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Jedburgh
06-10-2009, 03:56 PM
4 Jun 09 testimony before the HASC Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee on Thinkers and Practitioners: Do Senior Professional Military Education Schools Produce Strategists?

RADM Garry E. Hall (http://armedservices.house.gov/pdfs/OI060409/Hall_Testimony060409.pdf), Commandant The Industrial College of the Armed Forces


Maj Gen Robert P. Steel (http://armedservices.house.gov/pdfs/OI060409/Steel_Testimony060409.pdf), Commandant The National War College


RADM James P. Wisecup (http://armedservices.house.gov/pdfs/OI060409/Wisecup_Testimony060409.pdf), President The Naval War College


MG Robert M. Williams (http://armedservices.house.gov/pdfs/OI060409/Williams_Testimony060409.pdf), Commandant The Army War College


Maj Gen Maurice Forsyth (http://armedservices.house.gov/pdfs/OI060409/Forsyth_Testimony060409.pdf), Commander of the Spaatz Center and Commandant The Air War College


Col Michael Belcher (http://armedservices.house.gov/pdfs/OI060409/Belcher_Testimony060409.pdf), Director The Marine Corps War College

Van
06-10-2009, 04:13 PM
Are the politicians competent to interpret the answers?

A gentleman who was on the Republican Party primary ballot in all fifty states in 2008 and I were having a beer in 2007. He was passionate about the need for military action against Iran. When I mentioned something about the other instruments of national power, I got the "bunny in the headlights" look. When I started questioning second and third order effects of military action against Iran, I got the "bunny in the headlights" look.

Nice guy, I'd trust him to watch my kids, but I wouldn't trust him with national strategy, to differentiate between geo-political strategy and military strategy, or to assess the testimony of the officers that briefed the subcommittee.

Schmedlap
06-11-2009, 01:49 AM
I think it is important to hash out how the question should be framed.

Do we want to produce the folks who devise our national security strategy? Or do we want to produce the folks who devise the military strategy and understand how this integrates with the national security strategy?

ADM Hall starts off by pointing out how many civilians attend the schools, as evidence that this gives the military leaders exposure to non-military folks. The real benefit (which he nibbled around the edges of) is the exact opposite. The benefit is that we give those civilians an opportunity to better understand the military considerations.

It's kind of like when I attended a course on unit level maintenance for our SINCGARS radios. The fact that an Infantry Officer attended a one-week course intended for 31U's did not make the course good by virtue of exposing 31U's to an Infantry Officer. Rather, it was an opportunity afforded to me to better understand the ins-and-outs of my commo NCO's job and taught me how to more effectively use his talents. Same for the civilians at the military schools. The military serves the civilians. Allowing the civilian masters in to better understand their subordinates - that is the real benefit. Not the other way around.

William F. Owen
06-11-2009, 05:25 AM
From one of the great and good in testimony..


The NWC faculty combines an impressive blend of academic expertise, operational experience, and practical knowledge in the formulation and implementation of national security strategy.

OK, but where does the guidance on that come from? National security strategy is the product of party politics. Sometimes all parties may agree, but what if they don't?

Bob's World
06-11-2009, 01:32 PM
"Do Senior Professional Military Education Schools Produce Strategists?"

Short answer? No.

We really need to start teaching appropriate aspects of strategy at the 0-4 level; what it is, how to ensure operations support it, etc. Grow leaders to think in strategic terms over their field grade careers, with the Service College being the icing on the cake, and not the batter.

slapout9
06-11-2009, 01:38 PM
Why not include senior enlisted folks? If you had some Strategic Sergeants around to keep the officers in line things might work out:D

selil
06-11-2009, 02:47 PM
I think in this discussion we'll run into pundit podiatry. We'll all stand around looking at our feet talking to ourselves. If by strategy we mean grand strategy at the nation-state or coalition of nations level then the correct US military service member response is "no sir we don't teach that". The realm of politicians is strategy in a political way. This relatively new phenomenon is a result of a few cases of mistaken identity. Macarthur thinking he was a president, and Nixon thinking he was a god.

Lots of people think they do strategy but mostly politicians set goals. The National Military Strategy reads like a business case study.

I would make my friends with stars on their lapels angry on purpose by quipping that just because somebody has a uniform on doesn't mean they aren't a politician. It's a suit not an excuse.

Yet, when I read Nathaniel Ficks book "One bullet away" I was enamored of how in tune with the strategy and tactics he was with what his unit was engaged in. To say that Colonel Gentile is unaware or how strategy would effect his unit in Iraq would equally be in error. In Colonel Peter Mansoors book "Baghdad at Sunrise" he understands the expediency of certain tactics and their effects on strategy. Further in taking down an insurgent group he creates strategy, grasping victory, from the chaos of fractured chains of command. Nobody was thinking about strategy but him at that point.

The nit pickers will tease out the difference between tactics and strategy. Whether we accept lexical dogma based on long dead prussians or oriental obtuse prosaic certitude to find balance in definition the result will be the same. PME does produce strategists. They will and can define end states using and improving the cognitive tools of various strategic philosophies.

The question is will the dusty intellectual desert of political thought allow them to be strategists.

William F. Owen
06-11-2009, 03:06 PM
....If by strategy we mean grand strategy at the nation-state or coalition of nations level then the correct US military service member response is "no sir we don't teach that".
Concur.


The realm of politicians is strategy in a political way. This relatively new phenomenon is a result of a few cases of mistaken identity. Macarthur thinking he was a president, and Nixon thinking he was a god.
Not sure it is that new. History has hundreds of examples, and they certainly informed Clausewitz's view.

Lots of people think they do strategy but mostly politicians set goals. The National Military Strategy reads like a business case study.
Any idiot can write on military strategy, but anyone's views about the use of military power to gain political objectives, is a reflection of personal politics and values.
The "Strategy" of invading Iraq was a purely a product of political desire and the military merely served that desire.
....and yes, good commanders are aware that their actions may have political consequences. That does not make them "strategic."

John T. Fishel
06-11-2009, 03:56 PM
1. The subject of strategy is taught by the Army at the 0-4 level at CGSC.
2. It is also taught at the senior service school.
3. How to actually make strategy really isn't taught or not very well. I defer on this to my recently retired colleague from the Army War College, Dr. Gabriel Marcella.
4. Grand strategy for the US is made (or the responsibility of) the President with the advice of his NSC. It is published as the National Security Strategy of the US supposedly annually according to the Goldwater-Nichols Act. Because it is unclassified, it is inherently a partisan political document - some more so, some less. (The best of these was the final one published by the Budh 41 Adminsitration.) The NSC includes the CJCS as a statutory advisor; therefore, the military has appropriately input to US grand strategy. Note that the NSS is, in reality, a bureaucratic product so the Joint Staff and OSD are players. Key players from both as well as the NSC staff often wear military uniforms.
5. Much of what passes for strategy is not. What usually gets short shrift is the necessary focus on resources. Failure to include a detailed analysis of the resource leg of the stool means that strategy is little different from policy.When I was Chief of Policy & Strategy in SOUTHCOM I produced Gen Woerner's last Regional Security Strategy and Gen Thurman's SOUTHCOM Strategy. The difference was in the resources component. We did not do a very good job on it for the RSS and Gen Thurman insisted that we make the resource leg of the SS as complete and important as the objective and COA legs. Bottom line is that strategy seems easy but it really is hard.

Cheers

JohnT

Ken White
06-11-2009, 04:34 PM
As you show, there is always military involvement in the development of national strategies -- but in the end, our system says the civilian politicians get the final say on what is to be done. Just as in my house, another being always gets the final say on what is to be done. :D

I can live with both those things, no matter how inefficient -- the benefits are worth it...

Re: your post, I'd like to reemphaisze three parts:
It is published as the National Security Strategy of the US supposedly annually according to the Goldwater-Nichols Act. Because it is unclassified, it is inherently a partisan political document - some more so, some less.plus
What usually gets short shrift is the necessary focus on resources.and
Bottom line is that strategy seems easy but it really is hard.and emphasize the 'inherent' in the political document statement -- adding that even the classified variants will always be political to an extent because politicians must be involved and the politics will usually control the resources. That contributes to the important point that the 'resources' element is usually neglected (and that's very much why doctrine often gets involved to an excessive degree in the production of strategies; military capabilities [NOT desires...] are often a significant element of those resources). Add the fact that predictions or presumptions are of necessity included and strategy is indeed hard. Quite hard.

Developing strategy is difficult due to those factors -- as well as the fact that we all like things to be settled and completed --and dislike change. "This is our strategy" can become target fixation but strategy can never be completed. Nor can doctrine. Both must constantly evolve.

John T. Fishel
06-11-2009, 06:45 PM
Great additions:D You are right about even classified strategies being political to some extent. The are LESS partisan, however. Not non or bi-partisan, just less partisan. Part of what made the final Bush 41 NSS so good was that it was significantly less partisan then previous ones due to the fact that it was crafted to assist the incoming Clinton Administration. A second reason was that the managing editor was COL Geoff Jones on the NSC staff, one of the brightest Army officers I've ever met with a really good sense of the political.

I would also add to predictions, presumptions, and assumptions the notion of inferences. Inference can often be confused with presumptions and assumptions (as IMO Steve Metz does in his recent book). I would also note that inferences are less than predictions but may be a critical way station.

Ken White
06-11-2009, 07:09 PM
I would also add to predictions, presumptions, and assumptions the notion of inferences. Inference can often be confused with presumptions and assumptions (as IMO Steve Metz does in his recent book). I would also note that inferences are less than predictions but may be a critical way station."Indications lead me to believe..."

Yep -- a very critical way station and where, as Slap alludes, one can and often does go wrong very easily...

John T. Fishel
06-11-2009, 07:33 PM
and as Steve points out....

Old Eagle
06-11-2009, 07:56 PM
As a former Army strategist (ASI 6Z back then), I wasn't "produced" anywhere. I was developed over a course of civilian and military education coupled with assignments where I plied the trade under the mentorship of some really remarkable folks.

Apropos resources -- Remember Art Lykke's formulation of Ends+Ways+Means, where means were resources, both tangible and intangible. (Don't get me started on Art's 3-legged stool; it's clear that Art wasn't and engineer.)

slapout9
06-11-2009, 10:33 PM
Apropos resources -- Remember Art Lykke's formulation of Ends+Ways+Means, where means were resources, both tangible and intangible. (Don't get me started on Art's 3-legged stool; it's clear that Art wasn't and engineer.)

Old Eagle go ahead and get started on the 3 legged stool:wry:

John T. Fishel
06-12-2009, 12:41 PM
just taught strategy at CGSC and did it in SOUTHCOM. As Gabriel Marcella says, we teach about strategy but not how to craft a strategy. And we still teach Art Lykke's version. Anyway, I do in my university classes and mostly I give him credit.:D

If I were designing a course for strategists, the major assignments would be to craft a series of strategies from Theater level thru the NMS to the NSS. In other words, I would ask my budding strategists to cover the full range of the strategic level of war thru the overlap with the operational. If I were dealing with civilian strategists, I would modify the assignments to reflect their institutional location.

Of course, what we rarely mention in discussing strategies is Lykke's FAS test: Feasibility, Acceptability, Suitability. But then who wants to know in advance if one's strategy has much of a chance of being successful?:rolleyes:

Cheers

JohnT

William F. Owen
06-12-2009, 02:10 PM
Apropos resources -- Remember Art Lykke's formulation of Ends+Ways+Means, where means were resources, both tangible and intangible. (Don't get me started on Art's 3-legged stool; it's clear that Art wasn't and engineer.)

Ends+Ways+Means, was Clausewitz's "paradoxical trinity." It's also the partial basis for UK Doctrines, 3 elements of Combat power

zenpundit
06-12-2009, 04:36 PM
Grand strategy for the US is made (or the responsibility of) the President with the advice of his NSC. It is published as the National Security Strategy of the US supposedly annually according to the Goldwater-Nichols Act. Because it is unclassified, it is inherently a partisan political document - some more so, some less. (The best of these was the final one published by the Budh 41 Adminsitration.) The NSC includes the CJCS as a statutory advisor; therefore, the military has appropriately input to US grand strategy. Note that the NSS is, in reality, a bureaucratic product so the Joint Staff and OSD are players. Key players from both as well as the NSC staff often wear military uniforms.

All true but that may or may not really become a grand strategy, which to be operational, has to exist as a shared set of assumptions among the broad elite, not just among a few members of agovernment bureaucracy during a particular administration. Cranking out policy docs will not cut it. The grand strategy has to be accepted deeply by the American people, or at least their broad leadership, or it rests on sand.

Containment was a grand strategy. So was the Atlantic Charter. So was the Open Door and the Monroe Doctrine. They were grand strategies because their core transcended normal partisanship and, in practice, became a frame of reference with which partisans and officials understood, framed and debated policy options and strategic goals. The grand strategy represented a vital consensus.

America lacks a real grand strategy right now because it is deeply divided between Left and Right and between elite and masses and few politicians care to do the hard work of building such a consensus or have the longitudinal perspective to see the need to do so. Short term thinking prevails.

Steve Blair
06-12-2009, 04:54 PM
America lacks a real grand strategy right now because it is deeply divided between Left and Right and between elite and masses and few politicians care to do the hard work of building such a consensus or have the longitudinal perspective to see the need to do so. Short term thinking prevails.

I would argue that when the older examples of grand strategy were framed, America was also deeply divided. The difference is that there wasn't a great deal of concern and/or recognition of the masses as such. Decision-making was much more insulated than it is today, making it easier to frame and carry out grand strategies. There's also the matter of overall context for the framing of those strategies. Obviously grand strategy is a flexible thing, but it's dangerous to draw historical comparisons without context.

Bob's World
06-12-2009, 05:11 PM
At the Duke Conference on Grand Strategy that I was fortunate enough to attend a comment was made and widely concurred with that:

"Grand Strategy is typically crafted by some speech writer, and then discovered 20 years later by some historian looking back for a way to explain or describe what had transpired" or words to that effect.

Most appear to be built around some threat as a focal point and are more a naming after the fact of what has been done then any cogent scheme going in.

You'd think we be smarter than that. But as mentioned above, if Grand Strategy is some "vital consensus;" that's virtually impossible to get on the front end. Far easier to describe what the majority position actually did post facto.


But here we are today. I am intrigued by FDR's approach to Grand Strategy, and he had one that he was prepared to employ following WWII, but died before he could implement it. I think it makes a great point of departure for looking at what a Grand Strategy might look like today (tailored for the new realities, of course):

1. The "Four Freedoms": Of Speech, of Religion, from fear, from want

2. The "Four Policemen": The United States, Great Britain, Russia, and China

3. The End of Colonialism

4. The promotion of Self Determination


Churchill blanched at any partnership with Russia or China; and was adamantly opposed to ending colonialism.

There must be greater shared responsibility for world order today, though the number may be more than 4, the states have changed, and "policeman" may not be the best role; and certainly the remnants of colonialism are at the heart of so many conflicts; as is the denial of self determination.

So my vote is we put FDR's position on the table and move forward from there. We could do a lot worse.

Ken White
06-12-2009, 05:20 PM
Living through the period and being a borderline adult when it began and assisting in small ways with its implementation for 45 years, I can only say that:

- Steve is right, there were divides between policy elites and the mass of the nation; rich and poor, the various armed forces, Congress and the WH, members of the punditocracy and political ideologies that were just as deep as they seem today -- the difference today is simply that we are less restrained in our speech to the point of egregious incivility and significantly improved and easier mass communication lets everyone know that.

We also seem to have not learned much history...

- Containment was not a strategy, it like the Monroe doctrine was a Policy that was generally followed when it suited (and was ignored when it did not) and a series of Strategies -- and stratagems -- were developed by all the eight Presidents who served while the policy was in being. Each mostly different; most, in hindsight, not as useful as many thought. ADDED: After some thought, I'd even say that some if not most of those strategies were really counterproductive.

John T. Fishel
06-12-2009, 06:04 PM
but disagree on the latter.

But first, a digression. There is not much agreement on what constitutes Grand Strategy. Steve Metz uses Barry Posen's definition which is not really different from a definition of foreign and security policy. Of course, Steve modifies the definition he has chosen to use toward the end of his book to bring in the "Ways and Means" - especially the latter. Some Grand Strategies are effective, some are not - just like military strategies and theater strategies. I see GS as how a state chooses to organize its resources (both tangible and intangible) and employ them to achieve its objectives in face of the objectives of others (which may or may not be threats). Usually, these are written as documents - the NSS is an attempt, imposed by Congress, to force the Executive to produce and puiblish a GS.

Containment was, indeed, a policy. Kennan's Long Telegram - later published as the X Article - was less than a strategy. It stated a goal in line with an assessment of the threat and argued that if the USSR's expansion were "contained" (a shorthand description of a "way"), the goal would be achieved. NSC 68 turned the policy into strategy and GS at that. It spelled out the ways and the means (resources) and served us well throughout the Cold War with some tweaking. Did it have to be written? Not in theory but in practice writing it out was necessary and functionally so to achieve an effective GS.

Cheers

JohnT

Ken White
06-12-2009, 06:55 PM
and NSC 68 was one (or an -- or the -- I'm easy :D) ) implementing strategy. No quarrel with that. I'll also point out that, per your comment yesterday, the document contained no resource considerations...

However, it did constitute a strategy. BTW, remind me -- who authored that document? ;)

I further agree that it largely guided all elements of the USG from implementation in 1951 for about 20 years -- and that its principles were broadly followed for another 20.

However, I also suggest that a look at History will dispel any notion of great continuity within that 'strategy'. From the 'New Look' (NEC 162/2) to 'Flexible Response' (host of NSC Docs and AR 100-McNamara) to 'Sufficiency' to "Mikhail, I'll outspend you..." That latter policy (again with no resource considerations...) endorsed by my Wife... :rolleyes:

Thus my contention that Containment was not a strategy but a policy implemented by numerous strategies. Many of which did as much harm as good... :wry:

Our political system is inimical to 'Grand Strategy.' I submit that's why there is argument over whether there is such a thing. Some nations have them and use them; most democracies cannot due to changes of government.

John T. Fishel
06-12-2009, 07:41 PM
agreed. George Kennan wrote the Long Telegram and X article which articulated what came to be called the Containment policy. It had no resourcing and only the barest outline of a method or COA ie contain the Sovs and not let them expand.

NSC 68 was an implementing strategy - in my view a GS (but that is not really important) - and did contain very specific resources and COA to put those resources in place for use as needed. You are right about the whole range of policies that were proposed by various administrations and a number of strategic tweaks. IMO, however, the strategic implementations all fell within the rubric of containment - even Reagan's we'll spend you into oblivion.

I guess that I would argue that the strategy first articulated by NSC 68 was GS simply because it was both national in scope and survived with some modifications for over 40 years. American expansionist GS from 1785 until 1890 was encapsulated in a whole bunch of docs from legislation to Indian treaties - kind of like the British "unwritten" constitution - that all involved removing the Indian nations from their land and enclosing them on ever smaller parcels and reservations and killing them if they refused to be enclosed.

Cheers

JohnT

Ken White
06-12-2009, 08:30 PM
State.

NSC 68 was written by the Policy Planning staff at State -- from whence internationally aimed strategies should appear.

It also short circuited the NSC, BoB and DoD, all of whom had different ideas. I think there's a very strong and good message in that...

The fact that Louis Johnson, far and away the worst and dumbest SecDef (worse than McNamara, Clifford, Aspin and the other two bad ones, Charlie Wilson and Tom Gates combined), was in the Pent-agony probably helped get it by the building...

As an aside of no relevance, I believe if you'll check, NSC 68 did not contain any real resource requirements but only broad estimates -- one reason Truman initially rejected it. Only after North Korea attacked the South did Truman decide to implement the directive -- and his spending on defense future programs immediately exceeded the NSC 68 estimates. That brings up two points -- other players can cause major strategy modifications and resource estimates will generally be low due to that fact.

slapout9
06-12-2009, 08:59 PM
Here is my version of Grand Strategy and Leadership,,,, 1962 We Choose To Go To The Moon!

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=g25G1M4EXrQ&feature=related

Ken White
06-12-2009, 11:08 PM
No question both strategies helped the country out of the economic low...

At the time.

John T. Fishel
06-12-2009, 11:27 PM
the Policy Planning Staff, led by Paul Nitze, wrote the thing. (Sorry I missed the essence of your question:o) Agree about Louis Johnson. But, in the 1948 - 50 period there was no NSC staff to speak of and the concept was that State was the lead agency. The PPS was an innovation of SECSTATE George C. Marshall that, IMO, he created to replicate a planning component of a military staff. Today, that is the J5 staff section at the JS and all GCCs. And the PPS has significantly atrophied.

DOD, in that time was NOT the 800 pound gorilla - it was 3 services trying to become a unified department and fighting it all theway. The JS, such as it was, was very small; OSD was largely non-existent. I could go on.

You are right that Truman intially rejected - rather did not approve - NSC 68 because it was weak on resourcing. But as the document evloved over the course of 1950 the resource components were added - and before the N Kor attack (for the most part). The question of whether Congress would have approved w/o the push from the N Kor is problematic at best.

NDU press has published NSC 68 (in all its interations to include Pres Tuman's public EO) with discussion and commentary icluding an intro by Nitze. It's available online.

Cheers

JohnT

Ken White
06-13-2009, 12:09 AM
DOD, in that time was NOT the 800 pound gorilla - it was 3 services trying to become a unified department and fighting it all theway. The JS, such as it was, was very small; OSD was largely non-existent. I could go on.Yep, sure do. Remember it well, didn't read about it. Still, they were a 400 to 500 pound Gorilla even then, resource allocation wise. Scattered all over DC and the suburbs, too. Even in the old Temps on the Mall.

Though I would have said four services trying every way they could to avoid becoming a unified Department. Pity they didn't win. Not only am I not a Goldwater-Nichols believer, I'm not a fan of DoD. The Service bureaucracies were bad enough without adding an upper layer. See DHS and the DNI for current versions... :D

This, OTOH:
...and before the N Kor attack (for the most part).Is not as I recall but it's really immaterial, I suppose... ;)

John T. Fishel
06-13-2009, 01:39 AM
perhaps, i should defer to your memory.:wry:

Ken White
06-13-2009, 02:23 AM
Uh, what'd I say...:confused::confused:

I'm not even sure why I'm in this room. :D

Bob's World
06-13-2009, 12:35 PM
Well, according to (caution, name drop coming) John Gaddis, there were "grand strategies of containment," probably dovetails in with Ken's comments that each Pres had his own cut on how to operate within that construct, and each had his own unique challenges to deal with as well.

As to where the line lies between grand strategy and policy, I guess my take is: Does it really matter?

One man's grand strategy may be another's policy, but show me a nation with neither and I'll show you the United States over the past 20 years. Responding to Crisis, vs shaping a national destiny.

To me, an effective Grand Strategy does not require concensus, and it also does not need to be rooted in some threat; but it should be holistic enough that it guides decisions as broad as what to do in Pakistan, whether or not to bail our Chrysler, or what to say in my speech in Cairo.

Containment gave us context. It enabled us to take a tie in Korea, a loss in Vietnam and press on to a victory on the main objective. Sadly few things fail like success, so we have been continuing to cling to what worked for so long, even though it really just doesn't fit the globalized, post-cold war world.

We need a new policy, or a new grand strategy. I don't care which, just pick one and lets get moving forward together in a manner that allows us to know how relatively important the daily dramas really are.

slapout9
06-13-2009, 12:52 PM
No question both strategies helped the country out of the economic low...

At the time.


Yes, he got it right and wrong. Cuba too. First the Bay of Pigs...oooopps not so good. Cuban missile crisis did it right....then turned right around and continued to support the assassination programs against Castro....which affected our legitimacy as an Honorable country after signing the agreement with the Soviet Union saying we wouldn't do this. Say what you mean and mean what you say.

But from another point of view Cuba was a credible threat, meaning they had the actual capability to strike the Continental United States both conventionally and later with nuclear weapons.....a clear threat that had to be dealt with in some way. Vietnam never was any of those things but look what we did:eek:

Bob's World
06-13-2009, 01:17 PM
Sometimes we get so fixated on "capability" that we lose sight of "motive."

N. Korea is playing a dangerous game. A crazy guy with a gun in a crowded room is scary enough. A crazy man with a nuke in a crowded world? You can't negotiate with crazy, so here is a case where focusing on capability is probably appropriate.

Iran is another story. Here we need to lean toward policies that target their motive to develop and use such weapons, while at the same time taking positions with them that address their legitimate beliefs that they need such capabilities to achieve a regional influence that is appropriate to Iran's status in the middle east. Both the Israelies and the Saudis lead us to taking positions with Iran that are more in their national interests than ours, and we need to break free from that. It seems that the President understands that and is heading in the right direction.

We don't worry about England, or France, or Israel. Why? Plenty of capability, but no motive. Time to bring Iran into the circle of trust. I don't think that requires them to go nuke, but they will never believe that so long as they are outside the circle.

slapout9
06-13-2009, 02:49 PM
BW, some good points. So let me ask you a question. The Mid-east region AO. First we invade one country then we invade two countries now we are talking about fighting in a 3rd country Pakistan. How many countries do you have to be fighting in before you have World War 3?

Ken White
06-13-2009, 06:05 PM
Yes, he got it right and wrong. Cuba too. First the Bay of Pigs...oooopps not so good. Cuban missile crisis did it right....Questionable. I'd say not really. He traded all our many IRBMs that were in Germany, Greece and Turkey for the few that the USSR had placed in Cuba. So, yeah, he got it done but at a net cost to US credibility -- he simply got out traded by Kruschev...

You said:
...Say what you mean and mean what you say.I agree but most politicians cannot do that for a variety of reasons -- some understandable, some not. As an example
...a clear threat that had to be dealt with in some way. Vietnam never was any of those things but look what we did:eek:We went to Viet Nam because Eisenhower unfortunately got persuaded by his SecState and against the advice of his Army Chief of Staff to sign a Mutual Support treaty with South Viet Nam. -- and then the brothers Kennedy, looking for a way to show how tough they were -- and boost a flagging US economy -- decided to use that treaty to fix both those problem...

That Administration and its idealists did this nation a lot of damage. Nor were they very good at either saying what they meant or doing what they said.

jmm99
06-13-2009, 08:01 PM
perhaps a dangerous thing; but it does relate to part of the conversation here - and to any number of similar threads. The basic question presented is whether CvC got his "remarkable triangle" right or wrong in describing the primary characteristics of the people and the government.

This is not to question the concept of a triangle composed of the three elements: people, miltary and government; and that they must interface in deciding matters of peace and war. I'm suggesting that CvC got the primary characteristics of the people and the government ass-backwards - at least in the context of the US, past, present and future (if the future follows US history).

-------------------------------------
Framework

Here is an example of where I am coming from re: CvC's concepts of the people and government. It simply sets the stage and framework for discussion.

MCDP 1-1 Strategy (http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/service_pubs/mcdp1_1.pdf)


pp.31-32

THE TRINITY

This chapter has described the nature of the strategic environment. This environment is defined by the nature of politics and the interactions of political entities that participate in the political process. The strategic environment is complex and subject to the interplay of dynamic and often contradictory factors. Some elements of politics and policy are rational, that is, the product of conscious thought and intent. Other aspects are governed by forces that defy rational explanation. We can discern certain factors that are at work in any strategic situation-the constants and norms-and use them as a framework to help understand what is occurring. At the same time, we realize that each strategic situation is unique and that in order to grasp its true nature, we must comprehend how the character and motivations of each of the antagonists will interact in these specific circumstances.

Summarizing the environment within which war and strategy are made, Clausewitz described it as being dominated by a “remarkable trinity” that is-


composed of primordial violence, hatred, and enmity, which are to be regarded as a blind natural force; of the play of chance and probability within which the creative spirit is free to roam; and of [war’s] element of subordination, as an instrument of policy, which makes it subject to reason alone.

The first of these three aspects mainly concerns the people; the second the commander and his army; the third the government.

These three tendencies are like three different codes of law, deep-rooted in their subject and yet variable in their relationship to one another. A theory that ignores any one of them or seeks to fix an arbitrary relationship between them would conflict with reality to such an extent that for this reason alone it would be totally useless.

Our task therefore is to develop a theory that maintains a balance between these three tendencies, like an object suspended between three magnets.[17]

Clausewitz concluded that the strategic environment is shaped by the disparate forces of emotion, chance, and rational thought. At any given moment, one of these forces may dominate, but the other two are always at work. The actual course of events is determined by the dynamic interplay among them. The effective strategist must master the meaning and the peculiarities of this environment.[18]

17. Clausewitz, p. 89. > 3. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. and ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976).

18. See Edward J. Villacres and Christopher Bassford, “Reclaiming the Clausewitzian Trinity,” Parameters (Autumn 1995) pp. 9-19.

For present purposes, I will assume (since I am not an SME there) that his characterization of the military is acceptable.

-------------------------------------------
Discussion

Coming back to the key passage in CvC, with some inserts from his other passages in the same quote above:


... a “remarkable trinity” .... composed of primordial violence, hatred, and enmity, which are to be regarded as a blind natural force [JMM: the people - emotion]; of the play of chance and probability within which the creative spirit is free to roam [JMM: the commander and his army - chance]; and of [war’s] element of subordination, as an instrument of policy, which makes it subject to reason alone [JMM: the government - rational thought].

CvC obviously had a rather dim view of the people ("primordial violence, hatred, and enmity, which are to be regarded as a blind natural force"), who presumably were saved from barbaric savagery by government (the "instrument of policy ... subject to reason alone"). Perhaps, that was so in Europe of the early 19th century when he wrote - and during the 18th century which informed his view of the people and government. I doubt it; but that is not my primary argument.

I would suggest that the people are a more immutable segment than government; and that collectively over time are much more subject to reason in favor of the national interest than government. I suggest that, in looking at this segment of the "remarkable triangle", we look to what can be termed the National Character (examples in MCDP 1-1 at pp.23-25), and also its Organic Framework or even its Civil Religion. That Character encompasses, but is not limited to, its overall pattern of laws and customs (which I regard as informal law). The point is that, whatever you call it, the People's Character changes very slowly - measuring change in terms of decades or even centuries (e.g., in basic legal principles, for example; while COL Jones and I will differ in how to treat particular principles in the Declaration of Independence and Constitution, as to their interpretation and implementation in specific cases, we both agree that these are key expressions of the American Character).

Government, particularly as we know it in a democracy, is scarcely immutable. It is subject to the election cycles - and a complete change-over can occur in a 6-year period (an effective change-over in less time). While it is true that the people may go off half-cocked (or become quite insane, as in the French Revolution), the charge is invariably led by politicians who become the new government. One should note that, in the later stages of the French Revolution, the people in effect had enough; thereby allowing Napoleon to re-institute the ancien regime with a new facade (more acceptable to the by-then accepted concepts of liberty, fraternity and equality - but not too much of them).

However, beyond the mutable nature of democratic government in time, another feature of politics and politicians interferes with the concept that government acts with reason and rational thought re: the national interests. This feature is as or more important than governmental rate of change. Politicians tend to act with reason and rational thought - re: their own self-interests - there are exceptions, but I believe they prove the rule.

If I am correct in this line of thought, following CvC's view of the people and government is based on his false premises as to the character of them - and will often yield lousy results, since one will be looking in the wrong place for rationality re: the national interest. Populace-centric formation of strategy ?

Ken White
06-13-2009, 09:21 PM
I believe CvC was in his time and place correct in his placement but that many years and a different developmental process have caused the very real mutation which you astutely divined.

People who vote -- or an inordinate fear of them -- cause strange ripples to the governmental process in all democracies. Our errors occur when we try to emulate Europe. Nice folks but we aren't Europeans, there is a slightly different mindset here. Not better, not worse -- just a little different on some things.

Germans are also nice people and a lot of Americans are of German extraction -- no insult to any of them when I say that I have long wished and said that the nascent US should have adopted fewer European ideas and more of the Hodenosaunee or Iroquois governmental practices. Even more so than they did -- particularly that bit wherein the Sachems had to consider the effect of their laws and rulings on to the seventh future generation (though the mind boggles at most of the folks we elect to Congress trying to do that)...

And how much better off we might have been had Thayendanega been the senior instructor at Valley Forge rather then Von Steuben. :wry:

(Yes, I know the Revolution would have lasted a bit longer -- but it would've ended the same way. Then the US army might not then have adopted most of European Army bad practice and ignored their good practices which is effectively what we have done...)

Surferbeetle
06-14-2009, 01:11 AM
:D

Von Steuben (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Friedrich_Wilhelm_von_Steuben) from Wikipedia:


Steuben's training technique was to create a "model company", a group of 120 chosen men who in turn successively trained other personnel at Regimental and Brigade levels. Steuben's eclectic personality greatly enhanced his mystique. He trained the soldiers, who at this point were greatly lacking in proper clothing themselves, in full military dress uniform, swearing and yelling at them up and down in German and French. When that was no longer successful, he recruited Captain Benjamin Walker, his French-speaking aide, to curse at them for him in English. Steuben introduced a system of progressive training, beginning with the school of the soldier, with and without arms, and going through the school of the regiment. This corrected the previous policy of simply assigning personnel to regiments. Each company commander was made responsible for the training of new men, but actual instruction was done by selected sergeants, the best obtainable.

Another program developed by Steuben was camp sanitation. He established standards of sanitation and camp layouts that would still be standard a century and a half later. There had previously been no set arrangement of tents and huts. Men relieved themselves where they wished and when an animal died, it was stripped of its meat and the rest was left to rot where it lay. Steuben laid out a plan to have rows for command, officers and enlisted men. Kitchens and latrines were on opposite sides of the camp, with latrines on the downhill side. There was the familiar arrangement of company and regimental streets.

Perhaps Steuben's biggest contribution to the American Revolution was training in the use of the bayonet. Since the Battle of Bunker Hill, Americans had been mainly dependent upon using their ammunition to win battles. Throughout the early course of the war, Americans used the bayonet mostly as a cooking skewer or tool rather than as a fighting instrument. Steuben's introduction of effective bayonet charges became crucial. In the Battle of Stony Point, American soldiers attacked with unloaded rifles and won the battle solely on Steuben's bayonet training.

Again from wikipedia, Thayendanegea (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joseph_Brant)


Thayendanegea or Joseph Brant (c. 1743 – 24 November 1807) was a Mohawk leader and British military officer during the American Revolution. Brant was perhaps the most well-known North American Indian of his generation. He met many of the most significant people of the age, including George Washington and King George III. The American folk image emphasized the wartime atrocities his forces committed against settlers in the Mohawk Valley; in Canada, he was remembered for his efforts to regain land for the Mohawk people.


Brant acted as a tireless negotiator for the Six Nations to control their land without crown oversight or control. He used British fears of his dealings with the Americans and the French to extract concessions. His conflicts with British administrators in Canada regarding tribal land claims were exacerbated by his relations with the American leaders.

Brant was a war chief, and not a hereditary Mohawk sachem. His decisions could and were sometimes overruled by the sachems and clan matrons. However, his natural ability, his early education, and the connections he was able to form made him one of the great leaders of his people and of his time. The situation of the Six Nations on the Grand River was better than that of the Iroquois who remained in New York. His lifelong mission was to help the Indian to survive the transition from one culture to another, transcending the political, social and economic challenges of one the most volatile, dynamic periods of American history. He put his loyalty to the Six Nations before loyalty to the British. His life cannot be summed up in terms of success or failure, although he had known both. More than anything, Brant's life was marked by frustration and struggle.

His attempt to create pan-tribal unity proved unsuccessful, though his efforts would be taken up a generation later by the Shawnee leader Tecumseh.

Ken White
06-14-2009, 02:30 AM
than is contained in the quotes or the Wiki articles. I'm also aware of the the fact that Washington elected to fight the British on their own terms and thus Von Steuben was beneficial -- and that Thayendanega was an Indian and they had difficulties with group discipline (but not, more importantly, with self discipline once they were pointed in the right direction). He sided with the British but that was as much due to American intransigence as his earlier relationships.

In any event, that allegory was not really aimed at the persons but at the fact that we adopted European models for many things we do and those were possibly not the best approach for a very independent people.

Way off thread here, to get back on, one could make the case that Indian Strategy was not good, as they sort of lost -- but when one considers the time period involved and the raw numbers on both sides, they really did quite well. My reason for mentioning the Von Steuben / Thayendanega contrast was to make the VonS / CvC link and the point that a lot of German ideas permeated the early US and not all were beneficial. OTOH, Thayendanega was as American as one could possibly be, he took care of his people and he was a smart and principled guy. I believe a happy medium between those two poles -- Europe / Indian -- would have better served us. However, we didn't go that route...

We for years have adopted European strategic concepts and patterns as well as a Eurocentric strategy and I agree with Bob's World that these patterns have not done us any favors.

And JMM has a good dissection of one reason this is possibly so.

Surferbeetle
06-14-2009, 12:40 PM
...Thayendanegea or Joseph Brant was new to me and so I chased and shared a link. The Van Steuben link on the other hand brought back some memories for me...

There was a summer day at Ft Knox which I spent in the commissary parking lot while Drill Sgt O taught me and many others the 'spirit of the bayonet'. I don't remember any German or French being used but I did indeed learn some new, interesting, and choice ways to use the English language from him :wry:

As an aside, mapping (http://code.google.com/apis/kml/documentation/kml_tut.html) the North American Indian tribes (http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/histus.html) looks pretty interesting. I haven't thought about this side of things since I did a report on the Pacific Northwest Tribes a long long time ago...

William F. Owen
06-14-2009, 01:23 PM
If I am correct in this line of thought, following CvC's view of the people and government is based on his false premises as to the character of them - and will often yield lousy results, since one will be looking in the wrong place for rationality re: the national interest. Populace-centric formation of strategy ?

Be a bit careful of jumping to that conclusion. CvC was pretty sceptical of democracy and/or republics, as he saw them work in practice. Best to look back at Thucydides as a strong influence on Clausewitz, were the forces that drive nations or peoples to war, were Fear, Honour, and/or Interest.

CvC was describing the process as an observer. He saw no evidence that people, governments or armies were guided by rational thought - which is why he did not have much time for democracy!

He also had a number of trinities, and they were all context specific. Passion, reason and chance, for example are those he uses to describe the social nature of war.

I would submit that US Foreign Policy post -911 shows CvCs observation, as being correct.

Ken White
06-14-2009, 02:30 PM
I would submit that US Foreign Policy post -911 shows CvCs observation, as being correct.even a scintilla of rational thought to same before 911 -- a highly suspect proposition... :D

CvC was right, democracies aren't rational -- but Winston was also correct, "“It has been said that democracy is the worst form of government except all the others that have been tried.”"

Really, though, that lack of rationality bit is somewhat suspect; I think Democracies are as if not more rational than other forms of government (lacking a particularly wise benevolent ruler) but they do not react as rapidly as do other governmental types and that time lag can give the impression of dithering when it is actually simply time consumed to reach consensus. Regardless, CvC was correct on trinities -- and they are inherently unstable. :wry:

And I think JMM is on to something...

jmm99
06-15-2009, 12:35 AM
not the Bermuda Triangle (which captured my initial try at this post when at home - and sent it into the ether); but this one:


from Wilf
He also had a number of trinities, and they were all context specific. Passion, reason and chance, for example are those he uses to describe the social nature of war.

which is exactly the "remarkable trinity" quoted in MCDP 1-1 Strategy, and in any number of US doctrinal publications on strategy.

In that "remarkable trinity", the characteristics (using your terms) are primarily associated as follows: "passion" (people), "reason" (government) and "chance" (armies). Or, in CvC's own terms (Howard & Paret translation, which I quoted in my prior post and here numbered for absolute clarity):


... composed [1] of primordial violence, hatred, and enmity, which are to be regarded as a blind natural force; [2] of the play of chance and probability within which the creative spirit is free to roam; and [3] of [war’s] element of subordination, as an instrument of policy, which makes it subject to reason alone.

The first of these three aspects mainly concerns the people; the second the commander and his army; the third the government.

I suggest the foregoing rather clearly establishes that reason ("rational thought" in your words; "rationality" in mine) was associated by CvC with governments - in his theoretical construct, reason cannot be associated with the people who are moved by "blind natural force" - "primordial violence, hatred, and enmity". Nor can "reason" be relied on in the case of commanders and armies because of the element of chance (query: why chaos and complexity theory would not be applicable to peoples and governments as well, but that is a subject matter for another thread).

No doubt that CvC's view of governments was informed by the European governments in place when he wrote (a product of Metternich and Vienna, so quite conservative in tidy boxes) - and those which had shaped Europe since Westphalia. In that construct, the Sovereign was co-terminous with Sovereignty - then, in a very real sense, the ruler was the state. Not that many years before, Louis XIV had stated exactly that.

The salient point of all that is that the government (the ruler and his cabinet) was necessarily composed of statesmen because their objectives and courses of action were the state's objectives and courses of action. The government was the state and defined the national interests. A very simple construct, justified by the realities ca. 1831 Europe.

CvC was also informed (perhaps a better word is "uninformed") as you say:


CvC was pretty sceptical of democracy and/or republics, as he saw them work in practice. Best to look back at Thucydides as a strong influence on Clausewitz, were the forces that drive nations or peoples to war, were Fear, Honour, and/or Interest.

as to which, the first point is simply that the Athenian and Spartan systems of governance were not informative when it came to the system of Jeffersonian-Jacksonian Democratic-Republicanism then developing in the US; or to the parliamentary system of democracy developed in the UK after George III lost his grip. The Greek systems are even less informative when it comes to the evolved systems of governance in either the US or UK. In short, CvC was no SME when it came to the interplay between the people, government and the military in modern democracies like the US and UK.

The second point deals with the Thucydidean construct of "fear, honour and/or interest" as factors leading to wars. In CvC's time, whose "fear, honour and/or interests" were critical to the decisions to make war ? The only answer is the ""fears, honour and/or interests" of the statesmen, since they (not the people) decided on the national interests that include those factors.

Now, use of the term "statesmen" has everything to do with those folks being the "deciders" when it came to what they believed was in the national interest. It has nothing to do with whether those statesmen (by the Grace of God, etc.) were competent or not in making those decisions. Since CvC had the decisions of Louis XIV, XV and XVI in front of him, we can fairly infer that he did not believe that all statesmen and their governments were competent.

Moving this up to the present, and back to my initial point, is that there have been substantive changes in US politics since the era of Jeffersonian-Jacksonian Democratic-Republicanism (which CvC would have viewed with some distain is a good probability). Crudely stated, we are much more likely to find politicians, rather than statesmen, making national policy decisions.

To introduce some rigor in my terms, by "politicians" I mean persons who practice "politics", the art of getting elected to and remaining in office - often by log rolling legislation and policies which enhance the latter objective. While this has always been true to some extent in US politics, the present practicalities of the election cycles and fund-raising efforts require politicians to be just that - leaving little room for consideration (much less implementation) of the national interests. The vastly quickened media cycle has also added up to politicians being more and more politicians.

Even beyond that, we have seen more and more "professional politicians" in office. That is, the guy or gal who perhaps went to law school (let's say with very high grades, etc.), but then got into politics at the grassroots (say, in community organizing) or by marrying into the governor's mansion. Those folks are indeed SMEs in politics - that is a serious comment; they are good at it and know their profession as well as any professional. But, that does not make them "statespersons".

They, at the highest level, do end up with that mission - to be statespersons faithfully representing the national interests (the "peoples' business" as they are so fond of saying) - until the next election cycle, etc. Perhaps, I am naive, but I believe that Pres. Bush then, and Pres. Obama now, felt and feel that they represented and represent the national interests - as they saw and see them. That situation is, however, qualitatively different from the situation that CvC wrote about.

My suggestion is that the People, collectively and over a longer timeframe, are more likely to get the national interests right, than transitory politicians.

Entirely too long, and somewhat political; but the subject matter of the discussion seemed to require some political sidebars.

---------------------------
Wilf, this ...


I would submit that US Foreign Policy post -911 shows CvCs observation, as being correct.

looks like an argument heading in a brief. Please feel free to complete the brief; but tell me what CvC observation you are suggesting (he must have made 100s or 1000s of observations); and the facts tying that observation into post-9/11 US foreign policy.

Cheers :)

Mike

William F. Owen
06-15-2009, 04:37 AM
JMM

My reading of CvC is that Passion is associated with the people, because people as a collective are not rational. Rule of the mob? Governments are driven Reason, because they have to put forth policy. Policy should be rational? Chance is the concern of armies because war is inherently unpredictable. Now these are not direct relationships, they are merely cited as dominant influences. I see them as largely correct and useful. The greater the passion of the people, the more the influence on reason. The better the chance, the greater influence on passion, and reason. - so after 911, invading A'Stan was not a great leap. We Want to do it + We Can do it, = We Should do it. - Passion + Chance = Reason.

With democracy you see the passion of the people driving the election politicians and thus passion driving policy. Hitler and Hamas both got elected! You also have the interplay of "Chance" since if the odds look good, the army is tempted to believe they can get what the "elected official" wants.

Yes the Governments of today are not the Government of 1831, but their primary purpose is still the defence of the nation. They still comprise the trinity of People, Leadership and Army(armed force). The FARC, Hezbollah and Hamas also conform to that model.

No CvC was not an SME on 21st Century US Politics, but nor was he on Marxism or National Socialism, yet his observations remain true in the prism of totalitarian states or even theocracies.


My suggestion is that the People, collectively and over a longer timeframe, are more likely to get the national interests right, than transitory politicians.
OK. So where is the evidence? I don't think CvC ever suggested that passion might not, in the long term, create a reasonable outcome. Most peoples passion is for a safe nation, but bear in mind that a lot of terrorist organisation and insurgencies are born of someone's passion.

jmm99
06-15-2009, 05:36 AM
from Wilf
My reading of CvC is that Passion is associated with the people, because people as a collective are not rational. Rule of the mob? ... Now these are not direct relationships, they are merely cited as dominant influences. I see them as largely correct and useful.

you are, in classical US political terms, a Hamiltonian . It is very much a matter of perception - and a product of one's entire life experience. So, I end up a Jeffersonian-Jacksonian. You don't see it that way.

Evidence of the people collectively acting over time ? As one example, I'd look to the Civil Rights story from Reconstruction to the present, where the pendulum swung back and forth until something of a consensus was reached by a majority of the people.

All this having been said, you haven't addressed the key issue of transitory politicians setting national policy. If CvC addressed that issue in one of his "observations", please supply the quote - thereby giving me a chance to recant and renounce heresy. :)

-------------------------

Watch out for Aaron Burrs. ;) Now there was a rabble rousing politician who tried to lead a charge. Good pistol shot, though.

William F. Owen
06-15-2009, 06:33 AM
All this having been said, you haven't addressed the key issue of transitory politicians setting national policy. If CvC addressed that issue in one of his "observations", please supply the quote - thereby giving me a chance to recant and renounce heresy. :)


I haven't addressed it because I think CvC does in pretty well on Page 89 of the Princeton, Howard and Paret edition.

Do Politicians set policy? Are they effected by the passion of the people? Do peoples passions effect the setting of policy? CvC indicates all these to be true.

Page 89: These three tendencies are like three different codes of law, deep-rooted in their subject and yet variable in their relationship to one another. A theory that ignores any one of them or seeks to fix an arbitrary relationship among them would conflict with reality to such an extent that for this reason alone it would be totally useless.
I can't see how this is out of step with modern polotics.

slapout9
06-15-2009, 02:43 PM
The Moral Linkage! is what is missing. Before you can develop any worthwhile Strategy you have to answer the question......Is this the right thing to do?The whole history of our country can be analyzed in that way. When we were morally right we did very well, when we weren't we generally got into trouble. That is why we have such a total lack of direction in this country today and it may be our final undoing, we don't agree on what the right thing to do is anymore so we fall into the trap of prgmatism.....we tend to do things just because they are possible and that is dangerous.

William F. Owen
06-15-2009, 02:54 PM
The Moral Linkage! is what is missing. Before you can develop any worthwhile Strategy you have to answer the question......Is this the right thing to do?The whole history of our country can be analyzed in that way. When we were morally right we did very well, when we weren't we generally got into trouble.

Errr... I think the Native Americans and Texan Mexicans might take a slightly different view on that, as may the people of South Korea, the Lebanon and Somalia. Who says when you are morally right? I suggest its a political perspective.

Ken White
06-15-2009, 03:23 PM
many times in our history when we we did what was morally right. OTOH, there are few cases of totally amoral conduct including those Wilf mentioned.

The few times we did what was morally right, we generally screwed it up. Viet Nam was an example. We signed a treaty to assist. Morally correct, I think. We then urged and paid the Viet Namese to ask us to assist. Morally wrong, I think. We then proceeded to assist. Morally questionable. We screwed it up -- morality not relevant.

Same with WW II. We were on the side of 'right.' We did what was needed to win regardless of human cost (ours or others). We cheated, lied, stole and bullied other nations to get into the war that may not have ever significantly affected us. What of all that was 'right' and what was 'wrong?'

There's a lot of gray out there...

That said, we and the British have generally acted in our own interests as have all nations. Across the board, both of us have done more good than harm on a practical (pragmatic) and realistic basis. I think the 'moral' aspect in the conduct of nations is sort of a misnomer. Nations are not people; they may have some social characteristics and national trends in the psyche arena but they aren't people.

It has been said that morals are what others think you should be doing -- but they may not necessarily feel constrained to act the same way. Lot of truth in that.

William F. Owen
06-15-2009, 03:54 PM
many times in our history when we we did what was morally right. OTOH, there are few cases of totally amoral conduct including those Wilf mentioned.

...and would not wish to imply that cases I cited were immoral. I think we share the same concern. I really worry when people talk about ethics and foreign policy in the same breath. I am not a relentless cynic, or wedded to Realpolitik, or the thoughts of Brother Nicolo, but I do see international politics as more competitive than co-operative, so I am a bit iffy when it comes to moral approaches.

George L. Singleton
06-15-2009, 03:57 PM
Overall I find William F. Owen's comments best synthesize the practical and textbook facts and history of "strategy."

National strategy or goal setting by the President as supported by the NSC is good on paper, but the interpersonal direct influence of the SECDEF and SECSTATE have disproportionate implications. I used to say the same about the Director of the CIA but not too sure about that these days.

As from slamming Senator McCain over a beer discussion I find that tasteless and rude and totally unnecessary, perhaps pandering to political correctness with another as our now new President.

We all owe our allegiance to whoever our President is and if we differ with him or her (future tense thinking) we work our disagreements through our Congressmen and Senators and at the next Presidential election.

My two cents.

slapout9
06-15-2009, 04:30 PM
Wilf,Ken as Gomer Pyle would say Thank Ya,Thank Ya,Thank Ya for proving my points! I have to go do stuff but I will respond later and perhaps I can splain stuff mo better better:)

Surferbeetle
06-15-2009, 06:29 PM
...with the understanding that Asia is not my area of expertise, but an interesting place nonetheless.

From David Rothkopf's blog on the FP Website (http://rothkopf.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/06/12/the_real_executive_compensation_solutionand_a_bid_ for_some_terrorists_i_can_call_my):


Then you arrive at Singapore's Changi Airport and you are powerfully reminded that the excellence of the airline is not a fluke. This is the best airport in the world, spacious, efficient, and attractive. As such, it is the perfect preparation for Singapore itself, almost certainly the best run political entity on the planet. Admittedly, the country, led from the start by the man who is now known as its Minister Mentor Lee Kwan Yew, has practiced what I would characterize as constrained form of democracy but few places have ever so compellingly made the case that what is trade away in terms of the occasional citation for spitting gum on the sidewalk is more than made up for in a society that is prosperous (Asia's second richest), innovative, and safe.

It is a government that has led the way by behaving in many ways like a corporation, taking ideas like competitiveness and strategic planning seriously. (At dinner tonight with a senior business executive who is one of the country's great entrepreneurial success stories, she said, "In the beginning, in Singapore, the state was the entrepreneur." And that was said with a genuine appreciation for all the state achieved in that role.) Even in the midst of a global recession it has been seen as not just responsive, but creatively responsive, promoting retraining of workers and focus on new growth industries.

Part of the credit must go to its unique system of senior government official compensation. Ministers are paid via a formula: two thirds of the average of the eight highest salaries in six key professions (lawyer, accountant, banker, multinational executive, local manufacturer, and engineer). As a result in recent years the president and the prime minister have made in excess of $2 million a year in salary and other ministers in excess of $1 million. The result is that many of the best minds will be found in the government, zero corruption and terrific results. Want an example of the innovation? The president, prime minister, and ministers took an almost one-fifth pay cut this year because of the recession. What? Accountability among public officials? Real incentives? Imagine the loud "gak" you would get out of the U.S. government as they choked on those ideas.

slapout9
06-15-2009, 07:04 PM
Errr... I think the Native Americans and Texan Mexicans might take a slightly different view on that, as may the people of South Korea, the Lebanon and Somalia. Who says when you are morally right? I suggest its a political perspective.


I will start with the easy ones.
Tex Mex, your are right that is why we are still fighting them and they are winning.

Somalia,Lebanon, we should not have gone so we left good moral recovery.

Indians, we started off wrong in some cases but not all, but again good moral recovery at least in the South Indian tribes have exclusive rights to gambling,tobacco,alcohol in some places and have become political and economic powerhouses.

South Korea, I would leave it is their fight now.

slapout9
06-15-2009, 07:11 PM
The few times we did what was morally right, we generally screwed it up. Viet Nam was an example. We signed a treaty to assist. Morally correct, I think. We then urged and paid the Viet Namese to ask us to assist. Morally wrong, I think. We then proceeded to assist. Morally questionable. We screwed it up -- morality not relevant.



That is exactly my point exactly Ken ! We started out morally correct then screwed it up when we we tried to manipulate it or become immoral so morality is the binding glue for good or bad! The Moral..... is as you have said we need to be darn sure about our interest before we go sticking our noses into other people's business.

jmm99
06-15-2009, 07:39 PM
that is p.89 of Howard & Paret, as appears in full in my post #37 (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=74485&postcount=37), and which I will repeat here (keeping my numbering to designate the three points of the trinity; and keeping your emphasis and mine as well; and including CvC's fourth paragraph):


... composed [1] of primordial violence, hatred, and enmity, which are to be regarded as a blind natural force; [2] of the play of chance and probability within which the creative spirit is free to roam; and [3] of [war’s] element of subordination, as an instrument of policy, which makes it subject to reason alone.

The first of these three aspects mainly concerns the people; the second the commander and his army; the third the government.

These three tendencies are like three different codes of law, deep-rooted in their subject and yet variable in their relationship to one another. A theory that ignores any one of them or seeks to fix an arbitrary relationship among them would conflict with reality to such an extent that for this reason alone it would be totally useless.

Our task therefore is to develop a theory that maintains a balance between these three tendencies, like an object suspended between three magnets.

-------------------
Again, I have to make it very clear that the situation I am addressing is the interface between the people, the government and the military in setting national policy, and its impact on national strategy and military strategy (as those terms are defined in joint doctrine), as that interface exists in the US in the first decade of the 21st century.

I am not making or trying to make some generalized argument that applies to the US in other time periods, or to other nations in the same or other time periods. In short, I'm not addressing the application of CvC to Hitler or Hamas, WWII or Vietnam, Native Americans or Texan Mexicans, or the peoples of South Korea, the Lebanon and Somalia.

Scope: US, 1st decade of 21st century - its interface of people, government and military.

---------------------------
What CvC wrote is clear enough. As to the main tendency of the people: "[1] of primordial violence, hatred, and enmity, which are to be regarded as a blind natural force;" As to the main tendency of the government: "[3] of [war’s] element of subordination, as an instrument of policy, which makes it subject to reason alone."

My modest suggestion is that the primary characteristics, that CvC applied to the people and government ca. 1831 (a view strongly held by Metternich in Europe and less strongly by Hamilton in the US), are not the primary characteristics of situation I address - US, 1st decade of 21st century - its interface of people, government and military.

Further, I suggest that to take CvC's early 19th century charactistics for the people and government ("tendencies", as he called them, "like three different codes of law, deep-rooted in their subject") and apply them to the 21st century US situation, would be serious error - and without rigor.

In fact, I would suggest that to do so would to violate CvC's statement that "to fix an arbitrary relationship among them" would render that argument "totally useless" (from 3rd CvC paragraph quoted above).

My second modest suggestion is that CvC's early 19th century analysis of the people and government did not (and could not - since CvC did not claim a magic crystal ball) take into account what I call the transitory politicians of the 21st century US situation. Again, to attempt to define them (the transitory politicians) in terms of the 19th and 18th century statesmen would also be an "arbitrary fixation" - and also "totally useless".

So, my two modest suggestions are not contrary to CvC's warning against "arbitrary fixations" - in fact, they heed that warning.

The following is an important concept; that is, the "tendencies" are "... yet variable in their relationship to one another" (as Ken said, "they are inherently unstable"); and that (4th para. above):


Our task therefore is to develop a theory that maintains a balance between these three tendencies, like an object suspended between three magnets.

It is impossible to develop a theory and maintain the balance if one gets the composition of the magnets wrong; and attempts to define them for what they are not.

end part 1

Ken White
06-15-2009, 08:00 PM
That is exactly my point exactly Ken ! We started out morally correct then screwed it up when we we tried to manipulate it or become immoral so morality is the binding glue for good or bad! The Moral..... is as you have said we need to be darn sure about our interest before we go sticking our noses into other people's business.For Viet Nam, Eisenhower signing that treaty may have been 'morally correct' but it was strategically stupid. While I agree about being sure of our interests, sometimes the 'other people' are totally ancillary to our business. That was the case here.

In the event on VN, Kennedy decided to cater to domestic politics and engage in a little foreign adventure. I'm not making any moral judgment on that nor am I at all sure there is one to be made. One can make a political judgment about it -- I think it was wrong and self serving -- but I'm not sure where it lies in the moral compass bit.

You can ding Johnson for moral turpitude in his bid to expand it and the way he went about it but essentially morally neutral or ambivalent moves by Eisenhower and Kennedy put him in a position to do that. The one could not, would not, have happened without the others.

What happened after he got stupid was not a moral thing; the real screw ups were operationally and tactically by the US Army -- no moral dimension ascribed to that either; it was just a screw up. Nothing more (Mostly the fault of poor training -- now there's a moral failure... :eek: )

Back to our interests -- Who determines what our interests are? Therein lies the problem. For every US military adventure, there were people who legitimately believed it was the right thing to do. There were also people who said it was morally wrong. That's been true from the early Indian troubles on the frontier before we were even a nation through the Whiskey Rebellion up to Afghanistan today. In hindsight, there were at least questionable aspects about every one of our military efforts in a 'moral' dimension. EVERY one...

My belief is that all war is immoral and stupid -- but some are necessary. So are some military adventures. Iraq or something like it was necessary IMO. Thus I think it was the right thing to do (again, done poorly by the US Army and yet again due to poor training...) without ascribing any morality to it though some have said it was okay morally. Others strongly disagree with that, saying it was not the right thing to do and some saying it was immoral. Who's right? Depends on one's viewpoint, I believe.

I'm not sure you can properly apply moral judgment to the conduct of a nation if for no other reason than that there will always be people who disagree on moral grounds with any action -- or on failures to take action.

jmm99
06-15-2009, 08:20 PM
Did CvC have something to say about this, beyond the direct quotation of his "remarkable trinity" ? Indeed, he did.

The following quotes are from J.J. Graham translation, published in London in 1873, from Book 8, Chapter III, subpart B. "Of the Magnitude of the Object of the War, and the Efforts to be Made", which is here (http://www.clausewitz.com/readings/OnWar1873/Bk8ch03.html#B) - so everyone can quickly find them online and see the context. These quotes are running from start to finish (no cherry picking), starting 6th paragraph from the bottom:

------------------------

The first quote sets the context, where the French Revolution and Napoleon were much on CvC's mind - and where he eschewed prediction of the future:


Thus, therefore, the element of war, freed from all conventional restrictions, broke loose, with all its natural force. The cause was the participation of the people in this great affair of State, and this participation arose partly from the effects of the French Revolution on the internal affairs of countries, partly from the threatening attitude of the French towards all nations.

Now, whether this will be the case always in future, whether all wars hereafter in Europe will be carried on with the whole power of the States, and, consequently, will only take place on account of great interests closely affecting the people, or whether a separation of the interests of the Government from those of the people will gradually again arise, would be a difficult point to settle; and, least of all, shall we take upon us to settle it. But every one will agree with us, that bounds, which to a certain extent existed only in an unconsciousness of what is possible, when once thrown down, are not easily built up again; and that, at least, whenever great interests are in dispute, mutual hostility will discharge itself in the same manner as it has done in our times.

This brings in the concept that "great interests closely affecting the people" will result in a different manner of how "mutual hostility will discharge itself".

----------------------------

The next step in CvC's analyis (of his summary historical sections that precede this part) was to introduce the doctrine that each period has "its own peculiar forms of war", "its own theory of war" and must be judged in terms of the "peculiarities of the time"....


We here bring our historical survey to a close, for it was not our design to give at a gallop some of the principles on which war has been carried on in each age, but only to show how each period has had its own peculiar forms of war, its own restrictive conditions, and its own prejudices. Each period would, therefore, also keep its own theory of war, even if every where, in early times, as well as in later, the task had been undertaken of working out a theory on philosophical principles. The events in each age must, therefore, be judged of in connection with the peculiarities of the time, and only he who, less through an anxious study of minute details than through an accurate glance at the whole, can transfer himself into each particular age, is fit to understand and appreciate its generals.

But this conduct of war, conditioned by the peculiar relations of States, and of the military force employed, must still always contain in itself something more general, or rather something quite general, with which, above everything, theory is concerned.

but that the "conduct of war" has, in each era, some things which are quite general and which imply a more general theory of the conduct of war.

-------------------------------
The last step in CvC's analysis was recognition that all future wars will not be of a "grand character" - and that "external influences" and "manifold diversity of causes" alter the nature of the particular war. While not expressly mentioning the "people" and "government" legs of the trinity, context suggests that they are the source of the "external influences" and "manifold diversity of causes":


The latest period of past time, in which war reached its absolute strength, contains most of what is of general application and necessary. But it is just as improbable that wars henceforth will all have this grand character as that the wide barriers which have been opened to them will ever be completely closed again. Therefore, by a theory which only dwells upon this absolute war, all cases in which external influences alter the nature of war would be excluded or condemned as false. This cannot be the object of theory, which ought to be the science of war, not under ideal but under real circumstances. Theory, therefore, whilst casting a searching, discriminating and classifying glance at objects, should always have in view the manifold diversity of causes from which war may proceed, and should, therefore, so trace out its great features as to leave room for what is required by the exigencies of time and the moment.

Accordingly, we must add that the object which every one who undertakes war proposes to himself, and the means which he calls forth, are determined entirely according to the particular details of his position; and on that very account they will also bear in themselves the character of the time and of the general relations; lastly, that they are always subject to the general conclusions to be deduced from the nature of war.

So, analysis in this strategic context must be situation dependent, though always subject to the "general conclusions" to be deduced from the nature of war as it has been conducted.

slapout9
06-15-2009, 11:55 PM
You can ding Johnson for moral turpitude in his bid to expand it and the way he went about it but essentially morally neutral or ambivalent moves by Eisenhower and Kennedy put him in a position to do that. The one could not, would not, have happened without the others.



That is my point or rather the point, do see how what you call moral ambivalence got us into trouble and then it just went down hill from there. National Strategy has to start with what is right for the Country.

As to our interest. nations are people and some type of representation either elected or what ever..... but it is the human leadership of the country that is responsible. In our country their powers are defined in the Constitution as in how we deal with Treaties and Declarations of War and real live human beings are supposed to be held responsible for that.

Ken White
06-16-2009, 12:47 AM
I didn't say moral ambivalence -- I said morally neutral OR ambivalent. That is IMO, the early moves were morally clean or neutral but the worst case interpretation could only say they were ambivalent. That didn't get us into trouble; nor did Johnson's morally wrong Tonkin Gulf incident get us into trouble -- the poor performance of the US Army got us into trouble. Had the Army done better, Johnson's foolishness would have been irrelevant

If you want to play the morality game, i guess you could say that had Johnson's immoral act not been committed -- and had the majority of Congress gone along with him as well as the mass of Public Opinion -- the Army wouldn't have been there to fail -- but you're also confronted with the fact that Eisnhower's basically morally sound act set the stage for the whole thing. That's why I say one should be careful throwing that 'moral' charge around with respect to a nation. Any nation. It's generally not that clear cut.

One can, I guess, make moral judgments on what nations do; I just don't think anything is that simple and I don't believe nations are people and thus they cannot be judged as one would judge an individual. Any national action, particularly in a democracy, is going to have multiple players involved in decisions and I don't think group action can be judged as one would assess a single person. Say that nations should do what's right and I totally agree; say the must act morally and I ask ; whose morals? Mine, yours, my Uncle Bud? My Friend Tom? John Gotti's? Amy Winehouse's?

What's right can be arrived at by consensus; what's moral is an individual construct.

Yes, people are supposed to be held responsible for THEIR acts and, indirectly, if they were in charge, for the acts of the nation. That doesn't seem to me to address the point you're making. Every President from John Adams forward with few exceptions exceeded his authority to one degree or another. Adams and the Naval War with France and the Alien and Sedition Acts. Jefferson got those Acts repealed and pardoned all who had been convicted under them -- and then he proceeded to do some flaky stuff himself.

Move on to Lyndon and then forward. I've lived through 13 Presidents and every single one of them has "lied to the American People." We've undertaken a whole lot of less than moral actions and you cannot say that, in the end, all or even most were bad.

In fact, I'd appreciate it if you could name me a military effort by this country that was 'moral' in the sense I think you mean. I'm sure there's one out there but right now, I can't recall a one. You could also name me one that was a net minus for mankind or the country if you can think of one...

slapout9
06-16-2009, 02:18 AM
What's right can be arrived at by consensus; what's moral is an individual construct.



I don't see a differance between what is right and what is moral. I am not talking about an old guy with a beard up in the sky that is going to throw lighting bolts at us kind of moral. Moral in the sense of what is good based upon our laws, which while we are here on earth is pretty much the highest ones we are going to see.

Ken White
06-16-2009, 03:20 AM
that what is right can be arrived at by consensus (or application of law, which I did not say but is true, so we agree on that...) while what is moral is an individual construct. My morals and yours probably differ -- and ol' John Gotti probably differed in moral outlook to bofus. :D

I'd still like your opinion on the questions:

""...I'd appreciate it if you could name me a military effort by this country that was 'moral' in the sense I think you mean. I'm sure there's one out there but right now, I can't recall a one. You could also name me one that was a net minus for mankind or the country if you can think of one...""

Surferbeetle
06-16-2009, 03:26 AM
...which can be downloaded from iTunes for free and which livens up the morning commute...Plato's The Republic (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Republic_(Plato)) :wry:


At the end of Book I, Socrates agrees with Polemarchus that justice includes helping friends, but says the just man would never do harm to anybody. Thrasymachus believes that Socrates has done the men present an injustice by saying this and attacks his character and reputation in front of the group, partly because he suspects that Socrates himself does not even believe harming enemies is unjust. Thrasymachus gives his understanding of justice as "what is good for the stronger", meaning those in power over the city. Socrates finds this definition unclear and begins to question Thrasymachus. In Thrasymachus' view, the rulers are the source of justice in every city, and their laws are just by his definition since, presumably, they enact those laws to benefit themselves. Socrates then asks whether the ruler who makes a mistake by making a law that lessens their well-being, is still a ruler according to that definition. Thrasymachus agrees that no true ruler would make such an error. This agreement allows Socrates to undermine Thrasymachus' strict definition of justice by comparing rulers to people of various professions. Thrasymachus consents to Socrates' assertion that an artist is someone who does his job well, and is a knower of some art, which allows him to complete the job well. In so doing Socrates gets Thrasymachus to admit that rulers who enact a law that does not benefit them firstly, are in the precise sense not rulers. Thrasymachus gives up, and is silent from then on. Socrates has trapped Thrasymachus into admitting the strong man who makes a mistake is not the strong man in the precise sense, and that some type of knowledge is required to rule perfectly. However, it is far from a satisfactory definition of justice.

At the beginning of Book II, Plato's two brothers challenge Socrates to define justice in the man, and unlike the rather short and simple definitions offered in Book I, their views of justice are presented in two independent speeches. Glaucon's speech reprises Thrasymachus' idea of justice; it starts with the legend of Gyges who discovered a ring that gave him the power to become invisible.[8] Glaucon uses this story to argue that no man would be just if he had the opportunity of doing injustice with impunity. With the power to become invisible, Gyges is able to enter the royal court unobserved, seduce the queen, murder the king, and take over the kingdom. Glaucon argues that the just as well as the unjust man would do the same if they had the power to get away with injustice exempt from punishment. The only reason that men are just and praise justice is out of fear of being punished for injustice. The law is a product of compromise between individuals who agree not to do injustice to others if others will not do injustice to them. Glaucon says that if people had the power to do injustice without fear of punishment, they would not enter into such an agreement. Glaucon uses this argument to challenge Socrates to defend the position that the just life is better than the unjust life. Adeimantus adds to Glaucon's speech the charge that men are only just for the results that justice brings one- fortune, honor, reputation. Adeimantus challenges Socrates to prove that being just is worth something in and of itself, not only as a means to an end.

Glaucon's speech seduces Socrates for it is in itself contradictory. Glaucon has openly, passionately and forcibly argued for the superiority of the unjust life, something truly unjust men would never do in public. Socrates says that there is no better topic to debate. In response to the two views of injustice and justice presented by Glaucon and Adeimantus, he claims incompetence, but feels it would be impious to leave justice in such doubt. Thus The Republic sets out to define justice. Given the difficulty of this task as proven in Book I, Socrates in Book II leads his interlocutors into a discussion of justice in the city, which Socrates suggests may help them see justice in the person, but on a larger scale.[9]

Surferbeetle
06-16-2009, 04:00 AM
In fact, I'd appreciate it if you could name me a military effort by this country that was 'moral' in the sense I think you mean. I'm sure there's one out there but right now, I can't recall a one. You could also name me one that was a net minus for mankind or the country if you can think of one...

From Wikipedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Paperclip)


Operation Paperclip was the code name for the 1945 Joint Intelligence Objectives Agency[1] O.S.S.[citation needed] recruitment of German scientists from Nazi Germany to the U.S. after VE Day.[2]

President Truman authorised Operation Paperclip in August 1945, however he had expressly ordered that anyone found "to have been a member of the Nazi party and more than a nominal participant in its activities, or an active supporter of Nazism militarism" would be excluded.

Under this criteria many of the scientists recruited such as Wernher von Braun, Arthur Rudolph and Hubertus Strughold, who were all officially on record as Nazis and listed as a “menace to the security of the Allied Forces”, were ineligible. All were cleared to work in the U.S. after having their backgrounds "bleached" by the military. The paperclip which secured their new details in their personnel files gave the operation its name.

With the benefit of hindsight the cost/benefit ratios certainly appear to trend towards the plus side of things...

slapout9
06-16-2009, 04:41 AM
that what is right can be arrived at by consensus (or application of law, which I did not say but is true, so we agree on that...) while what is moral is an individual construct. My morals and yours probably differ -- and ol' John Gotti probably differed in moral outlook to bofus. :D

I'd still like your opinion on the questions:

""...I'd appreciate it if you could name me a military effort by this country that was 'moral' in the sense I think you mean. I'm sure there's one out there but right now, I can't recall a one. You could also name me one that was a net minus for mankind or the country if you can think of one...""


I was getting to that. Revolutionary War, Civil War, WW2 as good examples of Morally correct Wars.

Not sure what you mean by net minus for mankind or the country. I got it the War on drugs a net minus:D:D:D

William F. Owen
06-16-2009, 05:23 AM
Further, I suggest that to take CvC's early 19th century charactistics for the people and government ("tendencies", as he called them, "like three different codes of law, deep-rooted in their subject") and apply them to the 21st century US situation, would be serious error - and without rigor.

My modest suggestion is that the primary characteristics, that CvC applied to the people and government ca. 1831 (a view strongly held by Metternich in Europe and less strongly by Hamilton in the US), are not the primary characteristics of situation I address - US, 1st decade of 21st century - its interface of people, government and military.



a.) OK, so are you saying the the Passion, Reason, Chance trinity does not apply in the 21st Century US?

b.) So would you suggest better ascribing the characteristic of Passion (you can also say Emotion) to the Government or the Army and not the People?

....and I assume we are talking about the same 21st Century Americans who vote more on game shows than they do national elections? :eek:
Do Emotions ever effect things at the polls?

Sticking with the Howard Paret translation (because all my CvC commentaries use it) Book 1, Chap 1, Section 3, P76 says that "even the most civilise people can be fired with a passionate hatred for each other." How does that not describe emotions post 911?

Would you expect the primary source of emotion to be Army of the Government? Is the trinity wrong? If so, how?

If you are telling me that CvCs trinity does not accurately describe the system within which you live, then OK, but we'll have to wait and see, because it did, just 9 years ago, and has historically right up until now. Yes the US people may not be emotionally connected with current conflicts, but that does not undermine CvCs basic observations.

Ken White
06-16-2009, 05:36 AM
The Revolution was fomented by a bunch of folks who initially had no real problems; went out of their way to create problems and got a King they knew would be intransigent to overreact. British mistreatment was not an issue -- Colonial political ambitions and a long standing Scotch Irish hatred of the English fed that puppy...

The Civil War comes closest to being morally right, no question -- but that, too was fomented by a bunch of hotheads and the lead up during the late 1850s was beyond morally dubious -- and that applies to both sides. The abrogation of the Missouri compromise and the 30 year later compromise of 1850 plus the Dred Scott decision were moves pushed by some to get a war. No moral high ground on either side.

WW II was FDR's baby; he personally orchestrated the campaign to push the Japanese to get a predictable reaction and he got it. He violated dozens of laws to do that and supply the British -- and then deliberately drove the British and the French out of the colonial business. You may applaud that latter as a morally correct thing to do but our then 'allies' didn't look at it that way. Once in the war, we did what needed to be done to win but those things were not pretty -- nor were they moral. Not at all. I have no problem with any of them -- but they were not moral. :eek: ;)

Thus, your point that if we act morally, it turns out okay and that if we start morally and then go to a lower moral plane, we screw it up is not correct -- with respect to those three, it's backward in fact. All three were entered on morally suspect grounds but turned out alright for us.

All of our wars, morally suspect or not, have effectively left us better off than we were before them. Even Viet Nam. All have mostly been better for the world. All had costs and those costs in human terms may have been bad but they were transient costs. As an aside, I don't consider the War on Drugs a war -- it's just stupid. :rolleyes:

The right or wrong, the moral aspect, is only a part of the equation. It ain't that simple -- and that's my point in this discussion; moral is good and we can agree on that. However, there's more to it than that and we the US have never really been very moral in any of our military stuff, it's all about national interest and moral has never entered into it except for PR purposes -- except for maybe Wilson and WW I and even that was as much about selling stuff to Britain and France and getting Germany out of the Pacific area as it was defeating the Hun... :wry:

Jimmy Carter was probably the most moral President ever; certainly the most moral in my lifetime and easily the most honest -- yet he lied to the public on several occasions and his South Asia and Middle East policies are almost directly responsible for where we are today. Morality isn't everything. There's an awful lot of gray out there and there are few absolutes.

Ken White
06-16-2009, 06:02 AM
the first post on this sub thread and extracted what I thought (dangerous, that...) was JMM's principal point, to wit:
I would suggest that the people are a more immutable segment than government; and that collectively over time are much more subject to reason in favor of the national interest than government.I agreed with that and still do, all Wilf's valid points about the US populace not withstanding.

My reason for agreeing is that our US Politicians today -- the Government -- are entirely too much in the pandering and touchy-feely modes and will not take positions on anything that might force them to take an unambiguous stand. Add to that their fealty to their party and national interest becomes simply something to talk about for most. The people, not running for office, can effectively put their perception of the national interest first and most do so where as those in government are perpetually wishy washy.

That has not been the case in the past, I'd say things started changing in the 1970s and the transition is ongoing and has still not fully crystallized. However, I think it definitely is close to being complete.

Those 'people,' the hoi polloi, will definitely fall down on the side of the national interest as they see it but they do need a minor crisis that is an annoying interruption of their self centered day to day life to be stirred up enough to do that. :wry:

All that is said by me with respect to JMM's point and I'm not getting into what CvC might have said or meant -- I was busy elsewhere (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Siamese-Vietnamese_War_(1831-1834)) when he wrote the book...

You two have fun... ;)

William F. Owen
06-16-2009, 06:57 AM
As concerns the statement

I would suggest that the people are a more immutable segment than government; and that collectively over time are much more subject to reason in favor of the national interest than government.

I can't say that that is wrong, and I don't think CvC would quibble. The critical qualifier is "collectively over time." This in no way undermines the observation as the people being the source of passion.

a.) Passion/emotion is extremely important and does exist.
b.) The source of that passion is not the government or the military.

CvC never said that people might not see reason. By 1944, Hitler was patently more irrational/unreasonable than the German people, but a a lot had happened to get to that point. It was certainly the opposite in 1936.

slapout9
06-16-2009, 09:14 AM
Thus, your point that if we act morally, it turns out okay and that if we start morally and then go to a lower moral plane, we screw it up is not correct -- with respect to those three, it's backward in fact. All three were entered on morally suspect grounds but turned out alright for us.



That just doesn't make sense.

1- The Revolutionary War-remember The Declaration of Independence....The right of the People to alter and or Abolish it,etc. classic morality.

2-Civil War-again classic morality. The South wanted to separate from the Union which is illegal and Honest Abe fulfilled his 1st responsibility per the Constitution....."Form a more Perfect Union". And after the War he began Reconstruction again classic morality.

3-FDR - had to fight the 2nd World War because Wilson was so immoral in the first World War by being so oppressive of Germany after the War that he guaranteed a second World War. Unlike FDR who through the Marshall plan helped to rebuild Germany and Europe and avoid future conflict, again classic morality.
Wilson also created the Federal Reserve Board again a classic act of immorality and the source of many of our current financial problems. In fact he was so bad he thought he had ruined the country.

Link to his own quote about the Federal Reserve.....

http://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Talk:Woodrow_Wilson

William F. Owen
06-16-2009, 10:18 AM
1- The Revolutionary War-remember The Declaration of Independence....The right of the People to alter and or Abolish it,etc. classic morality.


I'd stay clear of attributing morality to any of these things. I could see the US declaration of Independence - for the white folks - as a pretty ill-disguised attempt to create an advantageous political and economic outcomes, once created by colonial endeavours. You cannot assume a morality is an absolute condition, applicable to modern constructs of foreign policy.

To rather state the obvious, the Nazis went to extreme lengths to ensure all their crimes had legal and moral justification - a trick borrowed from the Catholic Church!

Ken White
06-16-2009, 02:23 PM
That just doesn't make sense.Oh, it makes sense; it's also accurate and easily verifiable history. It just clashes with your view... :wry:
1- The Revolutionary War-remember The Declaration of Independence....The right of the People to alter and or Abolish it,etc. classic morality.Yes, that's probably true -- but what about the immorality to get to that point. You just don't count that part?
...The South wanted to separate from the Union which is illegal and Honest Abe fulfilled his 1st responsibility per the Constitution...It wasn't known as illegal at the time though that war made it so and again you gloss over the bad stuff that got it started to get to the good that came out of it...
...had to fight the 2nd World War because Wilson was so immoralFDR was as or more immoral than Wilson, politicians are like that. You're also wrongly ascribing the role of Clemenceau in the Treaty of Versailles to Wilson -- Wilson and the British just went along with the French who were determined to cripple Germany. The French were next door, we and the British were further away and had not been invaded by Germany twice in 44 years...

All politicians are immoral, just as are all wars. Including all three of those. Doesn't mean that they didn't do some good -- as I said, it isn't nearly as cut and dried as you seem to be determined to make it. :D

slapout9
06-16-2009, 02:33 PM
I'd stay clear of attributing morality to any of these things. I could see the US declaration of Independence - for the white folks - as a pretty ill-disguised attempt to create an advantageous political and economic outcomes, once created by colonial endeavours. You cannot assume a morality is an absolute condition, applicable to modern constructs of foreign policy.

To rather state the obvious, the Nazis went to extreme lengths to ensure all their crimes had legal and moral justification - a trick borrowed from the Catholic Church!

Wilf, nothing but British propaganda :D also I am Southern Baptist.:eek:

slapout9
06-16-2009, 02:50 PM
Ken, I don't gloss over anything just happen to agree with you about how horrible (not immoral) war can be. Don't think there is such an animal as a good war but some are necessary.

I don't see where we disagree that much myself. I don't see where moral conflicts with our interest when we accurately understand them. Take the example that Surfer beetle posted. Operation Paperclip It was moral and it was in our best interest to do so.

When you put a certain version of Religious Morality in!!!! is when you get into trouble. Take Vietnam....the original agreement to assist was moral (in our interest) then it began to get twisted and became immoral(not in our interest) and finally we became moral again and we left, it was in our best interest to do so.

The problem is when national leaders follow what is in their personal interest (moral/immoral) vs. what is in the interest(moral/immoral) of the country.

Ken White
06-16-2009, 03:41 PM
For example, my perception of Surferbeetle's post was that the operation was not very moral (i.e. disregarding the guidelines and accepting former Nazis to work on the rocket and later space program *) but that it was of benefit.

This:
The problem is when national leaders follow what is in their personal interest (moral/immoral) vs. what is in the interest(moral/immoral) of the country.is very much a personal interpretation; I have no quarrel with that 'interest' portion and I agree -- I'm simply saying the 'moral' portion is an individual perception. That your take and mine differ on the role of morality in three or four wars is proof of that; that Wilf and Surferbeetle chime in on the topic is even more proof.

* Note that does not address the fate of other former Nazis we did not bend the guidelines for, who provided the US with no benefit as did those scientists and whom we threw to the wolves when they were discovered. If you think all that was / is moral or right; we'll just have to disagree...

selil
06-16-2009, 03:52 PM
Arguing morals is like tying cats tails together. Fun, but useless. The structure of morals, ethics, justice are socially adaptive and totally culturally specific. Time, distance, culture all change the specifics. As an example prohibition/temperance was part of a social and moral imperative. Personal rights and the right to choose is equally part of a social and moral imperative. Both are covered by social compacts. Yet each has held sway in time as they go around in circles. Because, morals and ethic are socially adaptive and culturally specific to a particular person and time.

There is no such thing as morals or justice in concrete forms. There are only frameworks that each individual works within and the more generalized the situation the more likely people will agree upon that framework. Law has nothing to do with morals or justice. There have been many unjust laws (racial segregation, Jim Crow laws, poll taxes, being examples). There has been many incidences of the "justice systems" failing to dispense justice and providing a mechanism for violating peoples rights (DNA labs failure to do tests, lying police officers, tainted judges, etc.).

If you maintain a judeo christian anglo saxon north american eastern seaboard upper mid manhattan living above the fifteenth story point of view you might have commonality unless you want to talk about the north facing neighbors versus those hippy sun lovers on the south side of the building. There are so many different forms of ethical construct for considering war and the waging of wars but they all rely on perspective. Whether it is "just war" or "law of war" there are differences in the interpretation of either.

Indigenous populations are great examples of the horrors of colonization. The enforced and unrepresented legal compacts that allowed for American westward expansion and displacement of the Indians is not much different than the United Nations compact that created Israel. Indigenous populations were exploited and disenfranchised.

In capitulation to the ethical and moral dilemmas many people look to the concrete base of laws and religion to inform their decisions. Neither behavioral governing system is without egregious error and both are fraught with social change and temporal defining moments. In other words, you can't look through the lens of history and say this or that war was moral. Well you can but it is a waste of time. You have to put yourself in the people of that period and see if you can perceive their decision process. History is filled with good people, making the best decisions at the time, based on the information they had, and with the capacity they contained, that were evil in the extreme to the successive generations making claims. I'm sure as the sun shines the opposite is likely true too.

Don't even get me started on moral panics.

jmm99
06-16-2009, 08:09 PM
but he thought I should have posted it in the thread.

So here goes, even though the content is more political than I like to be on this forum. Perhaps the thread topic and discussion of CvC's "political trinity" justify this brief excursion into politics.

Trinity and its components - part 1

Your questions #1 & 2


a.) OK, so are you saying the the Passion, Reason, Chance trinity does not apply in the 21st Century US?

The trinity of people, government and military does apply; but not in its "ideal" form.


b.) So would you suggest better ascribing the characteristic of Passion (you can also say Emotion) to the Government or the Army and not the People?

To government - which is the rest of the story.

------------------------
US "government" re: national foreign policy issues

Formally, we have the Executive Branch (with several thousand presidential appointees) and the Legislative Branch (with thousands of staffers) - all subject to change on 2, 4 and 6 year cycles. Because of fund-raising, the next 2-year cycle for the House has already started (to end Nov 2010). All of these folks are very much politicians and take politics (not policy) very seriously. You do see "passion" in them - and, in many cases, actual "hostility" and "animosity" between those politicians - the "gotcha" tactic.

Informally, you have to add several other components to government. One is the media (old and new), which feeds off the politicians - and also feeds off another component, special interest groups (of which, there are 10s of 1000s, with variable input into the area of foreign policy).

Interest groups affect (and seek to effect) policy via lobbying (probably the most effective, if you have an inside track); and by use of the media. Since these folks have special interests, they tend to be true believers - so, "hostility" and "animosity" runs even higher among them than among the politicians. The media feeds off of that (helps ratings to have two nutjobs yelling at each other) - and so, we have what in effect is a constantly running Freak Show.

Another input into government (and the key source of presidential appointees) are the think tanks. While some are neutral (say, CFR which publishes Foreign Affairs, or AFIO in the intelligence area), many have definite agendas and more closely resemble special interest groups. So, with the latter, "hostility" and "animosity" can and do reign.

In short, the various components that make up our government (formally and informally) are made up of people, who are very inclined to emotions, passions and everything else you say.

----------------------
US People (using that in a collective sense, as in "We the People ...") re: national foreign policy issues

Apathy (as to things political) would best describe the vast majority of the American people; and yes ...


Quote:
.. we are talking about the same 21st Century Americans who vote more on game shows than they do national elections ...

and I couldn't have said it better myself.

Of course, I would say more elegantly (:D) that USAians have more and more dropped out of the political process, as fewer and fewer people remain involved in the political parties at the grassroots level, leaving politics as they are to the "professional politicians".

We see that the same thing has happened in the union movement. Except for unions of government employees (isn't that interesting), the union movement is a shell of its former self. That is scarcely surprising because government has become the "union of last resort".

USAians are not stupid (collectively) and are aware (collectively) of both foreign and domestic affairs (the latter being currently more important); but have left direct involvement in the political process to the "pros". That could change if the People feel threatened in their survival (hard to see absent a Thermonuclear War), or in their vital interests - try to cut out the Social Security system and see what would happen - Gray Panthers ! ;)

Of course, if one were to take our media at face value - and as an expression of what USAians really are - one would fairly conclude that the US People are collectively a bunch of impassioned nutjobs.

----------------------------------------

Trinity and its components - part 2

CvC actually relates to all this in the six paragraphs I quoted at post # 59 (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showpost.php?p=74594&postcount=59), where this seems very pertinent:


Now, whether this will be the case always in future, whether all wars hereafter in Europe will be carried on with the whole power of the States, and, consequently, will only take place on account of great interests closely affecting the people, or whether a separation of the interests of the Government from those of the people will gradually again arise, would be a difficult point to settle; and, least of all, shall we take upon us to settle it.

I'd suggest that, in the US of the 1st decade of the 21st century, the interests of government (as I have described the components) have separated from the interests of the People, who every now and then rear up - as in the case of the last two elections (2006 and 2008).

Combine this with all-volunteer military forces, and we have something that is kin to what CvC described in his summary of pre-French Revolution history.

And, in fact, Rome (which CvC found unique) may be the best parallel - since the trinity applied there, but in a different way than in its "ideal form".

I also found this piece of CvC interesting and seemingly applicable to methodology:


We here bring our historical survey to a close, for it was not our design to give at a gallop some of the principles on which war has been carried on in each age, but only to show how each period has had its own peculiar forms of war, its own restrictive conditions, and its own prejudices. Each period would, therefore, also keep its own theory of war, even if every where, in early times, as well as in later, the task had been undertaken of working out a theory on philosophical principles. The events in each age must, therefore, be judged of in connection with the peculiarities of the time, and only he who, less through an anxious study of minute details than through an accurate glance at the whole, can transfer himself into each particular age, is fit to understand and appreciate its generals.

But this conduct of war, conditioned by the peculiar relations of States, and of the military force employed, must still always contain in itself something more general, or rather something quite general, with which, above everything, theory is concerned.

So, while some things change in some way, they remain all the more the same in basic principles.

PS: I eschew game shows; but my evening viewing goes something like this:

Brett Baer (1/2 news, 1/2 Fox commentary); Shep Smith (straight news); O'Reilly and Hannity; Keith Obermann, Rachel Maddow and Chris Matthews (these last 5 from 8pm-1am; and definitely a Freak Show, best viewed for its entertainment value).

Most of the time, all that is on for background noise, while I read or write things on the computer.

Cheers :)

Mike

slapout9
06-16-2009, 11:21 PM
...which can be downloaded from iTunes for free and which livens up the morning commute...Plato's The Republic (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Republic_(Plato)) :wry:

Hi Beetle,Yes it does have many similar Qualities:wry: