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Sean DeCoursey
06-04-2009, 06:28 AM
Hi. I'm new. This may or may not be the right forum for this, so if it's wrong, I apologize in advance. I'm mostly going off of the fact that I, myself, am a "trigger puller" (a term I detest by the way, our job is to win, not shoot people, oftentimes winning involves shooting people, but its not the only, or always the best way to accomplish that goal.)

I've been seeing a lot of articles that discuss the current conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan in terms of historical COIN operations that the U.S. and other countries have conducted in the past. Operations and wars like Algeria, Sri Lanka, Vietnam, and the Philippines.

While I agree that all of these comparisons are valid and can offer significant insight, I think we're also really overlooking a serious source of ideas in the reactions and experiences of the military forces of the world during World War I.

During WWI the entire concept and methodology of war were radically transformed. The industrialization of war occurred. Machine Guns were introduced as effective non-novelty weapons for the first time. Over the horizon Artillery made its debut. Air power and motorized vehicles first appeared. Chemical weapons were developed and widely used.

In short, every single thing that anyone had known about war was completely turned on its head during WWI. The entire structure of military forces and the way they fight was changed. The horse was displaced as a viable military weapon (and may be making a comeback now). Pre-WWI cavalry was considered so important that gas masks were developed for the horses in cav units.

The machine gun, rifled barrels, shrapnel, and more accurate artillery ended the practice of using formations in battle. Camoflage went from "dirty dishonorable trick" to battlefield necessity.

Perhaps most importantly, the tactical advantage definitely switched from offensive operations to defensive operations.

Compare that with today: fighting forces are abandoning "honorable" uniformed combat for camoflage with civilians, tanks and heavy artillery have been largely neutralized by doctrinal changes. Advanced fighter jets have gone from dynamic, idealized necessity to useless waste of money and parts. Everything we know and knew about fighting wars has been largely obsoleted by an enemy who refuses to fight that way.

The scenarios are in many ways similar:
In 1913, many European countries had armies that could march and fight in foot formations with flanking cavalry units and supporting close artillery. The generals, politicians, and other senior leaders all knew how to fight battles like what America and Spain saw during the Spanish American War, various colonial uprisings, the previous French/German squabble, or perhaps the American Civil war in the case of the older fellows.

What they got was a bogged down bunch of trenchlines dominated by virtually impregnable machine-gun nests that could be pushed back to reserve trenches only temporarily. It wasn't until new ideas and new thinking - ideas like the Tank, or the tactic of "walking artillery fire" were developed that any significant movement on the front lines was achieved.

In 2001, America was ready to fight any big conventional neer-peer army the world had to offer. We had advanced tanks and fighter jets, submarines and aircraft carriers. American generals knew how to fight the soviets in Europe and Arab armies in the middle east.

What we got was an enemy who didn't wear uniforms, who used our freedom and openness as an avenue of attack, and who refused to engage us in equal fights whenever humanely possible.

I don't think that any particular tactics or strategies from WWI are particularly relevant now, but I think we could learn a lot from studying the way that the WWI-era militaries and politicians had to completely re-adjust their thinking and perspectives in order to effectively deal with the results of radical new technologies (internal combustion engine, flight, factories, machined parts, rifling, automatic weaponry).

We need the same types of new ideas and approaches to current systems use and development that were employed to finally turn the tide back then. I'm not an expert on WWI, but it does seem like there's an awful lot of useful information being ignored there. (Pershing himself also seems like a great study for COIN given his highly unusual career path - commanding both black and indian units, jumping straight from captain to general, his understanding of the culture of his non-white commands, etc.)

William F. Owen
06-04-2009, 08:39 AM
I think we're also really overlooking a serious source of ideas in the reactions and experiences of the military forces of the world during World War I.
If you rapid operational adaptation, then I agree.

During WWI the entire concept and methodology of war were radically transformed. The industrialization of war occurred. Machine Guns were introduced as effective non-novelty weapons for the first time. Over the horizon Artillery made its debut. Air power and motorized vehicles first appeared. Chemical weapons were developed and widely used.
I think that is a bit simplistic. War was already highly industrialised by the 1870s. War in 1914 was much the same as in 1904, but yes, by 1918/19, the modern roots of modern contemporary warfare were all in place.

Perhaps most importantly, the tactical advantage definitely switched from offensive operations to defensive operations.
That is not true. Defensive means just adapted to greater dispersion and depth - which is why you see the Russian talking about Deep battle, by about 1927.

Compare that with today: fighting forces are abandoning "honorable" uniformed combat for camoflage with civilians, tanks and heavy artillery have been largely neutralized by doctrinal changes. Advanced fighter jets have gone from dynamic, idealized necessity to useless waste of money and parts. Everything we know and knew about fighting wars has been largely obsoleted by an enemy who refuses to fight that way.
None of that is true. None of your statements are supported by history or operational experience.

What they got was a bogged down bunch of trenchlines dominated by virtually impregnable machine-gun nests that could be pushed back to reserve trenches only temporarily. It wasn't until new ideas and new thinking - ideas like the Tank, or the tactic of "walking artillery fire" were developed that any significant movement on the front lines was achieved.
Again, not true. What caused the trenches were artillery and the collision of too many forces in too smaller space. Machine guns were a symptom, not a cause. While tanks were important they were very much less decisive than artillery, which is what really shaped the whole tactical and operational conduct of the Western Front - but not all of WW1.

What we got was an enemy who didn't wear uniforms, who used our freedom and openness as an avenue of attack, and who refused to engage us in equal fights whenever humanely possible.
Well the US had seen that lots of times before. The Apache? The Sioux? The Viet Cong?

I don't think that any particular tactics or strategies from WWI are particularly relevant now, but I think we could learn a lot from studying the way that the WWI-era militaries and politicians had to completely re-adjust their thinking and perspectives in order to effectively deal with the results of radical new technologies (internal combustion engine, flight, factories, machined parts, rifling, automatic weaponry). Well it's all been written down and studied in detail. I can cite you many useful sources if you wish.

We need the same types of new ideas and approaches to current systems use and development that were employed to finally turn the tide back then.
There really are no similarities between then and now.
The US wilfully chose to ignore insurgency, as something all armies have to be able to do.
I can accept that European Armies ignored the lessons of the Russo-Japanesse War, but it is practically impossible for us to concieve of how great the intellectual and physical shock of WW1 was on all European Armies, and they adapted far faster than anyone in Iraq and A'Stan.

...and welcome to SWJ, where rigour comes with a smile - :D

George L. Singleton
06-04-2009, 07:17 PM
Two observations:

1. My Dad at age 14 (the youngest US combat veteran of WW I) used a dead mule to duck behind when attacking a German entrenchment, and the dead mule stopped the bullets very well. Early "kevlar equivalent" but too big to wear, you had to just "drop behind it."

2. Even before WW I, during the Civil War, an earlier cousin-ancestor, Colonel John Singleton Mosby, of southside Virginia, used what West Point "claims" were the first "modern guerilla warfare" tactics during the Civil War, lots of hit and run, capturing prisoners by sneak attacks, etc.

But, overally, I think Owen is on target and we are doing much of what is possible today.

Remember, we are constrained to let and get the Pak military and Frontier Force, and Pak Police to do the heavy lifting/fighting at long last underway inside Pakistan.

I particularly liked what I read in DAWN today (6/4/09) by a Pak Army Major General who said regarding Swat that clean up operations will take up to two months longer (at least) and that then continuing to keep the Pak Army on station all over Swat will be necessary for at least a solid year, maybe longer, to back up the local police and prevent an more resurgance of the Taliban.

I especially liked the Pak Major General's remark that if they do the job right, now, that there won't be any Taliban left alive to worry about.

Sean DeCoursey
06-04-2009, 07:40 PM
Three points.

A) Thanks for moving this to the right forum, I didn't notice the historian one when I was looking through the forum lists.

B) Ouch.

C) Re-reading my original post it tends to ramble a lot (and fairly incoherently in places) while not doing a good job of making my main point, which is better summed up as this:

A lot of the public and Journal-esque attention regarding the current fights seems to be focused on looking for tactical/strategic lessons on how to better fight the current wars based on how we and others fought insurgency campaigns in the past. While I think this is important and the correct approach, I also think we're potentially missing something by not also devoting a fair amount of time to studying how large military forces have adjusted to radical changes in the nature of war in the past.

Yeah, that sounds more like what I wanted to say while using the changes in WWI as an example. (I picked WWI because I've been reading Jeff Shaara's "To the Last Man" lately.)

davidbfpo
06-04-2009, 09:31 PM
Obviously WW1 was a profound experience for France and her post-WW2 COIN or decolonisation experience arguably worse.

I recommend you read: 'The Conquest of Morocco: A Savage Colonial War' by Douglas Porch and 'The Wars of French Decolonization' by Anthony Clayton. Plus of course 'A Savage War of Peace' by Alistair Horne and 'Street without Joy' by Bernard Fall.

The remarkable fact is that armies learn lessons and then discard them. A point often made here, invariably by Ken and sometimes difficult for a non-military person to absorb.

davidbfpo

William F. Owen
06-05-2009, 04:45 AM
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The remarkable fact is that armies learn lessons and then discard them. A point often made here, invariably by Ken and sometimes difficult for a non-military person to absorb.

Spot on David, and Ken is unusual -in many ways- because he is someone still engaged with the problem, but with over 55+ years experience.


Three points.
B) Ouch.
No Ouch intended. I am a semantic pedant who holds military history as somewhat sacred in the context of military thought.

C) Re-reading my original post it tends to ramble a lot (and fairly incoherently in places) while not doing a good job of making my main point,
Well that tends to be best practice here, so don't feel bad. I do it a lot.


I also think we're potentially missing something by not also devoting a fair amount of time to studying how large military forces have adjusted to radical changes in the nature of war in the past.
How and why armies adapt and evolve is a critical area of study, and it is by no means studied as much as it should be.