PDA

View Full Version : How Sri Lanka defeated the LTTE



SWJED
07-03-2006, 01:15 AM
2 July Associated Press - Sri Lanka Entering 'Low-Intensity' War (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/07/02/AR2006070200297.html).


... A year ago they called it a "Shadow War." Not anymore...

Four years after a cease-fire raised hopes for peace between the government and Tamil Tiger rebels, Sri Lanka is teetering on the brink.

The brink of what remains the question.

Naval battles, suicide bombings and jungle clashes have once again become the norm on this tropical island that for two decades has been largely known for the ferocious ethnic struggle between its Hindu Tamil minority and its Buddhist Sinhalese majority.

Still, the government and Tigers insist they are abiding by the truce, even as they settle into a pattern of attack and retaliation, with plenty of saber-rattling in between...

The roots of Sri Lanka's conflict stretch back to the years after independence from Britain in 1948, when the government made Sinhala the official language, gave Buddhism a prominent role and Tamils faced widespread discrimination in schools and jobs.

In 1983, a spasm of anti-Tamil violence that killed hundreds sparked war. Each side fought viciously: the Tigers used suicide bombings and murdered rival Tamil militants; the government routinely tortured Tamil civilians. The death toll stood at more than 65,000 when the cease-fire was signed in 2002.

By then, the rebel Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam controlled wide swaths of the north and east where they have a country complete with border guards and traffic police...

The inner workings of the Tiger leadership remain a mystery to outsiders, and there's widespread speculation about their motives for attacks such as a June 15 bus bombing that killed 64 civilians, most Sinhalese.

Many say the Tigers are simply trying to push the government to grant broad autonomy over the territories they control. Others warn the rebels could be softening up government forces ahead of the rainy season, which starts in August, when the government's armored vehicles would be bogged down in mud.

The government's motives are clearer - it faces pressure from hard-line political allies, generals and Sinhalese nationalists to destroy the Tigers...

Background links:


CIA World Factbook (http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ce.html)
State Department Background Note (http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5249.htm)
BBC Country Profile (http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/country_profiles/1168427.stm)
Library of Congress Country Study (http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/lktoc.html)
Global Security Tamil Tiger Page (http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/ltte.htm)
Wikipedia: Tamil Tigers (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tamil_Tigers)
Tamil Tigers Web Page (http://www.tamiltigers.net/)
Tamil Eelam Web Page (http://www.eelam.com/)

SWJED
07-03-2006, 02:28 AM
2 July Reuters - Tamil Tigers: Child Fighter Claims High (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/07/02/AR2006070200230.html).


Claiming they have just trained 6,000 civilians in armed combat, the Tamil Tigers accused the United Nations on Sunday of exaggerating the number of child fighters in the rebels' ranks.

A 2002 cease-fire between the Sinhalese-dominated government and Tamil rebels is rapidly deteriorating, with rising violence killing more than 700 people since April in this island nation off the southern tip of India.

A statement on the rebel group's Web site challenged UNICEF's claim that 1,387 children were among its fighters and said more than 800 of those listed were over 18 years old. Tamil Tigers have admitted to using children to fight their separatist war but have pledged to stop the practice...

Related:


Small Wars Journal: Child Soldiers - Warriors of Despair (http://www.smallwarsjournal.com/documents/swjmag/v2/sullivan.htm)
CETO: Child Soldiers - Implications for U.S. Forces (http://www.ceto.quantico.usmc.mil/studies/ChildSoldiersFinal.pdf)

Jedburgh
10-01-2006, 03:46 AM
From the 30 Sep 06 Baltimore Sun: 6 Charged in MD Arms Deal Sting (http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/custom/attack/bal-te.md.terror30sep30,0,6442415.story?coll=bal-home-headlines)

...The elaborate sting operation took center stage in Baltimore this summer, where federal agents put up a Singapore arms broker at a four-star Inner Harbor hotel, arranged for him to attend religious services at a mosque in Laurel and took him to a shooting range in Harford County so he could test-fire machine guns they said he was interested in illegally buying.

The ruse, authorities said, led representatives for the Tamil Tigers insurgents in Sri Lanka to deposit $700,000 with undercover agents as a down payment for millions of dollars in sniper rifles, submachine guns and grenade launchers. The arms dealers also inquired about unmanned air vehicles and buying surface-to-air missiles to shoot down Israeli-built aircraft in Sri Lanka, according to federal court papers...

Jesse9252
03-27-2007, 02:02 AM
COLOMBO (Reuters) - A Tamil Tiger light aircraft bombed a Sri Lankan air force base next to Colombo international airport before dawn on Monday, killing three airmen and wounding 16 in the first such air strike by the rebel group.

The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) said more such attacks by its air wing would follow, threatening to deepen renewed conflict in the island state off the toe of India.

Airline and government officials said the civilian airport, 23 miles north of the capital, was not damaged but was closed for several hours following the attack.

The military said the bombs hit a barracks, and that none of its aircraft was damaged. Sri Lanka's stock market fell in early trade following the attack.

"A light Tiger aircraft flew over the air force base and dropped explosives. There have been two explosions. At the same time our air defenses activated and there is a search operation going on," said an air force spokesman, Group Captain Ajantha de Silva.

Taken from http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/03/26/AR2007032601734.html

Pictures can be found at this Tamil website http://www.tamilnet.com/art.html?catid=13&artid=21668

The Air Force fighter jocks must be thrilled by the prospect of A2A combat in small wars!

Jedburgh
05-31-2007, 06:19 PM
ICG, 29 May 07: Sri Lanka's Muslims: Caught in the Crossfire (http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/asia/south_asia/sri_lanka/134_sri_lanka_s_muslims_caught_in_the_crossfire.pd f)

...The Muslims are the forgotten party in the Sri Lankan conflict. They have never resorted to violence to achieve their aims and so have never been properly consulted on how to end the conflict. With the new war in the east, they again are caught in the crossfire. Any initial support for the government’s offensive is waning as the TMVP replaces the LTTE as a threat, and Muslims once more face serious insecurity and concerns about Sinhalese nationalism....

Abu Buckwheat
06-01-2007, 04:14 AM
Seems to me SL has been in Low Intensity war for about 20 years now... the fighting has been far worse and the terrorism much more intense a decade ago ... is this another case of mastering the obvious by a writer who just heard about the SL war? I am sure it is.

Jedburgh
06-12-2007, 10:03 PM
The Economist, 7 Jun 07: A War Strange as Fiction (http://www.economist.com/world/displaystory.cfm?story_id=9299003)

...an ugly war that has claimed over 70,000 lives flickers and, as currently, flares. Last year, according to official figures, more people died violently in Sri Lanka than in Afghanistan. In the past 18 months over 5,000 have been killed, compared with fewer than 200 in the previous three years. Sri Lankan pundits are calling this violence “Eelam War IV”: the fourth round in the struggle for an Eelam, or independent Tamil homeland. A ceasefire, brokered by Norway in 2002, is officially still in place. Yet government and Tigers are both preparing for bigger battles. A peaceful resolution to Sri Lanka's conflict may never have looked less possible....

Jedburgh
06-18-2007, 01:23 PM
ICG, 14 Jun 07: Sri Lanka's Human Rights Crisis (http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/asia/south_asia/135_sri_lanka_s_human_rights_crisis.pdf)

II. HOW NOT TO FIGHT AN INSURGENCY

“Yes, we can beat the Tigers, and no, we ain’t headed that-away”, Dayan Jayatilleka, Sri Lankan Ambassador to the UN in Geneva.

Previous government attempts to combat Tamil nationalist militancy have all been accompanied by serious human rights abuses. Not coincidentally, all have failed. From the late 1970s onwards, government policy has been characterised by tough anti-terrorism laws and harsh police action against alleged militants, while successive administrations have ignored underlying political grievances. Government repression fuelled violent reaction and provided popular support to what were initially small and marginal groups in Tamil society.

The cumulative effect has been disastrous....

SteveMetz
06-18-2007, 01:27 PM
From the 30 Sep 06 Baltimore Sun: 6 Charged in MD Arms Deal Sting (http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/custom/attack/bal-te.md.terror30sep30,0,6442415.story?coll=bal-home-headlines)


Geez, I could have shown the guy Baltimore neighborhoods where he could have just bought machine guns off the street. Much less risky.

The Singapore connection is interesting. The Tamil Tigers have probably made as much use of a global diaspora community as any insurgency (save perhaps the IRA).

Jedburgh
06-18-2007, 01:54 PM
...The Tamil Tigers have probably made as much use of a global diaspora community as any insurgency (save perhaps the IRA).
In the 2001 RAND pub, Trends in Outside Support for Insurgencies (http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/2007/MR1405.pdf), The LTTE is the focus of Chapter 3: Diaspora Support for Insurgencies.

...This chapter analyzes the scope and dimensions of diaspora support for insurgencies. It provides an in-depth examination of how the LTTE has harnessed its overseas migrant community, using it for funding, arms running, and a host of other activities. The LTTE's experience is not typical, but rather represents the apex of how an insurgent organization can exploit a diaspora for its own ends. Drawing on the LTTE's experience, as well as that of other insurgencies, the chapter then describes the reasons why immigrant communities often support insurgencies in their native lands and examines the difficulties that many host governments have in halting this form of assistance. The chapter concludes with a brief discussion of the utility of diaspora backing in general and its value relative to states....

SteveMetz
06-18-2007, 01:56 PM
In the 2001 RAND pub, Trends in Outside Support for Insurgencies (http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/2007/MR1405.pdf), The LTTE is the focus of Chapter 3: Diaspora Support for Insurgencies.

I once bought a suit from a Tamil tailor in Singapore so, unfortunately, I may have underwritten an RPG myself.

There's a huge Tamil population in Canada as well.

Jedburgh
08-11-2007, 11:50 AM
HRW, 6 Aug 07: Return to War: Human Rights under Siege (http://hrw.org/reports/2007/srilanka0807/srilanka0807webwcover.pdf)

Sri Lanka is in the midst of a human rights crisis. The ceasefire between the government and the armed secessionist Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) exists only in name. Since mid-2006, when major military operations resumed, civilians have paid a heavy price, both directly in the fighting and in the dramatic increase in abductions, killings, and “disappearances.” The return to war has brought serious violations of international human rights and humanitarian law.

The LTTE is much to blame. The group, fighting for an independent Tamil state, has directly targeted civilians with remote-controlled landmines and suicide bombers, murdered perceived political opponents, and forcibly recruited ethnic Tamils into its forces, many of them children. In the areas of the country’s north and east under its control, the LTTE harshly represses the rights to free expression, association, and movement....

Human Rights Watch has long documented abuses by the LTTE, particularly the LTTE’s systematic recruitment and use of children as soldiers, the targeted killings of political opponents, and its abusive fundraising tactics abroad. We will continue to report on LTTE abuses and press the LTTE to change its practices.

This report, however, focuses primarily on abuses by the Sri Lankan government and allied armed groups, which have gotten decidedly worse over the past year. As the hostilities have increased, the government’s respect for international law has sharply declined, with it often appearing indifferent to the impact on civilians in the north and east....
Complete 131 page report at the link.

Jedburgh
11-08-2007, 01:50 PM
ICG, 7 Nov 07: Sri Lanka: Sinhala Nationalism and the Elusive Southern Consensus (http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/asia/south_asia/sri_lanka/sri_lanka___sinhala_nationalism_and_the_elusive_so uthern_consensus.pdf)

....Peace is a long way off. The LTTE has demonstrated a clear lack of interest in a negotiated settlement. The government is beholden to and sympathetic with forces that conceive of Sri Lanka as an essentially Sinhala and Buddhist nation. Denying the existence of legitimate grievances specific to Tamils and the need to accommodate their concerns in a settlement, the politically dominant forms of contemporary Sinhala nationalism assert that the central problem is a terrorist threat that needs to be crushed.

Despite claims to be committed to a political solution, the decision to rely on hardline Sinhala nationalist parties with an ideological commitment to the unitary state has left the government with little option other than to pursue the LTTE’s military defeat. Any meaningful southern consensus on devolution – necessary for a lasting solution – will take time but without much stronger international efforts to persuade both the government and the UNP to find common ground beyond unitary and federal labels, there is little chance the APRC will produce a political package attractive to Tamil moderates and able to win two-thirds support in parliament. Reaching a sustainable settlement will be even harder if government plans to establish new Sinhala settlements and weaken the power of Tamil and Muslim political parties and civil servants in the Eastern Province are in fact carried out....

Jedburgh
12-15-2007, 07:16 PM
The East-West Center, 14 Dec 07:

Muslim Perspectives on the Sri Lankan Conflict (http://www.eastwestcenter.org/fileadmin/stored/pdfs/ps041.pdf)

The Sri Lankan ethnic conflict is often regarded as a two-way contest between the Sinhala majority and the Tamil minority, ignoring the interests and concerns of the island's 8 percent Muslim (or "Moorish") minority. One-third of Sri Lanka's Muslims are concentrated in towns and districts located within the Tamil-speaking agricultural northeast, a region envisioned as independent "Tamil Eelam" by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). In the postindependence period, the Muslim leadership at the national level abandoned their colonial identity as Arabs ("Moors") and adopted a religious identity as Muslims, clearly defining their ethnicity as neither Sinhala nor Tamil. Muslim politicians emphasized coalition politics with mainstream Sinhala parties until the outbreak of the armed Tamil secessionist campaign in the 1980s. Since then, Muslim communities in the northeast have suffered violence and dispossession at the hands of the LTTE, and they have been harmed by indiscriminate military campaigns conducted by the Sri Lankan armed forces. A Muslim political party, the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress, was formed in the 1980s to defend the security of the northeastern Muslims, and it has sought to secure an equal role for the Muslims in peace negotiations following the Ceasefire Agreement of 2002. A narrow Sinhala vs. Tamil mindset, and a complex set of sociological and political factors within the Muslim community, have limited the direct participation of the Muslims in the peace process. However, because of the large Muslim population in the multiethnic northeast, Muslims must be actively involved in any long-term settlement of the Sri Lankan ethnic conflict.
Complete 100 page paper at the link.

Jedburgh
02-20-2008, 01:55 PM
ICG, 20 Feb 08: Sri Lanka's Return to War: Limiting the Damage (http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/getfile.cfm?id=3320&tid=5305&type=pdf&l=1)

Sri Lanka is in civil war again, and there are no prospects of a peace process resuming soon. On 2 January 2008, the government announced its withdrawal from a ceasefire agreement with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). This formalised a return to conflict that has been underway since 2006 but also presaged worse to come. The humanitarian crisis is deepening, abuses of human rights by both sides are increasing, and those calling for peace are being silenced. There is no present chance of a new ceasefire or negotiations since the government, despite pro forma statements in favour of a political solution, is dependent on hardliners and appears intent on a military decision. International actors must concentrate for now on damage limitation: protecting civilians from the war’s worst effects and supporting those working to preserve Sri Lanka’s democratic institutions.

In addition to heavy fighting in the north, the first weeks of 2008 have seen the assassinations of a government minister and a Tamil opposition member of parliament, multiple bombings in Colombo, a wave of deadly attacks on civilians in the majority Sinhalese south, and widespread disappearances and killings of non-combantants in the north and east. More than 5,000 combatants and civilians are estimated to have been killed over the past two years. At least 140,000 have fled intensified fighting in the north, and more are likely to be forced out if the military continues its push into Tiger-controlled territory. If the government’s military approach in the east is a precedent for its conduct of the northern campaign, civilians and their property are at grave risk.

Much of the blame for the resumption in violence lies with the LTTE; its ceasefire violations and abuses of the population under its control pushed the government towards war. The Tiger strategy was to shore up internal support by provoking a Sinhala nationalist reaction; it worked, although the insurgents may come to regret their approach. President Mahinda Rajapaksa has also overplayed his hand. Relying on support from Sinhala extremists, he has let them set an agenda that allows only for a military approach.....
Complete 38 page paper at the link.

Ray
02-28-2008, 01:01 AM
http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/2008/01/24/stories/2008012450520800.htm

End of ceasefire in Sri Lanka — Will it lead to peace?

While the abrogation of the ceasefire in Sri Lanka has raised fears internationally that the ethnic conflict will escalate, it is seen by Sri Lankan authorities as creating space for a more inclusive and sustainable peace process, one in which it clearly wants India to be more actively involved, says G. PARTHASARATHY. The author is a former Indian High Commissioner to Pakistan.

That apart, there are two corrections that I wish to make.

The statement, "......ferocious ethnic struggle between its Hindu Tamil minority and its Buddhist Sinhalese majority." as contained in the article, "Sri Lanka's Return to War: Limiting the Damage", is incorrect.

The Sri Lankan struggle is an ethnic 'struggle' and has no religious fervour spurring it on. In fact, the top echelon of the LTTE has Christians as was the late Anton Stanislaus Balasingham aka AB Stanislaus, the LTTE's Chief Negotiator and think tank. He was a Roman Catholic, whose first wife (who died) was a Protestant. His second wife is an English lady.

Second, all Tamils of the Tamil Diaspora do not support the insurgency. So go ahead, with a clear conscience and buy as many suits as you like from them, be they in Singapore or in Timbuctoo! :D

Surferbeetle
02-29-2008, 05:42 AM
Bloomberg has an interesting article this evening on Sri Lanka




Sri Lankan Army Captures Mannar Water Control Area From Rebels

By Paul Tighe

Feb. 29 (Bloomberg) -- Sri Lanka's army captured sluice gates controlling water supplies in the Mannar area in the latest advance against bases held by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam in the north.

As many as 30 Tamil Tiger fighters were killed or wounded during a daylong battle in Sinnaodaippu, the Defense Ministry said on its Web site late yesterday. The LTTE hasn't commented on the attack.

Air force jets bombed an LTTE artillery command center in Jaffna yesterday and pilots ``confirmed that the target was accurately taken,'' the ministry said.

Sri Lanka's military is staging almost daily attacks on the LTTE's estimated 7,000 fighters in the north, the last region held by the group after it lost control of the east in July. President Mahinda Rajapaksa's government has vowed to eradicate terrorism in the north while seeking a political settlement with all Tamil groups in the region.

The LTTE, designated a terrorist group by the U.S. the European Union and India, has been fighting for a separate homeland for 25 years in a conflict that has killed more the 70,000 people.

Jedburgh
03-11-2008, 01:49 PM
HRW, 6 Mar 08: Recurring Nightmare: State Responsibility for “Disappearances” and Abductions in Sri Lanka (http://hrw.org/reports/2008/srilanka0308/srilanka0308webwcover.pdf)

The resumption of major military operations between the government of Sri Lanka and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in mid-2006 has brought the return of a haunting phenomenon from the country’s past—the widespread abduction and “disappearance” of young men by the parties to the conflict. With the de facto breakdown of the 2002 Norway-brokered ceasefire between the parties, and its formal dissolution in January 2008, it is likely armed conflict will intensify in thecoming year. Unless the Sri Lankan government takes far more decisive action to end the practice, uncover the fate of persons unaccounted for, and prosecute those responsible, then 2008 could see another surge in “disappearances.”

Hundreds of enforced disappearances committed since 2006 have already placed Sri Lanka among the countries with the highest number of new cases in the world. The victims are primarily young ethnic Tamil men who “disappear”—often after being picked up by government security forces in the country’s embattled north and east, but also in the capital Colombo. Some may be members or supporters of the LTTE, but this does not justify their detention in secret or without due process. Most are feared dead....
Complete 243 page report at the link.

Jedburgh
04-09-2008, 03:31 PM
The Washington Times, 7 Apr 08: Sri Lankan Rebels Set Up US Branch (http://www.washingtontimes.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20080407/NATION/280220219/1001)

.....Mrs. Mauskopf said the LTTE has "covertly operated within the United States" for years, drawing on the country's financial resources and technological advances to further its war of terror. She said the organization had undertaken a major worldwide campaign to raise money for its offensive against the Sri Lankan government.

In Maryland, Thirunavukarasu Varatharasa, a Sri Lankan national, was sentenced in January to 57 months in prison on charges of conspiracy to provide support to the LTTE and the attempted exportation of arms and munitions. In a sting operation, he and three others negotiated to buy a laundry list of weapons from an undercover business in Baltimore.

A criminal complaint said Varatharasa conspired to export $900,000 worth of machine guns, ammunition, surface-to-air missiles, night-vision goggles and other military weapons to Sri Lanka. A co-conspirator, Haniffa Osman, who lives in Singapore, even traveled to Baltimore to test fire some of the weapons at a range in Havre de Grace with undercover U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents.....

Rex Brynen
04-24-2008, 04:43 PM
Hundreds Killed in Sri Lanka Battle (http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/60CBC0EB-432A-4C01-B5C8-16973381AF1F.htm), al-Jazeera English, 24 April 2008.


Heavy fighting between Tamil separatists and government soldiers has subsided in northern Sri Lanka after intense battles left hundreds dead or wounded.

The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) claimed on Thursday they killed more than 100 soldiers, wounded about 500 and lost only 16 of their fighters in a 10-hour firefight the day before.

But the defence ministry said its forces killed more than 100 Tigers and reported losing 43 soldiers, with another 33 missing in action.

It was the security forces' biggest loss in a single offensive since October 2006.

Jedburgh
10-16-2008, 02:05 PM
ICG, 15 Oct 08: Sri Lanka’s Eastern Province: Land, Development, Conflict (http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/asia/south_asia/sri_lanka/159_sri_lanka_s_eastern_province___land__developme nt__conflict.pdf)

....The province is Sri Lanka’s most ethnically complex region and has been at the heart of post-independence conflicts. It features a Tamil-speaking majority split equally between ethnic Tamils and Muslims, as well as a sizeable Sinhala minority who mostly moved there from the south under state irrigation and resettlement schemes. Lying at the intersection of competing Tamil and Sinhala nationalisms, the east has seen some of the worst of Sri Lanka’s inter-ethnic violence and remains at risk for more.

For Tamil nationalists, the province is an integral part of the Tamil homeland, but has been subject to deliberate state attempts to change the ethnic balance and undermine its Tamil character. The October 2006 Supreme Court decision to separate the Eastern from the Northern Province, temporarily merged under the terms of the 1987 Indo-Lanka accord, and subsequent provincial council elections in May 2008 were a major blow to Tamil nationalists. For Sinhala nationalists, the province should be equally open to all Sri Lankans, and its hundreds of ancient Buddhist sites and rich Sinhala cultural heritage should be defended and preserved. The east is also home to an emergent Muslim nationalism, largely a product of Muslims’ insecurity relative to Tamil armed groups and the Sinhala-dominated government.....

Entropy
10-31-2008, 02:08 AM
I have to admit that I don't know much about this conflict, but the news reports of the LTTE "navy" and "Air Force" are fascinating. Here's the latest (http://ramansterrorismanalysis.blogspot.com/2008/10/ltte-air-wing-strikes-again.html):


The air wing of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) carried out two attacks within an interval of about 90 minutes on a military target in the North and an economic target in Colombo on the night of October 28,2008. This is the seventh operation by the LTTE's air wing since it went into action in March last year.

Culpeper
05-17-2009, 02:29 PM
http://apnews.myway.com//article/20090517/D987V6VO0.html


May 17, 7:22 AM (ET)

By BHARATHA MALLWARACHI


COLOMBO, Sri Lanka (AP) - The Tamil Tiger rebels admitted defeat in their 25-year-old war with the Sri Lankan government Sunday, offering to lay down their guns as government forces swept across their last strongholds in the northeast.

The government rejected the last-ditch call for a cease-fire, saying the thousands of civilians trapped in the war zone all have escaped to safety and there was no longer any reason to stop the battle. The military said the remaining guerrillas were still fighting.

Rex Brynen
05-17-2009, 02:39 PM
Big story, and one which deserves more attention and analysis than it has received: 26 year civil war and 80,000+ dead.

tequila
05-17-2009, 06:06 PM
It will be interesting to see what direction the Tamil nationalist movement goes from here. Hopefully the Tigers will be destroyed as an organization, which will allow more moderate and peaceful Tamil movements to grow. Just as importantly, the Rajapakse government needs to allow those movements political space. Long-term peace should be the goal, not just the destruction of a pack of terrorists.

William F. Owen
05-18-2009, 05:20 AM
Big story, and one which deserves more attention and analysis than it has received: 26 year civil war and 80,000+ dead.

Especially when, after the recent offensive, the UN does not launch a "war crimes" investigation, and journalists aren't being paid and despatched by NGOs to "gather" evidence.

Bill Moore
05-18-2009, 07:40 AM
In many ways I think this will be a classic case study on how wage a civil war / counterinsurgency. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) have waged a very interesting conflict against the government of Sri Lanka. I don't recall reading about any other conflict that is remotely similiar in scope.

The LTTE were among the first to develop cadres of suicide bombers (Black Tigers), normally individuals with suicide belts/vests, but they have also vehicle bombs (it was a truck bomb that seriously damaged the financial center in Colombo), and suicide boats that were capable of outrunning most Sri Lankan naval craft.

In large pitched battles they frequently defeated conventional Sri Lankan troops, and in some battles the LTTE managed to kill several hundred Sri Lanka soldiers in one to two day battles using indirect fires and maneuver.

In the last few years the LTTE even developed their own air force of sorts, and actually conducted raids on the airport in Sri Lanka's capital creating a great deal of panic for the economy.

The Sri Lankan Tamils have large expat communities that are political active and raise considerable funds. They conducted fairly large protests recently in the UK and Canada in an effort to mobilize the international audience to put pressure on the Sri Lankan government to stop commiting alleged atrocities in the current fight, a fight that may spell the end of the LTTE as a credible force.

Over the years this conflict has ebbed and flowed from mostly insurgent activities to realitivel large scale conventional fights, and LTTE operations have not been restricted to Sri Lanka. The government's current offensive is much different than the many they launched in previous years. Many of their previous offensives were successful until they the government couldn't sustain it, so they were unable to defeat hardcore pockets of resistance, thus they withdrew once again handing the territory they fought so hard for back to the LTTE. Obviously something has changed this time (external support?), and it appears that the Tigers will finally be defeated as a credible force. I'm sure we all hope that the LTTE is finally facing defeat, so Sri Lanka can hopefully enjoy a hard earned peace.

Questions:

1. Even if the LTTE main cadre and leadership is killed or captured, will that be the end of the Tamil struggle in Sri Lanka? Certainly not if Sri Lanka is not prepared to conduct a robust effort to address the needs of their Tamil people.

2. What role will the Tamil expats play? Will they assist their people in accepting a peaceful resolution with the government, or will they attempt to subvert any peace efforts from afar?

3. Is the Sri Lankan military and government capable of winning and sustaining the peace?

The next few months will be critical.

William F. Owen
05-18-2009, 09:50 AM
1. Even if the LTTE main cadre and leadership is killed or captured, will that be the end of the Tamil struggle in Sri Lanka? Certainly not if Sri Lanka is not prepared to conduct a robust effort to address the needs of their Tamil people.


This assumes they (the Tamils) have a legitimate grievance. Many terrorist/insurgent organisations do not have legitimate grievances, so there is nothing you can do to address them.
EG: The RUF in Sierra Leone had no legitimate grievance. The FARC have no legitimate grievance. They are just drug dealing Marxists. They may hijack the odd social issue, but that this nothing to do with their raison-d'être.

Bill Moore
05-27-2009, 06:42 AM
The term defeat is relative, thus it is used here only to refer to the battlefield defeat that the LTTE clearly were handed. It will take several months before we know if the defeat is complete. The LTTE diaspora is alive and well and they have already vowed to continued the fight. There are also LTTE splinter groups that were not under Prabakaran's sway that can now emerge as dominate players over time if the Sri Lankan government does not rapidly and satisfactorly address the thousands of Tamils displaced by the fighting.

Recent articles written by those who appear to have good access indicate that several factors contributed to the defeat to the LTTE, but the following seemed to be essential:

1. Strong Sri Lankan political resolve
2. External support primarily from China, both military and political
3. Joint operations
a. Naval operations to isolate the LTTE by sinking their supply ships
b. Air operations to conduct deep attack opertions (and close air support)
c. Special opertions forces conducting raids deep in LTTE territory
d. Most important militarily large scale, multi-front ground offensive where Sri Lankan Soldiers took and held ground.
4. Important split within the LTTE ranks in 2004 that the LTTE never recovered from.

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/8063409.stm


Today, Sri Lanka is among the few nations that can say it has successfully quelled a nearly three-decade insurgency by military means. This quote along is worthy of discussion.


So many factors have contributed to the success of the Sri Lankan forces. There was a clear aim and mandate from the political level to the official level and to the military level to destroy the LTTE at any cost. Political will and mandate

They also had international political support from China. China helped keep the UN off Sri Lanka's back, while Sri Lanka conducted aggressive military operations. These operations were viewed by many in the West as inhumane (what war isn't?) and perhaps outside the bounds of what is considered legal by the international community. It can be argued that ending the war is more humane in the long run than tying one's hands behind their back and dragging the conflict out for years. Perhaps this is a wake up call as to the true nature of war, and why so many western countries recently congratulated Sri Lanka on their success?


A massive recruitment drive for the armed forces was launched (it increased from about 80,000 to more than 160,000 personnel). New weapons - including fighter jets, artillery guns and multi-barrel rocket launchers - were bought from countries like China, Pakistan and Russia, and new military strategies and tactics were evolved. Sustained military build up


Small teams of commandoes were sent behind enemy lines to carry out attacks against rebel leaders and key defence lines. Disruption, destroy their sense of confidence


The military also started to stretch them thin by opening up a number of fronts in the north.
Perfect application of conventional forces to take and hold the ground.


The Tamil Tigers had no answer to the bombing missions by air force jets. Asymmetric mismatches are always desired.


The Sri Lankan military juggernaut cruised ahead despite mounting civilian casualties. The rebels thought the international community, especially neighbouring India, would intervene looking at the civilian suffering and bring about a ceasefire in the final stages. When that did not happen, they ran out of options The LTTE was isolated politically and then defeated militarly.

the following is an interesting article on China's support (note the turn around in the fight started after 2004 long after most western countries withdrew their support from Sri Lanka, so China, Pakistan and Russian apparently made the biggest contributions in foreign aid and training).

http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/article6297463.ece

Chinese support crucial to Sri Lankan victory over Tamils


Sri Lanka’s imminent victory over the Tamil Tigers owes much to a badly needed injection of arms and aid from China, as well as robust Chinese support at the United Nations, ever since the Government began its new offensive in 2007.


Beijing appears, however, to have increased arms sales significantly to Sri Lanka since 2007, when the US suspended military aid over human rights issues.

China's contributions were not altruistic, they want access to Sri Lankan ports so they can protect their trade lanes. They upped their aid to Sri Lanka from a few millions dollars to one billion dollars last year which must have enabled Sri Lanka to sustain their offensive against the LTTE.


In addition, China has provided crucial diplomatic support in the UN Security Council, blocking efforts to put Sri Lanka on the agenda.

Culpeper
05-28-2009, 04:09 AM
Nice write-up.

Bob's World
05-28-2009, 11:17 AM
Bill:

This is a good laydown.

My assessment would be that the LTTE made a major strategic error in transitioning to phase III operations too soon and attempting to fight this as more of a civil war than as an insurgency. Essentially setting up the "weak state vs strong state" scenario which rarely ends well for the weaker.

Concur that the "Insurgency" is by no means defeated, but that the security forces have done their job in creating a window of opportunity for the politicos to fully address the roots of the insurgency itself. My fear is that while those who missunderstand the true nature of insurgency cheer the "victory," the very victory they are cheering will be slipping away as new leadership emerges, wiser from the recent setback, and begins anew with phase 1 activities.

Right now what the US should be doing is a full court diplomatic press on the government of Sri Lanka to close the deal. To be the bigger man. To be a Lincoln /Grant and recognize that one must be a gracious in victory as they are determined in battle.

State Department your move. Judging by your actions in our own GWOT to date, I fear you don't fully realize that though...

Mark O'Neill
05-28-2009, 11:59 AM
Bill:

This is a good laydown.

My assessment would be that the LTTE made a major strategic error in transitioning to phase III operations too soon and attempting to fight this as more of a civil war than as an insurgency. Essentially setting up the "weak state vs strong state" scenario which rarely ends well for the weaker.

Concur that the "Insurgency" is by no means defeated, but that the security forces have done their job in creating a window of opportunity for the politicos to fully address the roots of the insurgency itself. My fear is that while those who missunderstand the true nature of insurgency cheer the "victory," the very victory they are cheering will be slipping away as new leadership emerges, wiser from the recent setback, and begins anew with phase 1 activities.

Right now what the US should be doing is a full court diplomatic press on the government of Sri Lanka to close the deal. To be the bigger man. To be a Lincoln /Grant and recognize that one must be a gracious in victory as they are determined in battle.

State Department your move. Judging by your actions in our own GWOT to date, I fear you don't fully realize that though...

And I bet that it doesn't happen. Hubris is a powerful politico/military force (as the Coalition in OIF in late '03 demonstrates...)

Cheers

Mark

William F. Owen
05-28-2009, 01:30 PM
My assessment would be that the LTTE made a major strategic error in transitioning to phase III operations too soon and attempting to fight this as more of a civil war than as an insurgency.
Bob, I think you make an excellent point.

... and how do you tell the difference between a civil war and an insurgency, and why does it matter?

S2MSSI
05-28-2009, 01:43 PM
A good short article in the paper Sunday covered the fact that in the LTTE COIN, "[They] were not worried about collateral damage…So in many regards it's a very difficult model to adopt." Some great ethical and strategic debate should come from the last push of this conflict, which is being deemed as successful despite the heavy civilian casualties in the end surge. (Below is the print article with some snippets from the original author’s submission not published in the print version).

“Other lessons are either unique to Sri Lanka or would be politically unpalatable in other societies, including the high civilian and military death tolls and alleged human rights violations. The United Nations and many human rights groups repeatedly called for a cease-fire so civilians caught in the crossfire could flee the conflict area -- calls the government largely dismissed. Because Rajapaksa's base was the nation's Sinhalese majority, there was relatively little domestic pushback over the deaths and displacement of ethnic Tamil civilians. The government restricted the access of international media and independent humanitarian groups, making it difficult to report what was going on. The lesson of nonstop, no-holds-barred combat -- the army even powered on during monsoons -- was complemented by better use of small, flexible "deep penetration" special forces units, many trained by their U.S. and Indian counterparts. Dressed like the rebels, they went behind enemy lines, assassinating Tigers, crippling infrastructure in rebel-held areas and reporting target locations to the army and air force. Cutting supply lines, creating faster and more mobile special forces units, going after financing and hitting jungle hide-outs are additional strategies applicable to other insurgency battles, experts said. At the same time, the Tigers' scope made them a bigger target. For years, they parked freighters at sea and ferried arms, oil, food and other supplies into ports they controlled. In recent years, the government destroyed seven of these mother ships, reportedly with the help of satellite intelligence from India and the United States, and made better use of small, maneuverable, heavily armed "Arrow" vessels.”

www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/chi-sri-lanka-lessons_bdmay24,0,7880875.story

chicagotribune.com

Sri Lanka's defeat of the Tamil Tigers offers lessons for other countries fighting insurgencies
By Mark Magnier

Tribune Newspapers

May 24, 2009

NEW DELHI -- Sri Lanka's victory last week after a 25-year battle against the Tamil Tiger rebels represents a rare government success story in the global fight against insurgencies.

Even as leaders in Colombo declared a national holiday, military planners and analysts around the world have begun scrutinizing the war for lessons on how to fight Al Qaeda, the Taliban and other lethal militant groups.

For more than two decades, the conflict in Sri Lanka had neither side strong enough to overcome the other.

That changed three years ago, when the Sri Lankan army adopted more mobile tactics, overhauled its intelligence system, promoted young commanders and steadily hemmed in one of the world's most ruthless and innovative rebel movements. At its peak, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, as the Tigers are formally known, controlled one-third of the country; had its own army, a navy and nascent air force; and served as a role model for insurgencies worldwide with its pioneering use of suicide vests and female suicide bombers.

Last week, the army displayed in triumph what it said was the portly, bullet-riddled body of Tiger leader Velupillai Prabhakaran.

Arguably the most important factor in ending the stalemate was the political will to do whatever it took. In a supreme irony, President Mahinda Rajapakse was elected in November 2005 by a 1.9 percent margin after Prabhakaran urged Tamils to boycott the election. Rajapakse made military victory over the Tamils a cornerstone of his administration and signaled to the military it could get whatever resources it wanted simply by asking.

"They did everything a general dreams of," said retired Indian Maj. Gen. Ashok Mehta, a commander of the Indian peacekeeping forces in Sri Lanka in the late 1980s. "Unfettered resources and no political interference."

The military budget quickly grew by 40 percent a year and the army by 70 percent to 180,000 troops as it added 3,000 a month, compared with 3,000 a year previously -- drawn largely from poor rural Sinhalese attracted by relatively high wages.

With more soldiers, the army was able to hit the Tigers on several fronts simultaneously, breaking with years of hit-or-miss operations.

"Before the army would take territory then move on, allowing the LTTE to come back," said military spokesman Brig. Udaya Nanayakkara. "That changed, and we hit them on all four fronts so they could no longer muster all their resources into one place."

Some lessons are transferable, experts said. "Sri Lanka provides a case study," said Rohan Gunaratna, head of the International Center for Political Violence and Terrorism Research in Singapore.

Other lessons are either unique to Sri Lanka or would be politically unpalatable in other societies, including the high civilian and military death tolls and alleged human-rights violations. The UN and many human-rights groups, for example, repeatedly urged a cease-fire so civilians caught in the crossfire could flee the conflict area, calls the government largely dismissed.

"They were not worried about collateral damage," said Ajey Lele, a military analyst and ex-Indian wing commander. "So in many regards it's a very difficult model to adopt."

tequila
05-28-2009, 02:33 PM
Right now what the US should be doing is a full court diplomatic press on the government of Sri Lanka to close the deal. To be the bigger man. To be a Lincoln /Grant and recognize that one must be a gracious in victory as they are determined in battle.


Unfortunately I think the U.S. has little leverage over Sri Lanka at the moment, which is probably much more interested in embracing the PRC, especially given the Rajapaksa brothers' personal interest such relations. The Sri Lankan media is naturally full of denunciations of the West in general for seeking to investigate human rights violations and hinder military action, which in their view did nothing but protect the Tigers.


... and how do you tell the difference between a civil war and an insurgency, and why does it matter?


We could spend many posts arguing over the semantics of those two words. But I agree with Bob that the Tigers made a premature transition towards establishment of a mini-state rather than remaining a mobile guerrilla-based movement. The Tigers created an infrastructure and a government base that then had to be defended in conventional battle. They invested so much into their mini-state that they could not survive its destruction at the hands of a conventional army.

Most of the failure can be laid at the feet of the Tiger leadership. They irretrievably alienated India in the 1980s through their inability to accept competing Tamil nationalist groups. The assassination of Rajiv Gandhi eliminated any possibility that India would ever support a Tiger-dominated Tamil homeland, and only with Indian support could a Tamil autonomous region in Sri Lanka hope to survive in the face of determined Sri Lankan opposition.

Bill Moore
05-31-2009, 03:28 AM
I"m posting a couple of links to LTTE and supporter websites to demonstrate how sophisticated their media operation is.

http://www.eelamweb.com/

http://www.tamilnet.com/

Also a link to an article on how the LTTE's defeat will impact the drug trade in S. Asia. I can see where the loss of the LTTE merchant ships would have a significant impact, but the drug trade is an open source business, so it will be interesting to see who fills this void.

http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/Cities/LTTE-fall-will-alter-drug-trade-in-India/articleshow/4595554.cms


Thus, over the years, drug enforcement agencies in Mumbai have arrested several Sri Lankan Tamils, and charged them with smuggling narcotics. "The accused were found to be highly motivated. They were taking the risk not just for the money, but because they believed in the LTTE's cause,'' said a public prosecutor. "The LTTE started using the revenue from narcotics to finance its armed struggle ever since the conflict started in 1983,'' said intelligence expert B Raman. However, the LTTE's role in the narcotics business was different from other international gangs such as the `D' Company, which indulges in direct selling of drugs.

Prof G H Peiris, a Sri Lankan security expert who writes for the US magazine ‘Jane's Defence Weekly', believes that the LTTE's involvement in the international drug trade was largely in the form of bulk delivery of heroin and cannabis from producing areas in Asia to consuming countries. He said that there did not appear to be any extensive involvement of the LTTE in drug ‘peddling' in the retail market or participation in opium growing and refining of heroin.

Posted by tequila,
Unfortunately I think the U.S. has little leverage over Sri Lanka at the moment, which is probably much more interested in embracing the PRC, especially given the Rajapaksa brothers' personal interest such relations. The Sri Lankan media is naturally full of denunciations of the West in general for seeking to investigate human rights violations and hinder military action, which in their view did nothing but protect the Tigers.

Yep, and if you look at the LTTE websites they have links to all the articles where prominent politicians and human rights groups are calling war crime investigations. Of course you have to wonder to what end? In my opinion the character of the war has changed from a shooting war to lawfare.

Posted by Bob's World,
My assessment would be that the LTTE made a major strategic error in transitioning to phase III operations too soon and attempting to fight this as more of a civil war than as an insurgency. Essentially setting up the "weak state vs strong state" scenario which rarely ends well for the weaker.

I don't think they transitioned too soon, as this strategy worked very well for them. Remember this war has been ongoing for over 30 years, and over that time the LTTE built up a powerful para-military and military force, so they could take and hold terrain. Since Sri Lanka is an island nation, they couldn't establish needed safehavens across the border, and they needed their safehavens to facilitate recruiting, training, planning, business, practice governance, etc. It is important to note that while they didn't have a safehaven for their military, the LTTE did establish a very large and politically active global diaspora. This is now the fighting wing for the current lawfare taking place IMO.

The LTTE's biggest mistake was their failure to recognize the transformation that took place in the Sri Lanka government and military. The military was better trained, larger, better equipped, and most importantly had a political mandate to destory the LTTE. The LTTE probably should have given up land and dispersed and started over with low level insurgency and terrorist acts, but obviously that is a hard pill for anyone to swallow. Seems like that decision hits all three factors: interests (safehaven, psychological victory, etc.), pride (fight until the last man), and fear (what happens if we give up our hard earned territory?). The LTTE strategy seemed to be, survive long enough to get the the international community to intervene in their behalf, but obviously that didn't happen. Like many defeated armies they were stuck in yesterday's strategy.

Civil war versus insurgency is somewhat loaded, but in general (begining with our civil war) one side isn't interested in overhrowing the established government, but rather succeeding from the establishment. The LTTE didn't want to overthrow the government in Colombo, they wanted to establish their own homeland. It would have been a different fight altogether if they wanted to overthrow the government and establish controll over the entire nation. One that they couldn't have won.

slapout9
05-31-2009, 04:19 AM
Bill you seen this? Is it accurate?


http://therealnews.com/t/

Bill Moore
05-31-2009, 04:41 AM
It was a tough slog, and there were several civilian casualties, I don't think anyone really knows what the real numbers and I suspect (but do not know) that 20k civilians killed is greatly exagerated.

I don't think anyone will argue that civilians suffered terribly, but then again this is a war among the people, and there were at least two sides to this conflict and the LTTE reportedly held several thousand civilians hostage for protection. Holding their own people (Tamils) hostage in an effort to create a disaster to get the international community to intervene on the LTTE's behalf. No one should underestimate the ruthlessness of the LTTE leadership. The world didn't intervene because the LTTE are noted terrorists who have killed hundreds of innocent civilians and the world is tired of terrorists.

Slap, the short answer is I don't know, but I do know there are at least two sides to this story. I also know there is no such thing as humane war, perhaps the most humane act is to take the necessary actions to bring the conflict to an end?

slapout9
05-31-2009, 04:46 AM
I also know there is no such thing as humane war, perhaps the most humane act is to take the necessary actions to bring the conflict to an end?

You want to know who also told me that.....Air Force guy...retired Colonel.....intials are JW....writes a lot about Rings;)

jmm99
06-01-2009, 05:07 AM
from Bill
In my opinion the character of the war has changed from a shooting war to lawfare.

Interesting that you'd say this - and put it in bold.

Just quick now went through the countries not appearing on list of those who have ratified 1977 Additional Protocals I (http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/WebSign?ReadForm&id=470&ps=P) & II (http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/WebSign?ReadForm&id=475&ps=P) to the GCs. I didn't find: India, Burma, Malaysia, Indonesia and Sri Lanka. Thus, a greater freedom of action since those protocals were set up to give insurgents an edge - an example of Lawfare waged with long-term goals in mind.

What think thou of a Lawfare thread and where ?

-------------------------------
Also interesting is this:


from S2MSSI linked article
The lesson of nonstop, no-holds-barred combat -- the army even powered on during monsoons -- was complemented by better use of small, flexible "deep penetration" special forces units, many trained by their U.S. and Indian counterparts. Dressed like the rebels, they went behind enemy lines, assassinating Tigers, crippling infrastructure in rebel-held areas and reporting target locations to the army and air force.

as to which, see this thread (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=7332) for some legal on "pseudo-gangs".

Bill Moore
06-01-2009, 05:24 AM
What think thou of a Lawfare thread and where ?

I would love to see one, probably under Small Wars Participants (military-other) or under Global and General (international politics), but you sir are the expert in this area, I'll gravitate to where ever you post.

Cavguy
02-13-2010, 02:49 PM
I have to write a relatively short paper for a class on terrorism and terrorist groups (a problematic definition, I know). I have wide latitude on the subject and thought I would look at Sri Lanka's defeat of the LTTE and the employment of the "ruthless" approach. I mainly want to focus on the shift in strategy over the last decade, how they handled the international objections (human rights), and prospects for long term stability.

Bottom line, am looking for good books and articles as sources, or credible websites. This isn't a dissertation, but the sources need some rigor.

davidbfpo
02-13-2010, 10:41 PM
Niel,

There are several hits on LTTE here and one main thread:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=7413 and I expect places like IISS have commented on what happened. I suspect Indian observers watched the most, try http://www.satp.org/and maybe the Israelis who acted as advisers to the Sri Lankans IIRC.

Cavguy
02-14-2010, 07:54 PM
Niel,

There are several hits on LTTE here and one main thread:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=7413 and I expect places like IISS have commented on what happened. I suspect Indian observers watched the most, try http://www.satp.org/and maybe the Israelis who acted as advisers to the Sri Lankans IIRC.

Been interesting trying to find disinterested (objective) comment - most of the articles or sites are clearly partisan to one side or another.

The summary by Bill Moore in the thread you linked helped.

Entropy
02-14-2010, 09:11 PM
Cavguy,

The latest CRS report (http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL31707.pdf) may interest you and there is also this paper (http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA500867&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf) by a Sri Lankan General.

Hope those help.

William F. Owen
02-15-2010, 06:58 AM
I have wide latitude on the subject and thought I would look at Sri Lanka's defeat of the LTTE and the employment of the "ruthless" approach. I mainly want to focus on the shift in strategy over the last decade, how they handled the international objections (human rights), and prospects for long term stability.

As concerns "ruthless" I would pass on the commonly heard question from many foreign officers as to why is it OK for the US Army to kill "100's" of civilians in Iraq and Afghanistan, yet not OK for others to do the same given far greater strategic need in defence of their actual home lands.

I submit that Sri-Lankans merely observed that US(?)NATO conduct of operations gave very wide latitude to the idea of what levels of force were acceptable in the pursuance of policy.

From what I have seen and heard Tactical methods used were mostly just "best practice" give the threat, terrain and policy.

Bill Moore
02-15-2010, 05:29 PM
Wilf,

Excellent points and they to many conflicts around the globe. I wish some of our DOD and DOS policy members would comment on how any nation could feasibly defeat a separatist movement like the LTTE following our policies? Policies as you stated that we wouldn't follow ourselves. From where I sit we seem to generate extremely naive policies that are beginning to result in America influence being less welcome in many parts of the world. One only need to review the Leahy Amendment on human rights violations to get an understanding of how far we have gone down this road to unintended isolation from the real world.

The losers now (and their supporters, both State and non-State in the global community) get to take the winners to trial, which means that the conflict will continue via lawfare that Jmm99 wrote about a few times. In a way the EU, UN, U.S. and others have joined hands with the LTTE, while China and others have joined hands with the Sri Lankan government. Is this a World War (using lawfare)?

I think the West in general is getting to the point that our extremely simplistic views of right and wrong are going to result in us in having less influence on the world stage as we continue to isolate ourselves in a concoon of quixotic ideals that simply don't apply in the real world. Perhaps the saddest part of this is the intent to support human rights is good, but in practice the way we apply the policies results in indecisive action, which in turns results in conflicts dragging on for years. This results not only in much more suffering, but in lost generations that know nothing but war.

If it is essential to our national interests to enter a conflict (directly or indirectly), then whenever possible I would recommend pushing for a strategy that resulted in a decisive victory instead of prolonging the status quo by applying naive policies. I realize the world isn't black and white, but in many cases we "seem" to add imaginary complexity.

davidbfpo
02-15-2010, 08:22 PM
Niel,

Thinking a little about LTTE and the 'ruthless' approach. First LTTE were themselves ruthless, which helps explain India's decision to exit. Throughout the war no all Tamils sided with LTTE - once they had been confined to the Jaffna area. LTTE were not the only targets of the Sri Lankan state, IIRC a left wing revolt amongst the Sinhalese was repressed brutally before LTTE "took to the stage".

LTTE ran an effective PR campaign abroad, amidst the diaspora, but many in that community only co-operated from fear. Their PR failed to gain traction amidst a wider audience - including the Tamils in southern India. Compare the LTTE abroad to other Indian insurgent groups, who has heard of them? Very few.

The war went on so long and only spectaculars, e.g. Colombo airport attack, got external attention, so Sri Lanka knew few would oppose a 'ruthless' approach.

Were the LTTE exhausted by the end?

tequila
02-16-2010, 12:04 AM
Wilf - Are you wondering why the Israelis can't fire 155mm artillery into Palestinian towns at will? I really doubt it is the U.S. holding the IDF back, perhaps you should ask them.

Bill - Can you cite a single serious example of the "losers" taking the "winners" to trial? Where has this happened where the so-called "winners" didn't deserve it? Do you think that, say, the Bosnian Serbs are being unjustly persecuted for the "battle" of Srebrenica? Or perhaps the Hutu supremacist FAR shouldn't face any consequences for their counterinsurgency "techniques"? Or maybe we need to take a second look at Charles Taylor's record from a more understanding perspective. And I don't know why everyone hated on Saddam Hussein - don't people understand that the Kurds and Shiites were violent too? After all, Saddam's tactics really brought the whole Kurdish-Arab conflict to a swift end --- if we'd just allowed him to "finish the job" back in 1991, we wouldn't even be talking about a Kirkuk problem now, would we?

Bill Moore
02-16-2010, 01:57 AM
Cavguy,

You may find some of these links useful. Most are from Tamil websites, so of course they're bias, but professional. The conflict continues, though the means for resisting have changed (for now).

http://www.tamilnet.com/art.html?catid=79&artid=31156


Given the failure of the international community's responsibility to protect the Tamil people during the slaughter and during the post-massacre collective internment in Manik Farm, new national and transnational litigation strategies must be explored by all actors supporting the cause of Tamil justice so that substantive remedy can be afforded to the thousands of Tamil victims.

http://www.tamilnet.com/art.html?catid=13&artid=31091


Unavoidable Politics
Many young British Tamils, as do their non-Tamil peers, profess an aversion to the morally questionable arena of politics. ‘I am not into politics; I believe in human rights’ some say. But politics and human rights are inextricably linked. To try and improve human rights whilst turning a blind eye to the politics driving abuses and repression is not only futile but foolish.

An attempt to mobilize the Diaspora youth to take political action.

http://www.tamilcanadian.com/news/

News posts from the Tamil Diaspora in Canada, also contains links to their version of the history of the conflict, etc.

http://www.europeanvoice.com/article/2010/02/eu-suspends-sri-lanka-trade-preferences/67156.aspx


The Commission recommended on 15 December that member states suspend the preferential trade terms after a Commission report published in October found “significant shortcomings” in Sri Lanka's compliance with its human-rights commitments under the scheme, known as the GSP+ regime.

Sri Lankan officials say that the suspension is unfair because it refers to the situation on the ground when the country was at war against Tamil insurgents. They argue that the situation has much improved since the Tamil Tigers were defeated last year. EU diplomats dispute this view and say that the problems are not all linked to the Tamil situation.

I'm sure further bankrupting Sri Lanka will improve humanitarian conditions in Sri Lanka.

http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/05/18/outside-sri-lanka-tamil-diaspora-not-ready-to-surrender/

Good picture of Diaspora protesting outside the White House. Article provides some interesting insights, but putting it in context it was written shortly after the LTTE's military defeat.

Ken White
02-16-2010, 02:14 AM
One only need to review the Leahy Amendment on human rights violations to get an understanding of how far we have gone down this road to unintended isolation from the real world.You, sir, are a master of understatement (in the vernacular; you got that right!).
I think the West in general is getting to the point that our extremely simplistic views of right and wrong are going to result in us in having less influence on the world stage as we continue to isolate ourselves in a concoon of quixotic ideals that simply don't apply in the real world.True, I believe -- unless someone screws up and gives us a wake-up call, a likely occurrence...
...the way we apply the policies results in indecisive action, which in turns results in conflicts dragging on for years. This results not only in much more suffering, but in lost generations that know nothing but war.Absolutely correct. Our half baked approach kills more of us and them and does more general harm than would occur with firm and rapid action...

Tequila:
...Can you cite a single serious example of the "losers" taking the "winners" to trial? Where has this happened where the so-called "winners" didn't deserve it?Isn't that in the old eye of the beholder as they say? Particularly the last clause...:wry:

In any event, I think Bill was looking at the future and simply discussing the trend line. It hasn't truly happened yet in a major way but the portent is obvious.

What we cannot know at this time is whether that will be a good thing or a bad thing...

P.S.

Left this off...

Re: Wilf and 155s; I think his point was that we, the US, are rather hypocritical with respect to who should shoot what and where, i.e a rule for us, another for others. I personally think he's correct.

Jedburgh
02-16-2010, 04:45 AM
.....I mainly want to focus on the shift in strategy over the last decade, how they handled the international objections (human rights), and prospects for long term stability.

Bottom line, am looking for good books and articles as sources, or credible websites. This isn't a dissertation, but the sources need some rigor.
There is a tremendous amount available on the human rights issue, so I won't bother with that. But here's some other material you may find of use:

UK House of Commons report with a brief general history and a detailed look at the conflict from '02 on: War and Peace in Sri Lanka (http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/documents/UKHCL_WarPeace_SriLanka.pdf)

A pair of RSIS commentaries: Ending the LTTE: Recipe for Counterterrorism? (http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/documents/SRSIS_EndingLTTE_RecipeForCounterterrorism.pdf) and Military Defeat of the Tamil Tigers: From Velvet Glove to Iron Fist (http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/documents/SRSIS_MilitaryDefeatTamilTigers_FromVelvetGlove_Ir onFist.pdf).

And this one from the East-West Center, published just before the final push by the Sri Lankans: Countering Violent Extremism: The Fate of the Tamil Tigers (http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/documents/EWI_CounteringViolentExtremism_FateOfTamilTigers.p df)

Outside of complaints regarding the campaign against the LTTE, the Sri Lankan government isn't looking so clean in plainer terms. Since winning the presidential election last month, Rajapaksa has had his political opponent arrested, purged the military and assaulted/jailed numbers of journalists who were critical of him during the election campaign. Opposition protests have been broken up by the police in Colombo and other cities. Even without the LTTE, the government is doing itself no favors in the legitimacy/stability department.

Cavguy
02-16-2010, 05:23 AM
Thanks for all the sources. My paper (last of grad school!) will likely point out that the LTTE's defeat is owed mostly due to the following factors:

1) Political Isolation from terror attacks
2) Reduction of its expat funding network (related to #1 in the EU and India)
3) Physical (geographical) isolation
4) Introduction of massive aid and political cover from China on the government side that allowed the "ruthless" approach.

Overall, I think the tactics used by the Sri Lankan government didn't really change, mainly the shaping conditions.

My graduate thesis came to the conclusion that possession of external support and sanctuary were the best predictors of insurgent victory, rather than the tactic used. This action is another confirming case study.

William F. Owen
02-16-2010, 06:30 AM
Wilf - Are you wondering why the Israelis can't fire 155mm artillery into Palestinian towns at will? I really doubt it is the U.S. holding the IDF back, perhaps you should ask them.

Ken White is correct. My point is the US killed 12 civilians in A'Stan yesterday, with no condemnation from the UN, EU, or anyone and the theatre commander, McChrystal was not accused of war crimes.
....and yes, this gets talked about a lot here. How is something "OK" in Iraq and Afghanistan, but almost exactly the same action "not OK" in Gaza?

M-A Lagrange
02-16-2010, 10:57 AM
Some excellent paper have been released by ICRC on the Sri Lanka and LTTE offensive.Especially concerning its impact on the practice of war and restriction of humanitarian field.
This also echoes with Wilf questions. Basically it is not Ok to kill civilians in Irak or Afganistan.
Following Sri Lanka and Swat valley offensives, ICRC even went up to call for a new round of Geneva Convention discussions to addapt and extend civilian protection to new forms of war.
All available on ICRC website.

tequila
02-16-2010, 12:21 PM
How is something "OK" in Iraq and Afghanistan, but almost exactly the same action "not OK" in Gaza?

"Almost" exactly?

Call me when U.S. forces kill over 250 children in Marjah, or when Marjah turns into one of the most densely-populated parts of the world.

Also, like I said, do you guys have any real examples of an "unjust" war crimes prosecution by the ICRC (which the U.S. does not even support) or even any solid examples of how the U.S. or the West is losing "global influence" (I thought we didn't really care how the rest of the world thought of us, Ken, since they are fated to hate us/be jealous of us no matter what?) due to our insistence on care for civilians in wartime?

William F. Owen
02-16-2010, 01:34 PM
Call me when U.S. forces kill over 250 children in Marjah, or when Marjah turns into one of the most densely-populated parts of the world.


Just in Marjah, or in the 2003 invasion? Amiriyah in 1991?

Moreover population density is highly variable and context specific, and I've never seen it specified in ROE.

Point being, in Afghanistan alone since 2001, as a result of US military action (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Civilian_casualties_of_the_War_in_Afghanistan_(200 1–present)#Civilian_and_overall_casualties_.282008 .29) you have:
direct deaths: at least 5,568 - 8,360
indirect deaths in initial invasion: 3,200 - 20,000
direct & indirect deaths: 8,768 - 28,360

You can argue all you want about the accuracy of these figures. Folks are rarely swayed by facts.
Now let us be clear. If it really mattered, air strikes and artillery would simply not be used in Afghanistan. - but this is the real world and war is extremely complicated, messy and unpredictable, so civilians will always die, once you start using force. American lives matter more to Americans than Afghans. - and that rule applies for most peoples.

My point being it is easy to pontificate about levels of force used, when it is not your civilian population under fire, and your own strategic requirements are far less pressing.

Ken White
02-16-2010, 09:06 PM
of little real worth so I don't pay them much heed...
even any solid examples of how the U.S. or the West is losing "global influence" (I thought we didn't really care how the rest of the world thought of us, Ken, since they are fated to hate us/be jealous of us no matter what?) due to our insistence on care for civilians in wartime?I do not know if we're losing global influence, nor do I or most Americans particularly care. I also believe that said 'influence' is predicated to a great extent on the strength of the USD. What I do know is that our popularity fluctuates wildly but has never been great so far as the rest of the world is concerned.

Said popularity does go up when we save someone from from a bad day (which happens a lot) and it goes down when we throw our weight around or screw something up (which happens even more often). In my observation, our popularity was not great in 1947 (first year I paid attention) and has been on a generally downhill slope with only occasional upticks since. mid to immediate post Viet Nam was the lowest point I've seen. Iraq was just a slight downturn compared to VN.

The fact that no one like to be bailed out of difficulty by someone else also intrudes; immediate gratitude turns to resentment... :wry:

All that to reiterate that I and many I know do not really care (a few I know do care -- but not a great deal...) what the rest of the world thinks of us; that our 'global influence' is and off and on thing dependent on many factors; and that the fact that we espouse one rule for ourselves and varied more stringent rules for others merely makes us hypocritical -- the effect of that on our popularity or influence is indeterminable and infinitely variable. That effect has nothing to do with what I said or why I said it.

Our 'insistence' on care for civilians in wartime is a totally practical thing. Killing or harming too many has adverse military effect; we're simply trying to avoid that. That 'concern' is enhanced nowadays for propaganda reasons and to be politically correct and placate the American left. I suspect much of it would go out the window if we had a real war on our hands. You read this? (LINK) (http://www.amazon.com/Armageddon-Germany-1944-1945-Max-Hastings/dp/0375414339). Shows what happens when the gloves are removed, whole different attitude. And the American left was in charge then... :eek: :D

Backwards Observer
02-17-2010, 05:29 AM
The fact that no one like to be bailed out of difficulty by someone else also intrudes; immediate gratitude turns to resentment... :wry:

Reminds me of something a nice old Chinese guy told me, he started out as an orphan working in the Malayan tin mines before WW2 and ended up quite successful. He said, "In this life, don't hurt anyone...but don't help anyone either." I used to think he was joking.:(

Ken White
02-17-2010, 06:01 AM
'will sooner or later' turn to resentment.

Very wise oriental gentleman you talked to...:wry:

Backwards Observer
02-17-2010, 07:27 AM
Very wise oriental gentleman you talked to...:wry:

His wife would sometimes stand behind him rolling her eyes and making, "don't listen to him, he's loco", motions. Without turning around, he'd say, "Pay no attention to her, she's always trying to help people." Funny.

CWOT
07-07-2010, 05:20 PM
Thanks to those contributing to this thread. I have been doing some research on COIN in different conflicts, trying to evaluate what works the best. I started looking at Sri Lanka as I heard from several friends, "you should look at Sri Lanka, they defeated the LTTE!" And I like this case since it's not tied to the religious issues of AQ and the Middle East.

However, it seems from the sources, Sri Lanka really used a conventional military onslaught to defeat the LTTE.

Does anyone have any insight into what COIN techniques they tried to defeat LTTE? Did they do any of the COIN techniques that are documented in the COIN field manual?
Did they create militias, paramilitaries?
Have amnesty programs?
Increase intelligence?
I'm finding a lot of discussion about the LTTE, it's capabilities, etc, but very little about how the Sri Lankan's did COIN. Maybe they didn't?

Thanks for any suggestions you all might have.

William F. Owen
07-08-2010, 04:38 AM
Thanks to those contributing to this thread. I have been doing some research on COIN in different conflicts, trying to evaluate what works the best.
Depends on the context. What wins wars?

However, it seems from the sources, Sri Lanka really used a conventional military onslaught to defeat the LTTE.
That would be largely correct

Does anyone have any insight into what COIN techniques they tried to defeat LTTE?
The Sri-Lankans used military force to destroy the LTTE as an armed group. That is what works.

Cavguy
07-08-2010, 05:14 AM
Depends on the context. What wins wars?

That would be largely correct

The Sri-Lankans used military force to destroy the LTTE as an armed group. That is what works.

I have a forthcoming essay in Joint Force Quarterly on the topic. Hadn't seen this thread, but the essay pretty much tracks Bill Moore's reasons above - the isolation of the LTTE politically, financially, and militarily played the decisive role, the military operation and tactics used were icing on the cake.

Fuchs
07-08-2010, 02:31 PM
However, it seems from the sources, Sri Lanka really used a conventional military onslaught to defeat the LTTE.

Does anyone have any insight into what COIN techniques they tried to defeat LTTE?

You mentioned it yourself:
They allowed LTTE to become a conventional force (see Mao's phase model), built up conventional military power (including a form of "special forces" = airborne) and crushed them in a step-by-step campaign.

That's an equivalet to mobile defense in operational art. Give up ground, allow them to win a payrrhic victory that exposes them to a killing blow.
Good luck finding someone in charge with the guts to even attempt it (voluntarily).

CWOT
07-08-2010, 02:39 PM
I have a forthcoming essay in Joint Force Quarterly on the topic. Hadn't seen this thread, but the essay pretty much tracks Bill Moore's reasons above - the isolation of the LTTE politically, financially, and militarily played the decisive role, the military operation and tactics used were icing on the cake.

I saw a couple unsupported claims in newspaper articles about the use of paramilitaries and intelligence cooperation and isolation of the Tamil Diaspora to cut off their funding from transnational systems. But no one sources it, so I'm not sure if it is just general talk or a definitive strategy by the Sri Lankan government.

There is some good discussion about the Eastern Branch of LTTE breaking away from the north, but the COIN techniques used in Iraq don't really seem to emerge.

Has anyone seen any proof of these techniques?

Fuchs
07-08-2010, 02:44 PM
External funding is unimportant if you have control over a closed economy with no goods imports. In that case money import is really just paper import.

India helped Sri Lanka to embargo LTTE and the LTTE blockade runners were defeated by a Sri Lankan small fast boat armada (built in the country iirc).
They had sunk the last LTTE weapons & ammunition smuggling ships just months before the final battles.

That didn't mean much more than a weaker conventional posture of LTTE, though. Sri Lanka could as well have won (with more bloodshed) by focusing its resources on the army.

Cavguy
07-08-2010, 03:05 PM
I saw a couple unsupported claims in newspaper articles about the use of paramilitaries and intelligence cooperation and isolation of the Tamil Diaspora to cut off their funding from transnational systems. But no one sources it, so I'm not sure if it is just general talk or a definitive strategy by the Sri Lankan government.

There is some good discussion about the Eastern Branch of LTTE breaking away from the north, but the COIN techniques used in Iraq don't really seem to emerge.

Has anyone seen any proof of these techniques?

There was no pop centric COIN campaign, as others have observed. In 2005 "COL Karuna" and a sizeable group of fighters left the LTTE and reconciled with the government. Accounts differ on the scope of the impact, but it began to fracture the LTTE and exposed fractures within the LTTE's leadership.

People act as if the campaign from 1983-2005 wasn't harsh enough. Some of the brutality of the 90s exceeded what was used in the final offensive. It was "conventional" since the late 1980s. The difference was the isolation of the LTTE, cutting its logistical and financial ties, the 2005 Tsunami, internal fragmenting of the LTTE, a much improved Sri Lankan army and navy, and very significantly - the adoption of China as a benefactor, financer, and protector of Sri Lanka against western concerns about such pesky things as "human rights.

Fuchs, for all your hyperventalating about civilian casualties in the Apache video, I find it somewhat amusing you seem to be such a fan of the LTTE's brilliant operational art which killed thousands of civilians unnecessairly in the process, and hold it up as a paragon of "mobile defense".

Fuchs
07-08-2010, 05:57 PM
I did actually an analysis without emotions.

Wars tend to create many civilian casualties, that's why I reject all wars of choice and dislike that my country is allied with aggressive nations that break our alliance treaty at will. My country had very serious experiences with great wars, wars of choice and overly aggressive allies.

About the video; it was a policing situation to me, and I despise the idea that a helicopter would be allowed to fly over a megacity blasting people at will just because someone suspects weapons in a grainy image.

CWOT
07-08-2010, 06:39 PM
People act as if the campaign from 1983-2005 wasn't harsh enough. Some of the brutality of the 90s exceeded what was used in the final offensive. It was "conventional" since the late 1980s. The difference was the isolation of the LTTE, cutting its logistical and financial ties, the 2005 Tsunami, internal fragmenting of the LTTE, a much improved Sri Lankan army and navy, and very significantly - the adoption of China as a benefactor, financer, and protector of Sri Lanka against western concerns about such pesky things as "human rights.


Thanks, That was the impression I had as well, but it seems from a couple articles, from uninformed journalists I think, that there were 'lessons learned' for COIN in the Sri Lanka case.

The Tsunami, I had seen a reference in one article that this helped the government, I assume the provision of aid which was diverted to the Sri Lankan military for further military efforts. Is that right? It makes sense. And I imagine that it probably turned popular support towards the government as well, as they needed aid and the LTTE probably wasn't receiving the windfall of aid from outside governments.

Rex Brynen
07-08-2010, 06:47 PM
Some of the Iraq/Sri Lanka comments above imply that pop-centric COIN was the key to turning the situation in Iraq around. While it might have helped, I'm not at all convinced that it was the most important factor at work in Iraq--all of which raises the important question of what it is we should, and should not, be trying to learn from the Iraqi experience.

(I'll add this to my ever-growing list of "threads I should start when I have the time.")

Now, back to the war in Sri Lanka. With absolutely no sign that the Sri Lankan government will take major steps to address Tamil grievances, what are the chances of a substantial resurgence of violence in the next decade? Who wants to suggest odds?

Cavguy
07-08-2010, 07:08 PM
Thanks, That was the impression I had as well, but it seems from a couple articles, from uninformed journalists I think, that there were 'lessons learned' for COIN in the Sri Lanka case.

The Tsunami, I had seen a reference in one article that this helped the government, I assume the provision of aid which was diverted to the Sri Lankan military for further military efforts. Is that right? It makes sense. And I imagine that it probably turned popular support towards the government as well, as they needed aid and the LTTE probably wasn't receiving the windfall of aid from outside governments.

The Tsunami was one of the game changers between 2004-2007. Basically, Aid was largely prevented from reaching Tamil areas by the Sri Lankan government because it would not let funds reach the LTTE. Those areas never recovered, with the attendant effects.

I am still waiting for someone to show me how the Sri Lankan government changed the intensity (vice efficency) of its tactics and use of "brutal" force. The whole conflict was insanely brutal, especially during the 90's until the 2001 cease fire.

CWOT
07-08-2010, 09:00 PM
Thanks for the responses. This helps as I've been caught between hearsay and reporting, neither of which have given me much to go on. I think the reporting must be weak because of Sri Lanka's repression of journalists in the region and control of the media. Which would influence the degree to which the COIN concepts would be accurately described.

SWJ Blog
08-27-2010, 11:21 AM
What Sri Lanka Can Teach Us About COIN (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2010/08/what-sri-lanka-teach-us-about/)

Entry Excerpt:

What Sri Lanka Can Teach Us About COIN
by Lionel Beehner

Download the Full Article: [/URL]

It has become a truism to say there are no military solutions to defeat an insurgency. That was the thrust of the U.S. military’s 2006 counterinsurgency (COIN) manual as well as the mantras repeated by CENTCOM Commander David Petraeus, the manual’s coauthor, and his “warrior intellectual” offspring. Conventional wisdom also holds that COIN takes years, if not decades, to complete and emphasizes a population-centric strategy to avoid civilian casualties and win locals’ hearts and minds.

But Sri Lanka’s successful victory one year ago stands all this conventional wisdom on its head. It was brute military force, not political dialogue or population control, which ended its brutal decades-long war with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), or Tamil Tigers, a separatist group perhaps most notorious for popularizing the suicide bomb. The final military campaign lasted months, not years or decades. It was a gruesome finale, to be sure. The Sri Lankan government paid little heed to outside calls for preventing collateral damage. While humanitarian workers and journalists were barred from entering the war zone, as many as 20,000 civilians were killed in the crossfire and hundreds of thousands of internally displaced Tamils were corralled into camps after war ended . It was, as one journalist I spoke to in Colombo put it, “a war without witnesses.” Hearts and minds took a backseat to shock and awe.

Still, the lesson from Sri Lanka’s COIN experiment is that overwhelming force can defeat insurgents, terrorists and other irregular armed groups in relatively short order, but at a steep cost. Its model disproves the notion that counterinsurgencies must be drawn-out, Vietnam-like campaigns. With U.S. forces bogged down in Iraq and Afghanistan, it also provides states fighting small wars with a different counterinsurgency template. Not without reason did Pakistan and Thailand, which both face insurgencies on their peripheries, seek out Sri Lanka for military training and advice in recent months.

So do America’s warrior intellectuals and COIN theorists have it all backwards? Should we be emphasizing military solutions over political compromises and accommodation, overwhelming force over clear-hold-and-build campaigns, defeating the enemy over winning locals’ “hearts and minds”? Does Sri Lanka’s COIN strategy provide any lessons for Washington as it escalates the war in Afghanistan, or for other countries facing violent insurgencies along their unruly peripheries?

Or does the fallout from the use of massive force—the high death toll, the lost hearts and minds, the accusations of war crimes, the unresolved grievances of ethnic minorities—negate whatever victory is achieved on the battlefield or goodwill that comes from a peaceful settlement? It is a perplexing question for military strategists. “The end of the Sri Lankan civil war,” wrote Robert Haddick, a managing editor at the Small Wars Journal, “most especially the way it ended, with a clear military solution – will cause many sleepless nights for Western counterinsurgency theorists.”

Download the Full Article: [URL="http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/513-Beehner.pdf"] (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/513-Beehner.pdf)

Lionel Beehner is a Ph.D. candidate at Yale University and formerly a senior writer at the Council on Foreign Relations, where he is also a term member.

Cavguy
08-27-2010, 05:10 PM
Joint Force Quarterly # 59, due to be published next week, will contain an article by myself covering some of the same ground as Mr. Beehner's piece above - but with a very different take.

From my reading of events, Sri Lanka's victory had much, much more to do with the economic and physical isolation of the LTTE between 2001 and 2007 than the shift in tactics (brutality) emphasized in most of the literature and papers published thus far (including this one)

The LTTE’s collapse was the result of cumulative external and internal forces, not simply the employment of ruthless new tactics. Indeed, there is little beside the ability to disregard Western criticism that distinguishes Sri Lankan tactics or brutality post-2005 from earlier eras, as the conflict was already one of the most violent and ruthless in the world. Critical blows from internal defections, loss of external funding, a global antiterrorist mindset after 9/11, and second order effects of the 2004 tsunami crippled the LTTE. At the same time, foreign aid, domestic politics, and external political cover from China enabled the Sri Lankan government to resume its COIN campaign from a position of strength. The combination of these factors proved decisive in the defeat of the LTTE.

Hopefully I will be able to link the JFQ paper on SWJ in the next week.

Niel

(xposted from blog comments)

JMA
08-28-2010, 12:15 AM
Joint Force Quarterly # 59, due to be published next week, will contain an article by myself covering some of the same ground as Mr. Beehner's piece above - but with a very different take.

[snip]

Hopefully I will be able to link the JFQ paper on SWJ in the next week.

Niel

(xposted from blog comments)

I look forward to reading this.

Cavguy
09-04-2010, 05:36 PM
I look forward to reading this.

And it's out!

http://www.ndu.edu/press/understanding-sri-lanka.html


An examination of Sri Lanka's victory reveals the LTTE's collapse was the result of cumulative external and internal forces, not simply the employment of ruthless new tactics. Indeed, there is little beside the ability to disregard Western criticism that distinguishes Sri Lankan tactics or brutality post-2005 from earlier eras, as the conflict was already one of the most violent and ruthless in the world. Critical blows from internal defections, loss of external funding, a global antiterrorist mindset after 9/11, and secondorder effects of the 2004 tsunami crippled the LTTE. At the same time, foreign aid, domestic politics, and external political cover from China enabled the Sri Lankan government to resume its COIN campaign from a position of strength. The combination of these factors proved decisive in the defeat of the LTTE.

Those who wish to use the LTTE's defeat as a foil for criticizing U.S. COIN doctrine have adopted an overly simplistic narrative of the LTTE's defeat. These critics have missed the larger picture of what occurred in Sri Lanka. Appropriate and legitimate debate continues as to the significance of populationcentric tactics practiced by the U.S. military during the surge to the successful reduction of violence. Without doubt, numerous changes in the wider internal and external dynamics of the conflict coincided with the tactical shift and accelerated the turnaround in Iraq. Likewise, by 2009, the LTTE was a shadow of its former self, bankrupt, isolated, illegitimate, divided, and unable to meet an invigorated government offensive of any kind. At almost every turn, the LTTE made profound strategic miscalculations in the post-9/11 environment by continuing its use of terror tactics despite a fundamentally changed global environment. Failing to realize this shift, Prabhakaran made poor strategic and tactical choices that doomed his movement long before the government began its final offensive. Taken together, these conditions proved essential to the collapse of the LTTE after nearly 30 years of conflict.

Bob's World
09-05-2010, 03:46 AM
The key to remember is that while this particular organization, the LTTE, may well and truly be defeated (time will tell, and it probably takes about 3-5 years to accurately assess such a defeat); true success will only be if no similar organization emerges from the ashes to continue the challenge against popular perceptions of poor governance. The military is far too quick to assess these political operations in military terms. How many times have the insurgencies in Algeria and the Philippines been "defeated" militarily, only to reemerge a few years later?

This is but one more reason why it is so helpful to look at insurgency as a civil emergency, a condition existing within a populace based on their perceptions of poor governance on the part of the government that may result in non-violent or violent illegal challenges depending on the nature of the group that rises to challenge.

Yes, LTTE may well be defeated, but if the perceptions of poor governance have not also been addressed it is just a matter of time before that, or some other, group emerges to challenge yet again. This is the lesson of history. It has little to do with either threat-centric or Pop-centric COIN (both are flawed), it has to do with insurgency itself.

Bill Moore
09-05-2010, 11:25 PM
Neil,

Outstanding article! One area where we may disagree on is the value of one of the factors listed, and that is the Chinese aid. As you mentioned the conflict ebbed and flowed over the years, and more than once in the 1990s the Sri Lankan forces "almost" defeated the LTTE militarily, but they were not able to sustain the fight and had to pull back allowed the LTTE to reconstitute its military organization. With the billion dollars Chinese aid (and the other factors you listed) the Sri Lankans were able sustain their assault until victory was realized.

Despite the claims of extreme left in Europe and the U.S. the LTTE was not a widely popular groups among the Tamils, as they tortured, terrorized and murdered their own people to garner support. If the West will get off its high horse and stop pushing for war crimes (based on tragic, but normal behavior during wars) and instead assist the Gov of Sri Lanka in providing humanitarian aid to the Tamils it may be possible to build a lasting peace.

The good governance argument has no merit there, as the LTTE would have been worse for the Tamils than the Sri Lankan government. This was a power struggle between leaders waged military, not a struggle over ideas of how to govern better. It is very naive in my view to think that if Sri Lanka changed their discriminatory behavior towards and offered additional financial aid to the Tamils that the LTTE would have stopped fighting.

The LTTE is one brutal organization I'm glad to see defeated, and wish would do the same elsewhere in the world. Not every insurgent/terrorist leader has the welfare of his people in mind, and it is western foolishness to believe that is the case.

Just like the defeated Germans and Japanese needed help at end of WWII, the Tamils need help now. We didn't apologize to the German people for all their civilians killed to defeat Hitler, or have to ward off silly claims of war crimes. We focused on doing what was right, and we need to help the Sri Lankan Government do the same for the Tamil people, instead of pushing for war crimes.

Bob's World
09-06-2010, 02:27 AM
I sense my bow has been scorched by the shot fired across it! :) I do agree that this is a well researched, well written article. I won't however jump on the celebratory bandwagon just yet.

To be clear, I have never said that the insurgent offers "good governance" (though they will certainly promise it); only that they emerge to challenge "poor governance." The difference is significant, and clearly applies here, as the Sinhalese majority of southern Sri Lanka saw independence for Great Britain as their opportunity to create a Bhudist, Sinhalese homeland, banning the language and culture of the Hindu Tamil minority in the north. All to often it is a greater evil than the one in power that emerges to challeng poor governance. Too often good people will support the cause of change, but will not take the step to become outlaws to challenge the government directly.

I will not laud the LTTE, they were every bit as bad as Bill says; but that has little to do with what caused them to emerge, and what will in turn cause some new organization to emerge in due time; as I suspect that little has been done to address the conditions that gave rise to the LTTE in the course of the military defeat of the LTTE.

Celebrate the victory, but understand that it is merely a suppression of a particular insurgent movement, and that the grace offered is temporary unless the underlying issues are addressed as well. By understanding the role of governnce in insurgency it enables clear thinking. This defeat is an opportunity, but only if taken advantage of will it really mean anything in the long run. Hopefully the brutal tactics of the government did not dig a hole so deep that they can never climb out of it.

Now is the time to put pressure on the government to focus on true reforms that include the entire populace, not to believe that somehow the problem is resolved through military action alone. Also to engage the Tamil people to refocus as well, and to work with the government and if forced to act out illegally again to strongly consider the use of non-violent tactics that have worked so effectively for others in similar situations.

This is not the end, it is a beginning. Time will tell where this beginning leads.

Bill Moore
09-06-2010, 05:46 AM
Bob, my shots are directed at your argument, not you. I think the argument that we "need" to always address the underlying root cause is dangerously misleading. Sri Lanka is another example of where the world is continuing to pay for bad British decisions (not unlike most of the Middle East). Tamils were imported to Sri Lanka to work the tea plantations and given some degree of preference. This gets at my opposition to the "its the tribe stupid" strategy (if you dare call it a strategy). When your policies drive a wedge between peoples, the underlying issue is hate and greed, not poor government (governments can contribute to the level of hate as Hitler's party did, but it can't extinguish the level of hate / greed, as we saw in our own reconstruction efforts in the south after the Civil War).

There was no amount of good governance after the conflict started that would bring the conflict to an end in Sri Lanka, and one side had to win, or the people would have continued to suffer for more years if the war continued to drag out without a decisive victory (no matter how short lived it may be).

War amongst peoples is rarely if ever rational, it is based upon emotion, not simply some government policy. Those colonized hated their colonizers. After the colonizers left there were (and many continue) many battles for power, but not so much over failed governance, it was just that some other group wanted to be charge so they could steal from the people.

The issue wasn't good governance and very few people are fighting for it, they're fighting for their tribe, group, religion, region, etc.

Every conflict is different, but I would argue in wars amongst people very few are about good governance for the collective whole, but rather what's in it for their group. We can support this baboon level of society by playing tribal games, or we can try to instill western forms of government, but I suspect both will backfire. What will work, has been proven to work, is defeating our enemies in battle, and we all know that victory (all victories) are short lived affairs.

Dayuhan
09-06-2010, 08:02 AM
Might make sense to think less of "good governance", which carries with it our implicit assumptions about what is or is not "good", and think instead of "perceived good governance". I may define "good governance" as "governance by me", or as "that form of bad governance that is best for me", or as "governance by anybody but these &%$#@"... in each case, what I have to offer is unlikely to fit your definition of what's "good", but it might fit mine... at least until I get it, anyway!

Bob's World
09-06-2010, 10:56 AM
Well, I will not argue against the hard cold facts of "might makes right," even a country like the U.S. that sees itself as a shining example goodness leans heavily on "or we'll destroy your economy or kick your ass." as the tag line when we engage others.

But what you offer is an endless cycle of bloody conflict without end; and I think we can do better than that by thinking more about why conflicts start rather than about how to suppress the next uprising. Taking your argument to the logical conclusion, an advisor to the government of Sri Lanka should tell them the current victory is a half measure, and that they will only have stability when they have killed or driven off the island every last Tamil. Of course that leaves 60,000,000 very pissed of Tamils just a few miles away in India...

But as you say, these things are complicated, and indeed, shaking off the disruptions caused by generations of Western Colonialism is at the heart of many of the insurgent conflicts we've seen since, oh, about the beginning of Western Colonialism. But in Sri Lanka there are two distinct groups of Tamils as I understand it: those who have lived there for centuries and those who were imported to work the tea; but regardless, the fact is that they are all there now and must learn to live together as a nation if they want the cycle of violence to end.

When I say "must" address conditions of Poor Governance (defined as perceptions from the perspective of the insurgent segment of the populace, and often irrational to the counterinsurgents perspective, and possibly quite disconnected from fact as well); I don't mean we are compelled to engage to fix it. Much of this type of conflict is really none of our business and we set ourselves up for international terrorist attacks when we take one side over the other. No, I mean "must" as in if one wants to see true resolution of the problem they must address the roots and not just attack the symptoms.

I suspect if I looked at the Sri Lanken Constitution I would find a document that allows or perhaps even drives the type of discrimination that fuels this conflict. I suspect that if I look at the laws and polices of the government in general I would find the same.

So, my perspective and advice to the government and people there remains the same:

"The current victory is just a suppression of the symptoms of insurgency. The true insurgency is not the LTTE who you have defeated, but rather lives in the hearts and minds of the Tamil people who perceive that the governance of Sri Lanka as applied to them is poor. They may not accept your legitimacy, so look hard at how you fill governmental positions and ensure that it is a process that all have an opportunity to participate in and shape. They may feel that the rule of law as applied to them is not just. Look to your justice system and assess it carefully as to if it is biased against or for some groups over others, or if it is untimely, or too harsh, or too easily manipulated, etc. They may feel that they do not receive equal respect and opportunity as a matter of status. Human biases are natural, so laws must be enacted and enforced that protect against such abuses, whereas many of the laws you have enacted since independence have actually codified them. Fix this. Lastly, build off ramps for insurgency. True insurgency is about politics, and while it is impossible to create a society where all is harmony and everyone agrees on the big issues, it is not impossible to create governmental systems that ensure that every segment of the society has an equal and fair representation in the government, and that change can be affected in regular, certain, and trusted ways. The Tamils are a minority, so pure democracy will always leave them out. Consider modifications such as we employed in the US to protect against the dangers of democracy, such as the balancing equal representation by region, as well as equal representation by populace to ensure that critical regional issues are not run over by a larger populace in another region. As to the Tamils, you need to push for these changes as well, but you will not likely succeed through violence. The LTTE elevated your cause and showed that you have the will and ability to fight, now it is time to take your argument to the media, to the courts, to the streets in peaceful demonstration. To employ a type of pressure for governmental evolution through non-violent tactics that history shows are more likely to yield the results you seek."

Yes, every insurgency manifests uniquely based on all of the many factors at work. But they all involve people, and they all involve some group that is grossly dissatisfied with their current lot under the current government; and there are indeed commonalities in that fact. I'm sure I don't have it exactly right, but I am equally sure I am digging in the right location.

Besides, even if I am wildly wrong, there are thousands of others out their selling threat-centric and population centric techniques for addressing the symptoms of insurgency, so that's pretty well covered. The fact is that the symptoms must be managed, and there is merit in both of those camps, so I am fine with the content of their work, I just don't think it can actually resolve an insurgency though. I think there is room for at least one to dig for the roots.

davidbfpo
09-06-2010, 09:28 PM
I know very little about how Sri Lanka defeated the LTTE in Sri Lanka, so my comment is directed at the diaspora faraway - yes, in Europe.

The police in London appear to have been surprised by the numbers mobilised to protest outside Parliament, when the offensive reached a peak. See the BBC reports on the start: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/8007858.stm and at the end: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/8056441.stm

There remains the issue of fund raising within the diaspora, whether coerced or not is a moot point. An issue that affects other countries, even in places like Switzerland.

I do wonder how the diaspora will be effected by learning what has happened since the LTTE's military defeat. Can that feeling be transferred to non-LTTE activities?

A big snag is that the diaspora Tamil communities speak a language that few outsiders speak or understand and there is plenty of "room" for a knowledge gap.

Dayuhan
09-06-2010, 10:29 PM
Yes, every insurgency manifests uniquely based on all of the many factors at work. But they all involve people, and they all involve some group that is grossly dissatisfied with their current lot under the current government; and there are indeed commonalities in that fact. I'm sure I don't have it exactly right, but I am equally sure I am digging in the right location.

I also think you're digging in the right direction, but there are some roots in the hole. For one... I think it's true that insurgency is almost always based on popular dissatisfaction and popular perceptions of bad governance. It would be a huge mistake, though, to assume that any given insurgent group or set of insurgent leaders represents popular aspirations, that their agendas have anything to do with the will of the people, that their leaders have the interests of the people in mind, or that they negotiate (if they do) on behalf of the people. More often insurgent leaders are trying to leverage popular anger to support their own agendas and their own desire for power.

In these cases addressing the governance issues may remove the incentive to fight and gradually erode the support base and rank-and-file fighter base of the insurgency. It will not convince leaders to modify their demands or agendas, because all the leaders want is power, not something easily compromised.

The case of Sri Lanka appears to represent something analogous to what we've seen several times in the Philippines: defeating an insurgent group does not eliminate the causes of insurgency, but it does open a window of opportunity for government to step in and produce some results, a window that probably cannot be opened any other way. If the government fails to exploit that window, more fighting is likely down the line, as has always been the case in the Philippines.

Military victory in these cases should not be seen as an end in itself, but rather as a necessary means to an end. It doesn't resolve the issues, but it creates space that government can exploit to achieve resolution. If government fails... back on the wheel, and the losers, as always, are the people.

Bob's World
09-06-2010, 10:53 PM
The rise of an insurgent group should be seen by government primarily as a clear metric that they are missing the mark in major way. The government should then exercise the rule of law in a just fashion with the illegal actor (the insurgent), while as the same time focusing on what it is they are doing wrong and need to address.

In no way does the rise of an insurgent group mean that that group is the solution to the problem of poor governance. Too few George Washington's, and far too many Adolf Hitlers out there who emerge to take advantage of these situations. Again though, it is best I believe to see insurgency as a condition that exists within a populace, and not an organization that rises to take advantage of that condition. The organizations that rise may be worse than the current government. It is the condition that is important and must be addressed. A government that refuses to evolve, that refuses to recognize and address the condition of insurgency deserves what it gets; sadly it is the populace that loses out, as they are the ones caught in the middle, and often have one bad government defeated only to be made subject to one that is worse.

Dayuhan
09-07-2010, 01:09 AM
A government that refuses to evolve, that refuses to recognize and address the condition of insurgency deserves what it gets; sadly it is the populace that loses out, as they are the ones caught in the middle, and often have one bad government defeated only to be made subject to one that is worse.

Evolution or revolution, take your pick...

Unfortunately, the people who run many governments threatened by revolution are, in effect, dinosaurs, and would not survive evolution. They would rather try to suppress a revolution and take the risk of losing than submit to an evolutionary process that they (often accurately) believe would inevitably lead to their extinction.

Bill Moore
09-07-2010, 06:01 AM
Posted by Bob's World,


The rise of an insurgent group should be seen by government primarily as a clear metric that they are missing the mark in major way. The government should then exercise the rule of law in a just fashion with the illegal actor (the insurgent), while as the same time focusing on what it is they are doing wrong and need to address.

It appears that your in view there is an acceptable political solution for all governments under attack by an insurgent group. An arrangement that somehow addresses all the core issues of all potential belligerent groups. An arrangment that will void the need and desire for conflict; and if a government doesn't identify this arrangment they failed to govern well.

I don't think these arguments stand up to examination. Simply look at the extreme right movement in the U.S. with their fantasy of overthrowing the U.S. government, so they can develop a segregated society and kill off all the Jews. The likes of the Aryan Nation, KKK, etc. have clearly stated their beefs against anyone not white and Christian, and they see a Jewish conspiracy in every story. While admittedly a lame movement, none the less how should our government address their core issues?

In Iraq the Sunni extremists want to establish AQ's version of Sharia law, which really means they just want to run the show and exploit their people, since the vast majority of AQ in Iraq are simply criminals. The various Shi'a groups supported by Iran also want to run the show, and of course the Kurds want their own homeland in the midst of this madness (perhaps the only legitimate political claim). A government that fails to address all these underlying conditions is not a failure in my book, but if they fail to defeat those who are violently opposed to them then they will definitely fail.

If you're a government leader or advisor in a developing nation and maybe 10-15 percent of the populact wants to install a Marxist government by implementing a violent over throw of the government, the government has obviously failed, because they only satisfied 85-90 percent of the populace. Should the government offer an olive branch to the Marxists? Shold they offer a shared power arrangement with the Marxists? Should they simply admit they're right even if the majority wants nothing to do with them, hell just go ahead and dissolve the current government (which again has obviously failed)?

Addressing underlying issues is hardly a new idea; however, in many situations it remains in the realm of wishful fantasy. All issues in the world do not evolve around government, but all governments have responsibilites to protect the integrity of their State and protect their citizens. If we disregard the value of actually commiting to the fight or either severing our relationship with a failed government (yes there are bad governments, we all agree with you), we'll instead linger in a perpetual stalemate that results in generations knowing nothing else but conflict and hate. Make a tough decision now or a tougher decision later, but get off the middle ground, it is not decisive. Our efforts to wage a kinder type of war has resulted in prolonged suffering and misery for millions.

The hatred in Sri Lanka runs deep on both sides of the ethnic divide. Does anyone think that Prabakaran and his LTTE organization would have laid down their arms if the Gov of Sri Lanka outlawed discrimination against Tamils and let them have some (not complete seperation from the State) politicial autonomy? Do you really think most Tamils wanted to live under the brut Prabakaran? The military solution was appropriate based off the behavior of the LTTE during previous ceasefires. Peace was not their objective.

Government policies can't mandate people's feelings, and we all know the government is not always the answer. During our reconstruction efforts in the South after our Civil War our government mandates failed to address the deep rooted racism, hate and fear among peoples. The only way to bring any degree of peace and a slight protection to the blacks living in the South was to employ sufficient security forces (which we never did). It still took over a hundred years of bloodshed to address many of the main racial issues in our country, but many still exist. The truth in general is rather simple and sad, people fear and sometimes hate other people that are not like them. How many places are we going to deploy our forces and how many years will they stay there to address the issue of hatred?

Sri Lanka's military victory was a tough earned victory that definitely qualifies as a victory. I too suspect another Tamil separatist movement will emerge in time, but that seems to be the natural course of history in countries with deep seated racial issues. If we really want to help, we need to get off the war crimes kick, and assist the Government render aid to the Tamils.

Cavguy
09-07-2010, 06:33 AM
The Sri Lankans won, you can't steal their victory with promises of a future conflict, so their military victory doesn't count. It definitely counts. I too suspect another Tamil separatist movement will emerge in time, that is the general path of history in conflicts with deep roots.

Exactly. The LTTE was soundly defeated, and with it the Tamils hopes for a separate state. It also left them isolated, impoverished, and exhausted. My essay was an attempt to briefly capture what happened. Some writers imply that Sri Lanka won because they woke up one day and decided to use "at all costs" tactics. Baloney. They were using those from the start, by 2007 they simply got the upper hand in resources to win due to their own improvements and the LTTE's self inflicted wounds.

Bob is right, of course the Tamils can rise again, and they may. The LTTE's refusal to abandon its objectionable tactics (suicide bombing, chemical bombs, terror) deprived the Tamils of a crucial requirement - external political support. By 2005 the Tamils had no allies other than their expats, no champion in the international community because of the character of their campaign.

Any future Tamil insurgency would have even less chance of a "conventional" victory given the government's increased strength. A transition to political (even non-violent) insurgency vice military may have a better chance of success if it attracts international sympathy.

Bob's World
09-07-2010, 11:10 AM
My point is that the LTTE in Sri Lanka has been defeated; but that the conditions of insurgency are probably even stronger than they were before.

We need to not confuse the two. I agree that extreme, violent groups must be dealt with, and often they must be dealt with harshly; but my point is that in so doing one must understand that the group they are dealing with exists because the conditions of insurgency exist and feeds upon those conditions and that the defeat of the insurgent group is a very different thing from the defeat of the conditions of insurgency.

The majority viewpoint sees insurgency from the perspective of the counterinsurgent as something caused by the insurgent, or perhaps even caused by some malevolent outside force (conducting UW) that comes in and radicalizes a populace to turn against them.

This is wishful political BS. I believe that one takes a much healthier and more accurate perspective when one sees insurgency not as an organization that rises against the government, but rather as a condition that exists within the perceptions of some segment of the populace due to the actions (or inactions) of the government. Populaces do not fail governments, it is governments that fail populaces.

Certainly this condition, these perceptions of poor governance are exploited by those with their own agenda. Inside actors with bad intent will attempt to use them to rise to power. Outside actors will come in and conduct UW, and employ PSYOP to "radicalize" the populace in enhancing the conditions of insurgency by building on the already existing perceptions of poor governance. States do this. AQ does this as well. But none of it takes root if the perceptions of poor governance, if the conditions of insurgency do not already exist in spades.

So, the LTTE is defeated. Great, and so what? What happens next? If everyone is too busy celebrating the great victory and thinks they are somehow "mission complete" simply because the initial military operation is over (sound familiar Iraq vets?), then they are in for a harsh surprise, probably sooner than later.

Defeat of the insurgent group is like crossing the LD, you still have to get to the objective in order to win. In insurgency the objective is addressing the conditions of insurgency, and that onus rests firmly on the civil government. My assessment is that the government of Sri Lanka is not ready to do for the Tamil segment of its populace today what the government of the U.S. did for its African American populace in the 60s. Make real concessions, make them the law of the land, and enforce those laws. It still takes time. The U.S. has not completely resolved the conditions of insurgency related to our problem, but it gets better every day. I don't think Sri Lanka even understands what they need to do and why they need to do it. Celebrating their defeat of LTTE does not help in that regard.

My opinion, and it does stand up to historical challenge.

Bill Moore
09-07-2010, 05:10 PM
I agree that extreme, violent groups must be dealt with, and often they must be dealt with harshly; but my point is that in so doing one must understand that the group they are dealing with exists because the conditions of insurgency exist and feeds upon those conditions and that the defeat of the insurgent group is a very different thing from the defeat of the conditions of insurgency.

Hard to disagree with this statement, it is quite logical as far as it goes, but you didn't really respond to my questions above. A lot of insurgent groups are violent minorities (not necessarily talking ethnic group), so does the government really need to address their extreme views or defeat neutralize the group?

In some cases what you're arguing is very applicable (the Philippines and Sri Lanka both being good examples), but in other situations a minority with extreme views whipped into violent revolt by internal or external leadership is not a failure of government in my view.

Every situation is different, and in some cases it is more appropriate for the security forces to be the main effort to quell the problem, in other cases it will take more of a holistic approach that addresses legitimate grievances.

I think we're simply talking past one another, because my point isn't that the military is always or even normally the best approach to quelling an insurgency, but on the other hand I think we tend to downplay the importance of force intelligently applied. Where we may disagree is that I think security force pressure (again intelligently applied) on the armed insurgents is valuable, and something that I don't think we're doing as well as we could be in Afghanistan. I also am against re-writing history to force historical events conform to our views, so I always welcome your counter arguments. We're going to be doing this for many years, so if we can do it more effectively I'm all for it.

Bob's World
09-07-2010, 11:35 PM
Bill,

Nah, we're just forcing each other to clarify their points. I suspect it is helpful for others who are watching us lock horns.

Evil or selfish men will step up to lead insurgencies when the conditions exist and the same goes for governments and now, non-state actors like AQ, who will swoop in to conduct UW for their own purposes as well.

Poor governance opens the door for change...what that change will be depends upon who steps up to the plate.

Dayuhan
09-08-2010, 01:29 AM
Evil or selfish men will step up to lead insurgencies when the conditions exist and the same goes for governments and now, non-state actors like AQ, who will swoop in to conduct UW for their own purposes as well.

Poor governance opens the door for change...what that change will be depends upon who steps up to the plate.

This is true, but we must be very wary of any impulse to direct change by trying to step up to the plate on someone else's behalf... no designated hitter rule in place here. Evil and selfish aren't the only dangers: it's wise to remember the old adage about the pavement on the road to hell.

jmm99
09-08-2010, 02:47 AM
Once upon a time, my dad led me to a couple of deer skeletons - bucks with locked horns. Dumb way to settle mating squabbles.

Or is it (the discourse) more akin to battleships passing in the night before radar ? Impressive salvoes (fired according to perceived fire control), but no real hits.

Not much real comment on Niel's article - or re: each of the multiple factors that he felt were important to consider. Get it - multiple factors (not "one notes").

Regards

Mike

Bill Moore
09-08-2010, 08:02 AM
Posted by Mike,


Once upon a time, my dad led me to a couple of deer skeletons - bucks with locked horns. Dumb way to settle mating squabbles.

Mike, you worry me sometimes :D

You're absolutely correct there are tens to hundreds of variables that influence the start of insurgencies and that determine who will be victorious. We're at grave risk of misunderstanding the real issues if we come in with preconceived ideas (false truths), and subsquently at risk of developing the incorrect strategy to address the issues.

Neil's article did a great job of addressing several of the variables that influenced the outcome of this conflict instead of focusing on one pet theory.

Pardon me now, for I have to find my ideological foe so we can lock horns again (the break is over).

Bob's World
09-08-2010, 12:08 PM
Mike should appreciate this (no deer will be killed in the telling of this story):

So, I'm attending an "Evidence Symposium" on the role of Development in COIN. Good topic, good group, interesting day. What was new for me was this new trend from the administration of "getting beyond argument by analogy (This is what we did in Iraq, Vietnam, etc, and therefore this is what we should do here...) and instead argue with "evidence."

So, I think about that as the keynote guy is talking (sharp guy, tough job, impressive), and on the break I ask him "so, how do you know what evidence is material if you have not defined the elements of what you are trying to prove?" "What do you mean", he wanted to know (and this gets to Bill's point that all insurgencies are different as well); "well, 'evidence' is kind of broad. First you have information, and then you determine what of that information is 'fact', and then just some of those 'facts' make it through a strict analysis that allows them to be considered as 'evidence.' But this is just the start, much 'evidence' is irrelevant to what you are trying to prove, then of that that is relevant, much is immaterial. Material evidence is the gold nugget, as it goes straight to proving or disproving the elements of charge."

He gives me the "I'm listening, but am not sure where you are going with this look."

So I go on, "Insurgency is complicated, and while there are many opinions, you can lock 5 experts in a room to come up with the elements of what causes insurgency and you will get a great debate, but you won't get your elements; and personal opinion, there are some serious flaws in both historic approaches to COIN and much of the nouveau COIN that is being put out, so I really think that the first thing one needs to do in taking an evidencery approach is to first determine the elements of the problem you are seeking to prove.

At this point I was upsetting his neat new approach to problem solving (heavily laden with the implication that the problem with the previous administration was that they used analogy to solve problems), so he got busy talking to someone else. Hopefully he's thinking about it though, as he's much smarter than I am and is in a position to do something about it.

(And yes, I did offer my four causal perceptions as a strawman for the elements for insurgency to guide a quest for evidence that is material to COIN).

When people argue about how every insurgency is different they are always right. The question is, how many of those differences are relevant, and are there in fact certain common elements that can drive a quest for material evidence as to what works and what does not.

This is still new and the group struggled with the concept. One study was based on a broad base of data from Iraq and lauded as "evidence." It was good work with good insights, but to my thinking it was still based on a sample of one insurgency and as such was still 'analogy' until the finding could be cross-referenced and challenged by running them against a history of hundreds of other insurgencies to see if they stand up.

Day two. I'll try to listen quietly....

jmm99
09-08-2010, 04:10 PM
Bill is playing the role of worried parent :confused:; and Bob has regressed to his days as a trial lawyer :eek::


from Bill
Mating squabble? ...
Mike, you worry me sometimes :D

from Bob
So, I think about that as the keynote guy is talking (sharp guy, tough job, impressive), and on the break I ask him "so, how do you know what evidence is material if you have not defined the elements of what you are trying to prove?" "What do you mean", he wanted to know (and this gets to Bill's point that all insurgencies are different as well); "well, 'evidence' is kind of broad. First you have information, and then you determine what of that information is 'fact', and then just some of those 'facts' make it through a strict analysis that allows them to be considered as 'evidence.' But this is just the start, much 'evidence' is irrelevant to what you are trying to prove, then of that that is relevant, much is immaterial. Material evidence is the gold nugget, as it goes straight to proving or disproving the elements of charge."

Good advice in a search for gold nuggets, silver nuggets, or even lumps of hardened coal. I suppose one could take it to its logical extreme and search for the alchemist's stone. However, my own goals are more basic and I would be satisfied if I could identify the elements of a much smaller set of conflicts.

The concept of confronting several hundred "insurgencies" - and fully understanding them to the point of determiniing in each of them what is "material" and what is not (where so much of that understanding depends on knowing population groups of which I know little or nothing) - boogles my mind. Sorry, I'm not that intelligent.

My thoughts re: Sri Lanka is to consider the basic situation where a minority population was promoted by a colonial power to a position where the majority population perceived the minority as being advantaged to the minority's benefit and the majority's disadvantage.

Does that basic situation have one solution, one result ? The answer is clearly negative looking at four cases (adds to the dataset are welcome):

Rwanda

Sri Lanka

Iraq

Finland (Svecomen minority; Finnomen majority)

So, why did Rwanda evolve as it did, as opposed to Finland ? In both countries, a population geneticist would have a hard time distinguishing between the minority and majority groups.

Regards

Mike

Bill Moore
09-08-2010, 04:26 PM
This is still new and the group struggled with the concept. One study was based on a broad base of data from Iraq and lauded as "evidence." It was good work with good insights, but to my thinking it was still based on a sample of one insurgency and as such was still 'analogy' until the finding could be cross-referenced and challenged by running them against a history of hundreds of other insurgencies to see if they stand up.

This paragraph indicates you have fallen into the same trap most of us fall into. You're looking for evidence to prove a theory instead of using evidence to discover the truth. I'm sure I can cherry pick evidence from hundreds of insurgencies to support my theory compared to yours and vice versa (RAND does it all the time). Fortunately or unfortunately we have military minds (unconventional or not), and we tend to want to develop simple answers (doctrinal approaches) based on common truths (whether they exist or not).

After thinking about your arguments a little more, I also think your approach is too absolute. You are proposing that every problem is due to poor government, and the center of gravity (pardon the military term) is always the government. I suspect people can find supporting evidence (depending on how you interpret it) for that in many insurgencies, just as they can find examples of where an enemy centric approach worked, but the reality in both cases i suspect will be different, and as Mike stated the outcome was due to several variables, perhaps hundreds of them. Until we all learn to back off our pet theories and preconceived ideas the evidence based approach is doomed to fail just as badly as the correlation approach. For an evidence based approach to work it would require using evidence with no bias, and it is very hard for humans to do that.

Ken White
09-08-2010, 06:46 PM
This entire paragraph:
After thinking about your arguments a little more...it is very hard for humans to do that.Summarizes what I've been saying about Bob's World view from the first. There are other causes (which Bob dismisses as minor inconveniences :D) and the human factor (specifically his US specific remedies) will ALWAYS intrude. We're not as nice or as smart as he wishes. I kept saying that but have sort of backed off recently not because I've come to see the correctness of his views but solely because I don't want to belabor the point -- even if Ol' Bob does. :wry:

I know Bob's a smart guy and that he knows all that -- but he also is trying to sell a product, one that has merit but is vulnerable to a counter pitch on those two factors. Either that or he's looking for that long river in Africa...;)

And Mike, as usual, makes excellent points...

Bob's World
09-08-2010, 11:19 PM
Come on guys, don't tell me it's "too absolute", tell me where it falls apart.

I only apply it to political based insurgencies, (so the McVeigh one-offs don't apply, nor do the drug cartel profit oriented violence as in Mexico and perhaps even a Sierra Leone). But when the issue is political I've yet to find one where it does not apply.

Now, still all it provides is a focal point for getting stated. So, worst case you go in on an intervention with the following checklist driving your focus for your campaign design:

1. Look at insurgency as a condition that exists within a populace rather than as an organization that is challengeing the government. Deal with the organization, but make your focus addressing the condtion itself; as this will have the best liklihood of disempowering the current organization and also preventing it or others from emerging later.

2. Does the populace perceive that the government draws legitimacy from a source they recognize and accept? As a whole? The insurgent segment? To find out don't worry about objective metrics, instead design and implement a logical system of polling (formal and informal) that gets at this and the following questions indirectly. Ask Gallop, they are pros at this. If not this is a deal breaker. We cannot create legitimacy. State will need to tell them to fix this first if they want our help. If they are unwilling to do so we will ask the same of the next guys.

3. Are there "off ramps" for the populace short of insurgency? Do they have trusted, certain, timely and legal means to address concerns about their governance? If not, make the is a focus of State's enagagement with them. Do it on terms that fit this culture, not ours.

4. Look for systemic inequities that treat some segments of the populace better or worse than others as a matter of status. Ensure that any enagement does not enhance these perceptions, and where possible work to negate them. Focus pressure on the government to address these biases and at the same time encourage the populace to seek non-violent ways to put pressure on the govenrment to evolve. This should be a major aspect of strategic communications.

5. Justice. Look at the rule of law as it is applied, and does the populace as whole, and the insurgent segment in particular perceive it to be just as applied to them? Focus engagement on addressing those factors leading to perceptions of injustice. (too slow, untrained underpaid and therefore corrupt staff, biased, etc etc.)

6. Dont' look at intervention efforts as "COIN" and don't look at the operation as a whole as "war." Ensure the HN stays in the lead and that they conduct COIN and that our assistance is called something else and is clearly in support; but focused on the conditions of insurgency rather than on the insurgent and his organization. Don't call it a war because the fact is this government may not be up to the task of governing its populace and we don't need the strategic risk that comes from having to either prop them up, or pull out under the context of "war." Make it clear up front that we are here to support the populace and to address the conditions of insurgency, not just help them beat down an insurgent organization. If they don't want our help on those terms, go home and deal with the new government. They may well be worse, but if we don't coddle them either they will either get better or suffer the same fate as the last guys.

Lastly: A lot of special interest groups will put huge pressure on the government to ignore this advice and but US interests on a back burner behind the interests of their corporation or organization. Don't cave in.

jmm99
09-09-2010, 02:29 AM
appear to be valid points that should be examined before some civilian (say JMM) sends you and Moore on an "intervention" - which if this civilian had any say would be a rare event. They seem to me to be more national security policy issues - so a fair topic for both the political and miltary sides.

That having been said (first do a good political area study pre-intervention), another concurrent examination must be whether the incumbant government has examined those same points - and what did it conclude.

I'd also add some factors based on the population's (and its sub-groups') perceptions of security, opportunity and ideology vice the incumbant and the insurgent - and let's go back and add into the mix Niel's factors (and Dayuhan's, and Bill's, and whoever else wants to enhance the area study).

Now, if the incumbant government and the putative intervenor are on all fours after examining all the relevant factors in how and why the insurgency will be targeted politically and militarily, then intervention might be a "go". But, if any material differences exist between the incumbant and the putative intervenor, intervention is extremely questionable. History teaches us that those differences are more likely to grow worse over time - leaving the intervenor locked into the very possible illegitimacy of the incumbant (Tim Lomperis' "illegitimacy lock"; e.g, Vietnam).

-------------------------------
Independent of critical examinations by the putative intervenor of the incumbant and the insurgent, the putative intervenor should also conduct a critical examination of where the incumbant country fits into the pecking order of the intervenor's enlightened self-interest - and the overall plusses and minuses of intervention.

Here is an example:


In October 1951, the student conclusions to their study of US policy in Southeast Asia were presented to the college. Although opinions were somewhat divided, a large majority opposed any major US involvement. The conclusions of the majority could be summarized as follows:

(1) The United States had probably made a serious mistake in agreeing with its allies to allow French power to be restored in Indochina. As a colonial power, France had done little to develop indigenous civilian and military leaders and civil servants in preparation for the countries' eventual independence.

(2) Indochina was of only secondary strategic importance to the United States. The economic and military value of Vietnam, the most important state in the region, was not impressive. Politically and socially, Vietnam was obviously entering an unstable period with uncertain consequences. In any event, it did not warrant the commitment of US forces to its defense.

(3) General war planning by the US Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) envisioned a strategic defense in the Pacific, drawing the US forward defense line to include Japan, South Korea, and the offshore island chain (Okinawa-Taiwan-the Philippines). But in Southeast Asia, the line was drawn through the Isthmus of Kra on the mainland, excluding all of Indochina and most of Thailand. Thus, the Strait of Malacca and populous, richly endowed Indonesia were considered to be the prime strategic targets of the region.

(4) Militarily, the region in general and Vietnam in particular would be an extremely difficult operational area, especially for US forces. Unlike the relatively narrow Korean peninsula, Vietnam presented very long land and coastal borders that would be almost impossible to seal against infiltration and difficult to defend against overt military agression. Much of the region was covered with dense jungle and much was mountainous. Weather, terrain and geographic conformation combined to present formidable obstacles for military operations and logistic support.

(5) Politically and psychologically, the United States, if it were to become involved, would have to operate under severe disadvatages, for it would inherit the taint of European colonialism. The United States should not become involved in the area beyond providing materiel ["-iel", not "-ial"] military aid.

"US Policy in Southeast Asia". Reports of Student Committees #13-17 (Carlisle Barracks, Pa: US Army War College, 1951), cited in Bruce Palmer Jr, The 25-Year War (http://www.amazon.com/25-Year-War-Americas-Military-Vietnam/dp/0813190363) (1984) - with HT to Ken White for suggesting this book.

Regards

Mike

Bob's World
09-09-2010, 03:33 AM
Well, as I say, I think it is a big mistake to see COIN as "warfare", so of course the critical issues are civil/policy. After all, the heart of my perspective is that insurgency is a condition that comes to exist within a populace when that same populace perceives conditions of poor governance to exist. These are conditions caused by action or inaction on the part of the government so it stands to reason that the majority of the fix is on the part of the government as well.

Just because the military focuses on applying violence to the violent aspects of the insurgent groups that arise from these conditions of insurgency; and just because civil governments are quick to dump the entire problem on the military once it goes violent, does not in turn somehow turn it into a military problem with a military solution.

The Army/Marine Corps manual on COIN goes off the rails sentence one, paragraph one, chapter one, where it states that "COIN is Warfare." That's like going out the door with your static line unhooked. One big mistake up front makes the rest of the operation a whole lot harder than it ought to be.

tequila
04-21-2011, 11:08 PM
U.N.: Sri Lanka's crushing of the Tamil Tigers may have killed 40,000 civilians (http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/un_sri_lankas_crushing_of_tamil_tigers_may_have_ki lled_40000_civilians/2011/04/21/AFU14hJE_story.html?wprss=rss_homepage)


Sri Lanka’s decisive 2008-09 military offensive against the country’s separatist Tamil Tigers may have resulted in the deaths of as many as 40,000 civilians, most of them victims of indiscriminate shelling by Sri Lankan forces, according to a U.N. panel established by U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-moon.

The panel recommended that Ban set up an “independent international mechanism” to carry out a far more thorough probe into “credible” allegations of war crimes and crimes against humanity by the Sri Lankan government and the Liberation Tigers of the Tamil Eelam (LTTE), which held more than 300,000 civilians “hostage” to enforce a “strategic human buffer between themselves and the advancing Sri Lankan army.”

Extensive portions of the report were published over the past several days by a Sri Lankan newspaper, the Island, and have been quickly repudiated by Sri Lankan authorities. U.N. officials confirmed the authenticity of the report but said the disclosure was incomplete. They said Thursday that the release of the report had been delayed amid discussions with Sri Lanka over the possibility of including a rebuttal in the report.

The panel’s findings constituted a devastating indictment of the country’s military conduct during the final stage of the 28-year war, accusing government forces of shelling hospitals, no-fire zones and U.N. facilities, and blocking the delivery of humanitarian assistance to victims of the war. The panel calls on Sri Lanka to “issue a public, acknowledgment of its role in and responsibility for extensive civilian casualties in the final stages of the war" ...

Bill Moore
04-21-2011, 11:21 PM
Just curious, how many civilians did we kill in Germany, Japan, and Vietnam?

40k civlians killed is of course tragic, but it was long running vicious civil war fought by the people and their militias. The UN can of course attempt to impose their rules of war if they wish, but at this point I don't see what good will come out of it. There were plenty of atrocities on both sides, it wasn't a single event that was an aberration, so who exactly are you going to put on trail and for what? Are we witnessing a new breed of ambulance chaser lawyers that will show up after every war and put everyone involved on trail?

Ray
04-22-2011, 03:43 AM
The Sri Lankan insurrection was messy and brutal.

No side was of angels.

http://www.lankanewspapers.com/news/2009/6/44718_space.html

jmm99
04-22-2011, 06:20 AM
which call into question how effective legal rules are (as opposed to social norms) in reducing civilian casualties in either regular or irregular warfare. Sri Lanka was not the only messy and brutal event since 1900.

See, Collateral Damage on 21st Century Battlefield, The Air Force Law Review, Vol. 56 (2005) (snip pp.77-80, attached as pdf) (emphasis added):


Although the incidence of collateral damage in U.S. combat operations has declined since World War II due to improved technology and strategy, the number of civilians killed in conflict has generally increased. The relationship between concealment warfare strategies and high numbers of civilian casualties generated is evident from conflicts in virtually every corner of the world from Cambodia and Uganda to Kosovo and Colombia.[321] The number of civilians killed in conflict since 1900 is estimated at 62.2 million compared to 43.9 million military personnel. Further, the incidence of civilian deaths has increased since the 1949 Geneva Conventions.[322] One explanation for this rising trend is that concealment warfare is the method of choice with higher frequency among adversaries. A subjective review of media and special interest group reporting suggests a similar conclusion civilians and civilian objects account for the majority of deaths and destruction in 21st century warfare.

321. [footnote too long to copy - see attached pdf for lots of data]

322 GEOFFREY PARKER, CAMBRIDGE ILLUSTRATED HISTORY OF WARFARE 369 (1995); see also, ERIC V. LARSON & BOGDAN SAVYCH, MISFORTUNES OF WAR: IMPACTS OF COLLATERAL DAMAGE INCIDENTS IN RECENT U.S. WARS 2-4 (Mar., 26 2004)(unpublished manuscript on file with the RAND Corporation and author). Ruth Sivard estimates 109.7 million people were killed from war between 1900 and 1995, including 62.2 million civilians and 43.9 million military. RUTH LEGER SIVARD, WORLD MILITARY AND SOCIAL EXPENDITURES 1996, 18-19 (16th ed. 1996).

A fair (though not conclusive) inference is that "concealment warfare" (combatants hiding in non-combatant populations) - encouraged by some provisions of AP I & II and of "Customary International Humanitarian Law" - has increased the relative frequency of civilian deaths.

The full article (www.afjag.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-081009-011.pdf) (100+ pages) reviews collateral damage (with focus on US targeting) from WWI through OIF.

Regards

Mike

TDB
06-16-2011, 02:24 PM
Having read quite a bit of the report and seen the recent documentary aird on Channel 4 here in the UK, it certainly seems that their was a direct effort to target civilians. Particularly in instance where the ICRC had given GPS coordinates to the SLA of the locations of hospitals treating civilians and injured LTTE cadres alike, which had no military use. The constant moving of the no fire zones seems deliberate in order to force as many people as possible into as small a space as possible. The LTTE do not exactly come out clean either, use of suicide bombers in processing centres and the use of civilians to construct defences etc. However the LTTE are a perscribed terrorist organisation and are hardly expected to act like saints.

The two issues that face the Sri Lanakn government are the conduct of it's armed forces which amount to war crimes and it's policy which amount to crimes against humanity. The cases of summary executions and rape from the SLA are clearly war crimes and their needs to be an investigate. The policy of the government in it's managing of the humanitarian crisis and the way it commanded it's armed forces, after all the chain of command goes right to the PM. No one likes to throw the word genocide about and I'm not saying it applies here, however the there does seem a concerted effort to cleanse as many LTTE cadres as possible and control the Tamil population caught up in the conflict.

I've heard first hand accounts of how the government controled the movements of international NGO workers after the conflict. It was too big a mess to sweep under the carpet.

Bob's World
06-17-2011, 01:24 AM
Haven't been on this thread in a while.

Mike: Killing the civilians of some enemy state in war is very different than killing non-combatant elements of one's own populace in COIN. This is one of the reasons why I distinguish that COIN is the actions of a nation to resolve it's own internal insurgency (not an intervetion) and that COIN is much more a civil emergency than war.

Sri Lanka waged war against their own populace, and if what TBD lays out is true, there will be consequences. Not from the international community, but from the Tamil populace. This insurgency is perhaps suppressed, but the more brutal a government is in the suppression of internal revolt, the more certain and and the more bloody the blow back will ultimately be. Sure, elements of the Sri Lanka populace waged war against the government, but a government must be like a father attacked by a son. Sure you can just beat his ass and justify it by his attacking you first, but that ignores what drive a son to attack his father, and also ignores the consequences of a ### for tat retaliation.

Our COIN doctrine sucks. It is a doctrine written by Colonial masters and Containment controllers. It is time for an update. FM 3-24 offers some pop-centric tactics, but leaves it within that colonial/containment context, so remains a fatally flawed approach.

Bill Moore
06-17-2011, 02:43 AM
There is no doubt that the Sri Lankan Armed Forces won "this" war against the LTTE, and they did so using tough tactics (there are many such examples in history). I spent a few weeks on three separate occassions in Sri Lanka and worked closely with their military. The country was in economic shambles (probably still is), morale was low, the hate that many (not all) Sri Lankan officers had for the LTTE was palpable. It was also understandable after years of brutal fighting. As stated elsewhere war itself can radicalize the opponents, and it is quite understandable why this happens.

Bob is right, "if" the Sri Lankan government fails to integrate the Tamil people (which is what they need to do to consolidate their victory), then it is likely we will start seeing the embers of a new resistance. Often overlooked in this conflict was that the LTTE brutalized its own people to suppress other Tamil resistance groups, so defeat of the LTTE doesn't necessarily mean all Tamil resistance groups are defeated. The remains of those who were suppressed by the LTTE could very well be organizing their clandestine structure now, and there is still a large and active Tamil diaspora that they can reach out to for support. The last thing the Sri Lankan government needs to do at this point is provide a spark to gas by continuing to ignore the alleged crimes and continued suppression of the Tamils. The government is in a tough position with hostile NGOs in the country that have already formed their opinions. It will be interesting to see how this plays out over the next few months. Unlike our approach where we attempt development during the fight (which hasn't worked), now is the time that the Government should be pushing development into the Tamil community. Not only development, but a common vision for a peaceful Sri Lankan where all the citizens enjoy its benefits. They need a spiritual leader that can ease the level of hate between the Singalese and Tamils, or this won't be possible. It is easy for us to sit back and criticize, but if you lived there and were traumaized by the war year after year, I don't think your feelings towards your enemy would magically disappear overnight. I don't like gay, leftist terms, but for lack of a better phrase there needs to be some sort of healing process.

jmm99
06-17-2011, 02:47 AM
I've ever argued that killing the civilians of some enemy state in war is the same as killing non-combatant elements of one's own populace in COIN.

I've no idea what will happen in Sri Lanka's future. My lawyerly crystal ball (always cloudy and cracked) went out the window effective 1 Jun - and my suits went into two large garbage bags and will be hauled away tomorrow (garbage day). :D Etc.

Cheers

Mike

Bill Moore
06-17-2011, 03:42 AM
Mike,

don't throw your suits away! Just read the latest issue of Fortune Magazine and they had a couple of pieces on "retirement" coaches. One of the free tidbits shared was that retirees stop shaving, getting decent haircuts, and quit dressing for success, and this leads to less self esteem, etc. Not sure I'm buying it, but I'm going to shave next week, and dress for success at least once a week to ensure my self esteem doesn't dip into the red. :D

TDB
06-17-2011, 09:51 AM
Link to said documentary and related information. Available to watch for international audiances too. www.channel4.com/srilanka

I think there is a lot to be said about the point made above. In the aftermath of the conflict the government had two routes they could go down, enfranchise the Tamil population thus helping to bring them on side (not as simple as that but I think everyone will know what I'm getting at), or brutally suppress them therefore preventing them from organising any form of armed resistance again. After years of brutal war and constant attacks from LTTE suicide bombers, hardly a vote winning tactic, the government obviously opted to the latter as in their minds they could care less for these pesky people to the north.

Bob's World
06-17-2011, 12:38 PM
Bill,

I know that "we had to destroy the village to save the village" is widely accepted as a sound COIN practice (see current Clear-Hold-Build tactics that are the rage in Afghanistan); and that history is indeed replete with examples where some government defeated some insurgent organization; buying stability for some period of time, but always with insurgency springing up again somewhere among the populace.

Perhaps a new location, different segment of the pop, or different leaders/ideology. But there is always one constant: A government that has not much changed in how it governs, and that believes that it "defeated" the insurgency so need not change. Our good allies in the Philippines are the modern poster child for this; the Algerians as well.

Facilitating this is the belief that insurgency is something that is brought to the government, that causation rests in the dark hearts of "malign actors" or some evil ideology, or some insidious external plot. While all those things may exist one must always come back to the common thread, and that is the government itself. As you often point out, even when the insurgent wins, it typically is by a party that is only too quick to take up the same bad practices of the government they took down, and soon too find themselves subject to some growing insurgency.

So no, I continue to reject your version of history, and believe that causation radiates out from government onto the populace, and that insurgency is a reaction to such governance. COIN is the reaction to the reaction by a government that is unwilling to recognize that they really don't need to counter anything so much as simply listen to their populace and make some minor, but essential modifications of how they govern.

Yes the government of Sri Lanka "defeated" the Tamil Tigers, but in so doing I suspect have steeled the resolution of the Tamil people to their cause and inflamed perceptions of ill-will toward the government. Perhaps they can overcome the tactics applied to design and implement changes of governance that effectively resolve this insurgency, but until such time, this is a "suppression" rather than a "win."

If this were war, your assessment would probably be accurate, but this is insurgency, and that is a very different animal altogether.

Bill Moore
06-18-2011, 03:21 AM
In the case of Sri Lanka, I'm not sure where we disagree? I am making the same points, but adding the fact that the level of hate between the Tamils and Singhalese was so thick you could cut it with knife, and that time of emotion frequently trumps reason.

Not all insurgencies are due to a failure of government, but the insurgency and then civil war in Sri Lanka was clearly a case of the government failing, and now it failing to consolidate its hard earned victory.

davidbfpo
10-19-2011, 09:00 AM
News of this political conflict appears rarely, so I offer this as an update.

From an Indian commentator on security issues and I've added text in italics to help to explain:
...Tamil Nadu is still hosting 114 refugee camps for 68,606 Sri Lankan Tamils. The UPA (Indian political party, currently in government)also made the mistake of bracketing Lankan Tamil issues with the LTTE. They failed to fathom the Tamil's emotional bonds with the diaspora. The mainland Tamil population, despite its revulsion after Rajiv Gandhi's assassination, started getting alarmed by the Rajapaksa regime's excesses (Sri Lanka Prime Minister}. They were also upset with New Delhi's ambivalent attitude towards the UN sponsored enquiry on war crimes. Lankan Tamil discontent resulted in the Tamil National Alliance (TNA) controlling 24 local government councils in the North/East (in Sri Lanka) after the July 2011 elections. The Rajapaksa family, which made this a prestige issue, could win only three councils through their Freedom Alliance (UPFA). They now say that the TNA is acting like the LTTE.

Link:Sunday October 16, 2011 http://www.sunday-guardian.com/analysis/foreign-policy-must-make-sense-at-home-in-india

davidbfpo
01-02-2012, 09:54 PM
Reviewed in the IISS journal Survival 'The Cage: The Fight for Sri Lanka and the Last Days of the Tamil Tigers' by Gordon Weiss, Pub. Bodley Head 2011. The author wasa UN officilA with the Tamil Tigers at the end and the reviewer is impressed:
..vivid and well researched...Sri Lanka has done important things right, including a health and education record that are almost unmatched in the developing world.

I was struck by the reviewers comments on political violence generally:
When everyone in a country believes his community risks annihilation at the hands of a desperate and implacable foe, the result is a widespread willingness to use whatever means that can the threat.

An aside. There is a RFI on the LTTE:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=9697

TDB
03-08-2012, 07:52 PM
So it looks like Channel 4 are back with some more damning evidence, next week, Wednesday. Should be interesting.

(Added by Moderator)

Link to cited programme, it hopefully works beyond the UK:http://www.channel4.com/programmes/sri-lankas-killing-fields/4od

davidbfpo
07-15-2012, 11:29 AM
The title of a KoW comment by David Ucko, the catalyst appears to be a WaPo article, although other links are embedded:http://kingsofwar.org.uk/2012/07/sri-lankas-illiberal-peace/

Two key points:
The broader point is that the West was not needed nor was its approval sought.....we ought also to consider the declining currency of our professed Western ‘values’ – not least through our own actions, but also because of the wide variety of viable alternatives.

Bob's World
07-15-2012, 04:42 PM
A tragedy for the people of Sri Lanka, but can't say I was surprised by the article.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/sri-lanka-descending-toward-dictatorship-critics-say/2012/07/13/gJQAUOoXhW_story.html

Bill Moore
07-15-2012, 05:24 PM
The misleading emotionalism in this Washington Post article is exactly what alienates the press in Sri Lanka, not only with the Government, but the citizens that endured decades of terrorism.

Examples of journalism rag wording that one would expect to find in the National Enquire or similiar rags.


scorched-earth campaign


The United States and India, Sri Lanka’s two main trading partners, had largely looked the other way as the government crushed the Tamil Tiger rebels


President Mahinda Rajapaksa took the war to the Tigers with unprecedented ruthlessness and single-mindedness.

Then this dispassionate statement:


At the height of their power, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) ran vast swathes of Tamil-dominated northern and eastern Sri Lanka as a virtual mini-state. But they had also turned a struggle for the rights of the island’s Hindu and Christian Tamils into a terrorist campaign involving suicide bombers and child soldiers — assassinating anyone who stood in their way, including thousands of moderate Tamils, a Sri Lankan president and, in 1991, former Indian prime minister Rajiv Gandhi.

The article fails to address the LTTE didn't represent all Tamils, there were several opposition Tamil grops that the LTTE targeted, and they repeated used Tamil human shields in combat, and had what we now call a sophisticated and robust radicalization process that produced a number of suicide bombers long before it became the norm in the Arab world. The other side of the LTTE was their sophisticated global information campaign, that many reporters fell for hook, line and sinker.

It is understandable the Government is tired of this one way reporting. There are definitely problems with the government that the government and its citizens need to address, which can probably be done more effectively without outside interference that puts the government in a defensive posture.

Bob's World
07-15-2012, 06:37 PM
Like most militant arms of an active insurgency, it is probably true to say that the LTTE did not represent the majority of the Tamil populace.

Equally true, I suspect, that the major reasons that led Tamils to join the LTTE and to fight the government were largely shared throughout the populace, and that those reasons are stronger now than ever before. Just because a group does not represent the populace does not means its reasons for fighting are not widely shared.

The government has imposed an artificial state of stability through force of arms, and now sustains it in the same manner. The government of Sri Lanka waged counterinsurgent or counter guerrilla operations, not COIN. A defeated insurgent organization is in no way a resolved insurgency - regardless of what our history books say.

My advice to the government of Sri Lanka is to reconcile with the Tamil populace and to work to fully integrate them into the nation with the same equity, respect and justice offered to all. And to ensure that the entire Sri Lanken populace perceives they possess trusted, certain and legal means to shape their governance. Once they work to do this they will be conducting COIN. States that do this enjoy a true stability, states that do not are either unstable or artificially stable.

What is the role for the US military in engaging with states in any of these three forms of stability? Well first, don't follow US military Stability doctrine, as that is simply about imposing a system of artificial stability. Stability is not a "phase" or an "operation", it is in truth the ultimate goal. Once we gain a clear sense of that fact, then we can tailor our approaches so as to help someone else in their efforts to attain natural stability, but in large part it isn't a mission demanding a great deal of US military activity. Military forces are not very good at creating natural stability (though are necessary to protect such stabile societiies from those internal and external parties who would seek to destroy the systems and trust that make such stability possible)

The path to true stability is not all that difficult, the problem is that so many governments pointedly refuse to take it. Such governments (and many of these are ones we are supporting vigorously in our little war on terrorism) simply prefer the status quo and accept the associated friction and violence as a cost of holding onto what they have.

davidbfpo
07-15-2012, 06:40 PM
In a bizarre twist and undoubtedly some Sri Lankan "spin" here:
Former Tamil Tiger snipers have been selected to represent Sri Lanka in shooting sports at national level. They are among 16 picked at a talent-spotting camp held for ex-fighters last month. Others will represent Sri Lanka in swimming, athletics and cricket.

Link:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-18831958

Bill Moore
07-16-2012, 01:18 AM
Bob,

It is hard to tell based on media bias, but the government is reaching out to the Tamils to resolve the underlying issues. Whether they're successful or not is yet to be seen. Understandably they're frustrated with illegitimate reporting and spin, and while that doesn't excuse disappearing reporters, it does point out that the media is in capable of professional, non-bias reporting, and simply continues to beat up the government. Some of it deserved, some of it not so much. The government also needs to maintain legitimacy with the Singhalese, and the racial divide and hatred after decades of war will not make easy for the government to come up with solutions that are acceptable to all.

Dave, saw that report earlier, it is a small step in the right direction. If Tamils accept a Sri Lankan identity and the Singhalese accept the Tamils as equal citizens, then a lasting peace may be obtainable. Sports may be a viable venue to provide that identity.

davidbfpo
11-13-2012, 04:39 PM
A BBC report on an issue that appears to have been swept off the agenda:
The United Nations failed in its mandate to protect civilians in the last months of Sri Lanka's bloody civil war, a leaked draft of a highly critical internal UN report says. "Events in Sri Lanka mark a grave failure of the UN," it concludes. The government and Tamil rebels are accused of war crimes in the brutal conflict which ended in May 2009.

Link:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-20308610

Interesting tactic by the Sri Lankan state:
It also points to the Sri Lankan government's "stratagem of intimidation", including "control of visas to sanction staff critical of the state". The result was a UN system dominated by "a culture of trade-offs" - UN staff chose not to speak out against the government in an effort to try to improve humanitarian access.

Certainly not unique.

Ray
11-13-2012, 07:56 PM
Any idea of what the so called 'leaked' UN report on the Sri Lankan 'victory' is all about?

I was listening to the BBC World but since I joined at the end I could not get the essence.

Any links to this UN report?

davidbfpo
11-13-2012, 10:18 PM
Any idea of what the so called 'leaked' UN report on the Sri Lankan 'victory' is all about?..... Any links to this UN report?

Ray,

My reading is that the official UN report has yet to be published, partly as the Secretary-General has to read it.

davidbfpo
08-28-2013, 02:01 PM
From the book review section of 'Perspectives on Terrorism', an e-academic journal:
Ahmed S. Hashim, When Counterinsurgency Wins: Sri Lanka’s Defeat of the Tamil Tigers. (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013), 280 pages, US $59.95 [Hardcover],
ISBN: 978-0-8122-4452-6.

A highly authoritative and up-to-date study about the protracted civil war in Sri Lanka, which was terminated with the military defeat by government forces of the separatist Tamil Tigers in 2009. The author discusses the evolution of the military measures that ultimately won the intractable insurgency - a conflict which for many years was viewed as unwinnable by the Sinhalese government’s forces - although its military victory came at the cost of human rights violations (and the Tamil insurgents engaged in such violations as well). Also discussed are lessons learned about terrorist tactics by the Tamil Tigers that have been emulated by terrorist groups such as Hizballah, Hamas, as well as al Qaida-affiliated groups in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Somalia. The author also discusses whether the Sri Lankan government’s counterinsurgency tactics are worthy of being implemented by other governments facing their own protracted terrorist insurgencies.

Link:http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/285/576

The book on Amazon, with no reviews:http://www.amazon.com/When-Counterinsurgency-Wins-Lankas-Defeat/dp/0812244524/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1377695919&sr=1-1&keywords=When+Counterinsurgency+Wins%3A+Sri+Lanka% E2%80%99s+Defeat+of+the+Tamil+Tigers

ganulv
09-03-2013, 12:40 AM
A piece from last Friday at Salon.com about the Sri Lankan military’s role in the country’s economy. [LINK (http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/roads/2013/08/sri_lankan_army_goes_into_tourism_business_after_c rushing_the_tamil_tigers.html)]

davidbfpo
06-27-2014, 10:04 AM
Elsewhere on SWC and SWJ Blog the Sri Lankan option, the final or most recent stage in the conflict have been discussed. It maybe worth checking in.

First 'Nigeria Military Studies Sri Lankan Tactics for Use Against Boko Haram', with an exchange:http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/nigeria-military-studies-sri-lankan-tactics-for-use-against-boko-haram

Second 'Can the Sri Lanka Army be Described as a Counterinsurgency Force?', a SWJ article:http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/can-the-sri-lanka-army-be-described-as-a-counterinsurgency-force

Ray
07-01-2014, 08:23 AM
Much of what is stated is from the military standpoint.

A conflict is not purely military. It has it historical and sociological issues that make it a military issue.

The LTTE case is unique and one has to understand.

The animosity of the Buddhist majority towards the Tamil is historical and they don't honestly recognise that Tamils belong to Sri Lanka. Therefore, there is no love lost if the Tamils exist or they are wiped out.

The animosity is more intense because the Tamils flourished under the British since they learnt English and were in positions of influence that were open to the 'natives'.

On the other hand, the majority Buddhist Sri Lankans looked upon the British as interlopers who came to subjugate them. They boycotted the British and did not learn English and so were left out in the blue whereas the Tamils (who in the first place the Buddhists did not feel belonged to Sri Lanka or Ceylon then) were ruling the roost, after the British.

One of the thing the Sri Lanka Govt did was abolish English and adopted Singhalese Only (the majority Buddhist's language) so that the Tamils did not have the advantage. Then more restrictions were placed. This cause the Tamil heartburn and the LTTE was born.

Therefore, given the equation, wiping out the Tamils ruthlessly and without a care for Human Rights, was not taken to be a crime, and instead applauded.

JMA
07-01-2014, 10:25 AM
Well put...


Therefore, given the equation, wiping out the Tamils ruthlessly and without a care for Human Rights, was not taken to be a crime, and instead applauded.

Indeed, and as I have said before, this approach to any conflict can not be adopted by any western country directly or even through proxies.

davidbfpo
02-13-2017, 11:45 AM
Just discovered an old, 2013 review of 'Total Destruction of the Tamil Tigers: The Rare Victory of Sri Lanka's Long War' by Paul Moorcraft; it was in The Spectator, but the only complete online review is elsewhere and is an exact copy:http://sangam.org/review-total-destruction-tigers/

Amazon USA:https://www.amazon.com/Total-Destruction-Tamil-Tigers-Victory/dp/1781593043/ref=sr_1_fkmr0_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1486985971&sr=1-1-fkmr0&keywords=otal+Destruction+of+the+Tamil+Tigers%3A+T he+Rare+Victory+of+Sri+Lanka%E2%80%99s+Long+War

Amazon UK:https://www.amazon.co.uk/Total-Destruction-Tamil-Tigers-Victory/dp/1781593043/ref=sr_1_7?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1486986186&sr=1-7&keywords=paul+moorcraft

Two quotes from the review:
The simmering idea that permeates this book, that ultra-violence is a way, albeit a bloody one, effectively to conquer insurgency, is therefore predicated on a false idea that the Tamil issue is now resolved.Then a list of the 'Colombo's approach' from an Indian expert:

Political will
Go to hell (Ignore domestic and international criticism)
But keep important neighbours in the loop
No negotiations
Control the media
No ceasefire
Complete operational freedom
Promote young and able commanders