayatollahs and the imams. If we want to understand the enemy we're fighting in Iraq, the magic word is "tribe." . . .

http://www.d-n-i.net/fcs/pressfield_tribes.htm

Tom Odom
10-11-2006, 01:51 PM
Good post and good read. I would say he is half right--it is tribal and it is also religious, although the Shia-Sunni divide is in many ways tribal in its origin, the Shia seeking succession via "blood" or tribal lines. In his defense, he does state this with the critical sentence
"The enemy is tribalism articulated in terms of religion." but he fails to follow up on the thought, which is really essential to understanding the AO.

The best sentence in this entire article is
"you can't sell "freedom" to tribesmen any more than you can sell "democracy."

It's funny (sad funny not ha ha funny) that this same article could be titled It's the Clans, Stupid, dated Oct 1992 (3) and we could be discussing Somalia.

Best

Tom

marct
10-11-2006, 02:00 PM
What a mishmash of outdated ideas! Some of his "observations", if they can be called that, are pretty good - at least about how pastoralist tribes' honour systems operate. The rest is a rehash of some of the worst 19th century, armchair Anthropology.

Marc

Ray Levesque
10-11-2006, 02:01 PM
If you haven't seen it yet you may want to take a look at a new book out this year:

Shultz, Richard H., and Andrea J. Dew, Insurgents, Terrorists, and Militias: The Warriors of Contemporary Combat, New York: Columbia University Press, 2006, 316 pp.

The strength of this book is its attempt to lay out a framework for analyzing tribal-based insurgents, terrorists, and militias in layman's terms. It presents a methodology for militarily analyzing how and why tribal-based groups fight.

They recommend the following criteria as a substitute for traditional Military Capabilities Analysis: the tribe's concept of warfare; its organization and command and control; its areas of operations; the types and targets of its operations; its constraints and limitations; and the role of outside actors. The authors make their argument by first discussing the differences between the western way of war and "primitive warfare," and then assessing the way wars have evolved since the end of the cold war.

It's a pretty good food for thought book.

Ray

marct
10-11-2006, 02:05 PM
Thanks for posting this, Ray. It sounds like they are updating the old Ft. Bragg military-culture briefings.

Marc

Steve Blair
10-11-2006, 02:15 PM
What a mishmash of outdated ideas! Some of his "observations", if they can be called that, are pretty good - at least about how pastoralist tribes' honour systems operate. The rest is a rehash of some of the worst 19th century, armchair Anthropology.

Marc

I agree. This looks like one of those "one stop solution" things that has been simplified to the point that it has no real value but can beguile many into believing that it has value. Perhaps that's what happens when someone who's predominantly a novelist takes a crack at major anthro-type writing.

marct
10-11-2006, 02:38 PM
I agree. This looks like one of those "one stop solution" things that has been simplified to the point that it has no real value but can beguile many into believing that it has value. Perhaps that's what happens when someone who's predominantly a novelist takes a crack at major anthro-type writing.

LOLOL Too true!

What really got me was two things:

he is using "tribe" as if there is only one type of tribe and "they are all the same" (which is a crock);
his entire rant is based on the old, 19th century unilinear evolutionary argument for cultures (analogically similar to that AF article we have been talking about elsewhere).


Back in 1968, Marshall Sahlins wrote a little primer of tribes called, appropriately enough, Tribesman (Foundations of Modern Anthropology, Prentice-Hall). In it he identifies 7 different major types of "tribes", and we are pretty sure now that there are or have been more. I'd actually recomend it since you can usually find it in a second hand shop for a couple of bucks.

Sahlins also wrote what is probably the best analysis of how tribes hang together. It's mainly an argument out of economic anthropology (and somewhat complex), but brilliant: Stone Age Economics (http://www.amazon.com/Stone-Age-Economics-Marshall-Sahlins/dp/0202010996/sr=1-3/qid=1160577276/ref=pd_bbs_3/002-2372465-8461604?ie=UTF8&s=books). When you tie it in with Marcel Mauss' argument in The Gift (which Amazon is offering as a bundle), you get a really good feel for the structural dynamics.

Marc

Tom Odom
10-11-2006, 03:15 PM
I hear ya guys.

But I would also say that even if his ideas as Marc points out are outdated 19th century mishmash, certain points that he makes are valid and are not completely without value, those being on exporting ideas on freedom amd democracy and freedom (as if those are necessarily the same). The same holds true with points on different mental frameworks.

Finally I would point out that in offering what is a simplified (grossly) view of a complex subject, he does offer a counterview to equally (and grossly) simplified view of the world that has gained a great following among those seeking such views. If someone who believes that an Iraqi's (or Afghan's) view of freedom (or democracy) is the same as an American reads this little piece and at least pauses to think for 15 seconds, the author has done that reader a service.

Best


Tom

marct
10-11-2006, 03:26 PM
Hi Tom,

I hope the fishing was good! :)


But I would also say that even if his ideas as Marc points out are outdated 19th century mishmash, certain points that he makes are valid and are not completely without value, those being on exporting ideas on freedom amd democracy and freedom (as if those are necessarily the same). The same holds true with pints on different metla frameworks.

Oh, I have no difficulty with that part of what he said :). Afterall, "freedom" may just mean the freedom to carry out a longstanding feud without some twit intervening. ;)


Finally I would point out that in offering what is a simplified (grossly) view of a complex subject, he does offer a counterview to equally (and grossly) simplified view of the world that has gained a great following among those seeking such views. If someone who believes that an Iraqi's (or Afghan's) view of freedom (or democracy) is the same as an American reads this little piece and at least pauses to think for 15 seconds, the author has done that reader a service.

You know, most of the time I would agree with you on that. I think the reason I don't in the current piece is that the 15 second reader is also likely to pick up on terms such as "savage", "primitive" and "crazy". What really bugs me is that he is constructing tribesmen as "unknowable" and setting "them" up in permanent opposition to "us". I'm just waiting for the "Axis of Savagery" comments to start appearing...:rolleyes:

Marc

Tom Odom
10-11-2006, 06:32 PM
You know, most of the time I would agree with you on that. I think the reason I don't in the current piece is that the 15 second reader is also likely to pick up on terms such as "savage", "primitive" and "crazy". What really bugs me is that he is constructing tribesmen as "unknowable" and setting "them" up in permanent opposition to "us". I'm just waiting for the "Axis of Savagery" comments to start appearing...:rolleyes:

Marc


Oh I know and I understand your concerns; simplicity holds those risks whoever is using it for whatever point they are trying to make.

no fishing. just hunting Bambi. early season though and I still hope to have venison in the freezer before too long. it's that "savage" side of me :o

best

Tom

marct
10-11-2006, 07:39 PM
Oh I know and I understand your concerns; simplicity holds those risks whoever is using it for whatever point they are trying to make.

True, I just wish that he wasn't so - oooh what's the word I'm looking for? Hmm - "stupid" just about covers it <wry grin>. Seriously, thought, he could have made the same general pints and then proceeded to show just how Alexander won the Afghan tribes over to him. He was also confusing the magazine states of Sumeria (modern souther Iraq) with the tribal groups. Now, if he had talked about the Sogdians....


no fishing. just hunting Bambi. early season though and I still hope to have venison in the freezer before too long. it's that "savage" side of me :o

Hey, roast loin of Bambi is one of my favorite meals! Nothin' "savage" about it - just, hmm, how do my eco-friendly friends put it? Oh, yeah - just an "appropriate and ecologically sound use of resources" :D 'sides that, ever since my wife got forced off the road by one of them, I've been enaged in a feud with the species (hey, not a "tribal" one!!!! Perish the thought - just good old highland Scot's "inter-familial rivalry").

Now there's a thought - "how to win [triball] friends and influence people with a little shared hunting"! Love it!

Marc

Stu-6
10-11-2006, 10:16 PM
My question for those who would find fault with this piece’s over simplification is do you know of a better work on the subject of a similar length? Obviously complex ideas have been simplified but if they weren’t any discussion of the effects of tribalism on the current conflict would be hundreds of pages in length.

marct
10-11-2006, 10:41 PM
My question for those who would find fault with this piece’s over simplification is do you know of a better work on the subject of a similar length? Obviously complex ideas have been simplified but if they weren’t any discussion of the effects of tribalism on the current conflict would be hundreds of pages in length.

Hi Stu,

Well, the Sahlins book Tribesmen is pretty short and there is another in the same series call Pastoralists that would also work. You could read either one of them in a couple of hours with a six-pack :).

I do agree that complex ideas need to be simplified depending on the audience, but there is a real difference between simplification and drek. Probably the best model of what I think would work for most people involvced in Afghanistan and/or Iraq would be something similar to the old quicky ethnographies produced by the US Army Special Warfare School at Ft. Bragg. I believe there was an even simpler version produced for the various Pacific Islander groups during WWII in comic book form, but I've never seen any of them.

Marc

jcustis
10-11-2006, 11:00 PM
http://www.comw.org/warreport/fulltext/03alexander.pdf

Jedburgh
10-11-2006, 11:24 PM
My question for those who would find fault with this piece’s over simplification is do you know of a better work on the subject of a similar length? Obviously complex ideas have been simplified but if they weren’t any discussion of the effects of tribalism on the current conflict would be hundreds of pages in length.
Well, not a "similar length", but certainly not hundreds of pages either...

The article jcustis posted the link to is well worth the read, as is this other material...

Earlier SWC threads:

Wars Less About Ideas Than Extreme Tribalism (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=620)

An Adaptive Insurgency: Confronting Adversary Networks in Iraq (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?p=4218#post4218)

3rd Generation Gangs and the Iraqi Insurgency (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=241)

SSI: Tribal Alliances: Ways, Means, and Ends to Successful Strategy (http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB619.pdf)

USIP: Who Are the Insurgents? Sunni Arab Rebels in Iraq (http://www.iraqfoundation.org/reports/pol/2005/sr134.pdf#search=%22iraq%20tribal%20pdf%22)

Blog Excerpts: Iraq's tribal society: A state within a state , 4 parts (http://www.tecom.usmc.mil/caocl/OIF/Teaching_Tools/Iraq's%20Tribal%20Society%20from%20Iraqi%20Blog.pd f#search=%22iraq%20tribal%20pdf%22)

Stu-6
10-11-2006, 11:30 PM
Hi Stu,

Well, the Sahlins book Tribesmen is pretty short and there is another in the same series call Pastoralists that would also work. You could read either one of them in a couple of hours with a six-pack :).


Well Amazon had a copy of Tribesman for $1.95 so it is on order,the six-pack is chilling in the fridge.:)

marct
10-12-2006, 12:01 PM
Well Amazon had a copy of Tribesman for $1.95 so it is on order,the six-pack is chilling in the fridge.:)

Great! I've often found that academic material goes down better with a beer (or 6!).

Marc

Steve Blair
10-13-2006, 01:03 PM
Great! I've often found that academic material goes down better with a beer (or 6!).

Marc

Usually more if you're actually talking with said academic while reading his or her material....;)

marct
10-13-2006, 01:20 PM
Usually more if you're actually talking with said academic while reading his or her material....;)

Geeze! You're not THAT masochistic, are you Steve?:eek:

Actually, I've found that talking with academics about their work becomes a lot more comprehensible with almost any alcohol <wry grin>. I've noticed that moderately decent Hungarian Red works very well for complex Anthropology theory.... especially at 3am discussion fests :)

On a slightly more serious note, I noticed years ago that academic Anthropology had a very weird culture, especially at conferences. It took me a bit of time to realize it, but it turns out that there is a "split" between how Anthropology is taught and written about, and how you "really" learn it. The "real stuff" (the official theoretical term is "tribal gnosis" for anyone who collects useless trivia) comes out in small groups telling stories. I suspect that everyone here already knows that, at least about their own disciplines :) .

What I found interesting about the Anthro tribal stories was the content, Most of the time, the stories were about people whose work I was reading and, sometimes, they were the ones telling the stories. Sometimes funny, sometimes silly, many times frustrated with how we have to write in order to get published, the stories were always enlightening and, frequently, contradicted everything in the "official" line.

Marc

Steve Blair
10-13-2006, 01:26 PM
We tend to see the same thing in history, although with history it's more like a gathering of competing tribes - each with their own unique rituals (otherwise known as "schools" or "specialties"). I'm a military history type, so I often end up at odds with some of the social history types - mainly because most I have met are convinced you have to be a warmonger to study military history. In the end it often comes down to obscure debates about value and bashing of political scientists...;)

marct
10-13-2006, 01:37 PM
We tend to see the same thing in history, although with history it's more like a gathering of competing tribes - each with their own unique rituals (otherwise known as "schools" or "specialties"). I'm a military history type, so I often end up at odds with some of the social history types - mainly because most I have met are convinced you have to be a warmonger to study military history. In the end it often comes down to obscure debates about value and bashing of political scientists...;)

Too true :D !

For us, it tends to, usually, not break down into schools, but "lineages" (who was your supervisor, and theirs, etc.). This makes for some pretty strange tribal gatherings :D . I remember one CASCA (Canadian Anthropology Society) meeting where my supervisors' supervisor was introducing me as her grandson.

Marc

marct
10-14-2006, 12:16 PM
http://www.comw.org/warreport/fulltext/03alexander.pdf

Kudos for posting this link!

I just finished reading it carefully, and I'll tell you right now that I will be using it as a text / example in any course I teach on applied Anthropology. While it misses some of the bells and whistles so beloved by those of us in the academy (mainly those 5-sylable, Greek derived words that no one understands), it really does capture the basic structures and their operations.

The only additions I would really like to see are in two areas:

What are the specific Rituals of Reconciliation?
How does "historical memory" operate in these tribes?


On the specific rituals question, this is important not only for ethnographic detail but, also, for both theoretical and pragmatic reasons. On the theoretical side, any ritual of reconcilliation is a structural repair mechanism evolved to maintain a homeostatic condition withing a cultural group (cf. Max Gluckman (The Utility of the Equilibrium Model in the Study of Social Change, American Anthropologist, 70(2), April, 1968; Custom and Conflict in Africa; Lewis Coser, The Functions of Social Conflict (http://www.amazon.com/Functions-Social-Conflict-Lewis-Coser/dp/002906810X/sr=1-1/qid=1160827409/ref=sr_1_1/002-2372465-8461604?ie=UTF8&s=books)). Or, translating this into plain English, all conflict resolution models serve to justify and reinforce a particular political and social model, and you have to use the approriate one for the culture you are operating in. On the pragmatic side, what are you going to tell the troops (and administrators!) to do in order to try and strat one of them?

The second question is more tricky but, actually, gets at the heart of the larger GWOT. How a culture constructs historical memory, both the mechanisms of that construction and the content, influences how current events will be interpreted. As one example, consider how the "Crusader" construction has been used agains both the forces in Afghanistan and Iraq. Now let's flip it around and ask "How will the Coalition forces be constructed in the future?" as a result of current actions, and how will this influence future interpretations?

Well, enough of commenting on this paper. It is excellent, and I can't recommend it highly enough. The three authors get a fictive "A+" and a hearty "Well done, guys!".

And now, I have to go off and sing for three hours...

Marc

Jedburgh
10-14-2006, 01:50 PM
Marc,

This paper addresses conflict resolution as influenced by Islam at the local level. I believe you will find the portion on Sulh and Musalaha of interest (beginning on page 11 of the pdf file).

Islamic Mediation Techniques for Middle East Conflicts (http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/1999/issue2/irani.pdf)

Of course, there are significant variations in conflict resolution/mediation rituals and traditions between ethnic groups (i.e. Arabs vs Kurds) as well as regionally (i.e. the Levant vs the Gulf), that go along with the clearer rural-urban divide.

Roger Fisher and his work in the field of negotiation and conflict resolution was mentioned in another thread (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=1041&page=5). I've found his work, and other material from the Harvard Program on Negotiation (http://www.pon.harvard.edu/) to be useful in training HUMINT'ers (with some modification for both integration with HUMINT collection methodology and application in the target culture). His book Getting to Yes, has been very influential in the field, and certainly has broad application. Prior to my retirement, I had some success in modifying and integrating aspects of Fisher and Urtel's Getting Ready to Negotiate with conventional interrogation planning and preparation methodology.

As has been stated many times and in several threads on this board, the problem with many in both the civilian and military arenas is lack of understanding when it comes to application. They just don't "get it". In my perspective "getting it" means far more than simply understanding the realities of the current conflict and the effective application of lessons learned - it means having the breadth of understanding necessary to implement valuable insights from multidisciplinary inputs with necessary adaptations for current context. Where the aforementioned lack of understanding enters into the picture is when inputs from fields outside the military - such as conflict resolution and reconciliation methodologies - are simply taken as a blunt whole without any real attempt to integrate and modify application in accordance with local realities and elements of existing methodologies that are proven to work. "Reinventing the wheel" and "throwing out the baby with the bath water" are more than just trite sayings.

...all conflict resolution models serve to justify and reinforce a particular political and social model, and you have to use the approriate one for the culture you are operating in. On the pragmatic side, what are you going to tell the troops (and administrators!) to do in order to try and strat one of them?
What usually happens is that the troops & administrators are given a simple block of instruction on local culture and traditions (often repeatedly), but lacking any real insight or instruction into how to effectively synchronize culture and tradition with their operational methodologies.

I believe its a people issue - we don't have nearly enough people with the appropriate background and experience to leverage that sort of training and the scale required and those that we do have are fully engaged in doing other things.

Well, so much for Saturday morning rambling. Time for pancakes.

marct
10-14-2006, 05:35 PM
Marc,

This paper addresses conflict resolution as influenced by Islam at the local level. I believe you will find the portion on Sulh and Musalaha of interest (beginning on page 11 of the pdf file).

Islamic Mediation Techniques for Middle East Conflicts (http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/1999/issue2/irani.pdf)

A very interesting article, and you're right, the parts on sulh an Musalaha were very interesting. Thanks for posting it. It was especially apropos, since I had just finished re-reading the first lecture in Gluckman's Custom and Conflict in Africa called "The Peace of the Feud".


As has been stated many times and in several threads on this board, the problem with many in both the civilian and military arenas is lack of understanding when it comes to application. They just don't "get it". In my perspective "getting it" means far more than simply understanding the realities of the current conflict and the effective application of lessons learned - it means having the breadth of understanding necessary to implement valuable insights from multidisciplinary inputs with necessary adaptations for current context. Where the aforementioned lack of understanding enters into the picture is when inputs from fields outside the military - such as conflict resolution and reconciliation methodologies - are simply taken as a blunt whole without any real attempt to integrate and modify application in accordance with local realities and elements of existing methodologies that are proven to work. "Reinventing the wheel" and "throwing out the baby with the bath water" are more than just trite sayings.

What usually happens is that the troops & administrators are given a simple block of instruction on local culture and traditions (often repeatedly), but lacking any real insight or instruction into how to effectively synchronize culture and tradition with their operational methodologies.

I think that this goes back to the culture of the military. In general, it makes a lot of sense to create a "book" and then get people to "play by the book". This is esecially important in building militaries in cultures that otherwise have "individualism" as a central value, and has been a hallmark of armies since the Napoleonic era (okay, William the Silent if you will).

The problem with this, in this type of fight, is that all the training expectations, the "patterns of expected behaviour" are rote-learning - read this manual, follow these 6 points, use the following steps in the proscribed order, etc. Do you think it is a lack of insight or a lack of institutional support for insight? (I'd bet on the latter, myself, but I could easily be wrong).


I believe its a people issue - we don't have nearly enough people with the appropriate background and experience to leverage that sort of training and the scale required and those that we do have are fully engaged in doing other things.

It could well be, I honestly don't know. Even if it is mainly a "people issue", I suspect that there are lots of institutional factors stopping it as well. For example, if a Sulh ritual is considered leagally binding as the Irani article points out (by tribal law if nothing else), then what happens if a unit that engages in one rotates out and is replaced by another unit?

Things to think about but, for me at least, not today <wry grin>. I just finished singing three hours of Baroque and Rennaisance music and I now get to spend the rest of my weekend building a web site - Oh Joy! Oh bliss! Oh rupture!!!

Marc

Rifleman
10-16-2006, 03:01 AM
I'm replying after reading only the essay, so pardon me if this was covered in any of the responses. This isn't the author's central theme but I think it's related to the general idea.

I've long thought that a western style representative republic (it may or may not be democratic as we define the term) can only work in Afghanistan and Iraq, if it can work at all, if it's organized along tribal lines.

Representatives could be sent to congress by tribes, not American style congressional districts. The bigger tribes have more representatives but each tribe has the same number of senators regardless of size. Also, let the tribes select their congressmen however they want. Who cares if tribal congressmen are elected or appointed by a tribal chief? Who cares if some tribes do it democratically and others do it autocratically?

This still may not make Afghanistan and Iraq true republics, of course, but I think it's a lot more likely to work than trying to establish American style democracy.

marct
10-16-2006, 04:03 AM
Hi Rifleman,

I s'pose that when it comes down to it, most of us have a "live and let live" attitude which, for us, gets expressed via a democratic mythos - whether that's republican or a constitutional monarchy (a la Britain and Canada). Afghanistan and Iraq have, historically, followed a somewhat different route.

"Tribalism", and there are some pretty significant differences between that of Iraq and Afghanistan, is, on the whole fairly similar to modern democratic states, at least as far as the power held by any individual is concerned. In other words, it's pretty darn limited <wry grin>. Honestly, that's really a function of population size and density (I really hate to sound like an academic, but cf Durkheim's Division of Labour in Society, 2nd edition or, for a more American take, check out Thomas Paine's Common Sense).

In most democratic states, with the possible exception of the US, people have turned over their right of self defense to the state. In tribals societies, the right of self defense is held by the individual and their "vengence group" - close friends and kin. In most democratic societies, security is a function of the state, whereas in most tribal societies it is a function of an implied blood fued. Both work fairly well to maintain a fairly stable society.

Coming out of this right of self defense is a placement of political power. In most republics, it is in the control of voting blocks and state institutions (take a look at Rome during Marius and Sulla, Athens after Pericles, or the US for the past 25 years or so). It's similar in constitutional monarchies, but the monarch retains some powers which may ofset the worst ravages of the political aristocracy (pre-revolutionary Russia and Britain in the 20th century are examples). In some cases, the monarch remains the chief of the armed forces and execises a moral suasion over them (e.g, Thailand).

In tribal societies there is always some mechanism to control the potential for conflict and guarentee safety. In Afghanistan, one of those mechanisms was the Loya Jirga (http://afghanland.com/history/loyajirga.html), although the last one in 2003 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2003_Loya_jirga) was rather contentious (http://cesr.org/node/52).

Iraq is another matter entirely. Iraq is not really a "nation" in the same way as western nations are or as Afghanistan is. It was created in the aftermath of WWI with the breakup of the Ottaman Empire. While the area has been a centre of civilization since at least 6000 bce, whenever it was "unified", it has been under a strong centralized monarchy, usually a "god-king" of some type (Saddam was drawing on a long lineage from Gilgamesh on down). "Democracy" just doesn't mean that much in Iraq historically. It is especially difficult to encourage democracies of any type in areas where there is no history of them.

Well, I guess we have one now in Iraq, and it will be interesting to see what heppens with it. Personally, I expect that, barring a lot of good luck, sacrifice and some really intelligent operations, it will fall apart. Western democracies don't have a good track record with long wars, and we have a worse track record with nation building exercises.

Hmm, midnight, too much brandy, and I think I am feeling a touch pesimistic.

Marc

tequila
02-27-2007, 01:25 PM
Interesting study I found by random Googling. A study (http://www.logtech.net/docs/IraqiTribalStudy.pdf)of the tribes of Iraq and specifically Anbar province. Lots of very interesting historical info.

jonSlack
02-28-2007, 03:14 AM
This is the type of product we should have about anyplace we are and any and all places we may go in the future.

marct
02-28-2007, 02:14 PM
This is the type of product we should have about anyplace we are and any and all places we may go in the future.

It reminds me of some of the material from the 1960s on Vietnamese tribes. I agree, it is the sort of material that should be available.

Marc

goesh
02-28-2007, 03:56 PM
Anyone for making like a British press gang of old and 'pressing' a few Anthropologists into service in the interests of national security and strategic planning?

tequila
02-28-2007, 04:48 PM
I don't think the problem is a lack of knowledge. The problem is a lack of willingness to listen to and use that knowledge. See: State of Denial (http://www.amazon.com/State-Denial-Bush-War-Part/dp/0743272234/ref=pd_sim_b_2/104-5610957-7891905), Cobra II (http://www.amazon.com/Cobra-II-Inside-Invasion-Occupation/dp/0375422625) and Imperial Life in the Emerald City (http://www.amazon.com/Imperial-Life-Emerald-City-Inside/dp/1400044871).

This is not just politically in the White House, but also institutionally on the part of the military and the Department of State (http://p251.news.mud.yahoo.com/s/nm/20070217/pl_nm/iraq_usa_rebuilding_dc).

Shek
03-01-2007, 02:18 PM
I don't think the problem is a lack of knowledge. The problem is a lack of willingness to listen to and use that knowledge. See: State of Denial (http://www.amazon.com/State-Denial-Bush-War-Part/dp/0743272234/ref=pd_sim_b_2/104-5610957-7891905), Cobra II (http://www.amazon.com/Cobra-II-Inside-Invasion-Occupation/dp/0375422625) and Imperial Life in the Emerald City (http://www.amazon.com/Imperial-Life-Emerald-City-Inside/dp/1400044871).

This is not just politically in the White House, but also institutionally on the part of the military and the Department of State (http://p251.news.mud.yahoo.com/s/nm/20070217/pl_nm/iraq_usa_rebuilding_dc).

So if this type of information were available in 2003 to the extent possible (i.e. some of the information from the report is based on post 2003 actions), is your thought that it wouldn't make a difference? Also, it would seem that you are arguing as well that there can't be any bottom up influence on decisions.

I don't disagree with the thought that senior policy makers aren't attuned to the details, and that that has hurt us, but at some point the rubber meets the road and rhetoric gives way to the practical. Had someone made this kind of information available to me in 2003-4 while I was in Iraq, I could have been much more effective in fighting the insurgency in spite of any national level policy that disregarded this type of information.

Jedburgh
03-20-2007, 02:37 AM
Here's a very brief summary of the key points of Iraqi Arab tribal structure from the Congressional Research Service:

Iraq: Tribal Structure, Social, and Political Activities (http://www.opencrs.cdt.org/rpts/RS22626_20070315.pdf)

For centuries the social and political organization of many Iraqi Arabs has centered on the tribe. Socially, tribes were divided into related sub-tribes, which further divided into clans, and then into extended families. Seventy-five percent of Iraq’s estimated 26 million people are a member of a tribe. They are more strongly bound by these tribal ties and a strict honor code than by ethnic background or religion. This report describes the political orientation of several Iraqi Arab tribes, including the Shammar, Dulaym, and Jibur tribes. This report will be updated as warranted. For further information on Iraq and U.S. policy, see CRS Report RL31339, Iraq: Post-Saddam Governance and Security (http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/81929.pdf), by Kenneth Katzman.

John T. Fishel
03-20-2007, 12:26 PM
Back in ancient times when I was a current intel analyst on the Army Staff, CIA produced a classified basic intelligence document on nearly all the countries of the world - it had everything you ever wanted to know, and a lot you didn't. Then, sometime in the 70s or 80s they stopped producing it. Meanwhile, the Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress, on a DA contract, produces the Area handbook Series - Country Studies. They are good but not at all up to date. (El Salvador is current as of 1988!) DOD does produce some Country Handbooks - marked FOUO - with lots of pictures of military hardware. And that seems to be where we stand on basic intelligence, so we have to contract out for a study like this one - long after we really need it.
In the Spring 2005, the Security and Defense Studies Review (the e-journal of the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies of NDU) published a special issue devoted to the ongoing UN PKO mission in Haiti. See link:

http://www.ndu.edu/chds/journal/indexarcspring05.htm

The study is being published this summer by NDU Press/Potomac Press under the title, Capacity Building for Peacekeeping: The Case of Haiti, with all the chapters that were in Spanish or Portuguese (about half) now translated to English - as soon as I finish the final edits. The final article/chapter (at the link in English) by my colleague Andres Saenz and me addresses, in part the issue of this forum - the dearth of basic intelligence and recommends several fixes. But even if implemented beyond my wildest dreams, the problem remains: "You can lead the horse to water, but you can't make him drink." (It really is as true of horses as it is of people.)

Tom Odom
03-20-2007, 12:40 PM
So if this type of information were available in 2003 to the extent possible (i.e. some of the information from the report is based on post 2003 actions), is your thought that it wouldn't make a difference? Also, it would seem that you are arguing as well that there can't be any bottom up influence on decisions.

Shek,

This information was available in 2003 as it was in 1990 when I was the current intel analyst on the Middle East for the Army Staff, including Desert Shield and Storm, Provide Comfort, and the aftermath in southern Iraq. Given that the Undersecretary of Defense Wolfowitz had testified before Congress that there were no ethnic divisions in Iraq as in the Balkans and that a war against Iraq would pay for itself, I don't see any chance that input from below, outside, or elsewhere inside would have changed the operative assumptions of that period.

That is not to say that such material or thinking is irrelevant; just the opposite in fact because sooner or later reality catches up making this input critical.

Best

Tom

Jedburgh
03-20-2007, 01:10 PM
So if this type of information were available in 2003 to the extent possible (i.e. some of the information from the report is based on post 2003 actions), is your thought that it wouldn't make a difference? Also, it would seem that you are arguing as well that there can't be any bottom up influence on decisions.

I don't disagree with the thought that senior policy makers aren't attuned to the details, and that that has hurt us, but at some point the rubber meets the road and rhetoric gives way to the practical. Had someone made this kind of information available to me in 2003-4 while I was in Iraq, I could have been much more effective in fighting the insurgency in spite of any national level policy that disregarded this type of information.
I second Tom as to the availability of this type of info on Iraq both pre-Desert Storm and pre-OIF. The pre-OIF info was even more detailed, because we had people on the ground inside Iraq reporting on many fine elements of information post-Desert Storm - especially during the OPC and UNSCOM periods in the early to mid 90s. In '03 there was a helluva lot of good, solid info of this nature readily available to those who were willing to look for it.

As regards "bottom-up influence on decisions", if you have the time I highly recommend the book Knowing One’s Enemies – Intelligence Assessment Before the Two World Wars (http://www.amazon.com/Knowing-Ones-Enemies-Intelligence-Assessment/dp/0691006016/ref=pd_bbs_sr_1/103-2454477-6123016?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1174395504&sr=1-1), published by Princeton University Press in 1986.

The book isn't a Small Wars piece; it looks at pre-war intel for WWI and WWII. It consists of sixteen essays that review intelligence collection, analysis and decision making at the national level in various countries at critical junctures in their history (Austria-Hungary, Germany, Russia, France, Great Britain and Italy before WWI and Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Russia, Japan, and the US before WWII).

To the point that has been raised here, the book clearly illustrates that even when a nation is in possession of sufficient intelligence of a quality to make effective policy decisions, it can all drop in the crapper due to the inherent biases, proclivities and abilities of key policy makers. The harmful effects of internal disputes within intelligence agencies, and turf battles between competing agencies, are also laid out in careful detail. It is a must-read classic in the field of strategic intelligence.

Shek
03-21-2007, 04:18 PM
Tom and Jedburgh,

Thanks for the responses. I guess I was unclear in my prior post - I don't harbor any thoughts that such information would have changed the administration's decision making (and I am not that surprised that it wasn't factored in); I was merely stating that at the tip of the spear, such information would have made a difference if it had been readily available down to that level. That being said, I don't know if it would have gained enough traction to have created enough of a bottom-up "revolution" to have changed the grand strategy in Iraq. For example, I might have been able to have built relationships with all of the power players in my AO (I didn't realize the extent of how tribal relationships permeated all of Iraqi society, to include in the urban areas), but I would have still been limited in being able to harness those relationships bcecause of a lack in reconstruction funds to provide mutually beneficial projects.

Also, thanks for the book recommendation - unfortunately, my Amazon wishlist has now grown over 200 books long now - the mind and wallet are willing, but the schedule is not able :(

Jedburgh
05-02-2007, 07:46 PM
This article speaks to several points that have been made in this thread:

Military Review, May-June 2007: The Power Equation: Using Tribal Politics in COIN (http://usacac.leavenworth.army.mil/CAC/milreview/English/MayJun07/mann.pdf)

....Infantry officer courses and intermediate-level professional military education schools must incorporate courses on negotiating skills into their programs of instruction. Because tribal leaders are often expert negotiators, company commanders must be well prepared to win across the meeting table as well as on the unconventional battlefield. Cultural awareness means more than just being sensitive to a community. It is a component of the intelligence preparation of the battlefield and a capability that can help us achieve our objectives.....

jcustis
05-02-2007, 10:16 PM
I went to a Karrass Group (you know that insert in the inflight magazines?)seminar years ago. It was a little goofy, but darn good. It couldn't be all that difficult to get a trainer in and spin up a hundred or so folks at a time.

Jimbo
05-03-2007, 03:58 AM
I thought the Schultz book was pretty good.

The issue of tribes vs. religion is that you are dealing with both in Iraq. I guess it is a hybrid of the two.

tequila
05-03-2007, 10:18 AM
CSMonitor article focusing on the Anbar Salvation Council and the Bu-Fahed (http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/0503/p01s04-wome.htm)subtribe in Hamdhiyah in particular.

Shek
05-25-2007, 02:04 AM
Does anybody have this book? It looks like a potentially promising purchase, but I'd be curious to see if the 30 years since it was first published has outstripped its relevancy. Thanks.

http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0863565204/ref=wl_it_dp/102-0438121-3920159?ie=UTF8&coliid=I3VK0G15HYNSRB&colid=3BV4R4OFS2ZIM

SWJED
05-25-2007, 10:31 AM
24 May The Belmont Club post - More on Anbar (http://fallbackbelmont.blogspot.com/2007/05/more-on-anbar.html).


... Isn't this what we are seeing in Anbar? A tribe that is allied with the US is much more similar to Hezbollah than it is to a nation-state.

Here's the real takeaway though: this never would have happened without some sort of American presence in Iraq. It was not diplomats that turned the tribes, it was military officers. That is the secret that will be hard to swallow: we are in an age wherein the opposite of the 'exit strategy' will have to be the lynchpin of strategy: presence, not early exit, is what is required in these broad swaths of the world that where instability threatens US interests. The key will be not to figure out whether to be there or not, which is the current debate. The key will be to figure out how much to be there and in what form: soldier, diplomat, spy, or some other category that has yet to be determined: perhaps a combo of all three, or perhaps some privatized version of any one of them.

tequila
05-25-2007, 03:28 PM
The link to this study no longer works, but I have it saved. However this document is FOUO - in light of recent changes to regs, I have doubts if this is kosher to put up on the internet. Anyone know for sure?

marct
05-25-2007, 03:51 PM
Hi Tequila,


The link to this study no longer works, but I have it saved. However this document is FOUO - in light of recent changes to regs, I have doubts if this is kosher to put up on the internet. Anyone know for sure?

I agree, it is probably verboten. Does this mean I will have to delete it from my laptop before entering the US :eek:?

Marc

tequila
05-25-2007, 08:35 PM
Another interesting article about tribal mobilization - possibly moving beyond Anbar.

Iraqi tribes shift from hurdle to help (http://www.marinecorpstimes.com/news/2007/05/military_tribes_070525w/) - MilitaryTimes, 25 April.

Several weeks ago, Lt. Col. Kurt Pinkerton came face to face with the leading edge of a movement that senior coalition officials say has significant potential to shift the war against al-Qaida in Iraq in their favor.

Pinkerton, commander of 1st Cavalry Division’s 2nd Battalion, 5th Cavalry Regiment, was meeting a tribal sheikh in the Baghdad suburb of Abu Ghraib.


“The battalion commander goes to meet with this sheikh,” said Gen. David Petraeus, head of Multinational Forces-Iraq and the senior U.S. commander in country.


Pinkerton knew that the sheikh and his tribesmen were “sort of on the edge” of those who had been fighting the coalition.


“These guys are more resistance than hard-core insurgency,” Petraeus said. “They’re a tribe, and the tribe has sort of helped the insurgents a bit.”


But the sheikh had a surprise for Pinkerton. He told the lieutenant colonel the tribe was ready to take up arms against al-Qaida.


“What makes you think you could possibly turn out volunteers?” Pinkerton asked him, according to Petraeus.


“Well, come out back,” the sheikh replied.


When Pinkerton stepped outside, Petraeus said, he found roughly 2,000 tribesmen staring back at him. “And they all want to be provisional police,” the general added ...

Rex Brynen
09-10-2007, 12:59 PM
Todd et al, Iraq Tribal Study – Al-Anbar Governorate: The Albu Fahd Tribe, The Albu Mahal Tribe and the Albu Issa Tribe (2006, recently released by DoD), via Pat Lang's blog here (http://turcopolier.typepad.com/the_athenaeum/files/iraq_tribal_study_070907.pdf).


Based on an examination of the identity and history of Iraq’s tribes and attempts to influence them; case studies of influence of other Middle East tribes; and an analysis of a wide range of counter insurgencies, a number of insights on influencing Iraq’s tribes have emerged. These insights are key to successful tribal engagement and influence operations aimed at the Sunni Arab tribes of al-Anbar Governorate...

SWJED
11-03-2007, 12:51 AM
Glubb’s Guide to the Arab Tribes (Part 1) (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2007/11/glubbs-guide-to-the-arab-tribe/) by Dan Green at the SWJ Blog.


To enable one country to appreciate what another people really thinks and desires is both the most difficult and the most vital task which confronts us. -- John Bagot Glubb, Britain and the Arabs: A Study of Fifty Years 1908-1958, (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1959), p. 147

As military units prepare for service in the Middle East, it is not uncommon for them to consult the published works of British military personnel and diplomats who played such a large role in the politics of the region in the 1910s to the 1930s. It is already customary for deployers to consult the works of T.E. Lawrence and Gertrude Bell and for those who have read more expansively, perhaps even the writings of Sir Alec Kirkbride , Sir Percy Cox, or even General Aylmer L. Haldane. Collectively, these various authors have taught our military personnel a great deal about working in the region, fighting alongside Arab irregulars, working with tribes, building governments, fostering development, and combating insurgents. The reason I've written this brief essay is to bring to your attention another great British soldier and diplomat, John Bagot Glubb, whose experience is as expansive if not more so than many of the aforementioned authors. His robust experience of thirty-six years in the great deserts and Bedouin tents of Iraq and Jordan greatly informs our current operations. I have written a brief biography of Glubb in order to familiarize the reader with his achievements and then compiled a collection of his observations, thoughts, and musings taken from his published writings about working with the Arab tribes, fighting guerillas, service to the nation, and on operating in the Middle East. Glubb's views are as useful today as when he made them, incorporating them into our operations in the Middle East will greatly improve our chances for victory...

Dan Green works at the U.S. Department of State (DOS) in the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism. He served a year as a Political Advisor to the Tarin Kowt Provincial Reconstruction Team in Uruzgan Province, Afghanistan, for which he received the DOS's Superior Honor Award and the U.S. Army's Superior Civilian Service Award. He also received a letter of commendation from Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Peter Pace. The views expressed in this article are his own and do not necessarily represent the views of the Bush Administration, the DOS, the U.S. Navy, or the Department of Defense. Mr. Green recently returned from Iraq where he served as a tribal liaison officer (US Navy Reserve).

-----

Part 2 - John Bagot Glubb's Published Works and The Tribes of Arabia to be posted 3 November.

bismark17
11-03-2007, 03:57 PM
That is very interesting. Thanks for posting this!

shark11
05-01-2008, 03:37 AM
This study is good but there are some errors....I used in country and benefited greatly but was initially frustrated with the few mistakes. What I realized is you will never get the tribes of Iraq, Arabia, and perhaps the entire world completely figured out.

Don't get me wrong, its a great read.

Rex Brynen
02-28-2009, 12:47 PM
A colleague of mine is involved in a research project on the role of Iraqi tribes, with a particular focus on the role (or not) of neighboring countries. Among the issues of interest are:


To what extent do neighboring states seek to influence Iraqi politics through particular connections to the tribes?
How is such influence exerted, and to what ends?
How effective is this, and how has influence changed over time?
Some tribal leaders relocated to Jordan (etc) for reasons of safety after 2003... how did this affect their influence?


Does anyone on SWC have any thoughts of this—especially if you have boots-on-the-ground experience with tribal engagement? He is especially interested in Jordan (and western Iraq), but information on the role of Syria, Iran, and Saudi Arabia would doubtless would be welcomed.

Also, "as far as I know the neighbors were largely irrelevant in my AOR" is just as important as any other response, so if that was your experience please say so!

tribeguy
05-23-2009, 09:17 PM
Gentlemen, as the security agreement requires that US forces withdraw from all cities to the rural areas, this brings a very serious shortcoming to light. First, we don't have a mastery of how the Iraqi tribal system works. Secondly, we are moving from the cities, where tribalism is weaker, to the rural areas, where it is stronger. As insurgent sanctuaries are generally in rural areas, they are engaging the tribes to coexist with and recruit from them.

It is imperative that we as Americans fighting the war in Iraq gain some mastery on how to interact with the Iraqi tribal system. When we are in harmony with the culture with which we coexist on a tactical level, it saves soldiers' lives, and it also is a powerful counter to insurgent information operations.

To that, please have a look at www.theiraqitribalsystem.com. It's not the answer to all questions...but it is the first more comprehensive treatment of the subject, with applied methodologies for leveraging the tribal data contained in the book for the purpose of establishing strong relationships with tribal leadership that are based on respect, humility, and trust.

If are able to fill the gap between what we think is intelligence and what causes cultural phenomena such as the insurgent groups in Iraq, we are will be well on our way to helping the Iraqis themselves towards state formation.

That's victory!

Respectfully,

Sam Stolzoff
www.theiraqitribalsystem.com

tribeguy
05-24-2009, 12:29 AM
Greetings SWJ Members,

My name is Sam Stolzoff, and I am an Iraq analyst that supports the United States Army. I am a veteran of Operation Iraqi Freedom, and with four years of experience in Iraq, I have come face to face with both our successes and failures in counterinsurgency.

The most acute issue is our lack of understanding of the tribal system - which I am sure has hampered us in other areas of operation as well. In 2007, after finally breaking just one entire tribe into its many sub tribes and organizing it hierarchically, I began my search for a culturally correct source for tribal data in the English language. I was shocked that I couldn't find it. The Brits have some of this data, but the spelling isn't standardized and it was filtered through a western prism of tribal studies. In other words, I couldn't make any sense out of it, and given the lack of real tribal analysis throughout the western world (no joke), I sought resources in Arabic.

I found a treasure trove. After translating 'Abbas Al-'Azzawi's 4 volume set of tribal hierarchies into English in a culturally correct manner that could be easily used by anybody with a little bit of training, I compared it to what I learned operationally since 2003.

The data was good - and way more complete than I ever expected. So I began to collect other Iraqi tribal studies in Arabic, and have translated them, as well, so that they could be put in databases and analyzed sensibly.

For example, why is Nuri ((Al-Maliki)) the prime minister? How was he elected? What is his power base? What I found is that as we imposed a democratic model of government on the tribal system, that the ((Al-Maliki)) phenomenon, and many other phenomena were grounded in the tribal system, which exists in much the same way that it has for thousands of years.

Further, I wonder why we didn't have this information 6 years ago, when we needed it the most. It is for that reason that I encourage you all to please begin to study the Iraqi tribal system in depth. The tribal system leads to many fruitful paths with respect to targeting in a counterinsurgency, and explains why our western paradigmatic targeting method has a tendency to fall short of out right victory over insurgent forces, as it can't get down to the root of the problems - which are found in small entities called sub tribes.

I encourage open discussion on this subject. I am not the master of all things tribal, but what I have for you is a substantial amount of data and the analysis thereof, which seems to be in harmony with events on the ground as we are able to perceive them through the news media.

Thanks for reading this - and thanks in advance for your kind participation.

Very Respectfully,


Sam Stolzoff
www.theiraqitribalsystem.com

Tom Odom
05-24-2009, 07:45 AM
Gentlemen, as the security agreement requires that US forces withdraw from all cities to the rural areas, this brings a very serious shortcoming to light. First, we don't have a mastery of how the Iraqi tribal system works. Secondly, we are moving from the cities, where tribalism is weaker, to the rural areas, where it is stronger. As insurgent sanctuaries are generally in rural areas, they are engaging the tribes to coexist with and recruit from them.

It is imperative that we as Americans fighting the war in Iraq gain some mastery on how to interact with the Iraqi tribal system. When we are in harmony with the culture with which we coexist on a tactical level, it saves soldiers' lives, and it also is a powerful counter to insurgent information operations.

To that, please have a look at www.theiraqitribalsystem.com. It's not the answer to all questions...but it is the first more comprehensive treatment of the subject, with applied methodologies for leveraging the tribal data contained in the book for the purpose of establishing strong relationships with tribal leadership that are based on respect, humility, and trust.

If are able to fill the gap between what we think is intelligence and what causes cultural phenomena such as the insurgent groups in Iraq, we are will be well on our way to helping the Iraqis themselves towards state formation.

That's victory!

Respectfully,

Sam Stolzoff
www.theiraqitribalsystem.com


Mr Stolzoff,

I appreciate you want to sell your book; I enjoy my royalty checks as well.

As a retired FAO for the Middle East and Africa, I have long dealt with tribal cultures and offshoots ala Rwanda.

As somene currently engaged in the theater, I can assure you that our understanding of the tribes is quite good and grows better everyday. A variety of factors play in the current state of affairs; the tribes are one of them and one to which we pay close attention.

Thanks

Tom

davidbfpo
05-24-2009, 11:21 AM
Sam.

Welcome aboard, your specialism will arouse interest and maybe some will buy your book.

Iraqi tribes are not my special subject, nor Iraq. In the UK I have relied on the work of Dr Toby Dodge, an academic (his webpage: http://www.politics.qmul.ac.uk/staff/Dodge/index.html ) and as IISS expert ( http://www.iiss.org/about-us/staffexpertise/list-experts-by-name/dr-toby-dodge/ ). I am sure on my bookshelf is a post-invasion Adelphi paper on Iraqi tribes.

Maybe worth connecting with him?

davidbfpo

marct
05-24-2009, 02:33 PM
Hello Sam,


Further, I wonder why we didn't have this information 6 years ago, when we needed it the most.

Well, there are a lot of reasons why that material was not part of the available information, although most of them boil down to a simple one: it didn't fit with the main stream institutional paradigm (organizational culture if you will) of most of the US forces. Tom, as an ex-FAO, is one of the outliers :D.


The tribal system leads to many fruitful paths with respect to targeting in a counterinsurgency, and explains why our western paradigmatic targeting method has a tendency to fall short of out right victory over insurgent forces, as it can't get down to the root of the problems - which are found in small entities called sub tribes.

I assume you are referring to what Anthropologists call a segmented lineage system? We (Anthropologists) have know about and written about that in some detail since the 1930's (cf Evans-Pritchards The Nuer and, latterly, most of the political Anthropology of Africa from the 1950's). There is also an extensive literature on the evolution of tribal organizations and their interactions with and adaptations to the urban environment in archaeology (the late 1980's - early 1990's debates on the "world war" of ~3500 bce come to mind) amongst other places.

From the sounds of it, you have managed to get and translate some really good data - something that is often scarce :wry:. Glad to have you here, and i'm looking forward to your input.

Cheers,

Marc

tribeguy
05-24-2009, 02:46 PM
Hi Tom- thanks for the kind comments. One quick note about 'our understanding of the tribes is quite good." I beg to differ - but then again, I've worked in different places in Iraq for over four years, and with me, there is no language barrier. I think I am on solid ground when I say that we don't understand the tribal system.

If we do, then I pose this question. What is a noble tribe, an what is its role in society, an how are noble tribes empowered or disenfranchised by the democratic system?


Dr. Tyrell,

Please see my question below. If the detail to which you refer assists you in your answer, please answer away! Of course, I am familiar with the writings to which you refer- and some are quite good. That was a different time, though.

I own Dr Dodge's books. I hope that what I bring to the table opens up some other fruitful realms of thought for you.

- Sam

marct
05-24-2009, 03:04 PM
Hi Sam,


Please see my question below. If the detail to which you refer assists you in your answer, please answer away!

About noble tribes? Pretty simple concept which, depending on locale, refers to a "sacred" lineage. It shows up around the world in various forms and with different criteria for membership (most often descent, but sometimes via phenotypic characteristic and / or "special" abilities). Sometimes it gets conflated / expanded out into castes or classes (such as the Brahmin / Kshatrya divide in India), other times it is located in specific descent inheritance (sometimes matrilineal, sometimes patrilineal).


Of course, I am familiar with the writings to which you refer- and some are quite good. That was a different time, though.

True, it was a different time, but a lot of the structural models and insights are quite applicable today.

Cheers,

Marc

William F. Owen
05-24-2009, 03:06 PM
If we do, then I pose this question. What is a noble tribe, an what is its role in society, an how are noble tribes empowered or disenfranchised by the democratic system?


Good question. If it applies to the Bedouin in Jordan, or the Negev, I'll ask my wife for you! Otherwise I am sure there are others here who can help you out.

Tom Odom
05-24-2009, 04:22 PM
Hi Tom- thanks for the kind comments. One quick note about 'our understanding of the tribes is quite good." I beg to differ - but then again, I've worked in different places in Iraq for over four years, and with me, there is no language barrier. I think I am on solid ground when I say that we don't understand the tribal system.

If we do, then I pose this question. What is a noble tribe, an what is its role in society, an how are noble tribes empowered or disenfranchised by the democratic system?

- tribeguy

As I am currently on the ground and working the out of the cities issue --including issues with the tribes--I will hold to my original statement.

We can agree to disagree on the extent of that knowledge. I tend to focus on the necessary. Understanding tribal relations is only part of it.

Good luck with your book.

Tom

tribeguy
05-24-2009, 04:36 PM
Dr. Tyrell - that is good - but what are the names, specifically of the noble tribes in Iraq, and what role to they play in Iraqi society, specifically?

Another question: what do Abu Umar Al-Baghdad I, II, and III have in common? What can we learn in terms of AQ's recruitment and tribal engagement strategy from this?

Respects,

Sam

Hi Tom:

(I know the answers to these questions - but I ask them to prove the point - which is who cares if I know? The important thing is for "us" to know. Hence this thread.)

I am looking forward to your posts on the noble tribes. There is a good deal of Arabic scholarship on the subject. I promise you that this area will bear fruit, but I caution all that hard and fast rules and inflexible thinking are the enemy.

Iraqi society is incredibly complex, and so are its people. If somebody represents that they are a tribal "expert," or that they "really understand the tribes," think again. That's why I have translated so much arabic scholarship on the tribes, and most particularly their hierarchies. It differs greatly from its western counterpart, and leads to analytical paradigms that are much more incisive, since they are organic to the culture.

Our paradigms and such, whether or not they were part of the institutional culture (I agree, they weren't) still would only bear so much fruit as they filtered through the way that we as outsiders see the Iraqi tribal system.

I am trying to break through that "outsider" barrier. I've had some successes and some failures in that area. Bottom line - I don't have the answers, but I have a lot more questions.

Keep up the good work - stay curious on the subject of tribes. This subject doesn't exist in a vacuum. I have seen that tribalism permeates every aspect of Iraqi society. That's why I started this thread.

I spent 4 years on the ground in Iraq, and will be returning in the near future. I suspect that our paths may have crossed before.


Marc,

I agree that it is a simple concept, until you bring it down to a "what should we do" level of thinking. Just because we think we know a concept doesn't mean that we can apply it.

So, that is the reason that I asked which are the noble tribes of Iraq.

V/r,

Sam

marct
05-24-2009, 05:08 PM
Hi Sam,


I agree that it is a simple concept, until you bring it down to a "what should we do" level of thinking. Just because we think we know a concept doesn't mean that we can apply it.

So, that is the reason that I asked which are the noble tribes of Iraq.

Get's us back to Clausewitz doesn't it :D? Yeah, I agree that the devil is in the details when it comes to applying the concept. Personally, I don't know who the ones in Iraq are... then again, I've never claimed to have that granular level of knowledge ;).

The entire issue, though, does raise some interesting points. For example, even without knowing the specifics in an area, and what the actual meaning(s) of those specifics is/are (i.e. what does it actually mean today in terms of operations), if you have the concept, you can get the data either by asking people who know (that's the Socratic in me!) or by looking for structural similarities / analogs. Of course, figuring out what it means is crucial and how it gets transformed is critical to actually using it :wry:.

The flip side is getting hung up on concepts and structures that are much less operationally relevant and focusing on them to the detriment of the long term goal. One of the problems that I've noticed with a lot of political / military writing about cultural phenomenon is the implied assumption that culture is static rather than constantly being negotiated (another problem is the naive idea that "We" aren't ruled by it, but "They" are - hah! We should get Rob Thornton in on this one :D).

Anyway, I've got to get back to work (sigh).

Cheers,

Marc

tribeguy
05-24-2009, 05:25 PM
Hi Sam,



Get's us back to Clausewitz doesn't it :D? Yeah, I agree that the devil is in the details when it comes to applying the concept. Personally, I don't know who the ones in Iraq are... then again, I've never claimed to have that granular level of knowledge ;).

The entire issue, though, does raise some interesting points. For example, even without knowing the specifics in an area, and what the actual meaning(s) of those specifics is/are (i.e. what does it actually mean today in terms of operations), if you have the concept, you can get the data either by asking people who know (that's the Socratic in me!) or by looking for structural similarities / analogs. Of course, figuring out what it means is crucial and how it gets transformed is critical to actually using it :wry:.

The flip side is getting hung up on concepts and structures that are much less operationally relevant and focusing on them to the detriment of the long term goal. One of the problems that I've noticed with a lot of political / military writing about cultural phenomenon is the implied assumption that culture is static rather than constantly being negotiated (another problem is the naive idea that "We" aren't ruled by it, but "They" are - hah! We should get Rob Thornton in on this one :D).

Anyway, I've got to get back to work (sigh).

Cheers,

Marc
Marc! I can't let you off that easily. Hear me now and believe me in 10 years, the noble tribes are MOST operationally relevant. Hence the question, what do Abu Umar Al-Baghdadi I, II, and III have in common!

The idea of being able to ask those who know invites undisciplined and agenda warped answers, especially in Iraq, which is the land of actual conspiracies - not theories.

Here's what I mean about operational relevance. It's the tribes:

Defeating Al-Qaeda's Tribal Engagement Strategy in Iraq (http://theiraqiarabtribalsystem.blogspot.com/2008/09/al-qaedas-tribal-engagement-policy-in.html)

Creating an insurgency is easier than fighting against one in Iraq, particularly if the grievances used to justify violence remain unaddressed by the Iraqi government.

One such grievance comes from tribal leaders who are ignored by the Iraqi government. Influence, or "wasita," is crucial for tribal leaders to ensure that they receive their share of resources from the government. Tribal leaders who are ignored by the government are shamed, and their legitimacy as sheikhs is threatened. Amongst the sheikh's many responsibilities is to ensure that his tribe is secure, prosperous, and growing. He also must ensure that his tribe is strong and can defend its territories from neighboring tribes who may wish to take resources from his tribe. If the government doesn't recognize a sheikh, what does that say to the sheikh's tribesmen? If the sheikh isn't important, then just how important is the tribesman? What can the tribesmen expect from the government if it doesn't recognize and communicate with his sheikh? Is this the message that the Iraqi government should be sending to its citizens?.....

And finally, (insert deep breath here), our counterinsurgency strategy is linear, and our targeting is essentially a "whack a mole" strategy.

The issue isn't the mole - they are problems, but the problem is actually in parts of the soil that the mole is digging in to screw up the Iraqi lawn.

The soil is the tribal system, and parts of it (some sub tribes) are very sympathetic to AQ and other ACF elements.

Our intel does a great job of who, what, when, and where. That's the essence of whack a mole, but it really applies best to fighting a conventional enemy.

In COIN, why is the key. And individuals are not. Groups, and by that I mean sub tribes, are the key.

Here's a snippet from a recent talk that was held between some "old school" iraqis and their "new school" officers.

Old school: There are sub tribes of the X tribe now in Y location - they are going to make trouble there.

New school: what should we do?

Old school: we need to destroy that sub tribe, entirely.

New school: but that is a violation of human rights!

Old school: if you want the government to stay in power, you have to send a message to the rest of the sub tribal shaykhs not to follow in this direction.

Note that we, the Americans, should just let the Iraqi government do what it must to stay in power.

I do not suggest that destroying sub tribes is what US forces should do. Quite the opposite, it runs against what I believe in.

However, if that is what the Iraqi government has to do, I think we need to just turn a blind eye to it.

What are your thoughts, Marc?

slapout9
05-24-2009, 07:31 PM
where is the free first chapter?:D

marct
05-24-2009, 08:26 PM
What are your thoughts, Marc?

At the moment, focused on a presentation I have to give on Tuesday and another on a paper for mid-June. As i said, I'm up to my eyebrows in work right now ;).

tribeguy
05-24-2009, 08:52 PM
Work always gets in the way. Thankfully, my work intersects with my interests. I am sure it does for you as well.

I am looking forward to your posts. Right now I am preparing a top down analysis of the Iraqi tribal system by province, region, Qadha', and Nahiya. While the source data is somewhat dated, I am interested in evaluating it to see where it supports events on the ground.

I just finished translating 'Abd 'Aun Al-Rudhan's encyclopedia of iraqi tribes - it has 14193 sub tribes in total - with locational data included. However, this work will be misunderstood and misinterpreted by those who don't understand how Iraqi scholars study and analyze their own tribal system. That's why I wrote the book.

It's not "my method," but rather, is my attempt to describe theirs. I think it is much more intuitive than our western attempts, having studied those extensively.

The Brits, God bless them, produced a lot of tribal data, but they over emphasized the role of "confederations" and super confederations. At the local level, the major tribal entities are almost dead identities. Sub tribal identity is much more cohesive, but those are much more numerous.

A British scholar with great understanding said that it was their most important yet most difficult challenge to understand and interpret Middle Eastern Tribal systems. He didn't have the benefits of database software, unfortunately. Our challenge is to first understand the nature of the tribes themselves, and then somehow incorporate this into an analytical system that allows for some degree of predictive power such that we can at least identify the myriad of most likely short, intermediate, and long term futures with respect to how the tribal system will interact and react with the governments that purport to represent them.

Again, I am looking forward to your input.
Very Resepctfully,

Tribeguy

Scott Shaw
05-28-2009, 03:37 PM
I was able to watch Sam pitch his first class yesterday on his theory. 1. Sam is amazingly intelligent. He is a speaker, writer, and reader of Arabic. 2. His presentation is very animated – he’s excited about this topic. 3. He is very well read on his sources having personally translated many of them.

Yeah – he had a shameless plug for his book and I’ll buy a copy if just to read what he translated since my Arabic reading isn’t so good. If you can get over the plug (and you really should), as davidbfpo above pointed out, he brings a level of specialism that is not found elsewhere that I know of.
His basic point – and Sam if I got this wrong, then tell me – is that there are tribes in Iraq (the Noble Tribes) that drive the society (drive may not be the right word, so I’ll go “Where the Noble Tribes go, so goes the country.)

As far as what Tom Odom says above, the “necessary” of what Sam does can be explained in the question, “What motivates Iraqi X to do what he is doing?” I served as a MiTT Chief for a year in addition to commanding a rifle company in Baghdad. The full tribe name of the Iraqis that I worked with can explain some of what they did (in retrospect since I was not aware of the importance of sub-tribe/clan until yesterday). It’s deeper than just “Mr Maliki” or Saddam Hussein al-Tikriti – what about the albu Nasirs that Saddam belongs to? How do you talk to them? How about the fact that there are Malikis all over the country and their power base is much larger than that of any other tribe cross province (there are more of certain tribes in certain provinces, but cross province – the Malikis take it.

Scott

Steve Blair
05-28-2009, 03:42 PM
Interesting, but any close reading of the Army's operations on our own frontier would have pointed out the importance of understanding tribal organization and interior politics. Sad how we always have to reinvent the understanding wheel every few years....

Tom Odom
05-28-2009, 03:47 PM
Scott

I appreciate your comments. No dispute on the importance of the tribes.

But as I said before, the premise that everyone is ignoring the tribal aspects of what goes on here in Iraq is wrong and in the context of plugging a book misleading.

Thanks again

Tom

Scott Shaw
05-28-2009, 03:53 PM
Tom,

I didn't copy the whole of what I meant to post - what I wanted to get at was at what level are we thinking about tribe/sub-tribe/clan and the effects of it. I really think that at that company/battery/troop level, our guys ought to be thinking about it (thus the need for the company level intel support team - and a smart Commander) to understand motivations. I know that the MNC-I/MND/BCT staffs are, but from what I know of staffs in 2004-2005 from personal experience and from the students I taught as an SGI and from what I saw in 2007-2008, I know that many (and I hate generalizations too) battalion staffs are not. Too bad for us and too bad for our Soldiers - and their families. I just think that extensive tribal knowledge at the battalion and company level goes a long way.

Scott

Tom Odom
05-28-2009, 03:59 PM
Tom,

I didn't copy the whole of what I meant to post - what I wanted to get at was at what level are we thinking about tribe/sub-tribe/clan and the effects of it. I really think that at that company/battery/troop level, our guys ought to be thinking about it (thus the need for the company level intel support team - and a smart Commander) to understand motivations. I know that the MNC-I/MND/BCT staffs are, but from what I know of staffs in 2004-2005 from personal experience and from the students I taught as an SGI and from what I saw in 2007-2008, I know that many (and I hate generalizations too) battalion staffs are not. Too bad for us and too bad for our Soldiers - and their families. I just think that extensive tribal knowledge at the battalion and company level goes a long way.

Scott

And I don't disagree with any of that. In fact, I pushed CoIST issues for the past 6 years from my day job at JRTC. The HTS is a step in the right direction with the HTTs but there is work needed there. The system is not a system yet and at that i will shut up.

I believe in the cultural awareness push and all of it. I was an anthro minor; that is one of the reasons I became a FAO in the first place.

Best
Tom

Hacksaw
05-28-2009, 05:26 PM
I'm with Slapout.... where is the teaser beyond - I know something you don't?

I'm intrigued... I'd say the approaches that tribeguy describes have been the focal point of the Seminar that the USA/USMC COIN Center has pitched for the past 3.5 years (problem is that as cursory as that treatment is... 7 days) but that approach is not universally adopted across training/education entities...

So.... Tribeguy, help us help you, if what you have to sell is unique and helpful... loosen the copywrite strings a little and let us read and think about your approach beyond a few leading questions...

I love the smell of sunflowers in the morning... it smells like... summer

slapout9
05-28-2009, 05:37 PM
Interesting, but any close reading of the Army's operations on our own frontier would have pointed out the importance of understanding tribal organization and interior politics. Sad how we always have to reinvent the understanding wheel every few years....


Absolutely, on another thread we were talking about the Revolutionary War and Indians. George Washington was a land surveyor by trade and he had numerous contacts and knowledge of the Indian tribes that certainly were of benefit during our own Insurgency. But we seem to have forgotten that as Steve points out.

slapout9
05-28-2009, 05:39 PM
I'm with Slapout.... where is the teaser beyond - I know something you don't?

I'm intrigued... I'd say the approaches that tribeguy describes have been the focal point of the Seminar that the USA/USMC COIN Center has pitched for the past 3.5 years (problem is that as cursory as that treatment is... 7 days) but that approach is not universally adopted across training/education entities...

So.... Tribeguy, help us help you, if what you have to sell is unique and helpful... loosen the copywrite strings a little and let us read and think about your approach beyond a few leading questions...

I love the smell of sunflowers in the morning... it smells like... summer



Yea, there is another best seller out called Tribes by marketing expert Seth Godin and your sales tactics seem to mimic this book:mad:

tribeguy
05-28-2009, 06:45 PM
Alcon:

I appreciate your concerns, but a chapter or two out of my book isn't going to get you where we all need to be.

I do post things on my blog at www.theiraqiarabtribalsystem.com, but I am not sure that anybody (anthropologist or not) is really going to understand the fullness of it without some basics that come from actual Iraqi Arabic Tribal scholarship. That's why I wrote the book. We, on the whole, have a partial understanding of the importance of tribes and their relationship to all things relevant in Iraq. This concerns me a great deal.

And I'm not saying that I understand the fullness of it - after having briefed the commander of MND South, as well as a variety of other senior level officers, however, the universal response has been "I wish we would have known about this five years ago." So, while I think most are pursuing a greater understanding of the tribal system, I believe that we are limited by the way that we approach the subject - through our western prism.

For example, Tom posted the idea that he studies the tribes as it is necessary. Well, what Tom believes is necessary might differ substantially from what is actually required. Also, what I think is necessary might be overstated, and it might also fall short. I think that we all need to remain very curious about this subject. Tribalism is one of the most powerful currents in Iraqi history, not just post-Saddam. There are reasons for this that need to be understood before we start trying to put tribalism in some kind of conceptual box. Tom has stated in other posts that tribalism and sectarianism are both important, and I agree with that. There are many scholars that believe that sect and tribe are separate issues - and they are not. The question then becomes, where does tribalism and sectarianism intersect.

That's why I ask the question: what are the noble tribes in Iraq, and what is their role in.....well, everything. It's a subject of study - and it is not something that I can answer even in the most longwinded post here.

Some of the topics that are most germane in the book are: 1) the Arabic Naming Convention and its Application to Tactical Tribal Analysis, 2) the sub tribal naming convention and its application to tactical and strategic tribal analysis, and 3) the identification and management of Iraqi tribal hegemonies at the national, regional, provincial, Qadha, and Nahiya Levels and 4) The relationship between the democratic model of government and the tribal system and who this empowers, and also who it automatically disenfranchises.

Having been involved in operations at the ground level for four years, I am confident that our collective understanding of this (including anthropologists) is insufficient and thus doesn't bring us the really important data that we need to incorporate into our strategies from the corps level to the company level.

That being said, I pose the questions to Tom, as he works for MND-C: What is the relevance of Sunni noble tribes to events on the ground in Baghdad province, from the the FOR to the present? What is the connection between Sunni noble tribes and the insurgency (based on open source stuff only).

I presented some of the answers to this to the class that I gave yesterday. I am so grateful to them for bearing with me through this.

The book is very inexpensive in comparison to the thousands of dollars that I have spent amassing Iraqi and other arabic tribal research. My heart tells me to give the book away, but my wife disagrees. So, I made the book inexpensive, and I trust that everybody else who has written a book that they believe is important would and has done exactly the same thing. Further, writing the book has cost me a substantial amount of money. The copies that I have were the ones that I had to purchase. I'm not in this for self promotion, nor am I in this for the money. I am also not in this to go further into debt. I am sure that anybody can understand this.

Besides, the issue at stake here is the tribes and our efforts in Iraq. I have something to contribute beyond my book, and so does everybody else. Buy it, or don't. But let's talk about the tribes, eh?

What I will do for free is post my provincial analysis of tribal balances of power in Iraq, the data from which was translated directly from 'Abd 'Aun Al-Rudhan's "Encyclopedia of Iraqi Tribes," Dar Al-Ahaliya L-Al-Nashar Wa Al-Tawzi'a, 2007. I am in the process of completing this analysis, and hope to have the intial results by this Friday.

The database that I put together on this allows for me to drill down to Qadha and Nahiya levels as well. My intentions are to build a model of Iraqi society, including the government with the tribal system as its base. Now, this is a top down approach that I hope will assist those who operate in theater in understanding the connections between events on the ground and the broader strategic picture in terms of tribalism and politics.

It's going to take some time, and since this is all going to be open source without the nuisance of copyright issues, I'll be pleased to share it with those who care to actually use it.

That being said, the tribal picture isn't comprehensible without a disciplined approach to the sub tribes vis a vis the sub tribal naming convention- which is the Arab convention, and not our western model. I have found that the Arab method is much more easy to understand, and allows us westerners to distinguish between the thousands of sub tribes that have exactly the same first names.

As for giving what I know without asking the leading questions, I disagree. The questions are the most important thing. Once those questions are understood, I think that everybody is going to own this subject. And that is my goal - that we all own it. The leading questions aren't for me to answer. They are for everybody to answer. I don't have all the answers. I do have some questions that have led to fruitful answers, but those answers aren't permanent, as the tribal system and politics are dynamic. So, the questions are key, and have to be asked and studied on an ongoing basis.


Hacksaw - I am in Leavenworth. Contact me at sam.stolzoff@gmail.com, and I'll send you my contact data. I'd be pleased to help you, now that you mention that you are at the COIN Center. That goes for others who are in Leavenworth. I have a lot of presentations put together that cover topics that are germance to your efforts, may add some nuance to what you already have, and some methods and applications that you all might not.


Thanks for all of your input.

Tribe on!

V/r,

tribeguy

tribeguy
05-28-2009, 11:06 PM
Sir,

I have a lot of data on sub tribes with cross border presence, Syrian and Iranian Arab Tribes.

If you have Analyst's Notebook, I can send you some products that I made on that very subject.

I have four years of boots on ground experience, I speak read and write Arabic and English fluently, and have a ton of successful experience in tribal engagement.

Please contact me for more details.

V/r,

Tribeguy

tribeguy
05-29-2009, 03:42 AM
True - the Brits had some true genius - Sandeman is amazing. Those who were in charge of Transjordan were also very skilled and shrewd at tribal administration.

Alas, many of those lessons are indeed long forgotten.

We Americans truly want to do the right thing, but we often listen to the wrong people when it comes to getting counsel on tribes.

There are many in academic circles who are discourged from studing tribalism - it's not PC. It's seen as culturally judgemental. So, for the last 50 years, glorious academia has fallen short in tribal studies. Yes, there are some fine works out there, but their scope is generally quite small.

Worse yet, our soft science student corps generally doesn't speak foreign languages, and especially middle eastern ones. So, the chinese wall between academia and middle eastern studies is built with the brick and mortar of our making.

Now, I am not a fan of all things British, but hats off to your brave forefathers (and to you too for raising the point!).

I agree, also, with Tom about HTS. But, good things are happening there - and they are getting much, much better. More on that to follow - the system is starting to emerge on the Iraq side of the house. I am very hopeful in that regard. I'm not too sure about the Afghan side of the house quite yet. The Afghan side works very hard, but the data sets available for them prevent predictive analysis at this point. Predictive capability (or at least educated guestimation) is being developed on the Iraq side of the house, of that I am quite confident.


V/r,

tribeguy

tribeguy
05-29-2009, 03:44 AM
Some of the magic in there is fully understanding the connection between the Imam's and the tribes. I've discovered some very interesting things in that regard. Problem is that us Americans, in general, are resting on our laurels when it comes to tribal studies. We still think we know something about the tribes - and we are just getting done with our first step!


I like your thinking, Rifleman. In fact, many sheikhs in Iraq are pushing for the creation of a "house of lords" branch of the government. It's not a terrible idea, and at the very least it would allow for sheikhs to either succeed at positively contributing to the government, or proving once and for all that they can't. Nevertheless, I like the idea of including their voices in the government from an official standpoint - it gives the sheikhs a buy-in to the iraqi government in a way that would make the government uniquely Iraqi. In the end, the government has to represent the population in a manner that conforms with the shape of the population.

V/r,

tribeguy

Steve the Planner
05-29-2009, 03:49 AM
I suppose its a little of each.

Like Tom said, we know a lot. All the older tribal references have been pretty exhaustively mapped if you know where to ask. Seen 'em and spent much time debating them with the folks who put 'em together. If you really wanted to track names, its easier to cross-reference the Land Records with the property maps (both are digital), and track the name influences and transfers.

Problem with all these sources is that with some 15-25% of the population in rapid transit pulses since the 1970's (not just our displacements), older printed references (like the old tribal maps) do not reflect the facts on the ground in many of the critical areas (especially the disputed areas). Somebody on the ground better make sure who is where NOW before any serious actions are backed by outdated data.

In September 2008, I assembled all the census data for Central and Northern Iraq going back to the 1930's---Iraqis themselves tracked ethnic and religious info via census, not tribal, until 1980's. The tribal maps were elsewhere but I have digital copies of most. I had to create a complete set of census places/pol/admin maps to connect the data to places and politics, but, once done, it showed very enlightening patterns (up to a point).

Once you followed through on the ground, it often seemed that the parties who knew what they were doing were focused not on tribal issues but on shifting political demographics to beyond a tipping point on a nahia-by-nahia basis. It sometimes seemed random to us, but the real players new how the underlying geo-political/ethnic/religious game is played (Iraqis don't need to be taught gerrymandering---they are hard-wired for it). So, do you follow old, partially relevant data, or the big drivers.

Sam's point about tribes having less influence in cities sort of mirrors the Talabani/Barhzani split in the Kurdish world. Talabani represented the urban (and often educated and technocratic) Kurds, and Barhzani the old land holder class (like the Bhuttos in Pakistan). One is not very tribally oriented, and the other is. The combination of different cultural, social, educational, business and other outlooks between the two (technocrats vs. old land owners), begs the question of how much the tribal (vs. other socio-economic, ethnic) factors are a major driver.

Nonetheless, Iraq is primarily an urbanized population, following similar rapid urbanization (or ruralization of cities) in many areas. This urbanization pattern, and it's inherent result of breaking down tribal links, often goes hand in hand with those things needed to become successful in an urban environment. As an urbanist (an urban planner and economic geographer by training), I am intrigued by the cross-cultural commonalities of the pressures that arise from urbanization (whether in New York in 1880 when immigrants came, or most northern US cities when everybody (and particularly southern blacks) moved to the cities in and after WWII, and the folks that have exploded the populations of cities in places like Iraq, Afpak,etc... How do you keep 'em down on the farm, and what do they need to go through once they arrive?

Yesterday, I attended a talk by Linda Robinson (Tell Me How This Ends: General David Petraeus and the Search for a Way Out of Iraq), and share her belief that: the tribal thing was overplayed. A knowledgeable Arab explained it to me like coming into New York after the technocrats drove off the Tammany Halls, and offering to boost up the old mafiosi to replace them (a less than desirable step backwards).

Alas, I agree with Sam that the level and quality of information in US hands is far from what it should be. As one who suspects the SOFA will not be supported by the Iraqi public (even with consequences of insecurity), and, therefore, our current time is short, I wish there was more focused and systematic attention to collecting up the information that would be useful later.

Steve

jcustis
05-29-2009, 03:50 AM
I don't mean to be wry or flip when I ask this, but why should WE be worried about the tribe context?...so we can advise the Iraqis on the issues inherent with them, or just know what forces are at work?

This smells to me like you think we are still in the lead in Iraq, or should be. If I misread you, my apologies, but I just get this sense of gloom eminating over how little we know about the tribes. I have to ask the question of why (at this juncture) we should care?

Tribalism in general?...got it. Iraqi tribalism?...not so sure it is as relevant as argued here.

Steve the Planner
05-29-2009, 04:26 AM
Yesterday, I had the pleasure of meeting the Honorable Iraqi Ambassador Sumaidaei (Hope I got that right). He is a man of great distinction, and very worldy and well-educated.

Put him together with the likes of Deputy Prime Minister Barham Saleh, and the current (Dr. Ali Baban) and former Ministers of Planning, and you have enough US and British diplomas to float a new think tank in DC.

So how do these distinguished and forward-looking Iraqis, who are all very much in important positions, fit into a view that tribes are anything more than relevant, but not central to Iraq's future?

Saddam was a nobody by birth, and leapfrogged to prominence by expanding the power of a lesser tribe into something powerful...using bloodlines for security first, and tribal factors as coincidental. No?

Sure he played up his link to Salah ad Din, but he was actually a Kurd from Erbil.

Steve

tribeguy
05-29-2009, 06:06 PM
Jcustis - our ability to prosecute the GWOT in general will be enhanced manyfold by our knowledge of tribes. One of our errors as westerners is to assume that there is such a thing as a tribe that is confined within national borders.

We are all concerned with the war against terror here, and our enemy as substantial mastery of the tribal system, does use this material. Have a look at Al-Sahab.com, and you will find that members of the salafist community that sympathize (work with) AQ and other affilliated organizations trade this data, and I must assume that this is because the tribal networks are their logistical and recruitment networks. (Actually, that's not an assumption.)

So, why should we care? Because detailed knowledge of the tribal networks are vital to our lines of effort in Iraq and the GWOT.

Willful ignorance of this will teach us very painful lessons that result ultimately in the deaths of our soldiers. Sythesis of tribal network analysis has and will continue to play a very important role in our lines of effort. Not continuing to develop our capabilities in that is like saying we don't need a rifle that is better than the M16, or that we don't need to develop new weapons systems, or that we should ignore Iran. It's a bad mistake, considering that we'll likely be involved in the Middle East for the forseeable future, and that the small wars that we prosecute in other places throughout the world largely take place in tribal socities. If we develop solid and precise methodologies in Iraq, they will come in handy in the Horn of Africa, the Phillipines....

In other words, tribal analysis has been a huge force multiplier or us in certain circles. Yes I am an advocate of expanding this capability so that we can have it at the ready for future conflicts. Precision in this area gives us great insight into the "why" of the intelligence process in terms of prosecuting a COIN. As others have noted in other forums, we have some serious S2 shortcoming in terms of syntesizing cultural data into the intelligence process. The rewards for successfully doing so are readily apparent as per the capture of Khalid ((Al-Mashhadani)) on 4Jul07 - a noble tribesman that Nibras Al-Kazimi identified as being Abu 'Umar Al-Baghdadi in his blog www.talismangate.blogspot.com. Khalid was a noble tribesman! Sheikh Hamid ((Al-Zawi)), the new Abu 'Umar Al-Baghdadi is, too! What does this tell you about AQ's tribal engagement strategy?

Not care about the tribes? The enemy does. The Awakening is completely tribal. The tribal system can be our friend, or an enemy to be feared. Just ask the Brits who were massacred in the Middle Euphrates in 1920.

I think it would be wise to analyze all phenomena that occur in Iraq in from a tribal perspective, in addition to others. My experience from doing so is that it is often more reliable than other, western oriented means of analysis. More importantly, history teaches us that ignoring the tribes leads to failure when it comes to the Middle East! We are prosecuting a COIN. Ignoring the organic political structures of the green population is unsound from a conceptual point of view, in my opinion. However, my views are the product of my experiences, education, and those who have had great influence on me throughout my life. The truth is bigger than that, of course.

All of your comments are great - I'm interested in this ((Al-Samida'a)) character that one of our members had the pleasure of working with. It might please you to know that he is a noble tribesmen - and while some might wish to downplay this - the subject of noble tribes seems to keep rearing its head in terms of the insurgency on both the Shi'ite and Sunni sides of the fence. I find the fact that Mr. ((Al-Samida'a)) uses his tribal name to be very interesting, particularly if he downplays the importance of tribalism in Iraq to you. In fact, the concept of noble tribes is culturally central in terms of tribalism and Islam despite the fact that the noble tribes are small. Why is this?

The Iraqi intelligentsia wants to move us away from analyzing their society in terms of tribes, and to the degree that such a thing would be insulting I can understand that position. Keeping in mind such sensitivities is important, this doesn't discourage me from diving into the issue. There is certainly a time and place for discussing tribalism- and talking tribalism in a meeting with a major representative of the Iraqi government might not be the most polite thing to do until you have an established and trusted relationship with that individual that has lasted for more than a few hours, and when the conversation is private.

As the sheikh of the ((Al-'Akra'a)) ((Al-Shimmari)) tribe told me a couple of months ago "Yes, we have our doctors, our lawyers and our politicians, and they say that they aren't us (tribesmen). Actually, they always are, and always will be. We Iraqis are like schools of fish - we can only swim in certain waters. If we go to waters where there is the slightest change in salinity, it could kill us. We like to stay together."

Outstanding comments all - fascinating. Again, the noble tribes.....

V/r,

sam

Steve the Planner
05-30-2009, 03:35 PM
Tribe guy:

You can ready His Excellency Ambassador Sumaida'ie's bio at www.iraqembassy.us/Ambassador.htm

He is also a subject written about in Linda Robinson's Petreaus book.

If you want to wrap him in your worldview of noble tribes, I can't change that, but I watched him sit across from Linda as she gave a speech in which she said the tribe thing was overplayed in Iraq, and he shook his head in agreement.

Maybe there are other dimensions???

Steve

Surferbeetle
05-30-2009, 06:18 PM
From today's BBC Dramatic plane arrest of ex-Iraq minister (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/8075158.stm)


Iraq's former trade minister has been arrested at Baghdad airport on corruption charges as he was trying to leave the country.

Officials said Abdul Falah Sudani had been on a flight to the United Arab Emirates which was asked to turn back to Baghdad so he could be arrested.

Mr Sudani resigned as minister earlier this month amid claims officials in his department had embezzled large sums.

He denies wrongdoing. Investigators had already arrested one of his brothers.

Sabah Mohammed Sudani was held on suspicion of corruption at a checkpoint in the south of the country on 9 May.

Jedburgh
05-30-2009, 07:50 PM
....One of our errors as westerners is to assume that there is such a thing as a tribe that is confined within national borders.....
That is not just a general statement - with all the caveats going along with that - but stating that "westerners" assume such a thing is yet another assumption on your part. As someone who was not too long ago a young buck sergeant in uniform, you know exactly what assume means.

Awareness of cross-border (often not just two, but multiple borders) has long been critical in strategic intelligence analysis and especially for SOF. It was known and exploited in many ways by both sides during the good ol' Cold War days.

And tribal network analysis is simply another aspect of simple social network analysis. Hell, I've worked tribal influence linkages since the stubby pencil days of charting. Most other old HUMINT'ers with a focus in regions with substantial tribal populations could say the same thing in their unique context. As a relatively recent example, in the early '90s (during Provide Comfort) we did extensive tribal analysis integrating that with resettlement patterns and the influence of political parties among the Kurds. And during the period between Desert Storm and OIF, extensive study and research was done at the strategic level (and in academic circles) on how Saddam manipulated tribal relations to solidify his power base.

I could go on and on with historic examples - both of success and failure in where tribal knowledge (or the lack thereof) played a role. With regard to what most consider the roles of intelligence and policy in "modern" warfare, there are extensive lessons dating back to WWI. But you could all the way back to Caesar's Commentarii de Bello Gallico and see how he took tribal networks into consideration during the IPB process and how it ultimately affected operations. A lot of lessons have been forgotten, but new ones are being learned - and making general statements about how the importance of tribes is being ignored is simply insulting to all of those who effectively integrate such awareness into operations and policy.

The "willful ignorance" comment with regard to al-Qa'ida's exploitation of tribal networks for logistics and recruitment is a also a bit over the top. (Whether or not it is self-serving is another question) Those focused with real responsibility on the issue are have long been well aware of such exploitation, as well as how important tribal networks are for JI and other such organizations. But there is an entire spectrum of influence factors, and to focus too tightly on tribes - as to focus too narrowly on any aspect - is a recipe for failure.

Finally, as regards this continuing discussion, your arguments thus far tend to be devoid of substantial context, failing to flesh out your position clearly at the strategic, operational or tactical levels. You're crying out listen to me, I know the answers, yet your own assumptions and repeated generalizations in pushing your single-focus agenda do you little intellectual credit. I'll pass on the book.

Tom Odom
05-31-2009, 08:24 AM
That is not just a general statement - with all the caveats going along with that - but stating that "westerners" assume such a thing is yet another assumption on your part. As someone who was not too long ago a young buck sergeant in uniform, you know exactly what assume means.

Awareness of cross-border (often not just two, but multiple borders) has long been critical in strategic intelligence analysis and especially for SOF. It was known and exploited in many ways by both sides during the good ol' Cold War days.

And tribal network analysis is simply another aspect of simple social network analysis. Hell, I've worked tribal influence linkages since the stubby pencil days of charting. Most other old HUMINT'ers with a focus in regions with substantial tribal populations could say the same thing in their unique context. As a relatively recent example, in the early '90s (during Provide Comfort) we did extensive tribal analysis integrating that with resettlement patterns and the influence of political parties among the Kurds. And during the period between Desert Storm and OIF, extensive study and research was done at the strategic level (and in academic circles) on how Saddam manipulated tribal relations to solidify his power base.

I could go on and on with historic examples - both of success and failure in where tribal knowledge (or the lack thereof) played a role. With regard to what most consider the roles of intelligence and policy in "modern" warfare, there are extensive lessons dating back to WWI. But you could all the way back to Caesar's Commentarii de Bello Gallico and see how he took tribal networks into consideration during the IPB process and how it ultimately affected operations. A lot of lessons have been forgotten, but new ones are being learned - and making general statements about how the importance of tribes is being ignored is simply insulting to all of those who effectively integrate such awareness into operations and policy.

The "willful ignorance" comment with regard to al-Qa'ida's exploitation of tribal networks for logistics and recruitment is a also a bit over the top. (Whether or not it is self-serving is another question) Those focused with real responsibility on the issue are have long been well aware of such exploitation, as well as how important tribal networks are for JI and other such organizations. But there is an entire spectrum of influence factors, and to focus too tightly on tribes - as to focus too narrowly on any aspect - is a recipe for failure.

Finally, as regards this continuing discussion, your arguments thus far tend to be devoid of substantial context, failing to flesh out your position clearly at the strategic, operational or tactical levels. You're crying out listen to me, I know the answers, yet your own assumptions and repeated generalizations in pushing your single-focus agenda do you little intellectual credit. I'll pass on the book.

Well said, Ted.

Best

Tom

tribeguy
05-31-2009, 04:46 PM
Overplayed in some cases - yes. The Tribal Awakening is certainly overplayed at his point in time.

Overplayed in accordance with our understanding of tribes yes. But there is something about the tribal system that we don't get -that something is where tribe and sect meet.

The underlying story of the insurgency, and much of Iraqi history has to do with struggles of groups of people over who should rule the Caliphate. Tribe and sect meet at this juncture.

Which are the tribes from which the ruler of the Caliphate should come? This is a body of knowledge that you don't find in western books, and further puts UBL and middle eastern political Islam in a light that is much more understandable, and gives more predictive power than trying to interpret events on the ground in terms of who we westerners think about the tribes.

The Tribal Awakening, from a certain perspective, has been overplayed.

The analysis of tribes with respect to actually figuring out "why" the insurgency happened, and why those conditions still exist today speaks to the center of COIN.

The noble tribes are most certainly a part of this answer. I certainly don't mean to downplay the efforts of those with "real responsibility" in that area, however, I am also certain that nobody is talking about the noble tribes and their dispositions with respect to the current GOI. The divergence of interest between Sunni Noble tribes and their Shi'ite counterparts explains an awful lot about why the insurgency wasn't a united front against US forces, and why they were fighting each other.

True, I am withholding some information - but I am doing so so that you all can be the ones who discover this on your own. The subject falls squarely in the field of our anthropologist friends. They are the ones that should be able to answer the questions regarding the noble tribes with great specificity with respect to Iraq. Their theories and analytical models, if applied most directly to events on the ground in Iraq, will show what I am talking about with respect to the noble tribes.

Do a cursory review of all of the AUAB's except for the ((Al-Mujama'i)) that is in custody right now (he's an imposter - a tool in an information operation against AQ). Find out whether or not they are from noble tribes.

Then, do a cursory review of the tribal affiliations of Iraqi Shi'ite Imams (not ((Al-Sistani)), he's Irani).

So what? I think you will find that all of the AUAB's are from Sunni noble tribes, and the majority of the major Iraqi Shi'ite Imams are from noble tribes as well.

The previous speaker of the house was Mahmud ((Al-Mashhadani)), the future one will be a ((Al-Samara'i)). Both are Sunni noble tribes. Both speakers, in sucesssion. All the AUAB's - in succession, and most if not all of the Shi'ite Iraqi Imams, in succession are from noble tribes.

Both sides claim to be the direct descendants of Muhammad, the prophet. Both sides tacitly believe that they have a right to at least candidacy for Caliph.

The argument over the Caliphate is ongoing, even while the current Iraqi governmnet is in power. The noble tribes are at the center of that, and thus at the center of the insurgency (on both sides of the sectarian fence).

And yes, the noble tribes have been ignored. It's a sensitive subject for our Iraqi friends. However, 'Ali Al-Wardi discusses these issues with great frankness from a historical perspective in his book "Lamahat Ijtima'iya," which alas has not been translated into English. The names of the noble tribes have shown up over and over again throughout Iraqi history - but without knowing the context of why they are noble and why this has been and is still an important driver from a cultural perspective has and does inhibit us from understanding why certain phenomena such as insurgencies and sectarian violence occur. There is a depth to this that isn't applied by our huminters and our analysts across the board.

As Galula states in his books - it is best to listen to all members of your units, even measly former buck sergeants like me. I appreciate Jedburgh's rebuke - but just because I was a buck sergeant doesn't mean that I wasn't in a position of real responsibilty, and nor does it define anything about me except to those who can't think outside of the box.

-Tribeguy

jcustis
05-31-2009, 08:20 PM
Overplayed in some cases - yes. The Tribal Awakening is certainly overplayed at his point in time.

Overplayed in accordance with our understanding of tribes yes. But there is something about the tribal system that we don't get -that something is where tribe and sect meet.

The underlying story of the insurgency, and much of Iraqi history has to do with struggles of groups of people over who should rule the Caliphate. Tribe and sect meet at this juncture.

Which are the tribes from which the ruler of the Caliphate should come? This is a body of knowledge that you don't find in western books, and further puts UBL and middle eastern political Islam in a light that is much more understandable, and gives more predictive power than trying to interpret events on the ground in terms of who we westerners think about the tribes.

-Tribeguy

This sounds like the thesis to your book, which is what folks like me wanted to hear from your first post on the subject, rather than just the broad-brush claim that we don't pay enough attention to tribes. Now that wan't hard was it? :D

And please, please do not bristle at criticism. It doesn't get anybody anywhere around these parts. YOU brought up the topic of being a buck sergeant, as if Ted was attacking you over that fact. Maybe I am incorrect in this perception, but if you feel that passionately about what you have to say, you also need to remember that you will always have many detractors, both real and imagined.

Best of luck, but keep pushing the premise of your thesis to us. That will help me understand better why you think you have methodoligies that exceed the standard, or are going to allow us to understand aspects of tribes in ways that can benefit our warfighting efforts.

One particular question I have that I do not believe I asked well the first time is this: If we are attempting to end even our supporting role to the Iraqi govt and military, what does a deep understanding of the tribes gain us? As we apply fewer tactical and operational resources to the issues Iraq faces, and delve further in the political and strategic, aren't we talking more along the lines of diplomacy, and not lines of operation that a RCT or BCT commander would be concerned with (assuming the counterpart Iraqi Bde Cmdr even permits the US commander to send his troops off the FOB)?

In a post-SOFA Iraqi state, what does this tribal expertise gain us, when we are not in the lead over there?

How does this insight stack up against our commitment to the central government? I'm not certain I understand whether you are advocating a closer relationship with the noble tribes, or simply pointing out realities that you believe we do not see, to our peril when it comes to analysis of the situation with the tibes, who they might be supporting, who is getting courted by AQI/ISI, and who we need to interview/interrogate next.

tribeguy
06-01-2009, 12:13 AM
Yeah - it was hard - my intention was to vet council members' tribal understanding - I believe I have done that, as I still haven't gotten the answer to the question: which are the noble tribes in Iraq?

I don't bristle at criticism. Note that I am not criticizing anybody except our collective selves - and I'm in that group. If that makes anybody bristle, well, that's the sound of a mind slamming shut. Hubris is a trap for everyone, from the lowly buck sergeant to the lofty general. I understand my cognitive limits. I wonder if the rest of us do?

Further, what we see as terrorism is a cultural manifestation that is deeply rooted in Middle Eastern society. It just happens to be a negative one, amongst many that are positive, I think. Identifying tribes that are sympathetic to the extremist version of the insurgency may well (actually does) point us in the direction sub tribes that are present throughout the rest of the middle east, and even Africa - many of which are logistical sources for ACF recruitment, lethal aid, yada yada. Many Iraqi tribes do indeed have a sub tribal presence in those other AOs, and vice versa.

Also - I was there when the tribes first approached us in 2004 - many saw where things were going, and wanted to provide security for themselves. If we knew so much about tribes then, as some of those who post here claim, then why didn't we help those tribe leaders that were, at that time, most clearly expressing that their true interests were in alignment with our own.

It's because we couldn't perceive what their interests were in the first place because we were clueless about the intertribal and intratribal alliances and disputes, and we had no idea what the concept of nobility is Islam, and apparently we still don't. The best answer I've gotten to the question of which noble tribes are in Iraq was from an anthropologist with a PhD, who could only provide a general definition of what a noble tribe is, and copped out with his statement that actually knowing ARE in Iraq is "granular knowledge." Oh, well, granular knowledge saves lives. Of course, I suppose I should sit back and just accept that - but if that is the best that anthropology can do for us in support of the GWOT, then I'm going to be looking elsewhere for answers. Middle Eastern scholarship is where it's at - with all of its warts, its still more reliable than somebody that worships at the altar of anthropological theories - or those that claim to be masters thereof but can't produce anything better than a cop-out answer. I've had the duty of applying what I learned on the job in Iraq.

I asked another social scientists "Which are the noble tribes in Ninewah province." I got a laughable answer - she said it was the Yazidis.

Our founding father, George Washington said "there should even be a place in our intelligence gathering for minutiae." Well, this is no small issue. It's the 800 lb gorilla sitting in the GWOT room.


So what? Get and stay curious, that's what. Noble tribes...

So, best we dive into this stuff while we are there, for the sake of the future GWOT. Might as well use our time wisely since we allegedly aren't in the lead, at least on the conventional side things. Iraqi tribes don't exist in a vacuum. Those stupid lines in the sand mean exactly @#$@ to a tribesmen with family members on both sides.

You said: One particular question I have that I do not believe I asked well the first time is this: If we are attempting to end even our supporting role to the Iraqi govt and military, what does a deep understanding of the tribes gain us? As we apply fewer tactical and operational resources to the issues Iraq faces, and delve further in the political and strategic, aren't we talking more along the lines of diplomacy, and not lines of operation that a RCT or BCT commander would be concerned with (assuming the counterpart Iraqi Bde Cmdr even permits the US commander to send his troops off the FOB)?

The answer to this question is easy if we stop looking at Iraq as a box, and start considering it as a vital organ in Middle Eastern Culture that is connected in a myriad of ways with all of its neighbors. What we learn there has a direct connection to how we work WITH tribal societies to fight extremists that hallucinate about the establishment of a caliphate and justify murder on that basis. An RCT or BCT commander has a very uenviable job of taking on the responsibilities of maintaining operations while deployed in Iraq, but has to be cognizant that this is just one phase of GWOT, and once we learn how to use the cultural tools that are at our disposal in Iraq and Afghanistan, we will have a much easier time getting ahead of the power curve in areas such as the FATA, HOA, et al. Hopefully, commanders with real experience in Iraq doing these things will find themselves in other areas, but this time thrice armed with a knowledge of the tribal system and the organic structures' importance in the fight against our enemy, and in the enemy's fight against us.

Yes, now we have an Iraqi government complete with diplomats so we can interface our governments in a way that seems best to us. As soon as all Iraqi insurgents quit, I suppose I'll stop studying the tribes and their connections to things that threaten to destabilize the state. I have at least 10 more years of this, as far as I can tell.

I don't bring any methodologies that are "mine" to the table. I do bring what other Iraqis call "their way of doing things" to your attention. It differs greatly from what we think we know - it's "their" methodologies, not mine. And yes, they are better than ours.

And, I'm NOT going to give away the answers to this and open myself up the "well, we already knew that" counter. If we all knew this, then I'd have my answer to which are the noble tribes in Iraq now, and happily move on to another area of study knowing that this field is in good hands. It's a good question. No good answers from the peanut gallery yet, though. Just personal attacks - but the issue remains, and I won't get distracted from driving the point home, unless of course somebody can make the point for me, which is preferable.

It's not that "I know something that you don't," its that they, the Iraqis know something that they aren't talking about, mainly because we have a tendency to ask the wrong questions about the tribes.

Case in point:

Is the tribal thing overplayed in Iraq? (obviously leading question to his excellency the noble tribesman).

Oh yes, Mrs. American writing a book about General Petraeus, the tribes are overplayed. Don't go in depth there! Nothing to see there!

I am sure that some are satisfied by such answers, especially those who were looking for that answer in the first place. As if our excellent Iraqi friend hadn't evaluated the question and decided to chose his words in such a manner that made you satisfied and served his interests in the first place. These people are far more sophisticated and savvy than you could ever imagine. Asking a question like the above is an invitation for him to warp his answer in such a way to make sure that you have no idea what is going on. Sound familiar? Well, it should! That's what Iraqis have been doing to us since 2003! What else would you expect.

Your example regarding Mr. ((Al-Samida'i)) is weak, proves nothing other than that the question was leading, and his agenda reflects that of the Da'awa party's own Nuri ((Al-Maliki)) who about 4 months ago told the American press that "the tribes are passe." The next week he was at a tribal council meeting, and shortly after that established the tribal support councils. Everything that you ever hear from any Iraqi politician is an information operation, particularly if people are taking notes.


-Tribeguy

Ken White
06-01-2009, 03:55 AM
Yeah - it was hard - my intention was to vet council members' tribal understanding - I believe I have done that, as I still haven't gotten the answer to the question: which are the noble tribes in Iraq?Not because no one here knows, probability is that someone or several someones may but aren't inclined to play games. The obvious answer to that is that you aren't playing games. If so, then you may be making the ol' bad impression. Like this:
"...If that makes anybody bristle, well, that's the sound of a mind slamming shut. Hubris is a trap for everyone, from the lowly buck sergeant to the lofty general. I understand my cognitive limits. I wonder if the rest of us do?We probably do understand ours and we collectively tend to avoid slamming minds shut and raise an eyebrow at anyone callow enough to suggest such things. To follow that with this:
... No good answers from the peanut gallery yet, though. Just personal attacks - but the issue remains, and I won't get distracted from driving the point home, unless of course somebody can make the point for me, which is preferable.Seems sort of a pot-kettle thing and as though you're looking for rejection and think you've found it.

But I believe you've only found skepticism. Nobody on this board rejects Privates who post here -- or high school or college students. A Sergeant with four years down range has beaucoup cred unless he shreds it by trying to be too slick and tap dance on the head of a pin and impress the locals with his smarts and savoir faire. That approach will get you some sharply worded questions and if the answer is "I have the holy grail" the intensity of scrutiny will increase because most of us hard headed old b@$!^&ds have heard that before and found out there was no pot of gold there. All that was there was another hill to climb and no water or resupply...

Don't think anyone here disputes that the Tribes are important, that you may have some fresh insights or that those tribes will strongly influence events in Iraq and nearby nations. I think the issue may not be closed minds here but a misperception on your part -- and that got started when you barged in and flooded the zone with excessively glib sales pitches and teasers. Most here don't do or play the academic mind game thing. FWIW, challenges to this crowd will generally get a reaction and if one isn't careful, it may not be the reaction one wants. Seems to me you can either modify your approach or chalk this crowd off as whatever you wish to call them / us and save everyone some time and effort.

That said, I do strongly agree with you on this: "Everything that you ever hear from any Iraqi politician is an information operation, particularly if people are taking notes. I'll add that if you check the Arabic notes and the English notes, there'll be a difference -- and those remarks apply throughout the Middle East and South Asia. Nothing there is as it seems, it's the area of the old Persian Empires; those who taught the area most of what they know. I'll also add that you may want to look at the impact of the Parthian and Sassanid Empires on the tribes if you haven't already done so.

Steve the Planner
06-01-2009, 04:55 AM
Ken's on the right track.

Last month I took a GIS analytical course with an ESRI master, and he pointed out that nobody knows everything about it. The software guys know what it could do, but the users know what it needs to do. But even there, the military GIS folks don't know a lot about the civilian/socio-economic/engineering side, anymore than vice versa.

The issues in Iraq have always been that way--- a multi-dimensional thing that sometimes looks very different depending on where you are playing it and when. Even if one of us thought we had the whole picture (including at the top), reality has proven a very tough task master.

Like with GIS, I know, perhaps five levels of a 25 level game, and have found, through this board, other folks who know a heck of a lot about their five levels. But nobody sees the whole picture, and we all still have to wait until the historians can gradually piece it all together (along with, as Tom Ricks reminds us, some of the big parts that haven't even happened yet) in 2029.

There are not a whole lot of people involved in matters in the Middle East that think there is a magic bullet, or that the pronouncements of a politician, even the Prime Minister, may be as quixotic as to be different for each audience he meets with in a given day. Nothing new in that...

But the Iraq puzzle is still in progress, and I doubt that the final answer lies in any of the one or two layers you have discussed than in the layers I know about. Comparing notes helps, but all of us are gifted with only partial knowledge.

Maybe the real answers to the next roll of the history dice are in events in Egypt, a whole new set of issues that will arise over the Kuwaiti positions in the UN negotiations over the sanctions extension, the upcoming Iraqi SOFA vote (the requirements for which came from Grand Ayatollah Sistani's sphere), or a domestic revolution against widespread corruption and governmental ineffectiveness. I won't hold my breathe for the noble tribes to re-establish the Caliphate any time soon.

Steve

jmm99
06-01-2009, 05:43 AM
with its title "It's the Tribes, Stupid" (paraphrasing James Carville is not a good idea to create any sort of civilized discourse) - and hasn't improved since.

Too bad, because the subject matter area could be of interest to me. I.e., Iraqi national law was and is Euro-Code based with some modifications. The tribal setup might suggest a parallel system or sytems of tribal law of equal or greater importance.

jcustis
06-01-2009, 06:10 AM
Also - I was there when the tribes first approached us in 2004 - many saw where things were going, and wanted to provide security for themselves. If we knew so much about tribes then, as some of those who post here claim, then why didn't we help those tribe leaders that were, at that time, most clearly expressing that their true interests were in alignment with our own.

It's because we couldn't perceive what their interests were in the first place because we were clueless about the intertribal and intratribal alliances and disputes, and we had no idea what the concept of nobility is Islam, and apparently we still don't.

I'm trying to understand this statement, as I was there in 2004 too, and probably reviewing intelligence developed through means you probably supported. Do you have any references that address this issue?

Who was approaching us, and what were there issues, concerns, or requests? What sort of branch did they extend?

There was a lot going on in 2004, predominantly a lot of heavy fighting that carried on into 2005, and since I was there too, I ask from an academic and historical perspective.

Tom Odom
06-01-2009, 06:28 AM
Not because no one here knows, probability is that someone or several someones may but aren't inclined to play games. The obvious answer to that is that you aren't playing games. If so, then you may be making the ol' bad impression. Like this:We probably do understand ours and we collectively tend to avoid slamming minds shut and raise an eyebrow at anyone callow enough to suggest such things. To follow that with this:Seems sort of a pot-kettle thing and as though you're looking for rejection and think you've found it.

But I believe you've only found skepticism. Nobody on this board rejects Privates who post here -- or high school or college students. A Sergeant with four years down range has beaucoup cred unless he shreds it by trying to be too slick and tap dance on the head of a pin and impress the locals with his smarts and savoir faire. That approach will get you some sharply worded questions and if the answer is "I have the holy grail" the intensity of scrutiny will increase because most of us hard headed old b@$!^&ds have heard that before and found out there was no pot of gold there. All that was there was another hill to climb and no water or resupply...

Don't think anyone here disputes that the Tribes are important, that you may have some fresh insights or that those tribes will strongly influence events in Iraq and nearby nations. I think the issue may not be closed minds here but a misperception on your part -- and that got started when you barged in and flooded the zone with excessively glib sales pitches and teasers. Most here don't do or play the academic mind game thing. FWIW, challenges to this crowd will generally get a reaction and if one isn't careful, it may not be the reaction one wants. Seems to me you can either modify your approach or chalk this crowd off as whatever you wish to call them / us and save everyone some time and effort.

That said, I do strongly agree with you on this: "Everything that you ever hear from any Iraqi politician is an information operation, particularly if people are taking notes. I'll add that if you check the Arabic notes and the English notes, there'll be a difference -- and those remarks apply throughout the Middle East and South Asia. Nothing there is as it seems, it's the area of the old Persian Empires; those who taught the area most of what they know. I'll also add that you may want to look at the impact of the Parthian and Sassanid Empires on the tribes if you haven't already done so.

Most excellent response.
Tom

marct
06-01-2009, 02:29 PM
Hi tribeguy,


The best answer I've gotten to the question of which noble tribes are in Iraq was from an anthropologist with a PhD, who could only provide a general definition of what a noble tribe is, and copped out with his statement that actually knowing ARE in Iraq is "granular knowledge." Oh, well, granular knowledge saves lives.

And have you ever seen me claiming that I am an "expert" on the tribes in Iraq? "Granular knowledge", at least in Anthropology, is gained both by reading about something and, most importantly, by being there. You want that, maybe I should claim to be an expert on something I'm not? You're the one claiming to be an expert at the granular level, not me.


Of course, I suppose I should sit back and just accept that - but if that is the best that anthropology can do for us in support of the GWOT, then I'm going to be looking elsewhere for answers. Middle Eastern scholarship is where it's at - with all of its warts, its still more reliable than somebody that worships at the altar of anthropological theories - or those that claim to be masters thereof but can't produce anything better than a cop-out answer. I've had the duty of applying what I learned on the job in Iraq.

Well, good for you. Since you denegrate theory, I will also note that you are making a logical category error extrapolating from my own lack of granular knowledge of the tribes in Iraq to the entire Anthropological community. I hope that you didn't apply the same logic when you were in the field!


And, I'm NOT going to give away the answers to this and open myself up the "well, we already knew that" counter. If we all knew this, then I'd have my answer to which are the noble tribes in Iraq now, and happily move on to another area of study knowing that this field is in good hands.


(from Ken)I think the issue may not be closed minds here but a misperception on your part -- and that got started when you barged in and flooded the zone with excessively glib sales pitches and teasers. Most here don't do or play the academic mind game thing. FWIW, challenges to this crowd will generally get a reaction and if one isn't careful, it may not be the reaction one wants. Seems to me you can either modify your approach or chalk this crowd off as whatever you wish to call them / us and save everyone some time and effort.

Totally agree, Ken. Tribeguy, let me point out something to you - online communities operate on a reciprocity system (if you don't know what that is, then you should read some of the theory you denigrate). These communities are "voluntary" and trans-national, so several of your rhetorical assumptions are flawed. First off, this isn't an Iraq 101 course where you get to play teacher and administer tests; your status and how people react to you, is based on what you give away (try reading Marcel Mauss, The Gift (http://www.amazon.com/Gift-Reason-Exchange-Archaic-Societies/dp/039332043X/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1243865532&sr=1-1) or chapter 5 of Sahlins Stone Age Economics (http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0202010996/ref=s9_simx_gw_s0_p14_t1?pf_rd_m=ATVPDKIKX0DER&pf_rd_s=center-1&pf_rd_r=0WCZZNNHFA450P7GF173&pf_rd_t=101&pf_rd_p=470938131&pf_rd_i=507846)). Second, your posts point towards an assumption that the people here are all American, something you should have realized was NOT the case by the location marker under many posters names. This shows up in your assumption that we are all "duty bound" to be involved in Iraq. Really? My government and military isn't there and never has been.

Once again, you are commiting the same category error you did earlier. You assume that because Iraqi tribes are the centre of your universe, they must be the centre of everyone's universe. Could I find out who the noble tribes in Iraq are? Sure, but why should I - I am neither your student nor you employee, and the subject, while of interest to me, is not germain to most of my research. Furthermore, you claim to already know who they are, and why they are important, so why should I bother? That knowledge is what you bring to this community.

tribeguy
06-01-2009, 05:52 PM
There seems to be some movement on this on the ground in Iraq. As I mentioned previously - shaykhs want to form a house of lords-like counterpart to parliament. I like the idea of molding the government closer to Iraqi cultural realities. As for actually incorporating tribal law, that gets into two questions.

The first question that our academic friends like to ask is 'what is and was the effect of Islam on the tribes?' And from there we can extrapolate that there was an effect, and that it influenced tribal law in some way. This extrapolation might be correct in some cases, and in others it might not.

The next question, which is taboo in most circles and quite un-PC is "What effect did tribalism have on Islam?" The answers to this question require a translation of tribal laws - which vary by tribe and even sub-tribe. It's a vast subject area, and I'm not sure how to approach that one. It's too big of a job for me - I've got my hands full with other things. And, the inference, which I think rings true, is that tribal law is represented to some extent and perhaps standardized in the shari'a. Now, that is conjecture on my part, but there's a lot of laws in the shari'a that sound rather tribal to me. Eye for an eye, God permits the marriage of cousins, and others.

However, a house-of-lords for the shaykhs might allow a process of further tribal law standardization to occur within the context of contributing to or modifiying legislation. This might ensure that tribesmen, who vote in accordance with the way their shaykhs tell them to, have some representation that is meaningful to them. That being said, I suspect such a house would collapse at times, and perhaps often into squabblings that are the result of both old and new grudges, so that might be a down side.

A house of lords also might also produce a situation that moves shaykhs away from implementing tribal law, and referring much of their reconciliations, disputes, and criminal issues to the federal government. They themselves may come to the realization that it is time for them to move away from the laws that aren't solving their problems, while keeping those that do. That's a long shot that will require a great deal of time, but is nevertheless a possibility that might make the investment in a parliamentary branch for landed shaykhs a worthwhile endeavor. However, these are decisions that lay in the hands of Iraqis, and most notably the Iraqi intelligentsia that is in charge right now. I believe that they have a disdain for tribalism overall, as many are educated abroad and have seen how their own tribal societies are limited.

But I think think the question remains as to how to "move" Iraqis from tribalism. And the answer to that is to create a situation where it can work itself out, shed the negative, and keep the positive contributions. Allowing a society to evolve on its own, I think, is best.

However, Iraq doesn't exist in a vacuum, we are there, and so are many other competing interests. The tribal system has adapted to many very difficult things in the past, including some aspects of what we consider to be modern life. Our presence, as well as others, are influencing that system by simply being present.

The answer might lie in government - and with that I hope that the government will get and remain quite close to its tribal leaders, incorporating their voices in the legislative and judical processes on a permanent basis. This is being done to some extent with the Tribal Support Councils, and such, but I think there are other ways in which the goverment can adapt itself to the tribal system, and thus encourage the tribal system to evolve.

Here's to good intentions.

As for the noble tribes being a silver bullet - that they are not. However, they are an indicator towards the fact that there is more than one war going on in Iraq, which everybody knows, but the question is what that war is really about, and why should we care?

That war is indeed about the Caliphate, which is certainly interrupted. However, the fight for such isn't over by a long shot. Those with the biggest interest in establishing a Caliphate are the noble tribes - which are a minority and by definition impeded from taking power due to the fact that the "democratic" system currently in place empowers large tribes, which in essence might be able to vote themselves or a coalition in which they participate into power on a recurring basis. Iraqis are keenly aware of this reality, and the big losers in this are inded the noble tribes.

According to my research, noble tribes at most consist of about 8.4% of the total population. There are around 40 or so different noble tribes, some larger, and some smaller. These noble tribes are divided by sect - no crossovers that I know of like the "non-nobles" such as the ((Al-Shimmari)) confederation, or the ((Al-Dulaym)) which have shi'ite and sunni sub tribes. Social marxists should ping on the noble tribes as being a potentially oppressed minority. Cultural experts should ping on that number as the noble tribes are a very, very important part of Islam. The noble tribes are the descendants of Muhammad the prophet - and many of them seek power and believe they are justified to wield it due to their lineage. The thing that we label "sectarian violence" has a lot to do with these noble tribes struggling against each other while using their followers, from many other tribes noble or otherwise, as proxies.

Further, after having counted all the sub tribes of every known tribe shown in Iraqi tribal research sources that I translated, the ((Al-Maliki)) ((Al-Muntafaq)) comprise about 5.1% of the tribal system in its entirety - and that number will be subject to revision as my research progresses, and once a decent and tribally oriented census gets done.

According to 'Abbas Al-'Azzawi's research, the ((Al-Maliki)) ((Al-Muntafaq)) consisted of almost 18% of the total tribal system in 1956, when he published that research. I think that is the result of the fact that he might not have had as much visibility as those who followed in his path of research in the 1970's and the 1980's.

According to data in Al-Rudhan - if we compare 'Azzawi with Rudhan and assume (bad idea) that both are entirely 100% accurate and not warped politically, it seems to me that between 1956 and the 1980's, the tribal system tripled in size (which sort of coincides with population estimates of those time periods in comparison).

Further, it seems to show that Al-Anbar and the north grew faster than the south, or that Saddam's death squads were particularly active in the south, allowing for more of a balance, and reducing the size of the ((Al-Maliki)) ((Al-Muntafaq)) in comparison with the rest of the tribal system.

Nevertheless, if we'd really considered the data in this light before, I think we might have identified who the real major tribal entities are in Iraq long before now. In 2003, I heard many, many senior officers repeating the mantra that the ((Al-Dulaym)) were the largest tribe in Iraq, or that the ((Al-Shimmar)), or the ((Al-Jubur)).

We had a tendency at the time to believe our trusted Iraqi friend who seemed to know all, not realizing that every tribe is the biggest tribe in Iraq if they are talking to us at the time.

If 'Azzawi's work is correct, then the ((Al-Maliki)) ((Al-Muntafaq)) can definitely maintain their tribal hegemony in the south as long as other tribal coalitions (masked by politcal parties) are divided hopelessly. If Al-Rudhan is right, then the ((Al-Maliki)) ((Al-Muntafaq)) have to create a broad coalition in the south, as they are widespread and dominant in many provinces, but they only constitute at best a plurality. Nevertheless, as long as Nuri doesn't completely dork things up, and can cut across and build consensus with the main tribal entities of other provinces, he has a good shot at staying in power.

Everybody is right that the tribes are not the only issue in Iraq. I wish it were that easy. I also wish that getting real answers by analyzing the tribal system was easy. It's not - and using western sources doesn't really lay these things out in a way that is understandable and incorporated intimately with the many other important factors.

Anyway, those are some of the things I am seeing right now. Both 'Azzawi and Al-Rudhan's work seem to reflect some very important aspects that British and other Iraqi Tribal research doesn't really show or make clear. It's all fine and good to have the tribal data - but without understanding and classifying the tribes by sect, nobility, location, etc, then we are prevented from really understanding those other important factors cohesively and as a whole. There is no separation between the tribes and politics, tribes and the insurgency, etc.

It's not that the tribes are MY world view, either. It's just a prism that seems to filter out a lot of chaff if used properly.

V/r,

Tribeguy

goesh
06-01-2009, 06:19 PM
Noble tribes is something new to me as well and at 8.4% there are a ton of outside vairables, aside from extreme minority status, that can impact the fragile power structure of a tribe with its extreme, paternal rigidity. It is not a viable mechanism of control that can extend beyond its own confines, no matter how you cut it.

jmm99
06-01-2009, 06:46 PM
from tribalguy (my emphasis added)
As for actually incorporating tribal law, that gets into two questions.

The first question that our academic friends like to ask is 'what is and was the effect of Islam on the tribes?' And from there we can extrapolate that there was an effect, and that it influenced tribal law in some way. This extrapolation might be correct in some cases, and in others it might not.

The next question, which is taboo in most circles and quite un-PC is "What effect did tribalism have on Islam?" The answers to this question require a translation of tribal laws - which vary by tribe and even sub-tribe. It's a vast subject area, and I'm not sure how to approach that one. It's too big of a job for me - I've got my hands full with other things. And, the inference, which I think rings true, is that tribal law is represented to some extent and perhaps standardized in the shari'a. Now, that is conjecture on my part, but there's a lot of laws in the shari'a that sound rather tribal to me. Eye for an eye, God permits the marriage of cousins, and others.

The bottom line is that you don't know and I don't know. Knowing would require knowledge of the tribal laws pre-Islam and those same laws as they developed after the Islamic Conquest. What tribal laws are or are not today is many centuries removed from the probative evidence.

"Eye for eye, etc." laws (that is, in codified form) go back well before Islam; e.g., as in rough chrono order: Hammurabi's Code of Laws (http://eawc.evansville.edu/anthology/hammurabi.htm); The Code of the Nesilim (http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/ancient/1650nesilim.html); The Code of the Assura (http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/ancient/1075assyriancode.html); Some Neo-Babylonian Legal Decisions (http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/ancient/neo-babylonian-legaldecisions.html). Then come the Persians (in several imperial iterations).

What effect did prior formal laws (and informal tribal laws) have on the Persian legal system - and it on the Islamic legal system that developed in the hinterland of the former Persian empire ? Many possible feedback loops, proof of which would require evidence contemporary to the loops.

--------------------------
Leaving aside issues of historical comparative law (which are not about to be resolved here), I do have a current events question: What is your opinion about the link between the Iraqi Al-Sadrs, from a tribal standpoint (if any), to Hez in Lebanon ?

PS: I punched your blog link in this post (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=72963&postcount=24) - it didn't work for me just now.

Steve the Planner
06-01-2009, 07:34 PM
JMM99:

I've been studying Ottoman and Post-Ottoman governmental structures to better understand sub-national governance. Typically, there was a court house and governmental center for each of the provinces (Mosul, Baghdad, Basrah), with districts and sub-districts below. The lower units seemed to be focused on organization/governance stuff rather than central gov/law.

Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan all have similar structures at the villayet/provincial levels (same as in N. Africa and the Crescent), which I assumed drew from Ottoman influence. What role if any did Persia play in these structures?

One of the big populations that intrigues me are the Kurds. Transnational, Sunni/Shia, etc... We hear a lot about the fighters in Turkey, but some of their strongest relationships are actually to Iran, along Iran's western border, and particularly around Kermanshah.

The heavy sunni populations in IraN east of Basrah seem to be a perrenial issue that re-appears every now and then. Many sunnis refer to the Shia leadership of IraQ as "Persians" but I find it interesting that there are so many Sunnis along "Persia's" borders (IraQ and Afghanistan) and that their issues are not as settled as some believe.

What's the big picture on Persia that you are referring to for the legal structure.

Steve

tribeguy
06-01-2009, 07:57 PM
Now this is a GOOD QUESTION: Leaving aside issues of historical comparative law (which are not about to be resolved here), I do have a current events question: What is your opinion about the link between the Iraqi Al-Sadrs, from a tribal standpoint (if any), to Hez in Lebanon ?

I'll expand on it with another question:

What do Muqtada Al-Sadr, Baqir Al-Hakim, and Bahar Al-'Alum have in common?

They are all from the ((Al-Musawi)) Tribe - a noble tribe that descends from Imam 'Ali, through Musa Al-Kadhim! I believe, but am not 100% sure, that Nasarallah is ((Musawi)) as well, if that is what you were referring to.

Also, Muqtada Al-Sadr is pulling a page from Nasarallah's book, using former JAM elements as a charity arm to get political cred with the population. It is, of course, his only option now that he is exiled to "study" in Iran. Ayatallah Muqtada - now, that will be the day!

And Steve, my database includes the Kurdish tribes that share presence in Turkey, Syria, Iran and Iraq. Haven't study that section of it yet in any detail, but I'll get around to it.

Right now I am comparing the overall tribal population of Ninewah province with that in Mosul. I already did the Kirkuk/Al-Ta'amim data compilation, and will sit back and think about the results after I do Mosul. Since Kirkuk is a serious bone of contention vis a vis Arabs and Kurds, I'd like to find the major tribal influences from both sides of the fence to see if I can make any solid assessments on how events in the large cities that surround Kirkuk affect it. Not sure what I am going to find yet, but that's the plan for today.

After that, I am going to finish the rest of the provincial studies - keeping the noble tribe picture as part of it, just to keep tabs on the issue.



I agree that it is not a viable mechanism of control - it's too fragmented. The fragmentation cuts both ways, though. It's to both our advantage as the counterinsurgent that doesn't know what they are, and since they are divided and prone to infighting, the potential threat seems small. Problem is there are pockets of extremism distributed throughout the sub tribes. I only have partial visibility on this - and I think it is in all of our interests to get some resolution on it, and keep it. There are more out there, and they have a tendency to be at or near the top of insurgent leadership hierarchy. they have political islamic cred just because of who they descend from in some circles.

Also, its worth noting that the ((Al-Tikriti)) tribal hegemony lasted for more than 30 years underneath a Ba'athist banner - and according to Al-Rudhan's work, they are no more than 1.03% of the total tribal population (147 subtribes/14193 total subtribes in universe) according to Al-Rudhan's two volume set. I think that if one were to ask if the ((Al-Takarita)) were able to take power and rule in 1956, then the standard answer might have been that it "wasn't a viable means of control." However, they were organized and able to organize others fairly effectively.

So, as for noble tribes, they aren't really organized, but they keep showing up in insurgent organizations at high levels. Regardless of whether or not we as westerners see their way as being a viable means of control, its not going to keep them from fighting, killing and dying for it along with whoever else they can get to do so. Just because we are there doesn't mean that the Iraq enterprise is going to succeed. And, just because we are going to leave doesn't guarantee that their grievances are going to be extinguished. We're just one of a long list of their gripes.

V/r,

Tribeguy

jmm99
06-01-2009, 09:02 PM
held all of the areas of which you speak (except for North Africa; and the littoral areas and Anatolia taken by the Romans and held by the Byzantines) for much of the 1000-year period until they were conquered by the Arabs.

I have no claim to fame as a Persian SME; but something had to rub off in 1000 years.

jmm99
06-02-2009, 02:06 AM
is what I was looking at ....


from tribalguy
I believe, but am not 100% sure, that Nasarallah is ((Musawi)) as well, if that is what you were referring to.

So, I don't know & you don't know. So far, we're batting 0-2 (one heck of a baseball team :) ).

Not an SME on the Jabal Amel, its history, genealogies and migrations; and definitely not an Arabist. Just looking at some folks involved in killing US Marines and agency people in Beirut a long time ago.

Here are some notes on genealogies [lots of current history on the folks named], for whatever they might be worth:

-----------------------
As-Sadr (or al-Sadr) - here used of a current family named after Grand Ayatollah Sadr al-Din bin Saleh ("heart of the religion") of Qom, a branch of the Sharafeddine family from Jabal Amel [1]. The Sharafeddine family itself is a branch of the Noureddine family, which traces its lineage to Imam Musa al-Kazim (the seventh Shi'a Imam), and through him to the first Imam, Ali ibn Abi Talib and Fatima Zahra, the daughter of the prophet Muhammad.

Iraqi & Lebanese al-Sadr descent from 1. Sadr-ed-Deen bin Saleh

[1X. Mohammad as-Sadr, Baghdadi leader of the 1920 revolution against the British government; exact fit in family presently unclear]

1. Grand Ayatollah Sadr-ed-Deen bin Saleh,

2. Grand Ayatollah Ismail as-Sadr (d. 1919-1920), son of Sadr-ed-Deen bin Saleh,

------------------- Branch A

3A. Muhammad Mahdi as-Sadr, son of Ismail as-Sadr,

4A. Ayatollah Mohammad Sadeq es-Sadr, a leading Iraqi cleric and father of Muhammad Muhammad Sadiq as-Sadr

5A. Grand Ayatollah Mohammad Mohammad Sadeq es-Sadr (1943 - 1999), also known as "Sadr II".

6A. Muqtada al-Sadr (1973-), son of Sadr II [5A], son-in-law of Sadr I [4C2], and great-grandnephew of Mohammad as-Sadr [1X].

---------------------- Branch B

3B. Grand Ayatollah Sadr al-Din al-Sadr (d.1954), 2nd son of Ismail as-Sadr,

4B. Imam Musa as-Sadr (1928-1978?), son of Sadr al-Din al-Sadr; a Lebanese political & religious leader and a cousin of Sadeq and Baqir. [2]

---------------------- Branch C

3C. Ayatollah Haydar al-Sadr (1891-1937), son of Ismail as-Sadr,

4C1. Isma'il, son of Haydar al-Sadr

4C2 Grand Ayatollah Mohammad Baqir al-Sadr (1935-1980), son of Haydar al-Sadr and a major Islamic thinker. He is also known as the "Third martyr" or "Sadr I". He is the father-in-law of Muqtada al-Sadr.

4C3. Amina Sadr bint al-Huda, daughter of Haydar al-Sadr, killed together with her brother.

----------------------------
[1] Jabal Amel - mountainous region of Southern Lebanon; shortened over the centuries from "mountains of the Banu 'Amilah", a Yemenite tribe (kindred to the Hamadan, Lakhm and Judham) settled in Syria, Palestine, parts of Jordan, and Lebanon (by its mythology, in pre-Islamic times). A Shi'ite Muslim area since ca. 7th cent. CE - Abi Dharr Al Ghafari, companion of the Apostle & Ali Bin Abi Talib, as initial proponents.

Hassan Nasrallah, August 31, 1960, in East Beirut's Bourj Hammoud neighborhood, ninth of ten children of Abdul Karim, born in Bazouriyeh, a village in Jabal Amel (to which, Hassan Nasrallah later fled). Nasrallah, after education in al-Sadr schools in Lebanon & Iraq, succeeded Abbas al-Musawi (ca.1952–1992) as leader of Hezbollah after Musawi was killed by Israeli forces, February 16, 1992. No genealogy in English (that I found) showing descent from Muhammad (possibly in Arabic).

[2] Disappeared in 1978 on a trip to Libya. Founded Amal - see Abbas al-Musawi & Hassan Nasrallah.

tribeguy
06-02-2009, 03:03 AM
JMM - magnificent. Here's my contribution:

Musawi sub tribes of Iraq:

((Bayt Sayid Ahmad)) ((Al-Nur)) ((Al-Sada Al-Musuwiyun))
((Bayt Sayid Mashkur)) ((Al-Nur)) ((Al-Sada Al-Musuwiyun))
((Bayt Sayid Sharif)) ((Al-Nur)) ((Al-Sada Al-Musuwiyun))
((Bayt Sayid Sharif)) ((Al-Nur)) ((Al-Sada Al-Musuwiyun))
((Bayt Sayid Sharif)) ((Al-Nur)) ((Al-Sada Al-Musuwiyun))
((Bayt Sayid Musa)) ((Al-Nur)) ((Al-Sada Al-Musuwiyun))
((Bayt Sayid Musa)) ((Al-Nur)) ((Al-Sada Al-Musuwiyun))
((Bayt Sayid Hashim)) ((Al-Nur)) ((Al-Sada Al-Musuwiyun))
((Bayt Sayid Yunis)) ((Al-Nur)) ((Al-Sada Al-Musuwiyun))
((Al-'Ali Basha)) ((Al-Dahiri)) aka ((Al-Dawahir)) ((Al-Sada Al-Musuwiyin))
((Al-Nassar)) ((Al-Dahiri)) aka ((Al-Dawahir)) ((Al-Sada Al-Musuwiyin))
((Al-Muhsin)) ((Al-Dahiri)) aka ((Al-Dawahir)) ((Al-Sada Al-Musuwiyin))
((Al-Muhammad)) ((Al-Dahiri)) aka ((Al-Dawahir)) ((Al-Sada Al-Musuwiyin))
((Bayt Sayid Musa)) ((Al-Sada Albu Hamad)) ((Al-Sada Al-Musuwiyun))
((Bayt Sayid Ka'ud)) ((Al-Sada Albu Hamad)) ((Al-Sada Al-Musuwiyun))
((Bayt Sayid Halil)) ((Al-Sada Albu Hamad)) ((Al-Sada Al-Musuwiyun))
((Bayt Sayid Zaghayr)) ((Al-Sada Albu Hamad)) ((Al-Sada Al-Musuwiyun))
((Bayt 'Akab)) ((Al-Sada Albu Hamad)) ((Al-Sada Al-Musuwiyun))
((Bayt Sayid Fakhar)) ((Al-Sada Albu Hamad)) ((Al-Sada Al-Musuwiyun))
((Bayt Sayid Shaliba)) ((Al-Sada Albu Hamad)) ((Al-Sada Al-Musuwiyun))
((Bayt Sayid Jabir)) ((Al-Sada Albu Hamad)) ((Al-Sada Al-Musuwiyun))
((Bayt Sayid Sa'ad)) ((Al-Sada Albu Hamad)) ((Al-Sada Al-Musuwiyun))
((Al-Sayid Hamud)) ((Al-Halu)) ((Al-Sada Al-Musuwiyin))
((Al-Sayid Muhammad)) ((Al-Halu)) ((Al-Sada Al-Musuwiyin))
((Al-Sayid Muhammad)) ((Al-Halu)) ((Al-Sada Al-Musuwiyin))
((Al-Sayid Muhammad)) ((Al-Halu)) ((Al-Sada Al-Musuwiyin))
((Al-Sayid 'Abdallah)) ((Al-Halu)) ((Al-Sada Al-Musuwiyin))
((Al-Sayid Habib)) ((Al-Halu)) ((Al-Sada Al-Musuwiyin))
((Al-Sayid Baraka)) ((Al-Halu)) ((Al-Sada Al-Musuwiyin))
((Al-Sayid 'Abd-Al-Muhsin)) ((Al-Halu)) ((Al-Sada Al-Musuwiyin))
((Bayt Sayid Safih)) ((Bayt Sayid Ahmad)) ((Al-Nur)) ((Al-Sada Al-Musuwiyun))
((Bayt Sayid 'Agul)) ((Bayt Sayid Ahmad)) ((Al-Nur)) ((Al-Sada Al-Musuwiyun))
((Bayt Sayid Sa'adun)) ((Bayt Sayid Ahmad)) ((Al-Nur)) ((Al-Sada Al-Musuwiyun))
((Bayt sayid Dharab)) ((Bayt Sayid Ahmad)) ((Al-Nur)) ((Al-Sada Al-Musuwiyun))

((Bayt Sayid 'Ali)) ((Bayt Sayid Mashkur)) ((Al-Nur)) ((Al-Sada Al-Musuwiyun))
((Bayt Masha'a)) ((Bayt Sayid Sharif)) ((Al-Nur)) ((Al-Sada Al-Musuwiyun))
((Bayt Sharif)) ((Bayt Sayid Sharif)) ((Al-Nur)) ((Al-Sada Al-Musuwiyun))
((Bayt Al-Sayid Mutar)) ((Bayt Sayid Sharif)) ((Al-Nur)) ((Al-Sada Al-Musuwiyun))
(Bayt Sayid Jasim)) ((Bayt Sayid Musa)) ((Al-Nur)) ((Al-Sada Al-Musuwiyun))
((Bayt Sayid 'Akla)) ((Bayt Sayid Musa)) ((Al-Nur)) ((Al-Sada Al-Musuwiyun))
((Al-Sada Al-Mashayikh)) ((Al-Sada Al-Musuwiyun))
((Al-Sada Al-Qaftun)) ((Al-Sada Al-Musuwiyun))
((Al-Sada Al Al-'Amili)) ((Al-Sada Al-Musuwiyun))
((Al-Sada Al Al-Batat)) ((Al-Sada Al-Musuwiyun))
((Al-Sada Al- Al-Danin)) ((Al-Sada Al-Musuwiyun))
((Al-Sada Al- Al-Fatal)) ((Al-Sada Al-Musuwiyun))
((Al-Sada Al- Al-Jaza'iri)) ((Al-Sada Al-Musuwiyun))
((Al-Sada Al al-Mahana)) ((Al-Sada Al-Musuwiyun))
((Al-Sada Al- Al-Mushat)) ((Al-Sada Al-Musuwiyun))
((Al-Sada Al- Al-Sayid Salman)) ((Al-Sada Al-Musuwiyun))
((Al-Sada Al Harmush)) ((Al-Sada Al-Musuwiyun))
((Al-Sada Al Mu'amin)) ((Al-Sada Al-Musuwiyun))
((Al-Sada Al- Sharaf Al-Din)) ((Al-Sada Al-Musuwiyun))
((Al-Sada Al- Wa'adh)) ((Al-Sada Al-Musuwiyun))
((Al-Sada Al-Al-Halwani)) ((Al-Sada Al-Musuwiyun))
((Al-Sada Al-Athiuwun)) ((Al-Sada Al-Musuwiyun))
((Al-Sada Al-'Auj)) ((Al-Sada Al-Musuwiyun))
((Al-sada Al-Baka')) ((Al-Sada Al-Musuwiyun))
((Al-Sada Al-Bakara)) ((Al-Sada Al-Musuwiyun))
((Al-Sada Al-Bakhat)) ((Al-Sada Al-Musuwiyun))
((Al-Sada Albu Badran)) ((Al-Sada Al-Musuwiyun))
((Al-Sada Albu Halal)) ((Al-Sada Al-Musuwiyun))
((Al-Sada Albu Halal)) ((Al-Sada Al-Musuwiyun))
((Al-Sada Albu Hamad)) ((Al-Sada Al-Musuwiyun))
((Al-Sada Albu Khayka)) ((Al-Sada Al-Musuwiyun))
((Al-Sada Albu Nasir)) ((Al-Sada Al-Musuwiyun))
((Al-Sada Albu Safir)) ((Al-Sada Al-Musuwiyun))
((Al-Sada Albu Tabikh)) ((Al-Sada Al-Musuwiyun))
((Al-Sada Al-Dhiya')) ((Al-Sada Al-Musuwiyun))
((Al-Sada Al-Fakhar)) ((Al-Sada Al-Musuwiyun))
((Al-Sada Al-Firaz)) ((Al-Sada Al-Musuwiyun))
((Al-Sada Al-Ghawalib)) ((Al-Sada Al-Musuwiyun))
((Al-Sada Al-Hadidiyun)) ((Al-Sada Al-Musuwiyun))
((Al-Sada Al-Halu)) ((Al-Sada Al-Musuwiyun))
((Al-Sada Al-Hamami)) ((Al-Sada Al-Musuwiyun))
((Al-Sada Al-Hawashim)) ((Al-Sada Al-Musuwiyun))
((Al-Sada Al-Hawashim)) ((Al-Sada Al-Musuwiyun))
((Al-Sada al-Hayadara)) ((Al-Sada Al-Musuwiyun))
((Al-Sada Al-Haydari)) ((Al-Sada Al-Musuwiyun))
((Al-Sada Al-Jalukhan)) ((Al-Sada Al-Musuwiyun))
((Al-Sada Al-Khursan)) ((Al-Sada Al-Musuwiyun))
((Al-Sada Al-La'aybi)) ((Al-Sada Al-Musuwiyun))
((Al-Sada Al-Sada Al-Makasis)) ((Al-Sada Al-Musuwiyun))
((Al-Sada Al-Masaha'asha'un)) ((Al-Sada Al-Musuwiyun))
((Al-Sada Al-Mayikhiyun)) ((Al-Sada Al-Musuwiyun))
((Al-Sada Al-Muqram)) ((Al-Sada Al-Musuwiyun))
((Al-Sada Al-Muzan)) ((Al-Sada Al-Musuwiyun))
((Al-Sada Al-Nafakh)) ((Al-Sada Al-Musuwiyun))'
((Al-Sada Al-Na'im)) ((Al-Sada Al-Musuwiyun))
((Al-Sada Al-Nasabin)) ((Al-Sada Al-Musuwiyun))
((Al-Sada Al-Nawaji)) ((Al-Sada Al-Musuwiyun))
((Al-Sada Al-Qatana)) ((Al-Sada Al-Musuwiyun))
((Al-Sada Al-Qazwini)) ((Al-Sada Al-Musuwiyun))
((al-Sada Al-Samida'a)) ((Al-Sada Al-Musuwiyun))
((Al-Sada Al-Sayid Hamad)) ((Al-Sada Al-Musuwiyun))
((Al-Sada Al-Shara'a)) ((Al-Sada Al-Musuwiyun))
((Al-Sada Al-Shawka)) ((Al-Sada Al-Musuwiyun))
((Al-Sada Al-Ta'a)) ((Al-Sada Al-Musuwiyun))
((Al-Sada Al-Tawil Al-Baghdadi)) ((Al-Sada Al-Musuwiyun))
((Al-Sada Al-Wahab)) ((Al-Sada Al-Musuwiyun))
((Al-Sada Bayt Abu Al-'Ays)) ((Al-Sada Al-Musuwiyun))
((Al-Sada Bayt Al-Ahwal)) ((Al-Sada Al-Musuwiyun))
((Al-Sada Bayt Al-Ashayqar)) ((Al-Sada Al-Musuwiyun))
((Al-Sada Bayt Al-'Asimi)) ((Al-Sada Al-Musuwiyun))
((Al-Sada Bayt Al-Hasri)) ((Al-Sada Al-Musuwiyun))
((Al-Sada Bayt Al-Khalkhali)) ((Al-Sada Al-Musuwiyun))
((Al-Sada Bayt Al-Sabubi)) ((Al-Sada Al-Musuwiyun))
((Al-Sada Bayt 'Alu)) ((Al-Sada Al-Musuwiyun))
((Al-Sada Bayt al-Wahab)) ((Al-Sada Al-Musuwiyun))
((Al-Sada Bayt Wa'adh)) ((Al-Sada Al-Musuwiyun))
((Al-Sada)) ((Al-Rafa'iya)) ((Al-Sada Al-Musuwiyun))
((Al-Sada)) ((Al-Sada Al-Musuwiyun))
((Al-Saida Al-Bahar Al-'Alum)) ((Al-Sada Al-Musuwiyun))
((Al-Sada Al-Sayid Nur)) ((Al-Sada Al-Musuwiyun))
((Bayt Sayid Safih)) ((Bayt Sayid Ahmad)) ((Al-Nur)) ((Al-Sada Al-Musuwiyun))
((Bayt Sayid 'Agul)) ((Bayt Sayid Ahmad)) ((Al-Nur)) ((Al-Sada Al-Musuwiyun))
((Bayt Sayid Sa'adun)) ((Bayt Sayid Ahmad)) ((Al-Nur)) ((Al-Sada Al-Musuwiyun))
((Bayt sayid Dharab)) ((Bayt Sayid Ahmad)) ((Al-Nur)) ((Al-Sada Al-Musuwiyun))
((Bayt Sayid 'Ali)) ((Bayt Sayid Mashkur)) ((Al-Nur)) ((Al-Sada Al-Musuwiyun))
((Bayt Masha'a)) ((Bayt Sayid Sharif)) ((Al-Nur)) ((Al-Sada Al-Musuwiyun))
((Bayt Sharif)) ((Bayt Sayid Sharif)) ((Al-Nur)) ((Al-Sada Al-Musuwiyun))
((Bayt Al-Sayid Mutar)) ((Bayt Sayid Sharif)) ((Al-Nur)) ((Al-Sada Al-Musuwiyun))
(Bayt Sayid Jasim)) ((Bayt Sayid Musa)) ((Al-Nur)) ((Al-Sada Al-Musuwiyun))
((Bayt Sayid 'Akla)) ((Bayt Sayid Musa)) ((Al-Nur)) ((Al-Sada Al-Musuwiyun))
((Al-Sayid Yasin)) ((Al-Sayid Muhammad)) ((Al-Halu)) ((Al-Sada Al-Musuwiyin))
((Al-Sayid 'Abdallah)) ((Al-Sayid Muhammad)) ((Al-Halu)) ((Al-Sada Al-Musuwiyin))
((Al-Sayid 'Issa)) ((Al-Sayid Muhammad)) ((Al-Halu)) ((Al-Sada Al-Musuwiyin))

I've got the locational data for the above sub tribes. The naming convention that I use is in the annexation format - name one belongs to name two which belongs to name three, etc. This format suits tribal analysis as it allows us to distinguist between sub tribves of the same name by claimed lineage. Of course, this is subject to change due to sub tribal attachment and other vagaries, but it makes sense from an "internal logic" viewpoint, considering that is how the Arabic naming convention and noun annexation works in Arabic. The Brits really dorked up their tribal studies in this regard - they tend to put the confederation first and then list sub tribes from left to right from largest to smallest, which impedes a great deal of understanding of where the live identities are, and where they are not. Then again, the Brits also drive on the wrong side of the road to this day. :)

Hence us Americans wondering which is the biggest tribe, as if that confederate identity was the only thing we needed to know. This still happes in country, right now, today.

I think I have more on the Musawis in Syria - but I have to go to work to get that, which I will tomorrow. Silly me for not bringing my work home with me.

I wonder what the Musawi network looks like going from Iran to Lebanon - I got most of that data - but the Lebanon part is hard to find.

I really appreciate why you are doing what you are doing. It's good to know that people like you are out there.


V/r,

Tribeguy

jmm99
06-02-2009, 03:37 AM
Musa as-Sadr > Abbas al-Musawi > Hassan Nasrallah, tends to catch one's attention. Of course, their links are also explained by educational feedback between Iraq and Lebanon. But, some or a lot of this may be old family ties in the Jabal Amel.

BTW: Do you have anything on the groups called the Sharafeddine and Noureddine families (obviously transliterated & maybe a bit screwed up) ?

You will make more out of the Arabic section of this website (http://www.alsadr.com/) (maybe someone could look at the Farsi). Hey, I can handle the English (such as it is). :D But, I can't determine whether the Arabic and Farsi add something of value.

tribeguy
06-02-2009, 04:02 AM
I'll hit this tomorrow at first light. Let's see where this goes! The requirements, really, are a complete tribal study, if possible, of Hezballah. Not sure where I can find that.

V/r,

tribeguy

jcustis
06-02-2009, 05:13 AM
Right now I am comparing the overall tribal population of Ninewah province with that in Mosul. I already did the Kirkuk/Al-Ta'amim data compilation, and will sit back and think about the results after I do Mosul. Since Kirkuk is a serious bone of contention vis a vis Arabs and Kurds, I'd like to find the major tribal influences from both sides of the fence to see if I can make any solid assessments on how events in the large cities that surround Kirkuk affect it. Not sure what I am going to find yet, but that's the plan for today.

I'm interested in how this pans out, as I just came back from Ninewah, outposted at the previously unoccupied airstrip south of Thari Al Ghara, where alliances/allegiances seemed very distinctly fracture along Kurdish/Yezedi lines and Arab ones supporting Sheikh Abdullah. Interesting place.

William F. Owen
06-02-2009, 10:42 AM
I'll hit this tomorrow at first light. Let's see where this goes! The requirements, really, are a complete tribal study, if possible, of Hezballah. Not sure where I can find that.


Knowing not a lot about Hezbollah, other than what is relevant to their use of violence for political aims, I would be amazed if they had any tribal affiliation at all. Even if they did, it would be almost entirely irrelevant.

What is more, unlike in Israel and the occupied territories, I suspect that there is virtually no up to date data concerning the "ethnography" of Southern Lebanon or the Bekka for that matter - and it's in not in the Lebanese governments interest to do it, - where as Israel keeps and records extensive amounts of data for obvious reasons.

Presley Cannady
06-02-2009, 09:15 PM
Whatever he's calling a "tribe," he's describing a gang. And while I don't doubt gangsterism is a strong undercurrent many of the insurgencies faced today, I'm skeptical that it's the dominant one--let alone the only one.

tribeguy
06-02-2009, 09:37 PM
Knowing not a lot about Hezbollah, other than what is relevant to their use of violence for political aims, I would be amazed if they had any tribal affiliation at all. Even if they did, it would be almost entirely irrelevant.


I am more curious than that - the question to me is whether or not there is an area in Hezballah where tribal or familial affiliation is relevant. The mere presence of Nasarallah ((Al-Musawi)) at the top of that pyramid seems to indicate that he has credibility, and I believe that credibility was established before the Israel/Hezballah war. I think it would be wise to see if there is more than one member that comes from a noble tribe. It's a political Islam credibility thing, with mutual reinforcement between familial/tribal and organizational honor.

I initially agree that it's not totally relevant - but tribalism isn't dead in Lebanon - not totally, and where it does it exist it needs to be known. This has the potential of giving leverage to those in the field. So, I wouldn't just brush that off despite what we think we know about Lebanon today.

Hezballah has a Shi'ite power base, particularly amongst the poor. I suspect that there is a tribal element there, but that might be irrelevant, as you say. It also might be a gateway to understanding a great many things about the organization. If we can't entirely describe Hezballah from the inside out, maybe we can get something of value by analyzing it from the tribal periphery? So the question then becomes which are the tribes in Lebanon that are predominantly Shi'ite. I suspect that the Druze and Maronite communities keep tabs on these things. I'd love some academic leads into that area, if anybody has them. I do know that both the ((Al-Luhayb)) ((Al-Jubur)) and the ((Al-Sada Al-Musawiya)) have a presence in Lebanon, however, to what extent I don't know.

I'd also like to know about any intertribal and intratribal disputes, grudges, "fitnas," alliances, intermarriages and anything else that might seem like minutiae regarding the ((Al-Musuwi)) tribe, if anybody has any visibility into that.

jcustis - the ninewah thing is panning out interestingly - not on its own necessarily, but in combination with the other provincial studies and in context of the major players in the Sunni insurgency. The tribal picture really explains a lot about why Mosul is kind of a stronghold for the insurgents, particularly in light of noble tribal networks that go from Baghdad and Al-Anbar all the way to Ninewah. There are a couple of noble tribes with at least a secondary presence in each province north of Baghdad. It's interesting to review this data after being on the ground without it. A$$-backwards, but interesting - should have had this in 2003 before I ever set foot in country.

The source that I am using is biased somewhat - politicized to accomodate Saddam's tribal policies. That being said, I don't entirely doubt it, and consider it a tool to be validated or invalidated with field work. However, much of this data lines up nicely with what I have seen, so I am confident that it at least describes the tribal picture, and definitely the noble tribal picture, with a workable degree of fidelity. It's good to have 'Azzawi's work to compare alongside Al-Rudhan's - both had different reasons for doing their tribal studies, but they seem to intersect a great deal, so hopefully therein lies some of the truth.

I am looking forward to the census - although it too will be politicized.

V/r,

tribeguy

slapout9
06-02-2009, 10:36 PM
Whatever he's calling a "tribe," he's describing a gang. And while I don't doubt gangsterism is a strong undercurrent many of the insurgencies faced today, I'm skeptical that it's the dominant one--let alone the only one.

You got that right!

tribeguy
06-03-2009, 04:54 AM
Jmm - I took a cursory look at that web site, and it's dedicated to the mourning of al-sadr's death. I didn't have enough time to read the entire site, but I'll get back to you as soon as I can. I got buried in a bunch of projects today, and I'll have to finish those before doing any more in depth study of that site. The first section was the copy of an announcement that was written many years ago after the death of said individual. There was gratitude the ministers from foreign countries who had sent their condolences, and kind words were spoken about the daughter who had been left without a father. It also mentioned how he was a revered teacher in Islamic Sciences. After I got the gist of it, I looked through the rest of the selections, and it seemed to mean to be a bunch of fluff. I'll go through it in more detail when I have a few spare moments.

v/R,

herndonja
06-10-2009, 03:41 PM
Sir,

I have a lot of data on sub tribes with cross border presence, Syrian and Iranian Arab Tribes.

If you have Analyst's Notebook, I can send you some products that I made on that very subject.

I have four years of boots on ground experience, I speak read and write Arabic and English fluently, and have a ton of successful experience in tribal engagement.

Please contact me for more details.

V/r,

Tribeguy
Tribeguy, I just got back from Iraq and would like to get more info on the tribes.

Jim

selil
06-13-2009, 02:10 AM
An interesting discussion of social networks and network theory useable in ways he likely never considered. http://www.ted.com/talks/lang/eng/seth_godin_on_the_tribes_we_lead.html

Tukhachevskii
09-03-2009, 12:12 AM
I initially agree that it's not totally relevant - but tribalism isn't dead in Lebanon - not totally,

Agreed, but the case for/in Lebanon is particularly odd given the strong tribalism elsewhere in the ME. Because of its colonial past (and constituional present) sectarianism is a more important indicator of political alliegance than tribalism is, for instance, in Iraq or even Jordan. Hezbollah/Hizb-Allah in the mid 80s spent most of its time wresting Shi'a support away from the more secularist Amal and it remains so to this day. Indeed, unlike Yemen, where people talk more about their tribe and what it demands of them in Lebanon its their sectarian outlook that is largely overdetermined. However, that is not to say that triablism doesn't exist. As you say vestiges of it remain, obviously given the dminance of Arab culture, but in terms of Hizb-Allah the connections between clerical families in Iran (esp. Qom/Qum) and the ties those can generate (in terms of marriage alliances) tend to make greater waves within Hizb-Allah. Tribal politics tend, IMO, to be of greater concern to foriegn fighters who either transit the region or end up in the pay of local strong men. However, that said see the quote below...

"Interestingly, since the dozen men in the room are from the Baalbek area, and ten of whom are Shia (two of the hired guns are Palestinians from the nearly base of Ahmad Jibribl’s Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command) not one of them supports Hezbollah. “ That seems odd, Why not”? I ask.

Some of their reasons had to do will family/tribal feuds. Hezbollah arrested a couple of them for various reasons, one said. He claimed he was held 10 floors underground in Dahiyeh until his large family sent a tribal elder to Hezbollah and explained they would fight them if he was not released—he claimed he was out the next morning and explained how his order of loyalty was to God, family, tribe and then Lebanon. "

from here

http://www.thepeoplesvoice.org/TPV3/Voices.php/2009/06/06/obama-s-reception-in-lebanon-s-bekaa-val

The author is Franklin D. Lamb who is apprently doing research in South Lebnon for the Americans Concerned for Middle East Peace organisation. It might be worth emailing him for more info.

tribeguy
10-17-2009, 12:42 PM
Tribal politics tend, IMO, to be of greater concern to foriegn fighters who either transit the region or end up in the pay of local strong men. However, that said see the quote below....

Sir,

What you said above negates what William Owen said. He thinks that tribalism is irrelevant in Lebanon. I wonder how much time he has spent with the ((Al-Luhayb)) of the ((Al-Jubur)) - they spend their time going between Lebanon, Palestine, Syria, Jordan, and Iraq! Could it be that tribes such as the ((Al-Luhayb)) of the ((Al-Jubur)) represent culturally organic lines of logistics that we refer to as "smuggling?" And if tribes are irrelevant to Hezballah - then why do we see concentrations of tribes that constitute Hezballah whereas other insurgent organizations are predominantly other tribes? Because society in the Middle East ISN'T tribal?

I think everybody here understands counterinsurgency theory well enough to know that what is important to the "green" population is what is important in counterinsurgency. Tribes are the culturally organic organizations that are important to the green population in Iraq. They have been for centuries. In the absence of a strong and effective government, such will remain the case, no?


-Tribeguy

tribeguy
10-17-2009, 03:30 PM
Knowing not a lot about Hezbollah, other than what is relevant to their use of violence for political aims, I would be amazed if they had any tribal affiliation at all. Even if they did, it would be almost entirely irrelevant.

Very interesting Mr. Owen. How many books have been written in Arabic about tribes in Lebanon? Is Hezballah not a manifestation of currents within Lebanese society? Are not tribes a part of Lebanese society? Isn't it easier for terrorist organizations to recruit through kinship groups? Are there any Arab tribes that are common to both Iran and Lebanon/Syria? Isn't moving lethal aid through kinship groups that have been involved in smuggling for hundreds of years easier than trying to fabricate them out of people that don't know each other? Haven't Iran and Iraq been using kinship groups to undermine each others' states since their inception? Are recruitment and lethal aid irrelevant when it comes to terrorist organizations such as Hezballah?

What makes you think that tribes are irrelevant to Hezballah when you don't know the answer to the above questions - the answer to which all point directly towards the importance of tribes in all aspects of middle eastern society, not just Hezballah (SADR family of the ((Al-Musuwi)) tribe, Nasrallah related to Muqtada Al-Sadr, Baqir Al-Hakim AND Bahar Al-'Ulum!!!)? As if they all reached the same conclusions because they aren't related to each other? As if noble tribes weren't important in Lebanon as elsewhere?

Your assumption and bias against the relevance of tribes is based on not knowing the precise answers to these questions. In other words, you don't know what you don't know yet. Please post relevant questions or answers in the future, not assumptions.

The answers to all of those questions are unamazing to me and assuredly well known by Syria and Iran. And you had better believe that tribes are relevant to Hezballah. And please, don't come at me with what all of your Lebanese friends say. I have heard it far too often. Lebanese scholars have well defined the importance of tribes, as have Syrians and Iraqis. Or, go ahead and let the all knowing natives run their mind jobs about how sophisticated they are compared to other Arab nations. I don't drink their kool aid.

William F. Owen
10-17-2009, 03:36 PM
What you said above negates what William Owen said. He thinks that tribalism is irrelevant in Lebanon. I wonder how much time he has spent with the ((Al-Luhayb)) of the ((Al-Jubur)) - they spend their time going between Lebanon, Palestine, Syria, Jordan, and Iraq!
hmmm... That's a bit of a stretch. Your point?
My initial contention was:

Originally Posted by William F. Owen
Knowing not a lot about Hezbollah, other than what is relevant to their use of violence for political aims, I would be amazed if they had any tribal affiliation at all. Even if they did, it would be almost entirely irrelevant.
Note that which is written in italics. Now, currently actually living among Arabs, and members of my family speaking Arabic, I am somewhat aware of the significance of "family" in it's broadest sense. However to assume that this influence is coherent and consistent across political and national dimensions of the Arab world would be grossly misleading.

Thus my initial point, that given Hezbollah's political objectives, - the ones they further by violence, - the tribal dimension is probably of little importance - especially as Hezbollah emphasises it's support and following from both Druze and Christians. See my point?

Tukhachevskii
10-17-2009, 05:24 PM
What you said above negates what William Owen said. He thinks that tribalism is irrelevant in Lebanon. I wonder how much time he has spent with the ((Al-Luhayb)) of the ((Al-Jubur)) - they spend their time going between Lebanon, Palestine, Syria, Jordan, and Iraq!

Tribeguy,

Actually, what I posted was a link to the opinion of another commentator. Although having both studied tribal structures in the MENA at Uni as well as having experienced them in Yemen personally I can only speak for myself. Thus, I belive that the methodological reductionism that logically follows from your over-emphasis on tribal systems of governance does an injustice to the extremely complex political imbroglio currently extant in the MENA. That said, we know that tribalism played an immensely important role in Saddam Hussein's regime, which was deliberate and heightened, and still does though it is partly superveined upon buy sectarianism which was "supressed" as a politically motivating force. Also tribalism is very important in Jordan ,Yemen ,Pakistan and Afghanistan but less so in Egypt and Lebanon (previous caveats aside). In Pakistan and Afghanistan the tribal aspect is almost wholly isomorphic with the ethnic divisions of each country to such an extent that the explanatory value of isolating the tribal elements alone is about as useful as only focusing on the ethnic, linguistic or sectarian aspects. The structural metamorphosis that tribes underwent under the Egyptian and Lebanese regimes did not remove them but altered their significance and modus operandi. Tribes are not unimportant; their importance derives from the presence or absence of other political forces, trends, structures. As Lenin said (and, IMO, it was perhaps the only thing he said that ever had a ring of truth to it) "everything is connected to everything thing else". We must take that to the grundnorm of any comprehensive understanding of any political/military phenomena.

tribeguy
10-17-2009, 08:24 PM
hmmm... That's a bit of a stretch. Your point?
My initial contention was....

Thus my initial point, that given Hezbollah's political objectives, - the ones they further by violence, - the tribal dimension is probably of little importance - especially as Hezbollah emphasises it's support and following from both Druze and Christians. See my point?

Stretch?

Let's see here - Hezballah exists in order to establish a caliphate. Caliphates must be ruled by direct descendants of Muhammad the prophet. Noble tribes are descendants of Muhammad the prophet. Noble tribesmen feel that they have a right and religious obligation to rule. Their supporters feel the same - it's the shari'a that compels them, and their pride. You can throw up the Israel thing as being Hezballah's raison d'etre, but it aint. They want power - and they'll either take it through the democratic process or through violence - whatever is easiest. And the Musawi tribe (vis a vis Nasrallah) is the prime beneficiary.

The insurgent organizations in Iraq, both Sunni and Shi'ite, are fighting to establish their versions of the Caliphate. What we see as sectarian violence is also a tribe war between the Sunni and Shi'ite noble tribes. It's an identity thing - they are both motivated by the same idea that their noble tribesmen have the right and obligation to rule the caliphate, should there be one.

The activities of the Luhayb are documented by scholarship - it's an example meant to drive home the point of the need to INVESTIGATE further. Since you are an Arabic speaker, I hope that it follows that you are an Arabic reader, as well. With this proficiency, I suggest diving all the way into the subject. Since neither one of us knows for sure, it requires that. However, I wouldn't be amazed if found that the majority of Hezballah's members come from the poorest Shi'ite Arab tribes in Lebanon, and that their recruitability stems largely out of economic need, perhaps MORE than the sectarian appeal. I hate to say it, but there is a social marxist theoretical application here that requires further exploration as well. Knowing the history of Lebanon and the concurrent "oppression" of shi'ites therein, this has to be a factor.

I see your point, but I don't concede it - not until the investigation of this issue is done. Such an investigation would require knowledge of what Hezballah's constituency looks like on a person by person level. It would then also require a thorough breakdown of Lebanon's tribal system using Lebanese scholarship.

Any Beiruti will tell you that there are no tribes in Lebanon. For Beirut, where there is relatively more government presence and effectiveness, this might be the case. But in the countryside, tribalism becomes more and more important. Where do you suppose Hezballah is strongest? Ibn Khaldun might suggest that if Hezballah is strong in the city now, then it is because they displaced those who were there before them.

For the sake of social dialectics, I'll conclude that tribalism as it pertains to Hezballah is more important than you suppose, and less important than I would guess. I place a lot of importance on the noble tribes as being key drivers of instability in the Middle East. As Nasrallah comes from the ((Al-Musuwi)) tribe, which claims nobility through Musa Al-Kadhim, who was a descendant of Imam 'Ali Ibn Abi Talib, and such Musuwis are important throughout the rest of Iraq as being high level leaders of insurgent organizations such as JAM, special groups, et al - I'm fairly certain that tribalism is an overlooked aspect in Lebanon's Hezballah, but not because it is irrelevant. It's because we drink too much progressive pan-Arabist kool aid, and because we are lazy and too prone to think that our Lebanese counterparts are "just like us." As if Hezballah is really just a political organization in modern clothes that isn't trying to get their version of a caliphate established...

Interesting subject - us Americans are just beginning to start studying tribes. The Brits were better at it 100 years ago, but they are as bad as we are now.

Regards,

tribeguy

tribeguy
10-17-2009, 08:41 PM
I like your style - but see my post about noble tribes, caliphates re: Hezballah. Perhaps I do overemphasize it, but I think that most people just don't get it, including on this site. I am heartened somewhat that there people who have some degree of field experience, but I am disheartened by the fact that in the US all of 6 people graduated in 2004 with degrees in Arabic. I am pretty sure that none of them are here, although some seem to have a bit of skill with the language. As for me, I am comfortable with it as I am comfortable with English. Insert jokes about my spelling here.

V/r,
Sam

Tukhachevskii
10-17-2009, 09:04 PM
I am disheartened by the fact that in the US all of 6 people graduated in 2004 with degrees in Arabic. I am pretty sure that none of them are here, although some seem to have a bit of skill with the language.

I agree. But I think in theatre experience is far more valuable than class room study. I myself learned Arabic in Yemen and quickly discovered that practice far outstrips theory when on a travel to the lawless wild east of hadramout myself and my friend found ourselves not only mis-understood but sometimes not understood at all. Learning on the job in theatre is IMO far better than class room study simply for the reason that context, subtleties et al are often far more important in threat identification than grammar.

As for tribes I apologies if I appeared to denigrate the importance of your project I just think that in some cases Jordan, Saudi, Iraq, Yemen tribes genuinely are more in,portant within the political/military matrix. But that is not always the case. Nonetheless, I find many of your findings fascinating if only as confirmation or negation of previous classroom study.

Rex Brynen
10-18-2009, 01:10 AM
Let's see here - Hezballah exists in order to establish a caliphate.

Not so much--being Twelver Shi'ites their views derive from their notion of the occulted/hidden Imam, and their support for the notion of Vilayat-e Faqih expounded by Khomeini. Unlike Sunni Salafist groups, they don't really call for the establishment of global Caliphate.


Caliphates must be ruled by direct descendants of Muhammad the prophet. Noble tribes are descendants of Muhammad the prophet. Noble tribesmen feel that they have a right and religious obligation to rule. Their supporters feel the same - it's the shari'a that compels them, and their pride. You can throw up the Israel thing as being Hezballah's raison d'etre, but it aint. They want power - and they'll either take it through the democratic process or through violence - whatever is easiest.

The "Israel thing" is big for Hizbullah, and I don't really know any major analyst (or, for that matter, member) of the organization who thinks otherwise. As for power, they want veto power in Lebanon so as to protect their interests, but actually refrain from maximizing their claim to either parliamentary or cabinet seats because it better serves them to not take on a major governing role. They certainly recognize that, given the sectarian complexity of the country, they will never be in a position to seize complete and direct power. This is why the brief May 2008 display of armed power, followed by Doha, the elections, and the 15-10-5 (with one of the 5 leaning towards the 10) cabinet formula works so well for them.


However, I wouldn't be amazed if found that the majority of Hezballah's members come from the poorest Shi'ite Arab tribes in Lebanon, and that their recruitability stems largely out of economic need, perhaps MORE than the sectarian appeal. I hate to say it, but there is a social marxist theoretical application here that requires further exploration as well. Knowing the history of Lebanon and the concurrent "oppression" of shi'ites therein, this has to be a factor.

Very few Shi'ites in urban Lebanon think of themselves in tribal terms (hamula is likely to be more important), although you'll certainly find it in the Biqa. Hizbullah has traditionally recruited from among the poorest segment of the population precisely because it positioned itself as a movement of the downtrodden--a point that everyone recognizes--although today I would say that their support is probably relatively constant across all socioeconomic strata.


I'm fairly certain that tribalism is an overlooked aspect in Lebanon's Hezballah, but not because it is irrelevant. It's because we drink too much progressive pan-Arabist kool aid, and because we are lazy and too prone to think that our Lebanese counterparts are "just like us." As if Hezballah is really just a political organization in modern clothes that isn't trying to get their version of a caliphate established...

If anything, Hizbullah is probably Lebanon's only functioning meritocracy. This isn't to say that kinship linkages don't have some effects, but it is to say that they do not play a substantial role in policy development and implementation within the organization with regard to important matters.

William F. Owen
10-18-2009, 05:44 AM
Interesting subject - us Americans are just beginning to start studying tribes. The Brits were better at it 100 years ago, but they are as bad as we are now.


I don't know how bad Americans are, but I can tell you that having travelled or lived in Algeria, Tchad, Niger, Jordan, Israel and the Sinai, from 1984 to the present day, you'll find Brit Anthropologists researching tribes.

As I am sure you know, the largest Archive of English Language Research into Arab Tribes in the Middle East is in Jerusalem - and far outstrips that recorded in any other language - and 90% of it done by Brits, and still being done!

Hezbollah:
As Rex, - someone extremely familiar with Hezbollah - notes, the tribal issue is almost certainly a "so what." If indeed you can trace a tribal structure to Hezbollah, where does it get you?

Extended family structures seem to have pretty thin within the PLO and PFLP. Yes, certain families/Clans backed the PLO at certain times, but I never spoken to anyone who has ever reference those affiliations within the organisation. - Rex may add to that.

- now Clans and extended families are extremely important in the "internal politics" of the West Bank - and to some extent Gaza - but again not really relevant to that part of thier politics that cause a problem - opposing Israel.
If they were not fighting Israel, they would and some days do, kill each other in quite large numbers.

Tukhachevskii
10-18-2009, 11:23 AM
I was mulling this over. Given the ethnic and sectarian bases of Hizballah's power base I am sure that the tribal network is useful in terms of the vetting of potential recruits, information sharing and counter-intelligence. Much harder to break into Hizballuh if you have no-one to vouch for you. That said, I think the tribal issue is peripheral to Hizballah's internal political/military structure or system of mobilisation but that doesn't mean it doesn't have a role to play.

William F. Owen
10-18-2009, 11:35 AM
I was mulling this over. Given the ethnic and sectarian bases of Hizballah's power base I am sure that the tribal network is useful in terms of the vetting of potential recruits, information sharing and counter-intelligence. Much harder to break into Hizballuh if you have no-one to vouch for you. That said, I think the tribal issue is peripheral to Hizballah's internal political/military structure or system of mobilisation but that doesn't mean it doesn't have a role to play.

Absolutely concur and very much supported by the Israelis utilisation of studying extended families within the Middle-east.

Fuchs
10-18-2009, 11:50 AM
The whole "tribal warfare" thing irritates me a bit.
I know "tribal warfare" as warfare composed of raids for loot, done by semi-permanent warbands that are led by a charismatic leader.

It shouldn't be difficult to identify those who benefited of loot or to identify a well-known charismatic leader.

It shouldn't be very difficult to make raids less profitable.
Actually, I don't see where there's loot to be had in attacking outposts and burning fuel trucks.

So maybe it's not as much tribal warfare as it is about highwaymen (taxation of civilian truckers at checkpoints), racketeering and smuggling (drugs, weapons, whatever) that keep the enemy (note I don't wrote 'Taliban') up economically?

Wouldn't "Mafia" be a better description than "tribe"?

M-A Lagrange
10-18-2009, 02:32 PM
So maybe it's not as much tribal warfare as it is about highwaymen (taxation of civilian truckers at checkpoints), racketeering and smuggling (drugs, weapons, whatever) that keep the enemy (note I don't wrote 'Taliban') up economically?

I do not know how it works in Afghanistan, but in Sudan, the tribes conduct razzia to exchange cattles against weapons from Somalia and Erithrea...
It is the youth that conduct such actions without any elderly support. The trick is that they need to proove the are men and warriors.
Also, the business men from Kenya are in the loop. Most of the razzia are done with already someone to purchase the cattle heads.
You mix that with politics... And you have endless stories.
If the situation in Afghanistan as the same characteristics concerning the razzia, then you may have an impact on the economical ressources of the ennemy. But you have to be carefull on the political aspect.

tribeguy
10-18-2009, 08:35 PM
I agree. But I think in theatre experience is far more valuable than class room study. .

............Nonetheless, I find many of your findings fascinating if only as confirmation or negation of previous classroom study.

Thanks for the props - and I agree that field work is the key. I spent four years in Iraq dealing with tribesmen - and it took me many years to understand how and why tribesmen think the way that they do. My work is currently giving predictive power that I wasn't expecting.

Tribal analysis offers us a secular doorway of dealing with extremist phenomena.

As for lack of tribal identification, but rather identification with Hamula, or clan, or whatever - these are are all tribal identifications. (you didn't bring this up, but somebody else did) Semantic nit noiding aside, there is no doubt that tribal counterinsurgency TTPs are in their nascent state in the west, including Britain. The problem is in the language - and there is no place to start but in the classroom. Regardless of how many British anthropologists are working in Africa or elsewhere, there aren't enough of Americans or Brits that really speak Arabic.

And there is no better way to create misunderstanding than to hire interpreters from 7-Eleven or liquor stores and try to use them to bring understanding between two members of radically different cultures and mindsets. Anybody who has any experience in the middle east knows the importance of relationships. Most interpreters ruin the possibility of this - and the answer is for us to learn their languages if we hope to get anywhere at all.

And none of this is worth doing unless we are successful.

Tribeguy

tribeguy
10-18-2009, 08:40 PM
As Rex, - someone extremely familiar with Hezbollah - notes, the tribal issue is almost certainly a "so what." If indeed you can trace a tribal structure to Hezbollah, where does it get you?


Sir, it gets you secular lines of communication and influence over those who are working for extremist thugs.

I think you can connect the dots from there.

-Tribeguy

tribeguy
10-18-2009, 09:37 PM
Absolutely concur and very much supported by the Israelis utilisation of studying extended families within the Middle-east.

And that doesn't have any application to Hezballah?

William F. Owen
10-19-2009, 06:22 AM
Sir, it gets you secular lines of communication and influence over those who are working for extremist thugs.

I think you can connect the dots from there.

-Tribeguy
So? Exploiting personal relationships for HUMINT purposes? The Brits were doing that in Northern Ireland for 40 years. The same basic understanding works against organised crime for the FBI, NYPD and many others. Exploiting family ties is something we are good at, have done for years and it's far from new.

And that doesn't have any application to Hezballah?
It has application against every individual in the world who has an extended family. I assumed that your point was the detailed knowledge of tribes allowed you to craft policy towards them. - and I agree on that, IF it is relevant to the context of the policy.

I see that as largely irrelevant in Hezbollah's case, because, it does not speak to a policy and they are largely meritocracy - but with strong connections to the Lebanon's organised crime families.

Yes you can look at some Terrorist groups and see their command structure break down along family/clan/tribe lines. Folks have been doing the same with the Mafia for years. This is not insightful. Everyone working in the Africa, Asia and Mid-East has been doing it for 100's of years - and still does.

Tukhachevskii
10-19-2009, 11:56 AM
A brief, disjointed, hurried and all round grammatically suspect (but no less reliable) set of field notes regarding tribes and tribal influence from Yemen (c. 2007). Tribes have often been kingmakers especially in Yemen, but they also constitute a shadow/alternative governance structure often at odds with the “legitimate” Government. Saleh owed his power due to the largesse and support of Sheik al-Ahmar (who was also, in tribal terms, Saleh’s superior given that Saleh’s tribe was part of Al-Ahmar’s Hashid tribal confederation). The Yemeni state doesn’t control anything outside the cities and even then places like Aden have a mind all their own (due to it being a Yemeni Socialist Party stronghold). Although to all intensive purposes (King of Queens reference there for all you fans) Ali Abdallah Saleh (be careful how you pronounce that last one) may appear to be a ‘typical’ Arab dictator in fact his power is severely limited to the cities. De facto control in the hinterlands, especially the lawless east opposite the Rub-Al-Khali desert is tribal controlled. The Tribal Shura Council, although lacking legislative authority, wields tremendous power for the above reasons and can rarely be ignored. The GPC / Tribal relationship has often paid dividends in the past (Saleh would never have defeated the South or achieved Union without them) and is currently useful in bolstering his armed forces in the Sa’ada war up north given the unreliability of certain sectors of the army.

However, the relationship is politically volatile especially when it came to Saleh trying to extract funds from the US for his supposed counter-terrorism effort (which the Ttribes saw as betrayal of Islam and which even the Al-Houthi insurgency in the North managed to capitalise on). Saleh cleverly ensured that the Political Security Organisation (’Amn As-Siyasiia) allowed key prisoners to escape thereby satisfying the tribal sense of sharafi’ (honour). This is the same PSO that is now largely staffed by ex-Iraqi Ba’athists! (I believe Iraq wants them back for trial). The relationship has benefitted the tribes in many ways such as when they insisted that Saleh turn the schools over to fully clerical/Islamic control (he had wanted them partially secular) when unification was finally achieved in 1994 (after the tribes helped Saleh destroy what was left of the South and the YSP’ military apparatus which, incidentally, still exists in the form of disgruntled ex-servicemen angry about the non-payment of their pensions which were promised when Saleh threw them out and replaced them with his own sycophants).

The Al-Ahmar led Hashid confederation briefly flirted with parliamentary politics by creating the explicitly Islamic (Hizb Al-) Islah reform party which included a wing led by sometime Bin Laden confidant Sheik Ali Az-Zindani (who is very well respected amongst all of Yemen’s Tribes, bar the Zaiydi’s up north). Even though Islah remains largely dominated by Tribal elders the Al-Ahmar Hashid Confederation is still inclined to throw its support behind whomever it considers useful financially and politically thus acting both constitutionally and extra-constitutionally to derive the most benefits and ensure its demands are met. Given that the tribes are overwhelmingly pious (or fundamentalist, depending upon your angle) Muslims those demands are obvious. Indeed, Zindani’s right wing of the Islah party and Al-Ahmar’s Hashid Confederation (amongst others) supported the creation of an extra-judicial morality police, along similar lines to that in Saudi, to patrol the godless streets of the cities (traditionally Saleh’s sphere of influence) even though, legally, they have no power to do so (the government has not stopped them).

Both Saleh’s presidential party the GPC (General People’s Congress) and the former ruling party of South Yemen (and now Yemen’s real opposition party) the Yemeni Sociality Party flirt with and court the tribes to varying ends; the 2006(?) presidential elections were contested by Islah and YSP in unison even though Shiek Al-Ahmar publically announced his Hashid confederation would “morally” support Saleh. Al-Ahmar died in December 2007 leaving leadership of the Hashid confederation to his son, Sheikh Sadiq al-Ahmar, who is known to hate Saleh but who is pragmatic enough not to break with him entirely in return for largesse and financial rewards which, given the role of tribal levies (10,000+) in the continuing Sa’ada war is going to be substantial.

Kiwigrunt
10-25-2009, 09:21 AM
And here's another interesting take on our own tribes (17 min. vid)

http://www.ted.com/talks/david_logan_on_tribal_leadership.html

Tukhachevskii
10-27-2009, 09:30 AM
Tribal leaders in Iraq eventually realized that Al-Qa’ida and other terrorist groups came with the intention of taking away tribal leaders’ authority. This suggests to a counterinsurgent fighting an Islamic extremist group that in the event that no other viable authority exists, finding a viable way to empower tribal leaders against the insurgents may be most wise from a cultural perspective. Taking authority from a tribal leader without compensation is a recipe for disaster, as this certainly played a role in the rapid growth of the Sunni insurgency in 2003.)

I found the excerpt on the whole very interesting but it was the above proposition that caught my eye. I think one of the things we tend to forget is that structures are constantly in flux with elements of both order and disequilibrium present. Although it may make sense to empower local elders/sheiks/clan leaders this may merely stoke the fires (or dampen them, but that's a contextual issue). What I mean is that if we look at Yemen (tribes) and the Caucasus (Clans) part of the appeal of the Wahhabi style of Islam was that it bypassed the elderly, rigid and largely ossified chains and networks of authority and loyalty which the young felt stifled by.

In Yemen the threat of AQ Yemeni/Southern Arabian branch is precisely in its ability to appeal to the dissaffected youth who feel constrained by the tribal system. Similarly, young people in the caucasus found their clan based systems of obligation to be politically, culturally and economically stifling. Having to bow to pressures of "elderly elders" who usually bowed to Russian government requestes or saw loyalty to Mosocw as traditional/acceptable meant those same eleders/sheiks were seen as collaborators. The flattening or equalising force of Wahhabism which stressed the indiviual's submersion into the will of Allah and thereby removed any mediating authority was greatly appealing. Thus, a relatively unexamined aspect of the Wahhabi phenomenon is it's demographic underpinnings fuelled by a population explosion of dissafected youngsters who feel constrained by tribes/clans and who thurst for freedom under Wahhabism (it is not, contra Fromm, of Muslims desiring to escape from Freedom but, rather, that they seek social freedom through the levelling effect of Wahhabism).

It was this, IMO, that forced tribal elders in Iraq to counter AQ; that they would lose control of their own cadres and thus their own systems of nepotism, patronage and influence. This is also, I recall, one of the reasons that Saddam kept an eye out for Sunni extremism. Gievn that he was suppressing, incorporating and balancing the tribes the last thing he wanted was for an alternative non-tirbal source of mobilisation which couldn't be bought off. Interesting excerpt nonetheless, is the book widely avaliable?

SWJ Blog
01-31-2014, 11:33 AM
To Retake Cities, Iraq Turns to Sunni Tribes (http://smallwarsjournal.com/node/15219)

davidbfpo
12-18-2017, 05:02 PM
This thread has been re-opened for the next post; having been closed in December 2015 Three small threads have been merged in. It now has 119,243views.

davidbfpo
12-18-2017, 05:08 PM
Tribes and Global Jihadism' edited by Virginie Collombier and Olivier Roy, is published by Hurst & Co (London) and their release describes the book as:
Across the Muslim world, from Iraq and Yemen, to Egypt and the Sahel, new alliances have been forged between the latest wave of violent Islamist groups –– including Islamic State and Boko Haram –– and local tribes. But can one now speak of a direct link between tribalism and jihadism, and how analytically useful might it be? Tribes are traditionally thought to resist all encroachments upon their sovereignty, whether by the state or other local actors, from below; yet by joining global organisations such as Islamic State, are they not rejecting the idea of the state from above? This triangular relationship is key to understanding instances of mass ‘radicalisation’, when entire communities forge alliances with jihadi groups, for reasons of self-interest, self-preservation or religious fervour. If Algeria’s FIS or Turkey’s AKP once represented the ‘Islamisation of nationalism’, have we now entered a new era, that of the ‘tribalisation of globalisation’?
Link:http://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/tribes-global-jihadism/?


It might just interest a few here.:)