Warrior Ethos

[CPT Foley]

I read an article a few years back by a British General who raised concern that the U.S. Army's Warrior Ethos may be counterproductive in the COIN environment - that it reinforces the 'kill-capture' culture. I didn't give it that much thought, but when I was reading Galula's "Pacification of Algeria", he was adamant that that last guys he wanted in his command were 'warriors.' For anyone who has been in combat we know the attitude of courage and can-do spirit we want around us, and we generally consider them - warriors. But I think both men are on to something. I don't think we are looking to mold kinder & gentler Soldiers, but rather Soldiers who have better appreciation for non-kinetic methods. Revising the some of our bedrock tenets/creeds may be in order. It's a sensitive subject because of the intense pride involved, but I think it is worthy of consideration.

[William F. Owen]

But I think both men are on to something. I don't think we are looking to mold kinder & gentler Soldiers, but rather Soldiers who have better appreciation for non-kinetic methods. Revising the some of our bedrock tenets/creeds may be in order. It's a sensitive subject because of the intense pride involved, but I think it is worthy of consideration.

I think the problem here is the very idea of a "Warrior." Silly word. Do not use it.

[CPT Foley]

I do worry the word conjures up images of raping & pillaging, or at least killing over pacifying, i.e., not the best word to convey what we want from Soldiers. I prefer a Soldiers Ethos.

[Ken White]

to what is supposed to be a disciplined and trained Soldier, Sailor, Marine or Airman. Warfighter as a term is just sort of silly; warrior so applied is simply wrong -- it's also an insult.

Agree that Warriors don't have an ethos other than fight anything and everything whether it need it or not so that means the phrase is stupid.

[Schmedlap]

I always thought the Warrior Ethos was an extension of the black beret idea. The rationale, as I understood it, was that elite Soldiers don't earn berets - beret-wearers morph into elite Soldiers. Likewise, a Ranger Creed for the masses would make them even more elite. We'll call it the Warrior Ethos. The only thing left to do is to rename our Brigades as Regiments.

This seems to be a much wider trend than just neat ideas from the top. Ever notice how much stuff people attach to their weapons when the only thing that they use them for is to point the muzzle into a clearing barrel? Or the amount of stuff the fabled "PX Ranger" dons - presumably to ensure that he survives his treks between the DFAC, PX, bed, phone center, and Pizza Hut?

The American Army, in some ways, is adapting some of the bad traits of Arab Armies. It seems to be about face, about an outward display, and concern with what others think, rather than emphasis about doing your job with discipline and diligence and not asking for adoration, sympathy, victim-status, or special treatment when you go home.

[IntelTrooper]

to what is supposed to be a disciplined and trained Soldier, Sailor, Marine or Airman. Warfighter as a term is just sort of silly; warrior so applied is simply wrong -- it's also an insult.

Agree that Warriors don't have an ethos other than fight anything and everything whether it need it or not so that means the phrase is stupid.
As usual, totally agree with Ken here. Furthermore, what is going on with an organization that needs to quantify its ethos?

[Hacksaw]

I will leave the discussion as to the efficacy of the term "Warrior" as a one-word descriptor for what we want our Soldiers to embody to others...

However, I can offer a little history as back dialogue...

The Warrior Ethos was developed and furthered as part of TF Soldier, which itself was part of a series of initiatives launched by then newly installed CSA Schoomaker. The Task Forces were meant to identify gaps he and his staff identified during their transition... I don't think its a stretch to say that the gap the ethos was meant to address in part was largely spurred by the incident involving the Patriot Maintenance Company that got lost and captured without acquiting itself very well (remember PFC Lynch?)

It was determined that a separate culture had developed amongst non-combat arms troops (one that embraced the specialist skill at the expense of the basic soldier skills). As I'm sure all will note, an ethos/motto isn't the path to changing a culture... real change in initial entry, advanced individual, unit and PME is necessary - and the Army has made those types of changes in addition to the adoption of the Warrior Ethos.


Soldier Creed
I am an American Soldier.
I am a Warrior and a member of a team. I serve the people of the United States and live the Army Values.
I will always place the mission first.
I will never accept defeat.
I will never quit.
I will never leave a fallen comrade. I am disciplined, physically and mentally tough, trained and proficient in my warrior tasks and drills. I always maintain my arms, my equipment and myself.
I am an expert and I am a professional.
I stand ready to deploy, engage, and destroy the enemies of the United States of America in close combat.
I am a guardian of freedom and the American way of life.
I am an American Soldier.

Not exactly the stuff of rape and pillage...

Now for truth in advertising... I served with and didn't always see eye to eye with the GO who led TF Soldier... I thought him a very blunt instrument at times (a description he'd probably agree with and take pride in), and much debate occurred in which senior officers debated whether Warrior was the right label...

However, for my money... the benefits of the changes instituted by TF Soldier (to include the Warrior Ethos) far outweighed any perceived baggage regading a term.

Have fun storming the castle...

[Ken White]

but I disagreed vehemently with that 'warrior' bit at the time (and with the "Wounded Warrior," which IMO is even worse)...

They didn't hear me; probably wouldn't have listened if they'd been able to; and won't pay any attention now. I know that. Still think it was a bad choice, it's a dumb word to apply to Soldiers, etc.

How's that getting the CSS types to be interested in if not reveling in combat working out? :D

I acknowledge that many improvements have been made in our training in the last five years. I also believe many more are needed -- not least dumping that dumb Task, Condition and Standards lowest common denominator approach...

[IntelTrooper]

I will leave the discussion as to the efficacy of the term "Warrior" as a one-word descriptor for what we want our Soldiers to embody to others...

However, I can offer a little history as back dialogue...

It was determined that a separate culture had developed amongst non-combat arms troops (one that embraced the specialist skill at the expense of the basic soldier skills). As I'm sure all will note, an ethos/motto isn't the path to changing a culture... real change in initial entry, advanced individual, unit and PME is necessary - and the Army has made those types of changes in addition to the adoption of the Warrior Ethos.


I'm glad this was identified as an issue and appreciate the steps taken to correct it, for sure. I'm not sure that requiring an extra plastic dog tag and a credit card-sized reminder of this creed has changed anyone's actual conduct in the midst of battle, though.

[CPT Foley]

Hacksaw brings up some great points; it's by no means a straw man argument.

But I do think the key line from the Soldiers Creed is:

"I stand ready to deploy, engage, and destroy the enemies of the United States of America in close combat." Basically the antithesis of COIN.

Destroying enemies of the U.S. in close combat is not the main objective for U.S. ground forces in the COIN environment.

Words have meaning. Don't call people Warriors if you want them to behave like pacifiers.

[slapout9]

Why don't they just call it the Soldiers Ethos....and Army men should be Green not digital stuff;)

[marct]

Why don't they just call it the Soldiers Ethos

Possibly because Kipling had already written one (http://www.poetryloverspage.com/poets/kipling/young_british_soldier.html) and they didn't like the last verse :eek::cool:.

[William F. Owen]

"I stand ready to deploy, engage, and destroy the enemies of the United States of America in close combat." Basically the antithesis of COIN.

Destroying enemies of the U.S. in close combat is not the main objective for U.S. ground forces in the COIN environment.

Actually I beg to differ. This is exactly what's wrong with current "flavour of COIN" some are advocating.

Defeating the enemy either in close combat or by stand-off methods is the essential military contribution to COIN. If this requirement did not exist then COIN could be performed by policeman.

COIN is WARFARE! It's primary mechanism is killing and captureing - in some cases, so as to contribute to the security of the population. It is in no way the antithesis of COIN. If you are not skilled in killing and capturing the enemy, he will merely seek to do the same to you, or the population.

[CPT Foley]

Actually I beg to differ. This is exactly what's wrong with current "flavour of COIN" some are advocating.

Defeating the enemy either in close combat or by stand-off methods is the essential military contribution to COIN. If this requirement did not exist then COIN could be performed by policeman.

COIN is WARFARE! It's primary mechanism is killing and captureing - in some cases, so as to contribute to the security of the population. It is in no way the antithesis of COIN. If you are not skilled in killing and capturing the enemy, he will merely seek to do the same to you, or the population.


COIN is a more subtle kind of warfare, that is primarily political in nature. Galula stresses a xerox machine is more powerful in COIN than a machine gun...a pediatrician more valuable than a mortar expert. GEN Chirelli stressed that there was direct correlation between violence and garbage pick up. It's an environment where Soldiers shooting up the Koran on camera is a more devastating set back than losing a whole Brigade in combat. I'm not pretending we don't need to be trained to inflict violence in the effort to protect the population, and I agree the Police take on a greater role in COIN, but I'm adamant that the 'kill/capture' takes a less prominent role - and wonder if the new paradigm is best characterized by the word Warrior. I was in awe of the bravery and selflessness of guys & gals I served with in Iraq and they did have something special that other Soldiers should emulate. I think we need to strive to build reverence around the word 'Soldier' the way the USMC has created around the word 'Marine,' and respecting other cultures and protecting noncombatants should be part of the new ethos. Not because its nice, but because it's key to winning in COIN.

[William F. Owen]

COIN is a more subtle kind of warfare, that is primarily political in nature.
All warfare is political. Read Clausewitz. Dead civilians are a political problem, not a moral one. There is only one kind of WAR and very few types of warfare.

Galula stresses a xerox machine is more powerful in COIN than a machine gun...a pediatrician more valuable than a mortar expert.
A Paediatrician is only useful if he produces political effect. If he treats kids and everyone still hates you, his work is useless.

It's an environment where Soldiers shooting up the Koran on camera is a more devastating set back than losing a whole Brigade in combat.
So a video on Youtube has greater political effect than 3,000 casualties in 24 hours? Seriously?

I'm adamant that the 'kill/capture' takes a less prominent role - and wonder if the new paradigm is best characterized by the word Warrior.
There is no new Paradigm. FACT. Nothing you are doing in COIN is new or hasn't been done by other armies. Regardless of the frequency you actually do it, Killing and Capturing, or gain advantage from it's threat, is still your primary function. It's what militaries do.

... respecting other cultures and protecting noncombatants should be part of the new ethos. Not because its nice, but because it's key to winning in COIN.
You do not need to respect the culture or protect noncombatants to win in COIN. Your actions should merely not needlessly create enemies, and you only need to protect those civilians relevant to the mission.

I'm not trying to be a hard ass here, but everything you are saying is symptomatic of the "new COIN" that seeks to portray it as something other than what it is. It is not armed social work, or summed up with silly expressions like "hearts and minds." It is a form of warfare.

[slapout9]

I think there is supposed to be a third aspect in COIN..... it's kill,capture or convert to your side.

[William F. Owen]

I think there is supposed to be a third aspect in COIN..... it's kill,capture or convert to your side.
True, but also true in many forms of warfare. Major grouping changing allegiance is usually fixed in the political domain.

[reed11b]

True, but also true in many forms of warfare. Major grouping changing allegiance is usually fixed in the political domain.

Darn beat me too it..I was going to say "if they convert, there no longer your enemy now are they?"
Reed

[slapout9]

True, but also true in many forms of warfare. Major grouping changing allegiance is usually fixed in the political domain.

Me thinks it is true in all warfare,conversion just has a higher ratio of activity compared to the others in COIN.

[William F. Owen]

Me thinks it is true in all warfare,conversion just has a higher ratio of activity compared to the others in COIN.

That might be debatable in an historical context. The Vietnam war was State v State yet over 120,000 defected, and a substantial number of those were NVA. The Korean War also similar - but I take your point!

[CPT Foley]

All warfare is political. Read Clausewitz. Dead civilians are a political problem, not a moral one. There is only one kind of WAR and very few types of warfare.

A Paediatrician is only useful if he produces political effect. If he treats kids and everyone still hates you, his work is useless.

So a video on Youtube has greater political effect than 3,000 casualties in 24 hours? Seriously?

There is no new Paradigm. FACT. Nothing you are doing in COIN is new or hasn't been done by other armies. Regardless of the frequency you actually do it, Killing and Capturing, or gain advantage from it's threat, is still your primary function. It's what militaries do.

You do not need to respect the culture or protect noncombatants to win in COIN. Your actions should merely not needlessly create enemies, and you only need to protect those civilians relevant to the mission.

I'm not trying to be a hard ass here, but everything you are saying is symptomatic of the "new COIN" that seeks to portray it as something other than what it is. It is not armed social work, or summed up with silly expressions like "hearts and minds." It is a form of warfare.


It is armed social work, and that's the paradigm shift. Read Toffler. Warfare is different in the information age. To bemoan, that killing/capturing "is what militaries do" denies the changing nature of warfare - warfare in a 24 hour news cycle where seemingly minor acts of disrespect can be seen by hundreds of millions within hours. An insurgency is a competition between the insurgent and government for the support of the civilian population. Your narrow mission-oriented approach reminds me of a combined exercise rehearsal I was at for a simulation exercise. I was the most junior person in the room, which included two retired Generals. An LTC was reviewing some proposed message traffic about our helicopters scaring the sheik's sheep. He quipped, "I don't think we will be sticking around to help herd them up." The room exploded into laughter. I was incredulous. The LTC and everyone in the room, myself included, has been conditioned to put the mission first and make sure SP's are met. But from just finishing a tour with SF in Iraq, I was dumbfounded, and frankly disgusted, that our senior leadership didn't recognize that pacifying the sheik was exponentially more important to overall mission than meeting an SP. And that even if the helicopters did have something equally urgent awaiting them, pacifying the sheik was certainly worthy of consideration versus laughter. That's the new paradigm.

[Entropy]

Count me as one who doesn't like the "warriorization" of our armed forces one bit. The rewriting of the service creeds is particularly bad - I absolutely cannot stand the new AF creed. I am not a warrior - I'm a citizen airman whose duty lies with my nation and constitution, not some warrior "ethos." There's good reason it's "citizen solidier/airman" and not "solider/airman citizen."

[William F. Owen]

It is armed social work, and that's the paradigm shift. Read Toffler. Warfare is different in the information age. To bemoan, that killing/capturing "is what militaries do" denies the changing nature of warfare - warfare in a 24 hour news cycle where seemingly minor acts of disrespect can be seen by hundreds of millions within hours.
Sorry but that's rubbish. No one in the military, or military thought takes the Toffler seriously. Are you seriously advocating the Tofflers over Clausewitz?
Killing someone is an act of disrespect. Did any of the US beheadings on the internet cause a strategic shift? Of course not.
The only news stories that can create strategic effect are stories about events which have strategic effect. Do not confuse the two.

An insurgency is a competition between the insurgent and government for the support of the civilian population. Your narrow mission-oriented approach reminds me of a combined exercise rehearsal I was at for a simulation exercise.
It is only a competition is that if effects a political end state or outcome. Insurgents sometime do not need the support of the population, they just need to scare them into submission. I witnessed this in Sierra Leone.
My narrow mission oriented approach comes from being trained in "COIN" as a very young soldier and studying and reading about COIN for over 28 years. Since I am not American, COIN is not new to me. It is merely a form of warfare.

I am pretty sure Warfare and war in the next 20 years is going to be like the last 20, with Sierra Leone, Georgia, Gaza, Sri Lanka, Pakistan and Darfur, and Machetes, High Explosive and AKs will create more political effect, than 24 hour news channels.

[CPT Foley]

Sorry but that's rubbish. No one in the military, or military thought takes the Toffler seriously. Are you seriously advocating the Tofflers over Clausewitz?
Killing someone is an act of disrespect. Did any of the US beheadings on the internet cause a strategic shift? Of course not.
The only news stories that can create strategic effect are stories about events which have strategic effect. Do not confuse the two.

It is only a competition is that if effects a political end state or outcome. Insurgents sometime do not need the support of the population, they just need to scare them into submission. I witnessed this in Sierra Leone.
My narrow mission oriented approach comes from being trained in "COIN" as a very young soldier and studying and reading about COIN for over 28 years. Since I am not American, COIN is not new to me. It is merely a form of warfare.

I am pretty sure Warfare and war in the next 20 years is going to be like the last 20, with Sierra Leone, Georgia, Gaza, Sri Lanka, Pakistan and Darfur, and Machetes, High Explosive and AKs will create more political effect, than 24 hour news channels.

I'm not suggesting Toffler replaces Clausewitz, but they aren't necessarily mutually exclusive. Sorry, but the idea that the military establishment scoffs at Toffler only confirms my sense he's probably on to something. To suggest that the media/internet doesn't have enormous impact on strategic events seems to defy credulity, e.g., Abu Ghraib, Gitmo, etc. By your reasoning these are just military detainment facilities. The mission is to keep prisoners from escaping and extract intelligence information. Why would we interfere with such military police operations with fuzzy public relations concerns? Because COIN is a big PR battle. It impacts support at home, host nation, IGOs, NGOs, coalition, etc.

I genuinely respect your considerable service in the COIN environment, but I find David Galula's views more persuasive, as best illustrated in his work "The Pacification of Algeria."

[Ken White]

with also some SF experience and as one who served as (non SF) advisor to two foreign Armies, I do not disagree with much you say and I do very much agree that Warrior is a bad term for the reasons you state and more, I still have some questions on your comments in this thread.

Given that I disagree with Wilf that the wars of the next 20 years for the US will only be like those of the last 20...

That will be true only if we allow that to happen -- we certainly need to be prepared for COIN support and FID but we should also avoid it if at all possible -- and we can do that if we wish -- one question is why would we not want avoid such warfare if at all possible?
To suggest that the media/internet doesn't have enormous impact on strategic events seems to defy credulity, e.g., Abu Ghraib, Gitmo, etc. By your reasoning these are just military detainment facilities. The mission is to keep prisoners from escaping and extract intelligence information. Why would we interfere with such military police operations with fuzzy public relations concerns? Because COIN is a big PR battle. It impacts support at home, host nation, IGOs, NGOs, coalition, etc.Impact, yes, I agree -- but have those impacts truly affected anything?
I genuinely respect your considerable service in the COIN environment, but I find David Galula's views more persuasive, as best illustrated in his work "The Pacification of Algeria."How did that effort in Algeria work out for Brother Galula and the French?

I ask that not to be snide or snarky but as a very serious question. Recall that the French had the same advantages in Algeria that the British had in Malaya; they were the government, there was no host nation to deal with -- we will always in any FID situation have the problem of dealing with the host nation and quite probably, also dealing with a coalition. Thus I question whether either Malaya or Algeria provides and guidelines we'd really want to follow. We did after all follow French guidelines in Viet Nam and we know where that got us.

As an aside, I'll point out that the Algerians were not like the Viet Namese as the French discovered, the Viet Namese were not like the Malays as we discovered -- and hopefully, we will realize that the Afghans are not like the Iraqis.

[Brandon Friedman]

I left active duty in 2004 before the U.S. Army began its intensive focus on COIN techniques and theory. I’m not “trained” in counterinsurgency. I’ve never been to the Counterinsurgency Center for Excellence and I’ve never studied the theoretical luminaries at ILE or the Army War College. I have only my own reading and experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan on which to base my views.

I was part of the QRF that got the call when the initial stages of Operation Anaconda turned into one big FAIL. As a rifle PL, I played a small role in what became a combined arms effort to literally blast our way into Afghanistan's Shah-e-Kot Valley to put an end to the AQ/Taliban resistance there. It was a kinetic fight to the max (to the point that I couldn’t stand having planes fly over me for several years). Throughout that week, there was no thought given to COIN, nor should there have been. It was all about the basics--shooting, moving, and communicating. And aside from the normal combat snafus (like occasionally shooting at each other), we were pretty good at it.

But when I arrived on the outskirts of Hillah, Iraq a year later during the invasion, the situation was entirely different. It was still a kinetic fight—we were still massing forces, utilizing air power and artillery, and aiming to seize and hold ground—but suddenly there were civilians everywhere. To survive and thrive in environment, we had to take the approach espoused by Mr. Owen when he says:


Dead civilians are a political problem, not a moral one.

and


Regardless of the frequency you actually do it, Killing and Capturing, or gain advantage from it's threat, is still your primary function. It's what militaries do.

and


You do not need to respect the culture or protect noncombatants to win in COIN. Your actions should merely not needlessly create enemies, and you only need to protect those civilians relevant to the mission.

and


It is not armed social work, or summed up with silly expressions like "hearts and minds." It is a form of warfare.

It was all about the mission of “taking Hillah.” We were only concerned with the population insofar as they assisted or inhibited our mission. And that was it.

However, when we arrived in Baghdad a few days later, with tracers still lighting up the night sky, the whole dynamic changed again. 3ID and the Marines had already punched through the cities defenses and the Iraqi Army had dispersed, leaving us to deal with intermittent snipers, masses of looters, and the capture of weapons systems (like all the locked and loaded AAA still positioned throughout Dora). Within 48 hours of my arrival in the city, the physical enemy was no more. Even the sniper attacks stopped. Our enemy had suddenly become a lack of public services.

At this point, our mission transitioned into the one described by CPT Foley when he says:


It is armed social work, and that's the paradigm shift.

I’m sorry, but that’s true. While many of my own leaders didn’t realize it at the time, our mission had quickly become an effort to pacify the population by keeping them happy. Officially, we were tasked with going after Saddam’s HVTs, but those were wild goose chases for the most part. Our real mission was to fill the vacuum left by Saddam’s government—which we attempted to do. Our real mission was preventive.

When you’re in a situation like that, you have to place a priority on the following tasks: 1.) Treating other people as you would have them treat you, 2.) listening to what the locals are saying, 3.) responding to their concerns, 4.) understanding their backgrounds and motivations, 5.) showing genuine empathy for their plight, 6.) and, all the while, somehow maintaining your ability to fight with unparalleled viciousness, should the need arise. It not only keeps you alive, but it also furthers the completion of the mission—which has now become political.

In fact, for the next three months, no one in my battalion fired a weapon. I have a photo that shows a list written on a wall of all the jobs guys in my company did during that time—after we left Baghdad and moved north to Tal Afar. Here’s the list:

1. Infantryman
2. Police officer
3. Gas station attendant
4. Painter
5. Water delivery guy
6. Security guard
7. Repo man
8. Chauffeur
9. Public relations officer
10. Graffiti prevention and removal officer

In Tal Afar and throughout northwestern Iraq, we kept a lid on things. While central Iraq smoldered and grew more violent by the day, aside from one incident in July, the AO of the 101st Airborne Division--under Petraeus--was the safest in Iraq. We didn’t go looking for fights and we focused on being “Officer Friendly.” I spent an entire day helping to coordinate transportation for Iraqi college kids trying to get to Mosul to make up their missed finals. We helped troubleshoot a pump station. We started learning Arabic. I yelled at one of my soldiers for shoving an Iraqi kid. I had one of my NCOs discipline another for throwing a water bottle from a moving truck at some guy’s sheep. We helped set up local elections. We hired locals to feed us and we hired locals to translate for us.

And when an insurgent or terrorist finally killed two of our guys on July 19 on the highway between Mosul and Tal Afar, the people of Tal Afar came out and brought flowers to the front gate of our HQ in the city.

By October, however, the fighting that began in central Iraq was no longer contained to that area. It spread north and, like everyone else, we were sucked into the cycle of violence. Thus, by the time I left Iraq, I had come full circle. My time in combat ended on a street in Tal Afar as it had begun in Afghanistan—in an all-out shooting gallery between combatants.

What I took from this overall experience is that these are three distinct techniques for success that should be applied as necessary. There’s the conventional, kinetic aspect of war, there’s the combination of kinetic operations with civilians on the battlefield—in which COIN techniques must be utilized—and there’s the preventive COIN environment, in which you spend the bulk of your time trying to keep the locals happy and safe—where it is “armed social work” and where you do “need to respect the culture or protect noncombatants to win," despite what Mr. Owen argues.

So my main question, I guess, is why doesn’t the military think it can train its troops for all three? Do we not think troops are able to adapt? We had never been trained in the differences, yet when placed in those environments, my company—through fits and starts and mistakes—was able to adapt. Why is there this conflict between people like William F. Owen and CPT Foley? The ideas aren’t mutually exclusive. There's a time and a place for both mentalities.

[Surferbeetle]

As to the French Experience in Algeria, I wasn't there, however I find that Alistar Horne has something to say on tactics in his book A Savage War of Peace, Algeria 1954-1962 (http://www.amazon.com/Savage-War-Peace-1954-1962-Classics/dp/1590172183)


Of all these measures, the most ambitious-as well as the one that was to leave the most lasting imprint of Soustelle's regime-was the formation of the S.A.S corps. Their aim, essentially, was to take into their protective net populations in the remoter bled that might otherwise become subject to the rebels, or buffeted by the army-or both. Some 400 S.A.S detachments were created, and each under an army lieutenant or captain who was an expert in Arabic and Arab affairs and could deal with every conceivable aspect of administration; from agronomy, teaching and health, to building houses and administrating justice. The kepis bleus, as they were affectionately called, were a selflessly devoted and courageous band of men, who made themselves much loved by the local populace, and for that reason were often the principal targets of the F.L.N., suffering the heaviest casualties of any category of administrator. Foreign journalists who saw them at work in the remoter bled, isolated and in constant danger, never ceased to be impressed. Unfortunately, there were always too few kepis bleus with all numerous qualifications that the job required; and, inevitably, there were the bad ones who transformed the S.A.S into "intelligence centers" where torture was not unknown.

Looking to the US experience I note that after MCO was over in WWII we moved into rebuilding/stabilization/globalization operations with respect to Germany and Japan...a combined operation kinetic/nonkinetic operation from the macro view which resulted in not a few years of peace. GEN Lucian Clay (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lucius_D._Clay) had a couple of thoughts on the necessity of such a strategy.

Moving to B.H. Liddell Hart (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Basil_Liddell_Hart) (a WWI veteran)in his book Strategy:


Strategy not only stops on the frontier, but has for its purpose the reduction of fighting to the slenderest possible proportions.

This statement may be disputed by those who conceive the destruction of the enemy's armed force as the only sound aim in war, who hold that the only goal of strategy is battle, and who are obsessed with the Clausewitzian saying that 'blood is the price of victory'. Yet if one should concede this point and meet its advocates on their own ground, the statement would remain unshaken. For even if a decisive battle be the goal, the aim of strategy must be to bring about this battle under the most advantageous circumstances. And the more advantageous the circumstances, the less, proportionately, will be the fighting.

As an Iraq veteran I am here to tell you that combat operations did not occur 24 hours per day during my year (03-04), and that indeed, indirect/armed social work/non-kinetic operations reduced violence levels. I also lived through the results of reduced indirect/armed social work/non-kinetic operations and the resulting increase in violence. For the datapoint, I worked 7 days a week 'outside the wire' for the first six months and 6 days a week 'outside the wire' for the next six months and traveled fairly extensively during both periods.

Another datapoint to think about...From Wired: North Korea: The Mother of All Stability Ops? (http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2009/05/north-korea-the-mother-of-all-stability-ops/#more-13103)


Let’s assume that the U.S. and Republic of Korea forces succeed — with brute force, or without — in smashing North Korea’s no-tech army. Then what? Well, you might have to deal with a few more consequences. Try dealing with millions of starving North Koreans, for starters. Add to that the threat of a few loose nukes. And finally — this is the really hard part — try administering a country that has been under the control of a Stalinist regime for six decades. I wouldn’t expect a swift transition to democracy or a painless reunification.

In a recent conversation I had with strategist and Pentagon consultant Tom Barnett, he made precisely that point. “North Korea is not really a war scenario, let’s be honest,” he said. “It’s a humanitarian scenario; it’s a hunt for the weapons of mass destruction scenario.” And you thought Afghanistan and Iraq sucked.

[Umar Al-Mokhtār]

Warfare is different in the information age. To bemoan, that killing/capturing "is what militaries do" denies the changing nature of warfare - warfare in a 24 hour news cycle where seemingly minor acts of disrespect can be seen by hundreds of millions within hours. I would posit if you change "warfare" to "politics" then you have a more accurate paradigm shift for the 21st Century. That doesn't obviate the fact that war is always war, and at its root it is all about killing. If they do convert, fine.

That is, of course, as long as the "conversion" doesn't occur while they are holding your vulnerable flank! :eek:


It is armed social work, and that's the paradigm shift.

COIN may involve some "armed social work" but that "revelation" is not a paradigm shift, COIN has almost always had an element of soldiers doing non-soldier jobs, when they were not killing the bad people. The FFL did it for nearly 100 years in North Africa.

As to laughing at the sheik's predicament that's just crass insensitivity, nothing more.

[Ken White]

are idealists, mostly. Regrettably the world is not an ideal place. Yet most of us develop our views of what's right and tend to try to do that and barring the proverbial epiphany we'll keep right on doing that. Some have had an epiphany, some have not, some think they might have...
.. is “armed social work” and where you do “need to respect the culture or protect noncombatants to win," despite what Mr. Owen argues.That's true and one sometimes has to do that; what concerns many is that the attitude to do that sort of thing can remove a combat edge and such removal is not good when you may be confronted with more -- and especially, more intense -- combat.

There's also the fact that Wilf comes from the British tradition where the civilian side of the FID effort used to be very much in charge and that system worked well for them. Thus he wants the Army to do Army things. CPT Foley is an SF Officer ergo he's into FID; different backgrounds lead to different approaches. Our system has always reversed the Briotish process and the Armed forces have always had the lead. I think current British practice shows they've lost their civilian edge to an extent -- and that our history shows that our system is not particularly effective -- or desirable. My solution to that problem is develop the civilian structure and get the military out of the lead for such efforts Even better, diligently avoid such efforts unless there is a really good reason to get involved.

That, of course, means educating politicians -- and good luck with that...:rolleyes:

As to full spectrum; fortunately, I'm old and have watched several good units make the switch between armed social work, a little casual door kicking, a few fairly stiff fire fights over a few days and the losses of weeks on end of continuous grinding combat. The switch isn't as hard as some believe; most people -- not all -- can do it fairly well.I've seen units switch back and forth and do so readily and easily.
So my main question, I guess, is why doesn’t the military think it can train its troops for all three? Do we not think troops are able to adapt? We had never been trained in the differences, yet when placed in those environments, my company—through fits and starts and mistakes—was able to adapt. Why is there this conflict between people like William F. Owen and CPT Foley? The ideas aren’t mutually exclusive. There's a time and a place for both mentalities.In order of your questions and comments:

Because we adopted a pathetically bad training process in the 1970s that tries to drill down to basic tasks and thus imputes that the troops being trained (ALL ranks) are incapable of absorbing more complexity. This in the face of an Army that did it all in WW II and Korea (less well educated and largely draftees as opposed to today's well educated professional force) and one that managed to train for full spectrum warfare all through the early 1960s. Quite simply, the Army lost its way in the aftermath of Viet Nam.

There are some today who do not think the troops can adapt -- they're terribly wrong -- and there are others that see the greater degree of work and effort required to do it right -- they also are terribly wrong (in a different sense). There are still others who say 'we cannot afford that.' That's just untrue and is IMO, a cover for the other two rationales or lack thereof...

The Troops will always adapt and pull the senior leaders fat out of the fire -- that's a pretty poor way to habitually operate but that has been the 'system' since the mid-60s. The big problem is, as you know, that having to learn by doing is time and effort consuming, subject to much error and can create other problems. Not too smart when there are massive bodies of work explaining all the things needed for every step on the spectrum of conflict. We owe the Troops and the Nation a better way of doing business.

The conflicts you cite are between those who do not really disagree on the desired end result; just on the route to arrive at that nirvana. The issue is really not tactics and techniques but what, philosophically, your force should do. There are those who think Armies break things; there are those who think Armies should fix things (to pick two polar views and, as you know, there are thousands of other views between those two). The problem, as a cursory reading of history shows, is that Armies have to be able to do both so the philosophies are something to argue about but reality -- and Politicians -- dictate what Armies actually do and the answer is "all of the above." As you note. As I noted, people are mostly idealists; they want what they think should be the focus to be that focus. Reality again is that systems make focal decisions and the idealist in us doesn't like that...

Yep, time and place for both -- and you never know which will be required. Or where...

Awful wordy but discussion boards aren't the best comm medium and I'd rather put too much in and let you discard what you don't need (or want, probably don't need any of it) than leave out something that might, barely, make sense... :wry:

We need to be full spectrum and globally capable. Period.

[slapout9]

We need to be full spectrum and globally capable. Period.


That should be a SWC quote of the day,week,month or however that is done.

[CPT Foley]

Some awesome comments. We absolutely need to be committed to Full Spectrum Operations.

However, the characterization of the French failure in Algeria having anything to do with Galula's strategy or theories is misplaced.

He was a CPT during the conflict and had little influence over the French war strategy. However, it should be noted that CPT Galula was very successful in pacifying his AO, and it's hard to imagine that the French wouldn't have fared better had they adopted his approaches in a broader manner.

[Schmedlap]

The term "armed social work" is in danger of becoming the next "hearts and minds." By that, I mean that people will assume the common usage of the words and draw meaning of the term from there. What do we mean by "armed social work"?

Here is a definition of social work from the International Federation of Social Workers (I'm guessing they're fairly authoritative on the subject?)...

The social work profession promotes social change, problem solving in human relationships and the empowerment and liberation of people to enhance well-being. Utilising theories of human behaviour and social systems, social work intervenes at the points where people interact with their environments. Principles of human rights and social justice are fundamental to social work. - source (http://www.ifsw.org/f38000138.html)Perhaps a more accurate term would be "armed community organizer (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Community_organizing)." (I recognize that term might bring with it baggage from politics, particularly the last prez campaign, but it sounds more accurate.)

[Boot]

This seems to be a much wider trend than just neat ideas from the top. Ever notice how much stuff people attach to their weapons when the only thing that they use them for is to point the muzzle into a clearing barrel? Or the amount of stuff the fabled "PX Ranger" dons - presumably to ensure that he survives his treks between the DFAC, PX, bed, phone center, and Pizza Hut?

This is funny to me because of an incident on the "rhino" that runs between the GZ and VBC. I was on the bus in full gear, no convoy was running there when I needed to be there and couldn't catch air, so it was the rhino I had to ride.
I had all my mags fully loaded (8). Another officer saw me and started to chukle. I asked him (who happened to be overweight looking by the way) what he was laughing at. He looked at my gear and shrugged. I said well the last time I was out I emptied all my mags and only had 5. He assumed (you know what they say about ass-uming) that because I was on the rhino I must be some fobbit who was enamored with gear. His response was, how is that, who are you with. I said I got a TT at FOB Loyalty, who are you with? He said "oh", and avoided me after that.
I know its off topic, but you reminded me of something I had forgotten about until I read you post.


Boot

[Surferbeetle]

The term "armed social work" is in danger of becoming the next "hearts and minds." By that, I mean that people will assume the common usage of the words and draw meaning of the term from there. What do we mean by "armed social work"?

Here is a definition of social work from the International Federation of Social Workers (I'm guessing they're fairly authoritative on the subject?)...
Perhaps a more accurate term would be "armed community organizer (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Community_organizing)." (I recognize that term might bring with it baggage from politics, particularly the last prez campaign, but it sounds more accurate.)


Schmedlap

You are killing me with this...this..community organizer??!!!! Armed social work is bad enough.

Civil Affairs (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Civil_Affairs) or Civil Military Operations (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Civil-military_operations).

Steve

[selil]

We need to be full spectrum and globally capable. Period.

This is exactly what I've been saying about cyber. Cyber is one chunk of the spectrum of conflict. It isn't high intensity conflict it isn't thermonuclear war and it may be in many ways like guerilla warfare. But, it isn't guerilla warfare. It is just one part of the spectrum of conflict.

COIN is not wrong or missing anything. It is part of the spectrum. It isn't going to replace high intensity conflict, armor operations, or anything else. it is another part of that spectrum. Counter to the USAF propaganda carpet bombing isn't the be-all it is just one part of the spectrum.

COIN has it's place within the spectrum. War is not a thing with walls it is a plateau with a horizon. All along that broad plateau the spectrum of war can be fought grabbing chess pieces of conflict. It is the intellectual minimalist that defines something as broad as war in a narrow space. What skill, strategy, process, tool, weapon, ideology, system, or person will bring about the desired result within the realm of conflict? Certain tools are the brushfires of destruction while others move through without disturbing a blade of grass. These tools are picked by the generals. The correct ones are picked by the good generals.

[slapout9]

The term "armed social work" is in danger of becoming the next "hearts and minds." By that, I mean that people will assume the common usage of the words and draw meaning of the term from there. What do we mean by "armed social work"?

Here is a definition of social work from the International Federation of Social Workers (I'm guessing they're fairly authoritative on the subject?)...
Perhaps a more accurate term would be "armed community organizer (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Community_organizing)." (I recognize that term might bring with it baggage from politics, particularly the last prez campaign, but it sounds more accurate.)

During the 60's the Black Panthers actually ran day care and food centers in poor neighborhoods and provided security against the oppressive US Guvmint :D as part of the community organizing political process, didn't work out to well:eek:

[Schmedlap]

You are killing me with this...this..community organizer??!!!! Armed social work is bad enough.

Civil Affairs (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Civil_Affairs) or Civil Military Operations (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Civil-military_operations).
To be fair, those definitions don't seem to match what our forces are called on to do. Our forces needed to organize some kind of civil order or governance (preferably the latter), not just cooperation between locals and the US military. CA and CMO seem to be geared towards synchronizing existing civil governance with the military, rather than creating or organizing civil institutions in the first place. It seems to assume that some kind of governing framework is already in place and can be leveraged. Well, what if there isn't?

The definitions from the links that you provided above (with my commentary in brackets)...

Civil Affairs - Civil Affairs units help military commanders by working with civil authorities and civilian populations in the commander’s area of operations to lessen the impact of military operations on them during peace, contingency operations and declared war. [Lessen the impact? That is not what has been needed, lately. What has been needed is the creation/organization of some kind of governance so as to prevent a situation from arising in which lots of people organize themselves into gangs, militias, and kill one another due to fear and competition for resources and power. That is not lessening an impact. That is preventing a new threat from emerging out of a vacuum.]
CA units act as a liaison between the civilian inhabitants of a warzone or disaster area and the military presence, both informing the local commander of the status of the civilian populace as well as effecting assistance to locals by either coordinating military operations with non-governmental organizations (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Non-governmental_organization) (NGOs)and IGO's or distributing directly aid and supplies. [Again, this does not meet the need that we have had lately. What was needed was to stand up some kind of indigenous civilian authority to mediate disputes and prevent the society from devolving into Hobbes' "state of nature"]

...operators provide critical expertise to host-nation governments and are also able to assess need for critical infrastructure projects such as roads, clinics, schools, power plants, water treatment facilities, etc. Once a project has been decided on, a contract is put out at a civil-military operations center (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Civil-military_operations_center) for local contractors to come and bid. CA teams will periodically check up on the status of the project to make sure the money is being well-spent. [Nice things to have, but you need some kind of governance. Otherwise, these projects do not have the intended effects. Does CA establish governance?]

CA provides the commander with cultural expertise, assesses the needs of the civilian populace, handles civilians on the battlefield, refugee operations, keeps the commander informed of protected targets such as schools, churches, hospitals, etc., and interfaces with local and international NGOs and private volunteer organizations, which provides the commander with a unique battlefield overlay of all civilian activity, ongoing infrastructure projects, and the presence and mission of NGOs in the area. [situational awareness and intelligence collection - but nothing about organizing the people into some means of governance]

Civil Military Operations - The activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, governmental and nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area in order to facilitate military operations, to consolidate and achieve operational US objectives. Civil-military operations may include performance by military forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of the local, regional, or national government. These activities may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other military actions. They may also occur, if directed, in the absence of other military operations. Civil-military operations may be performed by designated civil affairs, by other military forces, or by a combination of civil affairs and other forces."The part is in bold could be a solution in Iraq or Afghanistan, if there are enough troops to do it. But there are not and were not. So those troops, instead, need to organize the locals to do it themselves. But that is not what the definition is describing.

What was needed, so far as I can tell, is not defined in some existing term, so armed social work enters the vocabulary. It sounds, to me, like armed community organizing. Perhaps that is not the best term, either. Maybe armed social work is better. Maybe both are wrong. Fine. But it's beyond the scope of CA or CMO, imo.

This is funny to me because of an incident on the "rhino" that runs between the GZ and VBC. I was on the bus in full gear, no convoy was running there when I needed to be there and couldn't catch air, so it was the rhino I had to ride.
I always enjoyed my visits to the FOBs. My favorite moments were when NCOs or Officers would point out to me or my Soldiers that our uniforms were filthy - as if we had neglected to bring them to the cleaners or something. 99% of people had the common sense to realize that we did not live on the FOB or, if we did, that we clearly just returned from a patrol. There were always a few less gifted ones who pointed out the obvious because they were oblivious.

[Brandon Friedman]

My solution to that problem is develop the civilian structure and get the military out of the lead for such efforts Even better, diligently avoid such efforts unless there is a really good reason to get involved.

That, of course, means educating politicians -- and good luck with that...:rolleyes:

Ha. Tell me about it, Ken. That frustrating struggle has been part of my day job for the past two years. As you've implied, politicians are, in most cases, more loyal to both their constituents and their own intuition than to someone else is telling them what's right or wrong. So you can only accomplish so much through lobbying. The bottom line is that if you really want to affect policy change, you have to work to get your own people elected to office--and that means people with military experience.

[Brandon Friedman]

The part is in bold could be a solution in Iraq or Afghanistan, if there are enough troops to do it. But there are not and were not. So those troops, instead, need to organize the locals to do it themselves. But that is not what the definition is describing.

What was needed, so far as I can tell, is not defined in some existing term, so armed social work enters the vocabulary. It sounds, to me, like armed community organizing. Perhaps that is not the best term, either. Maybe armed social work is better. Maybe both are wrong. Fine. But it's beyond the scope of CA or CMO, imo.

When we were dealing with this in Iraq, it wasn't that CA couldn't do it or that we couldn't handle CMO ourselves, but, like you said, there just weren't enough of them (or us). However, I understand that now most combat arms Army officers being involuntarily mobilized out of the IRR are being re-classed as CA officers. I don't know how they're being utilized down range, but it would seem to me that we should be embedding CA teams at the company level (if not lower). Anyone know if we're doing that now? When I was deployed, we had something like a four-man CA team attached to the battalion. Sometimes.

And then there's also the option of creating a civilian international development expeditionary force through State, but there's a lot of political resistance to that.

[Schmedlap]

Ha. Tell me about it, Ken. That frustrating struggle has been part of my day job for the past two years. As you've implied, politicians are, in most cases, more loyal to both their constituents and their own intuition than to someone else is telling them what's right or wrong. So you can only accomplish so much through lobbying. The bottom line is that if you really want to affect policy change, you have to work to get your own people elected to office--and that means people with military experience.
I agree with the frustration, with one caveat. I don't think most are loyal to their constituents. They are loyal to whatever will induce their constituents to vote for them. That can be something diametrically opposed to the welfare of their constituents. It is self-interest - re-election to enjoy the junkets and mingle at the Georgetown cocktail parties; re-election to set themselves up for a future lobbying gig, influence-peddling enterprise, and/or high-paying speaking fees.

Disagree with the solution. An ethical individual will do the right thing, whether that person has military experience or not. We don't need to elect people with military experience (though that's not a problem if they have it). We need to elect people who are ethical. Good luck with that.:rolleyes:

[Schmedlap]

When we were dealing with this in Iraq, it wasn't that CA couldn't do it or that we couldn't handle CMO ourselves, but, like you said, there just weren't enough of them (or us).
Agree. I was just pointing out that what we were attempting to do was not, by definition, CA or CMO. It was something else that we're searching for a description for: armed social work, armed community organizing, applying band-aids to amputations, something else...

However, I understand that now most combat arms Army officers being involuntarily mobilized out of the IRR are being re-classed as CA officers.
Yikes. I'm afraid to ask how that's working out.

I don't know how they're being utilized down range, but it would seem to me that we should be embedding CA teams at the company level (if not lower). Anyone know if we're doing that now? When I was deployed, we had something like a four-man CA team attached to the battalion. Sometimes.
In OIF I, we had a CA team at Bn level. My last deployment with a CF unit ended in Jan 06. We had one CA team for the BDE. It worked about as well as you would expect.:(

[Surferbeetle]

Schmedlap,

Great questions, glad to see that you are back. I will break up a few of your points and address them individually. Lets see if we can better describe the Civil Affairs elephant.


To be fair, those definitions don't seem to match what our forces are called on to do. Our forces needed to organize some kind of civil order or governance (preferably the latter), not just cooperation between locals and the US military. CA and CMO seem to be geared towards synchronizing existing civil governance with the military, rather than creating or organizing civil institutions in the first place. It seems to assume that some kind of governing framework is already in place and can be leveraged. Well, what if there isn't?

Let’s split hairs concerning your assumption that a governing framework does not exist (and as I recall you spent time in Iraq so I will use Iraq as a staring point). Nature abhors a vacuum, and in Iraq my assessment (and apparently yours as well when you describe gangs and militias) was that many different governing frameworks existed even though the GoI framework ranged from weak to non-existent depending upon time and place. None-the-less, a review of US history reveals that we have imposed military governments upon countries whose governments we deemed to have failed. The examples (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Civil_Affairs) include Mexico, The Confederacy, the Philippines, Germany (WWI and WWII), and Japan. The question of who was legally in charge of Iraq during March 2003 until today, is beyond my technical expertise. Wikipedia, however provides a legal background/timeline on the occupation of Iraq (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Legality_of_the_Iraq_War) and the status of forces agreement (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Strategic_Framework_Agreement) and perhaps you or JMM can shed some additional light as to its adequacy and applicability to this question.


The definitions from the links that you provided above (with my commentary in brackets)...

Civil Affairs - Civil Affairs units help military commanders by working with civil authorities and civilian populations in the commander’s area of operations to lessen the impact of military operations on them during peace, contingency operations and declared war. [Lessen the impact? That is not what has been needed, lately. What has been needed is the creation/organization of some kind of governance so as to prevent a situation from arising in which lots of people organize themselves into gangs, militias, and kill one another due to fear and competition for resources and power. That is not lessening an impact. That is preventing a new threat from emerging out of a vacuum.]

[Again, this does not meet the need that we have had lately. What was needed was to stand up some kind of indigenous civilian authority to mediate disputes and prevent the society from devolving into Hobbes' "state of nature"]

[Nice things to have, but you need some kind of governance. Otherwise, these projects do not have the intended effects. Does CA establish governance?]

[situational awareness and intelligence collection - but nothing about organizing the people into some means of governance]

] "The part is in bold could be a solution in Iraq or Afghanistan, if there are enough troops to do it. But there are not and were not. So those troops, instead, need to organize the locals to do it themselves. But that is not what the definition is describing.



Security and Stability are inseparable, as we both know from Iraq. From a purely military standpoint as a CA-Bubba I can’t work with the locals to bring the local Water Treatment Plant back on line (LOO-Restore Basic Services) or assist with elections (LOO-Conduct Free Election) or work with the local police forces to bring them back on line (LOO-Restore Security) without Infantry-Bubbas doing snap-TCP’s, cordon & knock ops, raids, etc. etc. Simultaneously we need SF-Bubbas training local military forces and Active, Guard, Reserve and CA-Bubbas with professional civilian skills (practiced every day) working with the locals on this problem. This is the essence of Civil Military Operations…CA planners (limited resource) helping GPF forces (larger resource) to work with the local population (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=73183&postcount=41) (largest resource) to stabilize the AO.

As you know well, it’s a tough nut/moving target and this is reflected in the progression of US Doctrine for these situations: Small Wars, Low Intensity Conflict, Operations Other Than War, Military Operations Other Than War, Stability and Support Operations, Security Force Assistance, etc., etc.

For your Saturday night reading pleasure GTA 41-01-001 (http://www.civilaffairsassoc.org/V_CA%20Association%20Doctrine%20Brief%20Nov%2008(F NIAL.pdf) is one of our easily accessible guides to Civil Affairs which is “Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.” and provides more insight into how our small Civil Affairs forces work the worldwide battlefield.



What was needed, so far as I can tell, is not defined in some existing term, so armed social work enters the vocabulary. It sounds, to me, like armed community organizing. Perhaps that is not the best term, either. Maybe armed social work is better. Maybe both are wrong. Fine. But it's beyond the scope of CA or CMO, imo.

IMHO Germany and Japan are examples of adequately resourced CA/CMO operations and Iraq and Afghanistan are poster children for what happens when we don’t adequately resource CA/CMO operations. Who is the Four Star General Lucian Clay (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lucius_D._Clay) of Afghanistan or Iraq?

Again IMHO we should consider adequately resourcing Civil Affairs Forces across all of the services with respect to people, language training, cultural training, industry training, and technical & advanced degrees (your link to the WSJ article on Korean enlistment rates with respect to highly educated professionals could be a part of the solution). This would be with the understanding that the nation that we are assisting will provide the bulk of the needed human capital to accomplish the mission....which of course will drive how we approach the problem set.

Lastly we need to incorporate CMO training from AIT and BOLC forward.

Ken, however brings out some pithy points that need to be reflected upon as well. If I may paraphrase: Since capabilities/tools are often used in emergencies without respect to long term impacts is this capability something that we as a nation want to invest in?

Steve

[Ken White]

when it first came out, CPT Foley. Ipicked up an early copy at the SWC Bookstore on Smoke Bomb Hill in '64. First Edition. Read it a couple of more times later. Gave it to my son; he can use it, I'm long retired.

I had before and after the book the opportunity to try his techniques and / or see them attempted. He doesn't have any more answers than anyone else does. All wars are different and if you get wedded to a technique or series of them, you will fail. People, culture, terrain -- all those things differ.

The problem with Galula and all the COIN experts is one of resources. There is no question that what they want to do works, I totally agree with the philosophies of FID and COIN.

The issue is that to do what's prescribed is simply unaffordable.

You will never get enough trained soldiers, not SF, with language and cultural skills to do what Galula and the others recommend. That's reality. The French could not do it in Viet Nam or Algeria and later in Viet Nam, with over 1.5M Allied troops in a nation with half the population of Iraq in one-fourth the area, we could not do that -- and good techniques were tried early on (too few people) and later (too few trained and competent people). Afghanistan is larger, has more people and far more difficult terrain. You cannot use good COIN practices without enough people with the skills to do the job required and you will not ever have enough adequately skilled. To do so would require significant devotion of a great many national assets to one small nation and a cessatio0n of short tours; stay until the job's finished. The cost benefit ratio will never support such an effort. Nor should it.

Plus you have to cope with the one third rule and the two year rule and you can finesse those just so long...

If State and SF don't stop potential FID efforts before they build, you're going to have to call in the grundy old Big Army and unless it's an Andorra sized nation, there won't be enough folks and they are unlikely to do it right -- it is not their job, not really. They'll give it their best shot but it's unlikely to ever be more than barely adequate. That, too is reality.

Said Boot:"I know its off topic, but you reminded me of something I had forgotten about until I read you post." So too did you too. Had to hitch a ride on a C-130 once upon a time; Crew Chief or Loadmaster said "you can't get on this plane with those Hand Grenades." So without a word, I pulled them off my harness and tossed 'em to him. The AF has no sense of humor... :D

Brandon
"The bottom line is that if you really want to affect policy change, you have to work to get your own people elected to office--and that means people with military experience."I think you'll find that's a decidedly mixed bag; we've had a large former military / veteran presence in Congress, the WH and throughout Government before. Politics corrupts. They didn't do much better than the non-veterans have done. In fact, the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations did a really poor job on most things and they were loaded with WW II veterans. Johnson was far and away the worst President I've seen (even if he did give me a cigarette lighter).

Schmedlap has it right. Ethical and reasonably honest. Good luck with that indeed...

[Ken White]

However, ever now and then I do think I need to throw a cautionary wet blanket (with sand) on the beach party...:o
...As you know well, it’s a tough nut/moving target and this is reflected in the progression of US Doctrine for these situations: Small Wars, Low Intensity Conflict, Operations Other Than War, Military Operations Other Than War, Stability and Support Operations, Security Force Assistance, etc., etc.I suggest there is not so much a progression of doctrine as a plethora of names which have by themselves fragmented effort to an extent by precluding a consistent doctrine. Everyone wants to make big tracks when they're on watch...
IMHO Germany and Japan are examples of adequately resourced CA/CMO operations and Iraq and Afghanistan are poster children for what happens when we don’t adequately resource CA/CMO operations. Who is the Four Star General Lucian Clay (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lucius_D._Clay) of Afghanistan or Iraq?You keep using these and I keep pointing out that the circumstances and the people were and are totally different -- that's a bad comparison, the politics of the day, the economics, the troop strength and several other factors make those literally dangerous and misleading comparisons. Such an effort is not going to be made today. Not even close.
Ken, however brings out some pithy points that need to be reflected upon as well. If I may paraphrase: Since capabilities/tools are often used in emergencies without respect to long term impacts is this capability something that we as a nation want to invest in?We need to invest in it and will -- the real question is to what extent and for what use...

[William F. Owen]

The term "armed social work" is in danger of becoming the next "hearts and minds." By that, I mean that people will assume the common usage of the words and draw meaning of the term from there. What do we mean by "armed social work"?


Thank you! Hearts and minds was a silly think to say and Templer came to regret saying it. "Armed Social Work" is equally silly.

COIN is a form of warfare. It differs from other forms only in ways and means.
Based on his writing Moa-Tse-Tung read far more Clausewtiz than he did Sun-Tzu!

a.) Some in the US look at Iraq after an invasion and says "ahh... COIN," and confuses the acts associated with getting a society functioning, post war, with those acts exemplified by COIN best practice.

b.) What you see in "New COIN" is the US applying Iraq to COIN thinking and not COIN thinking applied to Iraq. - which is why A'Stan is far from over, and still may slip away.

c.) Securing the population, and addressing their physical needs - NOT SOCIAL - like, security, fuel, food, electricity etc, should only be done where the populations support/well being, bears on the political and military outcome, in that they support you, not the insurgent. Getting them to support you, to the extent that they provide you with intelligence, and deny the insurgents any support - so essentially give you target data, and deny the bad guys logistics - is aimed at doing the insurgents harm. Harm as in killing and capturing. This generally applies to all forms of warfare! - which is why the Nazis ended up with 100,000 strong "partisan" groups behind their lines in Russia.

To characterise the above as "armed social work" or "gaining the human terrain," is dumbing down solid, well understood and enduring military best practice.

[William F. Owen]

There's also the fact that Wilf comes from the British tradition where the civilian side of the FID effort used to be very much in charge and that system worked well for them.
Correct. - not surprisingly! The British "tradition" to countering an insurgency is based on being the existing government or having the explicit support of an existing government - which has the appropriate structures in place or having the resources and support to create them. - again, Sierra Leone is an excellent example.

I think current British practice shows they've lost their civilian edge to an extent -- and that our history shows that our system is not particularly effective -- or desirable. My solution to that problem is develop the civilian structure and get the military out of the lead for such efforts
I think the Basra fiasco was purely down to a lack of resources and political will - and the bad guys knew it. If operational success had been absolutely essential to UK foreign policy, the UK conduct of Iraq would have been very different. You can see the same issues in A'Stan.

[Surferbeetle]

However, ever now and then I do think I need to throw a cautionary wet blanket (with sand) on the beach party...:oI suggest there is not so much a progression of doctrine as a plethora of names which have by themselves fragmented effort to an extent by precluding a consistent doctrine. Everyone wants to make big tracks when they're on watch...You keep using these and I keep pointing out that the circumstances and the people were and are totally different -- that's a bad comparison, the politics of the day, the economics, the troop strength and several other factors make those literally dangerous and misleading comparisons. Such an effort is not going to be made today. Not even close.We need to invest in it and will -- the real question is to what extent and for what use...

...and so it's worth the wet blanket (even with the sand).

Ken,

We are in agreement that getting the analysis wrong can have dangerous consequences and that Germany & Japan are not the best fit models for Iraq & Afghanistan for the reasons that you mention...however I am open to suggestions as I dig around and try and find/understand more appropriate models :wry:

We certainly have other fish to fry when it comes to dedicating a four-star to head up CA/CMO operations for these two conflicts, but having been spoiled by having worked for some good GO's...

Steve

[William F. Owen]

—in which COIN techniques must be utilized—and there’s the preventive COIN environment, in which you spend the bulk of your time trying to keep the locals happy and safe—where it is “armed social work” and where you do “need to respect the culture or protect noncombatants to win," despite what Mr. Owen argues.


Sorry, but this strike to the heart of the issue. There is no such thing as "COIN techniques" - 99% of actions performed in COIN are applicable in other forms of warfare. What you are talking about is not something exclusive to something called COIN. It is a means to end, to applied as and when necessary, and within a political context.

Talking about "armed social work," and "respect for culture" utterly misses the point, of
a.) Don't let civilians, who are under your protection, come to needless harm, either by your action or ... worse.. inaction, because it will/may negatively impact your military operations.
b.) Do not do those things that will needlessly create offence, because it will/may negatively impact your military operations.

Now is statement A or B incorrect?
Are they actually different from saying "social work" and "respect for culture". I submit that A is not Social work, and B is good behaviour, not respect.
You are going to have to do things that are not synonymous with "respecting their culture" - killing, searches, etc, so why back yourself into that corner with sloppy semantics?

[Brandon Friedman]

I agree with the frustration, with one caveat. I don't think most are loyal to their constituents. They are loyal to whatever will induce their constituents to vote for them. That can be something diametrically opposed to the welfare of their constituents.

Absolutely. That’s what I meant when I said it. Should've been clearer.


Disagree with the solution. An ethical individual will do the right thing, whether that person has military experience or not. We don't need to elect people with military experience (though that's not a problem if they have it). We need to elect people who are ethical. Good luck with that.:rolleyes:

It’s not just about ethics. It’s about ethics and expertise when you’re trying to decide whether or not to go to war. I’ve met ethical politicians who simply don’t have the requisite experience or information to even know who to listen to. And with competing lobbying organizations, think tanks, and other political pressures, it becomes a problem. Both the House and Senate are filled with committee members whose only qualifications are that their district or state elected them to office. Others have a very narrow breadth of professional expertise. It’s not unusual to find one’s self horrified at the lack of knowledge and awareness on the part of some members of the House and Senate Armed Services and Veterans Affairs Committees (like when you have to explain to a sitting member of Congress what “dwell time” is and why it’s important in terms of effectively managing a long war).

And when you’re fighting in two or more conflicts at the same time, this type of knowledge becomes important. So it helps when members have military experience. However, if you’re willing to forgo that by not competing for representation, then the SEIU, the Club for Growth, George Soros, and Rush Limbaugh—people whose first, second, and third priority is not defense policy--will be more than happy to assist other candidates in taking your potential candidate’s place.

And when you allow that to happen, you get a Congress that gets jerked around by guys like Donald Rumsfeld and Dick Cheney. (Apologies if anyone here is a big fan of those two.)

You might say it’s not important to have people with military experience in office, but I will argue that it’s absolutely crucial that members of one co-equal branch of government be able to go head-to-head with a member from the other branch. Take Rumsfeld and Cheney for instance. Those guys, whether you support them or not, pushed Congress around in the lead-up to the Iraq invasion. They said that not only is invading Iraq an awesome idea (http://www.nytimes.com/2002/08/27/world/eyes-iraq-cheney-s-words-administration-case-for-removing-saddam-hussein.html), but we can do it with like 90,000 troops (http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/167/35435.html). And it’ll be easy (http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2002/11/15/world/main529569.shtml).

And there was no one in Congress with enough of a following or enough political capital (like, say, a Jim Webb) to stand up and say, no, actually, that’s a really bad idea the way you’re presenting it. That's why it's important. I'm sure there were plenty of ethical politicians in 2003 who believed Wolfowitz over Shinseki.

(I should also add, I'm not suggesting that prior military experience makes a politician ethical. I could probably name half a dozen unethical, former military members of Congress off the top of my head.)

[Brandon Friedman]

Sorry, but this strike to the heart of the issue. There is no such thing as "COIN techniques" - 99% of actions performed in COIN are applicable in other forms of warfare. What you are talking about is not something exclusive to something called COIN. It is a means to end, to applied as and when necessary, and within a political context.

Call it whatever you like.


You are going to have to do things that are not synonymous with "respecting their culture" - killing, searches, etc, so why back yourself into that corner with sloppy semantics?

If you're not willing to empathize with the population--to try and put yourself in their shoes--and to show respect for their culture and history, then you'll never know your enemy.

And what do killing and searches have to do with not respecting their culture? Nobody said when you search a house you have to completely toss it. And you can be shooting at a guy and still respect his culture. You just don't have to respect the fact that he's trying to kill you. It's not personal. And if you've laid a solid foundation of mutual respect with the locals prior to that, then they tend to understand.

[William F. Owen]

Call it whatever you like.
Thanks, but I am not doing this to be a semantic pr*k. There is a real danger now that some, maybe a lot, think there is something called COIN and something call "War fighting" so the all the diverse reasons and conducts of warfare, are now in two boxes. When you they find another conflict that doesn't fit, they'll invent another box. In fact if you look at "Hybrid" and the Lebanon, they did.
Words matter, and so does the meaning. If it doesn't you can't have doctrine, because you cannot teach it.

If you're not willing to empathize with the population--to try and put yourself in their shoes--and to show respect for their culture and history, then you'll never know your enemy.
I can empathise with them on a very basic human level. That's entirely normal, and you don't need to be taught to do it.
You can't tell soldiers to respect a culture that holds values they don't understand and are in some cases abhorrent to them.
Do you think it's okay to deny women's right? Allow male domestic violence? Arrange marriages? Honour killings? Consider some races sub-human?
These are unacceptable, and you should not respect cultures, or those elements of culture that advocated such things.

Culture is a highly complex area with many different forms of expression, and vastly variable, so the blanket guidance "respect culture," is so simplistic as to cease to be useful.

Let me give you a specific example. If you went to search a house and woman told you from behind a close door, "my husband is not home, go away!" would you? Respecting her culture means you go away. Understanding her culture, means going and getting two woman from another house, who can protect "her honour" and tell her husband, while you search her home.

World of difference. - and at some point, all the allowances and negotiations run out. If you can't find other women, you are going in anyway, and in some cases, that could get that woman beaten or even killed, by the husband, and there is nothing you can do about it. - then turn around to the platoon and tell them this is a culture they need to respect.

[Umar Al-Mokhtār]

"sloppy semantics" going on here (love that term wilf).

The term “respect” is a bit subject to interpretation since it can mean "to hold in esteem or honor" as well as “to show regard or consideration for.”

I for one do not respect the Arab / Muslim culture since it is decidedly misogynist and in many ways sadistic, ignoring basic human rights, particularly with regards to women.

However, when dealing with Arabs / Muslims I show respect for aspects of their cultural norms in not handing them items with my left hand, not exposing the soles of my feet, not touching the top of heads, and especially being mindful of women's precarious position in regards to contact with non-family member males since it could be very detrimental to their personal health and well being.

I think some folks are using the term in the latter sense vice the former; where as wilf is solidly using it in the former. But that's just me. :D

[William F. Owen]

I for one do not respect the Arab / Muslim culture since it is decidedly misogynist and in many ways sadistic, ignoring basic human rights, particularly with regards to women.
... I'm your brother on that one.

However, when dealing with Arabs / Muslims I show respect for aspects of their cultural norms in not handing them items with my left hand, not exposing the soles of my feet, not touching the top of heads, and especially being mindful of women's precarious position in regards to contact with non-family member males since it could be very detrimental to their personal health and well being.
... and someone taught you good behaviour and toleration.

I'm told the best Schwarma is in Haifa! Get your ass over here! :D

[CPT Foley]

"sloppy semantics" going on here (love that term wilf).

The term “respect” is a bit subject to interpretation since it can mean "to hold in esteem or honor" as well as “to show regard or consideration for.”

I for one do not respect the Arab / Muslim culture since it is decidedly misogynist and in many ways sadistic, ignoring basic human rights, particularly with regards to women.

However, when dealing with Arabs / Muslims I show respect for aspects of their cultural norms in not handing them items with my left hand, not exposing the soles of my feet, not touching the top of heads, and especially being mindful of women's precarious position in regards to contact with non-family member males since it could be very detrimental to their personal health and well being.

I think some folks are using the term in the latter sense vice the former; where as wilf is solidly using it in the former. But that's just me. :D


When I advocate respecting other cultures I'm not suggesting Soldiers embrace them, like them, or in any way adopt a relativistic approach toward culture. You can find aspects of a culture abhorrent and still treat members of the culture with respect. It makes me want to smash furniture when I hear Officers & NCOs refer to Haji this & that. Most of them know on an intellectual level that it's probably a bad idea to make light of one of the pillars of Islam. I suspect they succumb to it because the terminology is so widespread. We are that tone deaf as a force. I want to be clear, my issue is not based on fairness or sensitivity or ethics. It is purely base on pragmatism. We will have greater success garnering support in the AO, region, worldwide when our forces operate with the same meticulous care that we have for our arms and equipment toward cultural considerations. It's not a sensitivity issue, it's a success issue.

[Ken White]

with Wilf and Umar Al-Mokhtār. I can know and militarily adapt to an alien culture and accord the populace respect and some cultural awareness but there are and have to be limits or I am not doing my job and am taking the easy way out. I can make people working for me behave responsibly and I should do so -- but I'm not in a position to make them accept a culture that is alien to them.

I can know my enemy -- though in the situation we're talking here, the population should not be my enemy -- and I can respect him for his capabilities but that doesn't mean that I or any soldier has to accept any tenets of that culture.

I also suggest that in every foreign nation in which I've served, no matter how nice and respectful I or the Troops were, the locals did not want to understand us with only rare individual exceptions -- most of 'em were quite polite (most peoples are far more polite than Americans) and / or respectful or fearful as the situation seemed to dictate -- but they really just wanted us gone, out of their sight and out of their country as quickly as possible. A soldier in a foreign land had better never lose sight of that fact of life.

On a believe it or not allied note, Brandon, you mention that the Administration pushed Congress around in the lead up to invading Iraq. Possibly true and of note is the fact that the pushers you cite were former Congroids. Does this mean they 'knew their enemy?' Or could it simply mean that Congress' lack of gumption and concern for their own reelection has more to do with their rollover than did any lack of 'expertise?'

As I pointed out, the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations were quite poor strategically and they were loaded with veterans as were the Congresses of the time. I'm not at all sure your desire for more veterans in Congress will do what you appear to think it will do. The historical evidence over the last 200 years and particularly recently is not favorable. I think every Mother's advice "Be careful what you wish for, you may get it..." is probably appropriate.

[Brandon Friedman]

Thanks, but I am not doing this to be a semantic pr*k. There is a real danger now that some, maybe a lot, think there is something called COIN and something call "War fighting" so the all the diverse reasons and conducts of warfare, are now in two boxes. When you they find another conflict that doesn't fit, they'll invent another box. In fact if you look at "Hybrid" and the Lebanon, they did.
Words matter, and so does the meaning. If it doesn't you can't have doctrine, because you cannot teach it.

While there might be some people who want to put "COIN" and "war fighting" in two different boxes, I'm not one of them, and I never suggested that. But you're absolutely right that words do matter.


I can empathise with them on a very basic human level. That's entirely normal, and you don't need to be taught to do it.
You can't tell soldiers to respect a culture that holds values they don't understand and are in some cases abhorrent to them.
Do you think it's okay to deny women's right? Allow male domestic violence? Arrange marriages? Honour killings? Consider some races sub-human?
These are unacceptable, and you should not respect cultures, or those elements of culture that advocated such things.

I'm not going to get sucked into broad-brushing a billion Muslims here. That's absurd. Of course we don't respect men who abuse women or who practice honor killings. But when you walk into a city like, say, Baghdad with the mentality and preconception that the inhabitants are a bunch of wife-beating, 11th century savages, then you're setting yourself up for failure. When you enter a situation like that, you have to give people the benefit of the doubt--regardless of what you think you know about them. And if they disappoint you (or try to kill you), then you can make the adjustment. But when you allow an air of "their-culture-is-abhorrent"/"hajji-this-hajji-that" to permeate your unit in advance of any interaction, I'm telling you, it's going to cause problems for everyone.


Culture is a highly complex area with many different forms of expression, and vastly variable, so the blanket guidance "respect culture," is so simplistic as to cease to be useful.

Fair enough.


Let me give you a specific example. If you went to search a house and woman told you from behind a close door, "my husband is not home, go away!" would you? Respecting her culture means you go away. Understanding her culture, means going and getting two woman from another house, who can protect "her honour" and tell her husband, while you search her home.

World of difference. - and at some point, all the allowances and negotiations run out. If you can't find other women, you are going in anyway, and in some cases, that could get that woman beaten or even killed, by the husband, and there is nothing you can do about it. - then turn around to the platoon and tell them this is a culture they need to respect.

The ideal answer here is neither. In ultra-conservative areas like eastern Afghanistan, the answer is to bring along both Western female troops and plenty of Afghan troops. If that's not possible, then, like you say, in most--but not all--cases you have to go in anyway. If it's viewed in the community as a lack of respect, then it's something you'll have to take up with the village elders. But if you've shown respect in the past and you have good working relationships in the area, then it should work. On the other hand, if they're all Taliban, then you can, you know, make the adjustment.

[Brandon Friedman]

When I advocate respecting other cultures I'm not suggesting Soldiers embrace them, like them, or in any way adopt a relativistic approach toward culture. You can find aspects of a culture abhorrent and still treat members of the culture with respect. It makes me want to smash furniture when I hear Officers & NCOs refer to Haji this & that. Most of them know on an intellectual level that it's probably a bad idea to make light of one of the pillars of Islam. I suspect they succumb to it because the terminology is so widespread. We are that tone deaf as a force. I want to be clear, my issue is not based on fairness or sensitivity or ethics. It is purely base on pragmatism. We will have greater success garnering support in the AO, region, worldwide when our forces operate with the same meticulous care that we have for our arms and equipment toward cultural considerations. It's not a sensitivity issue, it's a success issue.

I agree with this.

[marct]

Hi Wilf,


Thanks, but I am not doing this to be a semantic pr*k. There is a real danger now that some, maybe a lot, think there is something called COIN and something call "War fighting" so the all the diverse reasons and conducts of warfare, are now in two boxes. When you they find another conflict that doesn't fit, they'll invent another box. In fact if you look at "Hybrid" and the Lebanon, they did.

Totally agree! (Of course, I expand the singular box a little further than you do). Let's add another part of the danger of constantly expanding taxonomies: for every "new" taxon, you need new "experts". Of course, that means that you have to hire new consultants, pay for new research (and translators), and set up new organizational units. Now, I would never say that that was a bureaucrats dream, but... :rolleyes:


Words matter, and so does the meaning. If it doesn't you can't have doctrine, because you cannot teach it.

I think Lewis Carroll captured this nicely...
http://blogs.knoxnews.com/knx/mason/Humpty1.gif


I can empathise with them on a very basic human level. That's entirely normal, and you don't need to be taught to do it.
You can't tell soldiers to respect a culture that holds values they don't understand and are in some cases abhorrent to them.

Hmm, I'm not sure about the first - 'tis a little too optimistic for me.

On the second point, of course you can tell soldiers to respect a culture that they find abhorrent! Of course, telling them to respect it is one thing, getting them to respect it is another. And, if they totally do "respect" it (in the cultural relativity suffering from PMS [Post-Modernist Syndrome :cool:] sense), then you have probably just helped your enemy.

Somewhat less on the tongue-in-cheek level, this is a problem Anthropologists have been dealing with for a century or so, and the British military has been dealing with for longer. "Respect" should, IMO, always be interpreted in two different, and distinct, ways: a) for the commonality between two people (whatever that may be - it varies), and b) for utilitarian purposes of completing the "mission", whether that be countering an insurgency or getting an ethnography published.


Do you think it's okay to deny women's right? Allow male domestic violence? Arrange marriages? Honour killings? Consider some races sub-human? These are unacceptable, and you should not respect cultures, or those elements of culture that advocated such things.

Wilf, I had no idea that you hated 19th century British culture so much :eek:!


Culture is a highly complex area with many different forms of expression, and vastly variable, so the blanket guidance "respect culture," is so simplistic as to cease to be useful.

Actually, I would go further - it is outright dangerous simply because it is so semantically loose. One of the worst things I ever saw as a graduate student was another grad student so traumatized by being told she had to "respect" the people she was studying that she ended up having a nervous breakdown. BTW, her fieldwork was with a group that is considered to be "nice" by most people.

Cheers,

Marc

[Brandon Friedman]

On a believe it or not allied note, Brandon, you mention that the Administration pushed Congress around in the lead up to invading Iraq. Possibly true and of note is the fact that the pushers you cite were former Congroids. Does this mean they 'knew their enemy?' Or could it simply mean that Congress' lack of gumption and concern for their own reelection has more to do with their rollover than did any lack of 'expertise?'

Ken,

Concern for a politician's re-election is always paramount. In this case it means they didn't have the popular support or political capital to oppose in any coherent fashion. But when a politician has relevant personal experience, that brings with it a wealth of political capital. By that, I mean it's much easier--with voters back home--for a senator who's a doctor to feasibly oppose a popular health care proposal. Or for a Congressman who served as a maneuver commander to oppose a widely accepted defense policy.

[Ken White]

unfortunately, mine is historically and actualities of a long life based and thus is far less benign. :wry:

[CPT Foley]

Sorry, but this strike to the heart of the issue. There is no such thing as "COIN techniques" - 99% of actions performed in COIN are applicable in other forms of warfare. What you are talking about is not something exclusive to something called COIN. It is a means to end, to applied as and when necessary, and within a political context.

Talking about "armed social work," and "respect for culture" utterly misses the point, of
a.) Don't let civilians, who are under your protection, come to needless harm, either by your action or ... worse.. inaction, because it will/may negatively impact your military operations.
b.) Do not do those things that will needlessly create offence, because it will/may negatively impact your military operations.

Now is statement A or B incorrect?
Are they actually different from saying "social work" and "respect for culture". I submit that A is not Social work, and B is good behaviour, not respect.
You are going to have to do things that are not synonymous with "respecting their culture" - killing, searches, etc, so why back yourself into that corner with sloppy semantics?

I don't think someone referring to COIN techniques would dispute that 99% or maybe 100% of the techniques would be used in other conflicts, e.g., large conventional ops, etc. I'm puzzled that people seem to question premise that the composition and frequency of tactics used in a COIN environment would differ from that of large conventional conflict. Agreed, a lot of the same tactics would be used in both, but it would be a different mix. It's like saying there's no such thing as MOUT because all of the things in MOUT are done in non-MOUT ops. It's a question emphasis. I don't think it's unreasonable to refer to COIN techniques to describe non-kinetic ops, but I agree that there are definitely kinetic elements to COIN.

[Schmedlap]

... as a CA-Bubba I can’t work with the locals to bring the local Water Treatment Plant back on line (LOO-Restore Basic Services) or assist with elections (LOO-Conduct Free Election) or work with the local police forces to bring them back on line (LOO-Restore Security) without Infantry-Bubbas doing snap-TCP’s, cordon & knock ops, raids, etc. etc. Simultaneously we need SF-Bubbas training local military forces and Active, Guard, Reserve and CA-Bubbas with professional civilian skills (practiced every day) working with the locals on this problem. This is the essence of Civil Military Operations…CA planners (limited resource) helping GPF forces (larger resource) to work with the local population (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=73183&postcount=41) (largest resource) to stabilize the AO.
But there is a very important job missing there. Essential services, law enforcement, elections, and defense are important. But what about standing up some shell of a government? If there is no government and no law, then what offices are you filling with your elections and what laws are the police enforcing? Without a local government, who is responsible for maintenance and standards of community property? I don't see any guidance for who is in the lead for standing up a government. State Dept maybe? I don't know. I didn't see any mention of it on this thread or the links provided. It would seem like something related to CMO, but that doesn't answer the question either.

[William F. Owen]

I'm not going to get sucked into broad-brushing a billion Muslims here. That's absurd. Of course we don't respect men who abuse women or who practice honor killings. But when you walk into a city like, say, Baghdad with the mentality and preconception that the inhabitants are a bunch of wife-beating, 11th century savages, then you're setting yourself up for failure.
I live amongst Arabs, albeit where they are a minority (20%). Rub shoulders with them everyday, and buy my bread and coffee from them, and talk to them once in a while - usually about football ..Eyuh!. Good folks.. mostly.

The secret to peaceful co-existence is mostly good behaviour.


Hmm, I'm not sure about the first - 'tis a little too optimistic for me.
Me too. Yes, you probably have to beat it into Rifleman F*cknuts, and Cpl Doomweeby, via 3 hours of lectures and make it very plain that any transgression will result in sever penalties, but I am strongly against the "they have a point," justification of beliefs that run contrary the values of the organisation you might be in.


Wilf, I had no idea that you hated 19th century British culture so much :eek:!
I am a product of it! I am a walking talking 1899 public School boy! My wife get irritated when I call here countrymen "The natives," and complains that it is very patronising the use the same tone of voice with the locals, that she has heard me use, when talking to pets!
Poor girl is a foreigner, so can't understand! ;)

[Umar Al-Mokhtār]

in the election cycle.


By that, I mean it's much easier--with voters back home--for a senator who's a doctor to feasibly oppose a popular health care proposal. Or for a Congressman who served as a maneuver commander to oppose a widely accepted defense policy.

One would hope, but that is not necessarily the case. Politicians often vote issues after calculating the strategic impact of the vote. Or as contrarian to the opposing party’s vote, regardless as to whether the legislation is a good thing for the people.

Ken’s experience from historically and actualities of a long life is based on his experiences back with the Constitutional Convention. :D

Mine just from both proximity and a politician father who had more faces than one could count. :rolleyes:

Brandon, you hit it on the head with this: “Concern for a politician's re-election is always paramount.” That's it, and not taking a stand that could jeopardize that goal. Consider that most in Congress make nice long winded speeches, to an empty chamber. It puts them on record, but come re-election time they are rarely called on their voting record or their stances. They run a campaign based on the “flavor of the week” issues in order to keep their seat, trusting the short memory and lack of political inquisitiveness of their constituency.

IMHO the people that routinely participate in this forum have a higher than normal curiosity about the world around them and the events which impact their’s and other’s lives. The vast majority of people, however, tend to live within very narrowly focused world views. Politicians know this, in fact they rely upon it.

[CPT Foley]

Hi Wilf,



Totally agree! (Of course, I expand the singular box a little further than you do). Let's add another part of the danger of constantly expanding taxonomies: for every "new" taxon, you need new "experts". Of course, that means that you have to hire new consultants, pay for new research (and translators), and set up new organizational units. Now, I would never say that that was a bureaucrats dream, but... :rolleyes:



I think Lewis Carroll captured this nicely...
http://blogs.knoxnews.com/knx/mason/Humpty1.gif



Hmm, I'm not sure about the first - 'tis a little too optimistic for me.

On the second point, of course you can tell soldiers to respect a culture that they find abhorrent! Of course, telling them to respect it is one thing, getting them to respect it is another. And, if they totally do "respect" it (in the cultural relativity suffering from PMS [Post-Modernist Syndrome :cool:] sense), then you have probably just helped your enemy.

Somewhat less on the tongue-in-cheek level, this is a problem Anthropologists have been dealing with for a century or so, and the British military has been dealing with for longer. "Respect" should, IMO, always be interpreted in two different, and distinct, ways: a) for the commonality between two people (whatever that may be - it varies), and b) for utilitarian purposes of completing the "mission", whether that be countering an insurgency or getting an ethnography published.



Wilf, I had no idea that you hated 19th century British culture so much :eek:!



Actually, I would go further - it is outright dangerous simply because it is so semantically loose. One of the worst things I ever saw as a graduate student was another grad student so traumatized by being told she had to "respect" the people she was studying that she ended up having a nervous breakdown. BTW, her fieldwork was with a group that is considered to be "nice" by most people.

Cheers,

Marc

You make a good point. I was a bit sloppy in my description that our Soldiers should respect other cultures. That's not what I meant. They should endeavor to display respect for other cultures because it will contribute toward mission accomplishment and the overall effort. Owen is also correct in that there will certainly be instances where we may have to takes some actions which will be viewed as disrespectful, e.g., searching homes with no males present, ops during Ramadan, etc. The fact that there will be exceptions in no way discredits the approach. The less people we piss off that we don't have to is an important consideration.

[MikeF]

But there is a very important job missing there. Essential services, law enforcement, elections, and defense are important. But what about standing up some shell of a government? If there is no government and no law, then what offices are you filling with your elections and what laws are the police enforcing? Without a local government, who is responsible for maintenance and standards of community property? I don't see any guidance for who is in the lead for standing up a government. State Dept maybe? I don't know. I didn't see any mention of it on this thread or the links provided. It would seem like something related to CMO, but that doesn't answer the question either.

Schmedlap hits on a very important point- one that I've been studying intensely for nearly the last two years. What do we do when there is no functioning government or the populace rejects the current government? There is no silver bullet answer here, and both Iraq and Afghanistan can arguably placed in this category. Unfortunately, we will probably find that we can either do nothing, or we will have to occupy for several generations in the hopes that an American military presence can provide enough security over time to allow the subtle,slow shift towards stability and acceptance of a national government.

Going back to the earlier discussion on the use of violence and soldier behavior in COIN, I had a Brigade Commander sum up our ethos with the following quote,

"Treat everyone with dignity and respect, but be prepared to kill them."

I would submit that actively pursuing, tracking down irreconciliables and killing them IS mutually exclusive to acting like a jackass and behaving ignorantly and disrespectfully to the populace. It is simply a matter of discipline and professionalism. Personally, I found acting politely and intermingling with the populace can be the best form of intelligence collection even if one is forced to use coercive population control measures to provide intitial security.

Teddy Roosevelt said we should "walk softly and carry a big stick." I think his words are still valid.

Ken would probably sum it up with METT-TC. There is a time to bring the love, and a time to bring the hate. A commander must discern which COA is valid given the particular environment. Regardless, one can still act in a manner of professionalism and discipline.

Ultimately, the true battle is between the host nation and its' people. It has nothing to do with us. We can either assist, arbitrate, or get in the way. When we forget that COIN/IW is warfare, then I would submit that is dangerous. I've observed too many units that drive down the road instead of manuevering/bounding b/c they felt all they were doing was conducting "non-lethal" operations. I could never understand why they did not realize the enemy did not care what their mission was.

CPT Foley- I wrote an essay (http://smallwarsjournal.com/mag/docs-temp/50-few.pdf) a while back on the conditions I observed in the DRV back in late 2006 as a small town descended into anarchy. You may want to take a look at it to determine how you would engage this situation in order to stop the violence and provide security. At the time, I determined an indirect or soft approach was not feasible given the total collapse of the government. It speaks more to what Wilf (Mr. Owen) is referring to as to the necessity of the use of violence to secure the populace.

With all of that said, I've gotta get back to my thesis writing. Please feel free to dissect and refute anything I've said:D.

v/r

Mike

[Hacksaw]

Disclaimor first

I'd like to clarify that my brief telling of the history behind the "Warrior" creed was meant to be informative rather than an endorsement... my only endorsement is that I thought the cumulative effect of the changes that resulted from the TF Soldier (to include the Warrior Creed) was positive....

Brandon... Rakasson (probably spelled that wrong, but what the hell)... Ironically it was the Deputy Commander that led TF Soldier...

WILF... In the end you are right (mostly)... however right or wrong - a Soldier does what a Soldier does out of necessity... sometimes that is non-kinetic operations to better secure the population that leads to improved intel to either kill or capture...

CPT Foley... there is nothing like a cocksure company grade officer (that's a compliment), but judging from your comments I'm thinking you are close to moving into the next phase of your career... and I can offer no better advise than to say the first rule is to understand you don't really understand anything... that can't lead to paralysis until you do reach that mythical situational awareness, only that there is value in considering that others may be right even when their views are in direct conflict with your own...

which brings us full circle... has the changes of TF Soldier (to include the Warrior Ethos) worked???

I think largely yes... while not a perfect set of solutions and open to improvements... and I have no idea whether non-combat arms Soldiers are more warrior-like in disposition... I do know that Soldiers, regardless of rank and specialty are far better prepared to achieve their mission in a hostile environment - and I think it insignificant that we use the term Warrior in a creed....

Now I'm done:D

[William F. Owen]

WILF... In the end you are right (mostly)... however right or wrong - a Soldier does what a Soldier does out of necessity... sometimes that is non-kinetic operations to better secure the population that leads to improved intel to either kill or capture...


Sir, I am in complete agreement and defer to your wisdom, good looks, alleged sexual prowess, and impeccable dress sense!

...turning to the right and falling out.... :D

[Hacksaw]

:DWell takes one to know one... fell out after posting

[CPT Foley]

Disclaimor first

I'd like to clarify that my brief telling of the history behind the "Warrior" creed was meant to be informative rather than an endorsement... my only endorsement is that I thought the cumulative effect of the changes that resulted from the TF Soldier (to include the Warrior Creed) was positive....

Brandon... Rakasson (probably spelled that wrong, but what the hell)... Ironically it was the Deputy Commander that led TF Soldier...

WILF... In the end you are right (mostly)... however right or wrong - a Soldier does what a Soldier does out of necessity... sometimes that is non-kinetic operations to better secure the population that leads to improved intel to either kill or capture...

CPT Foley... there is nothing like a cocksure company grade officer (that's a compliment), but judging from your comments I'm thinking you are close to moving into the next phase of your career... and I can offer no better advise than to say the first rule is to understand you don't really understand anything... that can't lead to paralysis until you do reach that mythical situational awareness, only that there is value in considering that others may be right even when their views are in direct conflict with your own...

which brings us full circle... has the changes of TF Soldier (to include the Warrior Ethos) worked???

I think largely yes... while not a perfect set of solutions and open to improvements... and I have no idea whether non-combat arms Soldiers are more warrior-like in disposition... I do know that Soldiers, regardless of rank and specialty are far better prepared to achieve their mission in a hostile environment - and I think it insignificant that we use the term Warrior in a creed....

Now I'm done:D

I will try to keep an open mind.

I found the article I referenced in my opening post. He makes his case much better than I.

http://usacac.army.mil/CAC/milreview/download/English/NovDec05/aylwin.pdf

[jenniferro10]

...they published this today: http://usacac.leavenworth.army.mil/BLOG/blogs/ctac/archive/2009/06/01/paleolithic-professional-military-education-lessons-learned-etc.aspx

[marct]

...they published this today: http://usacac.leavenworth.army.mil/BLOG/blogs/ctac/archive/2009/06/01/paleolithic-professional-military-education-lessons-learned-etc.aspx

Totally brilliant! You know, I think I may just use that in my class this fall :D!

As an FYI - here's one of the other ones
http://nerds.unl.edu/pages/preser/sec/articles/sabertooth.html

[CPT Foley]

...they published this today: http://usacac.leavenworth.army.mil/BLOG/blogs/ctac/archive/2009/06/01/paleolithic-professional-military-education-lessons-learned-etc.aspx

It is clever. "Quest for Fire" meets "Who Moved My Cheese."

[Surferbeetle]

But there is a very important job missing there. Essential services, law enforcement, elections, and defense are important. But what about standing up some shell of a government? If there is no government and no law, then what offices are you filling with your elections and what laws are the police enforcing? Without a local government, who is responsible for maintenance and standards of community property? I don't see any guidance for who is in the lead for standing up a government. State Dept maybe? I don't know. I didn't see any mention of it on this thread or the links provided. It would seem like something related to CMO, but that doesn't answer the question either.

FM 1-04, Legal Support to the Operational Army (Distribution Unlimited) gives some background on the JAG's role with respect to your question. Civil Affairs (https://rdl.train.army.mil/soldierPortal/atia/adlsc/view/public/9630-1/fm/3-07/chap3.htm#3) Rule of Law and Governance Teams (https://rdl.train.army.mil/soldierPortal/atia/adlsc/view/public/25221-1/FM/1-04/appe.htm) (Appendix E) are staffed by Functional Specialists (including lawyers - although the JAG Corps always brawls for those bodies) in these areas. Many/most of the CAT-A's are staffed by generalists (Army, Marine (http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/theprince2.pdf), & Navy)

With respect to Civilian Functional Specialists FM 3-07 Stability and Support Operations (Distribution Unlimited), Appendix F (https://rdl.train.army.mil/soldierPortal/atia/adlsc/view/public/9630-1/fm/3-07/appf.htm) speaks to PRT's and their role in Governance (Paragraphs F5, F6, & F7).

Imperial Life in the Emerald City: Inside Iraq's Green Zone by Rajiv Chandrasekaran. Haven't read it myself, but it may provide you some more insight on the CPA (https://rdl.train.army.mil/soldierPortal/atia/adlsc/view/public/9630-1/fm/3-07/chap5.htm) days...or not.

Gun toting diplomats (http://www.bragg.army.mil/sorb/SORB_CIVILAFFAIRS_WHAT%20IS%20CA.html) ? From the US Army's Special Operations Recruiting Battalion Webpage:


The remaining 96 percent of the Army’s Civil Affairs Forces are found in four Civil Affairs Commands, subordinate brigades and battalions in the Army Reserve. They provide a prime source of nation-building skills. These reserve-component Civil Affairs units include Soldiers with training and experience in public administration, public safety, public health, legal systems, labor management, public welfare, public finance, public education, civil defense, public works and utilities, public communications, public transportation, logistics, food and agricultural services, economics, property control, cultural affairs, civil information, and managing dislocated persons.

[Brandon Friedman]

IMHO the people that routinely participate in this forum have a higher than normal curiosity about the world around them and the events which impact their’s and other’s lives. The vast majority of people, however, tend to live within very narrowly focused world views. Politicians know this, in fact they rely upon it.

They do. That’s why it’s important for people like us--with our experience and military values--to actively involve ourselves in the political process. If you’re not willing to do that, then you’re conceding control of American defense policy to the people like you’ve described.


...they published this today: http://usacac.leavenworth.army.mil/BLOG/blogs/ctac/archive/2009/06/01/paleolithic-professional-military-education-lessons-learned-etc.aspx

That's a good piece. Part of the problem with inflexible leadership is that military leaders are never evaluated by their subordinates. So they’re never accountable to the troops they lead. I think this would help (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2009/04/irregular-warfare-and-adaptive/#comment-2889):


I've never understood why officers are officially evaluated primarily by their superiors, when it's their subordinates who really know whether or not they're effective. I've always wondered why the Army doesn't implement an evaluation program much like those administered in colleges and universities around the country--teacher evaluations. At the end of each semester, the professor leaves the room, the TA passes out the Scantron questionnaire forms with the extra sheet for comments, and the students fill them out anonymously. Then the forms go to the Dean. Why doesn't the military evaluate PLs, COs, and BCs like this? But instead of every soldier filling out the form, it would be answered by, say, only subordinate NCOs and officers.

I typed up my own forms and did this for one of my platoons at the end of my time, and it was the best, most honest feedback I ever received in the Army. If similar questionnaires on the other PLs had been passed up to my commander and the BC, they would've been able to better compare the effectiveness of their PLs.

To go along with that, Schmedlap also suggested peer reviews (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2009/04/irregular-warfare-and-adaptive/#comment-2890). This way, leaders who weren’t responsive to changing conditions would eventually be outed by their subordinates and, hopefully, not promoted into critical positions like the ones we’re talking about.

[Schmedlap]

Surferbeetle,

You provided some good info in that last post. Now my question is, where are those people? Where were they? If we have people tasked for the purpose of standing up a government, are they doing it? Were they trying in 2003? Were they even in theater? Are they now?

Assuming that we have properly identified the skill sets necessary to do this, and tasked the job appropriately (at least on paper), do we have nearly enough of these people to do the task that they have purportedly been given?

Somewhat related point - I think the real crux of the issue regarding whether we need to "train Soldiers for COIN" and also "train Soldiers for high-intensity operations" rather than "training them to operate across the full spectrum" is a debate that completely misses the point. The real crux of the issue is not just one of whether you can pack in a certain amount of knowledge and skills into one brain. Rather, it is a question of whether you can expect the average 19-year-old Soldier to adjust his mental and emotional state on the fly to operate across the full spectrum of operations. The average 19-year-old rifleman is intelligent, resourceful, and creative. He can learn the skills and apply the knowledge. But 19-year-old riflemen are generally not emotionally mature. They have a difficult time transitioning from close-quarters combat, where the interaction is an exchange of deadly force, to face-to-face non-lethal engagements where the interaction is an exchange of information. The real question should be, can we expect most Soldiers to operate effectively in this environment? (I think the answer is yes, but....) If so, for how long? If deployments were 4 to 6 months in length and units maintained a habitual relationship with their AOR (meaning you deploy to location X, redeploy and maintain dialed in to what is occurring in location X, then deploy again to location X, and so on) and we kept Soldiers at their duty stations for 5 or 6 years, rather than 3, then we would see much better results and there would be no more wondering about the counterproductive distraction known as the Nagl-Gentile debate.

[William F. Owen]

Somewhat related point - I think the real crux of the issue regarding whether we need to "train Soldiers for COIN" and also "train Soldiers for high-intensity operations" rather than "training them to operate across the full spectrum" is a debate that completely misses the point. The real crux of the issue is not just one of whether you can pack in a certain amount of knowledge and skills into one brain. Rather, it is a question of whether you can expect the average 19-year-old Soldier to adjust his mental and emotional state on the fly to operate across the full spectrum of operations.

Very much the point. This is the danger in the "COIN is not Warfare" approach that suggests that "in COIN" you do X and Y, instead of emphasising WHY things are done give an particular circumstance or condition, and this dependant on judgement. You want to provide a broad set of tools and education that is as widely applicable as possible. This is impossible in a culture that has become emotionally dependant fitting warfare into separate boxes.

[Brandon Friedman]

Somewhat related point - I think the real crux of the issue regarding whether we need to "train Soldiers for COIN" and also "train Soldiers for high-intensity operations" rather than "training them to operate across the full spectrum" is a debate that completely misses the point. The real crux of the issue is not just one of whether you can pack in a certain amount of knowledge and skills into one brain. Rather, it is a question of whether you can expect the average 19-year-old Soldier to adjust his mental and emotional state on the fly to operate across the full spectrum of operations. The average 19-year-old rifleman is intelligent, resourceful, and creative. He can learn the skills and apply the knowledge. But 19-year-old riflemen are generally not emotionally mature. They have a difficult time transitioning from close-quarters combat, where the interaction is an exchange of deadly force, to face-to-face non-lethal engagements where the interaction is an exchange of information. The real question should be, can we expect most Soldiers to operate effectively in this environment? (I think the answer is yes, but....) If so, for how long? If deployments were 4 to 6 months in length and units maintained a habitual relationship with their AOR (meaning you deploy to location X, redeploy and maintain dialed in to what is occurring in location X, then deploy again to location X, and so on) and we kept Soldiers at their duty stations for 5 or 6 years, rather than 3, then we would see much better results and there would be no more wondering about the counterproductive distraction known as the Nagl-Gentile debate.

This is spot on. One solution I've kicked around would be to focus unit training on kinetic, force-on-force engagements--as we've always done. At the same time, create a 10-week, stateside, permanent, counterinsurgent course focused on basic language instruction, customs, regional negotiation tactics, etc.

You send all junior combat arms officers through the course after OBC and you send E-4s and above when you can get them there. One of the primary purposes of Ranger School is that you train these guys from across the Army, and then sprinkle them evenly throughout combat units, so that no infantry platoon is without at least one or two Ranger-qualified soldiers. These soldiers, then, are supposed to be the ones who pass on mental toughness, confidence, and expertise (the ability to march while sleeping, I guess?:rolleyes:).

By setting up a course like this, you wouldn't have to spend time training every young soldier on the tenets of COIN while he's just trying to learn how to fight and how to use the 240 and the ANCD (if we still use those). Let the leaders in each platoon handle the counterinsurgency. (Because realistically, how often do 19-year-old riflemen need to interact and exchange information? That's a job for NCOs and officers and, fortunately, with the exception of maybe checkpoints, there's usually an E-5 or above present in most situations.) This way, COIN becomes ingrained in combat units, while they focus their unit training on shooting, moving, communicating, and fighting.

This would be expensive and excessively time-consuming, but when nature builds a better mousetrap, you have to become a better mouse. We have to be able to do both.

[Ken White]

I also know a few people of diverse ranks and ages who have the same problem. I have a Sister in Law, former schoolteacher who insists 19 year olds today are equal to 16 year olds of 30 years ago. She may be right but if so, no worries; I've seen a lot of then 16 year olds pass for 18, go to war and do okay -- and I mean do okay in shifting gears up and down the spectrum of combat and that to an extent few have seen recently.

Generally, if you tell people they can do something, they'll do it -- tell them you don't think they can and they'll do that; act as if their attempting to do it makes you nervous and that will make them nervous. Treat 19 year olds like children and they'll continue to act like them. You have to force them to grow up quickly; it is not that hard to do.

Everyone has difficulty transitioning from CQB to seemingly friendly interchanges for information; or, more correctly, that transition ability is not age specific -- it's person specific and some do it better than others. Know your people...

All that is idle comment -- point is; Our training is marginal. If we better trained at initial entry, Officer and Enlisted, we could eliminate a lot of this conjecture. It would be nice if in that training, we treated both as if they were more mature than they may be; people tend to rise to expectations. Do that and we will have no problem with full spectrum operations. The US Army trained for it before, successfully IMO, no reason they cannot do so again. That seems particularly so given the increased quality of troops today versus then...

We do need to stop the excessive PCS and we need to scrap up or out. We also should stop running decent kids off for minor disciplinary infractions. Schmedlap's tour idea is good; a year is a long stint and sending units to different AOs in succeeding rotations during operations like Afghanistan and Iraq is just tactically stupid -- the modular effort is great but there's a time and place.

[Ken White]

At the same time, create a 10-week, stateside, permanent, counterinsurgent course focused on basic language instruction, customs, regional negotiation tactics, etc.What language? Whose customs?

[reed11b]

I
All that is idle comment -- point is; Our training is marginal. If we better trained at initial entry, Officer and Enlisted, we could eliminate a lot of this conjecture. It would be nice if in that training, we treated both as if they were more mature than they may be; people tend to rise to expectations. Do that and we will have no problem with full spectrum operations. The US Army trained for it before, successfully IMO, no reason they cannot do so again. That seems particularly so given the increased quality of troops today versus then...

We do need to stop the excessive PCS and we need to scrap up or out. We also should stop running decent kids off for minor disciplinary infractions. Schmedlap's tour idea is good; a year is a long stint and sending units to different AOs in succeeding rotations during operations like Afghanistan and Iraq is just tactically stupid -- the modular effort is great but there's a time and place.
Agreed, I also feel that after intial training, most training should be unit based. That "Ranger" example eluded to earlier has always steamed me a bit. Do it as a unit and you get a unit, with the sense of team spirit and cooperation only improved. Do it as individuals and individuals you will get; and individuals make poor soldiers and TEAM members. Just my sleep deprived 2 cents.

Reed

[Bill Moore]

Posted by Wilf,
Very much the point. This is the danger in the "COIN is not Warfare" approach that suggests that "in COIN" you do X and Y, instead of emphasising WHY things are done give an particular circumstance or condition, and this dependant on judgement. You want to provide a broad set of tools and education that is as widely applicable as possible. This is impossible in a culture that has become emotionally dependant fitting warfare into separate boxes.

Excellent post, and you identified the words I have been looking for. Ken also hit the nail on the head in another forum where he discussed the Army's training down fall when it started adapting training methods from industry, which was check the block training on each task. If you put the right hand guard on first you get a no go, if you don't tie a perfect square knot on your pressure dressing you get a no go, and of course both of the requirements were no value added, but everyone had to waste time to learn how to respond like a robot instead of a thinking person. Even Specail Forces adapted this stupid training methodology. Old timers cringed, I wasn't experienced enough at the time to see the danger in the methodology, but I see it clearly now. During that transition period, many of our officers spent more time reading and quoting the latest business books (management fads) than they spent studying war fighting. I can see how we got to the point where we couldn't transition to changing environments well over the years. Hopefully those days are long behind us.

Posted by Reed,
Agreed, I also feel that after intial training, most training should be unit based. That "Ranger" example eluded to earlier has always steamed me a bit. Do it as a unit and you get a unit, with the sense of team spirit and cooperation only improved. Do it as individuals and individuals you will get; and individuals make poor soldiers and TEAM members.

Good point Reed, although I'm not sure what you do with the 50% of the unit that can't make Ranger school, but we do need more very tough unit level training. I still think JRTC and NTC are excellent training venues for units. The Army did good when they stood up these training centers. I haven't been through a rotation in recent years, so I can't speak to their effectiveness now, but it is an excellent concept.

[Brandon Friedman]

What language? Whose customs?

No idea. I mean, it's an important question that would have to be worked out. Fortunately, there's a lot of overlap--as in, Muslim culture has similarities from Indonesia to Morocco. Also, because we don't start new conflicts every year, we could target relevant regions for languages. For instance, we're not leaving Afghanistan or Iraq any time soon, so you could start with Arabic and the Persian languages. But it would likely have to also include a random mix of languages and customs (like Somali, Korean, Urdu, etc.)--that is, unless the Army went along with Schmedlap and started PCS'ing people every five or six years and sending units back to the same places. In that case, you could really target soldiers for regions.

Bottom line, I don't know. It's just an idea. I just think that having half a dozen trained and qualified counterinsurgents in each platoon would alleviate a lot of this debate on "fighting" versus "COIN."

[Schmedlap]

By setting up a course like this, you wouldn't have to spend time training every young soldier on the tenets of COIN while he's just trying to learn how to fight and how to use the 240 and the ANCD (if we still use those).
I think this has been what Ken has specifically argued against repeatedly. Part of learning how to use one's weapon and how to move as a member of a fire team, et cetera (all of those "skills" that are trained) is also learning how to apply those skills in different situations. In other words, you shouldn't separate training into COIN and high intensity. And, by extension, there is no need to teach "tenets of COIN" to the rifleman or the platoon leader. Just train them to apply force as a unit, how to increase or decrease as necessary, and why.

Here's an example. When I was a platoon leader in Bosnia, we never got into a firefight. We never expected to, either. Nonetheless, when my Soldiers entered a building/room, they still took up their points of domination or otherwise arrayed themselves in a tactical manner. That way, if a situation arose, they could immediately respond. That does not mean that they did a stack before moving through a door or moved with their weapons at the low ready. Their movement was casual. I suspect that none of the Bosnians had any idea that my Soldiers were actually arrayed in a manner straight out of a CTC handbook on urban fighting. But my Soldiers did remain cognizant of where they should be at all times and what sectors they were responsible for - as opposed to some units that viewed SOSO as something distinct from "warfighting" (rather than two ends of a continuum of operations) and just kind of milled about in a gaggle wherever they went. The same principles of movement as a member of a fire team applied. The form that the movement took differed only in the tempo and level of aggression. No need for two separate sets of training - clearing a building in high intensity and clearing in low intensity. Just teach how to clear, methods of breaching, et cetera, make sure Soldiers know the "why" for all of those considerations and they can operate in Bosnia or Iraq, peacekeeping or invasion, COIN or industrial war.

[CPT Foley]

What language? Whose customs?

I see your point, there are hundreds, maybe thousands of languages and cultures to choose from, and it's hard two determine where conflicts will emerge in six years. Very true. I think it's less about turning our Soldiers into cultural/language experts than to giving them enough cultural/lang. info to be more effective. I have been working on Arabic now for 5 years and am convinced I have the linguistic capabilities of a wombat. Doesn't look like I'm on the expert path. It's much easier to recruit experts than develop them. But I do think it's really worth giving our troops the culture/lang. 101 & 102. Most of our troops are very conscientious. If we let them know that learning 50 key phrases in the dominant language in their AO will make them exponentially most effective - and safer - they will embrace it. We do it now to a certain degree, but with a lack of emphasis. It's like another crummy online class we have to complete. Not something vital to our efforts.

Not to make group members pound the table and scare their family at breakfast, but I always felt we missed a big opportunity in Iraq to leverage the huge amount of Iraqi civilian workers (tens of thousands) on our bases. It's not hard to imagine an Iraqi worker at home listening to the extended family members debating how bad Americans are, how we should help with IEDs, etc., and have the worker say, "they seem like very good people. The men at the gate always say "ahlan wa shalan" when I come. The people who work in my building always say "salaam alaikum" and "shloon alahal" when they see me. The man I work for insisted I take some sweets home for the children. When I told him Yasin was sick he gave me aspirin. He insists I take a breaks for salat. They are good people. They are here to help."

Ok, "OIF the Musical" written by Frank Capra IV has gotta hurt your head. Especially for those used to dodging bullets. But I want to be clear. I understand we still need to kill, capture, interrogate, intimidate, use force, etc., etc., - so please don't make it a hard vs soft choice. We can do both. But I think the benefits of having our troops actively trying foster an great PR image would be a force multiplier. We are losing the IO battle to people who cut off peoples heads with dull rusty knives. But we don't have to. I realize most of our IO problems originate from the strategic level, but that doesn't mean we shouldn't maximize our opportunities at the operational level.

[selil]

What language? Whose customs?

I'd suggest Klingon, with smatterings of Romulan. Now before y'all get your backs up and protest.

Isn't the idea to teach principles rather than specifics?

Don't you want soldiers to be able to operate in ANY environment rather than a singular environment?

From my perspective as a "group" military establishments have a tendency to hold to silos of knowledge with the tenacity of drowning children. Some things need behaviorist (lock-step) automaton responses. This oozing social stuff though should be taught as principles and strategies, so says the technologist who doesn't go outside very often.

[goesh]

Warrior ethos - the ability of an individual to subjugate his emotional and physical pain to the well being of his unit and the chain of command. We have reached a point in our social evolution that outside of SF units, this is about impossible to achieve because the rights of the individual almost equal the rights of the collective. We compensate by trying to have smart soldiers with lots of technology at their disposal.

[William F. Owen]

I'd suggest Klingon, with smatterings of Romulan. Now before y'all get your backs up and protest.

Isn't the idea to teach principles rather than specifics?

Don't you want soldiers to be able to operate in ANY environment rather than a singular environment?



Don't forget Borg! - well 7of9 (http://images.google.com/imgres?imgurl=http://reparts.org/FL/content/7of9/big/7of9_1.jpg&imgrefurl=http://reparts.org/FL/engine/show.php%3Ffile%3D7of9/index.dat%26title%3D7of9%2520gallery&usg=__yuxzAZmCV7aY__kWkGiz9OsoaHA=&h=768&w=1024&sz=100&hl=en&start=4&um=1&tbnid=msea7afzDSGr-M:&tbnh=113&tbnw=150&prev=/images%3Fq%3D7of9%26imgsz%3Dxxlarge%26hl%3Den%26rl z%3D1G1GGLQ_ENIL316%26sa%3DN%26um%3D1) anyway.
...but what you say is exactly correct and the silliness of the Combined Arms boys still using Soviet threat models, speaks to this, but not in a useful way.

[Surferbeetle]

Now my question is, where are those people? Where were they? If we have people tasked for the purpose of standing up a government, are they doing it? Were they trying in 2003? Were they even in theater? Are they now?

Assuming that we have properly identified the skill sets necessary to do this, and tasked the job appropriately (at least on paper), do we have nearly enough of these people to do the task that they have purportedly been given?

Schmedlap,

Google Links for On Point

link (http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2004/onpoint/)

…and On Point II

link (http://www.cfr.org/publication/16692/on_point_ii.html)


The U.S. Army's Combat Studies Institute describes this report as the "US Army's first historical study of its campaign in Iraq in the decisive eighteen months following the overthrow of the Baathist regime in April 2003." It "examines both the high-level decisions that shaped military operations after May 2003 as well as the effects of those decisions on units and Soldiers who became responsible for conducting those operations".

These are very large documents and I have only sampled portions of them, however this would be a starting point from an official standpoint.

JFQ has an article on Civil Affairs manning (http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Press/jfq_pages/editions/i43/17%20JFQ43%20Florig.pdf)

From a personal standpoint, Civil Affairs needs more troops...

[Steve Blair]

You can also get the On Point series from CSI. link (http://cgsc.leavenworth.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/csi.asp)

They're both PDF and a heck of a haul on anything other than DSL or something equally fast.

[Ken White]

No idea. I mean, it's an important question that would have to be worked out.There are also other problems...
Fortunately, there's a lot of overlap--as in, Muslim culture has similarities from Indonesia to Morocco.If you believe the cultures of Indonesia and Morocco have much in common, you need to travel more. Afghanistan and Iraq are far more closely located and they're two totally different cultures. Plus, who says the issues will occur in Muslim areas.

I spent 45 years training or helping others to train for a land war in Europe. Never been there but I've eaten a whole lot of rice on many occasions in several nations over a good part of those years...
Also, because we don't start new conflicts every year, we could target relevant regions for languages. For instance, we're not leaving Afghanistan or Iraq any time soon, so you could start with Arabic and the Persian languages.During the Viet Nam unpleasantness, we trained people to speak Viet Namese -- then sent a lot of them to work with Montagnards who did not speak Viet Namese. I have visions of Dari speakers playing with Urdu speakers -- or Arabic speakers. :D
But it would likely have to also include a random mix of languages and customs (like Somali, Korean, Urdu, etc.)That doesn't address the personnel turbulence issue -- US Army units typically rotate about 20-30% of strength annually, thus your Dari speaker goes on PCS to Korea. We may improve on the turbulence and we should but it will still affect your proposal.
...that is, unless the Army went along with Schmedlap and started PCS'ing people every five or six years and sending units back to the same places. In that case, you could really target soldiers for regions.That's the point -- do not target soldiers for regions, that will in any implementation fragment units. Units are very important even though the US Army due to a 1917 derived personnel system consistently refuses to recognize that. Individuals are trained to be a part of a unit; Reed and Schmedlap are right, once you get an individual trained to be a competent soldier, he or she goes to a unit and that unit trains to do its job; COIN or MCO, the differences in what that unit does are relatively minor. How well -- or poorly -- it performs is largely a function of its leadership (the collective).

You have to train Units for their job; the effort should be toward generic training with occasional forays into specialized training for various environments. For deployment to specific areas, Training Packages, tailored to echelon (Plat/Co; Bn/Bde; Div/TF/JTF) with language and cultural stuff and structured for rapid learning are used. Those package have to offer EXTRA information and guidance for NCO leaders, for Co Officers and for senior commanders (and their vastly oversized staffs). The Packages must contain not only cultural and custom information but also should be very current politically and culturally -- that currency would not be present in a School course; I spent seven years in TRADOC and they do not do current...

Well, not very well, anyway. :(
Bottom line, I don't know. It's just an idea.Nothing wrong with ideas, the more the better. However, in the end, the Army has to settle on ideas that are effective (not that it always does...); training individuals for specific locations faces the difficulties of which locations and how much training coupled with when and where those individuals are assigned. The bureaucracy doesn't handle those aspects at all well. The probability is that an excessive amount of training will be given on areas an individual never sees -- or that is dated and no longer relevant.
I just think that having half a dozen trained and qualified counterinsurgents in each platoon would alleviate a lot of this debate on "fighting" versus "COIN."I suggest that it would merely move that debate into the Platoon that had a half dozen 'counterinsurgents.' The Platoon should be focused as a unit on its job -- which can be performed in all spectrums of combat.

The key to that transition ability is well trained and competent leaders. For a variety of reasons, some valid, some specious, we do not address that fact as well as we should.

You mentioned Ranger School and the 'philosophy' of having Ranger trained folks scattered through out the Army to sort of stiffen everyone. Good theory; in practice it doesn't work. Nor does Ranger School develop superior combat leaders -- it is too short and too intense; too much important stuff has to be left out. What Ranger School does accomplish is teaching future leaders that they're tougher and can do more than they might think. That's a big plus and is applicable in any spectrum of conflict. I can see no pluses in a Counterinsurgency School that would be short, intense and leave too much out.

OTOH, if 'counterinsurgency' techniques which are universal were simply embedded in ALL training as it was at one time...

It ain't that hard.

[Ken White]

I'd suggest Klingon, with smatterings of Romulan. Now before y'all get your backs up and protest.

Isn't the idea to teach principles rather than specifics?

Don't you want soldiers to be able to operate in ANY environment rather than a singular environment?That sums it up rather nicely. Full spectrum simply means just that. Soldiers don't pick the environment, politics do. :rolleyes:

Good job. You can have Sunday off... :D

[marct]

Isn't the idea to teach principles rather than specifics?....
From my perspective as a "group" military establishments have a tendency to hold to silos of knowledge with the tenacity of drowning children. Some things need behaviorist (lock-step) automaton responses. This oozing social stuff though should be taught as principles and strategies, so says the technologist who doesn't go outside very often.

LOL - are you trying to completely change the worldview of TRADOC :D?

Seriously, I do agree with you that it should be taught as principles, although I'm not so sure about "strategies" (I'd need some clarification on what you mean by that in terms of training).

One of the most effective cultural training systems was, oddly enough, the Roman system in the 2nd century and, again, in the 4th century. The vast majority of "principles" were only "taught" to the centurianate and the tribunate, but there was an extensive use of exempla - "stories" - that were used to teach the legionnaires. On the whole, both the 2nd and 4th century systems worked pretty well for their environment (the 3rd and the 5th are another matter :rolleyes:).

It should be possible to modify the 2nd century version - its weaknesses are not really apropos to today's environment (mainly that it encouraged the local revolt of generals once the imperial inheritance system of the Silver Age went down the tubes). The key to that system was to valorize innovative study of specific situations and inductively derive "lessons learned". This was encouraged by the shear number of exempla, stretching back over 1000 years. The final end product of this system, at least in terms of cultural training / education, can be seen in Maurice's Strategikon.

[Bill Moore]

The debate about language training has been ongoing in SF for years. How much time to dedicate to it, what combat training do you drop so you can conduct language training, what languages do we train on, etc.

It should be no surprise that there are several schools of thought in SF on this important topic, but of course the guy who has the most stars on his chest tends to carry the day on what school of thought is implemented. :)

A couple of thoughts on the topic that may be worth considering:

1. During the Cold War it wasn't unusual to have SF teams (ODAs) where everyone on the team spoke the same language, whether Polish, Russian, Chinese, etc., so just in case the ballon went up and we went to war they could deploy to that locale which they studied and conduct their mission (assuming they survived infiltration). IMO no argument, language was a critical capability for this mission set. You're not going to hire interpreters in a denied area.

2. Over the past 20 our so years (and there are still exceptions) teams general have Soldiers who speak different foreign languages. Not only does it make it tougher to manage training, but also is this really a warfighting or IW capability? If Joe speaks Urdu, and Bill speaks Korean, and John speaks Arabic, does Joe become an interpreter for the team when their in Afghanistan, or does he still focus on his main job (medic, engineer, team leader, weapons, etc.)? Or is just a guy on the team who has a relevant language for "this" mission.

3. For conventional forces I imagine the problems will be even more challenging, and as Ken states we rarely know where we're going, and in many countries they speak more than one language. I believe has at least 12 major languages for example. Even in long drawn out wars like OIF and Vietnam, which are somewhat predictable, we don't always get it right. There was at least one unit that recently was scheduled to go to OIF, and was diverted at the 11th hour to go to OEF-A. The Cdr being proactive and someone who gets the COIN fight, sent several of his Soldiers to Arabic language training, now they're going to Afghanistan. I'm not arguing that was a waste, but dedicating time and resources to language training (except for head start type train ups) involves some degree of risk. You're giving up other training venues in exchange for language training, so it is important to weigh that risk and not blindly go down the road that everyone needs to be a linguist. Not to mention it is a perishable skill, so it is the gift that keeps on giving.

4. For SF and for officers in general, I think it is valuable to learn a language in the training pipeline because it does make you more aware of other cultures, so there are benefits that are not necessarily tangible. If you simply realize that words represent concepts and shape the way you think, and that not everyone uses the English language, then you're one step ahead, even if you're a Korean speaker working in Afghanistan.

No recommendations at this time, just a caution to avoid thinking that language training for the GPF will solve the majority of our FID and COIN deficiencies. It is all about finding the right balance, which means conducting realistic risk assessments.

[Ken White]

SF need language capability and cultural knowledge -- and, as you say, there are several approaches on how, precisely, to do that. As you also point out, the vagaries of a change in command can undo a great deal of precision. Plans and priorities change, as do people... :o

The SF Troop is the FID/ SFA expert and hopefully will get in there, do his thing and preclude the need for the GPF to have to try -- poorly -- to do SF work. If the GPF have to go in and augment the SF effort or expand it considerably, everyone should understand that they will always only do a marginal job. That will generally be adequate but only rarely will they really do it well.

That's okay, it isn't their job. There's a very valid reason for the difference in structure, rank and specialties between an SF ODA and a Rifle Company and that means neither can really do the work of the other, their expertise and construction are designed for different things -- all of us should remember that, remember to use the right tool for the job and also remember "best is the enemy of good enough."

[selil]

One of the most effective cultural training systems was, oddly enough, the Roman system in the 2nd century and, again, in the 4th century. The vast majority of "principles" were only "taught" to the centurianate and the tribunate, but there was an extensive use of exempla - "stories" - that were used to teach the legionnaires. On the whole, both the 2nd and 4th century systems worked pretty well for their environment (the 3rd and the 5th are another matter :rolleyes:).

Would you believe that is how I teach? I was originally exposed to the principle as an undergraduate and the linkage between "stories" and socratic method.

When I said strategies earlier methods might have been a better word. "How to" adapt, change, meet mission requirements. Fusion rather than fission?

[marct]

Hi Sam,


Would you believe that is how I teach? I was originally exposed to the principle as an undergraduate and the linkage between "stories" and socratic method.

LOLOL - it's how I teach too - at least when it is possible.


When I said strategies earlier methods might have been a better word. "How to" adapt, change, meet mission requirements. Fusion rather than fission?

Ah, okay. That is a really good place to use exempla, so you can show how people at different times and in different places did it, but all based around a similar principle.

[William F. Owen]

One of the most effective cultural training systems was, oddly enough, the Roman system in the 2nd century and, again, in the 4th century. The vast majority of "principles" were only "taught" to the centurianate and the tribunate, but there was an extensive use of exempla - "stories" - that were used to teach the legionnaires. On the whole, both the 2nd and 4th century systems worked pretty well for their environment (the 3rd and the 5th are another matter :rolleyes:).


That there, my old beaver worrier, is gold dust. Excellent point and many thanks!

[Umar Al-Mokhtār]

If you’re not willing to do that, then you’re conceding control of American defense policy to the people like you’ve described.

From where I sit, I have more control over Defense policy then most elected officials. Which is in a way scary.

As to politics, with my checkered past, were I to run for high office, the press would have a field day. :wry:

[marct]

That there, my old beaver worrier, is gold dust. Excellent point and many thanks!

Thanks, Wilf. A fair number of the Canadian and, I would assume, British regiments had a similar system. I got it from both sides of my family :rolleyes:.

On another note, I'm thinking of changing my avatar.... What do you think, Wilf?
http://tradingcardshack.com/photogallery/Beaver.jpg

[Ken White]

Beavers 'in' the Prairie? Now there's a sight to see... :wry:

[marct]

Beavers 'in' the Prairie? Now there's a sight to see... :wry:

Hey, what can I say? We outsourced the instruction manual to Japan :D!

[Brandon Friedman]

There are also other problems...If you believe the cultures of Indonesia and Morocco have much in common, you need to travel more. Afghanistan and Iraq are far more closely located and they're two totally different cultures. Plus, who says the issues will occur in Muslim areas.

I didn't say the cultures were the same. I said there was a lot of overlap. That is, an understanding of the Quran is the common thread through which soldiers could communicate with locals from Marrakesh to Jakarta. And you can't underestimate the importance of that in a Muslim nation.


During the Viet Nam unpleasantness, we trained people to speak Viet Namese -- then sent a lot of them to work with Montagnards who did not speak Viet Namese. I have visions of Dari speakers playing with Urdu speakers -- or Arabic speakers. :DThat doesn't address the personnel turbulence issue -- US Army units typically rotate about 20-30% of strength annually, thus your Dari speaker goes on PCS to Korea. We may improve on the turbulence and we should but it will still affect your proposal.That's the point -- do not target soldiers for regions, that will in any implementation fragment units.

Maybe. But then perhaps the focus of a 10-week course that includes language instruction should be on not only learning the basics of a single language, but on absorbing the principle of the importance of learning a foreign language. Maybe the point is to stress the importance of learning the local language--and to put it on par with other military skills. It's not like anyone is going to graduate from a 10-week course with any fluency anyway. The biggest problem facing U.S. forces on the ground is the inability to communicate in any meaningful way with civilians on the battlefield. Perhaps I don't have the ultimate solution, but I know very well what the problem is.


I suggest that it would merely move that debate into the Platoon that had a half dozen 'counterinsurgents.' The Platoon should be focused as a unit on its job -- which can be performed in all spectrums of combat.

Does that mean requiring one member of the platoon to have a degree causes a debate over the value of a college education in implementing infantry tactics? Does it mean that having 2-3 members of the platoon being Ranger-qualified causes an internal debate over whether all soldiers should be tabbed? And not every soldier is CLS-qualified, right? My point is that there's no issue with having a handful of soldiers in a platoon specially trained and qualified to think or act in a certain way.

[Ken White]

...And you can't underestimate the importance of that in a Muslim nation.No but you can overestimate it. I lived in the Middle East, on the economy for two years and traveled broadly there; lot of myths about the area and the locals are quite adept at using Islam to gain what they want.
...but on absorbing the principle of the importance of learning a foreign language.That's one opinion, many agree with it -- many do not. The issue is will that occur; those attending learning that?
Maybe the point is to stress the importance of learning the local language--and to put it on par with other military skills. It's not like anyone is going to graduate from a 10-week course with any fluency anyway.I think your second point is quite accurate; and I agree -- so why bother? I believe the first point to be incorrect at least if not borderline dangerous; precipitated on one brief experience and aimed at a scenario that may not be repeated in our lifetimes.
The biggest problem facing U.S. forces on the ground is the inability to communicate in any meaningful way with civilians on the battlefield. Perhaps I don't have the ultimate solution, but I know very well what the problem is.We can disagree on that. I'd say the biggest problem is marginal training in basic skills -- which should include dealing with civilians in combat zones of all types, not just FID missions.

I also suggest you may be fighting the last war -- lot of that about...;)
Does that mean requiring one member of the platoon to have a degree causes a debate over the value of a college education in implementing infantry tactics?Not really. Lots of platoons do not have that one member requiring a degree and they work as well or better than many who do have that person. A College degree is not required to be quite expert at Infantry tactics.
Does it mean that having 2-3 members of the platoon being Ranger-qualified causes an internal debate over whether all soldiers should be tabbed?No but it does usually give rise to Ranger jokes... :D

There are also many platoons that do not have 2-3 Rangers or even one. Some of them do better than those Platoons that do have some Rangers. All Rangers, just like every other category of humans, are not equal. I've met some real losers with a tab.
And not every soldier is CLS-qualified, right? My point is that there's no issue with having a handful of soldiers in a platoon specially trained and qualified to think or act in a certain way.I don't disagree with that. I'm just pretty well convinced that the training you suggest will not qualify any soldiers for much of anything -- just as Ranger School does not qualify anyone for much of anything -- and I'm pretty sure based on watching soldiers for some time that such training emphatically will not make them act in a certain way -- that's simply a leadership issue. I also suggest that certain way will be extremely difficult to tailor or orient in a brief course, has rather narrow applicability and may not be required.

If extra training time is made available, it would be far better spent giving Soldier -- and Lieutenants -- a better grounding in the basics of the trade.

[Brandon Friedman]

There are also many platoons that do not have 2-3 Rangers or even one. Some of them do better than those Platoons that do have some Rangers. All Rangers, just like every other category of humans, are not equal. I've met some real losers with a tab.

That's God's honest truth right there.

[Schmedlap]

I'm just pretty well convinced that the training you suggest will not qualify any soldiers for much of anything -- just as Ranger School does not qualify anyone for much of anything -- and I'm pretty sure based on watching soldiers for some time that such training emphatically will not make them act in a certain way -- that's simply a leadership issue. I also suggest that certain way will be extremely difficult to tailor or orient in a brief course, has rather narrow applicability and may not be required.

If extra training time is made available, it would be far better spent giving Soldier -- and Lieutenants -- a better grounding in the basics of the trade.
Yup. What do useful courses (airborne, jumpmaster, HALO, scuba, etc) have in common? They teach a specific skill; generally one geared to a piece of equipment or a specific set of techniques that would be prohibitively expensive or likely result in unnecessary death if the introductory training occurred at the unit. Other courses, like Ranger School and Air Assault exist out of nostalgia and as overpriced and overhyped gut checks (why is it that everyone at "air assault" does about 15,000 overhead claps and a 12-mile road march?). The only thing of training value that Ranger School provides, imo, is a concentrated couple weeks of small unit leader training that should occur at the unit or in OBC, but, for some reason, doesn't. We called it IOBC 2 (well, we called it a lot of things, but that one seems most relevant here).

In many ways, the degree of importance of Ranger School for Infantry Officers detracted from other training (at least when I was in IOBC, prior to 9/11). IOBC was nothing but a 4-month pre-pre-Ranger. Pre-Ranger was 2 to 3 weeks of the stupidity that one would endure in the first 2 to 3 weeks of Ranger School. Ranger School - at least once you got halfway through Darby phase - was several weeks of what we should have been doing for several months in IOBC, except you got treated like a moron (lots of "smoke" sessions in the first few weeks intended purely to make the most mentally weak people quit). Rather than training Lieutenants themselves, I know a lot of battalion commanders relied on the tab or no-tab screening process (I think this has since subsided a little bit). I think that I would prefer to train my own leaders.

The school provides debatable value as a vetting process. In theory, I don't want a guy who just flat out quits Ranger School because he is tired or cold or hungry. In practice, of course, you get some duds who manage to graduate and some quality leaders who flunk out because they lose in the game of RI roulette. So the vetting value has lots collateral damage if the school is taken too seriously; kind of like a test that gives 20% false positives. Ranger School has since changed - I graduated from the last hard class - hopefully some of the changes have been for the better.

[Ken White]

We really don't do the training piece as well as we can. Agree with all you say and would only add that many military skills are cognitive skills -- as is a second (or more) language -- and, once taught, if you don't use it you lose it. That's why the practical effort schools teach skills that are incorporated in training or vice versa.

Schools need to be focused on subjects or tasks that are routinely embedded in all training. Teaching the esoteric and nice to have stuff that cannot or will not be routinely trained and reinforced can offer jobs for people and justify another bureaucracy -- it will rarely if ever contribute to combat capability. It will become just another block to be checked...

I went to Monterey for Farsi, one year course. Went to Iran and used it -- didn't prepare me to talk to the many Arabs and Kurds I interfaced with on that tour. Or with all the Iraniha who wanted to practice their English. Came back to the States and within two years had lost virtually all of the limited language skill I once had.

[Schmedlap]

Yup. I would also add that I am no fan of the "subject matter expert" trend that I began to see before I ETS'd. It seemed that we were sending guys off to school for everything under the sun and they were to be the SME's for the company upon their return (small arms master gunner, combatives, Javelin trainer, various commo courses, etc). It was a delegation of training responsibility from the unit leaders to whomever went off to attend the courses. The end result was leaders who didn't care about being proficient because they didn't need to train their men. And lacking sufficient knowledge themselves, they did worse and worse jobs of supervising training because they had no idea what was going on.

It is one thing to have a duty position or highly technical and critical additional duty with special schooling - jumpmaster, tank or Bradley master gunner, for examples. But small arms master gunner? That was certainly "A" way to quickly disseminate new uniform standards for boresighting, zeroing, and qualifying with the slew of new gadgets that we attached to our weapons. But some units were making this into a quasi-duty position (it may have become the norm since then). Within a span of months, I saw the SMMG go from "the guy who attended the course" to being tasked with company SMMG as an additional duty and a bullet point on an NCOER to the SMMG actually being put in the HQ section along with the Bradley MG. He was responsible for supervising skill level 1 tasks and coordinating training that is about as safe and uncomplicated as it gets (25-meter ranges, qualification, etc). Unsurprisingly, I know of more than one 1SG who had laser aiming devices on their weapons that were never boresighted and often did not even have batteries in them.

[Ken White]

is an absolute no-no -- but that's exactly what the SME bit has fostered.

I was at the Armor School when the Master Gunner was invented. A number of us thought it was a terrible idea for all the reasons you cite and pointed out that too many TCs, PLs and Co Cdrs would abrogate their gunnery skills. The civilian educational bureaucracy won that battle on two totally inane points; It was industry 'best practice' and it was akin to the 'Instructor Pilot' of the Aviation community. :rolleyes:

Pointing out that civilian best practice was totally not germane and that Tanks weren't helicopters didn't sway them. In fairness, one thing that aided their cause was that the incoming M1 and its high tech goodies ran smack into the tail of McNamara's Project 100,000 and sub standard recruits. Those folks are long gone; today's troops are a whole lot more capable -- but we're still using techniques that were marginal applied to their less competent predecessors.

Old habits die hard...

Our chaotic training system needs to die.

Added: Re: the 1SGs. Those guys should be the trainers for the Company / Battery / Troop. Theoretically, they're the most experienced guys in the unit. I've seen some that refused to be the chief clerk; refused to be the Cdr's shadow and worked at training troops -- most of those few did a superb job and had good units. Too many are willing to sit and fester. They rarely have good units

[yamiyugikun]

While I am a civilian and know little about the "warrior ethos," I've always thought warrior ethos was a spiritual approach to dealing with difficulties in life. I think that perhaps "warrior ethos" developed from the ancient codes of chivalry in medieval Europe. Orders of chivalry in England were the Order of the Garter, Order of the Thistle, and Order of the Bath. A Royal Navy captain or army general was generally admitted into one of those Orders, or given a peerage, elevated to the rank of a lord if he achieved a notable victory. From my understanding, the medals of bravery that General Washington gave during the American Revolution seemed to have come from this European tradition of Orders and medals. Just my thoughts on the possible history and roots of "warrior ethos," at least here in the West.

Naomi

[Uboat509]

Maybe it's because I come from a combat arms background, or maybe it's because I am a registered cynic but I have never seen the point of all this "warrior" stuff. It reminds of those cheesy corporate motivational posters that one sees around office buildings, an eagle soaring majestically in a clear blue sky with the caption "vision", or a colony of ants building a nest with the caption "teamwork." It may be interesting for about the first fifteen minutes after it goes up but then it just fades into the background and becomes little more than decoration. I don't believe for a second that changing PLDC to the "Warrior Leaders Course" or making Joe memorize the "Warrior Creed" has turned anyone into a warrior. The goal was admirable, model it after the Marine Corps where every Marine is an infantryman first and whatever job second. But the Marine Corps is an entirely different culture from top to bottom. Trying to recreate that culture across the board in the Army is just beating your head against a wall. I don't worry about the Warrior Ethos having a negative effect on the Army simply because I don't really expect it to have any effect at all.

SFC W

[slapout9]

Maybe it's because I come from a combat arms background, or maybe it's because I am a registered cynic but I have never seen the point of all this "warrior" stuff. It reminds of those cheesy corporate motivational posters that one sees around office buildings, an eagle soaring majestically in a clear blue sky with the caption "vision", or a colony of ants building a nest with the caption "teamwork." It may be interesting for about the first fifteen minutes after it goes up but then it just fades into the background and becomes little more than decoration. I don't believe for a second that changing PLDC to the "Warrior Leaders Course" or making Joe memorize the "Warrior Creed" has turned anyone into a warrior. The goal was admirable, model it after the Marine Corps where every Marine is an infantryman first and whatever job second. But the Marine Corps is an entirely different culture from top to bottom. Trying to recreate that culture across the board in the Army is just beating your head against a wall. I don't worry about the Warrior Ethos having a negative effect on the Army simply because I don't really expect it to have any effect at all.

SFC W


Agree 100% they are not warriors they are American Soldiers! and Army Men should be Green not Digital.....I feel mo better now.:wry:

[120mm]

While I think I already commented on this thread, though am being crushed at school so badly I won't reread it, last week I bumped into a couple fellow warriors. We recognized each other almost instantly, immediately went into the butt-sniffing routine and became fast friends. Despite never having seen each other before.

I'm still convinced that warriors are rarer than the Army corporate culture recognizes, and that a "real" warrior shares the common viewpoint that war is "fun", enemy contact is nearly erotic in the level of pleasure it produces and that subduing a worthy enemy is so desirable to subsume in importance normal people's desire for food or sex.

And no amount of sloganeering can turn a non-warrior into one. One of the guys I spoke to is convinced that true warrior-hood is a mild form of psychopathy.

[Kiwigrunt]

I think I get what you're saying. A more politically correct person than myself (in some circles referred to as gun-fearing wussies) might have some issues with the work 'mild' though :p;)

[jmm99]

as Wilf oft reminds us. So, what does "warrior" mean - etymologically speaking ?


warrior (http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?term=warrior)
1297, from O.N.Fr. werreieor (O.Fr. guerreor) "a warrior, one who wages war," from werreier "wage war," from werre (see war).

Now, this seems pretty straight forward - though so broad as to not provide much specificity (other than to define implicitly a "non-warrior" as "one who does not wage war"). So, the term "warrior" does not distinguish professional vs amateur, lifer vs citizen-soldier, regular vs irregular, uniformed vs non-uniformed, trained vs untrained, organized vs unorganized, authorized vs unauthorized, etc.

Perhaps, we can gain insight by following the bouncing ball to "war":


war (http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?term=war)
late O.E. (c.1050), wyrre, werre, from O.N.Fr. werre "war" (Fr. guerre), from Frank. *werra, from P.Gmc. *werso (cf. O.S. werran, O.H.G. werran, Ger. verwirren "to confuse, perplex"). Cognates suggest the original sense was "to bring into confusion." There was no common Gmc. word for "war" at the dawn of historical times. O.E. had many poetic words for "war" (guð, heaðo, hild, wig, all common in personal names), but the usual one to translate L. bellum was gewin "struggle, strife" (related to win). Sp., Port., It. guerra are from the same source; Romanic peoples turned to Gmc. for a word to avoid L. bellum because its form tended to merge with bello- "beautiful." The verb meaning "to make war on" is recorded from 1154. First record of war time is 1387. Warpath (1775) is from N.Amer. Ind., as are war-whoop (1761), war-paint (1826), war-path (1775), and war-dance (1757). War crime first attested 1906. War chest is attested from 1901; now usually fig. War games translates Ger. Kriegspiel (see kriegspiel).

Using the original meaning in an expansion, we find a "warrior" is "one who wages a bringing into confusion". And, based on most comments above, use of the term "warrior" in the Warrior Ethos has been true to its definition - a cause of confusion.

On a more serious note, we can alter the definition a bit to define a "warrior" as "one who participates in the confusion that we call war". There is more than a bit of CvC in that - perhaps a Jungian ancestral memory of his ancestors' use of the P.Gmc. *werso. So, while we correctly think of our word "war" as coming immediately from the Romance, as in Foch, Des Principles de la Guerre; it ultimately goes back to the Proto-Germanic concept of a state of confusion.

Do we do better by bringing in the word "win" (the descendent of the medieval Germanic translation of bellum):


win (http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?term=win) (v.)
fusion of O.E. winnan "struggle for, work at, strive, fight," and gewinnan "to gain or succeed by struggling, to win," both from P.Gmc. *wenwanan (cf. O.S. winnan, O.N. vinna, O.Fris. winna, Du. winnen "to gain, win," Dan. vinde "to win," O.H.G. winnan "to strive, struggle, fight," Ger. gewinnen "to gain, win," Goth. gawinnen "to suffer, toil"). Perhaps related to wish, or from PIE *van- "overcome, conquer." Sense of "to be victorious" is recorded from c.1300. The noun in O.E. meant "labor, strife, conflict;" modern sense of "a victory in a game or contest" is first attested 1862, from the verb. Breadwinner (see bread) preserves the sense of "toil" in O.E. winnan. Phrase you can't win them all (1954) first attested in Raymond Chandler.

Here we have some reality; whether "win or lose" (in our modern sense") - or to reach a settlement viewed as an acceptable result (this one for you, Ken), the result involves a precedent "struggle" (as in CvC's wrestling contest). So, "one who paticipates in that confusion that we call war" could be fairly termed a "winner" - but not necessarily a WINNER. :(

The more acceptable alternative for "warrior" (from the above comments) is "soldier":


soldier (http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?term=soldier) (n.)
c.1300, from O.Fr. soudier "one who serves in the army for pay," from M.L. soldarius "a soldier" (cf. It. soldato and Fr. soldat "soldier," which is borrowed from It.), lit. "one having pay," from L.L. soldum, from acc. of L. solidus, a Roman gold coin (see solidus). The verb meaning "to serve as a soldier" is first recorded 1647; to soldier on "persist doggedly" is attested from 1954.

The soldier of the 1300s could have been a mercenary (many were); but the revival of the term (in Latin, harkening back to the paid legions) was mainly due to the formation of regular, standing units because of the Hundred Years' War - e.g., the French ordinance companies.

Therein lies the problem with the etymology of the "Warrior Ethos" - it broadly encompasses too many categories: professional vs amateur, lifer vs citizen-soldier, regular vs irregular, uniformed vs non-uniformed, trained vs untrained, organized vs unorganized, authorized vs unauthorized, etc.

This is a problem not only in military ethics, but also in the Laws of Wars defining the regular combatant and the irregular combatant. Which is my interest in the question.

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I do have a question that perhaps Hacksaw or someone can answer.

What particular warrior ethos or creed was targeted as the model for the Warrior's Creed ?

Todd and I bnriefly discussed this topic last pool season - he thought North American Indian and the people who fought them (but then that's his focus in history).

Hard to put together an ethos, creed, culture, etc. unless you identify the model.

[William F. Owen]

One of the guys I spoke to is convinced that true warrior-hood is a mild form of psychopathy.

Well to my mind that nails the lid on the coffin of the idea of Warriors. The requisites are courage and determination, not a lack of empathy, or an inability to be able to tell right from wrong.

I can't get my head around why anyone would wish to be called a Warrior - because that's the implied purpose - "I am a Warrior." - especially when the kid next to you in the fire fight is some 19-year-old 57E or 92G, and is returning fire, and filling magazines same as you.

When we call tanks "Broom broom boxes," perhaps we can call soldiers "Bang Bang men," - and that day may not be far off.....

[Ken White]

When we call tanks "Broom broom boxes," perhaps we can call soldiers "Bang Bang men," - and that day may not be far off.....But you knew that... :D

[Hacksaw]

You wrote, "What particular warrior ethos or creed was targeted as the model for the Warrior's Creed ?"

To be honest, I'm not sure... work was done at Benning while I was positioned in VA, but if I were to guess... determination and courage (with an edge) were without doubt the qualities they thought the term embodied... Important to note that the lead sled dog was a pretty edgy guy with the nickname "The Freak"

I do think it is important to note (one last time) that the warrior creed was not the only change implemented by TF Soldier... I don't think anyone thought a creed and some naming conventions were the solution... PLDC does not equal the Warrior Leader Course... it was changed - conducted almost entirely in the field...all newly promoted LTs attend BOLC II... Field training for all regardless of branch before arriving at their Branch course...

IET changed also...

We can debate whether enough has been done, but it is unfair to characterize the Army's response as new jingle and naming convention...

Reed... The Army approach was to try to a specific level and that the remaining training was supposed to be completed at the unit... that works until the Army is at war and Soldiers are in combat within a week of arriving at the unit... hence adding and focusing on warrior tasks as paramount in IET...

Although I'm sure it sounds to the contrary, I'm not a TRADOC apologist... but it appears that most of the comments on this thread are based on "dated" experiences... is TRADOC bloated - probably but not to the extent anyone here may recall, the same can be said about CAC and the Branch Schools... most of that fat was trimmed long ago... they've been replaced by contractors and DACs...

I'll shut up now

Live well and row

[jmm99]

thanks for the response. You should shut up less often.

Soldier vs warrior (with warrior being the broader category - "one who wages war") is not merely a matter of semantics; but has possible legal implications in defining regular and irregular combatants.

Here are some words that could be associated with

- regular combatants (e.g., those clearly under GC III (GPW), Art. 4 et seq.): professional, regular, uniformed, trained, organized, authorized, disciplined ....

and with

- irregular combatants (e.g., those not clearly under GC III (GPW), Art. 4 et seq.): amateur, irregular, non-uniformed, untrained, unorganized, unauthorized, undisciplined ....

These same concepts also enter into formation of ROEs and targeting decisions (that is, is the rule based on the status of the target - easy to determine for regular combatants; difficult for irregular combatants - or on the conduct of the target, as in the SROEs absent a designated hostile force).

What the Army intended to create with its Warrior Ethos concept is not very clear from its "Information Statements" on the Soldier's Creed (http://www.army.mil/aps/08/information_papers/other/Soldiers_Creed.html) and the Warrior Ethos (http://www.army.mil/aps/08/information_papers/other/Warrior_Ethos.html). As to the latter:


What is it?

The Warrior Ethos is a set of principles by which every Soldier lives. In a broader sense, the Warrior Ethos is a way of life that applies to our personal and professional lives as well. They define who we are and who we aspire to become.
....
Why is this important to the Army?

These principles bind us to those who served before us. The Warrior Ethos was present at Cowpens, Lundy’s Lane, Chapultepec, Little Round Top, San Juan Hill, Montfaucon, Krinkelt, Chipyong-ni, Dak To and Iraq. By adhering and holding fast to these principles, our Soldiers will maintain this ethos for those who will come after us.

So, based on what the Army says, the model is what the Army (its soldiers) have done in past wars, from the RW to the present. Taken in that sense, it has nothing to do with the "Noble Savage" (ala Rousseau) or the warriors of that genre (whether Shaka or Crazy Horse).

What the Army seems to be driving at may be inferred from this:


... every Soldier is a leader, responsible for what happens in his or her presence regardless of rank. They will value learning and adaptability at every level, particularly as it contributes to initiative: creating situations for an adversary, rather than reacting to them. They will learn that the Army’s culture is one of selfless service, a warrior culture rather than a corporate one.

If one uses Brian Linn's terminology (from Echo of Battle - which I just read and will have to re-read, following COL Gentile's advice (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=72150&postcount=16)) - Heroes and Managers - the Warrior Ethos may be an expression of the Heroic concept vs the Managerial Concept (as in the bolded quote).

(IMO) It strikes me that whatever time was spent on the Warrior Ethos could have been better spent in distinguishing between regular and irregular combatants and the means and methods to be used re: each category.

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You actually carry that 2x4 around all the time ? ;) That would put you into the "Warrior Class" ala Rousseau :)

[Hacksaw]

(IMO) It strikes me that whatever time was spent on the Warrior Ethos could have been better spent in distinguishing between regular and irregular combatants and the means and methods to be used re: each category.
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You actually carry that 2x4 around all the time ? ;) That would put you into the "Warrior Class" ala Rousseau :)

I believe you are right regarding the time spent on the Warrior Ethos... to be honest I don't recall the development of a "new" creeed/ethos as part of the directed deliverables... I think that is one that the TF developed as an implied task (I could be wrong, but my role in the early days of the CSA TFs was fairly central in terms of doing the action officer staff work)...

It would also be safe to say that it was the kinetic/frenetic (I use the word in its Webster's Dictionary form as opposed to lethal) nature of this particular GO that was his best and worst leadership trait... in other words plenty of energy to go around, so using some to develop the Warrior Ethos did not result in another initiative being short changed... I don't think a staff could produce enough work to overtax the man's energy...

Ironicly he is "the man" when it comes to inital entry training.

I rarely have use for the lumber, but it is helpful when dealing with vehicle maintenance issue

[Ken White]

ceases to amaze me. It's lack of knowledge about it's own history always irritates me.

Theses battles: "(The Warrior Ethos was present at) Cowpens, Lundy’s Lane, Chapultepec, Little Round Top, San Juan Hill, Montfaucon, Krinkelt, Chipyong-ni, Dak To and Iraq." Are direct refutations of the warrior ethos -- all entailed disciplined soldiers doing things that most warriors would not have done. The first battle, in fact, took advantage of 'warrior' traits on both sides to use a few disciplined Soldiers to win a battle -- leading to the win of a war...

No warrior ethos to it. Soldiers doing what needed to be done. I agree with Hacksaw that the intent and the result were good -- doesn't change the fact that warrior was and is a poor choice of a word.