The Role of the British Political Officer on the North West Frontier

[Red Rat]

The Role of the British Political Officer on the North West Frontier, 1840-1945.

The British Political Officers (sometimes called Frontier Officers) were mostly (in the NWF) military officers serving, seconded or retired. Their role appears to have been to keep track on the tribes and provide detailed political direction and advice to commanders. I am trying to research some more on them as it occurs to me that the model used is possibly quite pertinent to today. With the exception of one book (on order, yet to arrive - The Making of a Frontier: Five Years' Experiences and Adventures in Gilgit, Hunza, Nagar, Chitral, and the Eastern Hindu-Kush (by the man who gave us the Durand Line :eek:) I have not found any good material. Does anyone know of any good material, primary or secondary out there? It is mostly outside the scope of the Imperial War Museum in London, and I have yet to check the National Army Museum (London).

On a similar vein - anyone aware of good material on the role of District Officers?

In failed states where any capacity for governance has to be grown (ie Afghanistan and Somalia where there is no functioning police, civil service or education system as we would recognise it, nor the educated middle classes to establish one) and intervention is measured in years, probably decades it occurs to me that the District Officer model could well be a successful model to follow. At the moment however I do not know enough about it to venture much of an opinion! :rolleyes:

[Van]

Red Rat, do a search on Google Books - I've found some period works that have been scanned in there.

Didn't some of these officers get published as ethnographers?

[tequila]

In failed states where any capacity for governance has to be grown (ie Afghanistan and Somalia where there is no functioning police, civil service or education system as we would recognise it, nor the educated middle classes to establish one) and intervention is measured in years, probably decades it occurs to me that the District Officer model could well be a successful model to follow.

Pakistan continued the political officer model in the FATA. As a model of low-cost governance that allowed Pakistan (and the British) to maintain the illusion of control over the Frontier, it worked whenever the tribal system was not in flux. However, it utterly failed to integrate the FATA into Pakistan or convince any of the inhabitants of the FATA that they had any stake in Pakistan at all. When confronted by masses of refugees from across the border, the growth of a violent mass movement, and the collapse of the tribal system, the District Officer model failed utterly. The result is today's FATA, which is under the dominance of al-Qaeda, the TTP, and associated Taliban, criminal, and jihadi networks.

Rather than a discredited colonial system that will simply require repeated combat deployments as it fails over and over again, a more extensive state building model may be appropriate.

[Leo Africanus]

Red Rat,

A good account, although oblique, can be found in Chevenix Trench's book, 'The Frontier Scouts'. Whilst primarily concerned with the development of the various Guides and Scouts regiments that have evolved into the modern, Pakistani, Frontier Corps, there are many references to the roles of the Political Officers.

Another source, although again oblique, are the recollections within the journals of the Indian Army Association (IAA). Now sadly defunct, a quick flick through the pages of that journal (and indeed others such as that of the Sikh Regiment Association) will produce a fund of stories. Some of them are quite wry. I've lost the detailed reference but one account of a major battle which lasted some 24 hours ends with a company commander clearing a ridgeline and just trying to work out how to winkle out the last remaining 'hostiles' from a cave, when along comes the political officer, who had been moving 'one bound' behind the lead troops and talks the opposition out of their bunker. He then led them off downhill without so much as a 'by-your-leave' to the company commander. The latter expressed himself as 'flabbergasted' but his problem had been solved as he reflected it would probably have cost him several men to clear the cave. It would be wonderful to know what the political officer did; I suspect remove them to a tribal shura where a decision would be made on whether they would be punished or more likely 'bound over' to keep the piece, until the next time..........

Lessons learnt? The need for an acceptable mechanism for what I suppose we would now call 'tactical reconciliation' - without the fuss. The need for authorised 'political officers', up close and dirty - perhaps partly met by the successful MSST concept, operating immediately in areas that have been 'cleared' in the SCHB construct. And finally, note the terminology: 'hostiles'. As David Kilcullen has shown, a percentage (the majority?) of those we are fighting are 'accidental guerillas', as Shakespeare puts it, 'Warriors for the Working Day'. In that case gracing them with terms such as Taliban, Anti Government Elements (AGE), Opposing Military Forces (OMF) or even 'insurgents' is to label them incorrectly. Our predecessors called them 'hostiles', because that is what they were at the time but they also knew that tomorrow they would have to deal with them politically. If you 'project' an inaccurate title onto them, then you will be failing in one of the first military principles, 'know your enemy'. May I commend a 'rebranding exercise' therefore - let them be 'hostiles' and thus judged by their behaviour and not by some 'a priori' labelling exercise. We may then learn also to be more discriminating in whom we are dealing with: those that are hardcore and irreconciliable can be dealt with accordingly; those who are willing to accept a political process, even if fighting now, can be approached differently.

Hope this might shed some light???????:wry:

[davidbfpo]

Second 'The Frontier Scouts' and I'd suggest looking at journals of imperial history / commenwealth history and maybe de-colonisation. Best of all get 'The Men Who Ruled India' by Philip Mason, pub. 1985; better known as author of 'A Matter of Honour: Indian Army 1746-1947'). District Officer obituaries are a good start, some refer to their own books, I use the daily Telegraph, although The Times can help. Further back 'Soldier Sahibs' by Charles Allen, pre-Mutiny time.

davidbfpo

[pakphile]

There is a huge literature on this subject. You can start with the originators of the tradition with just these names in Google or Wikipedia: Henry Lawrence, John Nicholson (there is an oblisk erected to his memory outside Islamabad), Herbert Edwardes (Edwardes College Peshawar), James Abbot (Abbotabad, NWFP), John Jacob (Jacobabad, Sindh). Also, early outfits like Hodson's Horse, Daly's Horse, Coke's Rifles, Jacob’s Horse, Lumsden's Corps of Guides.

Three famous ones from post-1857 years are John Lawrence (rose from tax collector to Viceroy), Robert Sanderman (creator of the concept 'hearts and minds' in the 1880s), Francis Younghusband (invader of Tibet and Political Agent in Gilgit and Kashmir).

These are good secondary sources:
Allen, Charles, Soldier Sahibs, John Murray, 2000.
Allen, Charles. God’s Terrorists. Little, Brown, 2006.
Loyn, David, Butcher and Bolt, Hutchinson, 2008.

Allen is a historian, Loyn is a journalist (BBC South Asia correspondent). Both have a good selection of primary sources in their biblio.

Most of the district gazetteers were written by British political agents and commissioners. Many are still available. But don’t look to these folks as guides to improved governance. Their purpose from 1757 to 1947 was plain and simple: protect the state and its profits. Their successors in Pakistan continued that tradition up to 2002 in the settled areas, but remain in the tribal belt using the British Frontier Crimes Regulation as their tool to bludgeon anyone they want. You can find a similar framework of collectors, commissioners, political agents in nearly all of the former British colonies. This institution has mostly retarded democratic growth, particularly local governance, everywhere it was planted.

By the way, Sanderman's 'hearts and minds' amongst the Baloch was created precisely to counter the 'butcher and bolt' policies that 'Henry Lawrence's Young Men' started with the Pashtun, particularly as practiced in Waziristan and Swat. Heard of those places lately? It seems neither tactics nor strategy have changed much in more than a century, so what have we learned?

[aborgu]

One recent article that may be of interest is:

Christian Tripodi, “Peacemaking through bribes or cultural empathy? The political officer and Britain's strategy towards the North-West Frontier, 1901-1945, Journal of Strategic Studies, Volume 31, Issue 1 February 2008 , pages 123 - 151

[Tom Odom]

The Role of the British Political Officer on the North West Frontier, 1840-1945.

The British Political Officers (sometimes called Frontier Officers) were mostly (in the NWF) military officers serving, seconded or retired. Their role appears to have been to keep track on the tribes and provide detailed political direction and advice to commanders. I am trying to research some more on them as it occurs to me that the model used is possibly quite pertinent to today.


Rat,

Given my current peculiar status as a retired officer (FAO) and civil servant now acting as a POLAD I can attest the role is both useful and in play, depending on who is doing the acting.

Best
Tom

[George L. Singleton]

During my two years in then West Pakistan, based on visits I made to Swat. then ruled by a carried over Raj era family principality, good progress was being made from the grass roots up: schools and colleges for boys and girls; light industry; good agriculture; tourism among the best in the world; great fishing and hunting; mountaineering.

What pulled Swat backward then and now was extremist religious practices and views. The benevolent, albiet non-democratic rulers were eventually pushed out, the necessity to keep a semblance of law and order came about, and coerced Sharia in it's most extreme forms reached it's apex today, and is now being resisted by the local tribes people who are being murdered at worship, Mulims murdering Muslims, while at mosque services, Sunnis attacking Shias.

Too, Christians, while a minority in Swat, had a peaceful coexistance until this era of the Taliban and al Qaida.

I have acquaintances today from Swat who are highly successful as professionals (MDs, recent Harvard Law graduate, etc.) who hate and want an end to the use of extremist religion/terrorism to try to take an unwilling people down to neolothic barbarism.

Terrorists and al Qaida hiding behind the good name of Islam are now being fought vigorously by the several tribes within Swat and this is most welcome. They are fed up and enough is enough bloodshed by the terrorists.



By the way, Sanderman's 'hearts and minds' amongst the Baloch was created precisely to counter the 'butcher and bolt' policies that 'Henry Lawrence's Young Men' started with the Pashtun, particularly as practiced in Waziristan and Swat. Heard of those places lately? It seems neither tactics nor strategy have changed much in more than a century, so what have we learned?

Basic freedoms involve the haves and the have nots, but social and religious issue of helping the have nots improve their lot is life is opposed by the terrorists, who fight progress to keep the people, the have nots, in economic subjigation in "the name of radical terrorism" which they try to "smoke screen" as religion.

The grass roots have to have basic freedoms and be allowed to practice moderate Islam, too.

[William F. Owen]

Given my current peculiar status as a retired officer (FAO) and civil servant now acting as a POLAD I can attest the role is both useful and in play, depending on who is doing the acting.


....some things never change. If want to be a nation builder, learn from colonial administrations. They did it best and there is no other model of best practice.

....ain't history cool!

[tequila]

Just finished Akhbar S. Ahmed's Resistance and Control in Pakistan (http://www.amazon.com/Resistance-Control-Pakistan-Akbar-Ahmed/dp/0415349117), specifically about his time as the political agent for South Waziristan in the early 1980s in the wake of a Wazir rebellion.

Very interesting and filled with excellent information about the tribal and qawm structure of South Waziristan and the way a smart, motivated religious leader can leverage his office into economic and political power in the frontier areas.

[Red Rat]

As ever a font of knowledge and good advice! Trench's 'Frontier Scouts', Allen's 'Soldier Sahibs' and 'God's Terrorists' are all in the library here - Ahmed's 'Resistance and Control in Afghanistan' is now on order. The first three titles are fonts of knowledge, but none seem to clarify the precise nature of the relationship between the Political Officer and the military in terms of formal C2 relationships. Perhaps it was more along the lines of supported (Political Officer) and supporting (Military).

Leo (Lyon?) made some very good points wrt naming ('hostiles' as opposed to the plethora of jargonistic and sometimes misleading terms we have now) and the concept of 'tactical reconciliation'. I am less convinced by the MSST (Military Stabilisation Support Teams) concept, partly because I know little about it. From the briefings I have had it comes across more as the deployable wing of the PRT designed to accomplish what the civilian component of the PRT (diplomats and development staff) cannot do because their rules and the local security situation will not allow them to deploy effectively; what they (the MSST) do not seem to possess is any political authority.

Of course what the big difference is now is that Coalition Forces are working with the Afghan Government, in whom the political authority is vested. Perhaps then we should have Afghan Poltical Officers attached to Coalition units instead?

Does anyone know what is happening in Pakistan with the current Pak Army offensive and the relationship between the political authorities and the military authorities there? The media gives the impression that all authority has been passed across to the military and report on it in purely military terms.

[davidbfpo]

Red Rat refers to:
I am less convinced by the MSST (Military Stabilisation Support Teams) concept, partly because I know little about it. From the briefings I have had it comes across more as the deployable wing of the PRT designed to accomplish what the civilian component of the PRT (diplomats and development staff) cannot do because their rules and the local security situation will not allow them to deploy effectively; what they (the MSST) do not seem to possess is any political authority.

I know the advocate of the MSST, who had years of experience in the region and in Helmand. Quite simply the technical skills needed could only be found in the military - mainly from the reservist Territorial Army - who had suffiecent military skills to defend themselves and do the desired task.

The MSST was not envisaged as having any political role, although if deployed in the field - away from the PRT it could easily have that role.

More on Pakistan later.

davidbfpo

[tequila]

The first three titles are fonts of knowledge, but none seem to clarify the precise nature of the relationship between the Political Officer and the military in terms of formal C2 relationships. Perhaps it was more along the lines of supported (Political Officer) and supporting (Military).

Ahmed's book provides an interesting perspective on this --- he notes that there really isn't any such relationship. He notes that the PA for S. Waziristan and the commander of the South Waziristan Scouts before him were at odds with regards to their attitude towards the Wazir mullah behind the revolt, and that this greatly assisted the mullah's power grab.

He also relates an anecdote on how the British PAs were often seen by their military counterparts as being too close to the tribes they were supposed to be overseeing. To paraphrase, the PA was accompanying a punitive expedition into the frontier. When the shooting started, the PA disappeared and could not be found. Later on that night, the PA appeared again for dinner. "So how did your side fare? Casualties on our side were half-a-dozen."

So obviously political-military relations during the British political officer days weren't all they could be.

[davidbfpo]

Red Rat's other question was:
Does anyone know what is happening in Pakistan with the current Pak Army offensive and the relationship between the political authorities and the military authorities there? The media gives the impression that all authority has been passed across to the military and report on it in purely military terms.

There has been no first-hand reporting on the South Waziristan campaign, although this week access was allowed (see:http://defenceoftherealm.blogspot.com/2009/10/playing-games.html ) and a flurry of reports followed, notably over documents linked to the 9/11 attack (in the daily SWJ news brief). There is little of substance on the Pakistani Army's offensive, which appears to be under-resourced (BBC cites two divisions -v- 10-20K militants) and that "militants" have evaded capture.

The Long War Journal has a map that shows what the situation is: http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2009/10/map_of_taliban_contr.php (The origin is unclear and I suppose it is an amalgam of what is available).

I've seen little on the current civil-military relationship recently; two weeks ago there was this by Ahmed Rashid and given the attacks since relations are unlikely to have changed IMHO: http://watandost.blogspot.com/2009/10/pakistan-civilian-military-ties-hit-new.html

The BBC News reported this today: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/8335738.stm by Pakistan's prime minister at news conference that the country's leadership was united in its efforts to wipe out the Taliban.

We are at war. We do not have any other option because their [the militants] intentions are to take over.

[M Payson]

This site has good coverage of day-by-day actions and maps on South Waziristan campaign. http://www.irantracker.org/analysis/waziristan-ground-operation-coverage-pakistan-october-2009. They’ve also got profiles of Taliban leaders. Here’s Hakimullah Mehsud. http://www.irantracker.org/related-threats/king-dead-long-live-king-hakimullah-mehsud-takes-power-ttp

Also, here are some resources on FATA and Waziristan. As with Afghanistan, it's humbling to consider history and the weight of our current actions.

“Imperial Frontier: Tribe and State in Waziristan,” by Hugh Beattie, published by Curzon Press in 2002 - a detailed, fascinating work, with extensive notes on sources.

“Waziristan 1936-1937: The Problems of the North-West Frontiers of India and their Solutions,” by Lieut.-Colonel C.E. Bruce, published in 1938. He and his father before him spent years in/near Waziristan, Balochistan, etc. Available in a couple of formats. http://www.archive.org/details/waziristan193619031345mbp. Also available in PDF http://coin.security-review.net/bitstream/handle/10383/113/waziristan193619031345mbp.pdf?sequence=1

“The Shape of Frontier Rule: Governance and Transition, from the Raj to the Modern Pakistani Frontier” by Joshua T. White (published in Asian Security, vol. 4, no. 3, 2008) offers some thoughts on governance reform in FATA and transitioning into the future.

And “Understanding FATA: Attitudes Towards Governance, Religion & Society,” a 2008 survey, provides an extensive range of public opinions on everything from political institutions to possession of firearms. http://www.understandingfata.org/home.html

Finally, ICG just put out a new report, Pakistan: Countering Militancy in FATA” (21 October 2009) that gives a scorching indictment of the current system governance, including and especially political agents http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=6356. There's a thoughtful editorial in Pakistan's Dawn newspaper http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/news/pakistan/09-fata-reforms--szh-01 that points out some important constraints to just solving the problem... There's certainly not agreement in FATA on what reforms should look like.

[davidbfpo]

Catching up on my reading I found a review of a 'Edge of Empire: the British Political Officer and Tribal Administration on the North-West Frontier 1877-1947' by Christian Tripodi (Farnham and Burlington,VT.: Ashgate, pub. 2011):http://ccw.history.ox.ac.uk/2012/09/18/the-primacy-of-politics/

The review has some startling reminders of how Political Officers worked and died sometimes. The reviewer, Rob Johnson, himself an Afghan "hand", ends with:
He also has some sage words of advice for those who advocate the use of Political Officers in recent or future conflicts. He raises some thought-provoking questions about the purpose of such officers, the context of their tactical viewpoints within a broader strategic purpose, and casts doubts on their appropriateness in a post-colonial world. The fact that the West reached back, rather too late in the day, into its history to find solutions to insurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan tells us much about the character of those conflicts and the relationship between the political leaders and their militaries. The key point is that the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan were characterised by an absence of political progress. Although the Western militaries obeyed the principle of ‘primacy of political purpose’ in countering-insurgency, too often the lack of political direction or political will to find a solution meant the soldiers had to fill the gap.

Not cheap US$100-125 on Amazon:http://www.amazon.com/Edge-Empire-Christian-Tripodi/dp/075466838X/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1351888797&sr=1-1&keywords=Christian+Tripodi

Or:http://www.amazon.co.uk/Edge-Empire-Christian-Tripodi/dp/075466838X/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1351889021&sr=1-1

Just ordered a second-hand copy, so will add a review one day.

[davidbfpo]

It took a long time to get to read all of Christian Tripodi's book, Edge of Empire: the British Political Officer and Tribal Administration on the North-West Frontier 1877-1947' and it was brilliant.

The writing style is easy, fluid even; there are references a plenty - so many it deserves a second read to note them. His views are balanced and every factor is taken into consideration - finance in particular, not just the political agent -v- military aspects.

Earlier in this thread Sandeman's work in Baluchistan, which steadily became an imperial province with little conflict, as he followed a policy of 'heats & minds'. Yes, that is where the phrase originated.

There are a couple of contemporary references, rightly the author does not comment on whether the political agent was a "fix" over the Durand Line.

[davidbfpo]

There are a number of reviews of Tripodi's book available via a Google search. This is a critical one:https://www.academia.edu/1144465/Review_of_Christian_Tripodi_Edge_of_Empire._The_Br itish_Political_Officer_and_Tribal_Administration_ on_the_North-West_Frontier_1877-1947

In looking at these I found an Australian officer's research paper, written when studying at Pakistan's NDU 'An Historical Analysis of the ‘Incessant Disputes in the Tribal Areas’ (of the North-West Frontier) against the British (and the British Indian Army) from 1893 to 1939. Which I might get to read another day:http://www.defence.gov.au/adc/publications/commanders/2012/02_sligo%20paper.pdf

[davidbfpo]

In 2009 Christian Tripodi contributed a paper to a RUSI meeting, it is a commentary on whether the past could guide the present; the actual title is 'British Policy on the North West Frontier 1977-1947: a suitable precedent for the modern day?'.

A taster:
The fundamental point, however, was not necessarily that British methods were possessed of inherent weaknesses. Any system of administration in an environment as testing as the North-West Frontier was and is bound to have its weaknesses exposed, as the contemporary Pakistani experience has illustrated. Rather, the point to be made is that those weaknesses had little effect in real terms because the British were afforded the luxury of being able, over time, to marginalise the tribal areas within their own strategic considerations. They could afford to persevere with a 'hands off' system of control and administration that was fully acknowledged to be faulty and lacking in imagination but which sufficed in the face of institutional conservatism; a state of affairs that one would presumably wish to avoid today.

Link:http://www.rusi.org/analysis/commentary/ref:C4AB377DACA5CF/

[davidbfpo]

Thread re-opened after a day in the archives in London, my research came across a book on North Waziristan 1946-1947, which has first-hand reporting on Political Agents as they were called and a sad tale follows in a moment.

The book is 'Frontier Legion: With the Khassadars of North Waziristan' by Frank Leeson, a very young Ghurkha officer, which was published in 2003. He describes the area:
When one speaks of them as hills, rolling downs on which tanks and cavalry can operate are not meant, but the worst mountain-warfare country imaginable – steep precipices, narrow winding valleys every vantage point commanded by another, and innumerable refuges and routes of escape.
Link to book, alas without reviews:https://www.amazon.com/Frontier-Legion-Khassadars-North-Waziristan/dp/1904726070

For background see this 2008 BBC News item on him: http://news.bbc.co.uk/today/hi/today/newsid_7713000/7713192.stm

(http://news.bbc.co.uk/today/hi/today/newsid_7713000/7713192.stm)On June 21st 1946 John "Jos" Donald, the Political Agent for twelve consecutive years, was ambushed by Mahsud tribesmen and held for ten days until a ransom was paid. The Mahsuds refused to return the ransom and the political-military authorities examined their options - they agreed to use aerial bombing (to destroy buildings). "Jos" returned from recuperation leave, engaged in several meetings (Jirga) with the Mahsuds and wrote to the Provincial Governor that he was incapable of carrying out his duty. Soon after he took his own life. (From pg.234).

By mistake the bombing caused a few deaths and led to a political furore across India - at one stage Gandi, from the Congress Party, visited the area and other parts of North West Frontier Province - with a hostile verbal reception from the Pathan tribes at meetings.