Some Things Never Change

[Viscount de Turenne]

Today, the average officer and leader in the military has come to devalue the study of pre-twentieth century warfare. From Alexander the Great to Napoleon and even MacArthur, these generals have all used the same basic principles of how wars and battles should be conducted. But the present-day defenders of modernity and relevance, the most radical of whom claim that nothing that occurred prior to 1945 has any value for the modern officer, continue to say that technology has advanced so far in the last 100 years that all of those military "rules", if you will, are not applicable anymore. I agree, in part, with this statement. Technology has advanced, and many of the traditional strategies used before the twentieth century can no longer be of any use. But there are exceptions, many strategies, tactics, and factors that are immune to technological advances and are still as relevant today as they were 2,000 years ago. One of these would be the timeless pincer maneuver. This tactic was used by Hannibal at Cannae and by the Germans in their Blitzkrieg attacks. These are just my personal thoughts on this issue. If anyone has anything to add or any comments to impart please share.

[Ron Humphrey]

Today, the average officer and leader in the military has come to devalue the study of pre-twentieth century warfare. From Alexander the Great to Napoleon and even MacArthur, these generals have all used the same basic principles of how wars and battles should be conducted. But the present-day defenders of modernity and relevance, the most radical of whom claim that nothing that occurred prior to 1945 has any value for the modern officer, continue to say that technology has advanced so far in the last 100 years that all of those military "rules", if you will, are not applicable anymore.

Just out of curiosity might you be able to name one Officer or military leader
who has actually pro-posed that the pre-twentieth century lessons are no longer useful. Haven't really met any of those myself.




I agree, in part, with this statement. Technology has advanced, and many of the traditional strategies used before the twentieth century can no longer be of any use. But there are exceptions, many strategies, tactics, and factors that are immune to technological advances and are still as relevant today as they were 2,000 years ago. One of these would be the timeless pincer maneuver. This tactic was used by Hannibal at Cannae and by the Germans in their Blitzkrieg attacks. These are just my personal thoughts on this issue. If anyone has anything to add or any comments to impart please share.

Might be that some of those we may think may no longer be possible may just be(Time and place--- Einsteins WW4 sticks and stones and all that) ;)

[Brandon Friedman]

Today, the average officer and leader in the military has come to devalue the study of pre-twentieth century warfare. From Alexander the Great to Napoleon and even MacArthur, these generals have all used the same basic principles of how wars and battles should be conducted. But the present-day defenders of modernity and relevance, the most radical of whom claim that nothing that occurred prior to 1945 has any value for the modern officer, continue to say that technology has advanced so far in the last 100 years that all of those military "rules", if you will, are not applicable anymore.

I have to agree with Ron. Can you provide some evidence of this? I found the fighting more often akin to a school yard brawl than to some technologically advanced conflict. Fighting is fighting. It hasn't changed. Dudes mixing it up is dudes mixing it up.

[Schmedlap]

I think principles to guide our actions and factors to weigh in choosing courses of action remain fairly timeless. Whether some officers disagree with that... I guess some might, but they are a tiny minority. Technology just changes what it looks like when the decisions are made. Whether you're using slings and stones or computers and bullets, the true professional will just see shifts in security, threat, and uncertainty and leverage the assets available to align those things more favorably.

[jmm99]

Why did you pick Turenne ?

Serious question from someone who has a passing interest in French military history.

I think you will find many people who frequent this board who are very familiar with pre-20th century military history, strategy, operations and tactics. Wilf looks at warfare as a 4000-year continuum (my perception of your writings, Wilf - feel free to correct me).

And, Ken White led the charge in the first Neolithic battle even recorded in cave paint. :D He also can tell you a lot about generals, ancient and modern.

Just two examples of many.

I don't know what handle I would have selected at your age - probably my then-current nickname which I shall leave undisclosed.

------------------------------

One of mine, Charles de Bragelongne (see mariage acte below), served under Turenne as commissaire général de la cavalerie - his father of the same name held that office before Turenne rose to fame. The pecking order in the French cavalry was (also reflected in the names of the regiments that they personally commanded, with links to English webpages that give the basics):

Colonel Général Cavalerie (http://www.kronoskaf.com/syw/index.php?title=Colonel_G%C3%A9n%C3%A9ral_Cavaleri e) - CO of the cavalry corps.

Mestre de camp Général Cavalerie (http://www.kronoskaf.com/syw/index.php?title=Mestre_de_camp_G%C3%A9n%C3%A9ral_C avalerie) - XO and staff functions for plans and operations

Commissaire général Cavalerie (http://www.kronoskaf.com/syw/index.php?title=Commissaire_g%C3%A9n%C3%A9ral_Cava lerie) - except for plans and operations, oversaw all of our present staff functions and combat service and support functions - plus, some non-cavalry functions (e.g., design, construction & inspection of fortresses - see snip below).

There is a 4 vol. manual for the military commissaires, François de Chennevières, Détails militaires, dont la connoissance est nécessaire à tous les officiers, & principalement ... (1750; 4 tomes), which can be downloaded from Google Books (http://books.google.com/books?q=editions:0qxFsu0S0tGkWpmOx8&id=8dgmvv6wtsIC).

- Extrait des registres paroissiaux de Saint-Nicolas-des-Champs à Paris

18 III 1660. Mariage de Charles de Bragelongne, chevalier, commissaire de la cavalerie de France, fils de Charles de Bragelongne, seigneur de Villevenard, aussi commissaire général de la cavalerie et de Madeleine Asselin, et de Madeleine de Vigny, fille d’étienne de Vigny, maître des eaux et forêts d’Orléans et de Madeleine de La Fond. Témoin : Barthélémy de Vigny, seigneur de Villiers et d’Isy, frère de la mariée.

- Extrait du Discours généalogique: Origine et généalogie de la maison de Bragelongne, Paris, 1689.

p. 115. « Charles de Bragelongne a succédé à son père en la charge de commissaire ordinaire des guerres, à la conduite générale de la cavalerie, où il s’est acquis la réputation d’un très habile ingénieur : pourquoi il a esté commis par Sa Majesté pour faire réparer les fortifications des frontières de Picardie et de Champagne, dont il s’est très bien acquitté, notamment à S. Quentin, où il a fait construire un des plus beaux bastions du royaume. J’ay vu plusieurs volumes qui ont esté entièrement dessignez de sa main des principales forteresses de l’Europe, avec ses remarques : on peut dire que c’est une pièce des plus curieuses que nous ayons en ce genre.»

- Extrait du Bernard Germain É. de La Ville sur Illon, Histoire génèrale, physique et civile de l'Europe (1826), p.129:

"Vingt-quatrième Époque 1643-1689

.... un conseil composé de Condé, du Turenne, de Villeroi, de Colbert [JMM: ca. 1664-1675] ...
....
Colbert fait voyager en Hollande ... ; ..... l'ingénieur de Bragelogne, et Arnoul, intendant des fortifications et des galères des ports de la Méditerranée ; il les charge d'étudier avec soin tout ce qui est relatif à la marine, aux travaux des ports et au commerce; ....
....
Louvois fait observer les mèmes règles dans le département de la guerre ...."

JMM: Henri Jules de Bourbon, prince de Condé (1643-1709), Grand Maître de France - 1660-1685. Henri de La Tour d'Auvergne, vicomte de Turenne (1611-75), Colonel Général de la cavalerie, 1657; Maréchal de France en 1660. Jean-Baptiste Colbert, Contrôleur général en 1664, surintendant des Bâtiments, Arts et Manufactures (1664); mort en 1683. Letellier, marquis de Louvois, Département de la guerre en 1662-1691.

[jcustis]

Hmm, I'm reading extracts about Napoleon and Jomini right now, for a professional military education course that all field grade officers have to take, unless they go to the resident PME.

Is it taken with a grain of salt? Sure, but we don't dismiss it out of hand as you allege.

[Steve Blair]

What I see is a handy, sweeping statement intended to possibly spark discussion. The influence of technology on strategy is nothing new, and has been with us ever since Tom showed Ken that a pointy stick really WILL travel farther than a club if you throw it at someone....:D

If anything, I've noticed a trend in some corners to obsess on warfare in the 20th century to the virtual exclusion of most of what came before. Again, this is something that comes and goes, and tends to be more focused with folks who have agendas or are trying to make a name for themselves.

[William F. Owen]

I think you will find many people who frequent this board who are very familiar with pre-20th century military history, strategy, operations and tactics. Wilf looks at warfare as a 4000-year continuum (my perception of your writings, Wilf - feel free to correct me).


Well 4000 years or back to when Ken got his first command. Which ever came first! :D Eyh.. I kill me!

More seriously, military history is and can be our only guide. War does not change, and warfare evolves in mostly logical and predictable ways, excepting the odd unique circumstance - and that is very, very rare (EG: use of the atomic bomb)

[Tom Odom]

What I see is a handy, sweeping statement intended to possibly spark discussion. The influence of technology on strategy is nothing new, and has been with us ever since Tom showed Ken that a pointy stick really WILL travel farther than a club if you throw it at someone....:D

If anything, I've noticed a trend in some corners to obsess on warfare in the 20th century to the virtual exclusion of most of what came before. Again, this is something that comes and goes, and tends to be more focused with folks who have agendas or are trying to make a name for themselves.

Anyone who really knows Ken knows that you can't show him anything without a club...:D

[George L. Singleton]

Agree that pincer movement is timeless and still of great value in places like Afghanistand and Pakistan.

[George L. Singleton]

I think our freshman year (probably now a rising sophomore) in high school merely wants to stimulate discussion to learn from the old heads. Youth are prone (speaking as one with three early 20s daughters) to sometimes push a statement up the flag pole not to spite or upset but to cause informative responses which help the questioner to learn...from all of us.

I would ask the young high school student what his take is on the Mannehiem Line circa 1940 and how that strategy and tactic might apply in FATA today. Just an off the wall question.

[Ken White]

Anyone who really knows Ken knows that you can't show him anything without a club...:Dto realize...

I dunno about this Tureen guy, okay general at best. Had it not been for Gus the Second and his reforms and Maurice teaching the young Henri his trade, we might never have heard of him. Pity he wasn't as sharp as that other Maurice who also later became Maréchal Général des Camps et Armées du Roi -- and did so without benefit of having French royal blood...

The two Morries were among my better pupils (Tom, OTOH, had a bad tendency to launch himself with the Lance... ;) ).

Gus, OTOH, taught me a lot.

[Schmedlap]

And, Ken White led the charge in the first Neolithic battle even recorded in cave paint.
JMM - I would expect you to know the rest of the story. In one battle, Ken's adroit use of a club resulted in a caveman named Cirroc being bonked unconscious and his body was frozen in the ice. Scientists later thawed him and he became... Unfrozen Caveman Lawyer (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unfrozen_Caveman_Lawyer)!

Seriously, though, the most valuable lessons that I think we can learn from the past are not how smart Generals employed their militaries on the battlefield, but in what preparations they made prior to arriving to the battlefield - particularly in the arena of forming alliances, generating public support, putting the adversary off guard, deceptions, et cetera. The General and statesman were not always two separate individuals. In many ways, the job of the General is easier because he can now focus on a narrower set of issues and leave the political bickering to the civilians. He is also in a better position to provide advice to those civilian masters because his nose isn't against the grindstone regarding political matters. He has the luxury of stepping back and looking at everything in perspective. That was my impression as an XO. While I trusted the judgment of my CO and found him highly capable, I also noticed on several occasions that by me not being knee deep in all of his command-related issues, I could more easily critique his decisions and step in every now and then to say, "woah, sir, wait a minute - what about this...?"

[Umar Al-Mokhtār]

Sun Tzu and Saint Carl...say it ain't so! :D

In light of this newly revealed paradigm should I trash my copies of Machiavelli, du Picq, Freddy The Great, Musashi, Herodotus, Maurice of Nassau, Tacticus, Vauban, Thucydides, Vegetius, Xenophon...

Seriously, by tossing out all those pre 20th Century dude's books I could free up two shelves in one of my bookcases. :)

I draw the line at getting rid of my 1st Edition copy of Chandler's The Campaigns of Napoleon. Toted that beast around too many places to part with it. Not gonna do it. Wouldn't be prudent.

[jmm99]

to dispel the inaccuracies - nay, perhaps even culumnies - recited of that noted serjeant atte arms Ken de Alba, which are circulating with reckless abandon within the hallowed halls of our Inns of the Court, particularly amongst the middle benches of the fledgling barristers. Indeed, the tale is an old one - are not all truths and falsehoods old ? - of de Alba's use of a club in battle to dispatch Cirroc (a fate, which if true, was far too good for that wretched creature, allowing him admittance to Valhalla).

Nay, as revealed by our oldest pipe rolls, the facts are quite different. For Cirroc, amongst his clan and others, plied the trade of a divorce lawyer. It was in the course of de Alba's little-known first divorce that, what could have been a mutual and acceptable settlement between the man and the woman (represented by Cirroc), became a shambles because of Cirroc's abusive verbal tactics in resolving the question of custody of the Family Club. Driven beyond all reason by that divorce lawyer's antics, de Alba did indeed smote Cirroc with that honorific club - a clear case of irresistible impulse.

So, while de Alba did smote Cirroc with the club, it was not an act of war, but one of excusible assault. Perhaps, it was that story that impelled some in literary circles to claim that de Alba, by then known as White, caused the Bard to write the famous phrase "kill all the lawyers". Again, we know that also is inaccurate because the military rolls are explicit that White was then advising Lord Essex in his campaign against the Irish insurgents.

Another inaccuracy concerning de Alba (perhaps an enlargement of the Family Club tale) is that he used a club in battle. We know in fact that de Alba kept abreast of advances in military technology and wisely selected those weapon systems and associated tactics that would yield him the best advantage. Why do we know this ? Not because of the vagaries of hearsay, but because of demontrative evidence - the graphic of the blood feud battle between de Alba's clan and Cirroc's clan.

We see that de Alba employed a wedge formation - he leading the wedge; and all combatants used bows and arrows. His sense of tactics led to his now famous doctrine: "One up, two back; effective suppressive and supporting aimed fires - and hit them in the flank."

Cirroc's clan was, of course, outnumbered in this contest; for it lacked Cirroc. Not that that wretched creature would have added much as a warrior; but it was truly said that he had the voice of 10 or even 100 men - the first PsyOps officer.

PS: Wilf, the attachment is especially for you. :D

[slapout9]

PS: Wilf, the attachment is especially for you. :D


That drawing was Ken's first Strategic plan:wry:

[jmm99]

Gussy (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gustavus_Adolphus_of_Sweden), my mom's leading figure in pre-20th century Finnish history - not because of his strategies, operations and tactics (of which, she knew naught); but because he recognized the importance of Finland.

As such, he promoted Finns who did know those things military: Gustaf Horn (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gustaf_Horn) (Realm Marshal; his farm name was Kankas (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Horn_of_Kankas)); Ake Tott (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/%C3%85ke_Henriksson_Tott) (Field Marshal); Torsten Stålhandske (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Torsten_St%C3%A5lhandske) (General of Cavalry); and the little-known figure in the supply services, Erik Trana (http://books.google.com/books?id=w3qwCHn3EgEC&pg=PA41&lpg=PA41&dq=%22erik+trana%22&source=bl&ots=I29_e1_QWP&sig=1xkOOajJ8sWsR8Rwm6ugZePZWEE&hl=en&ei=dO4dSvyALoq4NM_loMQF&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=5) (Commissioner General of War). And, he introduced to continental Europe Stålhandske's Hakkapeliittat (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hakkapeliitta), whose concept of normalcy was that of "total war".

So, the prayer in RC German churches during the 30-Years' War:


"A horribile Haccapaelitorum agmine libera nos, Domine".
("O Lord, deliver us from the terrible army of the Haccapelites")

Study of these combined rulers-generals leads one to question of how useful even Gussy Dullfish was to his nation. Were the often transitory gains worth the long-term costs from lost opportunities?

In the case of Charles XII of Poltava (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Charles_XII_of_Sweden), we know the answer to be negative.

Is a nation better to have a policy formed by such as their ancestor Gussy Vasoline (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gustav_I_of_Sweden), who was a very reluctant warrior - either because he was too cheap, because he was sick of the slaughters (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stockholm_Bloodbath) that placed him on the throne, or both ?

Schmedlap, thanks for the reminder of one important use of history.

--------------------

The English Wiki articles call these generals "Swedish" - checking the birth places, where they lived and their genealogies prove they were Finns (e.g., Gustaf Kankas, aka Horn). They spoke Swedish (probably as well or better than Finnish), which was simply the norm for anyone connected with the Swedish Crown at that time.

[Ken White]

You shouldn't try to tell that when you've been partying...

Clobbered Cirroc with Wife Nr 1; head harder than club. :mad:

Not advising Essex but the O'Neill -- only thing I told Essax was to stay away from Walsingham as he would lead to trouble... :eek:

Tell Slap that plan also worked and note, not five rings but three dangles, ala Maize...

[jmm99]

from Slap
That drawing was Ken's first Strategic plan

a plausible suggestion - or, his after action report. Much less likely (since I don't think Ken believes in magic in things military) is a graphic invocation of magic before the battle.

We will have to get the answer from the bunny's mouth.

[jmm99]

the true scoop - and proof that even the ancient pipe rolls were sometimes inaccurate. Essex's military rolls were known to be very inaccurate (serious fact, not funning).

And, Ken, I'm so happy that you were on the right side - thought mention of Essex would get your Ulster going. :)

[William F. Owen]

I trash my copies of Machiavelli, du Picq, Freddy The Great, Musashi, Herodotus, Maurice of Nassau, Tacticus, Vauban, Thucydides, Vegetius, Xenophon...


You read Vauban? I am seriously impressed. What works? I can't find any of his work in English or recently and affordably published. He's is the uber-dog of Military Thought codification - something I aspire to! :D

I would also add FOCH, - a brilliant a very misunderstood man.

[CR6]

I draw the line at getting rid of my 1st Edition copy of Chandler's The Campaigns of Napoleon. Toted that beast around too many places to part with it. Not gonna do it. Wouldn't be prudent.

The only thing that keeps this from being my favorite book ever is the fact that it's a two-man lift.

[Umar Al-Mokhtār]

A Manual of Siegecraft and Fortification which I picked up at a library book sale pretty cheap in Yuma, AZ. The Vauban Fortifications of France by Paddy Griffin, a recent addition to Osprey's Fortress series, is a pretty good adjunct to it.

Foch doesn't really fit into the Viscount de Turenne's admonition of our general's lacking an appreciation for the study of pre-twentieth century warfare. :D

I would like to get a hold of his work. It is tough to get English versions of French strategic thinkers of the early 20th Century and my abysmal French doesn't lend itself to serious reading in it. I recently finished Paths of Glory: The French Army 1914-18 by Clayton and Pyrrhic Victory: French Strategy and Operations in the Great War by Doughty.

@CR6: My copy has a special place in my heart since several pages (the chapter on Rivoli and the spine) still show the effects from having been read under a leaky poncho, in the rain, on a hillside near Yechon, then dropped when I slipped on the way back to my hooch. :)

[jmm99]

are available at Google Books: Foch search (http://books.google.com/books?as_q=&num=100&btnG=Google+Search&as_epq=&as_oq=&as_eq=&as_brr=1&as_pt=ALLTYPES&lr=&as_vt=&as_auth=foch&as_pub=&as_sub=&as_drrb_is=q&as_minm_is=0&as_miny_is=&as_maxm_is=0&as_maxy_is=&as_isbn=&as_issn=); and Vauban search (http://books.google.com/books?lr=&num=100&as_brr=1&as_pt=ALLTYPES&q=inauthor%3Avauban&btnG=Search+Books).

Just downloaded OK Foch's Principles, his Precepts and Judgments (both in Eng) and the 1906 Principles in French.

The Vauban books are all in French - sorry, Wilf. :(

[Surferbeetle]

I have no financial interests in, and am not associated in any way with this website, but I have received excellent customer service from them and note that they carry many neat books to include St. Carl in German for Wilf, Vauban for Umar Al-Mokhtār, and...

Biblio.com

[William F. Owen]

A Manual of Siegecraft and Fortification which I picked up at a library book sale pretty cheap in Yuma, AZ. The Vauban Fortifications of France by Paddy Griffin, a recent addition to Osprey's Fortress series, is a pretty good adjunct to it.
I owe you a Schwarma and a beer, if you get your ass the Tel Aviv!
I know Paddy. Didn't know he'd written about Vauban.

Foch doesn't really fit into the Viscount de Turenne's admonition of our general's lacking an appreciation for the study of pre-twentieth century warfare. :D

I would like to get a hold of his work. It is tough to get English versions of French strategic thinkers of the early 20th Century and my abysmal French doesn't lend itself to serious reading in it. I recently finished Paths of Glory: The French Army 1914-18 by Clayton and Pyrrhic Victory: French Strategy and Operations in the Great War by Doughty.
Foch is very poorly understood in my opinion, thanks to some very sloppy military history. I have the 1918 edition of "Principles," in English.

A lot of the statements are of dubious merit, but within that, he is talking about a lot of stuff that we assume the Manoeuvre Warfare lobby invented. If you believe in something called Manoeuvre Warfare, then Foch was a believer and advocated as early as 1903. Moreover he clearly understands how armies work, in a way not clearly or usefully written about today.

[Schmedlap]

Speaking of technology and it's impact on war. I'm looking at my bookshelf and one of the books is "The Utility of Force" by GEN Rupert Smith. He points out that the two weapons that kill more people than any other, in spite of our technological and social progress, are the AK and the machete. I would add that another common strategy or tactic - depending on how you classify it - is rape. And forced conscription is still common, including children (so I guess our personnel system could actually be worse :eek:).


The only thing that keeps this from being my favorite book ever is the fact that it's a two-man lift.
That quote just brought back a bad memory. When I was an XO, I was the survey officer for a report of survey that was so large, so outrageous, had so many exhibits, and so much other related paperwork, that took so long to process, that we did not even call it by its document number. It was known throughout the battalion S-4 shop as the "two-man lift Report of Survey." Many trees gave their lives to finalize that nutroll. I actually dedicated one USB stick solely to that headache. And when the ordeal ended, I was only able to get one month's pay from the clown responsible for it all.

[William F. Owen]

Speaking of technology and it's impact on war. I'm looking at my bookshelf and one of the books is "The Utility of Force" by GEN Rupert Smith. He points out that the two weapons that kill more people than any other, in spite of our technological and social progress, are the AK and the machete. I would add that another common strategy or tactic - depending on how you classify it - is rape. And forced conscription is still common, including children (so I guess our personnel system could actually be worse :eek:).

The General is right about the Machete and the AK, but a great deal of that book fails the "So what" test. Once you boil it all down, you are not left with much, and almost everything he says was said by other authors in last 25 years.
Now, he is a very good General, jolly nice chap, and friend of several friends of mine, but had the book not been written by him, it is very doubtful we would be discussing it.
I am not quite sure how rape has a political or military dimension. What's the premise of it being a strategy?

[davidbfpo]

(From a non-SWJ friend)The only books in English I have are all on fortifications and sieges – Abel Swall’s 1702 translation, Rothrock’s Manual of A Siegecraft and Fortification and Blomfield’s biography.

Rothrock’s translation is the nearest I have which has some of Vauban’s military philosophy and codification in it; I found it second hand on the internet at $65, 2 years ago. There are tonight two copies on Abebooks at $60 and $78.

There are numerous books on fortification, in English, that include Vauban and of course there is a Vauban society, in France. Perhaps some of our French members can help too.

Hope this helps.

davidbfpo

[Umar Al-Mokhtār]

is very, very, very tempting. :D

My short visit to Haifa over a quarter of a century now past was delightful.

Now if I only had the money and the time... :wry:

[marct]

Hi Wilf,


I am not quite sure how rape has a political or military dimension. What's the premise of it being a strategy?

Really, it's more of a tactic that has strategic implications (like terrorism ;)). In many cultures, "rape" is considered to be the woman's fault, and serves to a) cut her off from her support network while, at the same time, b) shaming / dishonouring her male relatives ("'real' men can protect their women!"). As such, it doubly weakens a targeted population.

In other societies, it has been used as part of an ideological program of "forced eugenics". While it has similar effects, it also totally disturbs the cultural birth-spacing and drains resources while, at the same time, ensuring a "future generation" that will be at odds with the parental generation; a social destabilizing influence.

[Schmedlap]

Wilf / Marc,

Marc's response is basically what I had in mind. As for why this is "strategic," I was thinking that this generally occurs in countries that don't have a planned parenthood on every corner. If the rape victims are impregnated, then they are probably going to carry the child to term. Pregnant women require more food and medical care, have the risk of complications or death, have less energy, et cetera. It is a drain on resources, in instills terror and emotional distress that could be debilitating to a society for long after it occurs, or instills terror far greater than simply the fear of attack, and it has the "eugenics" effect that Marc mentioned. (Kind of like in Braveheart: "The problem with Scotland is that it is full of Scots").

I'm not a strategist. Do those qualify as strategic considerations?

[Tom Odom]

Hi Wilf,



Really, it's more of a tactic that has strategic implications (like terrorism ;)). In many cultures, "rape" is considered to be the woman's fault, and serves to a) cut her off from her support network while, at the same time, b) shaming / dishonouring her male relatives ("'real' men can protect their women!"). As such, it doubly weakens a targeted population.

In other societies, it has been used as part of an ideological program of "forced eugenics". While it has similar effects, it also totally disturbs the cultural birth-spacing and drains resources while, at the same time, ensuring a "future generation" that will be at odds with the parental generation; a social destabilizing influence.

In Rwanda, the former government's minister of women and families--a woman--organized the rape campaign as a tool to break whatever spirit was left in the Tutsi community as they were slaughtered. She actually led rape teams in the streets. Later she was the first woman convicted of crimes against humanity. The aftermath of that rape campaign is still unfolding as victims and their children die of AIDS

That program of rape morphed in the Congo where social norms already allowed male dominance and sexual mores tied to that dominance allowed men to demand sex at will. As the Congo war spiraled into a mix of militias and proxies, the rape phenomenon spread and now includes predatory sex against children under age 10 in some recorded cases as young as four.

Tom

[William F. Owen]

In Rwanda, the former government's minister of women and families--a woman--organized the rape campaign as a tool to break whatever spirit was left in the Tutsi community as they were slaughtered. She actually led rape teams in the streets. Later she was the first woman convicted of crimes against humanity. The aftermath of that rape campaign is still unfolding as victims and their children die of AIDS

Tom, that is extremely interesting and gives some indications as to how some societies view the political dimension of violence.



Really, it's more of a tactic that has strategic implications (like terrorism ;)). In many cultures, "rape" is considered to be the woman's fault, and serves to a) cut her off from her support network while, at the same time, b) shaming / dishonouring her male relatives ("'real' men can protect their women!"). As such, it doubly weakens a targeted population.

While not excusing the depravity of this, all tactics should have a relationship to the political aims, so I see your point. Rape is violence and thus violence can be applied to in pursuit of political aims.

Based on that sad fact, rape makes far more sense than "economic" or "cyber" warfare, both of which lack violence as a component. This would also clarify the difference between "warfare" and "strategy."

Good stuff guys. Thanks.

[marct]

Hi Wilf,


Based on that sad fact, rape makes far more sense than "economic" or "cyber" warfare, both of which lack violence as a component. This would also clarify the difference between "warfare" and "strategy."

I've been spending a lot of time over the past year or so thinking about conceptualizations of "violence", motivations for different types, etc. One of the models I'm trying to put together concerns the emergence of differing conventions (in the very broad sense) in situations of rapid environmental change (and by that I mean, physical, economic, social, cultural, etc. environments). What is really striking me as I try and untangle all the stuff I'm looking at is that for the past 10-12,000 years or so, we have really done ourselves a disservice (i.e. shot ourselves in the foot if not higher).

One thing that really stands out for me is how we have parsed the concept of "conflict" and "conflict resolution". Violence in the physical/kinetic sense is, to my mind, only one form of conflict / conflict resolution. If we go back to basic motivations for conflict, most of them seem, to me at least, to break down into one person/group trying access "scarce" resources and the consequent "power" that control over those resources represents and, once they gain control over them, trying to maintain that control.

The question of how you get (and maintain) this control, then, flips over into the development of "conventions" that limit the destructiveness of the inter-socially accepted tactics used; i.e. it develops "conventions". Sahlins talks about this a bit in Stone Age Economics (http://www.amazon.com/Stone-Age-Economics-Marshall-Sahlins/dp/0202010996/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1243792769&sr=8-1) in reference to really "early" social forms, but there are a lot of more modern example. These conventions, in turn, rely on a fairly stable set of environments and, if they are going to survive, they have to limit the destruction they accept to the carrying capacity of those semi-stable environments. In some cases, there may even be "positive" (at the group / population level) outcomes associated with a particular set of conventions.

But, while all of the seperate "conventions" may be structurally similar (in the sense of structural relationships), there are always specific differences. Even trickier that one of those structural regularities appears to be related to the "carrying capacity" of key environmental sectors. When this is coupled in with conflicts between different "conventions" adapted for different environments, things can get pretty wonky.

Let me go back to the rape example. Most cultures have some form of control over what's called "birth spacing"; i.e. how much time there is between pregancies. In fairly stable environments, this ends up being a fairly simply predator-prey model (even if the "prey" is vegetables :D) where the population fluctuates in response to food availability. When you get too much population, you usually find the appearance of population "sinks" including warfare, (cf. Henri Pirenne on the Crusades), disease (look at the death rates in medieval and Rennaisance cities), etc. It's the "Too many rats in the box, Jordy" phenomenon.

So, when you have a conflict between groups which are pretty finely balanced in terms of population carrying capacity, rape makes for a really good way to destabilize your opponents by forcing them to expend resources either in terms of child care / raising or in terms of fertile women. The former reduces the amount of resources your opponent can expend on a per capita basis, while the latter reduces your productive population base, and both have significant psychological impaqcts (read neuroses) on the target populations, which further reduces their ability to resist your attempts to gain / maintain control over resources.

When we get to the "competing conventions" point, things get even worse. Cultures can adapt to a convention of mutual rape as a weapon (there are certainly enough examples of this historically and, as Tom was mentioning, it seems to be gaining ground as a convention in the Congo). Where the really tricky part comes in is when the conventions developed around totally different "environments". For example, the original "command economies" - the Sumerian city states, not the Soviets ;) - had a totally different set of conventions from both the mountain tribes and the desert tribes they had to deal with (Iraq is still dealing with this!).

It's this "competing conventions" point that, I think, underlies a lot of our current (and past!) problems. At the same time, I would suggest that the conventions define what is perceived as a battlespace which, in turn, influences the resources aimed for, the tactics chosen, and, in effect, the entire stratgic "plan". Rob and I have talked a bit about this, and it is behind a lot of my comments on, for example, SFA planning and design. Now, I'm certainly not saying that violent, kinetic conflict doesn't takes place - that would be nuts! However, what I am saying is that the tactics and strategies of conflict will depend on the conventions of the combatants which, in turn, depends on what resources they see as core.

Let me take an organizational example for a minute. Fairly "classic", post-War compromise bureaucratic organizations (aka "Taylorist" or "Fordist" in a lot of the literature) identify bodies with limited skills as the core "resource", extended by specific technology. In military terms, think Industrial Age armies from William the Silent to ~1980's / 90's (FCS is sort of the last gasp of this thinking). Compare this with, for example, the hight tech, "project-based" type of organization that really starts appearing in the 1970's-80's where the core "resource" is the ability to think (Hezbolah in 2006 is one form of this, the rise of PMC's another, while AQ's current concentration as a PR/Propaganda group is a third). In this case, "bodies" can be "outsourced" by manipulating your "opponent" into creating them (cf Kilcullen's concept of accidental guerrilas as one form, while the PMC's hiring of US vets is another [minimal training cost]).

You know, all of this is a roundabout way of getting back to your comment about economic and cyber warfare :D. Economic warfare has been the hallmark of the Industrial Age from ca. 1570 or so until the 1980's - the core resources have been physical, material parts of "reality" (land, coal, iron, petroleum, etc.), and our economies have expanded to require them (and, and important point, our populations as well).

But there is one major problem with Industrial Age organizations - they are "soulless" and just don't give people much sense of "meaning" in existential terms. Most people, at least in the West, are just tired of the "Grand Narratives" - my guess as to why is that we have had our noses rubbed in the hypocrisy of the institutions responsible for them too often (I suspect that we see a similar reaction in the Middle East and Africa in response to the Grand Narratives of nationalism, industrialization, "development", etc.).

As a side note, but illustrative of this, I was listening to Tom Barnett last year as he was talking about where conflicts would be happening over the next century as part of the march of glabalization. At one point, I leaned over to the MG sitting next to me and murmered "doesn't it make you feel all warm and fuzzy that we'll be fighting to guarentee corporate profits?" I thought he would crack up out loud, but he just snorted and whispered back something cynical, the content of which, I suspect Tom would approve of.

Back on topic (sheesh I'm rambling!)....

As I was saying, economic warfare has been a hallmark of the Industrial Age, and Cyber-warfare, at least in the sense of hacking / cracking, interceptions, spying, manipulation of electronic economic systems, etc. is just an extension of the Industrial Age thinking about spying and economic warfare. What we are seeing with AQ and many other extremist groups is a totally different battlespace - they are aiming at our "souls"; our sense of meaning.

You know, I think I had better stop now before I ramble on even more ;).

[Ken White]

I'd agree that most conflicts were over resources but there are some that are simply about power. Much else to agree with in that Post. A lot, however, seems to have little bearing on rape as a weapon. :wry:

This is interesting, however:
"At one point, I leaned over to the MG sitting next to me and murmered "doesn't it make you feel all warm and fuzzy that we'll be fighting to guarentee corporate profits?" I thought he would crack up out loud, but he just snorted and whispered back something cynical, the content of which, I suspect Tom would approve of."Well, given the option of fighting for corporate profits -- the essential driver of British and US fighting for a great many years -- and the other options; religion, ideology for a couple of examples, I think the corporate profit bit has done more good and less harm by most measures. FWIW, I disagree with Barnett on many things and the 'fact' that there will be these wars and the Gap will be problematical are among them. Pundits -- and he has regressed to that -- will usually get as much wrong as they get right and basing anything of substance on a 50 percent solution doesn't seem smart to me..

In any event, I'm unsure of the "why say that" factor for your comment -- as for the Major General, I've met some smart ones. Met some who weren't as well...

Long way of saying that fighting for corporate interests has been broadly successful and beneficial to most of the world, whereas the ideological and / or religiously fervent types who aim for our souls -- not so much. They have no staying power when the initiating generation dies. ;)

[marct]

Hi Ken,

Well, I'll admit I tend to use theological terms for a lot of things that aren't necessarily theological per se; bad habit I picked up, I'll admit, but I tend to think its better to say "souls" than something like "the inanate, existential drive shared by all members of the species to 'belong', to believe that their lives serve some purpose and hold some mean".... "Souls" is just more parsimonious ;).


I'd agree that most conflicts were over resources but there are some that are simply about power. Much else to agree with in that Post. A lot, however, seems to have little bearing on rape as a weapon.

True, I'm afraid my brain goes into these "moments" every now and again ;). BTW, I would argue that "power" is just another way of saying "resources", especially if we are using the Galbraith forms of power.

If we go back to the earliest indicators of organized conflict of the kinetic variety (sheesh, I'm sounding like an academic again!) - okay, "warfare" - it seems to have been based around raiding with particular resources, including women, as a key goal. Given that a lot of groups were pretty small in terms of numbers, that actually does make sense at the population genertics level.

As for the rest having little bearing, okay, you're right - my mind was "theorizing" again....


Well, given the option of fighting for corporate profits -- the essential driver of British and US fighting for a great many years -- and the other options; religion, ideology for a couple of examples, I think the corporate profit bit has done more good and less harm by most measures.

On the whole, and taking a really long view, I would tend to agree, especially if we define the Good as "the increase of individual potentiality". Certainly it was a major driver in most of the Industrial Age wars from the Dutch revolt through to the modern era. Where I think the divergence is happening is in where those corporations are based, which is increasingly internationally rather than within the boundaries of a nation state (yeah, I know, that's being going on for quite a while now, but it is getting more spread out). So, for example, fighting a proxy war for the British East India Company in China directly benefited Britain and, to a lesser degree, India. Is the same true today? I really have to wonder...


FWIW, I disagree with Barnett on many things and the 'fact' that there will be these wars and the Gap will be problematical are among them.

I think that it is a "plausible" scenario, but that many of the grounds of his underlying assumptions are becoming increasingly divorced from reality. For one thing, it is all predicated on the current energy regime, and that may well be blown out of the water in the next 5-10 years.


In any event, I'm unsure of the "why say that" factor for your comment -- as for the Major General, I've met some smart ones. Met some who weren't as well...

Ahhh, sorry, being way too cryptic - it was the paradox of trying to motivate people to fight for something that wouldn't benefit them directly and for an interest group that is increasingly getting a bad public odour. I mean, seriously, how would you motivate a group of soldiers to fight for Madoff :wry:?


Long way of saying that fighting for corporate interests has been broadly successful and beneficial to most of the world, whereas the ideological and / or religiously fervent types who aim for our souls -- not so much. They have no staying power when the initiating generation dies.

Oh, I think we'll have to disagree on that - I think they have a remarkably consistent staying power. Then again, I think their main motivation is based on gaining ego-centric control of power structures and a totally psychotic joys in telling people what to do "or else" ;).

[slapout9]

Hi Wilf,



I've been spending a lot of time over the past year or so thinking about conceptualizations of "violence", motivations for different types, etc. One of the models I'm trying to put together concerns the emergence of differing conventions (in the very broad sense) in situations of rapid environmental change (and by that I mean, physical, economic, social, cultural, etc. environments). What is really striking me as I try and untangle all the stuff I'm looking at is that for the past 10-12,000 years or so, we have really done ourselves a disservice (i.e. shot ourselves in the foot if not higher).

One thing that really stands out for me is how we have parsed the concept of "conflict" and "conflict resolution". Violence in the physical/kinetic sense is, to my mind, only one form of conflict / conflict resolution. If we go back to basic motivations for conflict, most of them seem, to me at least, to break down into one person/group trying access "scarce" resources and the consequent "power" that control over those resources represents and, once they gain control over them, trying to maintain that control.

The question of how you get (and maintain) this control, then, flips over into the development of "conventions" that limit the destructiveness of the inter-socially accepted tactics used; i.e. it develops "conventions". Sahlins talks about this a bit in Stone Age Economics (http://www.amazon.com/Stone-Age-Economics-Marshall-Sahlins/dp/0202010996/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1243792769&sr=8-1) in reference to really "early" social forms, but there are a lot of more modern example. These conventions, in turn, rely on a fairly stable set of environments and, if they are going to survive, they have to limit the destruction they accept to the carrying capacity of those semi-stable environments. In some cases, there may even be "positive" (at the group / population level) outcomes associated with a particular set of conventions.

But, while all of the seperate "conventions" may be structurally similar (in the sense of structural relationships), there are always specific differences. Even trickier that one of those structural regularities appears to be related to the "carrying capacity" of key environmental sectors. When this is coupled in with conflicts between different "conventions" adapted for different environments, things can get pretty wonky.

Let me go back to the rape example. Most cultures have some form of control over what's called "birth spacing"; i.e. how much time there is between pregancies. In fairly stable environments, this ends up being a fairly simply predator-prey model (even if the "prey" is vegetables :D) where the population fluctuates in response to food availability. When you get too much population, you usually find the appearance of population "sinks" including warfare, (cf. Henri Pirenne on the Crusades), disease (look at the death rates in medieval and Rennaisance cities), etc. It's the "Too many rats in the box, Jordy" phenomenon.

So, when you have a conflict between groups which are pretty finely balanced in terms of population carrying capacity, rape makes for a really good way to destabilize your opponents by forcing them to expend resources either in terms of child care / raising or in terms of fertile women. The former reduces the amount of resources your opponent can expend on a per capita basis, while the latter reduces your productive population base, and both have significant psychological impaqcts (read neuroses) on the target populations, which further reduces their ability to resist your attempts to gain / maintain control over resources.

When we get to the "competing conventions" point, things get even worse. Cultures can adapt to a convention of mutual rape as a weapon (there are certainly enough examples of this historically and, as Tom was mentioning, it seems to be gaining ground as a convention in the Congo). Where the really tricky part comes in is when the conventions developed around totally different "environments". For example, the original "command economies" - the Sumerian city states, not the Soviets ;) - had a totally different set of conventions from both the mountain tribes and the desert tribes they had to deal with (Iraq is still dealing with this!).

It's this "competing conventions" point that, I think, underlies a lot of our current (and past!) problems. At the same time, I would suggest that the conventions define what is perceived as a battlespace which, in turn, influences the resources aimed for, the tactics chosen, and, in effect, the entire stratgic "plan". Rob and I have talked a bit about this, and it is behind a lot of my comments on, for example, SFA planning and design. Now, I'm certainly not saying that violent, kinetic conflict doesn't takes place - that would be nuts! However, what I am saying is that the tactics and strategies of conflict will depend on the conventions of the combatants which, in turn, depends on what resources they see as core.

Let me take an organizational example for a minute. Fairly "classic", post-War compromise bureaucratic organizations (aka "Taylorist" or "Fordist" in a lot of the literature) identify bodies with limited skills as the core "resource", extended by specific technology. In military terms, think Industrial Age armies from William the Silent to ~1980's / 90's (FCS is sort of the last gasp of this thinking). Compare this with, for example, the hight tech, "project-based" type of organization that really starts appearing in the 1970's-80's where the core "resource" is the ability to think (Hezbolah in 2006 is one form of this, the rise of PMC's another, while AQ's current concentration as a PR/Propaganda group is a third). In this case, "bodies" can be "outsourced" by manipulating your "opponent" into creating them (cf Kilcullen's concept of accidental guerrilas as one form, while the PMC's hiring of US vets is another [minimal training cost]).

You know, all of this is a roundabout way of getting back to your comment about economic and cyber warfare :D. Economic warfare has been the hallmark of the Industrial Age from ca. 1570 or so until the 1980's - the core resources have been physical, material parts of "reality" (land, coal, iron, petroleum, etc.), and our economies have expanded to require them (and, and important point, our populations as well).

But there is one major problem with Industrial Age organizations - they are "soulless" and just don't give people much sense of "meaning" in existential terms. Most people, at least in the West, are just tired of the "Grand Narratives" - my guess as to why is that we have had our noses rubbed in the hypocrisy of the institutions responsible for them too often (I suspect that we see a similar reaction in the Middle East and Africa in response to the Grand Narratives of nationalism, industrialization, "development", etc.).

As a side note, but illustrative of this, I was listening to Tom Barnett last year as he was talking about where conflicts would be happening over the next century as part of the march of glabalization. At one point, I leaned over to the MG sitting next to me and murmered "doesn't it make you feel all warm and fuzzy that we'll be fighting to guarentee corporate profits?" I thought he would crack up out loud, but he just snorted and whispered back something cynical, the content of which, I suspect Tom would approve of.

Back on topic (sheesh I'm rambling!)....

As I was saying, economic warfare has been a hallmark of the Industrial Age, and Cyber-warfare, at least in the sense of hacking / cracking, interceptions, spying, manipulation of electronic economic systems, etc. is just an extension of the Industrial Age thinking about spying and economic warfare. What we are seeing with AQ and many other extremist groups is a totally different battlespace - they are aiming at our "souls"; our sense of meaning.

You know, I think I had better stop now before I ramble on even more ;).

That is some outstanding stuff Marct.

[IntelTrooper]

Long way of saying that fighting for corporate interests has been broadly successful and beneficial to most of the world, whereas the ideological and / or religiously fervent types who aim for our souls -- not so much. They have no staying power when the initiating generation dies. ;)

Well now, there's no reason we can't do both at the same time, is there? :wry:

[Ken White]

True, I'm afraid my brain goes into these "moments" every now and again ;). BTW, I would argue that "power" is just another way of saying "resources", especially if we are using the Galbraith forms of power.Not a Galbraith fan, either. So I was not; you of course, may do so... ;)
So, for example, fighting a proxy war for the British East India Company in China directly benefited Britain and, to a lesser degree, India. Is the same true today? I really have to wonder...Understandable. The wondering, I mean. Still, all things considered it's better than the alternatives. If the system over reaches -- as it has -- it gets corrected, usually (Though we are not doing a great job thus far; but that's another Thread).
Ahhh, sorry, being way too cryptic - it was the paradox of trying to motivate people to fight for something that wouldn't benefit them directly and for an interest group that is increasingly getting a bad public odour. I mean, seriously, how would you motivate a group of soldiers to fight for Madoff ?It wasn't cryptic. Not at all. Most people do not and generally will not fight for something that benefits them directly. The answer to your final question is that Madoff is totally irrelevant to why soldiers fight.
Oh, I think we'll have to disagree on that - I think they have a remarkably consistent staying power. Then again, I think their main motivation is based on gaining ego-centric control of power structures and a totally psychotic joys in telling people what to do "or else" ;).We can disagree. Glad to see you endorse 'power' in a non-Galbraithian sense.

I won't be around long enough when they sputter and die out to say "I told you so" so you can consider it said now and hang on to it for less than 20 years from today. :D

[marct]

Not a Galbraith fan, either. So I was not; you of course, may do so... ;)....
We can disagree. Glad to see you endorse 'power' in a non-Galbraithian sense.

I always thought he was way too materialistic, sort of analogous to the behaviouralists like Skinner or Pavlov in psychology. Personally, I think the two best theoreticians on "power" right now are Stewart Clegg and Starhawk. Stewart really captures how systems of power operate, and Starhawk really gets how they are constructed and overthrown.


I won't be around long enough when they sputter and die out to say "I told you so" so you can consider it said now and hang on to it for less than 20 years from today. :D

Oh, I doubt you will see them dying out. First off, I fully expect you to be around in 20 years, and second, I'm pretty sure we 20 years from now will just show us another bunch of ego-centric psychotics wanting to control the world ;). 100 years from now, OTOH, will be another story...

[slapout9]

I always thought he was way too materialistic, sort of analogous to the behaviouralists like Skinner or Pavlov in psychology.


Oh that is all skint up and stuff:wry:

[Schmedlap]

Long way of saying that fighting for corporate interests has been broadly successful and beneficial to most of the world, whereas the ideological and / or religiously fervent types who aim for our souls -- not so much. They have no staying power when the initiating generation dies. ;)
The "corporate interest" angle sounds like something that could evolve into about 15 different threads. It sounds both too vague and too sweeping. I would simply rebut that if a competitive interest must be fought for, rather than achieved through hard work and creativity, then it was probably not the most beneficial outcome of the available alternatives. It just happens to be one that we look at afterwards and say, "okay, this ain't bad."

Regarding the "religiously" fervent types, do they really lack staying power beyond the initiating generation? I'm not so sure. Muhammed spread Islam by the sword and the Middle East remains Islamic, aside from a small strip of land called Israel. Islam arrived in the Balkans when the conquering Turks introduced it hundreds of years ago. It remains there today. They still practice Sufi Islam and still brew Turkish coffee (bring your own cup - theirs are about the size of shot glasses).

[Ken White]

Oh, I doubt you will see them dying out. First off, I fully expect you to be around in 20 years, and second, I'm pretty sure we 20 years from now will just show us another bunch of ego-centric psychotics wanting to control the world ;). 100 years from now, OTOH, will be another story...than a few years but I suspect a body that has, as they say, been rode hard and put up wet isn't likely to cooperate. :cool:

I meant the current crop of leaders will be gone within 20 years and their various organizations will morph to less deadly variants -- to be replaced, as you say, by a totally new batch of nut cases with a different agenda to cause minor panic and showcase the general failure of the west to rapidly adapt. :eek:

Schmedlap also suspects that you're correct. I certainly could be wrong and he and you correct. He says the religiously fervent types will outlast the current generation. He correctly ascribes it to a generation rather than my 20 years, picked as a number because these guys are really at the end of their generation which came to the fore after the Six Day war and the War of Attrition embarrassed them and gave them a 'cause' (thus my 20 years was a very conservative estimate -- I suspect it will be somewhat sooner).

To be sure they will have followers and successors, religion has great staying power -- but it changes with the times or slightly behind them. Some religions are further behind the times but today rapid global communications will put put significant pressure on them.

Regardless, history, I think is generally on my side with respect to the extreme ideologies and religious zealots -- the ideology and the religion stay, however the zealotry and / or fanatacism tend to be countered, seen as excessive, annoy a great many potential supporters and turn off many nominally disinterested observers. Their excesses hurt them and their cause and thus as the hard core die, the movement usually dissipates and morphs to either underground or less rabid manifestations. Y'all check it out in 2029 and send me a wire... ;)

Zealotry from any source is counterproductive and dangerous, thus you'd think we'd be smart enough to avoid it. Not so, each new generation brings a fresh crop -- usually with different agendas than their predecessors. Can't emulate the preceding generation...

[Surferbeetle]

...a very interesting post.

Marc,

If you have a paper or two to share I am always interested in reading them...and perhaps one of these times I will be able to provide some helpful comments :o



I've been spending a lot of time over the past year or so thinking about conceptualizations of "violence", motivations for different types, etc. One of the models I'm trying to put together concerns the emergence of differing conventions (in the very broad sense) in situations of rapid environmental change (and by that I mean, physical, economic, social, cultural, etc. environments). What is really striking me as I try and untangle all the stuff I'm looking at is that for the past 10-12,000 years or so, we have really done ourselves a disservice (i.e. shot ourselves in the foot if not higher).

One thing that really stands out for me is how we have parsed the concept of "conflict" and "conflict resolution". Violence in the physical/kinetic sense is, to my mind, only one form of conflict / conflict resolution. If we go back to basic motivations for conflict, most of them seem, to me at least, to break down into one person/group trying access "scarce" resources and the consequent "power" that control over those resources represents and, once they gain control over them, trying to maintain that control.

G.F. Gause, a Russian Microbiologist, took a look at the responses of pairs of protozoan and yeast species in homogeneous environments back in the 1930's and quantified resulting growth rates. The results were something we all intuitively know, competition creates winners and losers, but he is credited with Gause's Competitive Exclusion Principle (http://www.ggause.com/gfg06.htm)

The Lotka and Volterra equations (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Competitive_Lotka-Volterra_equations), developed in the 1920's, are in this vein of inquiry. Wolfram's mathworld is an interesting place and has an entry on these equations (http://mathworld.wolfram.com/Lotka-VolterraEquations.html).


As I was saying, economic warfare has been a hallmark of the Industrial Age, and Cyber-warfare, at least in the sense of hacking / cracking, interceptions, spying, manipulation of electronic economic systems, etc. is just an extension of the Industrial Age thinking about spying and economic warfare. What we are seeing with AQ and many other extremist groups is a totally different battlespace - they are aiming at our "souls"; our sense of meaning.

I would love to work on this one this evening but will have to save it for another day...

Best,

Steve

[marct]

Hey Steve,


If you have a paper or two to share I am always interested in reading them...and perhaps one of these times I will be able to provide some helpful comments :o

I'll be putting one together over the summer and I'll be glad to shoot it off to you. As always, please rip it apart ;).


The Lotka and Volterra equations (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Competitive_Lotka-Volterra_equations), developed in the 1920's, are in this vein of inquiry. Wolfram's mathworld is an interesting place and has an entry on these equations (http://mathworld.wolfram.com/Lotka-VolterraEquations.html).

Thanks for the source! I've been rereading Lotka's elements of mathematical biology, but my math skills are pretty weak :wry:.

Cheers,

Marc