Seeking testimony of those who interviewed Baath or al Qaeda detainees in Iraq

[Mark Eichenlaub]

If anyone on the board has worked in prisons or other situations and was able to sit in on interrogations, interviews of Baath or al Qaeda detainees in Iraq I would greatly appreciate a few minutes of their time.

I was previously of the persuasion that Saddam's regime had some connections for al Qaeda (thus my site www.regimeofterror.com) but I continue to get conflicting reports on what detainees said about the topic with some of Saddam's top men saying that the former regime spied on, loathed jihadists and some saying there was cooperation during times of joint interests.

I want to balance out my website and attempt to balance the media's "no links" extremist position.

Any help would be great.

Thanks.

[bourbon]

Hi Mark,
What makes the "no links" position extremist?

Most countries in the West and the Middle East have had at least peripheral links to AQ in the past. It's a matter of significance, degree, and when it occurred is it not? Say such links occurred after the US started woofing about invading Iraq, it is asinine to point to such pact with the devil relationship and then use it as justification for invasion.

[Mark Eichenlaub]

It's extremist to say there were "no links" because it is basically saying they never cooperated or discussed cooperation at all.

I didn't bring up the revelance of if the links were significant enough to go to war over and not sure why you did because discussion can be had without retreating into a prowar or antiwar knee jerk position right away. But since you did bring it up was there another state, aside from Iraq, who was openly praising al Qaeda after 2001 when they had just attacked us? Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and even Syria and Iran were cooperating with the U.S. then.

[Danny]

To find reliable assets who can tell you information in this regard. This kind of information is normally going to be restricted to specific billets such as intelligence, for a multitude of reasons not the least of which no one else would have had time to do this except people to which the task had been assigned.

You will also run into the problem of OPSEC. Not that I would concur in this regard, but I typically see the knee jerk reaction that all information is OPSEC unless and until proven otherwise. It's just the way they work.

I do have some ideas for you, and will communicate off line. But for the most part, this kind of knowledge base on the regime will be restricted to high level individuals, and this will make it almost impossible to develop a comprehensive personal database for an individual like yourself who doesn't run in these circles (e.g., Army intelligence [or perhaps CIA] who actually participated in such work).

As one related subject, I find discussions about the justification for OIF 1 to be wasteful and boring from a military perspective (I am NOT here directing this statement at you or this discussion thread, I guess your post just touched a nerve). Of course, they are not at all wasteful in Polisci classes or policy debates. But for instance, since I also run a web site that is fairly much directed at military issues, I have specifically killed discussion of the justification for OIF 1 every time it comes up. It simply doesn't matter to me. I would rather people have contributed to the success of OIF 3. That's a mistake, BTW, that I have seen almost every day over the past couple of years. One person is debating Iraq in the context of OIF 1, the other person is advocating support for OIF 3, and the two don't even know that they aren't speaking the same language or discussing the same thing.

Now that we are involved in stability OPS in Iraq, I find discussions of troop redeployment from Iraq to Afghanistan to be equally monotonous. We do what we must do.

V/r,

H

[jkm_101_fso]

If anyone on the board has worked in prisons or other situations and was able to sit in on interrogations, interviews of Baath or al Qaeda detainees in Iraq I would greatly appreciate a few minutes of their time.

Sat in a few. I've got nothing. Mostly angry young men that wanted us to go away or wanted some money.


I want to balance out my website and attempt to balance the media's "no links" extremist position.

It's not just the media, Sir. And I don't think it's extremist.

If you're a partisan, be sure to tread lightly around here. This isn't the place for that.

If you are not, then I apologize for being suspicious.

[Mark Eichenlaub]

jkm,
Thanks for your reply and your service.

I still don't consider it to be a partisan effort to find out about the shadowy fighting and/or dealings between Saddam's goons and al Qaeda. I have been going through the testimony of some Gitmo detainees who were native Iraqis and were members of al Qaeda and the Taliban before 9-11 and these guys had been previously jailed and/or hunted by Saddam's goons. I also have spoken with a few other people (both CIA and military folk) who have interviewed Baath and al Qaeda detainees and found a split (as previously mentioned) amongst both sides on cooperation.

The details of al Qaeda members sitting inside Saddam's prisons would be a fascinating story, would it not? Naming the names of those involved and who made the decision to jail them and why, would it not? Would it not be a fascinating tale to have one of Saddam's former Mukhabarat agents, tasked with watching al Qaeda, Ansar al Islam, or the Taliban tell of how and where he did this?

Would examples of limited cooperation not also be a story countless people would be fascinated hearing the details of?

This stuff is going to come out one day and perhaps the "what if's" of it all can be addressed some time after all the information is out, which is what I am trying to do. Sorry if that offends some people.

[Schmedlap]

The odds of getting reliable information from detainees about the existence of links between the Ba'ath regime and al-Qaeda seem almost nil. Aside from the unlikely event that the detainees would even know anything about such a sensitive and high-level arrangement, it would be difficult to discern whether they are being truthful. And even in that case, such a high-level PIR would almost certainly be classified. If such information were obtained, it would probably have been obtained very early on in the occupation - but that was when we were the least sophisticated in our operations. After that, once the insurgency heated up, I doubt that we were too worried about extracting that type of information. So you've got time, priorities, memories, and skill level all working against the probability that, even if such information were out there, that we managed to obtain it, know whether it was accurate, and made it accessible now by not overclassifying it.

As to whether there were links - either overt or implied - I think the most likely instances occurred in the region where the borders of Kurdish-controlled territory in Iraq met the Iran-Iraq border. There are reports (as to their reliability, I have no idea) about Iran and Iraq not necessarily directly cooperating with Ansar al-Sunna, but generally looking the other way because they had a common enemy in the Kurds. Ansar al-Sunna allegedly had contacts with al-Qaeda and there was allegedly movement of al-Qaeda and Ansar al-Sunna operatives between Afghanistan and Iraq - largely confined to the border region mentioned above. The connection to the Ba'ath regime seems weak, even if these reports are accurate. But they speak to at least some connection. It may turn out that the truth lies somewhere between the two extremes of "no connection" and "slam-dunk evidence of a connection." Now that would really be something.

[Mark Eichenlaub]

The odds of getting reliable information from detainees about the existence of links between the Ba'ath regime and al-Qaeda seem almost nil. Aside from the unlikely event that the detainees would even know anything about such a sensitive and high-level arrangement, it would be difficult to discern whether they are being truthful. And even in that case, such a high-level PIR would almost certainly be classified. If such information were obtained, it would probably have been obtained very early on in the occupation - but that was when we were the least sophisticated in our operations. After that, once the insurgency heated up, I doubt that we were too worried about extracting that type of information. So you've got time, priorities, memories, and skill level all working against the probability that, even if such information were out there, that we managed to obtain it, know whether it was accurate, and made it accessible now by not overclassifying it.

As to whether there were links - either overt or implied - I think the most likely instances occurred in the region where the borders of Kurdish-controlled territory in Iraq met the Iran-Iraq border. There are reports (as to their reliability, I have no idea) about Iran and Iraq not necessarily directly cooperating with Ansar al-Sunna, but generally looking the other way because they had a common enemy in the Kurds. Ansar al-Sunna allegedly had contacts with al-Qaeda and there was allegedly movement of al-Qaeda and Ansar al-Sunna operatives between Afghanistan and Iraq - largely confined to the border region mentioned above. The connection to the Ba'ath regime seems weak, even if these reports are accurate. But they speak to at least some connection. It may turn out that the truth lies somewhere between the two extremes of "no connection" and "slam-dunk evidence of a connection." Now that would really be something.

That's what I think is the most likely explanation. Thanks for the reply.

[J Wolfsberger]

There were some connections prior to 9/11 reported in the media. However, the reports were smothered out by the debate over going to war. Based on my recollections and readings, the Ba'athist regime didn't want AQ within the borders of Iraq. For all the Islamic, pan Arabic rhetoric, Saddam was a secularist at heart. AQ would have been a threat.

Having said that, I would think Iraqi intelligence would use AQ as a tool to advance Iraqi interests. Remember that prior to 9/11, Iraq was suffering from the effects of economic sanctions. Iraqi intelligence may have known that AQ had something in the wind, and may even have provided support in the hope it would put pressure on the West. (I recall some news account of meetings in Europe - Vienna(?) - prior to 9/11.)

Your best bet would be to use something like Wayback to glean whatever information was reported, then try to read between the lines.

[Ken White]

The details of al Qaeda members sitting inside Saddam's prisons would be a fascinating story, would it not? Naming the names of those involved and who made the decision to jail them and why, would it not? Would it not be a fascinating tale to have one of Saddam's former Mukhabarat agents, tasked with watching al Qaeda, Ansar al Islam, or the Taliban tell of how and where he did this?To some, perhaps those things are fascinating for some odd reason. To most Americans I suspect they'll be of little if any interest. Such knowledge will produce no tangible effect.
Would examples of limited cooperation not also be a story countless people would be fascinated hearing the details of?Highly doubtful.
This stuff is going to come out one day and perhaps the "what if's" of it all can be addressed some time after all the information is out, which is what I am trying to do. Sorry if that offends some people.It's not offensive and as you say, it will all come out some day -- about 2025 -2030, I think -- when the relevant stuff is declassified.

Until then you are it seems probably fruitlessly pursuing your agenda as is your right. Here though, agendas and partisanship are not particularly welcome because they interfere with logical discussion and most people here are concerned with the practical and tomorrow -- and with warfighting, not politics or the esoterica of intelligence. Yesterday is of little relevance unless that history affects warfighting. Your stated objective does not address warfighting and the intelligence value has virtually no warfighting implications. The political effort may have value to you and thus, you and your blog can certainly pursue it -- but I doubt it'll get much traction here.

[Mark Eichenlaub]

To some, perhaps those things are fascinating for some odd reason. To most Americans I suspect they'll be of little if any interest. Such knowledge will produce no tangible effect.Highly doubtful.It's not offensive and as you say, it will all come out some day -- about 2025 -2030, I think -- when the relevant stuff is declassified.

Until then you are it seems probably fruitlessly pursuing your agenda as is your right. Here though, agendas and partisanship are not particularly welcome because they interfere with logical discussion and most people here are concerned with the practical and tomorrow -- and with warfighting, not politics or the esoterica of intelligence. Yesterday is of little relevance unless that history affects warfighting. Your stated objective does not address warfighting and the intelligence value has virtually no warfighting implications. The political effort may have value to you and thus, you and your blog can certainly pursue it -- but I doubt it'll get much traction here.

I guess those who sifted through the documents of Stalin and Hitler's regime were just rank partisans trying to secure FDR and Truman's legacy. Right?

Examining how secular states and/or Middle East leaders and dictators could possibly used AGAINST terrorist groups (by looking backward) is of no intelligence or military value? I beg to differ.

[Mark Eichenlaub]

There were some connections prior to 9/11 reported in the media. However, the reports were smothered out by the debate over going to war. Based on my recollections and readings, the Ba'athist regime didn't want AQ within the borders of Iraq. For all the Islamic, pan Arabic rhetoric, Saddam was a secularist at heart. AQ would have been a threat.

Having said that, I would think Iraqi intelligence would use AQ as a tool to advance Iraqi interests. Remember that prior to 9/11, Iraq was suffering from the effects of economic sanctions. Iraqi intelligence may have known that AQ had something in the wind, and may even have provided support in the hope it would put pressure on the West. (I recall some news account of meetings in Europe - Vienna(?) - prior to 9/11.)

Your best bet would be to use something like Wayback to glean whatever information was reported, then try to read between the lines.

Thanks J Wolf,
I actually have a timeline from around 1990 through today with detailed events/activities of both groups and when their ideas/activities overlapped (1998, etc.) and conflicted (Gulf War I, etc.). Would you be interested in me sending this to you?

[Ken White]

I guess those who sifted through the documents of Stalin and Hitler's regime were just rank partisans trying to secure FDR and Truman's legacy. Right?Some were, some were truly dispassionate historians, some were intent on disproving those 'legacies.' Some were just dotty. All were involved in a search that changed absolutely nothing that occurred.
Examining how secular states and/or Middle East leaders and dictators could possibly used AGAINST terrorist groups (by looking backward) is of no intelligence or military value? I beg to differ.Differ merrily onward; Examine prodigously. I defer to your vast experience in these matters. :D

However, I still suspect my prediction on the traction you achieve here will prove correct... ;)

[bourbon]

Mark,
I have not seen on your site reporting of Saddam's regime and its security apparatus work against AQ, which is something you claim to be examining as well. Are planning on launching regimeofcounterterror.com to balance this out?

You can see how one could get the impression that you are cherry picking information? Going to such a granular level as soliciting raw intelligence from military intelligence personnel who participated in the interrogation of high value detainees and all…

[jmm99]

from ME blog
... more on Farris's [sic ! Faddis - name is correct in other parts of paragraph] thoughts on the topic will be shared in a yet to be published interview with this website....

more than one here will be interested in what Sam Faddis had to say about all of this. Thanks in advance.

[Rank amateur]

Saddam was a secularist at heart.

A paranoid psychopathic sadistic one. Anyone trying to replace Saddam with Islamist would've been tortured and killed. To suggest otherwise is to suggest Saddam "wasn't that bad" that he actually believed in a cause and wasn't just out for himself.

[Steve Blair]

A paranoid psychopathic sadistic one. Anyone trying to replace Saddam with Islamist would've been tortured and killed. To suggest otherwise is to suggest Saddam "wasn't that bad" that he actually believed in a cause and wasn't just out for himself.

I don't believe that JW was suggesting this at all.

[Mark Eichenlaub]

more than one here will be interested in what Sam Faddis had to say about all of this. Thanks in advance.

Very nice and classy guy. He was one of the first into Northern Iraq and said he interviewed dozens of al Qaeda/Ansar detainees. I can spoil the piece for you if you want....


A paranoid psychopathic sadistic one. Anyone trying to replace Saddam with Islamist would've been tortured and killed. To suggest otherwise is to suggest Saddam "wasn't that bad" that he actually believed in a cause and wasn't just out for himself.

I think he attempted build all those mosques and add religious slogans to the Iraqi flag to pre-empt that sort of thing and act like he needn't be a target of the Islamists...though he still was.

[Mark Eichenlaub]

Hi Mark,
What makes the "no links" position extremist?

Most countries in the West and the Middle East have had at least peripheral links to AQ in the past. It's a matter of significance, degree, and when it occurred is it not? Say such links occurred after the US started woofing about invading Iraq, it is asinine to point to such pact with the devil relationship and then use it as justification for invasion.


It is also an extremist position to hold that they were secretly in cahoots on everything and UBL and Saddam Hussein were close friends. I think the two positions (other being "no links at all") are the opposite extremes.

[jmm99]

No, I'd really like to read the interview.

[Mark Eichenlaub]

Ok, I can either post it here or email you when it's ready if you want.

[jmm99]

that way everyone can partake. I'm a patient person.

[J Wolfsberger]

A paranoid psychopathic sadistic one. Anyone trying to replace Saddam with Islamist would've been tortured and killed. To suggest otherwise is to suggest Saddam "wasn't that bad" that he actually believed in a cause and wasn't just out for himself.


Steve Blair is correct. That's not what I was suggesting (but I do see how it could be read that way). To be explicit, Saddam was a rank hypocrite who used Islam as a tool to further his own ambitions.

[Mark Eichenlaub]

more than one here will be interested in what Sam Faddis had to say about all of this. Thanks in advance.


Here is that Faddis interview for those interested.

Link. (http://regimeofterror.com/archives/2009/05/former_cia_operations_officer/)

[jmm99]

Way to come through. Good catch.

CF's comments parallel what he stated in his portion of the book Operation Hotel California (http://www.amazon.com/Operation-Hotel-California-Clandestine-Inside/dp/1599213664). For those not familiar with the book, it is really two books in one. The one by Mike Tucker, which is editorializing, etc. The other by Sam Faddis which is basically straight-forward. The portions are in different typefaces. So, you read the book and then re-read Faddis' portion at least once more.

A point not covered in the interview - not a criticism, Mark, since your focus and locus were on-topic (Saddam-AQ ties or not) - was Saddam's possession of WMD. From the book, Faddis' informants (who addressed that topic) were pretty much uniform in their beliefs that Saddam had or was working on WMD; but none had any direct evidence of that. Since you can't prove a negative (Faddis makes that point - still a lawyer, and a prosecutor in a prior life), the intelligence on that topic was ambiguous - as you note in your Analysis.

Good job. :)

[Mark Eichenlaub]

Way to come through. Good catch.

CF's comments parallel what he stated in his portion of the book Operation Hotel California (http://www.amazon.com/Operation-Hotel-California-Clandestine-Inside/dp/1599213664). For those not familiar with the book, it is really two books in one. The one by Mike Tucker, which is editorializing, etc. The other by Sam Faddis which is basically straight-forward. The portions are in different typefaces. So, you read the book and then re-read Faddis' portion at least once more.

A point not covered in the interview - not a criticism, Mark, since your focus and locus were on-topic (Saddam-AQ ties or not) - was Saddam's possession of WMD. From the book, Faddis' informants (who addressed that topic) were pretty much uniform in their beliefs that Saddam had or was working on WMD; but none had any direct evidence of that. Since you can't prove a negative (Faddis makes that point - still a lawyer, and a prosecutor in a prior life), the intelligence on that topic was ambiguous - as you note in your Analysis.

Good job. :)

Thanks JM.