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SWJED
06-27-2007, 07:23 AM
27 June Washington Post - Desperate Villagers Flee Central African Republic (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/06/26/AR2007062601851.html) by Stephanie McCrummen.


Widespread banditry, kidnapping and political violence in the volatile and virtually lawless northeastern corner of the Central African Republic are forcing thousands of villagers to flee to Chad, where the security situation is possibly more desperate, according to an Amnesty International report released Tuesday.

The strife in the Republic, a landlocked nation of about 4.4 million people, is being exacerbated by the politically distinct conflict in Sudan's western Darfur region, which has spilled into eastern Chad.

"There is a lot of talk rightly about Darfur and eastern Chad, but the international community seems to be forgetting the people in CAR," said Godfrey Byaruhanga, an Amnesty International researcher who interviewed villagers in the Republic and Chad...

Michael F
06-04-2009, 08:39 AM
In Dec 2008, a joint (DRC, Uganda, Southern Sudan) ops was staged to neutralize the LRA

See this NY times (http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/07/world/africa/07congo.html?_r=2&scp=2&sq=uganda&st=cse) article:
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/07/world/africa/07congo.html?_r=2&scp=2&sq=uganda&st=cse

The question now is not what went wrong or not (or maybe for lessons learned), who failed or not BUT HOW TO DEAL WITH THE LRA now ?

A new bill in the US Senate (Lord's Resistance Army Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery Act 2009) calls for renewed US/AFRICOM involvement and emphasize the need to protect civilian populations.

HOW CAN THIS BE ACHIEVED ? Any comment, advice, remark or reference to article is welcome.

davidbfpo
06-04-2009, 10:51 AM
Just in case background is sought, this is the previous thread on joint action: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=3528&highlight=uganda

davidbfpo

Tom Odom
06-04-2009, 12:29 PM
The problem with the LRA is not just the LRA but also the terrain and the countries involved. The LRA uses the flushing quail technique to great effect. That means blocking forces and airlift to shift them where they need to be. None of the countries involved have that level of air support at their disposal. You need the blocking forces to contain then as a sustained kill capture effort runs them to ground. Otherwise we get a repeat of what has happened before.

Tom

Michael F
06-04-2009, 01:08 PM
Sure Tom, terrain seems particularly difficult. The LRA (about 400 fighters) is spread in small groups of 10 men in an area twice the size of Ireland, now unpopulated, and with plenty of natural cover.

To neutralize them you have to find them hence the problem... UAVs (lack of autonomy) or Satelitte Pix (small mobile groups-average speed of a LRA group is 35 Kms a day) can not help finding them.
Even if you spot them, UPDF has a couple of Hinds in Southern Sudan, and even on QRA these would need up to 30 minutes to arrive on site (idem for MONUC's Hip in Dungu DRC).
Surrounding the area is just unthinkable (lack of forces, different countries and sheer size of the area).

One option would have been to leave Kony alone for a moment, let him resettle, rebuid camps and once the LRA is regrouped and fixed...reattack but Kony is too smart for that and knows mobility and terrain offer him a huge advantage.

An other option would be to install UN bases inside this area with a small force in each plus organize a Psyops (leaflets) to convince isolated LRA groups to disarm. I guess this would be too risky in the eyes of the UN.

Arming the locals to allow them to defend is according to me a great idea that could turn to nightmare as locals would also use these weapons to settle local conflicts (confer Ituri, North Katanga and Kivu...everytime self-defense militias were created these turned to ethnic then undiscriminated violence)

Finally, to continue to try to track every group and intervene after every village attack hoping to bag some LRA is not very successfull.

So what ?????

carl
06-04-2009, 06:00 PM
One of the complications in dealing with the LRA is that in addition to being very evil, they have on occasion in the past proven to be quite good infantry. The Guatemalans learned this the hard way several years ago.

Maybe this is somewhat akin to chasing the Apaches around; a very mobile opponent, difficult terrain and they fight well. What Crook did on at least on occasion was to get on their trail, and stay on their trail, no matter what. They eventually got tired of being chased around and gave up.

Perhaps a similar thing might work. You would have groups of men get on the trail of big or little LRA groups and stay there, for months if need be. The air support that was available would be used mostly to resupply the tracking groups. The armed helos would be ready to go out when a tracking group fixed a group of LRA.

The hard part would be getting good men for the tracking groups. I don't know if the Ugandans could do it. Judging by Tom's comments in the past the Rwandans could certainly do it. Then you would have to get somebody to pay for it and get the countries the effort would go through to sign off on it.

An advantage would be it would keep constant pressure on the LRA. If good African troops were used in the tracking groups the logistical reqs wouldn't be huge.

Lots of difficulties but doable I think.

Michael F
06-05-2009, 08:24 AM
Carl, this makes a lot of sense and i guess some US trained UPDF SF could do the job.

Tracking the LRA in small groups could be a very long task...(months) but present indeed the best chances of success.

It also allows for a more discreet Ugandan presence on DRC soil which surely would aleviate some political pressure on President Kabila.

BTW the UPDF SF commander is Lt. Col. Muhoozi Kainerugaba, the First son of President Museveni. Should the SF succeed it would also be good to prepare the kiddo to take over from daddy :D

About AFRICOM support, this could be minimal in terms of boots on the ground (support to planning, training the SF and intelligence) which would avoid to risk a second failure (the operation Lightning Thunder failed to its aim of killing Kony but is also said to have been plagged by massive corruption).

Actually, Carl, i think that your idea is possibly already applied. In a ENOUGH report (Finishing the Fight Against the LRA (http://www.enoughproject.org/publications/finishing-fight-against-lra-strategy-paper)), it is stated that " Many Ugandan troops, however, have stayed in Congo and continue to conduct “intelligence operations” against the LRA. Some low-scale fighting between the remaining Ugandan troops and the LRA has been reported, but these largely below-the-radar efforts are likely insufficient to corner the LRA leadership".

carl
06-06-2009, 01:51 AM
I hope the Ugandans are doing something like this now. If they were, it would not be something they would publicize until it was all done.

If they aren't, this is the kind of thing Special Forces A Teams (if they are still called that) would be ideal for. I imagine there would be great enthusiasm for a training mission, and maybe a little leading, to assist the UPDF in finally destroying the LRA.

One thing is, whatever is to be done, it can't depend at all on the FARDC and as little as possible on MONUC.

Tom Odom
07-14-2009, 12:49 PM
Congressmen and NGOs picking missions is never a good thing. I am fully supportive of taking out the LRA; an active role, however, for AFRICOM at this juncture would be a serious setback to its efforts to calm the continent about its mission.


AFRICOM’s new focus? (http://www.stripes.com/article.asp?section=104&article=63716)
Lawmakers push for U.S. to aid hunt for rebel leader
By John Vandiver, Stars and Stripes
Mideast edition, Tuesday, July 14, 2009

The leader of the Lord's Resistance Army, Joseph Kony answers journalists' questions following a meeting with UN humanitarian chief Jan Egeland Sunday Nov 12 , 2006 at Ri-Kwamba in Southern Sudan. Egeland met with Kony, the elusive leader of Uganda's notorious rebel Lord's Resistance Army and one of the world's most-wanted war crimes suspects, seeking to secure the release of women and children enslaved by the group during their 20-year conflict with the Ugandan government. But Kony denied that his forces are holding prisoners. STUTTGART, Germany — It’s not exactly a call to arms, but it doesn’t sound that far off either.

In a little-noticed piece of bipartisan legislation introduced this spring — the LRA Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery Act — a group of U.S. lawmakers is urging the Obama administration to form a strategy for taking out one of the most dangerous rebel leaders roaming the jungles of Africa: Joseph Kony, the leader of the Lord’s Resistance Army.

"Kony’s removal is essential to peace in the region," said Rep. Ed Royce, R-Calif., who was one of many Republican and Democratic politicians issuing statements following the bill’s introduction.

Michael F
07-14-2009, 03:07 PM
Honestly, i think Africom was and is already involved in more than "capacity building". Providing weapons to the TFG in Somalia, the support to the anti-LRA ops,Umoja Wetu in the Kivus...should prove enough that Africom, despite a young Command, wants to show "it can get its hands dirty". Is it a bad or good thing ? Should they be more directly involved ? Opinions may differ but mine is quite clear: It should be more involved and more open to other stakeholders.

In the LRA case, a joint AFRICOM, FR, UK, BEL, support (intelligence, logistic,...) to DRC, Ugandan, Southern Sudan and CAR would surely ensure complete international support, increase the quality of the intelligence provided, alleviate fears of "you are stepping into my area of influence"....Politically as well as technically, this would be mostly positive.
Should Africom go alone with the UPDF (meaning without collaboration with FR, BEL, UK and to some extend DRC) like for Lightning Thunder, and should it fail again, it would just help the sceptic in Africa and elsewhere to point the finger to Africom (young, ambitious but inexperienced would be their description of Africom)...

Sharing failure is the best way to ensure there won't be any (or at least support would be maximum) or to limit it a maximum in terms of public image.

Tom Odom
07-15-2009, 05:23 AM
Honestly, i think Africom was and is already involved in more than "capacity building". Providing weapons to the TFG in Somalia, the support to the anti-LRA ops,Umoja Wetu in the Kivus...should prove enough that Africom, despite a young Command, wants to show "it can get its hands dirty". Is it a bad or good thing ? Should they be more directly involved ? Opinions may differ but mine is quite clear: It should be more involved and more open to other stakeholders.

In the LRA case, a joint AFRICOM, FR, UK, BEL, support (intelligence, logistic,...) to DRC, Ugandan, Southern Sudan and CAR would surely ensure complete international support, increase the quality of the intelligence provided, alleviate fears of "you are stepping into my area of influence"....Politically as well as technically, this would be mostly positive.
Should Africom go alone with the UPDF (meaning without collaboration with FR, BEL, UK and to some extend DRC) like for Lightning Thunder, and should it fail again, it would just help the sceptic in Africa and elsewhere to point the finger to Africom (young, ambitious but inexperienced would be their description of Africom)...

Sharing failure is the best way to ensure there won't be any (or at least support would be maximum) or to limit it a maximum in terms of public image.

We can agree to disagree. AFRICOM has been under scrutiny since its beginning and this is too early for it to be proving its critics correct.

Tom

Mark O'Neill
07-15-2009, 01:24 PM
The LRA are only a problem when they actually do something -that is, go near / attack or attempt to influence a node that someone actually acres about. These are not as common as one might think in the large border areas of the DRC. Hence, you do not need to cover off on the whole area, only the things that matter. This reduces your problem considerably.

Next step is to take a leaf out of the South African book vis a vis SW Africa in the early 80s. The SAPOL's 'Koevet' organisation developed considerable expertise in a framework that consisted of positioning reaction forces near or on the known nodes or infil/ exfil points for the PLAN.

When cued to an incident, Koevet could react, and were equipped with trackers and were mobile enough to follow up and pursue the PLAN elements detected (normally small groups -much like the description offered previously of the LRA's current modus operandi). Whilst Helos were used, the key elements of success I assess were:
a. speed of reaction (based on on sound assessment of vital ground and appropriate positioning forces);
b. appropriate tactical mobility and firepower;
c. tracking skills (often using 'turned' terrorists and/or local indigenes); and
d. Aggression - a desire to close with the enemy and destroy him.

I would be keen to hear why such an approach couldn't work against the LRA.

regards,

Mark

davidbfpo
07-15-2009, 02:32 PM
The para-military branch of the South African / South-West African police in what is now Namibia are covered in 'Koevoet' by Jim Hooper: http://www.amazon.com/Koevoet-Jim-Hooper/dp/1868121674

There are two editions, I've got the early one(1988).

Hooper's book is not cited in: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Koevoet

davidbfpo

davidbfpo
08-10-2009, 02:13 PM
Update: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/sudan/5999097/Lords-Resistance-Army-targets-children-of-Sudan.html

davidbfpo

James Bean
08-30-2009, 08:00 AM
Rex, as SWJ contemplates, there are inherent sensitivities to discussing certain parts of one's work in too much detail. My own views of LRA are as follows:

1. Coming at armed insurgent groups from an Asian-lens, LRA is difficult to comprehend. I spend a lot of time in Northern Uganda, and find the Acholis and Langis to be compassionate, acutely aware of the conflict (even its westward migration), and hardworking (when they have the opportunity). Yet everything I have learnt about LRA firsthand is that it's a user-pays mercenary group specialising in insurgency; devoid of ideology. It is a maw that sucks in lives and destroys them.
2. As for the glut of commentary that militates against LRA and advocates SF/COIN and 'irregular' approaches to snuffing out the LRA; rather than being malignant, such commentary is simply benign and ignorant. Some of the local players have a second-to-none track record of dealing with insurgencies. On the sharp end of the ledger they know what they are doing. It's just much harder to attain stability than sew instability.
3. I won't deny that eliminating Konyi would have an immediate impact on LRA, but if we're honest about it, there's not a lot of precedent for success in either eliminating terrorist leaders or proving a sustainable result even when elimination has occurred.
4. For too long the focus has been on military solutions to the LRA and very little in the way of addressing security in the North. I like how one of our SWJ colleagues (David Kilkullen - hi if he's around - really like the cut of your jib mate!) refers to 'small is beautiful'. Small recoverable and innovative approaches to information dissemination and providing jobs and catalysing change in Northern Uganda will be just as effective, if not more, than gunships and leaflet drops in D.R. Congo (sorry, but in 2009 when people call this PSOP, I just laugh; it's like a ham radio operator obstinately denying the range/convenience of mobile telephony!).

How's that gentlemen?

Jim

M-A Lagrange
08-31-2009, 06:21 PM
To understand LRA, please pay a visit to Conflict Research Group working paper on it.
This document has been compiled by Kasper Thams Olsen, who I would call THE LRA SPECIALIST. He recently briefed UNMIS and MONUC on them.

http://www.psw.ugent.be/crg/publications/working%20paper/workingpaper_LRA.pdf

This paper is a qualitative study on LRA tactics, motivations and use of indiscriminate violence. If that can help... I would be much more than happy.

Please note that there have been alleged LRA attacks in North West South Sudan. It is not confirmed, it is not official, it has to be taken with caution. But still, that may make sense as they are not welcomed in Uganda, in DRC, CAR and in South South Sudan. Also, as Uganda peace negociator resigned, there is still a slight possibility they go back home. That would fit into their strategy.

Rex Brynen
08-31-2009, 11:07 PM
James:

Thanks for the thoughtful comments!

On whether eliminating Konyi would transform the situation (à la Savimbi/UNITA), its always hard to predict how internal dynamics play out once a lynchpin leader is removed. Of course, I'm sure none of us would shed a tear if someone were to test the hypothesis :D

As for information operations and economic initiatives, what would be the dynamic that would undercut the LRA? The Olsen paper that M-A Lagrange has kindly posted above suggests that the LRA's counter would be retaliation and collective punishment. Are you thinking, from a DDR perspective, of either the possibilities for encouraging defections, the dangers of unemployed defectors returning to the bush, or both?

M-A Lagrange
09-01-2009, 08:59 AM
Well, I can attest that LRA will retaliate on civilians. After failed action in 2008/2009, LRA killed 900 civilians with machettes as retaliation. I was in DRC at that time.

Please take time to think about it. When LRA does have undiscriminated violence as modus operantis. This is to demonstrate that opposite side is not capable of providing protection. (Weird, but that is their way).

Also there are good reports on former abducted children trained by LRA integrated into LRA hunt.

Michael F
09-02-2009, 08:43 AM
Apparently, Kony is still hunted down by up to 200 UPDF troops in DRC (so called intelligence advisors). During the past month, LRA movements have been reported by Open Sources in the Yambio-Doruma-Ezo triangle. Main LRA looting activity happens now in the EZO area (CAR -SUD-DRC triborder area) which could translate into an other group of LRA escaped to CAR.

Kony is supposed to have tried to organize a commander meeting in CAR last month (no confirmation if he succeeded to gather his unit commanders or not).

My gut feeling is (stating the obvious) that Kony is trying to gain time by escaping to CAR. UPDF forces would still be able to track LRA in that most remote zone but less efficiently than in the Garamba area. Kony may want to further reorganize its forces, ensure resupply from allies (Khartum???) via isolated airstrips and proximity to CAR groups supported by Khartum. The aim of the game is to survive untill 2011 and the potentially explosive Southern Sudan referendum. Khartum would surely consider reinforcing arab militias and the LRA ahead of this as these could come handy to influence the referendum or counter a newly independant Southern Sudan.

M-A Lagrange
09-02-2009, 11:05 AM
Well 2011 referendum seems a very long term target. 2010 elections could be a more archivable objective as LRA has no logistical support.
Also, despite percistent rumours of guns flying all over the place, there has been light hard evidence of Khartum involvement in it, even of the happening of such thing. The one I know is tanks flying from Kenya to Rumbek for GoSS. But still does not mean it does not exist. Bad people even say that it is GoSS that is arming the place to undermine coming referundum...:confused:

Also take in consideration coming DDR schedule in South Sudan. That will ease Kony job to come in and out South Sudan.

Other thing to take in account is that burning the land for food supply works when you have food coming. LRA favorite target always has been humanitarian programs. For the moment, WFP pockets are dry and donors are reluctant to fund, this is a secret for no one. according to FAO, the coming season is hunger...

I do not know about Kony meeting in CAR but in DRC, he was still capable to coordinate multy target attacks while his groups were splited all over the place.

Michael F
09-02-2009, 02:14 PM
Well 2011 referendum seems a very long term target. 2010 elections could be a more archivable objective as LRA has no logistical support.
Also, despite percistent rumours of guns flying all over the place, there has been light hard evidence of Khartum involvement in it, even of the happening of such thing. The one I know is tanks flying from Kenya to Rumbek for GoSS. But still does not mean it does not exist. Bad people even say that it is GoSS that is arming the place to undermine coming referundum...:confused:

Also take in consideration coming DDR schedule in South Sudan. That will ease Kony job to come in and out South Sudan.

Other thing to take in account is that burning the land for food supply works when you have food coming. LRA favorite target always has been humanitarian programs. For the moment, WFP pockets are dry and donors are reluctant to fund, this is a secret for no one. according to FAO, the coming season is hunger...

I do not know about Kony meeting in CAR but in DRC, he was still capable to coordinate multy target attacks while his groups were splited all over the place.


Some interesting thoughts,indeed.
If i may add mine.

Khartoum has been providing weapons to multiple groups in Southern Sudan across history and according to unconfirmed sources, is currently increasing the weapon flow.
About the areas bordering CAR, there are many strong ethnic and commercial links between local pro-Karthoum Sudanese and CAR groups and so between them and the CAR rebels.

Is Karthoum directly dealing with the LRA in CAR ? still unproven. Is Karthoum arming sudanese and CAR rebells along this border and indirectly the LRA ? It's not proven. Actually, proving it is impossible..... the deniability is too easy.

I've got my own opinion (Katrhoum has the motives, the means and the recklessness to do it so why shouldn't they ???)

Tom Odom
09-02-2009, 02:40 PM
They certainly have played a role whenever the opportunity to stick a needle in Museveni presents itself. They played a role arming the ex-FAR while they were still in the main camps outside Goma. I sent the serial numbers of various US munitions and weapons that we found on Iwawa Island in 1995. They had made the circuit from Saudi Arabia to Sudan and then into the weapons smuggling that was arranged via the Egyptians and the Sudanese. So it would surprise me in the least to see they were supporting the LRA with munitions and weapons.

Tom

davidbfpo
09-02-2009, 06:15 PM
Taken from FP:http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/09/01/two_years_to_self_destruct_in_sudan


Foreign proxies are also up to no good. The notorious Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), originally from Uganda, has stepped up its attacks in South Sudan. Bashir has a long history of using the LRA as his cat's paw in exchange for weapons, money, and political support. And though it's too early to tell if he is doing so again, Khartoum certainly does have every incentive to use violence in an effort to derail the independence referendum -- or at least seize substantial chunks of territory (some of which is oil-laden) from a newly independent South.

Only a sub-story within a warning on Sudan splitting and the likely mayhem before and after.

davidbfpo

M-A Lagrange
09-03-2009, 10:29 AM
There is one question I never had good answer to concerning LRA. When they were moved from Sudan to DRC, it is said it was without weaponery. The fact that they used mainly machettes in a first time, after failed attack during peace negociations, would go that way.
But now, they seems to have gain fire power again. Where they were in DRC is far from Khartoum roads for smuggling. And building an airstrip is not that easy.
I know FARDC are loose on keeping weapons in their hands but still.
Answering to that question would probably help in responding to the question what is their logistic support.

Tom Odom
09-03-2009, 12:23 PM
There is one question I never had good answer to concerning LRA. When they were moved from Sudan to DRC, it is said it was without weaponery. The fact that they used mainly machettes in a first time, after failed attack during peace negociations, would go that way.
But now, they seems to have gain fire power again. Where they were in DRC is far from Khartoum roads for smuggling. And building an airstrip is not that easy.
I know FARDC are loose on keeping weapons in their hands but still.
Answering to that question would probably help in responding to the question what is their logistic support.

It is like the movie field of dreams:

If you have cash, the weapons will come

And someone in the FADRC will bring them...:wry:

Michael F
09-03-2009, 02:45 PM
The LRA, off course, had weapons when they entered the Garamba in 2005. They just did not launch any attack for a long time.
"From mid-2005, when the LRA began to prepare for the
peace process that was to become the Juba talks, its fighters and high command moved towards the border of the DRC in Western Equatoria. On their way west, some of the fiercest fighting with the SPLA occurred in areas that had previously been untouched by the LRA, such as the road between Yei and Juba (BBC News, 2005). However, the LRA has denied that these attacks were carried out by their troops"

The Karthum supply actually must have stopped (temporarily) for logistical reasons while the LRA was in the Garamba. "While civilian and military interviewees say that Khartoum supplied equipment to the Ugandan rebels well into 2006, the LRA says that such supplies ceased long before then.36 Others have reported that supplies stopped in November 2005, when the LRA crossed into Garamba National Park in DRC."

The surge in firepower actually comes from a different "timing". The LRA, as a tactic, is used to leave arm caches in strategic areas. With the Karthum supplied weapons in the past, it was easy to build multiple caches in Southern Sudan and North Congo and to reuse those weapons as soon as they were hunted down.

I don't think they bought those weapons from the FARDC as the FARDC presence in the area was small during a long time and many other weapon salors were available (Mbororos, Equatorian, GoSS corrupt, Ituri militias,...). The LRA never worked with a lot of cash (they are out of the monetary system) and more by extorsion or support.

Quotes from the very interesting @small arms survey report@ http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/files/portal/spotlight/sudan/Sudan_pdf/SWP%208%20LRA.pdf

M-A Lagrange
09-05-2009, 08:33 AM
Some interresting developments are happening with our beloved Kony.
Populations in Sudan start to complain that the GoSS and UPDF are unable to protect them...
Seems that Kony has already won the psychological war.
That defenitively serves Khartoum, but looks more like an unattended side effect.

carl
09-08-2009, 02:22 PM
Today's BBC story

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8243829.stm

stating that Ugandan troops are in the C.A.R. chasing the LRA and have been for month. Interesting in that the C.A.R. is rather a ways away from Uganda.

Michael F
09-10-2009, 09:52 AM
New development:

THE army has captured another senior LRA commander in the on-going military push against the rebels in the DR Congo and the Central African Republic.

Mickman Opuk, who was close to LRA leader Joseph Kony, was captured from the jungles of the Central African Republic a fortnight ago as the joint military offensive pursued a group of rebels.

“We picked him like a grasshopper and he is intact,” said army spokesperson Lt. Col. Felix Kulayigye yesterday. “Our forces had been in hot pursuit of Kony’s group which he was part of.”

Four other LRA junior commanders have been killed and 98 abductees rescued since the army entered the Central Africa Republic to hunt down the rebels, Kulayigye added.

Opuk is one of the most notorious rebel commanders. According to the army, he participated in the 1995 Atiak massacre of over 200 civilians.

Asked when Opuk would be flown to Uganda, Kulayigye said he was being kept in the field to assist the joint forces with information.

“Slowly by slowly we are harvesting them. The fact that we have been allowed in the Central African Republic shows that Kony is not safe anywhere.”

He said the chief of defence forces of Uganda, the Central African Republic and Southern Sudan met in Kampala on Friday to review the progress of the anti-LRA operations.

Officials from the four affected countries met a month ago and agreed to allow Ugandan army units into the Central African Republic, Kulayigye told Reuters earlier.

“(Ugandan army) squads entered Central African Republic under the auspices of the joint security meeting.

“It was agreed that since Kony is a regional problem, he should be pursued into the Central African Republic.”
He, however, suspected that Kony was heading for Sudan's western Darfur region.

The joint military offensive was launched on December 15, 2008 after Kony refused to sign the final peace agreement.

The operation, codenamed Operation Lightning Thunder, involving ground troops and jet-fighters, pounded LRA bases in Garamba forest in eastern Congo, killing some rebels and sending others in disarray.

The UPDF withdrew from Congo at the end of March when the time-frame given by the Khartoum government elapsed.

It, however, maintained intelligence officers to help the Congolese army flush out the remaining rebels. The UPDF returned to the war-front when the rebels sneaked into the Central African Republic.


http://www.newvision.co.ug/D/8/12/694012

Michael F
09-18-2009, 12:01 PM
Might sound crazy (600 miles from Uganda) but the guy is and :
* It's safe of SPLA, CAR, FARDC, UPDF forces (and US allies),
* The NCP is present in Southern Darfur and can provide a secure environement,
* The LRA forces may stay spread between Western Bahr El Ghazal, CAR and DRC (300 miles) while Kony is safe north in Darfur.
* There is little chance the NCP will hand Kony over to anyone.
* UNAMIS and UNAMID are not present in those regions.


LRA moving north - S. Sudan army official
Friday 18 September 2009 05:00. Printer-Friendly version Comments...

By Manyang Mayom
September 17, 2009 (JUBA) – Southern Sudan Military Intelligence have determined that the Lord’s Resistance Army leader is moving toward Chad, according to the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) Spokesperson Major General Kuol Diem Kuol. He further affirmed that the LRA has now become powerless.

LRA troops march towards an the assembly point in Owiny Ki Bul, 160km (100 miles) south of Juba, Sudan September 20, 2006 (Reuters)
Maj. Gen. Kuol announced this on Wednesday night, claiming that Joseph Kony and his deputy are moving toward Darfur and that an attack is expected in Western Bahr El Ghazal.
Over 80,000 people have fled from their homes in Western Equatoria and Central Equatoria this year, according to a report released this month by the World Health Organization. The LRA guerrillas are implicated in a recent wave of massacres and killings in DRC, Sudan and CAR, with upwards of 1,000 killed since December 2008.
Ugandan army forces are pursuing LRA in the Central African Republic, according to recent media reports.
Kuol noted that particularly in Tumburia County of Western Equatoria on September 11, 2009, SPLA military intelligence found fresh footprints of the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) from Central African Republic heading toward Raja County of Western Bahr-El-Ghazal state. "According to the intelligence we have, LRA leader Joseph Kony and his deputy Okot Ozimo, they are heading toward Darfur; some of his forces will remain in DRC and some of the troops’ lives have become difficult for Kony to operate in Southern Sudan."
He went on to insinuate that paramilitary forces aligned with the Government of Sudan would orchestrate a military action or threat that would allow Kony to escape: "For Mr. Kony to move away from South Sudan, the National Congress Party (NCP) in Darfur are now threatening our forces in the North of Raja County in such a places like Timza, Karita, and Kitkit … – there is a big threat that Murahileen militias are threatening our forces of SPLA and the objective of NCP behind this threat is to let Joseph Kony with his deputy move freely to reach Darfur and then to Chad without facing a military offensive."
"All our forces in Raja area… are now put on maximum alert," affirmed Kuol. "I want to make use of your Sudan Tribune media to inform our civilians not to be surprised by this notorious LRA attack," he concluded.

M-A Lagrange
09-19-2009, 07:15 PM
As far as I know, this is not confirmed.
Does not mean it is false.
But what about what is going on in DRC?

M-A Lagrange
10-07-2009, 11:52 AM
Ugandan rebels have reportedly killed about two dozen villagers in an attack in the Democratic Republic of Congo's troubled northeast Orientale Province.
On Tuesday, the AFP news agency quoted a local association as saying that the deadly attack was carried out on September 25th in an area where no Congolese military force is present. "The inhabitants were surprised in the morning by about 40 members of the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) from neighboring Uganda. Twenty-two people were killed with machetes and knives," said the chairman of the Dungu Diocesan Justice and Peace Commission, Father Benoit Kilalegu.
http://www.indymedia-letzebuerg.net/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=32155&Itemid=28

Khony is may be no more in South Sudan but they’re still killing…

M-A Lagrange
10-08-2009, 02:13 PM
I found that on the net. The figures are quiete impressive but could be real. Does someone have more details on it?


On 6 October, Uganda's Daily Monitor quoted Congolese officials reporting that some 3000 LRA soldiers, wearing new uniforms and carrying new weapons, have crossed from CAR into northern Congo and are now advancing towards Sudan. Father Benoit Kilalegu reported from Congo that the LRA attacked Digba on 25 September, killing 22 people with machetes.

http://www.assistnews.net/Stories/2009/s09100045.htm

I know Uganda's Daily monitor is not the best source and FARDC even worst. And the net source... But still, even 10 times less would be a major pb.

Michael F
10-20-2009, 08:46 AM
http://petereichstaedt.blogspot.com/

After predicting more than a year ago that the now rebels-for-hire of the Lord's Resistance Army, led by their maniacal leader, Joseph Kony, eventually could be used against Darfur rebels, it appears to be coming a reality.

In a story published this Saturday in The Independent, and featuring the above photo by Reuters, Africa Correspondent Daniel Howden quotes a South Sudan military man as saying that LRA has entered South Darfur.


We have confirmed that the LRA are there and they have clashed with the local population said Major-General Kuol Deim Kuol.

South Sudanese officials are prone to saying such things based on extremely flimsy evidence. They eagerly make statements that call attention to the nefarious and always duplicitous dealings of the Sudan government in Khartoum.

That said, South Sudan knows what it's talking about since the south battled Sudan for more than 20 years. They know well that Sudan loves to use proxy militias, such as the janjaweed, to fight its bloody battles against defenseless civilian populations.

The LRA fits the Sudan ideal since it specializes in attacking, mutilating, raping and destroying the softest of civilian targets, just as it has done for 20 years in northern Uganda and for the past three years in northeastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, two of which were during the farcical peace talks in with Uganda, held in Juba, South Sudan.

While I remain skeptical that the LRA will be actively involved in what remains of the war in Darfur, I think the LRA is being positioned for that possibility by the Sudan government, which may again be arming and supplying the LRA.

The region south and west of Nyala, south Darfur's largest town, and extending into southeastern Chad, has been the province of Darfur rebel groups such as the Justice and Equality Movement. The JEM remains a strong threat to the Sudan government, having conducted the wild raid on Omdurman in February 2008, an attack that shocked Khartoum and revealed its glaring vulnerabilities.

With Kony's militia-for-hire in the area, Sudan has a perfect foil to conduct attacks on civilian targets in south Darfur and southeastern Chad, which is where Darfur rebels have found refuge for regrouping and resupply.

This will allow Sudan to tell the world that the war in Darfur is over, when in truth it is not.

My stronger sense is that Kony's move into the Darfur region is more for him to obtain the weaponry and supplies he will need for Sudan's likely efforts to disrupt the coming elections in South Sudan in 2010.

This will be a prelude to what could be an all-out civil war with horrendous civilian casualties as South Sudan moves to its independence vote in 2011, as called for in Sudan's 2005 peace agreement.

Sudan has used the LRA like this before, having given the LRA aid and comfort in South Sudan during the long 20-year war with Uganda. Sudan used the LRA also to fight south Sudan's army, which to the delight of Khartoum, made the region a veritable hell-on-earth where four armies fought: the LRA, the Ugandan army, the Sudan army and the South Sudan army.

Likewise, a consensus is growing that the recent fighting in the eastern South Sudan province of Jonglei is much more than bloody ethnic clashes over cows that it is portrayed to be. Rather, it is part of a calculated effort by the Sudan government to destabilize the region and prevent the development of the region's oil, which South Sudan needs desperately.

While this is speculative, it is based on well-established patterns by Sudan and the horrific history of the LRA. One can only hope that people like the U.S.'s envoy to Sudan, Scott Gration, is cognizant of all of this as he flies around the world trying to negotiate a "deal" with Sudan.

The sad reality is that while the world knows all too well the death and destruction that follows that LRA wherever it goes, nothing is being done about the LRA other than a lot of deep sighing and muttering.

As the numbers of dead and mutilated and raped continue to grow and as the LRA continues to grow increasingly malignant, those among the international community, such as the Dutch, the Danes, Scandinavians, and others who supplied the LRA from 2006 to 2008, saying that it was necessary for peace, should think again about the blood of innocent people that now covers their hands.

M-A Lagrange
10-22-2009, 06:34 AM
Sorry, I did a bad manip. Was looking at something else. Can someone erase the previous post?
Thanks.

Concerning LRA: DRC is facing now a problem of copycat from LRA. This shows how bad this country has fallen down. People are crazy enought to use the LRA M.O.

Also, the Human Rights special envoy in DRC relieased a report (the one I cannot find and wanted to attach) which points out the incapacity of MONUC to do its job. As an example he points out that reports on Human Rights abuse by LRA from Feb/March 2008 are still not available.

Reality, harsh reality...

carl
10-23-2009, 03:07 AM
I have two questions.

The first is, has anyone heard more about the UPDF ops against the LRA in the CAR?

Second, if the LRA is or will be in Darfur, how will the terrain there affect their operations and effectiveness? I have to read more but I am under the impression the LRA does most everything afoot. In that part of the world, everything seems to be done mounted, either on a Toyota or a horse.

Michael F
10-23-2009, 08:58 AM
LRA kill five people in South Sudan’s Raja County
Friday 23 October 2009 02:30. Printer-Friendly version Comments...

By Manyang Mayom

October 22, 2009 (WAU) - The Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) official spokesman Major General Kuol Deim Kuol, said five people were killed during an attack by Ugandan rebels on a village in Western Bahr-El-Ghazal State.


Joseph Kony, leader of the rebel group the Lord’s Resistance Army (AFP) On Saturday October 21, 2009, at around 11pm, Lord Resistant Army (LRA) rebels attacked a camp of Darfur Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) at the village of "Kor-Al-Madina" in Western Bahr-El-Ghazal State killing three elements of southern Sudan Police (SSP) and two civilians on the spot.

Kor-Al-Madina is a small village at 24 miles away from Raja County of Wau, the capital of Western Bahr-El-Ghazal state.

The LRA rebels runaway with three rifles belonging to the killed three policemen. They also abducted unspecific number of displaced people, Deim said. He pointed out that LRA is moving toward southeast of Raja county with abducted people.

This LRA attack had overwhelm civilian in this camps of Raja county, so when SPLA heard gunfire exchange between police and rebel, then our battalion of 333 rush to rescue the situation.

"The LRA is now heading with abducted people to southeast of Kor-Al-Madina toward the Sudan and the Central Republic of Congo border."

As it has become difficult for Joseph Kony rebels to operate in southern Sudan, since last September the SPLA s military intelligence found fresh footprints of the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) from Central African Republic heading toward Raja County of Western Bahr-El-Ghazal state. At the time the SPLA spokesperson said the Ugandan rebels are heading to Darfur.

"In September, we said that LRA is moving toward Darfur and might have links with Khartoum; this attack in Raja County has confirmed today that LRA is seriously moving to Darfur with backup from Sudan Arm Forces (SAF)," he said.

Raja commissioner Mr. Luwis Ramadan has also confirmed the report saying that three policemen and two civilian have been killed in the hottest attack by the LRA in Western Bahr-El-Ghazal State territory.

The Commissioner further added that on Wednesday attack the LRA has kidnapped about twenty one people and LRA rebel but he failed to determine the direction of the group saying they headed to unknown direction with the abducted people.

The Sudanese government denied SPLA claims that the leader of Uganda Lord Resistance Army (LRA) Joseph Kony relocated to the western region of Darfur.

Salah Gosh, the adviser to the Sudanese president and former director of the National Intelligence and Security Services (NISS) said that the SPLA claim is untrue.

He said that the SPLA is resorting to "fabrications" and "political maneuvers" to "distort the image of the Sudanese army".

(ST)

Michael F
10-23-2009, 09:11 AM
I have two questions.

The first is, has anyone heard more about the UPDF ops against the LRA in the CAR?

Second, if the LRA is or will be in Darfur, how will the terrain there affect their operations and effectiveness? I have to read more but I am under the impression the LRA does most everything afoot. In that part of the world, everything seems to be done mounted, either on a Toyota or a horse.

I'm not a specialist but i'll try to give answers that maybe will lead some "wiser" contributors to add their contribution.....

First, the UPDF has made some progress in CAR (where apparently their presence has been reported on several occasions) but the new operational environment, the presence of pro-Karthoum rogue groups,...surely will require the UPDF to get some adaptation time. The LRA is also known to refrain from attacking local populations when settling in an area (it's only after a certain time and under pressure that they will attack villages in the proximity of their CoG). So both the LRA and UPDF activities are going under the radar in CAR.

Second, the "LRA", IMO, is not in Darfur. Some advanced elements of the LRA are close to Darfur. The LRA CoG is in CAR. The region of Raja and Southern Darfur is geographically different from what we use to see on telly about Darfur. It's greener,...more Elephant grass/low forrest like in the Doruma area or Yambio area. The LRA troops there are so in a known tactical environment in what relates to forrest cover,... The LRA can move quite a distance on foot (50 Km a day).

Any additional thoughts ???????

carl
10-24-2009, 04:06 AM
We have a lot of Ugandan guards here and i like to ask them about the LRA. One told me tonight that the UPDF has people continuously in the DRC, South Sudan and CAR gathering intel on the LRA. When they get a good location, UPDF forces are dispatched as a strike force to hit them. The biggest problem is, the guard says, that there are people in the UPDF who tip off the LRA because of tribal sympathies. The LRA is so foot mobile that they don't need much of a warning to be well out of the area when the strike force hits.

If true, I infer that UPDF units are not continuously on the trail of LRA groups. This is disappointing to me. I don't see how any info can stay good long enough to get a strike force there in time, especially given how fast the LRA can move. I was also surprised that tribal loyalty could play a part in this.

I don't know how much if any the guard said was true but that is what he told me.

Michael F
11-03-2009, 01:40 PM
.... The biggest problem is, the guard says, that there are people in the UPDF who tip off the LRA because of tribal sympathies. The LRA is so foot mobile that they don't need much of a warning to be well out of the area when the strike force hits.

If true, I infer that UPDF units are not continuously on the trail of LRA groups. This is disappointing to me. I don't see how any info can stay good long enough to get a strike force there in time, especially given how fast the LRA can move. I was also surprised that tribal loyalty could play a part in this.

I don't know how much if any the guard said was true but that is what he told me.

This would be surprising to me.

Just imagine the UPDF is tipped off about the position of a group...
Where does this kind of info comes from ? Informants inside the LRA...doubtfull (because of Kony's paranoia), Witnesses...doubtfull as there is no communication network that would allow the info to be passed in a matter of a few minutes to the UPDF (CAR, GARAMBA and Southern Sudan are not "communication and IT" areas). Even so, it would take a 1 to 2 hours to move a UPDF strike force (even with their very few helicopters).
I guess INT collection is mostly done by tracking and scouting on the ground.
The same UPDF small units does both the INT collection and the strike action before the opportunity vanishes, i guess.

About sources inside the UPDF, it seems dubious. First, as explained above, with small search & destroy UPDF squads, the LRA can not have an informant in each one. Second, these sources would have little time to inform the LRA.

I do believe that exLRA troops are involved in the hunt against the LRA (In UPDF's 105th Bn). These know the LRA tactics, habits, acholli languageand the terrain better than most UPDF troops. They are perfect to track down their former kidnappers and most probably would not cooperate with them at all cost...but the very existence of this unit makes it an easy scapegoat if operations fails...("there was an acholli mole").

Only guessing...

M-A Lagrange
11-04-2009, 10:32 PM
There are several problematics in the LRA hunt.
The first one is the leakage of information. One of the parameters is that Kampala is not really playing "franc jeux". Kampala does have many interests in keeping the LRA as an active threat in DRC and in South Sudan. Does not mean they do it but this could be affecting their motivation. Also, if DRC is a chaotic failed state, South Sudan is a unborn dead body. So keeping the LRA active gives a good reason to Kampala to deploy troops up to CAR. I would call that the Rwandan strategy.
The second thing is that LRA released an important number of former members. When they are not integrated into UPDF, they are sent back home or to the refugees camps in South Sudan by the UN. They receive no psychological support, no reintegration programs… Even UPDF is complaining about UNICEF Sh@@ty work.
As former LRA members cannot reintegrate, they replicate what Kony taught them for a living.

Hope this helps to understand the mess.

davidbfpo
11-05-2009, 06:05 PM
Hurrah!
Senior Lord's Resistance Army commander Charles Arop, who was implicated in leading a massacre on Christmas Day that killed at least 143 Congolese, has surrendered to the Ugandan military, the army spokesman told AFP on Thursday.

"He was only left with one fighter so what choice did he have?" Lieutenant-Colonel Felix Kulayigye said, adding that Arop surrendered on Tuesday to Ugandan forces stationed in the northeast of the Democractic Republic of Congo.

http://news.yahoo.com/s/afp/20091105/wl_africa_afp/ugandadrcongorebelsunrest

davidbfpo

Tom Odom
11-06-2009, 07:22 AM
Hurrah!

http://news.yahoo.com/s/afp/20091105/wl_africa_afp/ugandadrcongorebelsunrest

davidbfpo

I vote for reintegration as fertilizer :wry:

James Bean
11-26-2009, 03:04 PM
Yeah Arop was captured. Like his unit, he is a fragment.

LRA is still around. Like the election in 2011, and the Sth Sudan Referendum next year.They're there too! I'm sure LRA will be a pest in either case.

The Red Pepper (local Ugandan tabloid) reported yesterday that Konyi has oedema. I reckon he could still move pretty quickly on chubby stumps though...

As I see it, LRA went 'regional' a few years back; perhaps the generic DDR a la Arica model might have worked on a sub-regional insurgency in Acholiland. Now the situation is far more complex.

Getting a balance of IO, UPDF military ops, and a believable sense of progress in Acholiland is really hard. That said, UPDF has arrested 20-odd different insurgencies since '86.

For starters, the usual donor-driven Mack truck with a 70cc Honda engine is predictably not making much progress from Kampala heading for Gulu...can't even get the f--kin thing out of the office it's so full of sh-t!

Visibility is all about "Brought to you by <insert your favourite NGO>". Objective-focused IO is not happening, leaving government looking incompetent. To those who understand recovery, reintegration, and stabilization; making government look incompetent - directly or indirectly - is plain wrong.

Loads of the usual infrastructure-for-all, HIV, GBV, quick-fix programmes that are basically paliative. Most of the NGOs implement-to-form virtually ignoring what is an incredibly dynamic socio-cultural, political, and trauma-riven context.

It will take a lot more imagination, effort, and resources than this to shift Uganda from a 'between-conflict context' to a 'post-conflict context'.

I have written a couple of reports as part of our reintegration work that might interest you folks:

http://uganda.iom.int/publications.htm

Jedburgh
11-30-2009, 07:51 PM
IPI, 25 Nov 09: From Uganda to the Congo and Beyond: Pursuing the Lord's Resistance Army
(http://www.ipinst.org/media/pdf/publications/e_pub_uganda_to_congo.pdf)

In 2008, the Ugandan military pursued the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), a northern Ugandan rebel group, into neighboring Congo during the military incursion known as “Operation Lightning Thunder.” This paper provides the historical context for this pursuit, including the historical background of the northern Uganda war that produced the LRA, and an analysis of the Juba peace process that began in 2006 and unraveled over the course of 2008.

The paper also examines the three months of “Operation Lightning Thunder,” focusing on official statements, press and NGO reports, and a newsmagazine report that first appeared in June 2009 challenging the official Ugandan version of events.

Finally, the paper explores what might come next that could contribute to peace and stability in northern Uganda and the region as a whole.

M-A Lagrange
12-21-2009, 09:56 AM
Congo LRA Rebels Threaten Attacks During Christmas
http://www.easybourse.com/bourse/actualite/congo-lra-rebels-threaten-attacks-during-christmas-group-775146

UN Congo force put on alert against LRA rebel threat – AfricaTimesNews
The U.N. peacekeeping force in Congo has put its soldiers on high alert after reports that Ugandan rebels are threatening to carry out mass killings of the kind they conducted last Christmas, a spokesman said on Friday.
Ugandan Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) rebels, who murdered over 800 civilians around Christmas and early January last year, have threatened a fresh wave of attacks despite a year of multi-national military operations against them, analysts warn.
“We are taking things seriously,” said Kevin Kennedy, head of public information for the U.N.’s Congo peacekeeping mission. Kennedy said information about the threats by the rebels had been passed on by aid workers in recent days and weeks.

Xmass, bloody Xmass… says the song :eek:

Steve the Planner
12-21-2009, 12:20 PM
James Message:

"Visibility is all about "Brought to you by <insert your favourite NGO>". Objective-focused IO is not happening, leaving government looking incompetent. To those who understand recovery, reintegration, and stabilization; making government look incompetent - directly or indirectly - is plain wrong.

Loads of the usual infrastructure-for-all, HIV, GBV, quick-fix programmes that are basically paliative. Most of the NGOs implement-to-form virtually ignoring what is an incredibly dynamic socio-cultural, political, and trauma-riven context.

It will take a lot more imagination, effort, and resources than this to shift Uganda from a 'between-conflict context' to a 'post-conflict context'."

Gee, could we insert XXXX for Uganda and have this story be universal.

M-A Lagrange
12-30-2009, 11:43 AM
FARDC captures 6 LRA rebels in Duru:
Capt Alex Ochen was capture with 5 others by the FARDC on 18 and 20 December 2009.
full article (in french): http://www.digitalcongo.net/article/63531

Some good news in fact.

carl
01-05-2010, 02:47 AM
The Ugandan Army reports that Bok Abudema was killed recently by the UPDF in the Central African Republic.

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8437886.stm

This seems another in a slow but steady stream of LRA commanders being killed or captured. It is interesting they appear to be going down alone or with only one or two followers. Perhaps the UPDF has figured out what to do and is doing it.

davidbfpo
01-07-2010, 10:26 PM
I caught this BBC radio report AM today and it is bad: http://news.bbc.co.uk/today/hi/today/newsid_8444000/8444884.stm

Item is at 0743hrs and is four minutes long:
Ritual killings of children in Uganda may be more common than previously thought, a BBC investigation has found. Tim Whewell reports from northern Uganda.

I hope this is available beyond the UK.

davidbfpo
01-09-2010, 02:45 PM
The earlier BBC item featured Thursday night on BBC Newsnight: http://www.bbc.co.uk/iplayer/episode/b00pv1lc/Newsnight_07_01_2010/ and since there are often problems with viewing - this item has text and an IPOD radio broadcast:http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/newsnight/8441813.stm

Cross-reference made on another thread where issue has appeared, from Post No.22 onwards, amidst an exchange:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=2038&page=2

carl
01-25-2010, 02:58 AM
The quote below is from this story

http://allafrica.com/stories/200912300068.html

in allafrica.com. I thought it interesting because it may shine a little light on how the UPDF is going after the the LRA.


Samuel Obali, who surrendered in November, said they were also forced to surrender because of the constant pursuit by the UPDF forces in the CAR, DR-Congo and Southern Sudan. We had no food, water, medicine and lacked communication with the central command. We had to organise ourselves and surrender to the Congolese Armed Forces in order to survive.

davidbfpo
03-27-2010, 10:16 PM
Evidence of the massacre (by the LRA) of at least 321 people in Democratic Republic of Congo has been uncovered by the BBC.

Link:http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/8587305.stm

Rex Brynen
03-28-2010, 01:41 AM
DR Congo: Lord’s Resistance Army Rampage Kills 321 (http://www.hrw.org/node/89348)
Regional Strategy Needed to End Rebel Group’s Atrocities and Apprehend Leaders

Human Rights Watch
MARCH 28, 2010
Anneke Van Woudenberg, senior Africa researcher


(Kampala) - The rebel Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) killed at least 321 civilians and abducted 250 others, including at least 80 children, during a previously unreported four-day rampage in the Makombo area of northeastern Democratic Republic of Congo in December 2009, Human Rights Watch said in a report released today.

"The Makombo massacre is one of the worst ever committed by the LRA in its bloody 23-year history, yet it has gone unreported for months," said Anneke Van Woudenberg, senior Africa researcher at Human Rights Watch. "The four-day rampage demonstrates that the LRA remains a serious threat to civilians and is not a spent force, as the Ugandan and Congolese governments claim."

The 67-page report, "Trail of Death: LRA Atrocities in Northeastern Congo (http://www.hrw.org/node/89324)," is the first detailed documentation of the Makombo massacre and other atrocities by the LRA in Congo in 2009 and early 2010. The report, based on a Human Rights Watch fact-finding mission to the massacre area in February, documents the brutal killings during the well-planned LRA attack from December 14 to 17 in the remote Makombo area of Haute Uele district.

Michael F
03-29-2010, 02:24 PM
I've been reading this report and a few things AMAZE me:

First, it took 12 weeks for MONUC to send an enquiry team. They say it was because of the remoteness of the killings grounds but it seems like a STUPId excuse: The FARDC and UPDF had troops there 2 days after the massacre (and they went on foot, MONUC has helicopters), refugees from this area have been flooding the city of Niangara (2 days of walk from the killing grounds)...so MONUC can't do with helicopters or on foot what FARDC, UPDF or civilians can do ?????

Second, MONUC knew end Dec 09, UPDF, FARDC a few days before,....and they kept on saying the LRA was "neutralized", with Rudia II being a "mop up" operation. These were overoptimistic statements despite knowing the truth ? a Lie thus ?????

Finally, the LRA now has some 200 new recruits via this operation and has proven to be able to do a lot of damage in a very short time. The months before, they were walking around in the same area without being hindered by any UPDF-FARDC actions (despite UPDF or FARDC forces never more than 50 Km from them).

My conclusion, everybody kept on saying the LRA was neutralized in DRC but knew it was false. Rudia II failed completely and MONUC, FARDC, UPDF (AFRICOM?) refused to admit it publicly.

Knowing the LRA, their next attack would be even more violent to make sure no "cover up" is possiblle.

M-A Lagrange
03-29-2010, 02:31 PM
"The population in DRC is not concentrated. So, for the LRA to get time to collect 300 people and kill them, they need days not hours to do so," he said, adding: "In Barlonyo, they were able to kill about 200 because people were in an IDP camp. What about people settled in their villages in a forested region?"
Col. Kulayigye wondered whether the Congo army would not have got wind of LRA activities within those four days and gone to rescue its people. He said the UPDF intelligence indicates that the LRA has less than 200 fighters who have no capacity to kill with impunity.
http://allafrica.com/stories/201003290001.html

Personally, I hate whem officials denie killings in Africa. It always reminds me the sentence: in those countries (African countries), massacres does not count...

But unfortunatelly, may be we do have copy cats there...:(

Michael F
03-30-2010, 09:27 AM
Personally, I hate whem officials denie killings in Africa. It always reminds me the sentence: in those countries (African countries), massacres does not count...

But unfortunatelly, may be we do have copy cats there...:(

The HRW clearly states that FARDC have been informed of the LRA incursion 02 days after it started and immediately informed the UPDF. Both UPDf and FARDC immediately dispatched local small units to the area and reached it 02 days later.

UPDF is trying to shift the blame for its inefficiency to the FARDC (an easy usual suspect in that matter).

Also, the fact that the information about those massacres only leaked now (12 weeks after FARDC, UPDF, MONUC and others...knew) is for me a clear prove of a cover up. Now it has been leaked they can only minimize it.

BTW it doesn't really matter as the US Senate already passed its LRA bill giving Kampala more money and FOA in that matter.

M-A Lagrange
03-30-2010, 02:30 PM
"These claims of massacres coming almost four months late are yet another fabrication by NGOs, which are advocating war," Justine Labeja, LRA’s Nairobi-based spokesman, told Reuters.
"Yes, we are in Congo but we have no problem with the Congolese people or its government and we continue to call for a ceasefire to end this war," he further said.
The rebel official also slammed the United Nations saying they want to use their group to justify their return into Congo. "The U.N. are being kicked out of Congo against their will but they now want to use us as an excuse to stay there," he said.
http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article34588

Now, all this is becoming silly. The LRA can now denie its participation into those massacres. Thanks UPDF... :mad:
Well thanks also to MONUC to be SO efficient! :eek:
Unfortunately, no one is expecting anything from FARDC and that's may be the best thing.

M-A Lagrange
04-06-2010, 02:38 PM
LRA Rebel Pins Sudan On Support

Kampala — THE Sudan government is in touch with the Lord's Resistance Army command and has given the rebels fresh supplies of food and medicines, a captured commander has said.
The LRA political commissar, Okello 'Mission', told journalists in Kampala that he was part of the LRA team that trekked to the Darfur region in Sudan where they met officers of the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) on October 4, 2009.
He said their delegation was led by Caesar Acellam and they met with the SAF brigade commander in Darfur, Col. Hamdou, and an un-named lieutenant colonel said to be the regional chief of intelligence.
He said Khartoum solicited for the meeting.
"The subject of the discussion was to resume the partnership with the government of Sudan," Okello Mission said.



Okello Mission, 30, was captured by UPDF soldiers at Ezo in Southern Sudan after a brief shoot-out in the evening of March 31. Okello was in a unit of 10 rebels, led by Felly Otimi, an escort to LRA leader Joseph Kony.
He graduated from Makerere University in 2004 with a bachelor's degree in computer science and joined the LRA as a peace negotiator in 2006. A relative of Kony, he hails from Lalogi in Gulu district and holds a Democratic Party (DP) membership card.
He joined the Juba peace talks at the same time with Santa Okot, Peter Obina, Yusuf Adek and Quinto Kidega. He said he remained with the rebels to explain the draft final peace agreement to Kony.


http://allafrica.com/stories/201004060006.html

An interesting article on the LRA. I really recommend it for all those who follow the question.

carl
04-12-2010, 01:22 AM
Here is a link to a New York Times story and video about the Ugandan army's continuing effort to kill the LRA.

http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/11/world/africa/11lra.html

The video has two brief scenes of the air support being given. One scene shows a mighty AN-2 being refueled by chunky anglo guys who I would bet 12 dollars are either Russians or Ukranians, Africa standard. The other scene shows a P68 Observer, not a common aircraft, being started up by its' crew, one of whom was a young anglo guy in what looked like a military flight suit. That guy did not look at all like a Russian.

davidbfpo
04-13-2010, 06:24 AM
Here is a link to a New York Times story and video about the Ugandan army's continuing effort to kill the LRA.

http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/11/world/africa/11lra.html


Carl,

I was struck by the reported use of ex-LRA members to hunt their former comrades:
In an unorthodox strategy that could help end this seemingly pointless war, the Ugandan Army is deploying special squads of experienced killers to track down the L.R.A.’s leader...These soldiers...are former L.R.A. fighters themselves, and just about all of them were abducted as children. They recently surrendered... the decision was the Ugandans’ and that in this case, as one American officer put it, “these guys may be some of the best they got.”

The battlefield statistics seem to bear this out. In the past 18 months, American officials say, the Ugandan Army has killed or captured more than half of Mr. Kony’s men, including his finance and communications officers, as well as several other high-ranking commanders.

I don't recall seeing this before; whilst it is a standard COIN tactic having read many of the Rhodesian threads of late perhaps I was more alert when reading this.

Plus the NYT video links failed for me.

carl
04-13-2010, 02:03 PM
David:

Maybe this link will work. It goes directly to the video.

http://video.nytimes.com/video/2010/04/10/world/africa/1247467554547/on-the-hunt-for-joseph-kony.html?th&emc=th

I wonder it they have tried or if it would be practicable to use Pygmy trackers in the effort. Those guys are pretty good.

davidbfpo
04-13-2010, 07:03 PM
Carl,

Thanks that link worked and yes the pilot footage is intriguing.

Michael F
04-29-2010, 08:01 AM
The NEW ICG report on the LRA. A MUST READ

http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/horn-of-africa/uganda/157%20LRA%20-%20A%20Regional%20Strategy%20beyond%20Killing%20Ko ny.ashx

M-A Lagrange
05-11-2010, 08:52 AM
Uganda Army Seeks More Funding To Flush LRA Rebels Out of Congo, CAR

Publié le 06 Mai 2010 Copyright © 2010 Dowjones - KAMPALA Uganda -(Dow Jones)-

The Ugandan army wants the government to increase its budget allocation to enable it to pursue and flush out remnants of the notorious rebels of Lord's Resistance Army from northeastern Congo and the Central African Republic, Uganda's defense minister said.
Crispus Kiyonga said in a ministerial presentation to Parliament Wednesday that the army requires an additional budget allocation of 25 billion Ugandan shillings ($12.5 million) in the current fiscal year ending in June to boost its logistical supplies and pursue the LRA in the resource-rich areas.
"This funding is required as a matter of urgency; the LRA is still active in Congo and the Central African Republic," he said, adding that the money would be spent to buy soldiers' uniforms, medicine and arms.
The Ugandan army has already been allocated UGX457 billion for the current fiscal year.
The LRA has waged an insurgency, targeting mainly civilians in northern Uganda, northeastern Congo as well as the Central African Republic for over two decades and its leader, Joseph Kony, is wanted by the International Criminal Court for war crimes.
According to analysts, the continued presence of Ugandan rebels in the volatile eastern and northeastern areas of Congo is a threat to security in Uganda's oil-rich Lake Albert basin, where commercial oil production is slated to start later next year.
Mediators are also trying to convince the remnants of the Allied Democratic Forces, which has bases in eastern Congo, to sign a peace accord with government ahead of planned oil production. In 2007, the ADF invaded the oil region but was swiftly repulsed by the Ugandan army.

http://www.easybourse.com/bourse/actualite/news/827990/uganda-army-seeks-more-funding-to-flush-lra-rebels-out-of-congo-car.html

M-A Lagrange
05-16-2010, 03:52 PM
US lawmakers pass legislation to end LRA rebels atrocities


"I urge President Obama to sign this bill into law and quickly develop a plan to stop Joseph Kony and the LRA from committing further atrocities by bringing a lasting resolution to this conflict," said Senators Russ Feingold who is one of the Congressmen who introduced the bill.
"The removal of Kony and his top leadership would decapitate this group. This legislation ensures US leadership in making that happen. The day can’t come soon enough," said Rep. Ed Royce, a former Africa subcommittee chairman.
The House of Representatives passed the Lord’s Resistance Army Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery Act of 2009 (S.1067) by voice vote. This vote constitutes the most significant action Congress has taken to date to end the LRA’s long reign of terror and restore lasting peace for the central African communities devastated by war.
http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article35064

M-A Lagrange
05-25-2010, 07:20 PM
Obama signs US law to help Uganda fight LRA rebels
May 25th, 2010
by AfricaTimes.
President Barack Obama on Monday signed a law aimed at helping Uganda and its neighbors combat the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), a rebel group that has brutalized Central Africa for decades.
Obama called the LRA’s actions — killing, raping, kidnapping children to serve as child soldiers — “an affront to human dignity” that must be stopped.
The Lord’s Resistance Army Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery Act of 2009 is designed to provide humanitarian aid to Uganda and neighboring states, to support regional efforts to end the conflict and to bring LRA leaders to justice.
“The legislation crystallizes the commitment of the United States to help bring an end to the brutality and destruction that have been a hallmark of the LRA across several countries for two decades,” he said in a statement.
The Ugandan rebel group has killed and abducted people on a regular basis for the last 23 years, from Uganda, Sudan, Central African Republic and Democratic Republic of Congo, Human Rights Watch noted in a report in March.
The U.N. says the LRA killed more than 1,200 people in a 10-month period throughout 2008 and 2009, while Human Rights Watch said a massacre in the remote northeast killed 321 people in December.
The U.S. military’s African Command (Africom) provides communications, logistical and intelligence support for Uganda’s national army in its pursuit of the LRA.
Reuters.
http://www.africa-times-news.com/2010/05/obama-signs-us-law-to-help-uganda-fight-lra-rebels/

Bravo!

Rex Brynen
07-16-2010, 06:23 PM
While I appreciate that motivation is 9 tenths of the matter would an investment into training the TGF troops not provide a better return on investment rather than bring in "foreign Christians" from Uganda to try to do the job?

There are a number of options as to how this training may be approached and I am wondering what if anything along these lines has be attempted?

This has been, and is being tried--as publicly evidenced by the abduction of two French security advisors last year (http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/world/french-agent-marc-aubrieres-amazing-barefoot-escape-through-mogadishu/story-e6frg6so-1225767742461). You're right, however, that security in Somalia--if it ever comes--will have to rest on Somali shoulders.

It doesn't help, of course, that not all of the TFG troops are sure what side they are on, or necessarily care!

As for the Ugandans, they have had some moderate (but limited) successes against the LRA. However, as northern Uganda has become increasingly less hospitable, the LRA have moved between south Sudan, DR Congo, and the CAR--which complicates things immensely.

carl
07-17-2010, 01:49 AM
My comment on the Ugandan army is based on their inability in their own country to deal with LRA which apparently comprises a majority of child soldiers.

I was told by Ugandan guy I know who was a recon platoon leader in one of the Ugandan factions during the 80s wars that the LRA should not be taken lightly. Child soldiers or no, stone cold evil or no, he said they know what they are doing.

Also during late 2005 or early 2006, the LRA beat the brains out of a Guatemalan army unit, part of MONUC, that was trying to track them down. That happened in northeast DRC.

Rex Brynen
07-17-2010, 02:16 AM
Also during late 2005 or early 2006, the LRA beat the brains out of a Guatemalan army unit, part of MONUC, that was trying to track them down. That happened in northeast DRC.

January 2006--a Guatemalan Special Forces unit. They lost eight dead when they were ambushed by the LRA in Garamba National Park.

JMA
07-17-2010, 09:34 PM
January 2006--a Guatemalan Special Forces unit. They lost eight dead when they were ambushed by the LRA in Garamba National Park.

There seems to be little out there on the incident. How many were in this unit and had they acclimatised and orientated themselves to an African jungle?

davidbfpo
07-17-2010, 10:07 PM
JMA,

Try Google with: "Garamba National Park" + MONUC + Guatemala. That found over four hundred results and the first few pages show several potentially useful sites to check.

JMA
07-18-2010, 07:03 AM
JMA,

Try Google with: "Garamba National Park" + MONUC + Guatemala. That found over four hundred results and the first few pages show several potentially useful sites to check.

It seems an 80 man recce patrol (out of a force of 105) had a four hour contact with an armed force (thought to be the LRA) in which they suffered 8 KIA and 14 WIA (5 seriously)

However, from this report (http://www.radiorhino.org/htm_material/archiv/audio/broadcasts/news.htm) in the 19 March report a Roman Catholic priest Father Wolgang Schonecke claimed that the majority of the dead bodies found at the scene of the ambush were those of Ugandan regular soldiers.

Then from here (http://www.sundayvision.co.ug/detail.php?mainNewsCategoryId=7&newsCategoryId=132&newsId=495938): A British officer?


Responding to the sound of gunshots, on January 23, Guatemalan UN peacekeepers, commanded by a British officer, went into Garamba National Park to fight the LRA. Instead, eight Guatemalan UN soldiers and 15 LRA were killed in the fighting, about 4km northwest of Aba town. Until that day, MONUC and the Kinshasa government did not admit that the LRA was in Congo. The UN in public statements did not officially identify the attackers as members of the LRA, although UN sources say they were almost certainly part of the group.

Then the UN and others condemned the killing of the "peace-keepers" which is very weird as these troops were on a mission to find and kill LRA members.

More questions than answers.

M-A Lagrange
07-22-2010, 07:49 AM
Then the UN and others condemned the killing of the "peace-keepers" which is very weird as these troops were on a mission to find and kill LRA members.

More questions than answers.

Well, actually it is widely agreed, shared and known that it was LRA. After this incident in 2006, LRA was labelled as "special forces" by the UN and no troops contributors did want to conduct any "find and ..." missions on LRA.

This is way in 2008 and 2009 when the peace talk went wrong MONUC did not respond to LRA killings (800 civillians).
Even more absurd, the MONUC HQ in Kisangany was dismanteled just several weeks before this happened.

JMA
07-22-2010, 10:45 AM
Well, actually it is widely agreed, shared and known that it was LRA. After this incident in 2006, LRA was labelled as "special forces" by the UN and no troops contributors did want to conduct any "find and ..." missions on LRA.

This is way in 2008 and 2009 when the peace talk went wrong MONUC did not respond to LRA killings (800 civillians).
Even more absurd, the MONUC HQ in Kisangany was dismanteled just several weeks before this happened.

The LRA are equivalent to "special forces"? Not sure about that.

Also not sure about what chance of success an 80 patrol would have in a strange and foreign jungle which the hunting grounds of the LRA.

I would assume this operation was an aberration. And there is no military skill in killing 800 civilians.

I need to try and find out more about the results of combat between the LRA and the Ugandan Army. I accept that the leadership of the LRA which has been there for years now has become wily and cunning and they know the terrain like the back of their hands. But that is about as far as I'm prepared to go on this.

M-A Lagrange
07-22-2010, 07:21 PM
The LRA are equivalent to "special forces"? Not sure about that.

Also not sure about what chance of success an 80 patrol would have in a strange and foreign jungle which the hunting grounds of the LRA.

I would assume this operation was an aberration. And there is no military skill in killing 800 civilians.

I need to try and find out more about the results of combat between the LRA and the Ugandan Army. I accept that the leadership of the LRA which has been there for years now has become wily and cunning and they know the terrain like the back of their hands. But that is about as far as I'm prepared to go on this.

JMA,

Take the time to look at the LRA threat (Africa section): http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=7483. It is quite instructive with a lot of links to detailed reports.

Personnaly, I do not think that LRA is a SF but they did kick the UN pretty hard.
And yes, I do not think there is any courage and skills in killing women and children. That's why Kony needs to be put on trial and face what he did.

But we are far from the Chabab bombing in Kampala.

M-A Lagrange
09-07-2010, 06:50 AM
That’s a legitimate question viewing the last development:


LRA rebels kill eight in South Sudan raid, local official saysAround six LRA fighters attacked the market village of Rii-Bodo at about 2:00 am (local time) on Saturday, 4 August, and killed civilians, said Lexon Amozai who is the state director of the Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Commission in Western Equatoria State. The murders took place after an LRA ambush at the nearby Nahua stream.
On Friday, the rebels launched a similar assault on the village of Gangura. "They killed eight people there, among them two women. There were no soldiers deployed there, so they attacked the civilians," Amozai said.
http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article36198


If LRA is on the survival mode and seems to be indestructible, some hints should let us think that things, in fact, are better than they look.
First of all, the SPLA is reinforcing the military network to secure villages since one or two month. Not saying that SPLA is the best army in the area but at least their presence seems to be deterrent enough to force LRA to attack unprotected villages. In Uganda the civil defence did work.
Secondly, the UPDF is still on the hunt.
Is Khartoum supporting LRA? May be, but nothing is sure at this stage. Bashir does have a lot to loose in his partnership with US in supporting LRA.
The last assumptions on LRA are that now it is a self sustained monster. And it does look like it is: no popular support, no territory, no political agenda (part from establishing the overwhelming ruling of Khony on earth…)…

Khony announced he will launch a huge terror campaign. Former LRA said that they were abducting children to prepare it. Now they are no more abducting children but simply killing people. It seems that Khony has his troops reassembled yet. And it’s either a little early or too late to destabilise the referendum.
Last weeks, Acholy civil representatives asked Reik Machir to restart negotiations with Khony. The answer was clear: NO. And Uganda will never accept that LRA comes back.

My personal opinion (and I can be wrong on this) is that LRA is trying a final push to not been forgotten and be the complete looser of the Sudan peace process.
Do they have a disturbing poweron Sudan 2011 referendum: certainly.
Are they a major threat? They are more an annoying problem for everyone than anything. Cause: what will you do with them after January 2011. Killing them and catching Khony has not been that easy yet.

davidbfpo
10-20-2010, 08:49 AM
A number of central African countries overwhelmed by the brutal attacks and mounting regional destabilization caused by the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) have established a comprehensive plan to combat the rebel group. Ministers from Uganda, Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and the Central African Republic agreed Friday in a meeting in Bangui, the capital of the latter, to create a joint military task force, centre of operations, and border patrol capacity, all to be supervised by a representative from the African Union.

Leaving aside practicalities and the diplomatic achievement, who is paying for this?

Just maybe the clue is in the closing sentences:
In an interesting development, a recent piece of legislation passed by the US Senate and currently before the US House of Representatives requires the White House to ‘develop a regional strategy to protect civilians in central Africa from attacks by the LRA, work to apprehend the LRA leadership, and support economic recovery for northern Uganda’. It was passed unanimously, though it remains to be seen what effect any such policy will have on the conflict if enacted into law.

Link:http://www.opendemocracy.net/opensecurity/daniel-c-giacopelli/regional-military-force-established-to-crack-down-on-lord%E2%80%99s-resista

jmm99
10-20-2010, 03:57 PM
The linked article seems a few months behind the times. S. 1067: Lord's Resistance Army Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery Act of 2009 (http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=s111-1067), was signed into law 24 May 2010, proving that we (US) have lost none of our Wilsonian rhetoric:


A bill to support stabilization and lasting peace in northern Uganda and areas affected by the Lord's Resistance Army through development of a regional strategy to support multilateral efforts to successfully protect civilians and eliminate the threat posed by the Lord's Resistance Army and to authorize funds for humanitarian relief and reconstruction, reconciliation, and transitional justice, and for other purposes.

Here are the Summary (http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=s111-1067&tab=summary) (CRS) and Full Text (http://www.govtrack.us/congress/billtext.xpd?bill=s111-1067).

The "Strategy Section" in the full text:


SEC. 4. REQUIREMENT OF A STRATEGY TO SUPPORT THE DISARMAMENT OF THE LORD’S RESISTANCE ARMY.

(a) Requirement for Strategy- Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall develop and submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a strategy to guide future United States support across the region for viable multilateral efforts to mitigate and eliminate the threat to civilians and regional stability posed by the Lord’s Resistance Army.

(b) Content of Strategy- The strategy shall include the following:

(1) A plan to help strengthen efforts by the United Nations and regional governments to protect civilians from attacks by the Lord’s Resistance Army while supporting the development of institutions in affected areas that can help to maintain the rule of law and prevent conflict in the long term.

(2) An assessment of viable options through which the United States, working with regional governments, could help develop and support multilateral efforts to eliminate the threat posed by the Lord’s Resistance Army.

(3) An interagency framework to plan, coordinate, and review diplomatic, economic, intelligence, and military elements of United States policy across the region regarding the Lord’s Resistance Army.

(4) A description of the type and form of diplomatic engagement across the region undertaken to coordinate and implement United States policy regarding the Lord’s Resistance Army and to work multilaterally with regional mechanisms, including the Tripartite Plus Commission and the Great Lakes Pact.

(5) A description of how this engagement will fit within the context of broader efforts and policy objectives in the Great Lakes Region.

(c) Form- The strategy under this section shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

To David's bottom line, the bill does not provide separate funding for these tasks. It states Congress's "sense" (a debatable issue) that up to $ 10 million US be spent annually by DoS from its general appropriations.


SEC. 9. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON FUNDING.

It is the sense of Congress that--

(1) of the total amounts to be appropriated for fiscal year 2011 for the Department of State and foreign operations, up to $10,000,000 should be used to carry out activities under section 5; and

(2) of the total amounts to be appropriated for fiscal year 2011 through 2013 for the Department of State and foreign operations, up to $10,000,000 in each such fiscal year should be used to carry out activities under section 7.
Thus, "the check is in the mail" so to speak.

I'd be curious about the views of others with knowledge and experience re: the capabilities of Uganda, Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and the Central African Republic to form and effective military coalition.

Regards

Mike

carl
10-20-2010, 06:46 PM
The main effect of a regional alliance I am guessing, would be just to give diplomatic cover to whomever actually does the the job. They have agreed to all kinds of things but I wonder if the main thing is they agree not to squawk about whatever kind of force is wandering around their territory.

I don't know anything about the armed forces of the CAR or South Sudan. The FARDC is completely hopeless. The Ugandans have done well enough it seems over the past year or two. So it comes down to the Ugandans and extra logistical support that may be given by us. All a guess on my part.

That strategy section of S. 1067 seems like it was copied from some international government textbook. There is nothing much out there, just people in villages living hand to mouth, tracks not roads-not much of anything. I don't know how all those points are going to apply in that part of the world.

davidbfpo
10-30-2010, 10:20 PM
Hat tip to Abu M for a comment on those who advocate the USA taking an active role in hunting the LRA: http://www.cnas.org/blogs/abumuqawama/2010/10/us-military-intervention-central-africa-further-review-still-really-bad-id

A linked blog has some more comments and intriguing information:http://tachesdhuile.blogspot.com/2010/10/ignorance-about-africa-part-i-when.html and then a more recent post:http://tachesdhuile.blogspot.com/2010/10/us-intervention-in-central-africa.html

From which I cite:
However, Ex is absolutely right to use Kilcullen's four questions as a starting point:

There are four questions we should ask when considering whether or not the United States should engage in an international intervention:

1. Will an intervention make the situation better, or worse?

2. If better, should the U.S. government participate in this intervention?

3. If yes, should the U.S. government lead this intervention?

4. If yes, what should the U.S. government do?

But both Ex and those who've rallied around him have continued to use strawmen arguments and inaccurate assertions to avoid actually addressing these questions.

The arguments then continue.

My own personal question is why is the USA the only power seen as able to intervene?

M-A Lagrange
12-09-2010, 06:43 AM
US strategy on the LRA - breakdown of key sections
US strategy on the LRA - breakdown of key sections
Resolve’s highlights and a brief breakdown of the strategy, including actions listed as priorities for implementation:
Vision: “Though the challenge is complex, the vision remains simple: people in central Africa are free from the threat of LRA violence and have the freedom to pursue their livelihoods."
Purpose: The strategy does not contain much detail about specific action steps, instead providing an "overarching, comprehensive strategy direction over several years to... increase the likelihood of success in mitigating and eliminating the threat posed by the LRA." (Upcoming Congressional decisions on levels of funding will help determine how robustly the strategy is implemented and hence specific action steps.)
Four main objectives (and summary of sub-objectives):
1. Increase protection of civilians
Improve sharing of information for understanding threats and vulnerabilities of civilian population as a result of LRA presence, and for supporting and developing effective protection strategies and interventions.
Promote the increase in physical security of vulnerable civilian populations through the presence and action of protection actors.
Strengthen the understanding of the LRA threat and the will and capabilities of key actors to support efforts to protect civilians and prevent and mitigate LRA attacks.
2. Apprehend or remove from the battlefield Joseph Kony and senior LRA commanders
Provide enhanced integrated logistical, operational, and intelligence assistance in support of regional and multilateral partners.
Enhance and sustain diplomatic efforts to coordinate and encourage support for multilateral and regional military forces in their efforts to counter the LRA and to deny any potential support to the LRA from outside actors.
3. Promote the defection, disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of remaining LRA fighters
Ensure continued multilateral support to efforts to promote defections of LRA fighters and non-combatants through radio programs, leaflets, and other communication.
Work with regional governments, MONUSCO, and other international actors to ensure necessary facilities and procedures are in place to receive defectors and transport them to desired home locations.
Support the provision of enhanced medical, social, and economic reintegration assistance to demobilized LRA members and receiving communities.
4. Increase humanitarian access and provide continued relief to affected communities
Humanitarian agencies provide minimum standards of life-saving support to LRA-affected populations.
Promote increased access and infrastructure for the delivery of humanitarian services.
Humanitarian agencies support early recovery activities, including transition support and livelihood support for LRA-affected populations.
Priority actions for immediate implementation
Increase physical access and telecommunications
including road and airstrip rehabilitation and telecommunications expansion, with focus on LRA-affected areas of CAR and DRC
Increase mobility and access of civilian protection actors in LRA-affected areas
mentions need to increase mobility of "humanitarian and civilian protection partners, including peacekeeping missions"
Enhance coordination of civilian actors and sharing of information across borders
Enhance the coordination and collaboration of forces in LRA-affected areas
mentions need for coordination between national militaries and peacekeeping missions
Increase opportunities for LRA fighters and associated persons to safely defect and escape
Multilateral engagement
The strategy mentions the October AU conference on the LRA in Bangui and "applauds AU engagement and regional leadership and coordination to address the LRA threat"
The strategy highlights three priorities for US engagement at the UN Security Council as, 1. ensuring relevant peacekeeping missions are "resourced appropriately to fulfill their mandates," 2. encourage the UN political office for Central Africa to strengthen regional and international cooperation on the LRA, and 3. support the deployment of UN humanitarian staff to LRA-affected areas.
The strategy also states an intention to continue engagement with the Office of the EU Special Representative, the World Bank’s TDRP-led LRA working group, and the Great Lakes Contact Group.
The strategy says "Any effective strategy cannot exclusively rely on one military force..." It also acknowledges that there is no guarantee Ugandan military operations against the LRA will continue and highlights the necessity of developing broader support and capacity among regional and international actors to address the crisis (though few specific details are provided).
Other notes of importance
The strategy acknowledges that “there is no purely military solution to the LRA threat and impact.”
The strategy highlights that additional support to the UPDF for LRA operations will happen in parallel with efforts to encourage professionalization of the UPDF and diplomatic efforts to encourage the Ugandan government and UPDF to respect human rights, democracy and good governance in Uganda.
The strategy mentions that "local outreach" is an important component of pursuing the strategy’s objectives, but does not provide detail on how this will be done.
The strategy also outlines continued US efforts to promote comprehensive reconstruction, transitional justice, and reconciliation in northern Uganda (see annex 3).
http://www.sudantribune.com/US-strategy-on-the-LRA-breakdown,37153

If someone has an open source for a more comprehensive doc, please PM me.

carl
12-09-2010, 04:05 PM
M-A:

Do you have any idea who they are speaking of when they say "civilian protection actors" and "civilian protection partners"?

nativebuddha
12-09-2010, 04:44 PM
Also there are good reports on former abducted children trained by LRA integrated into LRA hunt.

Are you saying that former LRA child soldiers are being used to fight the LRA?

Working for whom? Museveni?

davidbfpo
12-27-2010, 09:20 PM
An academic commentary from Perspectives on Terrorism:http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php?option=com_rokzine&view=article&id=145&Itemid=54

The introduction summary ends with:
It is concluded that the LRA is too ambiguous an organisation to be simply labelled in such a way. It is also suggested that the terrorism label has in fact been an obstacle to attempts to end successfully a confrontation that is now going into its 24th year.

Worth reading just to get this:
Gettleman ties this lack of ideology to the intractability of many of the current conflicts in Africa. Indeed, he uses the LRA as 'probably the most disturbing example’ of these new kinds of conflict, asking:

Even if you could coax them out of their jungle lairs and get them to a negotiating table, there is very little to offer them. They don’t want ministries or tracts of land to govern. Their armies are often traumatized children, with experience and skills (if you can call them that) totally unsuited for civilian life. All they want is cash, guns, and a license to rampage. And they’ve already got all three. How do you negotiate with that?

Citing:J. Gettleman. (2010) ‘Africa’s Forever Wars: Why the continent’s conflict never seem to end,’ Foreign Policy, March/April 2010.

The author concludes:
The case of the LRA should serve as a warning of both the difficulties of establishing whether a group in a conflict zone is truly a terrorist organisation and of the harm that such a label may cause when it comes to conflict resolution.

carl
12-28-2010, 01:54 AM
David:

You know more about the 100 Years War than I do. Do you think the LRA can be seen as something akin to the armed bands that wandered about France during that war?

davidbfpo
12-28-2010, 01:04 PM
Carl,

You are stretching my historical knowledge there! I can just about remember reading 'The White Company', which referred to the mercenary / bandit groups that meandered around France:http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_White_Company

Secondly, I will defer to Stan, Tom & MA-L our African experts.;)

I am on safer, nearer ground with the long history of large parts of the British Isles through history housing rebels and bandits. Only when roads, garrisons and other measures were taken did the problem abate. Not pleasant either, as Irish and Scottish folk will regale - notably on clearing small farmers from the land.

European and British experiences may not be a good guide for the LRA:eek::D

M-A Lagrange
01-16-2011, 09:01 AM
U.S. says it has no evidence Sudan supporting LRA rebels in Uganda

Karl Wycoff, the U.S. Deputy Assistance Secretary for African Affairs said Friday he has seen no evidence of support from Sudan to the LRA, though he said he was aware of the allegation.
"It’s something we closely monitor," Wycoff said during a telephone conference with journalists according to the Associated Press.
Ugandan army spokesman Felix Kulayigye said Kony has left Darfur and crossed back into Congo. Kulayigye, who did not say when Kony crossed back over, also said Ugandan officials have no evidence of any support to Kony from Khartoum.
http://www.sudantribune.com/U-S-says-it-has-no-evidence-Sudan,37637

The UPDF statement has to be taken with caution; rumors that Kony is still in Khartoum are quite vivace still.

M-A Lagrange
03-08-2011, 07:29 AM
U.S. lawmakers want monitoring of possible aid by Sudan to LRA

Two U.S. lawmakers introduced a bill on Thursday that would require Obama’s administration to ensure that the Sudanese government is not providing support to the notorious Lord Resistance Army (LRA) in Uganda.
This would be the prerequisite for removing the East African nation from the list of countries that sponsor terrorism.
This legislation cosponsored by Rep. Ed Royce (R-CA) and Rep. Jim McGovern (D-MA), requires the White House to certify to Congress that Khartoum is "no longer engaged in training, harboring, supplying, financing, or supporting in any way the Lord’s Resistance Army, its leader Joseph Kony, or his top commanders".
"Last year, bipartisan legislation was signed into law requiring the Administration to devise a strategy to end the LRA’s atrocities. The strategy promises to ensure the LRA ‘receives no support or safe haven.’ I view this legislation as part of that effort," said Royce, who chairs the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation and Trade.
http://www.sudantribune.com/U-S-lawmakers-want-monitoring-of,38170

An interresting initiative that comes a little late. For many analyst in the sub-region, LRA is now assimilated to banditry and has lost most of its support from Khartoum. But still, this is to be noticed and encourraged.

carl
05-27-2011, 11:51 PM
Stars and Stripes is doing a series of stories on American assistance to the FARDC. The link is to the first of the stories. It is about a rapid reaction battalion being trained by us. The first mission of the battalion will be to deploy to the north and hunt down the LRA.

http://www.stripes.com/trainees-try-to-be-a-force-that-can-overcome-child-abducting-rebels-and-their-own-horrific-past-1.144366

In the photo gallery accompanying the story is a photo of a 65 year old 2nd LT.

Same old Congo it seems. The second story in the series states that when the US ceased supplying the battalion and the FARDC took over supply, the troops went from 3 meals a day to one.

JMA
05-28-2011, 08:06 AM
Stars and Stripes is doing a series of stories on American assistance to the FARDC. The link is to the first of the stories. It is about a rapid reaction battalion being trained by us. The first mission of the battalion will be to deploy to the north and hunt down the LRA.

http://www.stripes.com/trainees-try-to-be-a-force-that-can-overcome-child-abducting-rebels-and-their-own-horrific-past-1.144366

In the photo gallery accompanying the story is a photo of a 65 year old 2nd LT.

Same old Congo it seems. The second story in the series states that when the US ceased supplying the battalion and the FARDC took over supply, the troops went from 3 meals a day to one.

Same old Congo? Maybe the same old mistakes being repeated in Africa?

Carl, this topic could well be a discussion in its own right where one could look at the various formulas for training indigenous African troops by "European" powers and the successes and failures. The US experience extends beyond Africa of course going back many years so one is surprised at the approach.

... I wonder if anyone called Stan and his mates for advice on how to handle this task? Doubt it.

M-A Lagrange
06-13-2011, 01:56 PM
Hello Carl and JMA,

Here is my bet: none did consult Stan or anyother people in charge at that time.
About FARDC training, I have been told it was done through private contractors rather than the US army directly. Does someone have more details on this?

M-A Lagrange
10-05-2011, 08:52 AM
Uganda LRA rebel tracking technology unveiledhttp://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-15173291

The first humanitarian success against LRA :confused:

davidbfpo
10-05-2011, 09:50 AM
MA-L,

Nice idea, but flawed. It is akin to a neighbourhood watch, LRA spotted, messages go out an who responds. In crime reduction "speak" who are the capable guardians? In theory it should be the state, but I expect they have little presence in such villages, nor the means for a rapid 'Fire Force' response.

I dread to think what will happen when say the original spotting village is raided by the LRA, the radio destroyed and the LRA leave. Will other radio users still use the radio?

Now if an air-mobile infantry company was added, that responded to sightings and stayed in villages at random - then I would be happier.

carl
10-05-2011, 01:47 PM
I think this is a good idea. When I was there HF radios were common in the larger towns and various churches in the interior. It appears from the story they are just providing HF to smaller places that didn't have it before. As a tool to defeat the LRA it does need some teeth to back it up, but as a tool to give people enough warning so they have time to flee into the bush, it could save some lives.

It will be more useful than may be imagined in hunting those guys down too. If the UPDF is still walking around the area it will save them a lot of time if they get a report that LRA were seen 8 klics north of someplace yesterday, when that someplace previously couldn't provide any reporting less than 2 weeks old. In this part of the world, you may not need cutting edge technology and helo borne QRFs to make a difference.

M-A Lagrange
10-05-2011, 04:18 PM
David, Carl,

I agree this is just gadget and will not put an end to LRA neither increase population protection. But this is the only part of the US LRA bill and strategy that have been put in place.

The US trained a company of FARDC and equiped them. They were deployed in the Uele but other non trained FARDC got jealous and advenged on the population. (Who said DRC is foxtrot uniform?)

tequila
10-14-2011, 07:32 PM
Obama orders U.S. troops to help chase down African 'army' leader (http://edition.cnn.com/2011/10/14/world/africa/africa-obama-troops/index.html?eref=ft)



Washington (CNN) -- President Barack Obama is sending about 100 U.S. troops to Africa to help hunt down the leaders of the notoriously violent Lord's Resistance Army in and around Uganda.

"I have authorized a small number of combat-equipped U.S. forces to deploy to central Africa to provide assistance to regional forces that are working toward the removal of Joseph Kony from the battlefield," Obama said in letter sent Friday to House Speaker John Boehner and Daniel Inouye, the president pro tempore of the Senate. Kony is the head of the Lord's Resistance Army.

U.S. military personnel advising regional forces working to target Kony and other senior leaders will not engage Kony's forces "unless necessary for self-defense," Obama said.

"I believe that deploying these U.S. armed forces furthers U.S. national security interests and foreign policy and will be a significant contribution toward counter-LRA efforts in central Africa ..."

carl
10-14-2011, 09:37 PM
I only know a very little about how the SF would work this. Can somebody give an outline of what they would do to assist the various forces involved? Would one of the things they might do be to work directly with the FARDC battalion we trained in order to make it actually do something?

jmm99
10-15-2011, 03:25 AM
The President's War Powers Act Notice (http://www.lawfareblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/uganda-WPR.pdf) reads in the parts most pertinent to me - the "jus ad bellum".


In the Lord's Resistance Army Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery Act of 2009, Public Law 111-172, enacted May 24, 2010, the Congress also expressed support for increased, comprehensive U.S. efforts to help mitigate and eliminate the threat posed by the LRA to civilians and regional stability.

In furtherance of the Congress's stated policy, I have authorized a small number of combat-equipped U.S. forces to deploy to central Africa to provide assistance to regional forces that are working toward the removal of Joseph Kony from the battlefield. I believe that deploying these U.S. Armed Forces furthers U.S. national security interests and foreign policy and will be a significant contribution toward counter-LRA efforts in central Africa.
...
I have directed this deployment, which is in the national security and foreign policy interests of the United States, pursuant to my constitutional authority to conduct U.S. foreign relations and as Commander in Chief and Chief Executive. I am making this report as part of my efforts to keep the Congress fully informed, consistent with the War Powers Resolution (Public Law 93-148). I appreciate the support of the Congress in this action.

As discussed in another thread, this decision is non-justiable (not subject to judicial review) - unless Congress objects to the decision.

Links for the Lord's Resistance Army Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery Act of 2009, Public Law 111-172 (http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=s111-1067) and abstract:


S. 1067: Lord's Resistance Army Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery Act of 2009
111th Congress: 2009-2010

A bill to support stabilization and lasting peace in northern Uganda and areas affected by the Lord's Resistance Army through development of a regional strategy to support multilateral efforts to successfully protect civilians and eliminate the threat posed by the Lord's Resistance Army and to authorize funds for humanitarian relief and reconstruction, reconciliation, and transitional justice, and for other purposes.

Sponsor: Sen. Russell Feingold [D-WI]
This bill became law. It was signed by Barack Obama.

Let's see how close this venture comes to the "estimated cost of $28,000,000."; and whether it resembles El Salvador or not.

Regards

Mike

Bill Moore
10-15-2011, 05:48 AM
Posted by Mike,


Let's see how close this venture comes to the "estimated cost of $28,000,000."; and whether it resembles El Salvador or not

From what I read Mike, I wouldn't be looking for an El Salvador model, or any other model, but an appropriate response based on the mission's objectives. If you're looking for model that may come close I suspect it will be the early years of the OEF-Philippines, but still not the same.

I'm glad to see this happening for a number of reasons.

carl
10-15-2011, 01:12 PM
This won't be anything like El Salvador because the situations are not all the same and the LRA isn't anything like the FMLN. The FMLN was, I believe, a classic (as much as anything can be) insurgent group that took advantage of popular grievances to advance itself politically. El Salvador was tiny. The LRA is basically a bandit group that couldn't care less about the people. Its' primary goal is survival and it does that by looting, killing and enslaving so it can survive to loot, kill and enslave some more. It is led by a genius, and evil one but a genius nonetheless. It operates in a huge, a huge area and is good enough at small unit infantry work that it must be taken seriously by anybody, including us, who goes after them.

If this were going to be like anything in the past, I would guess it would be more like Crook following the Apaches into Mexico. As I said, I don't know how SF is going to handle this but maybe they would do something like Crook did, with tiny groups of SF mixed in units of African troops, getting on the trail of LRA groups and staying on the trail come hell or high water until they are run to ground. We provide aerial re-supply so the groups can stay out. Maybe a variation of Fireforce tactics would help also. I'll bet pygmy trackers would help too.

carl
10-15-2011, 02:44 PM
I'm glad to see this happening for a number of reasons.

What are they?

Ken White
10-15-2011, 02:57 PM
Because it's the first step into another series of mistakes. :mad:

We have got to change the process that requires 'missions' and commitment of forces to justify existences -- and budgets; that's just stupid. :rolleyes:

Bob's World
10-15-2011, 04:44 PM
Threat-driven strategy is like 5 year-olds playing soccer.

Fun for others to watch as we wear ourselves out running all over the place not accomplishing much of purpose. We may all get participation trophies that make us feel good, but we won't get a juicebox and a nap at the end...

davidbfpo
10-15-2011, 05:09 PM
I do wonder if a LRA-like group was active outside Africa and in the 'developing world' it would get such attention from the USA. Given AFRICOM's perceived failure to gain traction with African nations, is this LRA action seen as a way of gaining credibility as being there to assist Africa beyond CT?

I base my use of 'AFRICOM's perceived failure' on a discussion in 2010 with two African peacekeeping advisers and their frustration with annual visits pushing the same agenda, with no "beef".

All this aside I wish the small US contingent good luck hunting the LRA.

It would be more impressive if capable African partners could also contribute, idealism lives on!

carl
10-15-2011, 05:13 PM
Threat-driven strategy is like 5 year-olds playing soccer.

Fun for others to watch as we wear ourselves out running all over the place not accomplishing much of purpose. We may all get participation trophies that make us feel good, but we won't get a juicebox and a nap at the end...

Near as I can figure, you don't think this is a good idea.

carl
10-15-2011, 05:16 PM
I do wonder if a LRA-like group was active outside Africa and in the 'developing world' it would get such attention from the USA.

The whole circumstance allowing the LRA to exist is unique. I don't think a group like that could exist anywhere else.

Bob's World
10-15-2011, 05:26 PM
Near as I can figure, you don't think this is a good idea.

Without having done any homework on this particular organization, or the "road to intervention" that has led to this thread, no, in general terms, I do not think this is a good idea.

I suppose if I pulled the string on this I would find a large body of well-developed intelligence products telling me all about why these are bad guys, and making obscure linkages to either AQ, or to some group with linkages to AQ. I suspect I would also find a GCC and TSOC staff tasked to stare hard at Africa for threats to defeat that has deemed this to be a priority for their focus in their assigned AOR (and reporting back that "NSTR" ['nothing significant to report"] is not what Flag-level commanders tend to do. That would indicate that they were insignificant as well. There is little balancing as to how this "threat" stacks against an overall global security picture, only how this "threat" stacks up against other "threats" in their AOR).

No one wants to be idle while others are active, and this does tend to inflate things. Currently every theater has an inflated threat picture, IMO.

carl
10-15-2011, 05:33 PM
Bob's World:

They have nothing at all to do with AQ. They are not a threat to anybody much except the local people they massacre by the hundreds regularly.

I don't know what TSOC or GCC mean.

jmm99
10-15-2011, 07:36 PM
as also to Libya (and Syria), is that it is outside my geographic bounds (Atl. Lit, WH, Pac. Lit).

That being said, I wish US troops good fortune wherever they are - regardless of how boneheaded USG policy happens to be re: that area.

Now, if a similar situation existed, say, in Bolivia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Che_Guevara#Bolivia), I'd probably hold up a green light.

Regards

Mike

carl
10-15-2011, 08:32 PM
At its' heart, it is a humanitarian mission. In that part of the world, the most effective humanitarian assistance that can be given is to kill some people dead. Ergo, the SF is the most capable humanitarian organization available.

I say this at the risk of having Ken launch into orbit never to be seen again.

Fuchs
10-15-2011, 08:36 PM
I am developing a hypothesis to explain U.S. interventions in the world after 1945.

I think its related with a world map and a dart.

Ken White
10-15-2011, 10:05 PM
and that isn't Isch on either count... ;)


At its' heart, it is a humanitarian mission. In that part of the world, the most effective humanitarian assistance that can be given is to kill some people dead. Ergo, the SF is the most capable humanitarian organization available.No, SF is not the most capable humanitarian organization around. Especially not for your purpose -- with which I agree; I just do not agree that it is in the interests of the US to provide that assistance, be it SF or whoever.

We have had people there, this is an excalation andI know how the US government works. Trust me, this is an Elephants trunk -- or a Puff Adder, too early to tell -- worming its way into the tent. This does not bode well... :rolleyes:

Ken White
10-15-2011, 10:06 PM
I think its related with a world map and a dart.Yeah -- but you forgot the blindfold... :( :rolleyes:

Bill Moore
10-15-2011, 11:16 PM
I'm surprised at the number of hostile comments regarding this action. The President called this a crisis of conscience and he absolutely right. In some situations the atrocities are severe enough to make intervention in our collective interests, but I'm confident the spoiled children of Western Europe will remain on the side lines shouting meaningless criticisms (just as they would have if they were aware of the crisis and we chose not to intervene).

Beyond the sound humanitarian reasons to provide this support, in my opinion there are strategic reasons beyond humanitarian that add support to this decision. First Uganda has been a regional partner/friend for years, and they're one of the few countries providing forces to battle the Al-Shabab in Somalia (and were targeted by Al Shabab during the World Cup for their decision to do so). Since when is our national interests not intertwined with our friend's national interests? We asked for support from multiple nations for the war on terror and the efforts in Iraq, so of course other countries also have the right to ask for assistance, and in this case there is no moral ambiguity. Furthermore, unlike our recent adventures mislabeled as COIN in Afghanistan and Iraq (and our support to the resistance in Libya) we're not there to overthrow a government and impose our will, we're there to help multiple nations deal with a transnational christian (self identified as Christian, but not hardly so in most people's view) extremist group that has killed thousands and hindered development efforts for years. Regional stability is in our national interests, and maintaining influence in an increasingly important region of the world (one reasons is to remain competitive with Indian and Chinese influence) is also important. I hope we're not so myopic to believe that the only threat to our national interests is Al Qaeda, nor are we so myopic to believe that every intervention will turn out to be disasters like Afghanistan or Iraq.

More on the next post.

Bill Moore
10-15-2011, 11:29 PM
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/statement-president-signing-lords-resistance-army-disarmament-and-northern-uganda-r


I congratulate Congress for seizing on this important issue, and I congratulate the hundreds of thousands of Americans who have mobilized to respond to this unique crisis of conscience. We have heard from the advocacy organizations, non-governmental organizations, faith-based groups, humanitarian actors who lack access, and those who continue to work on this issue in our own government. We have seen your reporting, your websites, your blogs, and your video postcards -- you have made the plight of the children visible to us all. Your action represents the very best of American leadership around the world, and we are committed to working with you in pursuit of the future of peace and dignity that the people of who have suffered at the hands of the LRA deserve.

One point of interest beyond this specific case is the power of activism to influence this particular White House, but in general there is a growing social awareness and collective action (activism) on a number of issues that will impact our national security objectives.

Back to the LRA specifically. This isn't new, we had Special Forces and other support in Uganda for years, and it wasn't an issue, at least prior to to our election cycle it was agreed to by both political parties for the reasons I stated in my previous post, so the Republicans and the anti-Obama crowd can’t cry foul on this one. Republician Senator Inhofe told GEN Ham he wanted to see this problem resolved during his command tenure.

See the hearing at this link: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Rbh-8QutON0&noredirect=1

AFRICOM Public Affairs:

http://www.africom.mil/getArticle.asp?art=7334


President Barack Obama has authorized the deployment to central Africa of 100 combat-equipped U.S. forces whose mission is to help regional forces fight the notorious Lord's Resistance Army and its leader, Joseph Kony.
During an Oct. 4 military strategy forum, Army Gen. Carter F. Ham, commander of U.S. Africa Command, commented on the LRA.


"If you ever had any question if there's evil in the world, it's resident in the person of Joesph Kony and that organization," Ham said.

Want to learn about the LRA just do a search on utube to get a snap shot. I have been following this group for a while off and on. This insurgency isn't about failed governance, it is about a personalty cult and the inability of the regional nations to neutralize this mass murderer without assistance .


The U.S. military, Ham said, has focused on facilitating intelligence, and in a State Department-led effort, U.S. personnel trained a battalion of the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s armed forces. Ham said the U.S. government was looking to increase support to the counter-LRA efforts by increasing the number of military advisors and trainers and training another battalion.

This is a perfect mission for Special Forces whose motto is "De Oppresso Liber". It is a principle based mission that is achievable and could have long term strategic benefits for the region and U.S. influence there. Like any mission, it can go bad in a number of ways. You have to weigh the potential risks against the potential benefits, but I think they're correctly calculated and wish the combined effort success.

Ken White
10-16-2011, 02:13 AM
I'm surprised at the number of hostile comments regarding this action.Why are you surprised -- I haven't seen a comment yet that is not consistent with long held and stated opinions.
The President called this a crisis of conscience and he absolutely right. In some situations the atrocities are severe enough to make intervention in our collective interests, but I'm confident the spoiled children of Western Europe will remain on the side lines shouting meaningless criticisms (just as they would have if they were aware of the crisis and we chose not to intervene).Unnecessary and incorrect slap at Europe who have intervened in Africa -- correctly; those are their former colonies -- far more than have we. The French virtually keep forces in several areas, the Brits do not stay but they do not hesitate to go when needed. Even the Belgiques, Italians and Portuguese have been and are more involved than the US.

You and the President may call it a crisis of conscience but I beg to differ with both of you. Whose conscience? As you and I both note, we've had people there for years (and not just SF) -- and unstated is the fact that the LRA and Kony have been at it for over 30 years and that Uganda and its neighbors ares not totally clean in this mess -- in any event, this is an escalation * and the timing is deeply suspect. This nation has built a system that virtually requires such commitments to keep things humming; height of foolishness. Ponder all that for a bit...
Beyond the sound humanitarian reasons to provide this support, in my opinion there are strategic reasons beyond humanitarian that add support to this decision. First Uganda has been a regional partner/friend for years, and they're one of the few countries providing forces to battle the Al-Shabab in Somalia (and were targeted by Al Shabab during the World Cup for their decision to do so). Since when is our national interests not intertwined with our friend's national interests?Remind me again what our strategic interest in Somalia is?

Could you go into a bit of detail about that intertwining of interests? What, specifically, are our interests in Africa?
Regional stability is in our national interests, and maintaining influence in an increasingly important region of the world (one reasons is to remain competitive with Indian and Chinese influence) is also important.Please also explain why this is so?

I thought the Cold War was over. Apparently not. Could you outlione to me this influence we have? Influence on a Continent that resoundingly rejected our influences (other than any money or goodies sent...) and has its GCC located on a different Continent because of the lack of influence...
I hope we're not so myopic to believe that the only threat to our national interests is Al Qaeda, nor are we so myopic to believe that every intervention will turn out to be disasters like Afghanistan or Iraq.I, OTOH, hope we are not so myopic as to believe that AQ is a threat, not just simply the annoyance it is; and that we are not so myopic as to believe that the same forces involved in Afghanistan and Iraq when employed by the same government elsewhere are not subject to reinvent a few wheels subject to get mired in local ruts...
One point of interest beyond this specific case is the power of activism to influence this particular White House, but in general there is a growing social awareness and collective action (activism) on a number of issues that will impact our national security objectives.Regrettably, that is a very accurate statement. Thus my comment that this does not bode well. We probably differ on the impacts -- I'm pretty sure they'll be adverse.
Republician Senator Inhofe told GEN Ham he wanted to see this problem resolved during his command tenure.That may not be the most stupid statement by a Senator in the last few years but it's in the top ten. What the good Senator wants and what is achievable may be two very different things. He was showboating, pushing a General in public. If anyone believes the Senator is driven by altruism and concern for Ugandans... :(

I am reminded of Rick Sanchez sitting behind a desk in Baghdad and pounding on it while screaming that he wanted more intel, better results from interrogations.

Folks should be careful what they ask for...
This is a perfect mission for Special Forces whose motto is "De Oppresso Liber". It is a principle based mission that is achievable and could have long term strategic benefits for the region and U.S. influence there.Once again; what's this strategic benefit?

I can see the strategic benefit to SOCOM and SF, I see some for Uganda and friends -- I see little for the US.

In another post above I also mentioned escalation { * ) but spelled it excalation. Freudian slip -- excavate, excalate -- when in a hole, do not dig...:rolleyes:

I'm not all that concerned about Uganda -- my concern is that Trunk or Adder sneaking in the tent -- which nation or nations nearby will be next. Anyone want to bet there won't be a 'next?'
Like any mission, it can go bad in a number of ways. You have to weigh the potential risks against the potential benefits, but I think they're correctly calculated and wish the combined effort success.We'll see, having been to Africa with SF (enjoying the interplay between Black SF troops and Africans... :wry: ) and also as an Eighty-deuce type and knowing a lot about US force mentality and a teeny bit about African fighter and governance mentality, I hope you're right but strongly suspect you aren't. Either way I hope the best for the Troops. We can agree on that one item.

Bill Moore
10-16-2011, 03:34 AM
Postd by Ken,


Unnecessary and incorrect slap at Europe who have intervened in Africa -- correctly; those are their former colonies -- far more than have we. The French virtually keep forces in several areas, the Brits do not stay but they do not hesitate to go when needed. Even the Belgiques, Italians and Portuguese have been and are more involved than the US.

I respectfully disagree, and I recall when working for USEUCOM (before AFRICOM formed) it was a challenge to get any support from European countries to support peace operations and capacity building throughout Africa. The UK and France (most recently in the Ivory Coast) have intervened effectively (and occassionally ineffectively as we did in Somalia), but to claim they're doing more in Africa than we are is a bit of a reach. I recall the French Garrisons in a West African country, and they didn't do anything for that nation, and the locals hated them because of their arrogance. Presence alone does not equate to action. No European nation to my knowledge has invested in Africa like we have with the ACRI and ACOTA programs, then the follow on post 9/11 programs. Please point out where they have? With the recent exception of Libya what has Italy done militarily in Africa that wasn't self serving?


You and the President may call it a crisis of conscience but I beg to differ with both of you. Whose conscience

Any person that thinks mindless murder on a mass scale and recruiting kids into a militia may be a morally bankrupt practice may consider this a crisis of conscience. True we ignored the slaughter in Rwanda (that the French helped enable) and it didn't touch our shores, but it did leave many authorities wondering if ignoring the crisis was the right decision. President Bush made the statement that there would be no Rwanda's on his watch. President Clinton intervened in Bosnia, and then Kosovo (slowly and largely after the mass murder and mass migrations). We can debate whether it is right or wrong to commit U.S. troops and finally come to an agreement or respectfully disagree, but in this case Congress did debate it and agreed we should.

I worked in West and North Africa, I haven't been to Central Africa, but I have seen the dynamic between U.S. black SF troops and locales and since they were high caliber soldiers they were respected. I didn't see or sense any hostility, but I suspect if you bring in young, undisciplined straight leg U.S. black soldiers that still project the inner city behavior they'll quickly be put on notice. Black Africans are embarrassed by that type of behavior just as Italians are embarrassed by our the U.S. reality show on Italian-Americans in NJ.


Could you go into a bit of detail about that intertwining of interests? What, specifically, are our interests in Africa?

Since I am not a member of the National Security Staff, I borrow what others have written.

From the Congressional Research Papers:


The Bush Administration’s National Security Strategy of 2002 reflected a need for a more focused strategic approach toward the continent: “In Africa, promise and opportunity sit side by side with disease, war, and desperate poverty. This threatens both a core value of the United States—preserving human dignity—and our strategic priority—combating global terror.” To
address these challenges, the document asserted that U.S. security strategy must focus on building indigenous security and intelligence capabilities through bilateral engagement and “coalitions of the willing.” The 2006 National Security Strategy went further, identifying Africa as “a high
priority” and “recogniz(ing) that our security depends upon partnering with Africans to strengthen fragile and failing states and bring ungoverned areas under the control of effective democracies.”

President Obama has affirmed his view of Africa’s strategic importance in numerous policy documents and public statements. In a speech in Ghana in July 2009, he said,

When there is genocide in Darfur or terrorists in Somalia, these are not simply African problems, they are global security challenges, and they demand a global response.... And let me be clear: our Africa Command is focused not on establishing a foothold on the continent, but on confronting these common challenges to advance the security of America, Africa, and the world

The focus throughout the document was on partnerships, and if we're going to be a partner then that means occassionally committing ourselves as a partner (a two way street).

In 1998 Ms Rice gave a talk explaining our interests there that are still relevant. Much more at the sight, but I included one paragraph where I think she addressed your concerns.

http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/rice4.htm


Some may point to these cowardly terrorist attacks as evidence of
Africa's fragility. When viewed in light of recent conflict in the Horn
of Africa, Congo, and Angola, cynics argue that the U.S. ought to give
up on Africa or, rather, never give it a chance. Recurrent instability
has led a number of commentators to conclude rather hastily that the so-
called "African Renaissance" has been a hallucination. Others maintain
we are witnessing the "birth-pains" of a new Africa.


First, as one of our two major policy goals, we must work in concert
with Africans to combat the many transnational security threats that
emanate from Africa just as they do from the rest of the world. These
include not only terrorism but weapons proliferation, narcotics flows,
the growing influence of rogue states, international crime,
environmental degradation, and disease.


we must press ahead to achieve our second principal
policy goal in Africa; that is, accelerating Africa's full integration
into the global economy. Increasingly, the U.S. economy is fueled by
exports.

No we're not in the Cold War, but we all are competing for market and natural resources, so access remains a national interest. I wouldn't label it a critical national interest, but still important, and committing a couple hundred SF troops is hardly a huge commitment. Again we're not trying to overthrow a government or anything near as ambitious as that, but simply give the regional security forces some additional capabilities to finish off the LRA. It may or may not work, but we don't own the problem, the regional nations do, so in the end we can pack up and go home if we're not effective in helping them. This isn't the same as sending the 82d and then ending up with a we can't pull out now or we'll look like we lost (as we did in Somalia).

Posted by Ken,

I, OTOH, hope we are not so myopic as to believe that AQ is a threat, not just simply the annoyance it is; and that we are not so myopic as to believe that the same forces involved in Afghanistan and Iraq when employed by the same government elsewhere are not subject to reinvent a few wheels subject to get mired in local ruts

I agree we over inflated and over responded to the AQ threat, but it is a threat, we know that to be a fact from the 9/11 attacks and the attacks on the USS Cole and our Embassies prior to 9/11. In regards to the same government well I can't argue that one, and if this fails it will likely be due to dumb decisions coming out of D.C.


I'm not all that concerned about Uganda -- my concern is that Trunk or Adder sneaking in the tent -- which nation or nations nearby will be next. Anyone want to bet there won't be a 'next?'

As long as it is small scale and we remain largely in a supporting role I hope there is a next. This is simply DIME playing out in a smarter way than it did in OIF or OEF-A.

I already know none of my arguments have changed your mind, and as always I respect your opinion on these important issues. There were two primary reasons I wrote "I'm glad to see this happening for a number of reasons" on the first post.

First, I hope we don't enter a post Vietnam and post Somalia period where we're paralyzed by the failures of those missions (and now OIF and OEF-A) to the extent we don't intervene when we should.

Two, this is a feasible mission and IAW our doctrine prior to 9/11 that "may" intelligently synchronize the elements of national power to achieve the desired ends. SF will play a small but critical supporting role, with State Department in the lead.

I'm standing by for my punishment now :D

Ken White
10-16-2011, 04:35 AM
but to claim they're doing more in Africa than we are is a bit of a reach.I said 'have' -- past tense. I acknowledge we're catching up net mission quantity wise even if most are Flintlock like efforts instead of killing bad guys.
I recall the French Garrisons in a West African country, and they didn't do anything for that nation, and the locals hated them because of their arrogance.They're FRENCH, whaddya expect... :D
Presence alone does not equate to action. No European nation to my knowledge has invested in Africa like we have with the ACRI and ACOTA programs, then the follow on post 9/11 programs. Please point out where they have?No, presence dose not equate to action -- but it does add significantly to knowledge and capability for action. No, they have not invested like we have because they do not spend money as prolifically (note I resisted the desire to say 'stupidly') as we do, thus, as you know I can't point out that they have done 'more.' I can point out they have more commercial interests there than we do and they have former colonial ties (good and bad in that).
With the recent exception of Libya what has Italy done militarily in Africa that wasn't self serving? What has any European nation or the US -- or China -- done there that wasn't self serving? That's what it's all about. And the Africans are quite aware of that.
Any person that thinks mindless murder on a mass scale and recruiting kids into a militia may be a morally bankrupt practice may consider this a crisis of conscience.Probably so; my problem is not how one gets from such a crisis to a responsibility to act, it is that what action is taken be intelligent and not a misstep.
True we ignored the slaughter in Rwanda ...President Bush made the statement that there would be no Rwanda's on his watch...President Clinton intervened in Bosnia, and then Kosovo (slowly and largely after the mass murder and mass migrations). We can debate whether it is right or wrong to commit U.S. troops and finally come to an agreement or respectfully disagree, but in this case Congress did debate it and agreed we should.Congress agreed with all the interventions, including that in Iraq with which you disagree so I'm unsure that's a plus. My problem with 'humanitarian intervention' of the types you cite is that such efforts generally do more harm than good to the afflicted; they are terribly expensive in ALL aspects; they rarely achieve the nominally desired results and they tend to last for years -- they provide little or no benefit to the US except to make some people feel good. That is essentialy true for all those you named...
I worked in West and North Africa, I haven't been to Central Africa, but I have seen the dynamic between U.S. black SF troops and locales and since they were high caliber soldiers they were respected.They were -- but they in my observation were respected for their military quality and that overcame the fact that they were Black but not African. On rare occasions when they attempted to blend, it almost invariably failed.
I didn't see or sense any hostility.Nor did I. Neither did I see any more or less acceptance than was accorded white guys or hispanics.
Since I am not a member of the National Security Staff, I borrow what others have written.No disrespect to you but bunches to the National Security Staff, State and Congressional types who I think mean well but based on performance, I consider to be broadly inept and caught up in archaic thinking.
No we're not in the Cold War, but we all are competing for market and natural resources, so access remains a national interest. I wouldn't label it a critical national interest, but still important, and committing a couple hundred SF troops is hardly a huge commitment.I acknowledge that some see it as being important and accept that it can be so considered, further agree that while an interest, it is not critical and that small SF commitment is tolerable. I do note that escalation is still occurring -- the Admin said 100, you say a couple of hundred... :D

That's my concern. Growth. The 'system' will demand it...
...we don't own the problem, the regional nations do, so in the end we can pack up and go home if we're not effective in helping them.And what will that quitting and taking our marbles home do for our influence thereabouts? I do agree it is THEIR problem and I have no problems helping them work on it; the issue is how to help and a failed mission will not do our street cred a lot of good. The AO is a mess in all aspects with little to no infrastructure and we're sending a bunch of suburban dwellers who are well enough trained but are used to comforts of a sort and who do not know the terrain or the people on a short tour. I further suspect that the leaders of the incoming troops may not pay as much attention to the guys who have been there for a while as they probably should -- we're bad about that. Hopefully, it'll work out.
This isn't the same as sending the 82d and then ending up with a we can't pull out now or we'll look like we lost (as we did in Somalia).I suspect tha had the 82d been sent to Somalia instead of all the folks who were, it might have ended differently. One of the more embarrassing days of my life was the day after that debacle when a Somali militia honcho was quoted in the NYT speaking of the Unit and 3d Ranger; "They did the same thing six times. Tactically you never do the same thing twice..."
In regards to the same government well I can't argue that one, and if this fails it will likely be due to dumb decisions coming out of D.C.Often the case but not usually solely to blame. See Somalia example.
As long as it is small scale and we remain largely in a supporting role I hope there is a next. This is simply DIME playing out in a smarter way than it did in OIF or OEF-A.It won't; we won't; and I hope not because we'll screw it up -- and that's from Ken, the incurable optimist. :wry:
First, I hope we don't enter a post Vietnam and post Somalia period where we're paralyzed by the failures of those missions (and now OIF and OEF-A) to the extent we don't intervene when we should.That's the question -- when we should...I have no problem with interventions that make sense, I have a big problem with stupidity and dumb forays against Windmills.
Two, this is a feasible mission and IAW our doctrine prior to 9/11 that "may" intelligently synchronize the elements of national power to achieve the desired ends. SF will play a small but critical supporting role, with State Department in the lead.Yep, it is and hopefully State will in fact be in the lead. Yet again, I'm not that concerned with this mission -- I'm concerned with what will follow this mission. Mark my words, there will more and worse... :mad:

One last trio of questions, though. This: "...intelligently synchronize the elements of national power to achieve the desired ends..." sounds good, great even. What's it really mean? What are those elements of national power? What, in fact, are the desired ends?

Bob's World
10-16-2011, 11:38 AM
My biggest concern? We are focused on a "threat" rather than a "problem." Intel driven strategy. Foolish.

When our senior civil and military officials can talk about Uganda in terms of problems then my inner alarm will likely stop ringing. This is a country with a history of colonial disruption, a country divided north and south by two major ethnic groups, a country that has recently been deemed to be sitting on vast amounts of oil, a country with a "president" who rose to power in '86 as the leader of the Coup, and who recently was extended for another long term in an election that drew cries of manipulation and corruption....

Bottom line, there are a lot of factors in play, and I will engage with my Africa-smart people to learn more about these factors so that I can offer an alternative voice to those who talk only in terms of "threats." I suspect there is probably an oil company or two who are very interested in the greater stability of keeping the same leader in power and reducing those who attempt to challenge him violently, and that those companies are doing some serious lobbying in Washington.

As is often the case, the US does not fight for oil, we fight for favorable distributions of oil profits. Uganda, like all oil producing countries will produce oil and sell it into the global market no matter what. Who profits most is always the critical issue that is fought over. Also, as is often the case, we thinly wrap such true motivations in terms of "liberty" or "democracy" or "human rights." That is a line that is losing it's luster. At least that is what Smedley Butler thought as he looked back at his long career of such service.

davidbfpo
10-16-2011, 12:43 PM
My title after reading Zenpundit's article 'The Limbaugh Rush to Erroneous Judgment', Zen's article is a comprehensive demolition of Limbaugh and adds some context to why the LRA needs attention:http://zenpundit.com/?p=4402

davidbfpo
10-16-2011, 01:05 PM
This subject popped up a few posts ago. Yes capable European nations have not been keen on an African commitment, for a host of reasons and the draw-down of French garrisons is one illustration.

Yet at the same time European nations have sent troops to Africa, invariably wearing the UN's blue berets; I recall an Irish Bn. in eastern Chad when refugees crossed from Darfur and IIRC Austrians along the Eritrea-Ethiopia ceasefire line awhile back. Just checked the IISS Military Balance and there are none currently, except the French in Ivory Coast.

Further back and in a non-military role so much lower profile has been the work of IIRC Italian and Norwegian parties in conflict resolution, such as ending the RENAMO -v- FRELIMO conflict in Mozambique.

There is some remaining European capability to deploy in Africa, invariably reliant on USAF strategic transport and hired Russian or Ukrainian planes. Missing is any will at the national level.

Back to the LRA and Uganda finally. Why the Commonwealth has not been able to offer help eludes me. Rwanda and Uganda are both members. If I was in government that is an option I'd pursue, as a successor to the US help.

Fuchs
10-16-2011, 01:19 PM
Germany had even 250 paratrooper blue helmets in Congo to help secure some elections a while ago.


The lack of Commonwealth support may be related to the fact that Uganda has been a de facto dictatorship for 25 years under Museveni AND it'S utterly irrelevant as a raw materials source.

carl
10-16-2011, 01:52 PM
I think it might be helpful to note that the Ugandan army ejected the LRA from Uganda several years ago. The area where the LRA operates now is a very long way from the Ugandan border.

Rush Limbaugh is just being Rush. He is, in my opinion, the very best when it comes to US domestic politics, but he is absolutely clueless when it comes to military affairs abroad. He also never could figure out why Abu Ghraib was such a big deal.

Ken White
10-16-2011, 01:58 PM
I think it might be helpful to note that the Ugandan army ejected the LRA from Uganda several years ago. The area where the LRA operates now is a very long way from the Ugandan border.Thus:

"Yet again, I'm not that concerned with this mission -- I'm concerned with what will follow this mission. Mark my words, there will more and worse...."

ganulv
10-16-2011, 04:00 PM
I’m hoping Mahmood Mamdani (http://www.columbia.edu/cu/anthropology/fac-bios/mamdani/faculty.html) chimes in on this one (and it makes sense that he would be interested in doing so, given that he grew up in Uganda). His book Saviors and survivors: Darfur, politics, and the War on Terror (http://books.google.com/books?id=X6XioDxT3z8C&lpg=PP1&dq=mahmood%20mamdani&pg=PP1#v=onepage&q&f=false) (WorldCat record for the book (http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/229026824); via YouTube, Mamdani debates John Prendergast (http://youtu.be/yGOpfH_5_pY)) is worth the time of the contributors to this thread. I don’t know enough about the region to judge the historiography and analysis of the current situation given in the book, but I recommend it solely on its strengths as a polemic. Mamdani’s politics are unmistakably to the left but I don’t think he can be categorized as a liberal (in the sense that we use the term in the U.S., at least) given that he calls the book a brief “against those who substitute moral certainty for knowledge, and who feel virtuous even when acting on the basis of total ignorance.”

Bill Moore
10-16-2011, 05:12 PM
Posted by Davidbfro,


My title after reading Zenpundit's article 'The Limbaugh Rush to Erroneous Judgment', Zen's article is a comprehensive demolition of Limbaugh and adds some context to why the LRA needs attention:http://zenpundit.com/?p=4402

Zenpundit could have added a little more context. First the LRA is Christians killing Christians (if you accept the LRA are Christians). Second, Southern Sudan is largely Christian, so I suspect (do not know) they're killing Christians in Southern Sudan also. According to numerous articles that reference Wikileaks we suspect or know that Khartom (the Muslim capital in Northern Sudan) has been providing support to the LRA. Finally, we're reportedly sending advisors to Southern Sudan to assist their forces battle the LRA also. Rush has been an idiot for years, and the fact that he actually has a loyal following is an indicator that our education has failed to produce critical thinkers. Disagreement with the decision to send troops is fine and those voices should be heard (and they may turn out to be right), but twisting the facts to make a case during election season is typical Rush.


Yes capable European nations have not been keen on an African commitment, for a host of reasons and the draw-down of French garrisons is one illustration.

Yet at the same time European nations have sent troops to Africa, invariably wearing the UN's blue berets; I recall an Irish Bn. in eastern Chad when refugees crossed from Darfur and IIRC Austrians along the Eritrea-Ethiopia ceasefire line awhile back. Just checked the IISS Military Balance and there are none currently, except the French in Ivory Coast.

I don't include the UK when I speak poorly of Europe, because they never seem to be lock step with main land Western Europe. However, my point about European nations not assisting African nations military remains valid. Yes they occassionally intervene militarily as blue hats or independently, but supporting a collective program to develop African capacity has been limited. There are tens if not hundreds of European NGOs throughout Africa doing great work, and they should be recognized for their contributions. They are not the subject of my comment.

Fuchs
10-16-2011, 05:16 PM
It's stupid to give a single man many hours airtime almost every day. He's bound to fill most of it with nonsense.

Bill Moore
10-16-2011, 05:25 PM
http://af.reuters.com/article/investingNews/idAFJOE79F00Z20111016


Earlier this week, Uganda's parliament passed a resolution urging the government to withhold consent for Tullow's proposed deal with France's Total and China's CNOOC until laws were in place to regulate the industry.

There are also numerous minerals, I have no idea how much or how critical they are to the global economy. One point that isn't mentioned, but I have seen it during previous reading not related to this issue, is that some nations are looking at Africa as a potential bread basket. They want to develop State farms there (lease the land) so they can feed their own people.

I think we should consider both short and "potential" long term economic benefits that may not be readily apparent. Bob's World always smells a bad government, he can't accept the fact that there is evil in the world and that sometimes (even if it is rarely the case) the insurgents do not have popular support. I suspect the government in Uganda is corrupt, most in Africa (and the developing world for that matter) are. In this case it appears to be that the government is the lesser to two evils. I'm looking forward to his injects from the African experts. Too bad Tom Odom hasn't posted lately.

Bob's World
10-16-2011, 09:05 PM
Bill,

If they do not have popular support, then they are not "insurgents." :D

As I have often stated, the primary source of causation radiates out from government. This LRA group was born at the same time the military coup put this government into power, and both have endured for considerable time. I doubt a group without a core of popular support (both the current government and the LRA) would have endured without such a base.

As I noted earlier in this thread, a quick bit or research shows that Uganda has two major ethnic populace bases, one in the south half, one in the North half. Are both halves equally represented by the government? Will both halves benefit equally from the new oil wealth??

As I have also noted, when the causation of poor governance that radiates out from government creates conditions of insurgency among some significant and distinct segment of the populace, it is often very self-serving individuals and organizations that form and grow to exploit those conditions. This does not excuse such actors, but nor does it grant amnesty to the government that is at the root of this causation either.

As a savvy Special Forces operator, you full well understand the nature of UW and the fact that one cannot go to a healthy, happy populace and conduct UW with any success. One must identify a populace where conditions of insurgency exist, and then exploit those conditions.

Insurgency is natural. It is human nature. But "insurgents" do not cause insurgency, they are merely the ones that exploit the conditions created by the government. Governments find this to be the most inconvenient of inconvenient truths. To such governments I simply say "Deal with it." You made this bed through your policies and actions. It is in your power to fix yourself, or to strike back at those who dare to oppose you. Most choose the latter, and most ultimately fall.

US foreign policy often, too often, sends us out to prop up and sustain such governments. We too need to evolve in our foreign policy. This too is an inconvenient truth.

Dayuhan
10-16-2011, 10:52 PM
Here perhaps we see the risks inherent in getting too close to a model. Are you trying to fit the LRA into your model of what insurgency ought to be, or are you adapting your model to fit the actual conditions?


If they do not have popular support, then they are not "insurgents." :D

I think if you look into the LRA you'll find that by your definition they are not insurgents, more a roving gang of bandits. There's no political agenda, no effort to seize state power, no popular support base. The old premise that "insurgents" need popular support or the locals will rat them out to the government doesn't really apply here... there really isn't much of a government in most of the area (spread across parts of 4 countries, not just Uganda) where the LRA operates. They simply raid, pillage, terrorize, and move on. There aren't many places in the world where such a group could exist, but Central Africa is one.

As Ken correctly points out, the LRA is not a threat to the US at all, in any way. They aren't really a threat to anyone except the villagers in the area they terrorize. That's one reason they've survived: if the governments involved saw them as a threat they might do something about it... though of course government is minimal in Uganda and the CAR and pretty much nonexistent in the southern Sudan and the NE DRC.

Of course in the long term it's in the interest of the US (and Europe, and China, and the rest of the oil consuming world) to see Uganda's oil reserves developed... by anyone, and regardless of where the oil goes. The extent to which the LRA is a constraint on that development remains to be seen. Their MO in general has been the village raid, and they may not be that interested in oil facilities: again, they aren't trying to topple a government or force reforms out of a government.

Any US move on the LRA isn't reeally threat-centric, because there is no threat to the US. If anything it's a humanitarian effort, vaguely reminiscent of the move against Aidid. I'd completely agree that Joseph Kony is one of those rare examples of a person that just plain needs to be killed, and that anyone who does that will be doing the human race in general and central Africa in particular a huge favor, I'm not fully convinced that it should be up to the US to do it.

As I have often stated, the primary source of causation radiates out from government. This LRA group was born at the same time the military coup put this government into power, and both have endured for considerable time. I doubt a group without a core of popular support (both the current government and the LRA) would have endured without such a base.

As I noted earlier in this thread, a quick bit or research shows that Uganda has two major ethnic populace bases, one in the south half, one in the North half. Are both halves equally represented by the government? Will both halves benefit equally from the new oil wealth??

As I have also noted, when the causation of poor governance that radiates out from government creates conditions of insurgency among some significant and distinct segment of the populace, it is often very self-serving individuals and organizations that form and grow to exploit those conditions. This does not excuse such actors, but nor does it grant amnesty to the government that is at the root of this causation either.

As a savvy Special Forces operator, you full well understand the nature of UW and the fact that one cannot go to a healthy, happy populace and conduct UW with any success. One must identify a populace where conditions of insurgency exist, and then exploit those conditions.

Insurgency is natural. It is human nature. But "insurgents" do not cause insurgency, they are merely the ones that exploit the conditions created by the government. Governments find this to be the most inconvenient of inconvenient truths. To such governments I simply say "Deal with it." You made this bed through your policies and actions. It is in your power to fix yourself, or to strike back at those who dare to oppose you. Most choose the latter, and most ultimately fall.

US foreign policy often, too often, sends us out to prop up and sustain such governments. We too need to evolve in our foreign policy. This too is an inconvenient truth.[/QUOTE]

Bill Moore
10-17-2011, 03:17 AM
Posted by Bob's World,


As a savvy Special Forces operator, you full well understand the nature of UW and the fact that one cannot go to a healthy, happy populace and conduct UW with any success. One must identify a populace where conditions of insurgency exist, and then exploit those conditions.


Yes and no.

Yes, this is appears to be true in most cases, but it is not a hard rule. Terrorists, insurgent leaders, criminals etc. can manufacture problems/beliefs concerning the government that didn't exist in the populace prior to a communicator putting them there, and then stoking the flames. Foreign sponsored communist insurgencies were skilled at creating events that prompted the government to over react, and then that reaction was exploited to further drive a wedge between the government and the people. Second, U.S. UW doctrine is based on the Cold War, heavily borrows from Mao, and is outdated. Your comment assumes that a guerrilla campaign must expand into a war of movement to ultimately be successful. This also is not true, a few bad actors that effectively employ terror to suppress the population can also achieve telling results. Kony appears to be one of those actors. I'm not even sure Kony's LRA is an insurgency?

I'm sure if we examine the Ugandan government we'll find significant problems, but the LRA is not a legitimate response to that government's shortcomings. I have already heard complaints about dictatorship, etc., which may be true, but I'm also seeing our form of legitimacy being imposed upon the people of Uganda. The bulk of the population "may" prefer a strong leader to maintains order. Some countries prefer monarchies, but of course since they're not democracies we would label them as ill legitimate.

Since I don't know how the Ugandan people feel about their government, I'll shift back to reality and ask why no one has challenged my assumption that we have to support our partners? We preach through and with (a terrible phrase, smells too much like Western hegemony) others to achieve our ends, yet when a country that has supported us asks for assistance with their problems we question the merits of it? A lot of countries could have questioned the merits of supporting us in Iraq, but they sent troops. To maintain these relationships we have give as well as receive. Uganda has sent troops to Somalia and supported the rebels in Southern Sudan. I suspect that makes them a partner in addressing regional issues. Do we simply say no when they ask for help from us?

carl
10-17-2011, 03:26 AM
No, SF is not the most capable humanitarian organization around. Especially not for your purpose -- with which I agree;...

Given that the purpose is killing Mr. Kony and killing or scaring into submission his minions, what organization would be more capable of doing this humanitarian mission?

Bob's World: Probably the most important reason the LRA has managed to hang on so long is that the Khartoum government found them to be a convenient way to irritate the Ugandan government and so provided them with money and sanctuary in South Sudan, a place where for a long time, the UPDF could not go.

Here is a story that illustrates how some Africans view black Americans. Bear in mind that in Lingala, the word for white guy is mundele.

This black guy I knew was working as a Peace Corps volunteer in Congo. He said he was out one night drinking palm wine. Palm wine is great he said. It tastes good, goes down smooth and you can get really drunk quick without knowing it.

He had enough and got on his motorbike to drive down the path to the village he lived in. It was dark and he wouldn't have been able to see well in the light so he missed the turnoff and continued unknowingly down the path to its' terminus, a sheer cliff.

The people in his home village heard him putt-putting in approach and then heard him putt-putting away toward the end of the path. Everybody in the village realized, all at about the same time, what had happened and they all tore out of their houses and down the path crying "Oh no! We've killed our mundele!"

They found him stopped on the path about 10 feet from the cliff, which he never saw. He had just gotten tired as drunks do and the mundele was saved.

ganulv
10-17-2011, 04:26 AM
[Palm wine] tastes good, goes down smooth and you can get really drunk quick without knowing it.

One of those three is true, and it isn’t #1 or #2! :p Though if your bar food was fried in palm oil you will be needing to #2 in short order. :o

carl
10-17-2011, 04:42 AM
That is about how I remember his description of palm wine, which means it may be at wild variance with reality. He also said it was extremely dependent on at what stage you took it from the tree.

I never had any so I will gladly defer to one with actual experience.

Ken White
10-17-2011, 04:44 AM
Given that the purpose is killing Mr. Kony and killing or scaring into submission his minions, what organization would be more capable of doing this humanitarian mission?Aside from the fact that I find the concept of killing Kony and his minions -- I doubt they're going to be scared into submission -- couched as a "humanitarian mission" kinda funny... :wry:

The Ugandan Defence Force has about 5,000 troops in Somalia (at our request and funded by us...), bring them home and put 'em to chasing Kony down. IF Musaveni really wanted to, that could have happened some time ago. Kony gives him a reason to stay in power -- against the wishes of most Ugandans as I understand it. So -- we prop up another questionable authority figure. Hope and Change. Humanitarians, tha's us... :rolleyes:

Musaveni of course welcomes us -- and money -- to Uganda. We'll see what happens with the DRC and South Sudan.

As for more capable for the mission you state (which may or may not be the mission of the US element being sent), probably the Ranger Company of Kenya's 20 Parachute Battalion. :cool:

Ken White
10-17-2011, 05:03 AM
...I'll shift back to reality and ask why no one has challenged my assumption that we have to support our partners? We preach through and with (a terrible phrase, smells too much like Western hegemony) others to achieve our ends, yet when a country that has supported us asks for assistance with their problems we question the merits of it? A lot of countries could have questioned the merits of supporting us in Iraq, but they sent troops. To maintain these relationships we have give as well as receive. Uganda has sent troops to Somalia and supported the rebels in Southern Sudan. I suspect that makes them a partner in addressing regional issues. Do we simply say no when they ask for help from us?I for one have no problem supporting partners. However, I question the degree of partnership involved with all your examples. In most of those cases, those nations 'supported' us because we paid them to do so, to include in Iraq. If you think that creates true partners as opposed to bought in support, we can differ. Uganda's efforts in Somalia are funded by us and are pretty much at our request. I suspect some money is being made in several unintended places thanks to our 'support' of our 'partners.'

The fact that I disagree with such efforts -- and have since Korea where we began the practice and continuing in Viet Nam with the Koreans and the Thais -- is immaterial, we did it. The question then becomes how much 'pay back' do we really owe... :rolleyes:

That, BTW explains part of my anger at the NSC / State / Congressional etc. crowd that gets us involved in such stupidity, then leaves for a Think Tank job and escapes responsibility for their screwups.

We also have been known to turn our backs on true partners. See Sinai, Falklands et.al.

Nations have interests, period. Extensive involvement in Africa is not in our interests. Getting Ugandan oil flowing may be desirable but it's likely to occur no matter what we do -- and we do not need it.

carl
10-17-2011, 05:12 AM
Ken:

Ok. I'll buy that as far as forces better suited for killing the LRA. Would the Kenyans actually be willing to commit that force to that mission? I was thinking something like Executive Outcomes might be better too. But alas, that type of force will never be again.

I don't think it so odd to view destruction of the LRA as a humanitarian endeavor. Mosquito eradication is a humanitarian endeavor because as long as those mosquitoes exist, people will die. The LRA is the same thing. As long as they exist, people will die. So killing the LRA is a service to the humanity unfortunate enough to live within their area. That is not how humanitarian service is normally viewed but it would be a darn sight more effective than most conventional humanitarian work.

A lot of LRA have been scared into submission from what I've read. A number just got tired of being chased all the time and gave up.

Bill Moore
10-17-2011, 06:36 AM
Posted by Ken,


I for one have no problem supporting partners. However, I question the degree of partnership involved with all your examples. In most of those cases, those nations 'supported' us because we paid them to do so, to include in Iraq. If you think that creates true partners as opposed to bought in support, we can differ. Uganda's efforts in Somalia are funded by us and are pretty much at our request. I suspect some money is being made in several unintended places thanks to our 'support' of our 'partners.'

The fact that I disagree with such efforts -- and have since Korea where we began the practice and continuing in Viet Nam with the Koreans and the Thais -- is immaterial, we did it. The question then becomes how much 'pay back' do we really owe...

That, BTW explains part of my anger at the NSC / State / Congressional etc. crowd that gets us involved in such stupidity, then leaves for a Think Tank job and escapes responsibility for their screwups.

After OIF I'm much more of an isolationist than I was prior to that fiasco, but I still don't mind SF and other SOF elements getting engaged at low levels, relatively low cost, and at relatively low risk to the nation (of becoming a bigger conflict). I'm not cold hearted, but if we lose some SF troops on these mentions, well that is what we all signed up for. I don't think conventional soldiers signed up for anything other than to defend the country for the most part.

I think relying on the through and with approach is stupid and have said so before, and you bring up a great point, "how much pay back do we really owe them?" That is really the rub. If a policy objective is worth pursuing, then it is probably worth pursuing unilaterally or with a coalition of the willing instead of paying for mercenaries out of our pockets. Mercenaries that generally do a pretty poor job.

However, since this is our policy, I'm my question still stands. Do we simply say no when they ask for help? If we do, will our through and with strategy work?

As for most Ugandans disliking their government, I have no idea. I have seen some documentaries on Uganda where they only interviewed individuals who disliked the current government, creating the perception that all Ugadans hated their government. The truth is hard to assess unless you spend a lot of time in country. Everything in Africa has some corruption dirt on it, we just have to decide if this is the least undesirable course of action.

Dayuhan
10-17-2011, 06:44 AM
Good briefing for those who want to know more...

http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/horn-of-africa/uganda/157%20LRA%20-%20A%20Regional%20Strategy%20beyond%20Killing%20Ko ny.pdf

Note recommendation...


To the U.S. Government:

7. Deploy a team to the theatre of operations to run an intelligence platform that centralises all operational information from the Ugandan and other armies, as well as the UN and civilian networks, and provides analysis to the Ugandans to better target military operations.

M-A Lagrange
10-17-2011, 11:42 AM
Hello everybody,

Ok, as I said, I'm late on that one but it is interresting to see all the comments.
I agree with Dayuhan: sending a team of trained special ops guys is a good idea.
That said, why it's not a good idea right now or at least let's look under the table what is going on.

LRA: they are out of DRC, most probably in Central Africa, to regroup.
They are around 200 and a group is probably still in DRC or at the border of South Sudan.

UDPS: they are not so much wiling to do the job and they are busy with Sudan and Somalia.

FARDC: US trained a regiment and equiped them. They had a join training for medical evacuation with USAF. AFRICOM came to visit just recently.

MONUSCO: they are naked. They just decided to transfert the Guatemalian special ops to Kinshasa during elections. Jordanians are supposed to take over the spial ops job. (Not much in fact). Result: lost of intel, contacts with population, knowledge of the ground, operationality...

DRC: it's election year. Kabila is in need to show he can bring peace in the country. In the 2 Eastern provinces of Kivu, where he used to be popular, he just lost all of it because he couldn't bring peace.
Kabila, to be reelected needs Province Orientale (where the LRA is active) to vote for him. This is pretty secured but an announce less the 2 month before elections (nov 28) is a good point for him.

Now, why is it not a perfect timing: political opposition is really challenging Kabila. Despite being un united, the opposition parties (mainly UDPS and UNC) have the capacity to be major players in the next National Assembly.
In order to govern, Kabila needs 251 seats at the assembly. In 2006, his party (PPRD) did 111 seats. With a cohalition he came to majority at parliament.
Presidential elections are important but they also have legislative elections the very same day.

US are seen as Kabila supporters. The declarations of Mme Otero in DRC, stating everything is Ok, in line with European Union, make it even more obvious. Since few weeks, there are demonstrations, violently repressed, from opposition in Kinshasa. (At least 4 dead)

US could put a cup of conditionality in their military cooperation. As for example: we help you with LRA but you open the election central server to opposition for checking.
France already issued such comment. The embassador said he found UDPS request legitimate. And France is providing training to the police in Kinshasa.

Ken White
10-17-2011, 03:34 PM
Carl:
That is not how humanitarian service is normally viewed but it would be a darn sight more effective than most conventional humanitarian work.That I can agree with. :D
A lot of LRA have been scared into submission from what I've read. A number just got tired of being chased all the time and gave up.No doubt. Situation like that, probably about 75% will typically recant (at least superficially...) but the hard core real killers will not because they know they'll be killed themselves -- they just have to be killed. There have been and can be exceptions and there is no 'norm' but that seems to be the case more often than not.

Bill Moore:
... I still don't mind SF and other SOF elements getting engaged at low levels, relatively low cost, and at relatively low risk to the nation (of becoming a bigger conflict). I'm not cold hearted, but if we lose some SF troops on these mentions, well that is what we all signed up for.I agree with that. No quarrel at all with deployments like that -- by SF or conventional troops.
I don't think conventional soldiers signed up for anything other than to defend the country for the most part.I note your caveat of "most part" and acknowledge that may be correct but as one who deployed several times for a lot of things not involving defending the country with a bunch of other 'conventional' guys and to three Continents, you're just flat wrong on that. Way wrong...

I suspect you're also wrong on the capabilities they could and did bring to such operations -- note the past tense -- though possibly not on what they might bring today in many cases. That competence thing is easily fixed. Conventional units are just like SF Teams or Battalions / Groups -- some are better than others; often much better. Parochial prisms are not good viewing devices and if the 'Big Army' is less all round capable than it once was as appears to be the case, then it's a lick on the Army -- but it should also be recalled that SOCOM helped foster that incompetence. Either way, it isn't hard to fix IF the powers that be wish to do so. ;)
I think relying on the through and with approach is stupid and have said so before, and you bring up a great point, "how much pay back do we really owe them?" That is really the rub. If a policy objective is worth pursuing, then it is probably worth pursuing unilaterally or with a coalition of the willing instead of paying for mercenaries out of our pockets. Mercenaries that generally do a pretty poor job.Policy is the rub -- we do not do that well and DC is partly responsible. The services and forces also contribute because those serving at high levels get more concerned with turf protection and budget enhancement (and concomitant risk reduction) than they do with providing forces that can undertake dicey mission; this ties the hands of the policy folks...

Regardless, we need to pursue necessary and not whim efforts overseas and paying for support is IMO foolish because it really absolves both sides, the payer and the payee, of other responsibilities
However, since this is our policy, I'm my question still stands. Do we simply say no when they ask for help? If we do, will our through and with strategy work?In reverse order, it works but is not conducive to solid relationships as I said just above. In the case of Uganda, we are where we are and, as I said, I have no particular problem with this mission (aside from the fact we shouldn't be involved in Africa much at all) -- I have a BIG problem with the public announcement of it and suspect the 'why' of that is IPB for future, other and bigger deployments there and, worse, elsewhere on the Continent.

I have no problem with violence and its penalties, I have no problem with deployments in the national interest. I only ask that it be true NATIONAL interest and not service or constituency interests that are the rationale. I do not think, all things considered, this one meets that criteria and I'm quite sure that, if I'm right and it is an opening that will be exploited for US domestic political purposes then I will be able to say 'I told you so' but I darn sure won't enjoy that... :( :mad:

M-A Lagrange:
US could put a cup of conditionality in their military cooperation. As for example: we help you with LRA but you open the election central server to opposition for checking.
France already issued such comment. The embassador said he found UDPS request legitimate. And France is providing training to the police in Kinshasa.Hopefully we're smart enough to be doing just that...

Fuchs
10-17-2011, 07:00 PM
Slightly related video:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RKcMfQrqC7I (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RKcMfQrqC7I&feature=player_embedded)

ganulv
10-17-2011, 09:21 PM
[MONUSCO is] naked. They just decided to transfert the Guatemalian special ops to Kinshasa during elections.

When I was living in Guatemala in the early ‘90s an ex-Kaibil did the board half of the room-and-board I was doing with a family. He once told me that the tales of Kaibil recruits having to kill a stray dog with their bare hands, remove its heart, then eat it raw weren’t true. He assured me that they were allowed to use a blade to do the killing and the removal of the heart.

Kaibiles don’t have an Angel of Death aura amongst Guatemalans (http://blogs.aljazeera.net/americas/2011/08/15/guatemalas-feared-special-forces) because of their reputed Spetsnaz-style training or because they are always supposedly GTG for a multi-day manhunt in Indian Country but rather because of the part they played in incidents of the sort we (and I use the exclusive <we> (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Inclusive_and_exclusive_we#Schematic_paradigm) here) tend to use euphemisms such as “tragic mistake” (http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6a6a54.html) to describe.

I say all of that as a set up for what troubles me about this deployment. The Acholi population has already been resettled (https://wikis.uit.tufts.edu/confluence/display/CultureandArmedConflictTheUnmakingandRemakingofthe World/Displacement+and+Re-making+the+world+in+Acholiland)—is someone under the illusion that SF can turn a forced resettlement program into something more humane than what it is? An effort to create local militias has apparently been largely unsuccessful (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lord%27s_Resistance_Army_insurgency_%282002%E2%80% 932005%29#Attempts_at_peace_and_militia_creation_. 28Early_2003.29)—is the idea that Americans are going to be better at it because, well, Americans are better at it? The Kaibiles have been involved in FFF previously (http://www.redorbit.com/news/international/373043/guatemalan_un_troops_killed_in_congo_arrive_home/index.html)—does someone think that SF is that much better than those guys?

I am not saying Obama has any ill intent with this deployment. But for the Acholis stuck between two armies (http://books.google.com/books?id=l9DGvBo7OmIC&lpg=PP1&pg=PP1#v=onepage&q&f=false) I am sure that matters little. And I am nervous that the only lesson from recent history that has been drawn is, “Oh, they just need someone there who knows how to do this right.”


I never had any so I will gladly defer to one with actual experience.

When you only have one choice for long enough anything starts to taste if not good at least decent. ;) I do, however, recommend millet beer (http://www.flickr.com/photos/mtbradley/4820461315/) if the opportunity ever presents itself. :)

carl
10-17-2011, 09:43 PM
—does someone think that SF is that much better than those guys?

Yes actually. When those guys got beat up by the LRA I asked a British LTC working for MONUC how that could have happened. All he would tell me was "Well, there are special forces...and then there are...special forces." To my knowledge there was never a detailed report about that action made public (there may be 4 volume report now), from which I gathered the Guats didn't do very well.


But for the Acholis stuck between two armies (http://books.google.com/books?id=l9DGvBo7OmIC&lpg=PP1&pg=PP1#v=onepage&q&f=false) I am sure that matters little.

I don't understand how this comment pertains to LRA as it is now. They aren't anywhere close to Uganda and haven't been for a long time.

ganulv
10-17-2011, 10:40 PM
Yes actually. When those guys got beat up by the LRA I asked a British LTC working for MONUC how that could have happened. All he would tell me was "Well, there are special forces...and then there are...special forces." To my knowledge there was never a detailed report about that action made public (there may be 4 volume report now), from which I gathered the Guats didn't do very well.

Who knows? It’s an inherently dangerous line of work and no amount of skill and training makes one bulletproof, intel is never perfect, etc. I can’t speak to the current status of the Kaibiles but I wouldn’t take one failed raid to be anything more than that. By way of analogy, I don’t think anyone out there would argue that the operation survived by Marcus Luttrell means the SEALs are a bunch of hacks. I mean, the Kaibiles do well enough on the free market (http://www.takepart.com/article/2011/08/15/killer-elite-switching-sides-mexico-drug-war).


I don't understand how this comment pertains to LRA as it is now. They aren't anywhere close to Uganda and haven't been for a long time.

Regardless of where the LRA is localized at the moment the campaign against them was and is the justification for the resettlement program whose aftereffects are still being felt in Acholiland. And some Acholis are still stuck in “sanctuaries.” Shouldn’t that give us pause about throwing in with the Ugandan government? I know they are not as bad as the LRA, but this conflict isn’t a forced choice question. And if it were, isn’t there a “none of the above” option?

Ken White
10-17-2011, 10:45 PM
... And I am nervous that the only lesson from recent history that has been drawn is, “Oh, they just need someone there who knows how to do this right.”If our recent history is any guide, your worry is more than justified. :o

carl
10-17-2011, 11:29 PM
Who knows? It’s an inherently dangerous line of work and no amount of skill and training makes one bulletproof, intel is never perfect, etc. I can’t speak to the current status of the Kaibiles but I wouldn’t take one failed raid to be anything more than that.

All I can say is that a professional soldier who was in a position to know, indicated that they weren't so good. And it wasn't all that unusual for MONUC forces to get beat up like that.

Maybe a thought experiment is in order, I couldn't imagine a well trained unit of say, Australian infantry getting into trouble like that anywhere.

jmm99
10-18-2011, 01:16 AM
apparently equates professionalism in killing with unrestrained bloodthirstiness ?

From the linked article, Killer Elite Switching Sides in Mexico Drug War (http://www.takepart.com/article/2011/08/15/killer-elite-switching-sides-mexico-drug-war) (bold added):


...the Kaibiles fought relentlessly [JMM: really ??] to earn a reputation for massacring civilians, epitomized by the December 1982 Dos Erres slaughter. At least 250 men, women and children were methodically killed by 40 of the elite troops at the village of Las Dos Erres.

One rather below average unit in the Americal Division managed much the same feat, didn't they ?

Regards

Mike

Ken White
10-18-2011, 01:49 AM
Maybe a thought experiment is in order, I couldn't imagine a well trained unit of say, Australian infantry getting into trouble like that anywhere.I've got a lot of respect for the Strynes, across the board they're better man for man than the US Army by a couple of notches. They're better trained and have more combat discipline -- but anyone can have a bad day...

It should also be recalled that units can excel against some opponents some places and be at a total loss against others in different places. It's all in what and where you train. Plus local terrain knowledge always gives the local folks a several orders of magnitude advantage. Then there's the minor effect of discipline -- that means Soldiers will think before they fire -- local warriors won't bother, they'll just shoot and not worry about who got killed as long as it wasn't themselves. This stuff isn't rocket science but neither is it nearly as easy as many seem to think.

Ken White
10-18-2011, 01:50 AM
One rather below average unit in the Americal Division managed much the same feat, didn't they ?Well done -- and appropriate.

carl
10-18-2011, 03:15 AM
Ken:

I am going to go as far out on a limb as a 4 eyed 4F pencil necked geek forever a civilian can go on when talking about this with somebody with your experience, so far out I'll commence sawing it off behind me now.

I think the circumstances of that fight, from the little I know, indicate that the Guats just walked into an ambush in a lightly populated area. I know that units can have bad days, but this was a so called "elite" unit. They should not have had a bad day in what seemed at the time to be a straight up small unit patrol action. Local knowledge, rules of engagement, intel etc didn't seem to have much to do with it. They were hunting the LRA and walked into an ambush shortly after dawn. I just can't see properly trained jungle and forest fighters doing that especially if they were brought in special for the purpose.

Ken White
10-18-2011, 04:50 AM
I think the circumstances of that fight, from the little I know, indicate that the Guats just walked into an ambush in a lightly populated area. I know that units can have bad days, but this was a so called "elite" unit.Like your British Officer said, there are SOF and there are SOF. Not that the SOF label proves much of anything in combat. The average two tour 11B Specialist in the 82d or the 10th Mountain has more combat experience than do most SOF types...
They should not have had a bad day in what seemed at the time to be a straight up small unit patrol action. Local knowledge, rules of engagement, intel etc didn't seem to have much to do with it.Those things always have something to do with it.

What, exactly, is "a straight up small unit patrol action?" :confused:
They were hunting the LRA and walked into an ambush shortly after dawn. I just can't see properly trained jungle and forest fighters doing that especially if they were brought in special for the purpose.First problem is AFAIK we do not know what the terrain was like; Was it jungle or savannah (rain forest trained folks would have problems in open savannah...); on a trail or not; we do not know how many people each side had; we do not know if the Guatemalans had local 'scouts' or guides who may have been turned; I believe they were on a specified mission to capture Kony's deputy honcho -- that implies some intel (false?) or possibly a set up; we do not know what weapons were involved; we do not know the ranges involved; how much recent rest had each side had; was it really an ambush or was it a meeting engagement. You may know enough to make judgments. I do not.

As I understand it one of the LRA's most important survival factors is their exhaustive knowledge of the terrain. If one is used to looking at terrain from a thousand or more feet or even from moving vehicles, a three foot hump in the ground may be totally invisible or not seem like much -- when you're on foot, 50 meters from that hump, you may or may not notice it for several usually vegetation related reasons and even if you do, you cannot see over it...

You can't see it, I have. I've seen it happen to British, French, Australian, Korean (N and S), Chinese, Thai, Viet Namese (N & S) and US units, several of those units high speed SOF types. War's like that -- it (war, not those in it) doesn't play fair and anyone and everyone involved can have a bad day. IIRC eight Guatemalans were killed and five wounded but they killed 15 of their attackers (sounds like an all round bad day to me...).

Those in it don't play fair either but that's another story. Hollywood, most Fiction Writers and Many Historians have much to answer for... :rolleyes:

Bill Moore
10-18-2011, 04:55 AM
Posted by Ken,


I note your caveat of "most part" and acknowledge that may be correct but as one who deployed several times for a lot of things not involving defending the country with a bunch of other 'conventional' guys and to three Continents, you're just flat wrong on that. Way wrong...

Ken, I didn't say it didn't happen, I said this isn't what a lot of people signed up for outside of SOF and the Marines (who historically get involved in more smaller scale contingencies than the Army), but you're right I overstated this. My comment was shaped by our transition from the Cold War to MOOTW in the early 90s and the large number of complaints from conventional units who repeatedly said they didn't sign up for Bosnia, Haiti, etc., but that was a relatively short transition period, so I withdraw the statement.


I suspect you're also wrong on the capabilities they could and did bring to such operations -- note the past tense -- though possibly not on what they might bring today in many cases. That competence thing is easily fixed. Conventional units are just like SF Teams or Battalions / Groups -- some are better than others; often much better. Parochial prisms are not good viewing devices and if the 'Big Army' is less all round capable than it once was as appears to be the case, then it's a lick on the Army -- but it should also be recalled that SOCOM helped foster that incompetence. Either way, it isn't hard to fix IF the powers that be wish to do so.

Where did I lead you to believe I was commenting on their capabilities? SOF needs General Purpose Force enablers for almost all operations, so I'm not sure where you think I said we didn't need them. I also don't think I commented on competence in this thread; however, SF is uniquely selected and trained to operate in these politically sensitive environments, so yes I think SF is the best force for this particular type of mission. Earlier comments about behavior of young conventional soldiers/marines still stand. I have seen how many young GPF soldiers/marines behave towards locals, and you're much more likely to have a serious Strategic Corporal incident (the wrong kind) with GPF than SOF. As you know we still have our share of idiots in SOF, but percentage wise it is much lower, and the behavior isn't accepted as the norm. The way GPF minimizes these incidents is micro-management, which degrades mission performance.

I think I know where you're coming from about SOCOM fostering that incompetence, but please clarify? Some blame USSOCOM for taking the best NCOs out of the Army, and of course that may be happening to some degree with MARSOC in the Marines also. Outside of that, how did SOCOM contribute to GPF incompetence?

carl
10-18-2011, 05:05 AM
Ken:

To my completely untrained civilian mind, a "straight up small unit patrol action" is a small unit walking through the forest looking for another small unit and they have a fight.

I yield on all your points but shouldn't a good unit, an elite unit, know how to evaluate micro-terrain (I read that term in a book)? I would think that ability, amongst others, is one of the things that makes a good unit a good unit. And from what I was told the Guats weren't very good so maybe they couldn't do those things.

The other thing I was told at the time was this. They figured that 15 LRA were killed because a MONUC helicopter gunship that eventually showed up fired 5 rockets at something or other. MONUC then figured that each rocket should kill 3 people ergo 15 LRAs must have been killed.

Ken White
10-18-2011, 05:57 AM
a "straight up small unit patrol action" is a small unit walking through the forest looking for another small unit and they have a fight.It almost never is and the outcome of the fight depends on many variables -- for this event, almost none of which we seem to know. I know I don't...
And from what I was told the Guats weren't very good so maybe they couldn't do those things.Maybe they were, maybe they weren't. Good that is. Micro terrain is almost as silly as human terrain. terrain is terrain -- and 'reading' it is fairly straightforward. Reading what it hides is never straightforward.
The other thing I was told at the time was this. They figured that 15 LRA were killed because a MONUC helicopter gunship that eventually showed up fired 5 rockets at something or other. MONUC then figured that each rocket should kill 3 people ergo 15 LRAs must have been killed.What I recall reading was that the Nepalese came in on the birds and did a mop up and got the count. Also reacall an account that said 8 UN KIA and 15 UN WIA.

You can make your mind up anyway you wish -- I don't have enough information to do more than ask questions -- which I very strongly suspect no one who was not actually there on the ground could answer...

M-A Lagrange
10-18-2011, 06:07 AM
First of all, LRA is no more Acholi based group. The heads, as Khony, still are but the troops are kidnapped childsoldiers.
Acholi live in North West Uganda and South/South-East South Sudan. Khony is in CAR or in the Uele in DRC. Basically around 700 km far from Acholi land.
The Acholi fable is long gone, as the North Sudan support fable.

Secondly, let’s be frank: LRA bothers noone. It’s a joke compare to the mess coming in South Sudan and little in comparison with the Great Lakes endless mess.
What is shameful is that it took so much time to realize that AU will do nothing and that local government wont do it neither. After all, LRA just kills people in an area where there is nothing but people…
The only justification for such action from US is they want to put down a former Khartoum proxy for the coming Sudan war or they want to strength the military cooperation between Great Lakes stake holders by having a direct hand in. My personnal feeling goes for the second one but I can be wrong.

About the Guatemalians SF bad day.
I must say that it was poorly prepared (no recent sat images, no reco, no local intel…) and they were trapped in an area where you can find elephant hemp. What that? It’s an herb that grows up to 1.5 to 2.5 m high. It’s easy to ambush someone, even well trained, in such place.
What is the problem with Guatemala SF is not so much their capacities than the frame they are operating in: MONUSCO mandate and will to actually implement the mandate. They are a “reaction” force and do not, far from it, take the lead to gain advantage over any opponent. That said, Guatemala government is not willing to bring back home even 1 single bodybag. This does slow down your operational capacity in the end.

That is why I tried to bring attention to the political timeline of this deployment. The real threat, at the moment, is that DRC government makes LRA an excuse to not go for elections (Unlikely) or to at least not run elections in that part of the country (not likely anymore).
LRA will surely attack but only on opportunistic base: no more defenses. In DRC news papers, that deployment is presented as a already won victory by those who are close to ruling party. Opposition news papers are less enthousiastic.

That said, it's a good news for the populations in the area. Now let see what's gonna happen.

carl
10-18-2011, 02:05 PM
Ken:

I've decided to stop making fool of myself. Everything you say makes a lot of sense and, upon re-reading, a lot of what I say doesn't; especially since I think I mixed up the rocket/# of dead thing with another incident. The Kaibiles though, probably wish they had done some things differently on that day. (How's that for a feeble Parthian shot as my horse limps over the hill with her hindquarters shot full of arrows?)

M-A:

Your comments make me very pleased about the progress the DRC may have made. Kabila's actions are based upon how he thinks the voters are going to perceive them. That means he actually cares what they think, at least a little. That is pretty remarkable for that part of the world.

M-A Lagrange
10-18-2011, 03:53 PM
Ken:
M-A:

Your comments make me very pleased about the progress the DRC may have made. Kabila's actions are based upon how he thinks the voters are going to perceive them. That means he actually cares what they think, at least a little. That is pretty remarkable for that part of the world.

Carl,

Don't get too exited. Elections will be hold only and only if the international community will be capable to provide logistic.
Insecurity can be a good argument to not have elections. That's why the effort is more than welcomed. But this doesn't mean democracy is on the way. THat's why conditionality is needed.
Kabila cares cause if he did not, then he would be wiped out from power. He has to care cause he is unpopular in most of the country.

Ken White
10-18-2011, 04:46 PM
My comment was shaped by our transition from the Cold War to MOOTW in the early 90s and the large number of complaints from conventional units who repeatedly said they didn't sign up for Bosnia, Haiti, etc., but that was a relatively short transition period, so I withdraw the statement.No need to withdraw it, it was and is accurate for the time -- I deliberately referred back to an earlier time to illustrate two things:

It wasn't always that way. It does not need to stay that way -- and IMO it should not.
...so I'm not sure where you think I said we didn't need them.Didn't think that.
Earlier comments about behavior of young conventional soldiers/marines still stand. I have seen how many young GPF soldiers/marines behave towards locals, and you're much more likely to have a serious Strategic Corporal incident (the wrong kind) with GPF than SOF. As you know we still have our share of idiots in SOF, but percentage wise it is much lower, and the behavior isn't accepted as the norm. The way GPF minimizes these incidents is micro-management, which degrades mission performance.I totally agree with all that, saying only that can be -- and should be -- changed. Our poor training designed to be cheap instead of effective is the major cause of that.
I think I know where you're coming from about SOCOM fostering that incompetence, but please clarify? Some blame USSOCOM for taking the best NCOs out of the Army, and of course that may be happening to some degree with MARSOC in the Marines also. Outside of that, how did SOCOM contribute to GPF incompetence?First, on the NCOs (or Officers...). I do not subscribe to that IMO SOCOM has some of the best and some of the worst of those in the Army -- and almost no one that's in between (which Big Army will tolerate because it believes it must, not due to actual need). There are people who make good shooters; there are others who make good SF types. There are a great many very competent people who do not want to do either of those jobs for a variety of reasons. There are places for all three types and those who both want to be and can pass selection should do the SF / SOF thing and the rest can soldier on in the rest of the Army. I will point out that there are folks in the rest of the Army who are every bit as good, combat wise, as the SF / SOF guys and gals, there are actually more of them in the Big Army but they are not concentrated or specialized so they are not as noticeable. So, no to raping units for the great guys. Not true.

I was specifically referring to the fact that big Army lost its focus in the 70s and severely (and quite wrongly) dumbed down training and thus lessened the competence of units to do their missions. Instead of fixing that, the Army wrongly scaled down mission sets. This gave SOCOM an opportunity to pick some mission sets they could logically claim were 'theirs' and get the missions and concomitant funding. Thus, the Army screwed up and SOCOM merely took advantage of their screwup to enhance their capabilities. The upshot was that SOCOM contributed to continued lessened competence in Army combat -- particularly Infantry -- units.

Aside from the adverse impact on the Army, there were unintended consequences for SOCOM, notably the diversion of SF into CIF and Strat Recon missions (as opposed to LRS which is not a SOF mission at all) -- both of which, IMO are wasteful of SF training and capabilities. People are needed to do those jobs, no question -- but IMO, SF should not be the provider.

Full disclosure, I'm not a SOCOM fan. I tried to tell people when Barb Wire Bob was skulking around Congress lobbying for it that it was not a totally bad idea but the way it would likely end up would not be all that good for the Nation. IMO, that has come to pass. What should have occurred was either creation of a new Service or nothing, the current process is the worst of both worlds.

As an aside, if the rest of the Army had the training money of SOCOM it arguably would be in better shape; you get what you pay for and in SOCOM's favor, they have never scrimped on training dollars whereas the big Army -- wrongly -- has.

All immaterial, The Army proper appears to be trying to improve it's training and capabilities (or, more accurately, restore both), SOCOM is here and on balance it does more good than harm but I, for one, wish they'd learn down in Tampa what SF is really supposed to do and stop trying to force it into other things. The US needs competent conventional forces, it needs highly trained Shooters, Strat Recon and SF -- and those are four very different missions requiring, really, at least four different kinds of folks. The fact that SF can switch hit is a plus, no question -- but is it really desirable?

Ken White
10-18-2011, 04:47 PM
(How's that for a feeble Parthian shot as my horse limps over the hill with her hindquarters shot full of arrows?)....and not feeble, no arrows. ;)

Bob's World
10-19-2011, 01:35 AM
I, for one, wish they'd learn down in Tampa what SF is really supposed to do and stop trying to force it into other things. The US needs competent conventional forces, it needs highly trained Shooters, Strat Recon and SF -- and those are four very different missions requiring, really, at least four different kinds of folks. The fact that SF can switch hit is a plus, no question -- but is it really desirable?

Amen. For what it's worth, there is confusion at Bragg and all of the TSOCs as well. We're working on it. In simple terms I say "we don't need SOCOM to be a bag of hammers." It's designed to be a diverse mix of tools to address a wide range of situations, but the focus of the past several years has shaped all of those tools into some variant of a hammer, IMO. As I said, we're working on it.

M-A Lagrange
10-19-2011, 11:47 AM
From: RDC : Pouvoir - Opposition, tricherie contre contestation ?
http://afrique.kongotimes.info/rdc/rdc_elections/3235-elections-congo-pouvoir-opposition-tricherie-contre-contestation.html

(I translate)
There is also the arrival of U.S. troops in Uganda, officially to hunt the LRA of Joseph Kony. Why these 100 U.S. military personnel have to be deployed in Uganda now, not after the elections in the DRC? These U.S. Marines came with sophisticated equipment that was not even waited by Ugandan officials. According to information relayed in The Monitor, the Ugandan army spokesman acknowledged that his army was surprised by the arrival of U.S. military hardware. Some sources claim that three Drones are also expected in the next few days in Kampala. These unmanned aircraft, which can be remotely from California, scare several senior African policy makers who fear their use for purposes other than tracking down the LRA of Joseph Kony.

What bothers African “policies makers” is not so much LRA than what US intend to do with 100 guys in Kampala.
But I personnaly think it's a good thing to have 100 US SOF ready to be deployed in Uganda. Just in case of... things turn ugly in Kinshasa.:cool:

ganulv
10-19-2011, 07:02 PM
(I translate)
These U.S. Marines came with sophisticated equipment that was not even waited by Ugandan officials.

Does «marines américains» really mean U.S. Marines (i.e., from the USMC) or is it more likely that the writer’s frame of reference includes the French troupes de marine?


What bothers African “policies makers” is not so much LRA than what US intend to do with 100 guys in Kampala.
But I personnaly think it's a good thing to have 100 US SOF ready to be deployed in Uganda. Just in case of... things turn ugly in Kinshasa.:cool:

Is it too far fetched to wonder if the recent independence of South Sudan might factor into the deployment in some way?

M-A Lagrange
10-20-2011, 10:58 AM
Does «marines américains» really mean U.S. Marines (i.e., from the USMC) or is it more likely that the writer’s frame of reference includes the French troupes de marine?



Is it too far fetched to wonder if the recent independence of South Sudan might factor into the deployment in some way?

Gav,

First: US marines means any US soldiers.
Seccondly: yes South Sudan is a matter of concern but with 100 green berets you can take Kinshasa and kill some LRA. But you have a limited impact on the North/South Sudan war to come.

Dayuhan
10-20-2011, 11:27 AM
M-A...

You're closer to this than any of us, so a question:

In your opinion, how dependent is the LRA on the personal presence of Joseph Kony?

I realize that the group is split up and some parts may not be under Kony's direct control. At the same time, though, he's the founder, he's always been at the head of it, and there doesn't appear to be any real ideological agenda. I'm wondering if some level of superstition has emerged around him, as it sometimes does with these leaders... perhaps rumours of supernatural powers, invulnerability, the ability see faraway places and to track down and exert revenge on defectors. That sort of thing would be enhanced by his ability to survive, and can hold people even when he's not physically present.

I'm wondering only because the LRA seems to be as much a cult as a political movement... all speculative of course, but I have to wonder what impact Kony's death would have on the remaining groups that identify themselves as LRA.

Thoughts?

M-A Lagrange
10-20-2011, 03:01 PM
Hey Dayuhan


In your opinion, how dependent is the LRA on the personal presence of Joseph Kony?

I realize that the group is split up and some parts may not be under Kony's direct control. At the same time, though, he's the founder, he's always been at the head of it, and there doesn't appear to be any real ideological agenda. I'm wondering if some level of superstition has emerged around him, as it sometimes does with these leaders... perhaps rumours of supernatural powers, invulnerability, the ability see faraway places and to track down and exert revenge on defectors. That sort of thing would be enhanced by his ability to survive, and can hold people even when he's not physically present.

I'm wondering only because the LRA seems to be as much a cult as a political movement... all speculative of course, but I have to wonder what impact Kony's death would have on the remaining groups that identify themselves as LRA.

In deed, Konhy has a strong hand on his troops. LRA use very low technical level of communication. Commanders take regularly orders from Konhy for a period that can be of several monthes. All orders are exchanged through direct communication between Konhy and his commanders. He call them regularly for meetings where they receive the commands from "god konhy". All of them are remains of the first LRA (Acholy ethnic base). When they are in the bush, they are capable to conduct quite well organised operations several weeks after receiving their orders. What keeps the things tide is their fear from Konhy and his super powers.


You are totally right by saying that Konhy has a cult rather than a political movement. Konhy rules by his personnal interpretation of the Bible and has been given super powers by God and the ancestors spirits (or something like that). His troops gives him power to see anywhere, to know what people think, the receive messages from spirits...
Actually only fools believe that LRA still has a political agenda (And those fools exist in various international organisations). Letting him grow by trying to negociate will give him a political agenda (as he will have a territory).

In my personnal understanding (But I might get it wrong), Konhy is the head of a sect which is trying to survive. He is not even the head of a terrorist group or what ever.

Now, the real question is if Konhy dies, what would do guys like Dominique (His first lieutenant)?
There are no response to this but what I can quietly assure is that they will not surrender.
They will probably keep on doing what they are doing because they have no ways to come back into society.

Dayuhan
10-20-2011, 09:26 PM
Now, the real question is if Konhy dies, what would do guys like Dominique (His first lieutenant)?
There are no response to this but what I can quietly assure is that they will not surrender.
They will probably keep on doing what they are doing because they have no ways to come back into society.

I can see why the second tier of leaders wouldn't surrender... but would they have the power over the troops that Kony provides?

It seems universally agreed that the LRA rank and file were forcibly recruited, mostly as children. Many still are children. That raises the question of why they don't shoot the leaders and go home. Belief in Kony's supernatural powers is one answer, and I wonder if the second tier would have the same capacity to hold the troops. Of course fear of reprisal is another answer, and it's possible that LRA leaders emphasize barbarity precisely to assure that the troops will feel that have nowhere to go after what they've done.

ganulv
10-20-2011, 09:45 PM
It seems universally agreed that the LRA rank and file were forcibly recruited, mostly as children. Many still are children. That raises the question of why they don't shoot the leaders and go home. Belief in Kony's supernatural powers is one answer, and I wonder if the second tier would have the same capacity to hold the troops. Of course fear of reprisal is another answer, and it's possible that LRA leaders emphasize barbarity precisely to assure that the troops will feel that have nowhere to go after what they've done.

I offer a question in response to your question—How many abusive parents ever have to go mano-a-mano with their children? Almost none. (I’ve known one person who decided he was going to give as good as he got from his dad and he ended up in juvenile detention for a couple of years for the trouble.)

Dayuhan
10-20-2011, 10:55 PM
I know there's no absolute answer and you don't have the supernatural powers of Joseph Kony... just asking your opinion!

Dayuhan
10-20-2011, 11:37 PM
I offer a question in response to your question—How many abusive parents ever have to go mano-a-mano with their children? Almost none. (I’ve known one person who decided he was going to give as good as he got from his dad and he ended up in juvenile detention for a couple of years for the trouble.)

Many of those press-ganged by the LRA as children are now well into adulthood. I imagine your average abusive dad would feel a bit insecure if his former punching bag was now 20 and walking around the house with an assault rifle.

carl
10-21-2011, 01:06 AM
That raises the question of why they don't shoot the leaders and go home.

Peter Singer wrote a very good book called Children at War that covers that. The methods by which they take charge of the child's mind seem almost standardized and are extremely effective. Once the children are removed from their social and family support mechanism they are very malleable. Scarily so. And when their minds are reformed, it doesn't take much to make it stick. If you grasp the basics, and are brutal enough, if you were able to get any group of 14 year olds and have exclusive control of them for two weeks, at the end of that time they would be killing their parents willingly. Like I said, very scary.

The book has the best explanation of the phenomanon (sic) that I've read.

Moderator adds

Link to the cited book, by Peter Singer and published in 2006:http://www.amazon.com/Children-at-War-P-Singer/dp/0520248767/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1319197163&sr=1-1

M-A Lagrange
10-21-2011, 05:21 AM
Just to complete Carl's excellent reading recommendation, specifically on LRA in North Uganda you have:
First Kill Your Family: Child Soldiers of Uganda and the Lord's Resistance Army
For having discussed the subject with friends who worked in Child soldiers reintegration and for having collected several testimonies my self, those kids gives you creeps when they tell you what they did to survive.
Cause in the end, for a 8 to 12 years old boy or girl, it's all about survival of the fittest.

Moderator adds

Link to the cited book, by Peter Eichstaedt and published in 2009:http://www.amazon.com/First-Kill-Your-Family-Resistance/dp/1556527993

Bill Moore
10-21-2011, 06:58 AM
This is the best open source description I have found of the LRA's tactics, weapons, use of technology, etc. Well worth the read for those interested.

http://www.enoughproject.org/files/publications/lra_today.pdf


The ongoing Ugandan army offensive against the LRA and renewed interest on the LRA issue in the West spurred by a bill recently signed in the United States necessitate a better understanding of how the LRA operates. A thorough analysis of the LRA’s modus operandi, leadership, and aims is lacking, even though substantive assets and valuable time are spent fighting the rebels by the Ugandan army with support from the U.S. government.

It seems overtly difficult to engage a group of fighters, whether militarily or peacefully, without knowing what they stand for. Such lack of understanding, arguably throughout the entire existence of the LRA, has played a significant role in the failure to resolve the conflict. Erroneous descriptions of the LRA as a Christian fundamentalist group composed of drugged children led by a madman have led to a profound underestimation of the strength and military ability of the LRA.
http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/10/can-the-us-finally-defeat-the-lords-resistance-army/246836/


Since the late 1980s, the Ugandan government has tried several times to defeat the LRA or at least compel it to disarm. It even created a senior position dedicated to this cause; the Minister of State for Pacification of Northern Uganda. The first person to hold this office, Betty Bigombe, negotiated directly with Kony, deep-jungle meetings that many of her staffers refused to attend for fear that they would be maimed or killed. But President Museveni squashed Bigombe's hopeful 1994 peace talks, and others since then. Museveni has good reason to want fighting to continue. He is still unpopular in the north, and the LRA gives him good reason to fill that once rebellious region with his troops. They've also given him an opportunity forcibly relocate a number of "vulnerable" northern Ugandans into displacement camps, where he said they might be more easily protected. The LRA's bloody attacks also provide a rallying point for once-fractured Uganda, a common enemy that keeps everyone in line. Whatever Museveni's brutalities, the LRA will always be worse.

U.S. assistance hasn't done much to help. In 2002, the Ugandan military launched a U.S.-aided campaign called Iron Fist against LRA camps in Uganda's north and Sudan's south. The U.S. had pushed the Sudanese government to allow the incursions; it also provided logistical and intelligence support to the 10,000 troops that Museveni sent against Kony. The LRA leadership escaped unscathed. A second Iron Fist campaign in 2004 pushed much of the LRA into Sudan and the neighboring Democratic Republic of Congo but did little else. Kony was later pushed even further west in the Central African Republic.

Bill Moore
10-21-2011, 07:44 AM
Based on my reading it appears that President Yoweri Museveni and Kony mutually benefit one another, each provides the other the justification for attempting to expand their power base. Interesting that Museveni may be attempting to undermine/weaken the AU role against the LRA. The U.S. with some success has pushed hard for African solutions to African problems, so whether militarily successful or not, it is politically successful when regional organizations act together to address regional security threats.

While this organization appears to be well informed, it is worth noting that they are very close to the White House so there may be some bias in their slant.

http://www.enoughproject.org/blogs/using-new-focus-lra-end-them


Another potentially critical development is the proposed African Union mission. The plans being finalized would include regional military operations and an A.U. special envoy for the LRA. The mission could provide a multilateral and African partner for a surge of commitment and resources from the U.S. and other countries. However, there are several problems with the A.U. mission as currently proposed, namely:
• Without a surge of U.S. diplomacy and resources, and the engagement of additional partners, the mission is simply a new face for the same faltering efforts.
• However, instead of enhancing the existing operations, the current plans for the A.U. mission appear more concerned with continuing the status quo while attracting funding for the regional governments via the A.U.
• Some governments involved, primarily Uganda, are attempting to weaken the proposed A.U. special envoy position—a post that could invaluably address the intraregional tensions that have inhibited cooperation and coordination on addressing the LRA crisis—and the A.U.’s overall ownership of the mission.

M-A Lagrange
11-11-2011, 08:51 AM
In African jungle, US group using new radios to fight vicious militia hunted by US troops
As Ugandan troops track the LRA through the jungle, assisted by U.S. intelligence and special forces advisers, the Crisis Tracker is garnering praise from the U.S. government. Obama, in announcing the U.S. deployments, congratulated Americans who have “mobilized to respond to this unique crisis of conscience.”
“The Crisis Tracker is a really innovative tool, and will be useful as we seek to enhance information-sharing among all protection actors in the LRA-affected area,” the State Department’s Bureau of African Affairs said in a statement.
A spokesman for the U.S. military’s Africa command, Ken Fidler, said the military is aware of the Crisis Tracker website, but he couldn’t reveal whether or how the military is using the information, other than the fact the military gathers information from a variety of sources.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/africa/in-african-jungle-us-group-raises-radio-towers-to-fight-vicious-militia-hunted-by-us-troops/2011/11/08/gIQAyu7u0M_story.html

The LRA crisis tracker website: http://www.lracrisistracker.com/

To follow the LRA in almost real time

Bill Moore
11-12-2011, 02:34 AM
The LRA crisis tracker is great illustration on how information technology can be leveraged to break through the stove pipes and leverage the entire population for near real time situational awareness, which expontentially increases our information/intelligence collecting capacity.

There are quite a few in the U.S. military that understand the power of this technology and how to use it, but still too many chicken hawks trapped in old ways of thinking and operating that are preventing us from using it to its maximum advantage.

M-A Lagrange
11-18-2011, 06:07 AM
You can find the last ICG report on LRA there: http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/horn-of-africa/uganda/182-the-lords-resistance-army-end-game.aspx

After the UN security council congratulating himself for all the good job they did not do, this is kind of fresh air.

RECOMMENDATIONS
For mustering and maintaining political will
To the African Union:
1. Appoint urgently a special envoy with a robust mandate to coordinate African and other international efforts against the LRA, including by persuading:
a) President Museveni to commit more troops and equipment to the military operation while increasing efforts to protect civilians and rendering it more accountable; and
b) Presidents Kabila (DRC), Boziz (the CAR) and Kiir (South Sudan) to grant the Ugandan army access to all areas where the LRA is active for six months, reviewable after five months, and to instruct their armies to increase civilian protection.
2. Set up the special envoys office with sufficient staff, equipment and resources to operate for at least one year.
To the Government of Uganda:
3. Demonstrate full commitment to anti-LRA efforts by accepting a multi-dimensional AU initiative, including a robustly-mandated AU special envoy; committing more troops and equipment to the military operation while rendering it more accountable; and increasing efforts to protect civilians.
To the Governments of the DRC, the CAR and South Sudan:
4. Demonstrate full commitment to anti-LRA efforts by accepting a multi-dimensional AU initiative, including a robustly-mandated special envoy; granting the Ugandan army access to all LRA-affected areas; and ensuring national armies increase efforts to protect civilians.
To the U.S. Government:
5. Support fully the launch of a multi-dimensional AU initiative, including a robustly-mandated special envoy.
6. Maintain pressure on Uganda, the DRC, the CAR and South Sudan to commit fully to a multi-dimensional AU initiative, including a robustly-mandated special envoy.
7. Be prepared, along with other donors, to scale down military and development assistance if the four presidents fail to demonstrate appropriate commitment.
8. Appoint a special envoy for the Great Lakes region to work with the AU special envoy in mustering political commitment for anti-LRA efforts.
To the EU:
9. Provide funds to the AU enabling it to set up an office for the special envoy with sufficient resources to lead anti-LRA efforts for at least one year and to establish a Regional Intervention Force (RIF).
For launching an urgent military push prioritising civilian protection
To the Governments of Uganda and the U.S.:
10. Intensify promptly military operations against the LRA, prioritising:
a) increased efforts to protect civilians;
b) enhanced civil-military relations, including by setting up two-way channels of communication with state authorities and other local leaders, such as church leaders and customary chiefs, and, in the CAR and South Sudan, by working closely with self-defence groups;
c) enhanced information management and coordination, including by setting up joint intelligence and operations centres with national armies in the CAR and South Sudan; and
d) strict accountability measures, including by implementing a code of conduct, rules of engagement and investigations of alleged human rights abuses and accusations of illegal exploitation of natural resources.
To the African Union:
11. Finalise the operational and legal framework for a Regional Intervention Force (RIF) that includes the priorities set out in Recommendation 10 above, as well as the standard operating procedures used by the Ugandan army stipulating the quick transfer of women and children LRA escapees to international protection agencies.
For intensifying complementary civilian efforts
To the UN Stabilisation Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO), the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) and the UN Peacebuilding Office in the CAR (BINUCA):
12. Coordinate a region-wide Disarmament, Demobilisation, Repatriation, Resettlement and Reintegration (DDRRR) program, including by:
a) expanding the communication campaign that encourages LRA fighters to surrender so it covers the whole tri-border region and continue it until LRA groups no longer pose a threat to civilians; and
b) coordinating efforts of international and national NGOs and church groups in the DRC, the CAR and South Sudan to help former LRA members return home safely and reintegrate into civilian life including through job creation programs and psycho-social care.
To the U.S. Government, the EU, the UN and other donors:
13. Support development and implementation of a region-wide DDRRR program and the repair and improvement of communications and transport infrastructure in the LRA-affected area.
For planning ahead
To the AU and its international partners:
14. Draw up a clear exit strategy that foresees the RIF in operation for one year and review after eight months whether a half-year extension is needed.
15. Plan to maintain and support the RIF and DDRRR operations after Kony and his top commanders are caught or killed, until residual LRA groups no longer pose a threat to civilians.
16. Request RIF participating countries to transfer the LRA leaders against whom the International Criminal Court (ICC) has issued arrest warrants (Kony, Odhiambo and Ongwen) to the ICC if they are captured and to hand over other LRA commanders not subject to such arrest warrants to the authorities of their country for prosecution or other appropriate accountability processes.
Nairobi/Brussels, 17 November 2011

M-A Lagrange
11-21-2011, 04:47 PM
General: U.S. troops’ Uganda mission likely to last until rebel leader is caught
Ham said the plan is to keep troops in the region until Kony is killed or brought to justice.
“That’s the mission,” Ham said in an interview during a visit to Washington last week.
The Lord’s Resistance Army has been fighting against the Ugandan government and attacking civilians for nearly a quarter century, but Ham predicted that the group “will probably wither” if Kony is apprehended
“This is not like another organization where if you take the top guy out somebody else can step in,” Ham said. “It really is about him personally.”

http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/general-us-troops-uganda-mission-likely-to-last-until-rebel-leader-is-caught/2011/11/18/gIQAOKeScN_story.html

davidbfpo
11-30-2011, 08:54 PM
A question posed by Kingjaja on a post elsewhere and moved for him.

Meanwhile, how long do you estimate it will take to catch Joseph Kony? Is the US sending troops to Central Africa to nab Kony or to keep a tab on goings-on in the Congo?

carl
12-29-2011, 05:36 PM
You can find the last ICG report on LRA there: http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/horn-of-africa/uganda/182-the-lords-resistance-army-end-game.aspx

M-A: I read this report last week and it seemed to conclude that the hunt for the LRA has slowed because Uganda, South Sudan, Congo and the CAR are just not that interested anymore. There is no real political payoff in getting the LRA. The only people hurt are locals in out of the way areas and nobody cares much about them. That seemed to be the situation the report concluded.

My question is this, will the US effort actually motivate those four countries or will they just string us along as long as possible until the money stops? One reason I ask this may be is that on another site a guy insisted that the LRA was still active in Uganda. He said he was there recently in an official capacity and that is what the Ugandan army told him. That is contrary to everything I've read over the past few years so I wondered if the Ugandans told him that so more of the money would be spent in Uganda rather than where the LRA actually is.

In other words, do think we are going to be had in this deal?

M-A Lagrange
01-09-2012, 08:23 AM
Hello Carl and David,

Sorry I did not see your questions before, was little busy.

Carl,
I would say that I am extremely cautious about LRA presence in Uganda. I am even more cautious if the intel is coming from the Ugandan Army. My personal opinion on that is that Uganda is worried about the oil fields in the western part of the country. DRC elections have already triggered some reactions from ADF and Mayi-Mayi near Beni and Museveny is worried about how far this could go. Also South Sudan mess is to be watched and is a good justification to serve the old LRA threat story.

David,
Let’s be clear: LRA is not a priority for any of the government involved. LRA are killing people and not threatening economical interest… Therefore the LRA hunt will goes on until an unlucky guy catches Khony…
Basically catching Khony would be a financial loss for Uganda. Catching Khony will take time, basically my bet is is that it will take as long as US are willing to fund that “adventure”. But delaying it is a mistake according to me as it will allow LRA to regain a territory and therefore a real problem. I do not think that keeping LRA at non vital threat level is a good option. But, as said previously in the post, keeping LRA active is usefull for Kampala.

carl
02-09-2012, 08:36 PM
Here is link that goes to the LRA Crisis Tracker 2011 report.

http://www.lracrisistracker.com/media/report/annual-security-brief-2011

LRA activities are down, especially recently, thank God.

They say their reporting is much better as of late because of distribution of HF radios to towns and villages in the threatened areas.

M-A Lagrange
02-20-2012, 12:14 PM
ESO Hunts Ugandan Rebels In Diaspora
Uganda’s External Security Organisation (ESO) has started the hunt for suspected combatants and sponsors of exiled rebel group Uganda People's Front/Uganda People's Army (UPF/UPA), Chimpreports.com can reveal.
The hunt was launched following the recent arrest of former US marine-turned fugitive Nix Bongomin in Northern Uganda where he was recruiting rebels to overthrow the government of President Yoweri Museveni.
...
The trio has reportedly been active UPF members, a rebel group which had started putting in place bases in Western Uganda in 2008.

http://www.chimpreports.com/index.php/special-reports/3984-eso-hunts-ugandan-rebels-in-diaspora.html

As long as some one is hunting Kony for real… All the rest of US and Uganda services can chase wild goose in the dark...

M-A Lagrange
03-07-2012, 09:07 AM
As AFRICOM is communicating its difficulties in hunting down Kony but also highlight the supposed effect of this hunt on LRA activity capacities:

US Defends Ongoing LRA Mission Amid Criticism
The top U.S. special operations commander for Africa, Brian Losey, said U.S. officials are already seeing a decrease of what he calls the “lethality of LRA activities.”
At a recent event in Washington, top State Department official Karl Wycoff echoed those remarks.
“In the last several months, scores of people have defected, escaped or been released from the LRA’s ranks. This is a welcome development,” said Wycoff.
Wycoff also made clear why President Barack Obama decided last year to send about 100 U.S. troops to help African countries battle the LRA.
“It is intrinsically an organization that needs to be removed, eliminated, reduced, so that it is no longer a threat to regional security and human security,” said Wycoff.http://www.voanews.com/english/news/africa/central/US-Defends-Ongoing-LRA-Mission-Amid-Criticism-140395413.html

Critics of UPDF are rising from all over:

Uganda: UPDF in Kony Hunt Accused of Rape, Looting
A new report accuses UPDF of massive plunder of resources like diamonds and timber in the tiny and war-wracked Central African Republic (CAR) where the army is pursuing bands of the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA).
The dossier, titled 'The Lord's Resistance Army in the Central African Republic' and authored by the New York-based Social Science Research Council (SSRC) in December 2011, alleges that some Ugandan soldiers operated a prostitution ring, raped and infected Congolese refugee girls in CAR, with the deadly HIV.
However, army spokesman Col Felix Kulayigye, on Thursday described the report as the usual banter from self-seeking organisations attempting to account for money from donors.
"That report is unfortunate. It's from masqueraders who are trying to earn bread from our blood and sweat. The UPDF is one of the most disciplined forces in Africa and we are pro-people. Anyone can check our record", Kulayigye said.
In November 2011, the Brussels-based International Crisis Group also accused the UPDF of plundering timber, gold and diamond not only in CAR but also in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).http://www.observer.ug/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=17456:updf-in-kony-hunt-accused-of-rape-looting&catid=78:topstories&Itemid=116
(I highly recommend to read the whole article)

And here is a link to a short video to remind us why and how US are involved.
STOP KONY:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Y4MnpzG5Sqc

carl
03-08-2012, 05:28 AM
That video on the LRA has had over 11 million, that's million, hits in just the last few days I believe. My 14 year old nephew heard about it on Facebook and now is interested.

It is quite a phenomena. It is good if it helps thing along but it disturbs me a little. The attitude of the video is something along the lines that this has gone on long enough and we are going to do something about it now. And what they are going to do is wear bracelets and go viral and speak out without fear. The object of all that is to make "them" get Kony this year. It seems like the makers of the video are as interested in patting themselves on the back as doing something about Kony.

It is an interesting happening.

Dayuhan
03-08-2012, 05:49 AM
It seems like the makers of the video are as interested in patting themselves on the back as doing something about Kony.

The makers of the video are of course not in a position to do something about Kony... drawing attention and building awareness is all they can do. If that involves a bit of patting themselves, so it goes... human nature.

One wonders, though, if they realize what's likely to be involved in getting Kony. If it were all that easy it would have been done already.

M-A Lagrange
03-08-2012, 01:20 PM
The makers of the video are of course not in a position to do something about Kony... drawing attention and building awareness is all they can do. If that involves a bit of patting themselves, so it goes... human nature.

One wonders, though, if they realize what's likely to be involved in getting Kony. If it were all that easy it would have been done already.
Here are some critics of the video

How a Ugandan warlord went viral in 24 hours
So how did Mr. Kony become a trending topic on Twitter in the United States, Europe, Canada and Australia in 24 hours? The answer: A U.S. based charity; A compelling video; And a savvy social media campaign that sought to influence key cultural personalities to propel its cause and engage new audiences. The group Invisible Children's aim is to make Joseph Kony famous, so that in 2012 he can be finally brought to justice. The group asks supporters to join a pledge that reads "Joseph Kony is one of the world's worst war criminals and I support the international effort to arrest him, disarm the LRA and bring the child soldiers home." The Globe and Mail

Kony2012 video goes viral, and so do concerns about its producers
[...] Visible Children has collected a number of these critiques. The non-profit's financial statements show that only 32% of the $8.6m it spent last year went to direct services. Meanwhile Foreign Affairs magazine has accused the organization of "manipulat[ing] facts for strategic purposes." Charity Navigator has given Invisible Children a two-star rating in accountability out of a possible four. Critics point out that the campaign calls on the public to pressure the US to continue working with the Ugandan military, an organisation that has its own record of abuses. The Guardian

Kony 2012 campaign criticized for dumbing down conflict
Critics have accused the campaign of using colonial language and advocating for military intervention in Africa. With the explosion on social media sites of an activist viral video, Kony 2012, exposing the misdeeds committed by Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) leader Joseph Kony, critics have reacted to the campaign denouncing it as "colonial" and reminiscint of Kipling's "White Man's Burden" argument. Globalpost

Lord's Resistance Army: After long silence, the US-tracked rebels attack
The deadly Lord's Resistance Army goes on attack again in Democratic Republic of Congo, but coordinated efforts by regional armies and the US military has put them on the run. CS Monitor

Some of those critics are legitimate some are... Less

TDB
03-08-2012, 01:25 PM
I did think the KONY12 video dumbed down, I guess it had to. The complexity of the conflict may be beyond many peoples comprehention. The few pieces I saw criticising it were a little outdated and illinformed. I think if you're going to set up a campaign like this, you need to give everyone all of the facts and allow those to do the talking.

carl
03-08-2012, 03:20 PM
The makers of the video are of course not in a position to do something about Kony... drawing attention and building awareness is all they can do. If that involves a bit of patting themselves, so it goes... human nature.

One wonders, though, if they realize what's likely to be involved in getting Kony. If it were all that easy it would have been done already.

If they do realize that, they don't say it in the video. They kept speaking of "arresting" Kony. They avoided saying anything about having to kill him. Nor did they say anything about walking around in the forest for weeks at a time. They stressed training and technology provided by those 100 Americans and they especially stressed really really wanting to see him got in 2012.

It is an interesting video from a cultural point of view. I watched it because I wanted to see what got my nephew so exercised so fast. From the standpoint of learning anything about the LRA beyond that they are really bad, it isn't so good.

davidbfpo
03-08-2012, 11:29 PM
When I looked there had been 34m views of the KONY12 video; I'd be intrigued how many views were of the total video.

Following a comment on Kings of War going viral KoW has been rather busy today, today's comment:http://kingsofwar.org.uk/2012/03/invisible-childrens-military-disconnect/#more-6538 and yesterday's:http://kingsofwar.org.uk/2012/03/llama-versus-psychopath/

KoW recommends this background article, from November 2010:http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/136673/mareike-schomerus-tim-allen-and-koen-vlassenroot/obama-takes-on-the-lra?page=show

Incidentally the UN's covert operation in 2006, using Guatemalan Special Forces, are mentioned:http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2009/05/15/hard-target.html

TDB
03-09-2012, 12:04 PM
When I looked there had been 34m views of the KONY12 video; I'd be intrigued how many views were of the total video.

Following a comment on Kings of War going viral KoW has been rather busy today, today's comment:http://kingsofwar.org.uk/2012/03/invisible-childrens-military-disconnect/#more-6538 and yesterday's:http://kingsofwar.org.uk/2012/03/llama-versus-psychopath/

KoW recommends this background article, from November 2010:http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/136673/mareike-schomerus-tim-allen-and-koen-vlassenroot/obama-takes-on-the-lra?page=show

Incidentally the UN's covert operation in 2006, using Guatemalan Special Forces, are mentioned:http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2009/05/15/hard-target.html

The Daily Beast article gave some really good background info. The failed Guatemalan attack must have really boosted his prowess, making people believe that he really does have super powers and a connection to god.

ganulv
03-09-2012, 02:20 PM
The Daily Beast article gave some really good background info. The failed Guatemalan attack must have really boosted his prowess, making people believe that he really does have super powers and a connection to god.
And Imad Mughniyah. And Jesse James. Some folks think Tupac’s still out there, too. Not trying to make light of a vile human being or a horrible situation, it’s just that people will believe a lot of things is all I’m saying.

davidbfpo
03-09-2012, 11:13 PM
FP Blog has a good article, the author has spent sometime in Uganda and a torrent of responses:http://blog.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/03/07/guest_post_joseph_kony_is_not_in_uganda_and_other_ complicated_things

carl
03-09-2012, 11:15 PM
Something occurred to my cynical side about this video. It is coming out, hopefully, late in the LRA game and if Kony is killed this year or next, the producers of this video will be able to use that to their advantage. They can enhance their influence in various circles because they will almost certainly take some of the credit. Professionally they already have a lot of cachet just because of the number of hits it has had.

JMA
03-10-2012, 01:43 PM
I did think the KONY12 video dumbed down, I guess it had to. The complexity of the conflict may be beyond many peoples comprehention. The few pieces I saw criticising it were a little outdated and illinformed. I think if you're going to set up a campaign like this, you need to give everyone all of the facts and allow those to do the talking.

I was Youtube view 63,644,267 and watched it all.

They need to get this guy.

If in the process some guys make a lot of money then as they say ... "that's America".

It is of course scandalous that it has not been a high enough priority for the Ugandan government, regional groupings and the African Union before Obama committed 100 odd yank soldiers to the mission. Well done Obama!

So now we will see how many 'kids' sign up for this initiative and if they are able to produce sustainable activism to press this issue home.

I hope they get the guy.


PS: After posting this I refreshed the Youtube page and saw the number had climbed to: 65,051,329 ... amazing!

carl
03-10-2012, 04:42 PM
I was Youtube view 63,644,267 and watched it all.

They need to get this guy.

If in the process some guys make a lot of money then as they say ... "that's America".

You're right.

It is damned interesting all those you tube views and I wonder what it portends for the future.

TDB
03-10-2012, 07:44 PM
I was Youtube view 63,644,267 and watched it all.

They need to get this guy.

If in the process some guys make a lot of money then as they say ... "that's America".

It is of course scandalous that it has not been a high enough priority for the Ugandan government, regional groupings and the African Union before Obama committed 100 odd yank soldiers to the mission. Well done Obama!

So now we will see how many 'kids' sign up for this initiative and if they are able to produce sustainable activism to press this issue home.

I hope they get the guy.


PS: After posting this I refreshed the Youtube page and saw the number had climbed to: 65,051,329 ... amazing!

I agree. Some of the comments against are listing all the other problems Uganda has. Well that's the problem if you're going to be a single issue charity, you're only going to target that one issue.

JMA
03-11-2012, 01:43 PM
I agree. Some of the comments against are listing all the other problems Uganda has. Well that's the problem if you're going to be a single issue charity, you're only going to target that one issue.

Sometimes it takes the initiative of outsiders/kids/whoever to shake the professional politicians awake and to force them to take action.

In my era Band Aid (1984) - run by a bunch of long haired gits - turned 'business as usual' on its head. Magnificent work.

The spark of humanity still burns in the young.

I am always reminded by what Cynthia Ozick wrote (in relation to the Holocaust):


Indifference is not so much a gesture of looking away--of choosing to be passive--as it is an active disinclination to feel. Indifference shuts down the humane, and does it deliberately, with all the strength deliberateness demands. Indifference is as determined--and as forcefully muscular--as any blow.

davidbfpo
03-18-2012, 12:06 PM
A well written article that starts with:
Ending the violence and insecurity perpetrated by the Lord's Resistance Army is more about empowering civil society and developing local solutions across many countries than about keeping US military advisers in Northern Uganda. The youthful, Western attention brought to the issue by Invisible Children and #Kony2012 is not in itself a solution.

It ends with:
Achieving a peaceful conclusion to this conflict involves efforts aimed at ascertaining and closing the supply lines of the LRA. It also entails ‘taking the governments’ back to these under-governed places, addressing the development and social challenges in these neglected areas.[22] Civil society can play a critical role at all levels in promoting dialogue to promote engagement, understanding and reconciliation.

Despite enormous odds, support for a strategy based on protection and engagement is widespread among those who bear the brunt of the conflict, civil society and communities across the region. They recognise that building a just and lasting peace takes time. This is a job that requires support for local approaches and peacebuilding initiatives rather than imposing more external firepower.

Link:http://www.opendemocracy.net/kennedy-tumutegyereize/what-will-it-take-to-end-conflict-with-lra

The author works for:
Conciliation Resources is an independent organisation working with people in conflict to build peace and prevent violence

Their website is:http://www.c-r.org

JMA
03-18-2012, 02:21 PM
This could only happen in America...

Joseph Kony 2012: filmmaker Jason Russell arrested on suspicion of masturbating in public (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/joseph-kony/9149918/Joseph-Kony-2012-filmmaker-Jason-Russell-arrested-on-suspicion-of-masturbating-in-public.html)

... Hollywood release of 'Kony2012 - The Meltdown' early next year?

Dayuhan
03-18-2012, 10:51 PM
It is damned interesting all those you tube views and I wonder what it portends for the future.

Very little, I would cynically guess. Most of those who viewed have probably moved on by now to the next viral sensation. Clicking "like" or "share" requires little effort and is hardly an indicator of commitment.

It's also not at all certain where any of this attention is meant to lead. If the video had come out before Obama had sent men and money to the area, I could have seen the point. It seems like an effort to pressure the US government to do what they're already doing.


A well written article...

To some extent, but when I see items like this:


begin by developing a comprehensive approach that prioritises civilian protection from abductions, political, security humanitarian, development and governance efforts. It would start with ensuring civilian protection in tandem with political dialogue involving regional governments to address, for example, the political and military rivalries driving the conflict.

it's hard not to see "getting Kony isn't enough, you have to send lots of money and "fix Africa" and send lots more money and then send..."

It is of course true that getting Kony will not solve or end the problems of Central Africa. What needs to be pointed out to many who remind us of this is that while getting Kony isn't the final solution, it is a reasonable and achievable goal for an outside power. Fixing Uganda, or fixing Central Africa, are not reasonable or achievable goals for an outside power and it would be silly for the US or any other foreign power to take them on.

Bill Moore
03-19-2012, 02:08 AM
I thought the recommendations in the article were unrealistic. First off the author dismisses the vast size of the geographical region he wants security forces to provide protection to, and apparently believes that recommending inept African governments to expand their outstanding government services to this large expanse is feasible. While there may not be a military solution to Central Africa's many woes, there certainly can be a military solution to finding and killing Kony. As others have mentioned this may send a message to other thugs in the region, but regardless it will be justice.

In summary, a military solution can remove Kony, but it can't solve all of Central Africa's woes.

M-A Lagrange
03-19-2012, 07:54 AM
I believe were getting lost here.
The Kony2012 video was interresting for the only purpose of flaging the issue.
Solutions in that video and in many articles are just innacurate, out of context and unrealistic. Regime change in Uganda will not stop Kony! Neither will the construction of schools or development of agriculture in North Uganda.

Mixing Kony and the actual prolems Uganda is facing, especially the post Museveni regime, is just missing the target by several univers.
The LRA has become a regional problem in 2008 as from 2006 to 2008 unsucessful peace talk took place in the trail of the 2005 South Sudan peace agreement. Before, Kony went from anti Museveni rebellion with popular support to crazy guy leading a bunch of psychopath terrorising the very same population who was supporting him. Why? Because he got defeated by UPDF.

Now, opposition is very loud in northern Uganda but for very different reasons. Mainly the grip of Museveni familly and friends over politic and economy. Solving the Karamajo and the gold mining issues will not affect Kony, never had and never will. Solving the Acholy land issues will not affect Kony, never had and never will.

Kony and Dominique and few others are just good to be sent to the ICC if caugh alive. That's all. Issues about Uganda and its necessity to find a way to ensure stable passation from Museveni dictarial regime to a democratic regime are completely different from LRA and Kony. The fact that Museveni has a long known strategy of legitimating his position by pointing out the existence of various rebel groups is well known, analysed and can be discuss in another threat (there is at least 1 on Uganda.)

LRA can be assimilated to pirats according to international laws. They have a warrant of arrest issued by ICC. Now the realquestion is not will the US catch Kony but rather why is Uganda asking for US help in that mission which should or could have been ended ages ago. (Specially when UN transported LRA and Kony from South Sudan to Garamba parc in DRC. A stop by The Hague could have been a good idea. But requested b@ll$ from the UN...)

Fuchs
03-19-2012, 11:03 AM
This stuff (http://img01.lachschon.de/images/128394_KonyTrollen_1.jpg) can only happen after such a viral video success... :D

This reminds me a bit of some satirist's critique of the computer chair heroes who got agitated a lot about something they have only 40 minutes worth of information about...
(I am a computer chair hero nowadays as well, but I get agitated about things I knew about for a decade or more! :cool: )


edit: Just one more (http://img01.lachschon.de/images/128186_Waswirklichdahintersteckt_1.jpg) :D

Interestingly (coincidentally), it's not (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Energy_in_Uganda#Oil_and_natural_gas) 100% baseless...

davidbfpo
03-25-2012, 09:00 PM
A marvellous headline, just what it means in reality we shall see and the report starts with:
A military force set up by the African Union to hunt down fugitive Ugandan warlord Joseph Kony is being launched in South Sudan. The AU says the 5,000-strong force will exist for as long as it takes to capture or kill Mr Kony.

Later:
The AU force will have a Ugandan commander and comprise troops from Uganda, South Sudan, Central African Republic and Congo - all countries in which the LRA has operated. It is based in Yambio, in the west of South Sudan, near the border with the Central African Republic and the Democratic Republic of Congo.

Link:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-17498382

If it was five hundred soldiers then I'd not be so wary. Do I hear the contributors thinking US$ will be forthcoming after the Kony video?

carl
03-26-2012, 04:27 AM
The first thing I thought of is who is paying for those 5,000 troops.

The second thing I thought of was a joint force with Congolese troops mixed in; that should be interesting.

M-A Lagrange
03-26-2012, 06:18 AM
The first thing I thought of is who is paying for those 5,000 troops.

The second thing I thought of was a joint force with Congolese troops mixed in; that should be interesting.

I can reassure you very quickly: it will not be the troops providers who will pay. So that's gonna be your taxes and mines...:o

And how the SPLA melt will be interresting to, just how much FACA will show how capabe they are.
Anyways, well played for Uganda, they have officially an operational base in South Sudan now. They just need to purchase Juba and South Sudan will be theirs. :cool:

M-A Lagrange
03-26-2012, 10:44 AM
Apparently, it's the US who will pay:
U.S. Support to Regional Efforts To Counter the Lord's Resistance Army

Fact Sheet
Office of the Spokesperson
Washington, DC

March 23, 2012

The United States’ comprehensive, multi-year strategy seeks to help the Governments of Uganda, CAR, the DRC, and South Sudan as well as the African Union and United Nations to mitigate and end the threat posed to civilians and regional stability by the LRA. The strategy outlines four key objectives for U.S. support: (1) the increased protection of civilians, (2) the apprehension or removal of Joseph Kony and senior LRA commanders from the battlefield, (3) the promotion of defections and support of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of remaining LRA fighters, and (4) the provision of continued humanitarian relief to affected communities.

http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/03/186732.htm

Dayuhan
03-28-2012, 02:39 AM
If Kony on the loose brings American aid, where's the incentive to catch him?

M-A Lagrange
03-28-2012, 05:50 AM
If Kony on the loose brings American aid, where's the incentive to catch him?

Hey Dayuhan,

You're actually asking the only interresting question that no one wants to answer.
And most probably responding to the question: why is UPDF uncapable to catch the man...

JMA
04-30-2012, 07:05 AM
Ugandan army says Sudan is backing Joseph Kony's LRA (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-17890432)

Surprise, surprise, who would have guessed.

M-A Lagrange
04-30-2012, 03:34 PM
Hello JMA,

Apparently it is true. But Museveni is coming back also with ADF, another Sudan funded group.
Keep in mind this is taking place in a time where both Sudan are on an undeclared war. And also Museveni is very much criticized by Muslim community in his country.

davidbfpo
05-13-2012, 09:07 PM
A short BBC News report:
A senior commander in the rebel Lord's Resistance Army has been captured by the Ugandan army, a spokesman has said. Caesar Achellam was seized on Saturday following a struggle between Ugandan soldiers and a group of 30 rebels. The commander, whom Ugandan officials say is a top rebel military strategist, was captured in the Central African Republic, one of several nations where the Ugandan-led LRA operates.

Link:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-18051522

Note a local reporter says the prisoner was with one, or two wives and eight children.

carl
05-14-2012, 02:13 AM
The report said Kony is being forced to move almost every other day. Perhaps an actual end is near.

M-A Lagrange
06-27-2012, 07:14 AM
A report evaluating the US military effort to end LRA.

I did not read the entire report but what I read was interresting, even if I do not agree with all what is said. (Political context might sometimes be too lightly understood or analysed for me)
Out of the electoral advocacy game, it is good that someone follows that up closely.

MOMENT OF TRUTH
The potential and limits of the US
military’s counter-LRA deployment
https://salsa.democracyinaction.org/o/2241/images/RESOLVE%20-%20Moment%20of%20Truth%20June%202012.pdf

davidbfpo
06-27-2012, 08:19 AM
Skimming through the cited report I noted on pg.10:
The 391st battalion of the Congolese military, which received extensive training by the US military and is now deployed to northern Congo, continues to face logistical constraints and has engaged little with LRA forces. MONUSCO, despite instability in eastern Congo, has opened up new bases in northern Congo’s Bas Uele region and utilized the Guatemalan Special Forces unit (GUASFOR) and other units to set up temporary bases in towns hit hardest by LRA activity

On pg.14 and one wonders which lawyers did imposed this condition:
US advisers are also helping to streamline US logistical support to Uganda’s counterLRA operations, which amounts to approximately $1.5 million a month for supplies and helicopter support provided through third-party contractors. The contracts for this support stipulate that the helicopters (US-contracted MI-8 helicopters) overnight at the Ugandan military base in Nzara, South Sudan, even though they are most needed at the Ugandan military’s current forward operating bases in Obo and Djemah, CAR. Consquently, the helicopters must fly hundreds of extra miles each day from Nzara to Djemah and Obo, wasting fuel and flight hours and reducing the effectiveness of Ugandan military tracking teams operating there.....US officials have restricted the advisers’ travel radius to within several miles of the towns where they are deployed.

...a $35 million authorization in the FY2012 defense authorizations act for US
support to military forces operating against the LRA. However, six months after the authorization bill was passed, bureaucratic hurdles within the Department of Defense have prevented any of the authorized funds from being put to use.

M-A Lagrange
06-27-2012, 11:41 AM
Joseph Kony's LRA blamed for uranium plant attack
Rebel leader Joseph Kony's Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) was responsible for an attack last weekend...

Rebel leader Joseph Kony's Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) was responsible for an attack last weekend on a uranium plant in the Central African Republic, a military source said Tuesday.
"The Ugandan rebels of the LRA... were recognised by residents, many of whom fled to hide in the Catholic church or in the bush" during Sunday's attack on a plant operated by French nuclear giant Areva near a uranium mine in the country's south-east, the source said on condition of anonymity.
"After occupying the site, the rebels then looted the premises, carrying off portable computers, food -- notably bags of flour, boxes of sugar, etc.
"They also destroyed office computers before retreating Monday afternoon."
Areva has said the attack's sole objective appeared to be looting. There were no reports of injuries or stolen uranium -- though a villager was killed shortly before the attack began, according to a military source.
http://www.starafrica.com/fr/actualites/detail-news/view/joseph-konys-lra-blamed-for-uranium-pla-239777.html

Let say we are lucky Kony is an idiot. :eek:

J Wolfsberger
06-27-2012, 12:27 PM
Let say we are lucky Kony is an idiot. :eek:

I think you're underestimating the damage idiots can cause.

M-A Lagrange
08-31-2012, 08:09 AM
According to news released by DRC press, Dominique Ongwen has been killed on 27 august 2012 in a firefight with UPDF in CAR.

Let's hope this is true.


Traque contre les hommes de Joseph Kony, le n°3 de la LRA tué sur le territoire centrafricain http://www.lobservateur.cd/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=8113:traque-contre-les-hommes-de-joseph-kony-le-nd3-de-la-lra-tue-sur-le-territoire-centrafricain&catid=48:actualites&Itemid=78
(A link, unfortunately in french, on Dominique Ongwen death.)

Dayuhan
08-31-2012, 09:03 AM
http://www.starafrica.com/fr/actualites/detail-news/view/joseph-konys-lra-blamed-for-uranium-pla-239777.html

Let say we are lucky Kony is an idiot. :eek:

Is that a uranium mining operation, or processing? Not much Kony's guys could do with raw uranium ore, and I don't think any refinement to a degree that would produce a dangerous product would be going on in CAR...

M-A Lagrange
09-02-2012, 05:46 PM
Hello Dayuhan,

Thats right, Kony can do nothing with uranium ore. And anyways, he is too dum to do anything with refined uranium.

LRA hunt is quite well engaged. And it just demonstrates that what is problematic in this part of the world are not the armed group but rather the absence of political will to effectively fight against them.
After 20 years of terror, LRA is going to be wipped out just because someone committed ressources and and sticked to the objective...

davidbfpo
09-28-2012, 06:57 PM
Hat tip to CFC for this unexpected update:
AU force to co-ordinate soldiers from regional armies hunting Lord's Resistance Army, but troops still lack resources....AU's special envoy on the LRA, Francisco Madeira, said the DRC had still not contributed troops but some commitments had been made and said the force required assistance to help it function properly.

"We need more support, I don't have to elaborate on these because my predecessor has done this so well. We need support in terms of means of transport, communication, medicine, combat rations and uniforms for the troops tracking the LRA. This is particularly important and critical and most urgent for the central African troops who handed over their contingent despite the challenges facing them.....

Link:http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2012/09/2012919145754887151.html

davidbfpo
12-06-2012, 03:21 PM
A harsh review on FP:
The African Union Regional Task force -- envisioned as a 5,000-strong regional expeditionary force tasked with hunting down Kony's Lord's Resistance Army over a 115,000 square mile area -- has never mustered all the troops needed for the mission, nor formed into a real mobile force capable of mounting a cross border chase.

"The [task force] is not close to realizing the vision of a multinational force conducting effective offensive operations against the LRA and protecting civilians....It exists only on paper and cannot be considered operational."

Link to article:http://turtlebay.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/12/05/hunt_for_joseph_kony_stalled

Link to cited report:http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Getting%20Back%20on%20Track%20Implementing%20the%2 0UN%20Regional%20Strategy%20on%20the%20Lord%E2%80% 99s%20Resistance%20Army.pdf

One wonders if the social media campaign on the LRA will pick this up and re-start their campaign. As it is Africa and the UN even if they did I have m' doubts anyone would do anything beyond "grandstanding".

davidbfpo
01-21-2013, 10:03 AM
Little by little.


The rebel, known as Brigadier Binani, was killed on Friday in a clash with Ugandan troops in the dense jungles of eastern Central African Republic close to the border with South Sudan....We got intelligence that the group was there and the squads were inserted to pursue them... the clash took place some 170 miles north of the remote settlement of Djema.

Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/joseph-kony/9815000/Joseph-Kony-top-bodyguard-killed.html

davidbfpo
03-18-2013, 12:22 AM
Pointer to a SWJ article, the full title being 'Youth Lost: Ugandan Child Soldiers in the Lord’s Resistance Army':http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/youth-lost-ugandan-child-soldiers-in-the-lord%E2%80%99s-resistance-army

An interesting article on a quick glance, written IMHO by someone who has not been "boots on the ground" in the region - from a short bio.

Step forward an anonymous commentator:
I would like to add some perspective from someone who has personally participated in tactical operations during Operations Observant Compass (OOC), AFRICOM’s mission to assist the Ugandan People’s Defense Force (UPDF) in eradicating the LRA.

davidbfpo
08-01-2013, 05:50 PM
A short CIMIC paper 'The Lord’s Resistance Army and the Search for Joseph Kony' landed today; requires free registration:https://www.cimicweb.org

From the current situation:
While reported attacks by the LRA decreased in 2012, according to the LRA Crisis Tracker, attacks against civilians in the DRC, CAR and Uganda increased during the first quarter of 2013. The uptick in attacks continued in April and May, with the Small Arms Survey reporting an average of fifteen LRA attacks in CAR and DRC during both of those months. Although it is believed that most of the LRA fighters are positioned within CAR, most of the attacks took place in DRC. Kony and the LRA leadership still remain at large. The hunt for Kony has been further complicated by the April 2013 coup in CAR, after which the international force had to abandon its anti-LRA operations in that country. Bilateral agreements with the previous CAR regime allowed Ugandan troops to conduct operations in CAR. However, the new regime has not recognised these agreements. In April 2013, Ugandan officials claimed that intervention by the African Union had allowed anti-LRA operations to resume, but this has not been confirmed. The latest testimonies by defectors place Kony in Kafia Kingi enclave, controlled by Sudan, along the border with South Sudan, and in close proximity to the border of CAR. The reports hint at a renewal of Sudanese support for the LRA, claiming that the region is a safe haven for the group which has been able to establish bases there. Sudan’s cooperation with international efforts to capture Kony is almost non-existent, thus giving additional credibility to these reports. The Sudanese army has denied the allegations.

Conclusion :
Since the 1990s, the LRA has failed to represent a threat to any particular government in the region, but has carried out atrocities exclusively on civilians. Renewed attempts to halt the LRA’s activities resulted in a reduction of violence, but failed to destroy the movement and capture its leaders. Since its inception, the LRA has benefited from a lack of governance and security in Central and East Africa, and has proved increasingly adept at identifying new strategies and alliances to ensure its survival. Recent events such as the coup in CAR and the subsequent suspension of the search raise well-grounded concern of renewed LRA attacks. Regional and international cooperation to stop the LRA has proved to be the most effective weapon against the organisation over the last two decades. If the cooperation is obstructed or neglected, the void may represent a missed opportunity to capture Joseph Kony while providing the LRA another opportunity to regroup.

The mainly US-based media campaign meet reality in Africa.

davidbfpo
10-22-2013, 06:30 PM
A superb New Yorker article, towards the end are two passages:
..the campaign itself has been an anomaly: cobbled together, as many have said, by love and Scotch Tape, and steered by an eclectic coalition of outside activists and committed individuals within the U.S. government and the U.N.....

In the past two years, L.R.A. violence has dropped by ninety-three per cent, from seven hundred and six killings in 2010 to only fifty-one in 2012. According to Resolve, a U.S.-based analysis and advocacy group, the L.R.A. had approximately four hundred fighters in 2010; by June, 2013, they were down to a hundred and eighty Ugandan fighters and fifty armed zande—abductees from Congo and the Central African Republic.

Link:http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/newsdesk/2013/10/how-a-texas-philanthropist-funded-the-hunt-for-joseph-kony.html

The PMC is led by Eeben Barlow, a SWC member:
.. he told her he would take the job—and that he did not want a fee. He did not want to make money on this, he told her; she would just have to pay his trainers and underwrite his expenses.

Way to go Eeben!:)

Firn
10-22-2013, 08:12 PM
A fine read and a good catch which did light up my heart.

Very well and nobly done...

While it is only a small detail within the big story I found that part interesting:



Around this time, additional contributions came in from the philanthropist and agricultural maverick Howard Buffett, and from Muneer Satter, a former Goldman Sachs partner and vice-chairman of the firm’s charitable foundation, who heard about Davis’s project and approached her. All this helped underwrite the escalating price of the operation: the helicopter costs about a hundred and sixty-eight thousand dollars each month, and the plane about seventy-three thousand dollars. Buffett told me he had even spent a night at one of the forward operating bases in the Central African Republic. “It’s miserable,” he said. But after consulting with lawyers to establish what was permitted, Buffett had few doubts about providing financial support. “We spent money on reintegration of child soldiers, on rebuilding agricultural areas, counselling rape victims. Why would you not jump at the chance to stop the core problem? If I can spend my money stopping it so I don’t have to spend more money in the future on the victims?”

Howard Buffett is of course Warren Buffett son and will most likely play an important part in Berkshires future even if much family capital is flowing out and into the Gates foundation.

CrowBat
10-22-2013, 10:25 PM
Am I getting that right: Eeben Barlow with his PMCs, plus a mix of US PMCs and US SPECFORs (measured by appearance of MC-130s at Entebbe), supported by a gaggle of 'usual suspects' like PC-12s, CASA 212s, Beech 200s, even a scant Do.328...not to talk about all the Russian and Ukrainian Mi-8/17s in UN markings... that one can get to see anywhere between Entebbe, Goma and Kigali these days... all of them are after these 'last 230 last LRA idiots'?

davidbfpo
10-22-2013, 10:37 PM
Am I getting that right: Eeben Barlow with his PMCs, plus a mix of US PMCs and US SPECFORs (measured by appearance of MC-130s at Entebbe), supported by a gaggle of 'usual suspects' like PC-12s, CASA 212s, Beech 200s, even a scant Do.328...not to talk about all the Russian and Ukrainian Mi-8/17s in UN markings... that one can get to see anywhere between Entebbe, Goma and Kigali these days... all of them are after these 'last 230 last LRA idiots'?

CrowBat,

From my reading - faraway - the UN marked helicopters are not involved, nor some of the aircraft and the last position of the LRA was a good distance further away - in the CAR. Marc L will know far more.

CrowBat
10-22-2013, 10:40 PM
Well, that's why I'm so much surprised by the appearance of all of that flying gear at mentioned airports in the last few days...

Russian/Ukrainian Mi-8/17s, 'OK, UN'. Even a USAF C-130 or USN P-3 at Entebbe, 'all OK'. But MC-130s, and all the other stuff...?

No clue what are they all doing there, but a connection to 'anti-LRA-ops' does not appear as 'logical' to me. Not on that side of Uganda (plus DRC and Rwanda).

M-A Lagrange
10-23-2013, 07:49 AM
An interesting article on the participation of less known actors in the hunt for Kony.
I was quite surprised that Mr Barlow accepted to jump in that messy mission... (Liked very much his book against all hods, by the way)

What surprised me the most is the accuracy of the figures given for the LRA fighters composition. Seems to me a little too accurate.:D

About the planes... Well, those lost parts of the world are getting crowded since 2008 Christmas and the mass murder of 800 civilians by LRA. But I agree the link with LRA is not that obvious or logical.

I would not link the planes presence to the Kivu conflict. It is quite far away and much more well equipped airports exist at a shorter flying distance. Eastern part of CAR is a nice play ground for special ops training. Also, with the fall of the CAR regime, the country entered chaos and heavy military presence in an uncontrolled part of a country where government is reduced to a list of names on a paper should not be that surprising. Especially since LRA is no more an issue for anyone, even Uganda.

What bothers me more is the harrow boy militia in South Sudan. They were set to defend the population against the LRA but were already on the path to become a "governor militia" in Western Equatoria 3 years ago.
Also, the DRC Province Oriental governor, Jean Bamanisa, just signed few month ago a military and trade agreement with the western Equatoria government. This should give a good clue on the level of LRA threat.

davidbfpo
11-21-2013, 07:05 PM
An odd report:
The president of Central African Republic has told the United Nations he has negotiated with Joseph Kony, even as an African force hunts the war crimes suspect, according to a UN envoy. Abou Moussa, a UN special envoy, said in an interview with AFP news agency that Kony may be sick and that Michel Djotodia, the Central African Republic president, had told him this month he has sent food to Kony.....20 bags of food, with manioc, kasava.

Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/joseph-kony/10463834/CAR-president-has-negotiated-with-Joseph-Kony.html

A little detail elsewhere, more a reminder for SWC:
In April, the Ugandan army suspended a search for Kony in the CAR, blaming "hostility" from the government formed when rebel forces took power there.

Link:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-25027616

The CAR is currently wrecked after a violent rebellion, with reports of genocide and communities splitting along religious lines:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-24996125

davidbfpo
11-22-2013, 10:31 PM
Today a different FP author "pors cold water" on yesterday's report:
Let's just say that analysts tracking Kony are, well, skeptical about that claim. What's more likely, they say, is that the government is talking to a group of LRA fighters, possibly defectors, who may have no affiliation with Kony.

(Near the end) So, don't get too optimistic about Joseph Kony being brought in anytime soon

Link:http://blog.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/11/21/dont_believe_the_hype_joseph_kony_isnt_about_to_su rrender?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_term=%2ASituation%20Report&utm_campaign=SITREP%20NOV%2022%202013

davidbfpo
03-24-2014, 12:19 PM
Post 230 in October 2013 by Crowbat refers to sightings of US military aircraft, which puzzled SWC at the time, it may do so again after a weekend DoD statement:
The Obama administration is sending about 150 special forces troops along with military aircraft to Uganda to help in the search for warlord Joseph Kony.....In the first deployment of U.S. military aircraft to the region, at least four CV-22 Osprey aircraft will arrive in Uganda by midweek, together with refueling planes and special forces airmen to fly and maintain them...US personnel were authorised to "provide information, advice and assistance" to an African Union force tracking Kony and his Lord's Resistance Army.

Originally a WaPo report, this is a UK version:http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/24/us-special-forces-uganda-hunt-warlord-joseph-kony

Added the WaPo story:http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/2014/03/23/aa468ca6-b2d0-11e3-8020-b2d790b3c9e1_story.html

I am sure Crowbat will wonder at the statement:
In the first deployment of U.S. military aircraft to the region

davidbfpo
06-14-2014, 02:48 PM
A rather laudatory NYT article on US SOF in Africa, as the writer follows an official tour by the SOF's BG Linder and the LRA is not the main subject. There is a long section on the hunt for the LRA by Uganda troops with SOF directly alongside, which IIRC was way beyond their original ToR, with my emphasis in bold:
Twelve days later and 4,500 miles away, in the bee-infested jungle of the Central African Republic, a team of four Green Berets and 22 Ugandan soldiers boarded CV-22 Ospreys, a kind of half-helicopter, half-airplane. It was 11 p.m., which meant they would have time to reach their objective under cover of darkness. Their mission was to raid an L.R.A. camp near a place called Nzako that recent defectors had described to them.......About half a mile from the target, two Ugandans and two Americans went ahead to conduct reconnaissance. They found a camp of 28 beds made of stacked grass that ringed the perimeter. But the beds were empty, and the fighters were gone, having most likely escaped a few days earlier. This happened all the time.

Nice to note:
Despite the reliance on the American planes, drones and dollars, it was the Ugandans who trained the Americans on how to survive.

Link:http://mobile.nytimes.com/2014/06/15/magazine/can-general-linders-special-operations-forces-stop-the-next-terrorist-threat.html?ref=magazine&_r=0&referrer=

Bill Moore
06-15-2014, 06:00 AM
A rather laudatory NYT article on US SOF in Africa, as the writer follows an official tour by the SOF's BG Linder and the LRA is not the main subject. There is a long section on the hunt for the LRA by Uganda troops with SOF directly alongside, which IIRC was way beyond their original ToR, with my emphasis in bold:

Nice to note:

Link:http://mobile.nytimes.com/2014/06/15/magazine/can-general-linders-special-operations-forces-stop-the-next-terrorist-threat.html?ref=magazine&_r=0&referrer=

David,

Great article, thanks for sharing. MG Linder is the right leader, at the right place, at the right time. He is employing special operations like they should be employed in an ideal situation. The only comment I disagreed with is MG Linder's comment about state on state conflict being a thing of the past. I only wish that were true. That isn't the issue they're dealing with in Africa at the moment, but Saudi and other Sunni States are waging a proxy war against Iran and vice versa. The risk of state on state conflict in the Asia-Pacific is high and increasing.

I only bring this up, because it confounds our balancing act for ensuring our forces are ready to deal with the most significant and likely threats to our national interests. Both types of warfare, the irregular warfare MG Linder is leading and assisting other with, and conventional warfare require considerable training to be proficient at. Where do you assume risk? How do you align your forces? Does SOF only do irregular warfare, and conventional forces focus on conventional war? I still don't understand our Army's focus on the Regionally Aligned Brigades. Is nation building the right focus for the bulk of our ground combat power?

To further demonstrate the challenge, in my view it is clear that SOF is being effectively employed in Africa. Others think so also, and want SOF in other regions to mimic how SOF is being employed in Africa, which is the wrong answer. It is the right approach in Africa, not in the rest of the world. We have a military that seeks models they can replicate, yet we talk about the necessity of deep understanding and cultural nuances. We still haven't got past the talk to reality in many cases.

JMA
06-16-2014, 12:35 AM
Lets look a a segment of that quote again, shall we:


About half a mile from the target, two Ugandans and two Americans went ahead to conduct reconnaissance. They found a camp of 28 beds made of stacked grass that ringed the perimeter. But the beds were empty, and the fighters were gone, having most likely escaped a few days earlier. This happened all the time.

I highlight what I consider to be the key to the problem.

With brutal honesty I would suggest that the LRA's bush craft and early warning systems are constantly underestimated - how close were the troops dropped by aircraft? Also the Ugandans would not be too unhappy to find these camps empty - and thus avoid combat. And I suggest the US troops knowledge of terrain and this enemy is underdeveloped.

I suggest a little reading of the Mau Mau in Kenya to understand the level of tracking and bushcraft skill needed to counter those 100% in tune with their environment through a lifetime of experience living in the bush.

JMA
06-16-2014, 12:39 AM
... in my view it is clear that SOF is being effectively employed in Africa.

They are?

How so?

I see no evidence of success anywhere so please enlighten me.

Bill Moore
06-16-2014, 02:40 AM
They are?

How so?

I see no evidence of success anywhere so please enlighten me.

Fair enough, and I'll attempt a feeble defense. First off, these are not war zones, so the military remains largely subordinate to the Department of State (DOS), and DOS is seldom about winning. They want to maintain control of the military strategy they don't understand. I question if they understand our political objectives, but that is a different argument.

Second, these operations take time, and more importantly they take the support of the supported nation. If your comment about the Ugandan forces not being disappointed is correct, then the FID approach won't work. At that point we need to reconsider what our way forward should be, to include leaving altogether. That would be a short term failure, but could contribute to long term success for more important missions when countries realize we're finally serious about them stepping up to the plate to address their own security problems. In Uganda I think our objectives extend well beyond killing Koni, so things may not be as bad you portray them.

If we're starting to provide support to Nigeria that will be a test case to watch.

To add to your argument I just saw a news flash about a potentially major terrorist attack on a Kenya coastal town. Still waiting for details. Carl has a point, we often have no intention on winning. It seems we prefer to take half steps for ever, which simply prolongs the fighting, prolongs the suffering, and creates a culture over generations that no nothing but war. We accused the Sri Lankan government of "winning" their war against the Tamil separatists the long way. We miss the point they won, and that country is being reconstructed. The level of hate and discrimination there is probably less than we experienced after our Civil War, but we only read history, we don't take lessons from it. We and the UN faulted the S. African mercenary unit who quickly and effectively suppressed the rebels in Sierra Leone. The more I think about we might be allergic to winning? Winning in most situations requires aggressive pursuit of the adversary, but doing so in a way that doesn't undermine our legitimacy at home and internationally like the French did in Algeria. No body said it was easy, but darned if we don't spend millions educating our officers to fight (I think), and instead we now have a movement to develop a military composed of nation builders. That is seen as more relevant because we're not allowed to win by fighting, so we put our hope in economic development.

JMA
06-17-2014, 04:27 PM
Bill, my experience in soldiering with Americans has been all good. From my experience there is no problem with the quality of professional soldiers in your country.

That said I would suggest that the weakness in these overseas adventures at short notice is that the soldiers so deployed have none or very little local knowledge of enemy and terrain... but perhaps worse still no understanding of the local troops they are to work with or train.

IIRC it was Norwegians and/or Germans who were called in to train troops for Somalia. Maybe now you can understand my contention that it is a case of the blind leading the blind. What can a Norwegian or a German contribute to the training of Africans for a war in Africa? Zero, zip, nothing (unless in a specific weapon or weapon system).

A few years ago we saw reference to the training of a battalion in the DRC comprising elements from various rebel groups by a US training team. Not good, look it up.

I put my head on a block that the only way to train troops in Africa is through "training the trainers".

OK back to warfare. To avoid coming in blind US forces must be fed into the system over a period of years and not - under any circumstances - on a short tour.

Study is important and I would suggest it starts here:

BUSH WARFARE - The Early Writings of General Sir William C.G. Heneker, KCB KCMG DSO (http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2012/dn-nd/D2-230-2008-eng.pdf)

This is an account of the experiences of a Canadian officer at the end of the 1800s who clearly was capable of understanding warfare in Africa and should be studied by all before deployment to Africa.

etc etc ...

davidbfpo
01-08-2015, 05:06 PM
Seleka, a mainly Muslim rebel group in the Central African Republic, said it captured Dominic Ongwen, a leader of the Lord’s Resistance Army militants, on Jan. 3 and handed him to U.S. forces (in CAR) two days later. A U.S. officer offered Seleka a monetary reward, General Antime, a Seleka official, said in a phone interview today

Link:www.bloomberg.com/news/2015-01-08/central-african-republic-s-seleka-says-it-captured-ongwen.html? (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/www.bloomberg.com/news/2015-01-08/central-african-republic-s-seleka-says-it-captured-ongwen.html?)

Events in France pushed this matter into the background, although on searching others have covered the story - so for a little more detail:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-30705649

davidbfpo
01-10-2015, 05:08 PM
Ho-hum, the Seleka haven't had their money or a thank you.:wry:


A Seleka commander said he was captured after a 25-minute battle, after which they informed US forces in the area. A US official had said that Mr Ongwen had defected, before being handed over to their forces.


Link:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-30743647

davidbfpo
01-13-2015, 11:44 AM
the story of the man as I know it, and what his defection might mean to the future of the LRA. More so than Joseph Kony, the founder and leader of the LRA, Ongwen is sadly typical of the LRA rank and file. His example refutes the erroneous but morally and sometimes legally convenient definitions of LRA members as either helpless victims or violent perpetrators. Abducted as a child, indoctrinated and forced into committing unspeakable acts before he had even hit puberty, Ongwen is clearly a victim, but he is also a perpetrator.

Which ends with:
The only thing clear from Ongwen’s surrender is that the LRA crisis is still not over.
Link:http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2015/01/12/the-complex-story-of-a-child-soldier/

davidbfpo
01-14-2015, 11:49 AM
A senior militia commander wanted for war crimes has been handed over to Ugandan troops in the Central African Republic (CAR), the US says.

Rebels in the CAR said he was captured but US officials say he defected.
Uganda has said he will face trial at the International Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague.
Link:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-30810501

davidbfpo
04-07-2015, 05:26 PM
Pending an official statement by Uganda the NYT reports:
The bullet-scarred remains of the No. 2 commander in the Lord’s Resistance Army, the guerrilla group that once terrorized central Africa, have been positively identified after having been exhumed three months ago in a Uganda (http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/countriesandterritories/uganda/index.html?inline=nyt-geo)-led military expedition, a person involved in the recovery operation said Monday.....only Mr. Kony, a warlord and self-described prophet, remains at large.
Link:http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/07/world/africa/body-of-a-lords-resistance-army-leader-is-identified-in-uganda.html?

davidbfpo
09-30-2015, 05:26 PM
The small US mission has attracted a WaPo report, with a lurid headline and these two opening passages:
As their mission stretches into a fifth year, however, U.S. troops have turned to some unsavory partners to help find Kony’s trail. Working from a new bush camp in the Central African Republic, U.S. forces have begun working closely with Muslim rebels — known as Seleka (https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-central-african-republic-has-become-a-nightmare-for-muslims/2014/03/16/d963b80a-aba6-11e3-98f6-8e3c562f9996_story.html) — who toppled the central government two years ago and triggered a still-raging sectarian war with a campaign of mass rapes and executions. The Pentagon had not previously disclosed that it is cooperating with Seleka and obtaining intelligence from the rebels. The arrangement has made some U.S. troops uncomfortable.
As previous posts from January 2015 show this cooperation is hardly new.

Link:https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-military-opens-a-new-front-in-the-hunt-for-african-warlord-joseph-kony/2015/09/29/73ffef96-66a9-11e5-9223-70cb36460919_story.html?
(https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-military-opens-a-new-front-in-the-hunt-for-african-warlord-joseph-kony/2015/09/29/73ffef96-66a9-11e5-9223-70cb36460919_story.html?)

davidbfpo
12-22-2015, 09:21 PM
A short article, no doubt part of the publisher's advertising; caveat aside maybe it helps to explain:http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/dec/22/joseph-kony-lra-book-evelyn-amony-memoir-extract

davidbfpo
02-12-2016, 10:09 PM
Perhaps one day more will be said:
A senior commander with the rebel group Lord's Resistance Army has defected to villagers in Central African Republic, the U.S. Africa Command said Friday. The rebel commander defected near the community of Pangbayanga, and is being debriefed in the country by the African Union Regional Task Force and U.S. forces, the command said. No further details were given.Link:http://bigstory.ap.org/urn:publicid:ap.org:535ba144f1564a729e7bd89be858d2 cf

(http://bigstory.ap.org/urn:publicid:ap.org:535ba144f1564a729e7bd89be858d2 cf)