Flawed Doctrine or Flawed Strategy?

[William F. Owen]

Flawed Doctrine or Flawed Strategy? (http://smallwarsjournal.com/mag/docs-temp/254-sheeran.pdf)

Ok, having read this I am not going to suggest that the author has not got a legitimate beef with things that are wrong on the ground, but to say that is the result of various debates going back in the US stretches credibility to the extreme.

Now, I have no dog in this fight. What the US Army does is of little interest to me, except, I see US Army ideas filter out of the US Army and break other good armies, so I figure I might as well get in at the source.

Firstly debate is entirely necessary and healthy. If folks know what they are doing, debate about doctrine, should not impact on practise. Only when the doctrine is taught should the effects be seen. So those questioning COIN doctrine cannot be held responsible for its flawed or otherwise application unless some in the food chain are catastrophically stupid.

Now I can’t speak for Gian, but I can articulate my concerns.

Doctrine and Strategy are vastly different. Strategy is political. Doctrine is what is taught. You cannot confuse the two. What the US Army currently has an approach that sees something they call “COIN” as some distinct form of activity, that is (to quote FM3-24):
“COIN is an extremely complex form of warfare. At its core, COIN is a struggle for the population’s support. The protection, welfare, and support of the people are vital to success.” Now that statement my be incorrect, but it's not the problem.

COIN is a form of Warfare, and not a distinct one either. You cannot have separate armies with separate doctrines to fight different kinds of warfare. The British Army fought against major domestic insurgency for 23 years while maintaining the ability to fight the Soviet Army, the Argentines, the Guatemalans, and the Iraqis.

Clausewitz tells us that every war is different. Because insurgents are different, each insurgency will be different. What lessons of the WW2 were germane to War in Korea? The US Army nearly lost Korea, because of the rapid erosion of the skills needed to fight a Regular Army. Big Wars you can loose in weeks. You don’t have the luxury of taking 3 ½ years to write FM3-24, for example. NO one is arguing that the USA should not be skilled at fighting insurgents, but that should not create an unnecessary degradation of other capabilities. What capabilities are needed is a different debate, but the debate has to happen, and it is entirely healthy.

Creating an Army optimised to fight in Iraq, will not create success in Afghanistan, and vice vera. It will also not guarantee success when you intervene in the next Lebanese, or Jordanian civil war, and it will help none when you are fighting your way into North Korea, (the cease fire is over, is it not), or even Iran – and no one can say “we’ll never do that.” You've done some strange things before.

[Schmedlap]

Counterinsurgency is what you call an operation conducted by a large military presence that lacks so much intelligence collection capability that an enemy force can be constituted and coalesce around the military, without the military even realizing it, and the military then commences to fight against that enemy without any significant ability to discern civilian from combatant.

Hypothetical: Suppose we are fighting against an insurgency in a country where the population is suspicious of us and does not want us around. Suppose we know who every one of the "irreconcilables" are, where they are, and we have sufficient forces in place to promptly kill or capture them with minimal civilian casualties or collateral damage to local infrastructure/property. We also know who the fence-sitters are and how to avoid them. How tough would that counterinsurgency campaign be?

In terms of our professional training as Soldiers and leaders, there is nothing significant that needs to change. Recent operations simply have highlighted the areas in which we have been most negligent in failing to prepare as a nation. Most significantly, as a national security community - the whole 3-letter alphabet soup of military, intelligence, and other agencies - we have done a horrible job of maintaining our capability to collect, process, analyze, and disseminate intelligence in a manner that can drive our operations. The end result resembles a boxer going into the ring blindfolded. Instead of his trainers tearing off the blindfold, they start debating whether he needs to take up kickboxing or whether his determination to win this fight in spite of the blindfold will instill bad habits in him that might impact future bouts where he fights without a blindfold.

People scoff at the notion that, "we win every firefight."
"That doesn't matter," they say. "Just remember, we won every battle in Vietnam."
Exactly. Whether we are fighting insurgents in Iraq, Taliban in Afghanistan, foreign fighters in either country, a mix of regular and irregulars in Vietnam, old-school Soviet-style formations in Iraq, Panamanian whatevers, drugged stick figures in Somalia, etc, etc, we stomp the bejeezus out of the poor saps who choose to fight. What we lack is the ability to figure out who the bad guy is, how to locate him, and how to discern bad guy from civilian. Does that really call for a major change in how we train our combat arms Soldiers? Or is that a dramatic failure of intelligence? I say the latter. But because of the "can do" "make it happen" attitude in the military, the military is too quick to take full responsibility and adjust for the shortcomings of the rest of the government. That may be well and good in the short term, but the military also suffers from a propensity to overprepare and overdo everything, which is exactly what all of the COIN vs conventional nonsense is about.

The "COIN skills" that people talk about - language training, cultural awareness, etc - are nothing more than means to mitigate for the woeful shortcoming in our intelligence systems. That is the equivalent to training the boxer to occasionally push up on his blindfold with his oversized boxing gloves, rather than just removing the damn thing before he goes into the ring. Our training objectives do not need to change based upon whether we expect to fight COIN or conventional. The direct combat capabilties needed for each are the same.

What we need is to figure out how to develop the necessary situational awareness for our military. Otherwise, we're sending a blindfolded Gold Glove boxer into the ring against Glass Joe and we're going to lose. The only excuse for fundamentally changing how we train and shifting focus toward "COIN skills," or whatever term one wants to use, is if we assume that we will not be able to develop the intelligence systems in the next several years necessary to support our military in operations similar to those that we are having so much difficulty with today.

Flawed doctrine? Flawed strategy? No and no. Inadequate intelligence systems.

[Tom Odom]

The "COIN skills" that people talk about - language training, cultural awareness, etc - are nothing more than means to mitigate for the woeful shortcoming in our intelligence systems. That is the equivalent to training the boxer to occasionally push up on his blindfold with his oversized boxing gloves, rather than just removing the damn thing before he goes into the ring. Our training objectives do not need to change based upon whether we expect to fight COIN or conventional. The direct combat capabilties needed for each are the same.

What we need is to figure out how to develop the necessary situational awareness for our military. Otherwise, we're sending a blindfolded Gold Glove boxer into the ring against Glass Joe and we're going to lose. The only excuse for fundamentally changing how we train and shifting focus toward "COIN skills," or whatever term one wants to use, is if we assume that we will not be able to develop the intelligence systems in the next several years necessary to support our military in operations similar to those that we are having so much difficulty with today.


That is largely circular. Intelligence systems are a red herring when postulated as the be all end all answer to developing situational awareness, cultural understanding, or whatever gap you feel that you face. Insurgency and counter-insurgency involves more that plopping a conventional force in the middle of an insurgency and letting it learn by mistakes.

Again I have heard the mantra that perfect intelligence is a perfect solution for 30 years. You never have perfect intelligence and you never will. You have to train to adapt and in 2001 the conventional force was not the most willing student when it came to adaptability. Some absolutely refursed to accept the idea that one might have to fight an unconvetional foe; that reluctance ran from the top to the bottom.

Tom

[Bob's World]

Being a good counterinsurgent will not defeat an insurgency. Not understanding this one point leads to long frustrating operations. The problem is that the military by its nature is designed and trained to do the counterinsurgent mission as opposed to the much larger and more holistic counterinsurgency mission.

This is at the crux of much current debate. I don't have, nor does it exist, the perfect answer to the question, but if you can just get people to recognize the truth of the quesiton itself, you are heading in the right direction and they will sort it out.

Insurgency is a condition of political dissent and dissatisfaction between a populace and the governance over them (be it one they selected, inherited, or was forced upon them), that is willing to conduct acts of violence as part of their ways of resolving the problem as they see it. If one is a counterinsurgent one is simply attacking one Means and perhaps suppressing one Ways of achieving this change, but in no way removes the problem or addressess the insurgency itself.

So where does the Army fit into a holisitc counterinsurgency problem? Reasonable minds can differ. But recognize that it is a holistic counterinsurgency problem first, and not just a simple case of finding, fixing and finishing on a handful of insurgents, and you are on the path to a solid concept of operations.

So, to argue about strategy or doctrine of one's solution set as being at fault misses the larger issue of if ones understanding of what they are trying to do being the true problem.

[William F. Owen]

Insurgency is a condition of political dissent and dissatisfaction between a populace and the governance over them (be it one they selected, inherited, or was forced upon them), that is willing to conduct acts of violence as part of their ways of resolving the problem as they see it.

Yet again, I profoundly disagree. An insurgency is an attempt by Irregular forces/guerillas to gain a political objective, using violance. It is war using warfare. That is it. Nothing to do with popular support. Popular support helps.
Do bad governments sometimes suffer from Insurgencies? Yes, but it is not a defining condition.
Insurgencies can occur where the Government is popular, or at least not un-popular to the degree that the insurgency has popular support. That is historical fact. Sierra Leone being one example and the Arab insurgency against Israel in the 1950's and 60's.
The Khmer Rouge were not widely supported by the Cambodian people. More over so called popular support can be very patchy, yet enough to sustain an insurgency, such as was seen in Rhodesia, because of the tribal and ethnic problems.
Insurgencies are not always dependant on high degrees of popular support. Insurgencies can and do use violence to gain support.


Being a good counterinsurgent will not defeat an insurgency. Not understanding this one point leads to long frustrating operations. The problem is that the military by its nature is designed and trained to do the counterinsurgent mission as opposed to the much larger and more holistic counterinsurgency mission.

True, which is why the UK never used to talk about COIN. They used to say "aid to the civil power." The military have a role in COIN, albeit the primary one, until the insurgency is defeated.

[Bob's World]

I don't believe I have ever established some % of the populace that must either actively or passively support the insurgency, only that it is a significant segment of the populace. Many will want the status quo, many will want change, but change that is far different than what the group that has opted to add a violence LOO to their Ways and Means.

Even in a Democracy, a Bill Clinton can become President on 43% of the popular vote. Doesn't matter that 57% of the populace voted against him.

If the segment of insurgent populace is too small, too insignificant, like the Tim McVeigh crowd in Montana, it really doesn't rise to an insurgency as they are just too fringe of an element and the masses agree with neither their platform nor their tactics.

But when a significant portion of the populace agrees with the platform, even if they disagree with the tactics and don't actively join the insurgent organization you have an active populace based insurgency on your hands that must be addressed at the causal roots.

But to simply view an insurgecy as a military target to be engaged and defeated is very, very dangerous indeed; and typically merely provides some temporary sense of satisfaction for the counterinsurgent ("there, that will show them!"), while actually expanding the grievance and popularity of the cause, thereby making the insurgency stronger.

Firing rockets at Taliban camps in Pakistan makes Americans feel good. Motivating previously separate bands of the Taliban into a unified force against us and the government of Pakistan while increasing the percentage of the local populace's support for them is a very bad, (and very foreseeable) resultant consequence...

Sending the Worlds best Army to Boston, or the largest fleet in the world to New York may make the British feel good, but again, it was the wrong tool applied to the wrong problem to actually resolve the insurgency in a manner likely to be favorable to the counterinsurgent.

[William F. Owen]

Bob's World

I am not debating with you that doing stupid things upsets the population, and a population that is against you makes your life harder - IT DOES IN ANY KIND OF WARFARE - look at the Nazis in Russia!

What I am disputing is your assertions that:

a.) that insurgencies can come legitimate grievances, and that addressing those should be part of the solution.
b.) That insurgencies are essentially social problems and not military.

If I have misrepresented your position then I apologise, but the historical record supports neither of those claims.

Yes, military force applied against the wrong people can be counter-productive. Applied against the right people it is generally decisive.

[Bob's World]

They should pay us extra for these little debates...

No, I think we both understand where the other is coming from for the most part, it is just a difference of scope of the problem perhaps? and then role of the military?

I see a much broader scope, and a continuous timeline. No start, no end, always civil responsibility, always a balancing of the needs and wants of a complex populace, sometimes boiling up into trouble beyond the capacity of the civil security forces and requiring a military assist. Pretty simple; but growing in complexity if done overseas among a "borrowed" or "co-opted" populace where one has established a colony or toppled an opponents government. Roles and responsibilities merge, friends and foes are undistinguishable. And soliders when pressed will resort to what they are trained to do, often with tragic results. (Kent State, Tiananmen square, Boston Massacre, etc, etc, etc.)

I do think the American military today is far too threat-centric on one hand, and far too "effectiveness" of government services focused on the other hand. Too much violence and too much kindness both. Military too mixed up in both. More tailored approach to both the security aspect, always focused on avoiding taking on undue legitimacy, while enabling very focused engagement by the HN to address issues of "poor governance" as determined more through polling than any objective measurement.

To be honest, I don't know what works, but do know that there are many examples of what does not work (though often thought of as a victory for a time, though only to flare up later); I do believe that every case is unique to the environment, the populace, the culture, the facts, etc; but at the same time that there are enduring "truths" that can provide a context or framework for shaping ones operations.

[William F. Owen]

They should pay us extra for these little debates...
Agreed.


No, I think we both understand where the other is coming from for the most part, it is just a difference of scope of the problem perhaps? and then role of the military?
True. I believe in the military carrying out policy, good or bad, and having no part in it's creation. To quote Gabi Ashkenazi, "Don't ask my opinion. Tell me what you want and I will tell you if it is possible."


To be honest, I don't know what works, but do know that there are many examples of what does not work (though often thought of as a victory for a time, though only to flare up later); I do believe that every case is unique to the environment, the populace, the culture, the facts, etc; but at the same time that there are enduring "truths" that can provide a context or framework for shaping ones operations.
War is a thing, so it does have a definable nature, but some very different characters, all of which are dependant on context. ...and only the dead have seen the end of war.

[Schmedlap]

You never have perfect intelligence and you never will.
Agree. While perfect or near perfect are unattainable, I think that we can do better than woefully inadequate, which is what our overall intelligence capability has been. My least favorite example occurred in the summer of 2003. Everyday, we had Baghdad residents telling us that "bad men are gathering in Fallujah." We would pass this along to the S-2 everyday (including our parent unit and various units that we were attached to as boundary lines were constantly shifted). The response was always, "well, that's not in our AO" and it was promptly disregarded. A few months later, 3ID was ordered to send a brigade to Fallujah after things flared up.


You have to train to adapt and in 2001 the conventional force was not the most willing student when it came to adaptability. Some absolutely refursed to accept the idea that one might have to fight an unconvetional foe; that reluctance ran from the top to the bottom.
I can't think of many examples where we were unable or unwilling to adapt our direct combat training - prior to OIF it was difficult to get a unit to put any significant amount of time for urban fighting on the training schedule. Now it's the bread and butter for most. Really, though, I can't think of many cases where it was even necessary to significantly adapt combat training - just make Soldiers aware of theater-specific threats and nuances and incorporate it into existing training. Our fighting ability has been the one saving grace in this conflict. Were it not for the ability of small units to win every engagement (aside from less than 10 total engagements over the 6-year span of the Iraq conflict), casualties would be significantly higher. Most of the changes that needed to occur were issues of procurement (armored vehicles, C-IED devices, EOD equipment, etc), strategy (pull into the FOBs and prepare for withdrawal versus disperse more deeply into the population), or intelligence. In my opinion, procurement caught up as quickly as could be expected. A change in strategy appears to have paid off thus far.

Intelligence systems (not just devices, but the full system of collection, processing, storing, and dissemination, to include instructions to Soldiers on what to gather) have not adapted well. How we gather intelligence did not change significantly. We just did a heck of a lot more of it, substituting quantity for quality by pushing an extra 50,000 troops deeper into the population. That's not a very efficient or sustainable method of intelligence collection when the country is clamoring for a reduction in troop levels.

Instead of improving our intelligence systems as a nation, as a military, or even at the MNC-I level, we've got SOF doing one thing, CF doing another, and individual CO/BTY/TRP level units experimenting with databases, spreadsheets, intel cells, or just relying on an understaffed S-2 shop. There is duplication of effort for many things and diametrically opposed efforts elsewhere. Some of it is due to mistrust between units for fear that a CF unit will "steal" a SOF target. Some of it is due to lack of coordination - more than one unit dedicating resources to the same thing and other things being ignored. Much of it is due to a patchwork system of random collection assets, incompatible methods of processing or sharing intelligence (such as databases and other programs that cannot share data), poor procedures for updating or correcting intel, inconsistency in analysis (different analysts who disagree simply write different reports, rather than putting multiple possible analyses into one report), and a poor job of interfacing with the rank and file whom the intelligence supports and who gather much of the intel (1. debriefs are input and we get no feedback; 2. if a fire team coming off of a 72-hour patrol does not have someone from the S-2 shop debrief them the the debrief that the team leader writes is going to be short on details).


Intelligence systems are a red herring when postulated as the be all end all answer to developing situational awareness, cultural understanding, or whatever gap you feel that you face.
I agree. But that does not mean that they are unimportant or not needing significant improvement. Our shortcomings in intelligence are far more significant than any imperfections in how our units operate. Rather than so many smart people debating whether we should train for COIN or conventional fights, we should be focusing more brain power on how to improve our intelligence systems (the full system, not just individual gadgets or some written "SOP" that nobody reads).

[Tom Odom]

Schmedlap,

Overall I would say you keep pointing to the need to reform intelligence above as as means to counter intelligence needs in a bottom up fight. There is no system to reform that will do the things you want done other than the reforms that are already taking place, notably company intelligence cells.

As for no need to alter combat training, the historical record at the CTCs speaks differently. Killing the enemy has not been an issue when we found him. Finding him has been and at times killing civilians around him has created more enemies. Even at JRTC, we found change to be quite necessary and that change has been both evolutionary and revolutionary.

Tom

[Schmedlap]

Tom,

Two things are obvious from this thread: (1) I am not an intel guy (therefore, much of what I have written above is probably not the proper terminology and it is generalized). (2) Brevity is not my strong point.

With those two things in mind, I won't keep this thread going forever on a topic in which I have no particular specialty. But, my last two cents (I promise)...


Overall I would say you keep pointing to the need to reform intelligence above as as means to counter intelligence needs in a bottom up fight. There is no system to reform that will do the things you want done other than the reforms that are already taking place, notably company intelligence cells.
That is certainly "A" way to do it - and probably the only way that is going to be pursued, unfortunately. I disagree regarding whether there is a system to reform that can do better. Our intelligence processing and storage still functions in a pyramid hierarchy from what I have seen and endured. While our enemies and even most private sector organizations are shifting to a leaner, flatter organizational structure due to the advances in IT/IS, our intelligence still flows up and down a pyramid structure and much of it remains stovepiped due to concerns about adjacent units "stealing" the intel or just due to poor systems in place for sharing it. Of all things to be networked, flatter, and knowledge based, intelligence seems like the most obvious candidate. Furthermore, in light of the SWJ post (http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2009/06/this-week-at-war-19/)regarding Gen Mattis's comments on more autonomous small units - what he is describing is a flatter hierarchy where more knowledge-based, specialized, autonomous units function with less top-down instruction and more adjacent unit coordination - I see no way to accomplish this unless we also flatten our intelligence systems.


As for no need to alter combat training, the historical record at the CTCs speaks differently. Killing the enemy has not been an issue when we found him. Finding him has been and at times killing civilians around him has created more enemies. Even at JRTC, we found change to be quite necessary and that change has been both evolutionary and revolutionary.
I'm not challenging your observation that changes occurred, but I would characterize the nature of that change as being about proficiency rather than a new set of knowledge or skills. In other words, not "what" we train (as the COIN v conventional argument would focus on), but rather "how well" we train (as the Ken Whites of the world would focus on). I would even take that one step further and propose that it is mostly a discipline problem. Unless you are caught in a near ambush, it doesn't take a whole lot of training, imo, to not shoot into a crowd, a mosque, a school, or a hospital. It's not a split-second shoot-don't-shoot decision like that made when you enter a room.

[Tom Odom]

Schmedlap,

On the flattening of the intelligence architecture to allow for smaller units, I would agree and it was an 8 year struggle to get us where we are now with CoISTs. The intel system has all the issues you cite and is in my opinion very unlikely to change as stovepipes are a form of system ricebowls.

On the training issue, agree somewhat at the shooter level--but with the caveat we got where we are now via heavy use of STX lanes at the CTCs to meet the needs of small units. Where the changes really occurred were in the mindset at battalion and brigade and those changes really did not start having noticeable effects until late 2005 and into 2006.


With those two things in mind, I won't keep this thread going forever on a topic in which I have no particular specialty.

Discussion is good.

Tom

[Ken White]

On the flattening of the intelligence architecture to allow for smaller units, I would agree and it was an 8 year struggle to get us where we are now with CoISTs. The intel system has all the issues you cite and is in my opinion very unlikely to change as stovepipes are a form of system ricebowls.However, this came first. I agree with everything you wrote there -- and would only add those rice bowls have needed breaking since before the Korean War. That Stove piping kills own troops all too often...
On the training issue, agree somewhat at the shooter level--but with the caveat we got where we are now via heavy use of STX lanes at the CTCs to meet the needs of small units. Where the changes really occurred were in the mindset at battalion and brigade and those changes really did not start having noticeable effects until late 2005 and into 2006.Three points if I may:

- If we trained new accessions decently, the STX lanes would be, as they should be, practice and not initial exposure. I know that's being worked on but it's long overdue and I fear more shortcuts or band aids. The US Army has pathetic fire discipline and the Marines are little better -- both for the most part, some units work at it but it's spotty. Joe has to think and he has to KNOW what to do because the myth that his Leaders will tell him what to do is not always possible. It is never desirable.

- Changing the mindset of 30 year old Officer OR NCOs is difficult; they're too set in their ways and will resist change consciously and unconsciously, overtly and subtly. We have to train new Privates and new Lieutenants properly (and we do not now do that) or the 'system' will not change (and those rice bowls above won't get broken -- and if we are to survive in near our current state, they'd better be...).

- Remark above applies to Bn and Bde Cdrs. Most are good guys and good leaders and commanders. Almost all of them are smart folks. Their Staffs are far too large but that's the fault of the General's who cannot resist micromanaging and want answers to unnecessary questions. At those rarified air level, change is resisted; after all the system worked for them...

We do not educate our NCOs well nor IMO do we do a great job with the Officers. I'm firmly convinced that the many great Officers and the great NCOs I've known have managed to be great in spite of the system. That's not right; the system should make good people better. Point is that it should not take seven years of war to adapt. If we get thrown into a major combat operation an excessive number of Americans will die due to that lack of flexibility. Said lack is due to a marginal training system that has been in business for the last 34 years and has been slowly stultifying the Army for that time. Fortunately, great people have overcome that to get us as good as we are. Unfortunately, the effort they had to expend to do that taught micromanagement and the time thus wasted precluded them from developing better tactical, operational and strategic perspectives. They had to concentrate on things they should have been able to trust subordinates to do...

Unless we fix our very dysfunctional personnel systems and processes and significantly improve initial entry training, Officer and Enlisted, we're going to remain little better than mediocre and thus only slightly better than most of our opponents. When we ran across the occasional opponent who was better (and we have done that several times) we usually outnumbered or out produced them.

All that's been good enough in the past -- I'm not at all sure it will be in the future.

[carl]

Unless we fix our very dysfunctional personnel systems and processes and significantly improve initial entry training, Officer and Enlisted, we're going to remain little better than mediocre and thus only slightly better than most of our opponents. When we ran across the occasional opponent who was better (and we have done that several times) we usually outnumbered or out produced them.

All that's been good enough in the past -- I'm not at all sure it will be in the future.

Ken: This may be a little off topic, but could you list the better opponents so I can do some studying about them. What I've read is rather less useful than what you've seen...and heard and read.

[Ken White]

Germans in WW II (not in WW I), Japanese in WW II (in both cases, early on, we got better as years went by ** -- we may not always have that time...), Chinese in Korea (not North Koreans), VC Main Force in Viet Nam 1962-68 (not PAVN / NVA).

While there's no question we were better trained than the opponents in Grenada, Panama or Iraq, we had some embarrassing and, more importantly, deadly induced problems in all three. Same is true of Somalia -- where a raggedy Militia 'Colonel' said of our operations after the very bad day in Mogadishu; "They did the same thing over and over. Tactically you never do the same thing twice" (or words to that effect). :mad:


* There were strategic failures by us in most as well but that's not a training or even a military issue, it's a political issue.

** The recurring complaint of WW II combat arms folks was that their stateside training was inadequate

[carl]

Thank you Ken.

That's four out of four of our last really big fights. :(

[selil]

** The recurring complaint of WW II combat arms folks was that their stateside training was inadequate

We will always come back to this point. Malcom Gladwel in Outliers talks about something near to my heart. He did a bunch of research on expertise. I love archery and I've talked to all of the top coaches and competitors. It takes about 10,000 hours of training to become an expert at a skill. To become an expert it will take between 4 and 10 years of practice (depending on how much of a job I make it). At between 30 and 50 arrows an hour that is a lot of arrows.

Contrary to any argument that might be made by military education. The research literature, the empirical research, the sports disciplines, and even music all pretty much agree on 10K hours as the level to reach expertise. Anything less is going to provide less expertise.

Isn't 7-10 years right around where NCO's and mid career captains really hit their stride?

You want doctrine and strategy to work you need to provide reasonable and sustainable education and training.

[Ken White]

That's four out of four of our last really big fights. :(do note that though we started out behind in all four we got to at least draw status in fairly short order, usually about two to three years..

While I agree with Sam -- and Gladwell -- that about 10,000 hours is needed for 'expertise' and that seven to ten years produce quite expert soldiers or marines, I will point out three things.

- Most Soldiers do not have to be expert; they just should be better than the competition. Good journeymen will work fine. Leaders should be bordering on Expert status -- today, many are there or close to it; a few are quite expert.

- Around six to eight months of good training versus our current 16-18 week norm is needed for the enlisted entrant; about a year for new officers. That will make them good enough if it's done right --and any combat adds impetus and reinforcement to all things learned and accelerates the attainment of skill. Thus it take seven to ten years in peacetime to develop 'expertise' but in wartime that can be halved in light combat as now or accelerated even more in heavy combat. It took about 18-24 months in WW II to turn marginally trained folks into pretty competent soldiers. The naturals, about 10%, can do it in weeks in sustained combat.

- Other Nations who might be problematic for us have improved their training in the last few years mostly as a reaction to our obvious basic competence and the fact that we have the most combat experienced Soldiers and Marines in the world. We have also improved our training -- but we can and should still do much better to preclude some nasty surprises down the road.

As an aside, Malcolm Gladwell in doing the research for that book also discovered that identifying potential experts at early stages was quite difficult. A great deal of specificity was needed in even trying. He pointed out that the college to pro football selection process for linemen was pretty straightforward and usually worked as predicted. Quarterbacks, OTOH, due to the vast differences in the job in college ball as opposed to pro ball, had a poor success rate on ideal selects.

The point there is that we can train the linemen better and get a an adequate product. The quarterbacks take longer -- and not everyone can do it...

[Schmedlap]

As an aside, Malcolm Gladwell in doing the research for that book also discovered that identifying potential experts at early stages was quite difficult. A great deal of specificity was needed in even trying.
That was something that always annoyed me from the first day of ROTC until finishing Ranger School a few years later. Nothing but poorly crafted evaluations and non-expert evaluators (most of them in ROTC were upperclassmen or LTs - what did they know?). IOBC tried to mimic Ranger School so as to "prepare us" for it, since having a tab was apparently so important; and then there was Ranger School (nuff said). If you looked at my evals from ROTC (barely passed), IOBC (center mass), and Ranger School (barely passed) - or sat in on my unit AARs at NTC (first as a PL, then as an XO) you would see a whole lot of evaluators whom I never saw eye to eye with. An RI in the Florida phase of Ranger School tried to convince the Bn Cdr to not let me graduate because I had 5 major minuses for mouthing off to RI's (I think 6 was the limit). The one exception was as a PL at JRTC where the OCs apparently couldn't say enough good things about me - coincidentally, I thought that JRTC did a far superior job of letting the scenario play out and avoiding canned scenarios.

Once I was deployed on real world missions, everything made sense to me. Most of what I did in Iraq probably would have earned me a no-go in Ranger School and a "stop training" at NTC because it didn't fit the linear-thinking preconceptions that most evaluators seemed to hold. But I would defy anyone to explain why any of it was tactically unsound or not in accordance with doctrine. After OIF I, I was explaining to one of my former PSGs from another unit how we executed an ambush a few months earlier. It looked nothing like anything in 7-8, but it violated none of the doctrine and it was tactically sound. I still remember his reaction: "Damn, that's pretty good. Good thing you did that in real life and not in Ranger School." That says it all, imo.

[selil]

Nothing but poorly crafted evaluations and non-expert evaluators (most of them in ROTC were upperclassmen or LTs - what did they know?).

Often in training and education, the reason that people only minimally better trained than the students are leading the instructional objectives, is that the trainer is actually being trained. As in the university the idea of grad students teaching is more about teaching the grad students than it is teaching the undergraduates. I imagine with ROTC upperclassmen or LTs teaching that would be the reason. Of course, to be sound practice oversight should be extensive and senior educators should be batting clean up.

[Schmedlap]

Often in training and education, the reason that people only minimally better trained than the students are leading the instructional objectives, is that the trainer is actually being trained. As in the university the idea of grad students teaching is more about teaching the grad students than it is teaching the undergraduates. I imagine with ROTC upperclassmen or LTs teaching that would be the reason. Of course, to be sound practice oversight should be extensive and senior educators should be batting clean up.
That makes sense for training at the university or in any training where the evaluation has no significant impact. I would only add that a lot of the evaluators at Fort Lewis, where all of the ROTC cadets go between their junior and senior year, are newly minted 2LTs. This is a problem because the purpose of the 5-week program at Ft Lewis is to evaluate the cadets against their peers. It can impact whether people get their first choice of branch assignment (lucky for me, Infantry was relatively easy to get). Even as a cadet, I had a hunch that a lot of the LTs didn't know what they were doing. In hindsight, it is obvious that they didn't. Hopefully things have changed.

[William F. Owen]

Contrary to any argument that might be made by military education. The research literature, the empirical research, the sports disciplines, and even music all pretty much agree on 10K hours as the level to reach expertise. Anything less is going to provide less expertise.

Now all that may be true, and I certainly don't doubt it, but their needs to be a very solid debate about the time and money needed to deliver the right degrees of training. I am my no means convinced the UK or US training infantry men in a way best suited to the needs. Does it work. Yes, but how well compared to other approaches we don't know.


You want doctrine and strategy to work you need to provide reasonable and sustainable education and training.
That sentiment is useful and correct, but I would emphasise that there is no relationship between Doctrine and Strategy, except that Doctrine must provide a useable description of Strategy.

[jcustis]

Now all that may be true, and I certainly don't doubt it, but their needs to be a very solid debate about the time and money needed to deliver the right degrees of training. I am my no means convinced the UK or US training infantry men in a way best suited to the needs. Does it work. Yes, but how well compared to other approaches we don't know.

We review these issues constantly, but certainly not effectively. As a guy still in on the ground at the tactical level, I can say that one of our most pressing concerns is over how much we adhere to our older training & readiness manual (which made some concessions to ops in OIF and OEF in 2006), or lean more towards the prescribed pre-deployment training (PTP) programs prescribed by our Training and Education Command (TECOM) HQ. Gents, it is not an easy task.

I agree wholeheartedly with Ken and many other of you that we don't train particularly well (and sometimes seriously enough :wry:), and that longer training windows would be optimal in some cases. The problem with getting the latter modified is that it takes years to turn the rudder. A patrial case in point is the Marine Corps start-up of its own 25mm Master Gunner course. For years on end, we have sent students to the Army course since our LAV-25s run the same Bushmaster chain giun. Advocates for our own school have been around almost since the first Marine graduated from Benning. The LAV-25 was introduced in 1984, and our pilot program is just starting this fall. There is something to be said for the Army program, but doing it in-house was generally preferred because of platform differences. Moving money and manpower around the Corps is like moving mountains sometimes.

It is true that we should be able to take a basically-trained conventional force, and with very little rudder steer, employ him in any environment. To a great degree we still go that, but somehow the term COIN gets used when in fact we are really just applying regionally-adjusted training regimens. If you look at the progression of vehicle check point training, you'd see a classic example. I never trained to execute a VCP in my life before late 2003, but damn sure did during prep to return to Iraq, for two reasons. First, we had used them the first go-around, and secondly, Division told us to.

Division told us to because a VCP is a very discreet skill set that requires a certain degree of standardization if you want to get it done right with minimum wasted movement and safety for innocent civilians We thought we were getting it right, and for the most part did okay, but axross all OIF rotations for all Marine Corps infantry battalions, it would take several years and hundreds of JAG investigation recreations before units in the field were able to prescribe the best happy medium for set-up, materials, and tear-down. At the outset, some of the worst violators of effective VCP execution were in fact not even grunts, but rather MP and artillery units employed as supply convoy escorts.

Where we get things screwed up, however, are when the business of standardizing something like VCPs (for distances involved, materials used, etc.) is hit and miss, or the evaluations at events like the old Mojave Viper employed diagrams that differed from other references floating out there.

And when it comes to the actual evaluation, why is it that a platoon commander is being evaluated by a corporal who is about to get out of the Corps in six months time, and certainly would rather be somewhere else not in the desert, and not in 100+ deg heat. The problem comes straight away from how we train, how we resource commands that do not have require T/O augmentation just to barely function, and how we look at events on the ground. "It gets the job done," is sometimes camo for just pure dumb luck, yet we don't realize it.

Something similar happened in detainee operations. These guys were not just POWs anymore where you could get away with 5 S's and a T. That took up training time and resources too, and since we did not get more dwell time tacked onto the equation, unit commanders had to (and will always do so) make some decisions about the likelihood of conducting a platoon in battle position defense vs. detainee training.

The pendulum has indeed swung too far at times, especially when "COIN" TTPs are all that we train to, at the detriment of retaining the ability to fix and maneuver (or defend as well). ####, the whole ability of infantry lieutenants to train effectively has shifted post 9/11, because so much of the standardization was pushed down anew, and from outside our normal doctrinal publication chain (where T&R review might come), by venues such as the Warfighting Lab. Training is served up so poorly nowadays that it is pretty easy to be dropped off at a training area, link-up with the contractor training and support cell, and start working lanes, without applying any thought at all towards the desired end result. It's great until your platoon commanders begin to grimace because Bob the retired combat engineer is tossing out training commentary at the school circle of Marines when he really should just be wiring IED sims.

I do think that up to now, the crop of battalion commanders have been savvy enough to know what they want, and to prescribe training that fits in with their estimation of the battlefield and its effects. My boss, for example, is working to get us away from the teat of predeployment training packages, and back to our T&R manuals. He succeeds at this to a great degree because he also succeeds at convincing HHQ to employ our unit in line with its doctrinal capabilities to the maximum extent pissible, rather than the square peg-round hole of armor in urban areas that deserve lightfighters. As our efforts progress, future commanders will have come up in environments that made cookie-cutter training the norm.

Other circumstances conspire to slow down progress, as when "Distributed Operations" became a vogue term and people started applying brain power to that drama...right in the middle of a very hot conflict. As if we didn't already have enough on our plate in Iraq during '05-'07?!? I look back, and besides a wire diagram that outlined manpower and a few historical examples, I don't know what DO really was designed to do, but I know that guys at Quantico who would otherwise be responsible for T&R manual development were seconded to the DO effort...and look at what we have to show for it. I clearly remember that captain who was supervising the participants at a T&R manual review conference. He was happy that he was eligible to retire within the year...I don't blame him.

I'd love to participate in any debate regarding the 5 W's of training and employment of the respective resources. Unfortunately, people usually only get excited about good initiatives in 3 year cycles, which not surprising, match up with the window before a guy gets his new set of orders and passes his turnover binder to another guy who starts out with great dreams.

[selil]

As to Wilf's mild and likely correct criticism, to me doctrine, strategy, tactics are kind of like the civilian vision/mission, goals, and outcomes. Your doctrine is how you want to see stuff come out in the end, the strategy is a series of goals to meet that overall vision, and your tactics are the discrete elements, tools, methods, or things you do to implement the goals (would be strategy). Not completely aligned but the security paradigm I work within is completely flipped anyways.

I also have never been a military trainer/educator. Other than those few ROTC or military members in my classes. My background is in education theory which is the ocean that the military dips their concepts from. The kind of education I do is applied studies. No wussy social sciences. Within my discipline we align education with desired outcomes that are inclusive of patterns of knowledge needed for continued growth of expertise. As such maybe I can bring up some ideas maybe I have nothing to add.

If there is an overall knowledge state and expertise level that a soldier/sailor/marine needs to acquire then you can create a syllabus to do that. Expertise as Ken White and I discussed previously is a fickle if understood quantity. We know the number to get to the end state, now we'll just quibble of the "good enough" number. What has to be identified are the general knowledge, skills, and abilities (KSA's) and then the specialized set. They all should point back at the doctrine as that desired end state.

This kind of holistic education is nothing new. The military has used it in the past. The higher education system has used it in the past. The rush to expertise in the post WW2 culture has mistakenly washed that away. An interesting point is that in the economic turmoil that has beset higher education consolidation is occurring and in some cases students are much happier. The generalized knowledge between two near-fields in depth is often much more utilitarian than the specialized knowledge at the surface. I once read a great piece illustrating this principle. Four hours training in how to use a blade screw driver is better than an hour on a phillips, an hour on a torx an hour on a blade, and finally an hour on an allen key screwdriver. They all work pretty much the same.

Some tasks simply can't be generalized or conceptualized as a form of a model eliciting activity (MEA). There are specialized skills like avionics or similar. You identify those and plug them into your education plan and how they reflect back towards doctrine. This should also reflect that doctrine has to be solid and can't be messed with simply for political proclivity to touch things. Doctrine should be generational rather than turmoil. That way as members of the military are educated the systemic forces will create cohesion that strengthens capabilities rather than eroding under parasitic tensions of counter doctrinal actions.

Well perhaps.

[Schmedlap]

Selil,

Do you think the current literature on knowledge management has anything to offer on this issue? I ask because I'm taking an Information Systems Management course right now (it's a core course of my MBA program). One of the topics that we will (hopefully) get to is Knowledge Management systems. My impression, so far, is that knowledge management generally involves breaking down all of the skills of an organization's members into something resembling the Army's current skill level manuals and then doing something (what that something is - I don't know) to facilitate the transfer of those skills to newer members of the organization. Ken has explained the shortcomings of the Task/Condition/Standard methodology, which also helps to explain why a focus on breaking down professional knowledge into just a list of skills is a bad idea. Does the current trend in KM mirror this Army TCS methodology?

[Kiwigrunt]

.....The generalized knowledge between two near-fields in depth is often much more utilitarian than the specialized knowledge at the surface. I once read a great piece illustrating this principle. Four hours training in how to use a blade screw driver is better than an hour on a phillips, an hour on a torx an hour on a blade, and finally an hour on an allen key screwdriver. They all work pretty much the same.


Am I pushing my luck to ask you for a link (or reference) to that piece?
I'd be very interested in reading it (I think). Totally off topic here but the potential learnings from it may have some relevance to my trade and industry and where its going here in NZ.

[selil]

Do you think the current literature on knowledge management has anything to offer on this issue? I ask because I'm taking an Information Systems Management course right now (it's a core course of my MBA program). One of the topics that we will (hopefully) get to is Knowledge Management systems. My impression, so far, is that knowledge management generally involves breaking down all of the skills of an organization's members into something resembling the Army's current skill level manuals

From my experience in the business world knowledge management has always been the lessons learned, frequently asked questions, and process efficiency capture processes. The key goal was process improvement of an already defined skill, or the capture of that skill so the company could not be held "knowledge hostage".

In my experience as a manage of information technology anybody engaging in knowledge hostage practices was terminated for cause instantly. It is the equivalent of a licensed insurgency against your company you pay to wage war against your internal interests.

Just to further clarify "knowledge hostage" was usually caused by system administrators who held all the keys, used arcane naming practices, or bent processes like back ups in such a way that the company could not function without that specific entity.

Knowledge management from my perspective was about rationalizing and standardizing practices so that people could move up, move linearly, or leave a company with no adverse effect against the company. In practice the tools were used to outsource to foreign companies and in unethical ways to hold employees dear to the company hostage. The road to heck is paved with good intentions.

I'm not a fan of the general MBA/MIS student or program. ROI on IT is like asking for an ROI on electricity and air.


Am I pushing my luck to ask you for a link (or reference) to that piece?
I'd be very interested in reading it (I think). Totally off topic here but the potential learnings from it may have some relevance to my trade and industry and where its going here in NZ.

I'll take a look. When I posted it I did a cursory look for the reference. There is a large amount of of literature around knowledge transference and the nature of expertise starting with James Dewey through now.

[Ken White]

Selil:
Four hours training in how to use a blade screw driver is better than an hour on a phillips, an hour on a torx an hour on a blade, and finally an hour on an allen key screwdriver. They all work pretty much the same.Not to pick on you and I know that's a hypothetical but I couldn't help thinking -- that's military instruction, cramming a 20 minute class into four hours... :rolleyes:

While there's too much truth in that as there is in what you say about being pretty much the same, another part of the problem is that in teaching the flat tip screwdriver, we don't teach the kid the mechanics of screws (because that's not a task...) so he understands the principle and we often fail to point out clockwise in unless it's a pre-war British item -- and we do not take the ten minutes involved to have him take out a few screws while blindfolded to embed the process in muscle memory (because he has to go to Rape Prevention class next...).
Doctrine should be generational rather than turmoil. That way as members of the military are educated the systemic forces will create cohesion that strengthens capabilities rather than eroding under parasitic tensions of counter doctrinal actions.Heresy! If we do that, then each new Commandant of a TRADOC School cannot invent something on his watch in order to get an enhanced OER. :D
. The key goal was process improvement of an already defined skill, or the capture of that skill so the company could not be held "knowledge hostage".That's called stovepiping in the services and we're terrible about it. Hostages everywhere. There's also another factor that impacts training. Aside from thinking the troops aren't smart enough to get 'advanced' concepts, the services have to face the double whammy of 'we can't spend too much money to teach the kid who may not stick around too long' and 'we can't train super soldiers rapidly not because we aren't able but because '...it takes time to make sure they won't misuse it.' Those can be managed but it's easier just to do it that way.

The counterpart double whammy is that kids are bored out of their skull by poor and excessively lengthy but too elementary training (kids of all ranks...) and good Captains leave because they do not wish to face a staff or instructor job and contribute to the first part or doing a lot of make-work.
or bent processes like back ups in such a way that the company could not function without that specific entity. The military counterpart is to keep knowledge to yourself and thereby becoming indispensable. I've met people who wouldn't and couldn't take a leave for fear their secret treasure trove of knowledge might be needed -- or found out.

Schmedlap:
a focus on breaking down professional knowledge into just a list of skills is a bad idea.Actually, breaking them down has merit -- but if the industry (or Army) involved doesn't take the next step of putting them back together to accomplish complex missions consisting of many individual and unit sub-tasks, then people will be stuck at the basic or task level. There is a difference between a METL and a Mission Training Program

Consider a simple thing like map use -- every school teaches virtually the same tasks to persons of all grades and skill levels. Rarely do they break those tasks down into basic, intermediate and advanced groups. Today, everyone can can get terrain mask data from the GIS software -- but Company, Battery and Troop Commanders should have been taught to do that for years with a plain old marginally accurate topo map. Actually, squad and section leaders should have been taught that. Still should. Today. So they can do it when the GIS is not available...

That's what happens when you teach tasks instead of how to achieve outcomes; people have to learn how to produce outcomes on their own. some can, some can't or won'. Your tale of precommission training showed you did -- but I bet you know several contemporaries who didn't... :eek:

[William F. Owen]

As to Wilf's mild and likely correct criticism, to me doctrine, strategy, tactics are kind of like the civilian vision/mission, goals, and outcomes.

Not criticism of you intended. I just felt it germane to mention it, so as we didn't all start compounding the error - and I think that strikes to heart of the article.

[Ken White]

That sentiment is useful and correct, but I would emphasise that there is no relationship between Doctrine and Strategy, except that Doctrine must provide a useable description of Strategy.Saw this yesterday and mulled it a bit. If you mean that Doctrine must provide usable description of how to enable a Strategy to succeed, then I agree with what you say. However, I'd also posit that frequently, there is a reversal and Doctrine begins to drive Strategy -- a very bad outcome IMO. Selil in effect said that:
Your doctrine is how you want to see stuff come out in the end, the strategy is a series of goals to meet that overall vision, and your tactics are the discrete elements, tools, methods, or things you do to implement the goals (would be strategy). Not completely aligned but the security paradigm I work within is completely flipped anyways.Taking his statements in reverse order, I believe all security paradigms are eminently flippable. That is, in the realm of 'security' to have a fixed view is likely to lead to a more flexible opportunists breaching your security simply because you elected a dogmatic, complacent or egoistic approach -- or a 'Doctrinal' approach...

I think that goals are discrete aiming points. Those goals are determined by national policies. Those goals are achieved by developing a strategy or strategies to attain them. Doctrine is the hopefully coherent methodology and BROAD guidance you use to develop the operational and tactical methods to implement various strategies. Doctrine must not only allow but must encourage maximum flexibility in the selection of appropriate operational methods and TTP to implement strategies.

The alternative is to allow your doctrine to become dogma and drive your methodology and thus constrain your strategy. That requires less hard thinking and is the easier route. It also allows others to predict your probable responses with ease...

Should one decide to use one's doctrine to develop strategy, it seems one would be constrained to doing only what one firmly decided in advance to do -- a very problematic approach -- instead of determining what was needed and how best to achieve that.

I submit that problematic approach has been the US operating methodology for a number of years -- and that hasn't worked too well...

[William F. Owen]

Saw this yesterday and mulled it a bit. If you mean that Doctrine must provide usable description of how to enable a Strategy to succeed, then I agree with what you say. However, I'd also posit that frequently, there is a reversal and Doctrine begins to drive Strategy -- a very bad outcome IMO.

I think, that is correct. What I meant was that Doctrine should say "Strategy is X,Y and Z," so that the doctrine has some defined purpose. "We do this because....".

[Ken White]

Let me play with what you said:
Doctrine should say "Strategy is X,Y and Z," ...Does that mean that Doctrine says "this aspect of doctrine supports a Strategy of X. If you wish to do Y, then that aspect of doctrine supports that. OTOH if you want to do Z, this other aspect of doctrine shows how that can be accomplished." If so, I agree.

I'm concerned with ability to do X, Y and Z but not being able to rapidly cope with AA or AC (much less some antiquarian who drags out D, G or M... :D). I'm also concerned that Doctrine can be constraining in the sense that if it is allowed to drive strategy, means inappropriate to the task at hand may be selected simple because those means are the doctrine.

I do agree with this:
so that the doctrine has some defined purpose. "We do this because....".and would only suggest that doctrine should be minimal and not overly prescriptive. If it become to finite, it becomes the de facto 'book' and deviation is punished. That is not good. As you said initially, Strategy and Doctrine are different things:

Doctrine drives what we do and how we do it.

Strategy drives what must be done.

The two are melded into operational parameters or guidance and execution of operations to achieve the goals of the strategy. Our doctrine must support the elected strategy and if it does not, then new or altered doctrine should be developed to do that. Conversely, our strategy must not be constrained by current doctrine.

[reed11b]

Jumping in the middle, on the training argument; individual manning further sabotages the training that we do. Soldiers are part of a team and training how to work as a team is critical. We keep breaking up that team, so that cohesion never happens. Allowing manning to be frozen during a training-deployment cycle would help the Army better utilize what training it does do. Up or out has similar negative effects.
Reed
I whole heartedly agree w/ Ken that initial training needs to be better.

[Schmedlap]

On the flattening of the intelligence architecture to allow for smaller units, I would agree and it was an 8 year struggle to get us where we are now with CoISTs. The intel system has all the issues you cite and is in my opinion very unlikely to change as stovepipes are a form of system ricebowls.
Does anyone know about any software that CoISTs are using? I read a little bit about TIGR, but this seems like more of collaborative thing to share information, rather than to conduct analysis. Have CoISTs developed TTP and/or software or other systems for analysis and target development?

[Bob's World]

Saw this yesterday and mulled it a bit. If you mean that Doctrine must provide usable description of how to enable a Strategy to succeed, then I agree with what you say. However, I'd also posit that frequently, there is a reversal and Doctrine begins to drive Strategy -- a very bad outcome IMO. Selil in effect said that:Taking his statements in reverse order, I believe all security paradigms are eminently flippable. That is, in the realm of 'security' to have a fixed view is likely to lead to a more flexible opportunists breaching your security simply because you elected a dogmatic, complacent or egoistic approach -- or a 'Doctrinal' approach...

I think that goals are discrete aiming points. Those goals are determined by national policies. Those goals are achieved by developing a strategy or strategies to attain them. Doctrine is the hopefully coherent methodology and BROAD guidance you use to develop the operational and tactical methods to implement various strategies. Doctrine must not only allow but must encourage maximum flexibility in the selection of appropriate operational methods and TTP to implement strategies.

The alternative is to allow your doctrine to become dogma and drive your methodology and thus constrain your strategy. That requires less hard thinking and is the easier route. It also allows others to predict your probable responses with ease...

Should one decide to use one's doctrine to develop strategy, it seems one would be constrained to doing only what one firmly decided in advance to do -- a very problematic approach -- instead of determining what was needed and how best to achieve that.

I submit that problematic approach has been the US operating methodology for a number of years -- and that hasn't worked too well...

I was at Bragg going over draft strategy with the Doctrine guys at SWCS this week and several times sparked the comment "that's not doctrine." To which my reply was essentially, "noted."

We cannot write a strategy for the future constrained by a doctirne based on an understanding of the past. Once we craft a new strategy, it will inform a review of existing doctrine and lead to a writing and publishing of the next generation of doctrine.

Once one becomes locked in place by their doctrine, they are doomed to an ultimate irrelevance.

[Ron Humphrey]

I was at Bragg going over draft strategy with the Doctrine guys at SWCS this week and several times sparked the comment "that's not doctrine." To which my reply was essentially, "noted."

We cannot write a strategy for the future constrained by a doctirne based on an understanding of the past. Once we craft a new strategy, it will inform a review of existing doctrine and lead to a writing and publishing of the next generation of doctrine.

Once one becomes locked in place by their doctrine, they are doomed to an ultimate irrelevance.

I've always been confused by the fact that from a low guy on the totem pole perspective I kinda understood Doctrine to be like directions on how to
get somewhere

Strategy seemed like a where you want to go thing.

In that context it becomes an exercise in organized confusion when your looking for directions yet your not sure exactly where your going:confused:

Looks like you all are doing a good job of clearing that up for us. :)

[William F. Owen]

We cannot write a strategy for the future constrained by a doctirne based on an understanding of the past. Once we craft a new strategy, it will inform a review of existing doctrine and lead to a writing and publishing of the next generation of doctrine.

How do you write strategy for the future? Can you tell the future? The strategy of September the 10th 2001 was irrelevant by the 12th. What the military contribution to strategy is surely dependant on circumstances of the moment.

Doctrine is and should be substantially enduring, excepting substantial changes in organisation or equipment capability. E.G. I'd suggest the basics of a cordon and search operation have not changed since about 1960.

[Ken White]

It is very broad, is devised and promulgated, hopefully with full knowledge that events and actions of others WILL cause changes. Thus strategy constantly evolves. Well, smart strategy does... :rolleyes:

Doctrine should also be broad. It could / would say you can, in the execution of a strategy, be required to do cordon and search operations.

Training involve using TTP which are fairly specific. They should still allow for individual approaches and differences standardizing only things so required to preclude self damage. TTP and Training tell you HOW to do a cordon and search; both must be frequently adjusted based on equipment and other parameters -- notably quality of personnel* -- as necessary.

Three different things with doctrine being the most static -- and therefor the one that need the closest scrutiny lest it constrain either your strategy or your TTP.

The problem in the US is that we have attempted to make 'doctrine' all inclusive to cover all eventualities (an obvious impossibility) and almost regulatory in its impact. IOW, in typical US fashion we have overdone it and thus confused doctrine with training and TTP (even with strategery... :D).

* Which the US Army has not bothered to do.

[Bob's World]

How do you write strategy for the future? Can you tell the future? The strategy of September the 10th 2001 was irrelevant by the 12th. What the military contribution to strategy is surely dependant on circumstances of the moment.

Doctrine is and should be substantially enduring, excepting substantial changes in organisation or equipment capability. E.G. I'd suggest the basics of a cordon and search operation have not changed since about 1960.

...though to take on the inertia of the doctrinaires you sometimes have to have some big brass ones!

In my current job I have met some professional futurists...guys who make living creating projections of the future. There were several at the last TRADOC conference I went to in fact, to lend their insights to writing the next Future Operating Environment (FOE). That's not what we do.

So much of what you see out there in terms of current understanding of what needs to be done is based upon what needed to be done for the last war. Almost a definition of doctrine, which is a codification of what needed to be done for the last war, applied to the next. Thus the "fighting the last war" syndrome.

Worth noting is that every previous insurgency took place in a pre-globalized world, where tactics of isolating the insurgent from the populace were feasible, and an insurgent organization could more easily be suppressed and order restored without having to actually deal with the underlying conditions of poor governance that gave rise to the last insurgency, and ultimately the next due to letting them continue.

Our work is not an effort to predict the future so much as it is to understand better the here and now, and to look then at what worked and in the past and ask what is still valid today, and what must be updated in order to achieve similar successful effects in this new environment.

I, for one, believe that the principles of both state-based and populace-based conflicts, while very different, are also very enduring in nature. But the environment in which they occur, made up of the history and culture of the affected populace/state; the terrain, veg, weather; the available technologies; etc, etc shape each in a unique way.

It is not a prediction of the future to say that the rate and availability of information today is unique in the history of man. Nor is it a prediction of the future to challenge tried and true COIN TTPs against their validity in this new operating environment.

Who will use them? Don't know. Where? Don't know. But there are trends and indicators of change.

This is my big beef with the Intel community from top to bottom. Gross negligent failure to evolve from a complete and total focus in identifying and learning as much as possible about who the "enemy" is; and a equally complete refusal to put their tremendous energy, skill and talent to creating a similar understanding of the environment in which these groups operate, and the causations that give rise to them in the first place and sustain them in their efforts. They are all about the symptom, and neither know, understand, nor care about the causes. It’s a disgrace, and it is putting out nation at risk.

So they drone on about who changed their name to AQ last, Who the top senior leadership is, endless drivel about ideology and radicalism; but I have yet to see them lay out the failures of governance around the world that are the causation of such groups. Or a linkage chart of 'legitimacy' laying out where activities by the U.S. have created dangerous perceptions of legitimacy over other populaces governances, and thereby placed us in the crosshairs of those same populaces as they seek change.

So, no, I don't try to predict the future, but I do try to understand more fully the here and now. That means a deep study and understanding of the past, without also adopting a blind adherence to the same.

[slapout9]

This is my big beef with the Intel community from top to bottom. Gross negligent failure to evolve from a complete and total focus in identifying and learning as much as possible about who the "enemy" is; and a equally complete refusal to put their tremendous energy, skill and talent to creating a similar understanding of the environment in which these groups operate, and the causations that give rise to them in the first place and sustain them in their efforts. They are all about the symptom, and neither know, understand, nor care about the causes. It’s a disgrace, and it is putting out nation at risk.

So they drone on about who changed their name to AQ last, Who the top senior leadership is, endless drivel about ideology and radicalism; but I have yet to see them lay out the failures of governance around the world that are the causation of such groups. Or a linkage chart of 'legitimacy' laying out where activities by the U.S. have created dangerous perceptions of legitimacy over other populaces governances, and thereby placed us in the crosshairs of those same populaces as they seek change.

So, no, I don't try to predict the future, but I do try to understand more fully the here and now. That means a deep study and understanding of the past, without also adopting a blind adherence to the same.


Very profound.

[William F. Owen]

So much of what you see out there in terms of current understanding of what needs to be done is based upon what needed to be done for the last war. Almost a definition of doctrine, which is a codification of what needed to be done for the last war, applied to the next. Thus the "fighting the last war" syndrome.

With respect Bob, that's not what history shows us. History and the operational record show us that screw ups in one war mostly come from not understanding the observations from the last. The list of examples is literally endless. Things known in WW1 were not applied in WW2. WW2 knowledge was not applied in Korea, and the Falklands etc etc etc. We hardly ever "fight the last war". if we did we might get somewhere. IIRC That line comes from Liddell-Hart, so needs to be taken with a huge pinch of salt.


I, for one, believe that the principles of both state-based and populace-based conflicts, while very different, are also very enduring in nature. But the environment in which they occur, made up of the history and culture of the affected populace/state; the terrain, veg, weather; the available technologies; etc, etc shape each in a unique way.
Concur


Who will use them? Don't know. Where? Don't know. But there are trends and indicators of change.
That are consistently ignored. All the "NEW WAR" crowd constantly ignore the evidence that Warfare is not changing in the ways they say it is.

This is my big beef with the Intel community from top to bottom. Gross negligent failure to evolve from a complete and total focus in identifying and learning as much as possible about who the "enemy" is;
I concur. If you can find him, you can fix him and strike him. Works on criminals, works on irregulars, works on Tank Divisions.

So, no, I don't try to predict the future, but I do try to understand more fully the here and now. That means a deep study and understanding of the past, without also adopting a blind adherence to the same.
I don't see how you could "adhere to the past," but yes, you have to understand what is relevant an why that is. Some day, someone might want to look at all the smart folks that came up with FCS, and ask what about history did they not understand.

[Surferbeetle]

This month's Technology Review has a Cloud Computing briefing and one of the associated articles Conjuring Clouds (http://www.technologyreview.com/computing/22606/) may be of interest:


Much of the popularity of cloud computing is owed to a technology known as virtualization. A host computer runs an application known as a hypervisor; this creates one or more virtual machines, which simulate real computers so faithfully that the simulations can run any software, from operating systems to end-user applications. The software "thinks" it has access to a processor, network, and disk drive, just as if it had a real computer all to itself. The hypervisor retains ultimate control, however, and can pause, erase, or create new virtual machines at any time. Virtualization means that e-mail, Web, or file servers (or anything else) can be conjured up as soon as they're needed; when the need is gone, they can be wiped from existence, freeing the host computer to run a different virtual machine for another user. Coupled with management software and vast data centers, this technology allows cloud providers to reap massive economies of scale. And it gives cloud users access to as much computing power as they want, whenever they want it.

The dream of on-demand computing--a "utility" that can bring processing power into homes as readily as electricity or water--arose as soon as computers became capable of multitasking between different users

MBA school introduced me to some interesting textbooks (http://www.amazon.com/Managing-Using-Information-Systems-Strategic/dp/0471346446) and provided some valuable insights into why the Army has been so slow in upgrading our knowledge management tools in this war. As a result of these insights into the costs and associated timelines for cultural changes I try and temper my impatience with the understanding that many of the resource allocators have not been on the front line and are not of the 'internet generation' (skills based definition).

It has been a while since the festivities kicked off in 2001 however.

And so I ask myself how many municipalities, cities, US States, and nations are using standardized COTS Geographic Information Systems (http://www.esri.com/industries.html)? For the frontline troop is it helpful to have inaccessible classified info buried somewhere on some arcane software program when the villagers he or she are working with already know where the weir dam is, where the irrigation ditches are, where the mill is, and who the ag folks are? Perhaps this knowledge could be used in having more villagers spend time on agricultural pursuits then on kinetic pursuits?

Standard Disclaimers (and more) apply but I found this to be a very interesting post nonetheless on the blog Free Range International: A Trip to Gardez and a Visit with the Marines (http://blog.freerangeinternational.com/?p=1726)

Wiki sites for TTP's, BCKS, and AKO are huge strides forward but we need more: wiki-style mapping (GIS/Google Earth) and information sharing break information stovepipes and get folks out gathering, sharing, discussing, and vetting knowledge among the participants. We do it in science and engineering and we gain valuable insights from the multidisciplinary interactions...we can do the same in the military.