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yamiyugikun
06-09-2009, 03:35 AM
Hi everyone,

I think this would be the right place to post a thread regarding history, since this is my reaction to reading Gen. Petraeus's dissertation so far, which explores the use of military force in the Vietnam war. I'm only on the first part of it, which explores how the Korean war influenced the thinking of senior military leaders in the Vietnam war.

First off, it is insightful and refreshing to read a scholarly work that is outside the typical liberalism of academia. I've been learning how traumatic isolated land conflicts were to the esteem of American forces caught up in them. The trauma then becomes a part of the collective memory the armed forces, internalized even by those who did not experience them directly, according to Petraeus. Not just the military, but other institutions have memories that define them.

The literature I have read for school talks about how museums, libraries and archives have insituitional memory as well. But never in my entire academic career have I heard the words "military" and "institutional" memory together in the same sentence. Yes, a lot of the anti-war protesters had trauma in their lives during the 60s, and many, no doubt, became the liberal professors in universities today, but through Gen. Petraeus's work, I have learned there is another side to the story. That is the trauma internalized by the senior military leaders who became cautious, if not indecisive, unless they were fighting conflicts they were positive they could win.

I think the reason why senior military leaders were hesitant to use counter-insurgency/unconventional war back when the invasion of Iraq first began, was due to painful memories still left over from Vietnam. Gen. Petraeus describes the inclination of "an all or nothing victory" in warfare as a reaction to avoiding another Vietnam. That might be why the US first went in with the heavy artillery and tanks back in 2003/4.

I am still studying the effects of Vietnam on US culture and Iraq today in this series on global conflict. I do not know as much as someone who lived through Vietnam, because I was not even born then. I am trying to understand the perspective of my professors, as well as my parents' generation as a whole. To me, it is 9/11 that holds real significance. Gen. Petraeus said that if an individual experiences a traumatic event in their formative years, then it impacts their psyche deeply throughout life.

I was studying at the University of Hawaii when 9/11 happened. I saw my fellow students cry at a candlelight vigil held in the dorms that day, when they discovered some of their loved ones had died in the World Trade Center. Even now, as they shed their tears, reciting the Lord's Prayer, their pain as fellow students of my generation is burned into my memory. I felt helplessness, pain and anger at those who attacked America. I saw that Waikiki was completely empty and tourists were stranded in Hawaii. Commerce in Hawaii was completely dead. No airplanes flew after 9/11 hitting Hawaii hard, as it is an island. Those were the firsthand effects of terrorism I experienced in my formative years, in Hawaii.

I can only imagine that is what my parents' generation experienced in Vietnam. About 1 month ago, when I mentioned being an Army civilian at a local coffee shop where I live, this man in his 60s got so angry at me, when he heard the word "army," and nearly yelled at me, I was guessing because it was anger at the Vietnam war. He didn't understand 9/11 is to my generation, what Vietnam was to his. I could mention many reactions I had while reading Gen. Petraeus's dissertation, but I thought I would share what I felt.

Naomi

Schmedlap
06-09-2009, 05:04 AM
I think the reason why senior military leaders were hesitant to use counter-insurgency/unconventional war back when the invasion of Iraq first began, was due to painful memories still left over from Vietnam. Gen. Petraeus describes the inclination of "an all or nothing victory" in warfare as a reaction to avoiding another Vietnam. That might be why the US first went in with the heavy artillery and tanks back in 2003/4.
I think it was more likely due to an assumption that an insurgency would not arise and a recognition among political leaders that 90% approval ratings don't last forever and if we were going to implement the long-standing policy of regime change in Iraq, then there was a narrow window of opportunity to leverage public support and get our foot in the door. Like any other government program, a large war is easier to start than to end.


About 1 month ago, when I mentioned being an Army civilian at a local coffee shop where I live, this man in his 60s got so angry at me, when he heard the word "army," and nearly yelled at me, I was guessing because it was anger at the Vietnam war.
I'm not being a wiseguy when I suggest this, but some people are just jerks. I know a lot of people who served during Vietnam - my father, friends of his, uncles, et cetera. ALL were draftees. I've never heard one word out of them regarding anything bad from Vietnam. They did their time and then got out. It is not that they're repressing anything. They simply have the same attitudes that we associate with WWII vets - they did their job, went home, and got on with their lives. They weren't raised with a victim mentality. Some people were. Those people generally grow up to be jerks.

pakphile
06-16-2009, 11:09 AM
I thought I would respond at length to this thoughtful post. You see, I was an 25th Infantry (Hawaii's own) platoon sergeant during the 1968 Tet Offense that came in the middle of the first 'long war'. Later I went to college and went back to Asia with USAID and the UN. I have lived in Asia (and some in Africa) ever since I left the East West Center in Honolulu in 1981. I just finished 3 years with the UN in Afghanistan and am now in Pakistan. I guess Petreaus is right, trauma early in life stays with you. ;-)

Institutions are not libraries, but are understood formally as complex configurations of formal and informal rules, beliefs and attitudes that evolve over time to influence human behavior. A review of the literature of New Institutional Economics (Douglass North is the godfather of the doctrine) and complexity science (see Mitchell Waldrop's early (1992) history of this scientific discipline) are both fundamental to understanding the distinction between institutions as the rules of the game and organizations (like the Senate, Army, and libraries) as the players. However, institutions (as social incentive structures) are conservative forces that support the status quo and change slowly (see North's work for about 8,000 years of evidence). Understanding institutions as socio-cognitive incentive structures is critical to understanding how societies, organizations and individuals learn.

The Army is an organization with an internal set of incentives, deeply embedded in the larger American institutional context, that have a tremendous influence on soldiers. No one wants to die or to be labeled a loser for not following a winning approach. Before Vietnam, America had NEVER lost so the lessons learned were easy to track and deemed to be universally applicable. Today's Army has a modern knowledge management system that effectively translates lessons learned into doctrine. The lesson in the failure of Gen McKiernan to adapt to the new COIN doctrine in Afghanistan is less a failing of an old soldier who couldn't learn than a recognition of the time it takes for social incentive structures to change in any organization so that doctrine can be consistently translated into strategy and tactics (human behavior).

On a higher level, contrasting the impact of Vietnam and 9/11 on American institutions provides an interesting case. Not all trauma are alike, certainly not in their long-term effects. Vietnam dominated life in America for 10 years, but its lasting impact has been far different from that of 9/11 (but somewhat similar to that of Iraq). The Vietnam experience undermined long-standing institutions and led to the decine in public confidence in the government and the Army. Vietnam pitted Americans against Americans more intensely than anytime since the Civil War. In contrast, 9/11 was a cathartic experience, more akin to Pearl Harbor, that actually served, for a time, to bring most Americans together, but it also galvanized a form of neocon patriotism that strengthened government control over the lives of citizens.

Now, if you have read this far, please tell me how I can get a copy of Petreaus's dissertation.

Aloha,

Paul

Steve Blair
06-16-2009, 01:27 PM
I'm not being a wiseguy when I suggest this, but some people are just jerks. I know a lot of people who served during Vietnam - my father, friends of his, uncles, et cetera. ALL were draftees. I've never heard one word out of them regarding anything bad from Vietnam. They did their time and then got out. It is not that they're repressing anything. They simply have the same attitudes that we associate with WWII vets - they did their job, went home, and got on with their lives. They weren't raised with a victim mentality. Some people were. Those people generally grow up to be jerks.

Quite so. And it's important to understand that every conflict (of any size...not just the "big ones" or the "long ones") produces folks who adjust well afterwards, some who view their time in the conflict as an excuse to act like jerks afterwards, and others who have difficulty adjusting afterwards. It's not unique to Vietnam (even though there is a significant minority on both sides who might wish us to believe that it is).

John T. Fishel
06-16-2009, 04:43 PM
that the "jerk" you talked to was a Vietnam vet (not that you did but Schmedlap thought you did). He certainly was traumatized by something about the Army and Vietnam. That said, Schmedlap is right that most Vietnam vets went about their business without a lot of trauma (as did most of the protesters of the war).

While Vietnam did shape American attitudes and the attitudes of a generation of military officers it was not the cause of the preference for conventional warfare; it merely reinforced that peference. Rmember that the American military has spent most of its history fighting small wars. From the American Revolution on, we have fought only 9 predominantly conventional wars by my count - less by some others. And those all had significant small wars going on inside the big wars. Interestingly, a big war seems to come along once in every generation which allows the military as an institution to justify its determination to prpare for those wars and ignore the small wars that we always have to fight.

The most articulate current spokesman for the big war point of view is COL Gian Gentile who writes here a lot - mostly debating John Nagl (and many of the rest of us.)

Cheers

JohnT

IntelTrooper
06-16-2009, 10:07 PM
In contrast, 9/11 was a cathartic experience, more akin to Pearl Harbor, that actually served, for a time, to bring most Americans together, but it also galvanized a form of neocon patriotism that strengthened government control over the lives of citizens.

I suppose very similar to how an economic crisis allowed a "progressive" administration to strengthen government control over the lives of its citizens.


Now, if you have read this far, please tell me how I can get a copy of Petreaus's dissertation.

I can get it through ProQuest, but you probably don't have access to that. It's a 20MB file, otherwise I would send it to you.
http://www.worldcat.org/oclc/20673428

pakphile
06-18-2009, 11:53 AM
[QUOTE=IntelTrooper;74643]I suppose very similar to how an economic crisis allowed a "progressive" administration to strengthen government control over the lives of its citizens.QUOTE]

You are correct, but, actually, that is exactly what 'progressive' administrations have been wanting to do since 1789. Check out the platforms of the formal Progressive Parties of TR, LaFollette, Wallace, McCarthy. Progressive has often been used as a way to sound like you are taking the moral high road while avoiding the 'socialist' label. Obama, like FDR, walked into such a mess that he was immediately convinced that his worst suspicions about capitalism were all correct. I think we are fortunate that Obama came on the scene so soon after the full extent of the debacle was evident. Had he come to power after 4 years of dithering, like FDR, his approach would have been even stronger.

Thanks for the tip. After a brief search, I found the full Petreaus dissertation (for free) through a blind 'PhD dissertation' link on the History News Network site.

Paul

IntelTrooper
06-18-2009, 08:42 PM
Thanks for the tip. After a brief search, I found the full Petreaus dissertation (for free) through a blind 'PhD dissertation' link on the History News Network site.

Awesome, enjoy the reading!

yamiyugikun
06-19-2009, 02:23 AM
Hi,

Very interesting:) I didn't realize there was such a difference between Vietnam and 9/11, that Vietnam caused such conflict between fellow Americans, whereas 9/11 was cathartic. Anyway, thank you for sharing with me the history of the military, its incentive based aspects as an organization, and how different types of people adjust to civilian life after conflict. One of you said that a lot of the protestors during the Vietnam war went back to their regular lives, but a lot of them never gave up protesting. They seem to have become the liberal professors today in academia.

This "jerk" that I met, whether he was a Vietnam veteran or not, had the same reaction as a few professors I've had when hearing about the military. From that I assumed he was a veteran. I asked a friend of mine why some liberal professors get mad when you advocate points of view that differ from theirs. He explained to me that some professors would rather create "carbon copies" of themselves through their students, instead of teaching their students to think critically and objectively.

One of the reasons I'm reading Petraeus's dissertation, is to try to understand the intense anger towards the military that some of my professors still hold. From my observations, a few professors of mine who were avid protestors during Vietnam, never quite left Vietnam mentally and see the military today the same way they did during the 60's. A type of mental time warp, they spiral around in and never really leave.

From a generation X (under 30?) viewpoint, speaking for myself, the army strikes me as a very modern, technologically advanced, "progressive" organization that tries to be in touch with the world around it. To someone my age raised on the Internet and technology, that is appealing. To someone who was a Vietnam protestor, the military is probably represents the social ills and conflicts from that era. I've observed people over 50 react a lot different to the military, often more negatively or strongly, than say, gen X.

Naomi

SWJED
06-19-2009, 10:42 AM
Here's a link to The American Military and the Lessons of Vietnam (http://www.brianbeutler.com/postvietnameramilitary.pdf): A study of military influence and the use of force in the post-Vietnam era.

John T. Fishel
06-19-2009, 01:28 PM
who came of age in the Vietnam era - and as an Army officer - our genertation has all kinds. it has been said that the last refuge for Marxists is the campus of American Universities and that is true - but only partly. Ask yourself how David Petraeus successfully wrote that dissertation at Princeton with all thos war protesting professors. Or LIBERAL Harvard's Kennedy School of Government with its regular complement of military war college fellows and Stanford where Condi Rice was the Provost.

All generalizations, including this one, are wrong.:eek:

Cheers

JohnT

William F. Owen
06-19-2009, 01:34 PM
The lesson in the failure of Gen McKiernan to adapt to the new COIN doctrine in Afghanistan is less a failing of an old soldier who couldn't learn than a recognition of the time it takes for social incentive structures to change in any organization so that doctrine can be consistently translated into strategy and tactics (human behavior).

So is that a failure to adapt to doctrine or a failure of those concerned to develop effective and useful doctrine? Teaching that works is rarely, if ever, rejected if it is seen to work. I fully agree that the community has got to gain the required level of confidence, but that is never going to happen if the evidence does not appear or remains elusive. Writing a COIN manual does not a COIN doctrine make.

Ken White
06-19-2009, 03:29 PM
I am sure that his statement is correct. "...the time it takes for social incentive structures to change in any organization so that doctrine can be consistently translated into strategy and tactics (human behavior)." is always a problem -- and that really amounts to "failure to adapt to a doctrine." In this particular case it is because the 'doctrine' has to overcome more than 30 years of inertia, fight a bureaucracy that is inimical to that doctrine, force change to deeply embedded training and education practices and is not accepted as totally correct by many in the institution to whom the doctrine nominally belongs.

In other words, there are a lot of people fighting the problem instead of the supposed enemy...

We need to get over the myth that COIN and allied efforts are exotic efforts requiring special training, education, practices or people. It is simply a part of the job. A part we elected to ignore for years because it's dirty work; more importantly to that neglect, it's also tedious work and does not provide instant feedback (bad ju-ju for impatient Americans who like quick results...). Effective training will produce people competent -- and willing -- to do what the job requires.

Steve Blair
06-19-2009, 03:54 PM
We need to get over the myth that COIN and allied efforts are exotic efforts requiring special training, education, practices or people. It is simply a part of the job. A part we elected to ignore for years because it's dirty work; more importantly to that neglect, it's also tedious work and does not provide instant feedback (bad ju-ju for impatient Americans who like quick results...). Effective training will produce people competent -- and willing -- to do what the job requires.

I actually don't mind parts of the myth IF it actually spurs changes in the way we train and (more importantly, IMO) retain the results of that training. From what I've seen of the American military historically, I remain (sadly) very skeptical of their ability to do that without major changes in a number of areas (starting with the personnel system). I also (sadly) don't see those changes coming from within.

Vietnam is only the most recent example of the Army shedding knowledge and experience as soon as they were done. If the 'myth of COIN' forces them to retain knowledge, improve training, and fix a personnel system that hasn't worked properly for at least 50 years (and I'm being generous there), it's worth it in my view.

pakphile
06-20-2009, 08:43 AM
So is that a failure to adapt to doctrine or a failure of those concerned to develop effective and useful doctrine? ... Writing a COIN manual does not a COIN doctrine make.

COIN is fully embedded within the 'Full Spectrum' concept which is now the US Army capstone doctrine. If the Sec DoD and CentCom are pushing the COIN (population centric vs. enemy centric) angle then it seems to me that it is more than 'a manual', but there are many layers of implementers for that doctrine to filter through, so there are many opportunities for outcomes to be different from what the designers intended. (That also leaves room for feedback, innovations and improvements, which is what (IMHO) 3.24 and 3.24.2 are to 3.0)

With public policy (which I understand better) you always have a number of possible implementation outcomes. Although the policy may come out as a single message, implementers who receive the guidance may:
understand and implement correctly (and even innovate)
misunderstand and implement incorrectly
understand, but, for many reasons, not fully implement

The less than satisfactory outcomes are often brushed aside, in civilian life, as 'unintended consequences'.

However, it is the right incentives, not 'effective training', that will get people 'to do what the job requires' (Ken White). I am sure some of you watched The Wire on HBO. This was essentially a 5 year TV study in the power of incentives to undermine doctrine. Each social group in the show became increasingly disfunctional as its members were influenced by the wrong incentives created by the wrong metrics: cops counted arrest stats, not public satisfaction; the heroin dealers counted corners not profits; the politicians counted contributions not progress; the educators ‘taught to the test’ not the pupil and the journalist leadership pursued Pulitzers rather than the truth.

The Vietnam-era penchant for body counts is one of the best examples of the wrong metric creating the wrong incentives that ultimately led to a colossal failure. What are the right metrics for COIN to improve its outcomes? That is probably the subject of some other thread on in the SWC.

William F. Owen
06-20-2009, 09:14 AM
COIN is fully embedded within the 'Full Spectrum' concept which is now the US Army capstone doctrine. If the Sec DoD and CentCom are pushing the COIN (population centric vs. enemy centric) angle then it seems to me that it is more than 'a manual', but there are many layers of implementers for that doctrine to filter through, so there are many opportunities for outcomes to be different from what the designers intended. (That also leaves room for feedback, innovations and improvements, which is what (IMHO) 3.24 and 3.24.2 are to 3.0)

While that may be the intention, I'd dispute this as being the fact. I think their is something poorly defined as "COIN" that the US Army has arbitrarily bolted on to what could be an essentially sound process. JFCOM talks about security and combat operations, as well as regular and irregular threats. These are essentially historically and doctrinally sound.

.... then out of nowhere you have "COIN doctrine." So you now have created a box, containing the "solution to the problem" which is pretty indicative of a "paint by numbers" approach.

Schmedlap
06-20-2009, 09:27 AM
COIN vs conventional. It's a lot like woodland versus urban terrain. The same principles apply, the same tactics, etc. What changes is only at the level of technique and procedure. But I guess that I would never be able to sell any books or write any lengthy papers with a thought that is so simple.

pakphile
06-20-2009, 09:48 AM
[QUOTE=yamiyugikun; I asked a friend of mine why some liberal professors get mad when you advocate points of view that differ from theirs.
[/QUOTE]

Naomi,

It sounds like a study of the institutional incentive structure of academia might be in order. You’ll have to think about what incentives are your liberal profs responding to. BTW, they were as inane in the 70s as they are now.

You are correct that the visceral reaction to the military still hinges on one's view of the Vietnam experience. For many, the Vietnam War besmirched the image of America as Camelot, the shining ‘city on a hill’, and the military was blamed for the failure, whether one’s perspective was a failure to win or a failure to avoid foreign entanglements. To help counter the argument that the military was responsible for the Vietnam debacle, you should read “Why Vietnam Matters” by Rufus Phillips. Philips was CIA (under Lansdale) in Vietnam in the 50s and 60s. He has just published his memoirs and he comes down hardest on the politicians and their advisors (who were mostly former liberal academicians) who controlled the military. A 3-part youtube interview on Vietnamese TV can be found at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mVaMiyEY28w&feature=related . The book has a website http://www.whyvietnammatters.com/. Of course, the classic, and contemporaneous, piece is David Halberstam’s 1972, “The Best and the Brightest”.

One other factor you need to take into consideration when comparing the civilian/military nexus, then and now, is The Draft. The modern US draft formally began in 1940 and ran until 1973. (Eighteen year old boys still need to register, but no one has been called up in over a generation.) There were always illegal draft evaders, but the Vietnam era spawned a process of legal evasion that was heavily biased towards the rich, particularly through college deferments. After the shock of Tet, the shift in middle class opinion away from support for the war was strongly influenced by the view that the sons of the less well off were dying for the mistakes of the upper class decision makers.

Your views are quite similar to those of a woman exactly your age who worked for me in Kabul (I just left, she is still there). She easily liaises with ISAF, DoD, as well as Norwegian, Canadian, Czech, and US PRTs.

Paul

William F. Owen
06-20-2009, 12:47 PM
COIN vs conventional. It's a lot like woodland versus urban terrain. The same principles apply, the same tactics, etc. What changes is only at the level of technique and procedure. But I guess that I would never be able to sell any books or write any lengthy papers with a thought that is so simple.

Ah... but... you see ... um... actually I don't think there is COIN v Conventional.

There are combat and security operations against regular and irregular threats and you might have to conduct combat and security operations against regular and irregular threats at the same time. Counter-insurgency could be an entirely false construct, and a misleading one as well.

Ken White
06-20-2009, 11:45 PM
However, it is the right incentives, not 'effective training', that will get people 'to do what the job requires' (Ken White).You can have the best incentives in town and poor training will not allow the most-highly-incentivized persons in the world to succeed in combat. Conversely, if your training is halfway decent, you can overcome poor or no incentives -- the US Army proves that on an almost daily basis. The British and Canadian armies do even better (due to better training than ours) on even more poor 'incentives.' Both are important, in an ideal world both would be right. Unfortunately, we do not live in an ideal world.
...educators ‘taught to the test’ not the pupil and the journalist leadership pursued Pulitzers rather than the truth.Disincentives both. Lot of that about. Those two in particular are responsible for a great many ills in the world. In fact, I'd say the educators are at fault for more poor incentives than almost any other trade or profession; the probability is that if they did their job correctly, proper incentives would be provided...

I know, Sam, I know...
The Vietnam-era penchant for body counts is one of the best examples of the wrong metric creating the wrong incentives that ultimately led to a colossal failure.Actually, while it was a totally bad idea, it had little to do with the failure -- and most decent units in Viet Nam did not fall prey to that foolishness. At least not in the 62-68 time frame, can't speak to after that.
What are the right metrics for COIN to improve its outcomes? That is probably the subject of some other thread on in the SWC.It's been argued before; should be able to use search and find the thread. Then you'll see my statement that attempts to apply metrics to war are just dumb. Engineering and other professions need metrics. Science needs metrics. War is not engineering (though engineering is used in war) and it is not a science (though science is used); it is an art and all metrics will do is delude you. Those threads will show some that agreed with me and some that did not.

Schmedlap
06-21-2009, 01:11 AM
Ah... but... you see ... um... actually I don't think there is COIN v Conventional.

There are combat and security operations against regular and irregular threats and you might have to conduct combat and security operations against regular and irregular threats at the same time. Counter-insurgency could be an entirely false construct, and a misleading one as well.

I agree. It is a false construct. My point was simply that many have a tendency to see a "type" (for lack of a better word) of combat and to name it. We fight in urban terrain and call it MOUT. We fight in mountains and call it Mountain Warfare. The name is just something that we throw around because it is combat occuring under conditions where we tend to use more of some techniques and procedures and fewer of others. The doctrine and tactics apply equally to both. People see the type of war that we're fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan and call it COIN. No problem - MOUT, COIN, Mountain, Desert, Woodland - whatever. Last I checked, we still use movement formations to ensure security, control, and flexibility, whether operating in Iraq, Afghanistan, or the Balkans. It looks different in each - technique - but that's it. Whether entering rooms in Bosnia or Iraq, we took up points of domination, but it looked a lot different than in Iraq, in terms speed and posture. We altered formations according to the perceived enemy situation. It's all the same doctrine. In Iraq, we modified our techniques and procedures for theater-specific threats.

I think OIF was a wakeup call for a lot of people who finally realized that our practice of training for CTC's, rather than training for war, led us to be a military only prepared for a very narrow range of enemies and a very narrow range of conditions. Some responded by writing another doctrinal publication. I think that really appealed to the cerebral crowd that enjoys the intellectual exercise of discussing big picture issues and putting it down on paper. The end-product was not useless. It was very effective upon the political and domestic target audiences. It sent a message that we were unprepared as a military, but were learning and getting our act together. The means by which we actuallly, on the ground, got our act together had little, perhaps nothing, to do with a doctrine re-write. Rather, it was a lot of squads, platoons, and companies figuring out how to apply knowledge that they already had. We finally realized, as an institution, that our training up until that point had been garbage - not because we weren't taught the basics, but because our training never emphasized teaching leaders and Soldiers how to apply their knowledge to a wider range of conditions, how to think more creatively, be more adaptive, and be more flexible. Our training pre-OIF was characterized more by a canned training scenario whereby if the BLUEFOR did not behave as the OC expected, then the situation would deteriorate at a speed, and on a scale, that was so absurd as to remove all training value from the exercise. If the BLUEFOR did behave as the OC expected, then there were no surpises and the commander got kudos in the AAR for being completely predictable and by the book. OIF turned into the worthwhile training exercise that we never had. After a few years, we finally became an adequately trained force.

ToddBoyle
07-30-2009, 11:52 PM
The common theme I see in Petraeus' dissertation and his recent speaking is a focus or specialization on the political aspects of military command. In seattle July 9th he spent more time reciting the names of people, relationships and their accomplishments than on Afghanistan, for example. (Time it.) The dissertation speaks frequently about *who* advised the President and political leaders, in various ways, in many conflicts, who those civilian leaders were, and who agreed or disagreed with whom.

In his Seattle, he talked about State and political leaders in fairly long passages but barely mentioned the name McCrystal or Odierno. There may have been operational reasons or relationship reasons for not focusing on his subordinates, but the extensive discussions of political and military figures was prominent.

The reason I mention this is, that it illustrates Petraeus and perhaps other general officers' excessive focus on things other than *why* we engage a particular war, or *alternatives* to the particular war, or its morality, legality under treaties, or its justness. Naturally, an officer's career is more successful if he focuses on the "How" rather than the "Why". I'm not even sure where one blends into the other. For example, you can hardly be excellent at answering the question "How", without a definition of the goal, and the goal in turn, is inevitably a part of the larger picture-- the whole picture of what we are trying to accomplish, in the world.

I don't think the compartmentalization, or professional specialization, among general officers is appropriate at their rank and scope of responsibilities, especially in this era of nation building (or "stability operations", or the"administrative force" described by Thomas PM Barnett.) It is frankly stupid, and I share Fallon's assessment of Petraeus as an ass kisser.

Ken White
07-31-2009, 12:32 AM
...especially in this era of nation building (or "stability operations", or the"administrative force" described by Thomas PM Barnett.) It is frankly stupid, and I share Fallon's assessment of Petraeus as an ass kisser.You're entitled to an opinion -- consider though that all the things you thought Generals should worry about they probably do but their opinions passed on to their political masters on such things get ignored more often that not.

Consider also that the Army is not that "SysAdmin" force described by Barnett (thankfully...) and thus it doesn't do that job well. Recall that the Army does not volunteer to do that job -- it gets sent.

If you know what we are trying to accomplish in the world, could you please call Washington and tell them -- I don't think they have a clue...:wry:

Schmedlap
07-31-2009, 01:11 AM
The reason I mention this is, that it illustrates Petraeus and perhaps other general officers' excessive focus on things other than *why* we engage a particular war, or *alternatives* to the particular war, or its morality, legality under treaties, or its justness.
It is also worth considering that the answers to those questions may not be seen as all that controversial and may be viewed as settled matters.


I don't think the compartmentalization, or professional specialization, among general officers is appropriate at their rank and scope of responsibilities, especially in this era of nation building (or "stability operations", or the"administrative force" described by Thomas PM Barnett.) It is frankly stupid, and I share Fallon's assessment of Petraeus as an ass kisser.
I think it is a healthy sign of our state of civil-military relations when people think that our Generals have too narrow a scope and are ass-kissers. It means that we are probably in no danger of a military coup.

pakphile
07-31-2009, 01:43 AM
Is there any podcast link to Petreaus' Seattle speech so we can hear what he actually said? Thanks

ToddBoyle
07-31-2009, 05:10 AM
Pakphile - the Seattle speech July 9th is at http://tvw.org and search for Petraeus.
It is also in the archives on CSPAN2.

Petraeus states many times in his dissertation that the military has adopted, since the close of the Vietnam War, a consensus that no war should be fought unless it is 1) supported by the Americn People, 2) has clear objectives that are achievable in a fairly short period of time before the country loses support, 3) the military is provided the resources and the freedom of tactics to win the war.

I (and others in the antiwar movement) have been saying for decades, they need to add several more requirements, 1) that the war ought to be lawful under both domestic law and treaties we have signed; i.e., the military should not obey illegal orders from the President, AND, 2) that the war ought to be, furthermore, a just war under some comprehensible scheme that would be discussed (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Just_war)

And of course both of these new requirements imply an end to wars other than self defense of the territory that is our jurisdiction, wars for economic reasons, or so-called "national interests". Both of these would repudiate the very longrunning tradition and practice of preemptive war (containment of communiism, domino theory, or today's preemptive "GWOT")

So, I would hope that some future Petraeus will write dissertations on the Iraq Syndrome, just as the Vietnam syndrome appeared, and that we succeed in defining it, instead of the neocons or whoever their successors may be in the military and policy establishment. Because, these are the reasons we are opposed to US wars-- they are immoral and cruel, and motivated by greed. They don't reflect my moral values and I oppose them. And so does most of the world.

Tom Odom
07-31-2009, 05:37 AM
They don't reflect my moral values and I oppose them. And so does most of the world.

Well thank you for that, Todd. I can now sleep soundly knowing you are against "us", whoever "us" may be.

But since you feel compelled to label and libel a senior serving officer who has his fans and his detractors, how about you follow the rules on this site and introduce yourself. You can even use first person plural.

Introduce Yourself (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?p=78437#post78437)

Thanks

Tom

William F. Owen
07-31-2009, 06:44 AM
2) that the war ought to be, furthermore, a just war under some comprehensible scheme that would be discussed (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Just_war)


Really? Just War? Staggeringly naive in my opinion. Worst form of published ROE. Tells the bad guys when you will act and allows them to work within and below your threshold for war - almost criminally stupid.

Schmedlap
07-31-2009, 06:46 AM
... they need to add several more requirements, 1) that the war ought to be lawful under both domestic law and treaties we have signed; i.e., the military should not obey illegal orders from the President...
What does this look like when implemented? Does the Supreme Court issue an injunction against the DoD, ordering it to not carry out an order from the President in regard to some exercise of force?


...these new requirements imply an end to wars ... for economic reasons, or so-called "national interests".
And that is one major reason why such requirements will never be adopted. People who neither identify as "anti-war" or "pro-war" - meaning the majority of Americans - want us to fight when it is in our perceived national interests. What "national interests" means varies with the times and situations and, depending on how the masses are influenced, might sometimes lead to unnecessary or poorly-conceived wars. Perhaps the best way to avoid unnecessary or ill-conceived wars is to ensure that the people are informed and thinking rationally. I don't know how you do that, but I do know that most folks will not subordinate interests to laws on issues of war. Laws tend to be cast aside when the perceived benefit is higher and seems more likely than the perceived cost.

But here is some common ground: You want wars to end? I want to eat more and weigh less.

ToddBoyle
07-31-2009, 10:35 PM
Well thank you for that, Todd. I can now sleep soundly knowing you are against "us", whoever "us" may be.

But since you feel compelled to label and libel a senior serving officer who has his fans and his detractors, how about you follow the rules on this site and introduce yourself. You can even use first person plural.

I did not feel "compelled." I read Fallon's remarks and found they had merit, after spending quite too much time listening to Mr. Petraeus and reading his works. Have you even listened to the subject speech? You're entitled to your opinion, of course.

In response to your challenge, the FAQ on this site does not say that introducing myself is "the rule" on this site. Have you looked at that? It even allows pseudonyms,

Kind regards,
TOdd

ToddBoyle
07-31-2009, 10:51 PM
Schmedlap and William Owen, thank you for your reasoned comments. I would share your skepticism that armies can be constrained to fighting wars only when it's lawful under treaties, self-defense of their territory, the cause is just, and such notions.

But that is the option of the most powerful army in the world. Only the most powerful military has the luxury of restraining itself.

Do you dispute that the U.S. could restrain its warmaking without risking attack?
Do you share my assumption that the U.S. does have an intact and well functioning chain of command that could implement such a major policy change?
Do you share my assumption that the U.S. does have a functioning judiciary?

Thank you for your thoughts.
Todd.

Schmedlap
07-31-2009, 11:13 PM
Do you dispute that the U.S. could restrain its warmaking without risking attack?
Do you share my assumption that the U.S. does have an intact and well functioning chain of command that could implement such a major policy change?
Do you share my assumption that the U.S. does have a functioning judiciary?
1. No.
2. That is difficult to answer since I have no idea what the policy change would look like or entail. See my earlier question re: What does this look like? A Supreme Court injunction?
3. Yes.

jmm99
08-01-2009, 01:09 AM
Mr Boyle is fairly well known on the Net. He is an old pro at things antiwar, military industrial complex and military recruiting. "Naive" is not a term I would use for Mr Boyle.

Google Advanced Search is your friend. :D

Stay safe in the Sandbox.

Regards

Mike

Schmedlap
08-01-2009, 01:16 AM
JMM,

Do you have any input in regard to my question about implementation? What is the realistic (if any) COA for someone pushing the argument that Boyle presents? Is it a court injunction? Something else? Nothing?

jmm99
08-01-2009, 02:23 AM
between the Executive and Legislative Branches, the Jus ad Bellum question (whether it is or was "illegal" to go to war) will be regarded as a "political question (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Political_question)" and the legal action will be dismissed.

Here is the bottom line in Doe v Bush (http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/pdf.opinions/03-1266-01A.pdf) (1st Cir 2003), pp. 3 & 24-25:


Plaintiffs are active-duty members of the military, parents of military personnel, and members of the U.S. House of Representatives. [1] They filed a complaint in district court seeking a preliminary injunction to prevent the defendants, President George W. Bush and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, from initiating a war against Iraq. They assert that such an action would violate the Constitution. The district court dismissed the suit, and plaintiffs appeal. We affirm the dismissal.

[1] The military personnel and some of the parents are proceeding under pseudonyms, pursuant to an order by the district court that is not before us. The members of the House of Representatives are John Conyers, Dennis Kucinich, Jesse Jackson, Jr., Sheila Jackson Lee, Jim McDermott, José E. Serrano, Danny K. Davis, Maurice D. Hinchey, Carolyn Kilpatrick, Pete Stark, Diane Watson, and Lynn C. Woolsey. We also acknowledge the assistance provided by amicus curiae on behalf of the plaintiffs.
....
It is true that "courts possess power to review either legislative or executive action that transgresses identifiable textual limits" on constitutional power. Nixon, 506 U.S. at 238. Questions about the structure of congressional power can be justiciable under the proper circumstances. See, e.g., Clinton, 524 U.S. at 428-36; Chadha, 462 U.S. at 941-44. But courts are rightly hesitant to second-guess the form or means by which the coequal political branches choose to exercise their textually committed constitutional powers. See Orlando, 443 F.2d at 1043. As the circumstances presented here do not warrant judicial intervention, the appropriate recourse for those who oppose war with Iraq lies with the political branches.

In short, organize and mobilize to elect antiwar candidates; but leave us (the courts) out of the political action. The position of the courts is similar to that of the military on Jus ad Bellum questions (it's not the province of the military to second guess a presidential-congressional decision to wage war).

The same doctrine of judicial restraint may or may not apply to specific Jus In Bello questions (whether an act in warfare is or was "illegal"); e.g., on the rights and duties of individuals to disobey manifestly illegal orders.

Schmedlap
08-01-2009, 02:44 AM
JMM,

Thanks. My impression is that people who make these claims of "illegality" are either very unacquainted with how the legal system works or willfully suspending their understanding because it conflicts with some other idealistic yearning for how they would want the world to operate. But, I suppose that I can be proved wrong in that impression. Are you aware of anyone who has made an argument that reconciles the "illegal war" claim with a legal process by which the court could/should/would realistically concur that, yes, this is illegal? That is - not necessarily an argument that has been made before a Court, but one that has been floated as one that the Court might buy into? There must be some creative argument whereby the Court might at least be willing to concede that the matter is justiciable, even if the Court would ultimately rules for the Executive. And, if not, then why does this "illegal war" argument persist?

jmm99
08-01-2009, 03:35 AM
which will be rewarded by some Googling. Here is a start for that task.

The basic idea to challenge a war legally (positing that the President and Congress are more or less on the same page) is to resurrect Nuremberg and Tokyo.

Those trials, besides "normal" war crimes, alleged Crimes against Peace (waging "aggressive" war) and Crimes against Humanity (genocides), as well as conspiracies to commit the basic charges. Crimes against Peace present a Jus ad Bellum question. Crimes against Humanity present a Jus in Bello issue.

There is no point in me going beyond that. And, it has been done by others (with whom, Mr Boyle will no doubt agree). As to Gulf I, Ramsey Clark did a full mock trial - A Report on United States War Crimes Against Iraq (http://deoxy.org/wc/wc-index.htm), etc. As to the current armed conflicts, you can ruminate in the Frederick K. Cox International Law Center War Crimes Research Portal (http://law.case.edu/War-Crimes-Research-Portal/links.asp?id=12).

In the latter source, you will find many links to Mr Boyle's arguments - Just War, etc.

The probabilities of any of those argumernts working on SCOTUS (in a Jus ad Bellum case) range between nil and null.

PS: looks like some of the Cox links are broken.

Tom Odom
08-01-2009, 05:52 AM
I did not feel "compelled." I read Fallon's remarks and found they had merit, after spending quite too much time listening to Mr. Petraeus and reading his works. Have you even listened to the subject speech? You're entitled to your opinion, of course.

In response to your challenge, the FAQ on this site does not say that introducing myself is "the rule" on this site. Have you looked at that? It even allows pseudonyms,

Kind regards,
Todd

Todd,

As you well know, that would be GEN Petraeus. Again if you wish to come in with an attack on a serving officer, do the board a favor an introduce yourself.

And yes as a mod I have read the rules. I will highlight the part that applies, those dealing with courtesy:


We invite members to consider providing some information about themselves, consistent with their personal preferences and situation. The two prime venues for that are:
The Hail & Farewell forum. In particular, consider launching a thread with your username as the title and your introduction as the first post.
Through the User Profile.
This introduction need not impose on privacy or interfere with pseudonymous participation, which we fully support. Even just a little general information about background, interests, and expertise is appreciated by other members as a polite and responsible way of participating that goes a long way in helping to build our professional community. Members control the information they choose to provide.

At the same time, we fully appreciate and respect that many members may not wish to share any information beyond a pseudonymous user name. As a matter of policy, that is just fine. We are about responsible participation on your terms, not some abstract concept of disclosure to fleeting preferences.

Unfortunately, not all registered users have always fully appreciated the latter. We have zero tolerance for members who perseverate on others' empty profiles or absent introductions.

Now before closing, Todd, let me say that this site is fairly clear in its intent of examining and discussing small wars. We for the most part avoid political discussions as they are not within that intent. That means simply we stay off the soap box. I suggest you do the same.

Tom

ToddBoyle
08-02-2009, 03:15 AM
Todd,

As you well know, that would be GEN Petraeus. Again if you wish to come in with an attack on a serving officer, do the board a favor an introduce yourself....
Now before closing, Todd, let me say that this site is fairly clear in its intent of examining and discussing small wars. We for the most part avoid political discussions as they are not within that intent. That means simply we stay off the soap box. I suggest you do the same.

Tom

On the question of respectfulness: Respect is something that arises of its own accord in the mind. I couldn't change my view even if I wanted to. On the question of restraining communication, yes, communications can be constrained.

As for your suggestion that political discussions are off topic on this board, if true, and that includes the questions *whether* to fight particular wars, or *why* to fight, then of course I will leave.

Now that I have responded to your points, I would like your response to my points in return. Petraeus' dissertation says, the U.S. military consensus after vietnam doesn't "recommend" military engagement unless a) the public supports the war, b) the objectives are clear and can be acheived, and c) the military is provided the resources and the latitude to do their job. I said the U.S. military should go further and recommend against d) wars that are unlawful under treaties and e) wars that are unjust under some framework that would need to be developed.

Todd

William F. Owen
08-02-2009, 09:27 AM
I said the U.S. military should go further and recommend against d) wars that are unlawful under treaties and e) wars that are unjust under some framework that would need to be developed.

"Recommend?" - Interesting use of language. Surely if "unlawful" you mean prohibit.
Why develop a "framework" that can only have the effect of limiting your options to enforce your nations desired policy? Seems pretty "out there" to me.

George L. Singleton
08-02-2009, 09:45 AM
From time to time folks come onto the SWJ without introducing themselves which leaves their comments without a foundation of exactly where they are coming from.

Being 'anti-war" says you are in the wrong place to start with to write on SWJ. Warfare is a means and arm of foreign policy, always has been, always will be. The world of reality tells you and all of us so. Fact.

For example 9/11, coupled with my 31 years in the active and reserve forces, and some years in NYC international banking, and writings in overseas newspapers and academic journals (foreign and domestic) were spelled out in my self intro when I first came onto SWJ. I served in Pakistan, as an example, from 1963-1965, as a young USAF officer at the old US Embassy in Karachi, as the Liaison Officer for the then US Air Base at Badabar, just outside Peshawar, and traveled years ago in Afghanitan, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Libyia, too, etc, etc.

Mr. Boyle, as Mr. Owen wrote in the open you, too, like us all, need to do a courteousy background introduction. But if you just want to slap on some opinions without the courteousy of an introductory hello first, perhaps you do need to find another venue instead of SWJ, whose clear and polite norms are the same for all of us, me included.

In terms of pure political science, international organizations and standards stand first upon any nation's, including the US, political objectives, goals, and needs related to the total global scene, not vice versa.

Foreign or even internal attacks on law and order and civilizied society such as 9/11 require no justification for self defense and pursuit of the attackers beyond what the world has from 9/11 to this day seen to be the case.

If you want to help mankind, find the means to stop the Islamist driven maniacs who are murdering fellow Muslims and all others worldwide today "in the name" of a religion whose defintion is "peace" but whose misguided practice by some Islamists is "sheer violence, murder and havoc."

The norms of world society do not allow for such and maybe you and any fellow thinkers of your view(s) need to get over there and show them how to observe, obey, and follow the international treaties and norms of world law and order you wish to have in place where the fighting is now.

By the way, be careful not to step on the bodies of young boys and girls used as suicide bombers, of school teachers murdered in the girls schools in Pakistan and Afghanistan...which schools back in the 1960s operated safely in a law and order society over there. And be sure not to polute the environment when your body is blown to bits by terrorist planted and detonated IUDs along the public roads, where many innocent civilian body parts are found all too often. This really messes up public cleanliness and santitation.

St. Edmunds Episcopal School in Peshawar educated Khan Abdul Ghaffer Khan the Muslim leader of the original 20th century Pakhtuns, if you will, "freedom movement" without any attempt to proselite him into being a Christian. He remained a Muslim of the peaceful sort as was Mr. Ghandi in India. You remember Mr. Ghandi, who was murdered by a religious terrortist?

George L. Singleton, Colonel, USAF, Retired

ToddBoyle
08-02-2009, 07:22 PM
Mr. Singleton, your message, and many other messages on this board are absolutely poliitcal. In fact, the only reason I visited this board was that it popped up in Google as a discussion of Petraeus' dissertation. Having read the entire 343 page dissertation and finding it absolutely political, from end to end, discussing whether to fight, how to fight, and who to fight. This board has a bad case of group-think. I would have to be a masochist to try to carry on a discussion here. The discussion is about SUBJECT. Your position is tantamout to making all discussion ad-hominem first, with the subject matter secondary.

Surferbeetle
08-02-2009, 07:59 PM
In fact, the only reason I visited this board was that it popped up in Google as a discussion of Petraeus' dissertation. Having read the entire 343 page dissertation and finding it absolutely political, from end to end, discussing whether to fight, how to fight, and who to fight. This board has a bad case of group-think. I would have to be a masochist to try to carry on a discussion here.

Todd,

SWJ could be likened to a modern-day digital Salon (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Salon_%28gathering%29) where the qualities of ideas and opinions matter. I for one enjoy considering and discussing opinions other than my own in a, for lack of a better phrase-gentlemanly manner, and hope that you are able to do so as well.

Having served with the General I find that your characterization of him does not square with my observations. Like some here I have also read a Noam Chomsky (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Noam_Chomsky) work or two, and I recognize that it would not further the spirit of intelligent discussion by resorting to name calling of those I disagree with.

In the interests of furthering polite discourse I will volunteer that I am an Iraq-war veteran and a civil engineer in the civilian world. I have not yet read GEN Petraeus' dissertation but will make a point of starting it today and perhaps we can discuss it further at a later date.

Steve

Schmedlap
08-02-2009, 09:25 PM
This board has a bad case of group-think. I would have to be a masochist to try to carry on a discussion here.
I would not judge the board on the basis of an experience on one thread. Conveying something in written word is a bit more difficult than in person, so it is easy to misinterpret people - especially if you are new to the board and do not know anything about any of the participants. That is one reason for the request that individuals give some sort of introduction. It aids in the flow of the discussion.

If you look at the majority of responses to your posts, you will see that most of us are genuinely curious about your position and/or responded fairly tactfully to your specific points. A few posts were not as tactful. I'm not sure why you chose to focus on those. Some of us even asked questions based upon your points. You chose to focus on the responses that you found no substance in. That is unfortunate, but hardly an indictment of the board. This board is what you make of it.

In regard to group think. Wow. Run a search for "Gentile Nagl" or "COIN conventional" as a couple examples. If this board suffers from group think, then Dick Cheney and Nancy Pelosi are best friends.

George L. Singleton
08-02-2009, 10:11 PM
I am noting that warfare historically is and has always been an arm of foreign policy of all nations, great or small.

"Political" at least in my case in referring to you focuses on your statement that you are an antiwar activitist. You could use that statement you made, by expanding upon it, to introduce yourself, if you want to try to come into reasoned discussions here.

The sum of many published egg heads on this site, several of whom are earned PhDs, is a vast font of knowledge and not to be taken lightly, in my view.

Here is a summary overview of the guy you alledge to have done a quick read of to categorically condemn him and his researched, knowledgable by academic and first hand experiences:


General David Howell Petraeus, USA (born November 7, 1952) is the 10th and current Commander, U.S. Central Command. Petraeus previously served as Commanding General, Multi-National Force - Iraq (MNF-I) from January 26, 2007 to September 16, 2008. As Commander of MNF-I, Petraeus oversaw all coalition forces in Iraq. Petraeus was the General George C. Marshall Award winner as the top graduate of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College—class of 1983. He subsequently earned a M.P.A. degree (1985) and a Ph.D. degree (1987) in International Relations from the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University. He later served as Assistant Professor of International Relations at the U.S. Military Academy and also completed a fellowship at Georgetown University. He has a BS from the U.S. Military Academy—class of 1974—from which he graduated as a distinguished cadet (top 5% of his class).

Petraeus has garnered numerous accolades in recent years. In 2009, he received the Union League Club of Philadelphia's Abraham Lincoln Award, the National Father's Day Committee's Father of the Year Award, National Committee on American Foreign Policy's George F. Kennan Award, the National Defense Industrial Association's Eisenhower Award, the Office of Strategic Service's William Donovan Award, the No Greater Sacrifice Freedom Award, the Atlantic Council of the United States'Military Leadership Award, and the Congressional Medal of Honor Society's Distinguished Citizen Award. In 2008, a poll conducted by Foreign Policy and Prospect magazines selected Petraeus as one of the world's top 100 public intellectuals. Also, the Business Executives for National Security awarded Petraeus their 2008 Eisenhower Award. Also in 2008, the Static Line Association named Petraeus as its 2008 Man of the Year, and Der Spiegel named him "America's most respected soldier." As 2008 came to a close, GQ Magazine (December 2008) named Petraeus as the "Leader of the Year: Right Man, Right Time", Newsweek named him the 16th most powerful person in the world in its December 20, 2008 edition, and Prospect magazine named him the "Public Intellectual of the Year". In 2007, Time named Petraeus one of the 100 most influential leaders and revolutionaries of the year as well as one of its four runners up for Time Person of the Year. He was also named the second most influential American conservative by The Daily Telegraph as well as The Daily Telegraph's 2007 Man of the Year. In 2005, Petraeus was selected as one of America's top leaders by US News and World Report.

IntelTrooper
08-02-2009, 10:33 PM
The discussion is about SUBJECT. Your position is tantamout to making all discussion ad-hominem first, with the subject matter secondary.
You're coming into a relatively small, largely experience-driven community. You don't necessarily need to divulge your name, but where complete anonymity may be valued elsewhere (4chan.org), it isn't here. I, for one, don't see why experienced professionals (as many of our posters are) should be compelled to spend their time responding to random amateurs off the Internet. So it's a respect thing. If you want to respect the norms of this community, provide a brief introduction. If you don't, don't be surprised if you are treated accordingly.

jmm99
08-03-2009, 01:18 AM
we end the "introduction" digression.

Mr Boyle's "bio" can be accessed very easily by using Google Advanced Search - "Todd Boyle" + any one of "antiwar", "military industrial complex" or "military recruiting" - from which, you can watch his videos and see what he looks like, etc. Mr Boyle does not claim or enjoy anonymous status.

Mr Boyle's posts (and questions raised) did cause me last nite to DL the Petraeus Thesis (1989; so a bit dated, and on a timeline with a number of later 1980s books on "lessons learned" from Vietnam). That tome is 19mb+ and on a dialup modem took a while. It also does not allow cut and paste.

I managed to get up to 1973 before quitting at 0500 this morning. So far, I find that I am (still today) a member of the "Never Again School" and have been such since the Korean War. Consistently. ;)

What the thesis has proved so far (to me) is that the military has not stuck its nose into what I call "political questions" - which has been the subject matter of a number of threads here (that is, the non-partisan political nature of the modern US military - wasn't always that way, see Linn and others).

I have no idea where this thread is going - and less on where it "should" go. As Ted once told me, (paraphase) let the thread develop by members' input. So, we'll see.

Regards to all

Mike

Surferbeetle
08-03-2009, 04:12 AM
...we end the "introduction" digression.

I managed to get up to 1973 before quitting at 0500 this morning. So far, I find that I am (still today) a member of the "Never Again School" and have been such since the Korean War. Consistently. ;)

What the thesis has proved so far (to me) is that the military has not stuck its nose into what I call "political questions" - which has been the subject matter of a number of threads here (that is, the non-partisan political nature of the modern US military - wasn't always that way, see Linn and others).

Mike,

What can I say, people are interesting...:wry:

...organizational decision making has been heavily covered...I am currently on page 61 of the dissertation...Laos 1961...at this point I can say that it's well written and I appreciate the extensive and interesting footnotes....

Regards,

Steve

George L. Singleton
08-03-2009, 01:32 PM
While stationed at the US Embassy in Pakistan, in the pre-MATS/MAC, et al world, when we only had Air Logistics Service, I controlled all US Air traffic in behalf of the upcountry base at Peshawar into and out of West Pakistan.

Thus I occasionally, only a Lieutenant (non-rated) you understand, manifested myself to inspect and check out the routes.

Thus I was able to take an ALS flight into and back from Rangoon, then Burma, the last such flight before they closed Burma to the rest of the world. Bought some nice narrow width 100% silk ties, was gawked at by a bunch of local military folks (guards etc.) and did not RON there...Burmese military wanted us in and out same day.

Not worth much but an odd bit of old history vs. today's still closed to the outside world "Burma" in it's renamed format.

Teen_Virtuoso
08-05-2009, 12:14 PM
I may only fifteen but has this theory that romans came up with even follwed by them ? This reminds me of the hilarious stance of some that war should be proportional (recent gaza conflict).

Dayuhan
08-05-2009, 01:49 PM
Now that I have responded to your points, I would like your response to my points in return. Petraeus' dissertation says, the U.S. military consensus after vietnam doesn't "recommend" military engagement unless a) the public supports the war, b) the objectives are clear and can be acheived, and c) the military is provided the resources and the latitude to do their job. I said the U.S. military should go further and recommend against d) wars that are unlawful under treaties and e) wars that are unjust under some framework that would need to be developed.


Here's a response to your point (from a civilian with no military background):

A military organization has neither the responsibility nor the capacity to determine what is "legal" or "just". That is purely the responsibility of the civilian government. The military is designed to be subordinate to civilian government and to carry out the tasks it is assigned by civilian government. Individuals within the military will certainly have their own opinions, but they are sworn to obey the civilian government, not to decide their own policies.

Do you, of all people, really want to see the military given the power to reach its own independent determinations of what is "just" or "legal"? That hardly seems consistent with separation of powers or subordination to civilian authority, and it seems to me that it could open a major can of worms.

Certainly it is reasonable for the military to advise civilian government on matters within its expertise: for example, if available resources are inadequate to perform an assigned task. Determinations of legality and justice are assigned to other branches of the government.

I personally find it difficult to see how individuals can describe themselves as "anti-war". Does this mean "opposed to all war, all the time"? Or opposed to a specific war? It might be useful to clarify. Personally, for example, I was opposed to the Iraq war: I thought it would distract from the primary goal of confronting AQ, and that the post-Saddam environment would be unmanageable (to make a long story short). Once we were committed to the war, I became "pro-war", in the sense that I believed that since were in, for better or worse, it was our responsibility to remain in until we had done everything possible to assure that the country did not collapse into civil war.

A position devoid of nuance on a topic as broad as "war" seems likely to be a position arrived at with little consideration.

As far as the general environment of this website goes... I come here from a background very different from most of the other inhabitants, and while this place (like most places) has its own conventions, I find that if you respect the conventions and engage with an open mind, there's a general policy of politeness and respect in disagreement, along with a good deal more honesty and intelligence than I see on many sites that rather pompously advertise their intellectualism. Approach with an open mind and a bit of respect, and you might well find the same.

jmm99
08-05-2009, 04:18 PM
Individuals within the military will certainly have their own opinions, but they are sworn to obey the civilian government, not to decide their own policies.

they, like I, are sworn to obey the Constitution. That, of course, vests power over the military in the civilian branches. So, your ensuing comment ends up being correct, though not by the correct analysis initially.

Where the distinction becomes important is in the case of manifestly unlawful orders. E.g., an order that the military act in such a way as to trample the Bill of Rights. The US oaths, whether by military or civilian officers, all are sworn to the Constitution as the highest civil authority. That must be contrasted to, say, the German officer's oath of WWII - a personal oath to the head of government, in that case - Hitler.

As to Just War, I can without difficulty come up with three somewhat different formulations. One is the current formulation of the Roman Catechism, which is on the Vatican website. Another is the traditional Just War formulations of Augustine and Aquinas (which also differ to some extent), which you can find by Googling. A third is the Southern Baptist formulation, which you can find on John Ankerberg's website.

My point being that I do not want military officers turning themselves into theologians professonally, whether in the Just War area or in other areas as well.

PS - Dayuhan: About Iraq, I favored the policy going in; but opposed the policy to stay (after say, Dec 2003). The "powers that be" differed (as probably most on this board). The question then is whether you stay on the boat or leave it. I chose to stay with the boat - and hope for the best (or, in Ken's terms, at least an acceptable outcome).

Dayuhan
08-05-2009, 09:34 PM
You're right, I was sloppy there, but I think the point is clear. I just thought it odd that someone of Todd's apparent ideological conviction was questioning the concept of civilian supremacy...

On Iraq, well, we all had an opinion. Looking at where it stands today, I'd have to say it's better that what I expected, going in.

jmm99
08-06-2009, 01:20 AM
although Iraq has not yet played out. The SOFA seemed an acceptable solution to me - and the 7 years or so extra, may lead to a much better outcome than if we had pulled the plug back in Dec 2003 as I wanted. I am always happy to be proved wrong by a better outcome. :)

I can't address Mr Boyle's ideology because I don't know what it is. The various legal and moral arguments (expressed by him in the form of questions) are pretty standard "war resister" arguments that are concerned with an immediate focus on potential war resisters in the military (who are not likely to be its senior officers ;) ) - not with the long-term position of the military re: civilian control.